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Transcript

SUDAN IN CONFLICT

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FREDERIC WEHREY: OK. Welcome, everyone, to this Carnegie event on Sudan in conflict. Before we get started, I'd like to remind you to turn off your cellphones. That includes the vibrate mode as well.

My name is Fred Wehrey. I'm a senior associate in the Middle East program. And we're really delighted to host this event today on one of the continent's most intractable conflicts. Border security negotiations are under way, if you're following Sudan, and this is a really opportune time to delve into the structural, social and political and economic routes of this long-running conflict. And we're delighted to have a lineup of speakers, of experts to help us do that.

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We're going to start out with Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, who really works at the intersection of the Arab and African worlds. She's published a paper on Sudan's many conflicts that really frames it from a multidimensional analysis looking at the – at the multiple factors behind this conflict. And her co-author, Mai El-Sadany, is in the back somewhere to provide reinforcements if needed. That's – she's going to start and then sort of set the context for the Sudan conflict.

Then we're going to be followed by policy practitioners, two long-standing hands of Africa. Ambassador Alan Goulty at the Woodrow Wilson Center, former British ambassador to Sudan, will provide his experiences. And we're delighted to have as well Ambassador Princeton Lyman, the U.S. special envoy to Sudan as well.

So with that, I'm going to give our speakers about 10 minutes each. And Marina, please start off.

[00:02:05]

MARINA OTTAWAY: OK. Thank you very much.

What I'm going to try and provide is a bird's eye view of the multiple conflicts that are afflicting the Sudan at this point, pretty much what I – what we did in the paper, which is – which is out there.

The situation – you know, not to – it's very difficult to describe the situation in Sudan right now in any other ways than saying it's a dismal situation. The hope that existed for a time, that first, that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would lead – after an interval of six years would lead either to a solution of the conflict with the two parts of the Sudan stayed together as a governable one country with – you know, where everybody agreed on the rules of the game, or that the country would split in two peacefully, just did not come to pass. The country did – the referendum made it clear what actually had been clear for a long time, that there was no willingness in the south to stay – to stay in a united Sudan. But unfortunately, the next step did not take place; that is, the split of the two countries was – did not take place in a peaceful manner, and soon led to a lot of conflict.

Now, why the conflicts? What are the roots of this conflict? And I think there are reasons. What I'd like – what I would argue is that there are reasons that have to do with the way the agreement was implemented and so on – and I would really leave my colleagues here, who are much more knowledgeable than I am on the details of this, to discuss more about it – but also that the reasons for the – for the failure, essentially, of this – of the separation to take place in a more peaceful manner is the fact that it is – and this may be a very pessimistic view on my – on my side, but it is almost impossible for countries that have been at war for a very long time to really settle down in a peaceful manner, particularly when countries are led by leaders who have been at war for most – for most of their life.

Keep in mind that the Sudan has been at war with a very brief interval ever since it became independent. In fact, there were signs of conflict even before it became independent. And after such an – and after a period of a decade, it's not easy to people to settle down, for leaders to settle down, to deal with the problems of peace rather than to deal with the problems of war, so that I would argue that there is a built-in problem, in this sense, in countries to settle down after long periods of war. We have seen it: For example, we saw it earlier in Ethiopia, when – just to stay in the Horn of Africa, where Eritrea separated from Ethiopia, and what – although the separation took place on the basis of a mutual agreement, in fact, the two countries were at war just a few – just a few years later.

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So I'd argue there are four main problems in the case of the Sudan that expect this – that explain this – what is happening now and what happened.

First of all, there is a very major problem of two countries sharing one major source of revenue – the – which is bound to be – to be a problem. Both countries, both north and South Sudan, have the potential for developing balanced economies, for having enough resources to – you know, to develop real economies. The fact is that the potential is not the reality. And in reality, what the two countries have in terms of quick access to revenue with which to govern the country and to tackle their own problems is the oil revenue.

The Sudan, the northern part of the country is, in fact – in a sense, it's economically worse off now than it was before oil was discovered in the sense that, yes, it has had more revenue, it has been able to do some things it would not have been able to do otherwise, but it has neglected many sectors of its economy – the agriculture has declined, for example – so that it's a country that suffers from the so-called Dutch disease in a very – in a very major way. The south, there was never much investment in anything, so that again, whatever potential is there is a potential and it's not a reality.

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So the issue of how you share the – not so much how you share the oil revenue, because a decision was made on how the oil revenue is going to stay with – you know, with the country where the oil wells are situated, which means that 75 percent is going to stay in the south, and 25 percent roughly is going to stay in the north – the problem is, how is the north Sudan going to make up for the lost revenue? In part the answer is through the pipelines, through the revenue that the south is going to pay for its oil transiting through the

pipeline, and a major problem has existed from the beginning on the incapacity of the two countries to agree on what the transit fees should be. So there is a major, major bone of contention here.

The second bone of contention is the border between the north and the south. And again, there are two ways of looking at the border issue. One is simply to say, well, there is a border that was established way back by the – you know, a line that was drawn by the – by the British at the time of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. And there are parts of this border that have not been – that have never been very clear. Like all colonial boundaries, they have a – there are a lot of missing pieces, if you want.

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But there is another much more fundamental issue; that is, in between the north and the south, in the border regions, there are populations that are not convinced that they should be in the part – that they really belong to the part of the country where they are officially or legally placed. There are parts of the population of the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan that are not convinced that they should be there. The population of Abyei is very divided. Technically, in the north, they were supposed to have a referendum they never had – very divided about where they belong. There are people who are now officially in the northern part, in north Sudan – and I keep on calling them the northern Sudan, the north and the south, because talking about the Sudan and Republic of the South Sudan just makes for tremendous confusion. But the – there are people in the north who fought alongside the south in the past and who really feel, you know, at least ambivalent about where they should be. So there are – the problem of the boundary, it's not simply a question of setting up a commission to delineate and then mark the boundary where the boundary is missing; it's a real problem of the identity of people, where they want to be, what they expect.

So this is the – these are the first two problems, essentially: the oil issue, the revenue issue and the boundary issue.

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But in addition – and to me, that – in some ways, it's even more important – or not more important, but it's probably the explanation why the other two conflicts can – are so difficult to settle, and it is that these are two countries, as I said before, that have always been at war. I mean, they have been at war in the living memory of most of the people who are alive now, essentially. Most people have not known anything else. And in a sense, settling these issues, I would argue, means to go back to try to tackle problems that are – that they have no experience in tackling, and that in a way, there is a gray – and I know I'm sticking my neck out on saying this, but – in saying this, but I'll say it all the same; I think there is a degree of comfort in war activities that both sides are extremely familiar with.

Let me – what are these problems? And let me start with the south. I would argue that the south has an almost – a problem of nation building that it's almost impossible to overcome. The south has never been developed. The – one of the problems – the main problem between the north and south was – from the beginning was that the south was a

neglected area, so that the south really has very little, not only in terms of physical infrastructure – everybody talks about the few miles of paved roads that exist in the south – but also has very little in terms of administrative infrastructure. I mean, it has always been – it's been – always been very lightly administered. And to try to build a country, to try to build a political system under these conditions, it's very, very difficult. I would argue that – I know there is all sort of – there are all sort of intervention, all sort of aid agencies, all sort of NGOs operating in the South Sudan, but in many ways, I think South Sudan has received probably less help in nation building than almost any other country under those condition.

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Let me give you an example. When Namibia separated from South Africa, essentially, again, it was pretty much of a neglected area without much of an infrastructure and so on. There was an effort that – for many years by the United Nations, by other organization, to try to train a cadre of administrator. There was an institute for Namibia who – that was located in Zambia at that point that really tried to provide a cadre of administrator ready to go. Was this – you know, was the effort adequate? Was it enough? There were all sort of problems and so on, but there was really a systematic effort made to try and do it.

I would argue that in the case of South Sudan, this – there has been much less systematic work. There is – aid is being provided, but I think it's much more – it's certainly not a systematic effort at nation building. You could argue perhaps it's not such a disaster because it's not that the international record of nation building is so brilliant, after all. But the fact is that this is a country with huge problems. And in many ways, it's easier to – not to even try to tackle this problem, and instead to be distracted by the problem of the relations with the north.

The north is much better off in many ways, because if nothing else, it has been a country, it has been the most viable part of the old united Sudan forever; it has an experience in administering itself and so on. But it has problems that, I would argue, are equally difficult.

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First of all, I – it has the problem of still having conflict pretty much all around its periphery: certainly in the west, certainly in Darfur, certainly in the south, of course, but the – we pay much less attention about what's happening in the east at the – on the – on the borders of Eritrea and so on where there is also a lot of unhappy and a lot of unrest. So essentially, this is a country that, despite having lost a very large chunk of its old territory, is still – it's still at war. The conflicts haven't – around its periphery have not – have not ceased yet. So again, huge daunting problem of how to settle those problems, and I think there is no way of settling those problems without a new political structure for the north – for the north of the Sudan. So there is – there is – that issue is very, very serious.

Secondly, I think the Sudan – the north Sudan, at this point – has truly an old and tired leadership. I was very struck – and let me just put it in a very – you know, in a very personal note – I was in the – I was in Khartoum in the fall last year, and I had not been

there for many years, essentially. And I start talking to people about who am I going to see and so on. And there are three names that everybody – you know, there are some people that everybody told me I absolutely had to talk to. And they were the same people I talked to the last time I was there over 10 years ago.

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I mean, there is something very distressing about the lack of the renewal of leadership. I think you all know whom I'm talking about – I'm talking Sadeq al-Mahdi; I'm talking about Hassan Turabi; of course, Omar Bashir himself is hardly a – is hardly a young man; and so on. But essentially, there is this sense of the lack of renewal of the political leadership. And this lack of renewal also means that they bring to these issues the old mentality, the old approaches, the old – the old way of looking at things.

If I can add a footnote, they all talk about each other as being very old – (laughter) – which makes it very funny because they are all more or less contemporaries, and they're very old; there is no doubt – there is no doubt about that.

So that essentially, we – although the problems of the north are very different from the problems of the south, we have the same issue of the – the same issue that, in many ways, it's easier to turn to external conflict, to the conflict to the other country, than to try to tackle the domestic problems.

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I just want to raise one issue that I – that – which I hope we can come back later on, and that is the question of what can the – what can the international community do under these circumstances? Because – or are we doing the right things? Because what I see, in many ways, is the fact that, you know, we are trying to remobilize – and I think we'll hear a lot more from Princeton about this – the old approaches. We are trying to intervene once again. We are trying to – and this is a very broad we. I mean, it's not necessarily – but the surrounding countries, the – you know, various organizations and so on try to renew the mediation efforts or to try to intervene again and so on.

And I am wondering whether we have come to the point where interventions are becoming counterproductive – in other words, that there is – that we are encouraging the two governments not to take responsibility for what they are doing and allowing them, essentially, to hope that somebody else will put – will solve the problem for them, that they'll get out of their own – of this – of the mess that they have put themselves in. I know it's a very difficult thing to say, to even raise the issue that perhaps, you know, we should let them sort it out themselves. I realize what the problems are. I realize there are people who are getting killed. We realize that there are populations that are really suffering because of the situation. But the question is, can we really prevent these problems by interventions at this point? So let me stop here.

MR. WEHREY: Thank you.

Ambassador Goulty.

[00:18:19]

MR. GOULTY: Well, Marina said the situation was dismal. I'd have said that it was dire. But – (laughter) – it was ever thus in Sudan. I first went there in 1972. Khartoum and Juba in that year were bereft of almost everything that would approach a normal life. It was subsistence. If you went to Sudan, as I did again in 1988, you had a raging civil conflict, a really incompetent government, all compounded by a movement of people driven by floods and starvation from the West and so on.

But somehow those past problems were overcome. The Sudanese found a way to talk to each other and agree on some way forward. You know, it reminds me a bit of what Churchill is supposed to have said about the Americans: They can be relied upon to do the right thing once they've exhausted all the alternatives. (Laughter.) And I think we might take the same view of the Sudanese. Anyway, I counsel us all to be optimistic and positive. I note that Nhial Deng in Addis Ababa a couple of days ago said much the same thing, we must be optimistic. When I was leading the British team in the – in the Naivasha negotiations, I told my team that we had to exude relentless optimism. And invariably, within about an hour, one of the team would say to me: Alan, where's the relentless optimism? Because I would be tearing my hair over this or that misfortune.

Marina sent me an exam paper. That's why I'm going more slowly than she did, because it's more difficult to answer a specific question. And the question is why in the end the CPA and all other international processes could not secure a successful transition. And I'm going to focus on the CPA, which I know best, and go through one or two points which I think have a bearing on the problems that Princeton is still wrestling with today.

The first point, Marina has already touched on, peace can only be made by the Sudanese, not by the international community or by an international process. The Sudanese are condemned to live as neighbors. They must find a way to do so in relative harmony, whatever the political architecture of the Sudan or Sudans. That happened in the Addis Agreement, the negotiations that led up to that agreement in 1972. And it happened in the CPA progress whereby the beginning of 2004, the two delegation leaders, with or without some of their teams, were meeting directly without even the mediators being present.

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And why did it come about that they were able to make peace in that way? A number of factors: widespread war-weariness among the ordinary people, among the fighting people and so on. Secondly, the leaders on both sides had recognized as earlier as 1955, when I established it firsthand from both of them, that no military victory was possible. Thirdly, there was an agreed basis for a deal. And that was, in brief, one country, two systems. And fourthly, there was international attention or at least some international attention. The United States, the troika were engaged, and the IGAD process had been re-energized.

Now, most if not all of these conditions, *mutatis mutandis*, apply today, except that, as Marina indicated, all the parties – and I include the opposition, north and south – seem to be appealing to the international community to intervene rather than talking to, still less negotiating with, each other. And it's worth observing too that nobody has any clear or good idea about how to reach a new political settlement within Sudan. I mean, by that, north Sudan in this case.

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The opposition, the SRF, can rally behind a cry of regime change, but they've not been able to give the slightest indication of how they would deal with the economic problems, how they would settle the disputes with the south that Marina has touched on and how to divide among the various parties which make up the opposition and their areas a much smaller economic cake. Everybody wants more for his or her area, but there is less to go around. Where is the more going to come from? Nobody has answers to this. So the problems in that sense are really intractable and difficult.

Now going back quickly to the CPA, I think Marina's question rather implies that it was wholly unsuccessful. That's not so. It achieved quite a lot: for the interim period, at least, peace, separation of forces; the Sudanese army withdrew from the south, the SPLA from the east. Secondly, it saw the creation of an autonomous government in the south which was adequately funded, if not perfectly, in accordance with the agreement, through the -- through the sharing of oil revenues. Elections were held throughout the country, however flawed. And the southern referendum was held on time. There's quite considerable achievements if you look back to the 1990s or 2002, when nobody thought that any agreement at all would be possible, still less implemented.

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So I would argue that you shouldn't knock the CPA, that much of the criticism of it was – is unjustified. Clever people often say it wasn't comprehensive. It was actually, in the meaning of the – of the act, comprehensive in that it dealt with all the issues between the government and the SPLM/A; that is to say, not only the south-north questions, but the questions of the three areas as well. It's criticized because other stakeholders were excluded. There were very practical reasons for that. If you, as Jeff Millington and I had said, sat through interminable, very difficult sessions with the two parties, the idea of having more parties would have appalled you, as it did General Sumbeiywo. It was just very difficult to reach the CPA. The whole Machakos process started, remember, nine years after IGAD had started their mediation. That sets the current AU efforts in some sort of perspective.

But you can, with hindsight – and I stress with hindsight – criticize the CPA because it was based on the one country, two systems formula and, by extension, the commitment to make unity attractive. Though there was a secession option sufficiently far down the road for the north not to jib at it, secession as such would not have been negotiable in 2002 or even in 2005. So the CPA made provisions for government of Sudan during the interim period, but none at all for the contingency of a possible southern vote for secession. That's why these issues are now bedeviling negotiators and mediators, because the – nobody was prepared to argue what the terms should be on which South Sudan would secede.

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Then the three areas – Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei – of course looked much less difficult in the context of one Sudan. After all, what does it matter whether Abyei is in one administrative division of the country or another? It makes a tremendous difference if it's – if it's on one side or the other of an international border, especially if the border is going to be heavily defended and policed and so on. So those issues became, clearly as we know, much, much more difficult with secession.

And it's easy to forget that as Khartoum in particular had gambled on yet another autonomy deal with a unity vote and didn't get it, it now feels snubbed, even cheated by its erstwhile SPLA partners and under pressure to concede a whole lot of other points on the border – Abyei and so on. And it seems as – Princeton will correct me, but it seems as though they've decided to draw a line in the sand and say there's – this is where we stand. We stand – we accept the outcome of the referendum, but we're not going to make any more concessions. And from a government's point of view, as we can all recognize in our own countries, as concessions are unpopular in the north and the government has come under very heavy criticism from Marina's old friends for making as many concessions as it did in the CPA at all, then there's – the political case for being more accommodating is very weak.

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Even so, despite all these difficulties, the unity option and the CPA intentions could have worked, but for events, primarily the death of Garang, which removed not only the main advocate of southern unity just weeks after the – he'd taken office as vice president, but the one southern figure whom Bashir and Ali Osman really trusted. And the SPLM, as you know, were thereafter inclined more and more to go with hearts and the emotions of the people and move towards secession. So neither they nor the NCP really acted on the making unity attractive part of the CPA. Each assumed that it was the responsibility of the other, and they fell into a more antagonistic mode rather than the partnership, which would have been essential if the CPA were to work.

I used to tell Garang and anyone else who would listen during the negotiations that the agreement we could all see coming would be 5 percent of the task – only 5 percent. The – it would be a basis on which Sudanese could continue to work to find a way of running their affairs better. But as you know, they didn't do so, nor did the international community. We, too, collectively took our eye off the ball.

We didn't accept any responsibility for making unity attractive, even those of us who witnessed the signing of the CPA. Most, more or less openly, indulged their preference for the South and eventual succession. Attention was switched to Darfur as early as January 2005. The criticism – the drumbeat of criticism of Khartoum at that point continued, leading to the halting of work on debt relief, which I'd started two years before and which was resumed, I think, last year or the year before, having wasted five years. It led to the nondelivery, for domestic political reasons, of the limited goodies that Senator Danforth and his team had promised to Khartoum.

Furthermore – that all, of course, compounds Khartoum’s suspicion and reluctance to engage in any international process now – that was compounded by slow delivery of aid, no peace dividends for the southern people, neglect of the three areas – there was aid promised for the South, but not specifically for Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains – it was compounded by feeble SPLM performance, politically speaking, in the Nuba Mountains, though the Blue Nile was better, and there were problems over Abyei stemming from what I regard as a wrong-headed Abyei protocol imposed on the exhausted parties by the Americans. But the author of the – the lead author of the protocol is carefully not catching my eye, so I will say no more about that. (Laughter).

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And finally, the – and this is another important point – we imposed a really cumbersome and generally ineffective peacekeeping force, the UNMIS, which took away – this is Marina’s point again – took away from the parties’ responsibility of policing their own agreement and their own – their own peace. In the Nuba Mountains in 2002, Swiss, Americans brokered a much leaner system – hard to operate, but a joint military commission formed by the two parties with a very, very light overlay of international presence to see fair play. It worked much better. In 1972 the peace commission was run by the two parties without any international involvement. And for a while, at least, it worked much better.

So very briefly, what lessons may be drawn from all this? First, as we’ve, I think, all – can all agree, there are no easy answers. Second, it bears repeating that peace has to be made and implemented by the Sudanese. Both sides can and will prosper if they cooperate. Both will suffer as they are doing now if they fail to do so. Sooner or later, Sudanese leaders must realize this.

Outsiders can help them come to this realization and mediate. But in my view, they should not take sides. They should talk to all parties, and that includes the NCP leadership. It includes, for this audience, sending a resident U.S. ambassador to Khartoum. And they should encourage them all to treat the other Sudanese parties with respect – that’s one of the real problems of the South; they’re not being treated by Khartoum with respect – on the basis of their common interests, and they do have common interests.

It follows, of course, that we shouldn’t encourage any tendency on any of the parties – Darfur rebels are foremost among this – to look to international intervention to solve their problems. They will have to negotiate their own solutions. So we can’t impose solutions. What should we be aiming to do? Encourage the Sudanese to move towards, first, a cessation of hostilities, policed by the parties. Without that, we will not be able easily to deliver humanitarian aid, and there will not be a conducive atmosphere for negotiating other issues.

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A final point: All this is a matter for leaders. We’re talking about the leaders on both sides. But our interest is not in who gains power in Sudan, but in how it’s used and, in particular, how it’s used to help the people of Sudan and of South Sudan. I met only one Sudanese leader in 40 years who showed the slightest concern for his people. It was the late Yousif Kuwa, who was the SPLA leader in the Nuba Mountains until he died in 2001, I

think it was. I first met him in Nairobi. I was expecting him to appeal for support and criticize Khartoum. And the first thing he said is, I need 3,000 shots of measles vaccine for the children. And that's what we ought to be spending our money and effort on, helping the people.

Princeton.

MR. LYMAN: Thank you, Alan.

And thank you, everybody, for being here and for all your interest; Marina, thank you; Fred. And I commend the report for those who have not had a chance to read it. It does summarize a great deal of the issues that we've been talking about. As I listen to Marina go through them all, I now know why I don't sleep so well at night – (laughter) – because they are complex and interrelated issues.

I want to get back – and I will come back to the fundamental question you raise and which Alan talked about, which is what is the role of the outsiders, the international community, in this. But let me just make a few comments on the situation and some of the problems.

[00:36:02]

One thing that Marina pointed out that I think it's very fundamental as you watch this process or participate in it, and that is the effect of basically 40 years of war. And out of it comes a deep, deep sense of anger, frustration, bitterness, memories, et cetera, which at times seems outside the room and you don't worry about it, and then somebody says something and it blows up. And you realize that down underneath still are deeply unresolved emotional issues from all those years of war. And they don't go away easily. Yes, in a sophisticated way, you can sign agreements, and you can say we're all going to live together happily – I think they must have signed a half a dozen nonaggression agreements in the last two years that I've been working on this. They don't mean anything because until the two parties really come to a position where they respect each other enough and some of these memories fade, there's going to be limits on the relationship. And it spills over into almost everything.

There's a second factor at work here that arises out of some of the things that Alan talked about, et cetera, that when they – they came out of the CPA – we saw this even before the referendum on the independence of South Sudan. What struck us – you know, I had a whole list of all the issues – and everybody here knows them – that had to be resolved before the South became independent. I mean, how could they become independent if you didn't solve borders, Abyei and oil? I mean, everybody – you have to do that, of course. But it didn't happen. The South became independent. None of those issues were resolved. The question is why didn't that happen?

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In part, because each side felt they were going to be in a better position afterwards than before. That's a terrible situation for diplomacy. But the point is that the North said, the South is going to be so weak, so difficult to govern, they're going to be sorry, and the West is going to be sorry they ever supported independence, and they're going to be in our

hands in terms of resolving all these issues. And the South said, once we become independent, we'll have respect, we'll have international backing, and we'll own that 70 percent of the oil, and now we'll be in the stronger position.

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Well, it's an interesting set of concepts, but it doesn't make for attitudes to let's get these issues settled, because each side is sort of waiting for that advantage to occur. And what has happened over time – and I'm simplifying an awful lot of stuff because of time – what's happened is that now you're in a position where each side is waiting for the other to crumble or to weaken.

People write – and it's so popular in the media – to say that the fight is over oil. It is – the fight isn't over oil. What's happening in Sudan – in South Sudan is oil is a weapon that each side is using against the other. The South says, we've got the oil, and they've shut down production, if you know the history of that. And then the earth is going to need that oil so badly that – and the fees of the thing and all the rest that sooner or later, in return for oil and all the rest, we'll get Abyei, we'll get borders, et cetera, a grand bargain. The North says, hey, we lost 50 (percent), 60 percent of our budget, but they lost 98 percent of their budget; they're going to crumble and pretty soon come back to us and to come to a – so now you have both sides committing, in effect, mutual economic suicide, that is, saying, we're going to go without a settlement, whether it's on oil or settling some of these conflicts, et cetera, because we're stronger; we can resist it. The South says, we suffered for 40 years; we can suffer longer. The North says, we're more developed, we can suffer longer.

And when you get into the negotiations, the question is, do they really want to resolve them and get to an agreement? And there's a real question about that. They'll, of course, all say they want to get to an agreement, but underneath is, A, I don't like and trust the other side, and B, if I wait long enough, they will crumble, and I will be in the more advantaged position. And that's the dynamic, quite frankly, when you deal with any of these issues, borders, security, et cetera.

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The other aspect of this which affects the negotiations is, as Marina has pointed out – the ongoing struggle inside Sudan – the north – over the internal conflicts that are going on, and particular in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains area and Blue Nile, because to Khartoum, this is a fundamental security issue. And they have chosen to define this issue as one that is largely the result of South Sudan's support to those who are fighting them, because of all the connections from this civil war between those two groups, rather than saying this is an internal political problem that goes to the heart of how Sudan is going to be governed, whether it's with – dealing with Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile or Darfur or the east, the whole question of how you deal with a still-diverse country in the politics of Sudan. And that has carried over into the current negotiations, which I'll describe in a minute, because Sudan is saying, this is our fundamental security issue, and until it's resolved, we're not going to deal with South Sudan on the other issues.

Where we are now in the negotiations is a new phase of international involvement, if you will. I mean, there's been a lot for a long time. But – and there's been, as many of you

know, the African Union high level panel, headed by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, which is charged by the international community – it's interesting – an implementation panel to implement all the agreements of the CPA or post-CPA, and they have in fact been the convener of all the negotiations. And that has been going on for some time with a little success here, a little success there, but with the situation almost getting out of hand, most recently with much more clashes on the border and the threat, in the eyes of the international community, that the two sides might actually go back to full-scale war.

And what's happened is that the international community has come together in a much more specific way than has been the case for some time. And the initial step was the African Union. The African Union Peace and Security Council, which is their equivalent, if you will, of the U.N. Security Council, met on April 24th. And instead of what you normally get – please, you two should get together and live in peace and harmony – they came out with a very specific mandated road map with very tight timelines, perhaps too-tight timelines. But it was striking. It wasn't just, you two get together. This is exactly what you've got to do, because your conflict is a threat to the peace and security of Africa, and all of us around you are not immune to what's going on there. That conflict can spread; it spills over – the refugees, all the rest.

[00:43:58]

A week later, May 2nd, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted the AU communique and added their own timelines and said – and this was remarkable, because you had the Russians and Chinese voting for this – that if in 90 days they haven't settled all the issues between them, the council will consider sanctions on the parties. And this was extraordinary to get this unanimous vote from the Security Council.

Now, what that has done has injected into the negotiations a degree of urgency. It has not solved the problems, the fundamental problems, but it has created a sense of pressure on the parties and a sense of urgency, because suddenly the whole international community – and nobody can run in one side or the other and get help from friends – is saying, enough already, because this is a threat to African peace and security; this is a threat to international peace and security, and we can't just stand by and let you two guys go at it for – time and time again.

[00:45:07]

Now, let me get to Marina's question, because I think it's a very fundamental one. And it's one that comes up constantly in the work of the African Union panel and in the work of all of us. And it's the difference that I would call between facilitation and mediation. Facilitation is where you bring the parties together, you do everything to create an atmosphere in which the two parties ultimately take responsibility and solve their problems, and you help them in a thousand different ways. And just to -- (inaudible) -- a background, I wrote a book on how we did this in South Africa. OK. And the responsibility was Mandela and de Klerk, and they took that responsibility, and they drove that process and they did it.

The question is, is President Bashir and President Kiir Mandela and de Klerk? And you have to look at the record of 20 years, and you have to say, doesn't look like it. They've

met several times with the idea that they were going to cut through some of these differences and instruct their people and take hard decisions, and they have not done it once because of all the reasons I mentioned, the deep mistrust and the misunderstandings and lingering anger and suspicion and all the rest.

So then the question is if you leave the parties to themselves, will they do anything but go back to war – and then you have all the international peace and security concerns – or do you come closer to mediation? I think we deal with this all the time. I think the pressure has to be on from the international community, but in the end, if the parties don't accept what comes out of it, it won't last very long.

[00:46:49]

Now, let me just say some things about the positive aspects of this situation, because sometimes you've got to have – what did you say, optimism?

MS. : Relentless optimism.

MR. LYMAN: OK. There are – relentless optimism. There are some aspects of this. And I'll tell you what, there was a big crisis recently, as many of you know, when the border clashes that have been going on really for a year – and they're related to the conflict in the two areas – got bigger because South Sudan went and occupied one of the most strategic areas for Sudan, the Heglig area and the oilfields, which had been providing – with the split in the oil, it was one of the main sources of oil still for Sudan, for the north. And it was the first time in this low level of conflict that one side had struck at a strategically vital area of the other. Oil facilities had been more or less off the table. They clashed on the border, but no one bombed an oil well; no one – well, this was – seemed to the world, to be a game changer. And of course, the world all rushed out to do something, and – including me. And what struck me was I got to Juba, and this was going on, and I got – I had an interview with one of the journalists, and he said, do you think they're going to go to war? And I said, look, they're at war.

[00:48:17]

Now, this is – was interesting because I got a lot of blowback both in Juba and Khartoum, people saying, oh, don't say that; we don't want to go back to war; don't call this war; this is a clash, but none of us want to go back to full-scale war; we've had it; we did it; we did it for 40 years; we know if we go back to all-out war, it's disastrous. I flew to Khartoum; I got the same thing: Please, don't call this war; we haven't gone to war; we are not at war; we had this terrible clash, but we're not – now, to me it was important because the two sides at least had drawn something of a line. Didn't mean they couldn't stumble into war, but neither side is looking really now to all-out war as a military solution between them. That doesn't mean they're going to not take advantage of clashes here or there or use oil pressure or something like that, but I think we're not – even though we say in the international community, you know, we're worried about this, I think that's one thing the two sides have decided not to do.

The other is that the economic situation, which is bad, is hopefully a source of reality for the two sides. Both are suffering quite badly. South Sudan lost 98 percent of its revenue, and its alternatives, building a new pipeline or something like that out of the south,

are three, four years away. And the country is as underdeveloped as Marina said, and this is no longer a liberation army; this is a government. They can't just say, well, we suffered for 40 years; we can suffer for three, four more. There's got to be more realism there.

But Khartoum also has to face the fact that they're in serious economic problems – if you watch the exchange rate, just recently a kind of de facto devaluation because the exchange rate had gone from 2.95 to almost 6. Food prices are going up very dramatically. Fuel shortages – great shortages of foreign exchange, et cetera. And you know, the country is saying, well, you know, we can stick it out. We don't need an oil agreement until we get this, that and the other thing. And you have to wonder whether in time people will come back for practical reasons to a better situation and even an oil agreement.

What I would say just to conclude is what can we expect? What should the international community try for? I think we all aimed – and you see it in the Africa Union high-level panel documents – we all looked for that grand “we're all going to live together in peace and harmony” between the two countries. You know, bygones are bygones, and we love each other, and we've all been Sudanese, and we're brothers. And it's amazing they are, because many of the people at the negotiating tables have gone to school together. Their wives have gone to school together. They've known each other, but they've also fought each other.

[00:51:25]

But we looked for that grand, beautiful thing that would say, these are two states that will live together. I don't think they're going to get there for some time. And I think our objectives perhaps for the time being have to be much more limited. One is to keep them from going back to full-scale war, because that's disastrous not just for the Sudanese; this is disastrous for the whole Horn of Africa. And we already have major refugee problems from the fighting that's going on.

Second, some kind of modus vivendi along the border, which is what the discussions going on in Addis are about right now; some kind of way of keeping those clashes from getting out of hand, whether it's with the official line of a demilitarized line and some verification – but something that just limits the conflict between them. And I'll give you an example of the – of the problem of Abyei. Abyei is a – is a longstanding conflict between the two, and they didn't have the referendum, et cetera. The south invaded it last year and occupied it, and we spent forever getting them to withdraw.

[00:52:30]

But what we have now is not a permanent settlement of Abyei but an agreement that it's going to be jointly administered until its status is finally determined. And it's complicated, but there's an Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. There's another – (chuckles) – U.N. peacekeeping operation there, but from very tough Ethiopians who are doing a wonderful job. And for the moment, you don't have war in Abyei. We almost had it last year; we don't.

These are imperfect steps. They are not resolutions of final issues. Sooner or later the countries have to get to that. And that opens the door to debt relief and a lot of other things. But I think we – if we can – we, the whole international community, the – and the two parties themselves – can move toward a situation where things don't get worse, where they don't stumble back into conflict and where they can eventually get to more pragmatic decisions and relationships with each other – I think for the time being that's pretty good.

[00:53:36]

In the meanwhile, one wants to encourage much more dialogue than now goes on. I am struck by the fact that the two sides almost never talk to each other unless the Africa Union panel convenes them. And that's always in Addis Ababa, because they won't go to Khartoum or Juba. There is no connection between the two central banks, although they should have some. There is almost no connection between the two militaries. There is no connection between the trade ministers; in fact, there's no trade between them. There's no – this – communications or institutional relationships between two countries that lie side by side and have so many relationships between them. Little by little, those need to be encouraged.

And finally, one thing that's striking out of this process – and I scratch my head about it all the time – is that it is still a very narrow process. I went to the discussions in Addis this last week, and I looked down the table on both sides; there's not a single woman at the table. And in all the discussions I've been in, I've never seen more than two or three women in the negotiations at any one time. Women are not part of this process. There are strong women's organizations in both countries, but they have not been able to crack through and have an impact on the process or much else of civil society.

So when the two sides get at it and say, you know, I'm going to be tough, and I'm going to walk out of the meeting, and we can go back to war – god, how many times have they said that – I would like to hear organizations of women and civil society and other say, no, don't you dare go back to war. We've had enough of it. So go back to the table and solve these problems. How one encourages that – it's difficult in Sudan itself. It's a quite repressive atmosphere, so it's not easy for people to do it. South Sudan, for a lot of reasons, it doesn't happen either. The government doesn't invite it. But I think over time we – if we had more of that, it would change some of this atmosphere underneath that would create over time a longer-term relationship.

So let me stop there and open it up. But thanks, Marina, Alan and Fred, and to all of you.

[00:55:58]

MR. WEHREY: Thank you for the compelling set of analyses.

I'm going to turn it over to questions now. In the interest of time, please make sure you do ask a question and not a statement. And we're going to go in groups of three just to speed things up.

So sir, in the – in the back. And if you would, please identify yourself and your institutional affiliation.

MR. LYMAN: We know him well. (Laughter.)

MS. OTTAWAY: (Laughter) But some people don't.

[00:56:25]

Q: I debated whether I should wait, Princeton or Alan. But Andrew Natsios. I – without going through a long dissertation of what I agree with and – I agree with much of what you said. However, there is a little – I think an important distinction between what's going on in the north and the south.

It's very clear to me that there's a deep division in the NCP. You see members of Bashir's party attacking him in the parliament, which we never saw before, calling for investigations on corruption, demands for why the Sudanese government failed to protect Heglig – why did they lose the battle initially? And Bashir himself is running around the city with Hussein, the defense minister, who's a hard-liner, as his driver. He drives him to events, because he's afraid – he's afraid of assassination or of a coup. They're constantly afraid of a coup. That is not the political situation in the south.

The U.N. says in June of last year that there was a de facto coup. The generals took over, and then Bashir basically is not running the country. He's not making the decisions. That's why he's not involved in this. It's the hardline, radical, ultranationalist Islamists in the party who are making the decisions. Taha is not making the decisions. It's Bahkri (ph), Hussein and a couple other real hard-liners who never supported the CPA in the first place. They were always opposed to it.

And so the southerners are saying, if these guys are in charge, we're not going to get a deal. They did make some negotiating positions last year that were very reasonable in the south. They've withdrawn them, I think because they get no response. With all due respect to the notion of us being – we were not mediators the entire time in the CPA negotiations. We intervened in a very decisive way, but not publicly.

I, as you know, have proposed – I'm sure neither of you support this, but I'm going to say it anyway, and I want to ask your reaction to it. The fact of the matter is, the north thinks they can bomb the south into submission. And the southerners are afraid of that, OK? And I think that's what's preventing them from agreeing to any – the generals say, to hell with them all; we'll just bomb them into hell if necessary. And they keep buzzing Juba and all that.

[00:58:36]

I think we should go back to what we had agreed to in 2008. I got the president to agree to it; so did Rich Williamson. We – two DOD teams were sent to this Juba to design an air defense system for the south so that the north cannot use their air force to bomb and

to intimidate the south. I think it's an – it's only a defensive system. They're already armed themselves in the south. They don't need our ground weapons. They don't need us there.

While it may take a while to implement it, it is a way of telling the north, if you persist in this use of your air force in the Nuba Mountains or particularly south of the border – they bombed Malakal – then – which is an act of war. No one – people say it's an act of war for you to invade Heglig. Wasn't it an act of war to bomb southern cities that are clearly and indisputably in the south? But no one said anything.

[00:59:26]

So the question is why is it not the time to intervene, to say to the northern generals who are running the country right now, we've had enough of this. You either negotiate this, or we're going to give an air defense to the system to the south. And you will be – you will not have the weapons to intimidate them anymore.

MR. WEHREY: Yes, sir. Right –

Q: David O'Brien (sp) with – (inaudible) – United. One issue that didn't come up despite the many references to South Kordofan and Blue Nile was the question of the humanitarian emergency in South Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains. If we accept the analysis that has been put forward, that we need to let the parties deal with it themselves or that all we can deal with is a cold peace – we need to prevent a full outbreak of war – we are leaving a lot of people, with all due respect to Ms. Ottaway, in a really grave risk with potentially hundreds of thousands of malnourished individuals and numerous deaths from starvation, depending on what happens over the next three months. How do we deal with that situation in this analytical frame of saying, well, we just have to prevent worse things from happening?

MR. WEHREY: Ma'am, there.

Q: Hi, I'm Arielle Weaver from globalsolutions.org. And I have a question for Ambassador Lyman. You mentioned that including more women in the peace talks would definitely change the climate of these talks. And I'm curious to know how – you know, what specific ways you are working to include these women, especially in the – with the cultural barriers that are – that are present.

MR. : If you want to do – (off mic).

[01:01:11]

MR. LYMAN: Well, you know, Andrew raises a – Andrew Natsios raises some very important questions. But you know, while the north has the advantage of being able to bomb – the south does not have that and doesn't have a widespread air defense system – the way the north uses the bombing, you'd have to have an extraordinary system to know where and when they're going to come and have the – because the bombing has been in the Nuba Mountains, which is a whole different story. If they hit Malakal one day, they're going to hit something else 500 miles away the next day. This is not a simple thing.

Second, while it is a tactic, a vehicle which is very important to the north militarily, it isn't very decisive. And that has been demonstrated in two ways: one, because the south did take Heglig. They didn't occupy it for very long, but they demonstrated that bombing alone doesn't necessarily give the north that much advantage. And in the Nuba Mountains, despite the horrific use of bombing against civilian, it's more a terror tactic than it is a strategic use of bombing. And they roll them out of the back of Antonovs, so they're not even very accurate. But they are terrifying.

[01:02:34]

The Nuba Mountains people continue to occupy that whole basic area. And they have not in a whole year of this been driven out, in spite of all that bombing. So it isn't as decisive a military difference. And if we go in and add, you know, a multiyear – four-, five-, six-year air defense system, it's not going to, I don't think, be the game changer. I respect Andrew tremendously. I don't think, though, it's – it would be a game changer.

Now, David raises, of course, a critical matter. And it goes to the fundamental question: Why did the international community get involved anyway? Because we are all affected – not only peace and security, but as David pointed out, huge humanitarian crises exist in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile. We're up to maybe a hundred thousand refugees coming out of there, et cetera. You can't ignore that. You can't ignore it at all.

[01:03:34]

We've been unsuccessful, as David well knows, in trying to get the government of Sudan to provide access to the two areas – this is where the immediate crisis is – from international humanitarian agencies, because they don't want that international presence, they don't trust it, et cetera. Even though the latest proposal came from the U.N., the Africa Union and the League of Arab States, they still did not accept it. And there we had a lot of international pressure on them from the League of Arab States, from the Africa Union, from a lot of places. They didn't do it.

And so we face a very serious humanitarian crisis. It's still on the agenda. It's turning into more and more a refugee crisis, and many of them are moving into areas which are very difficult to reach. So this remains a problem, and it – and it's rightfully the – on the agenda of the international community. And I did not mean to say, when I said we have limited objectives, that that wouldn't be one of the limited objectives, because you can't ignore it. But we're very frustrated by the government's refusal to allow that kind of access. And the crisis is getting worse, as we predicted, as we get toward the rainy season.

MR. WEHREY: Comments –

MR. GOULTY: I had a lot to do with –

MR. LYMAN: Oh, I'll come back to the women's question, too.

MR. GOULTY: Sorry, Princeton. Do you want to go first?

MR. LYMAN: Well, you know, I wish I had a better answer to you on that, because I've met with many of the women's groups in both Sudan and South Sudan, and we – and there are various international programs with those, et cetera, and I've raised it with both delegations. And their answer is, look, these are party discussions – that's what the CPA was structured around, and yes, we have party members who are women and sometimes they participate, et cetera, but that's not what these do – these negotiations aren't structured for that.

[01:05:38]

I don't have a good answer to it. It's something very much on my mind, and it troubles me a great deal. We do have a very active interest from the – there's an office Melanne Verveer heads on women's rights for Secretary Clinton; she's been very active with women's groups and international – gosh, I always forget the name but – Botswana – wonderful organization –

AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)

MR. LYMAN: Thank you. But I'm not satisfied that it's having the impact on the political process, and I wish I had better answers for you on that.

MR. GOULTY: On humanitarian access, as I discovered in the 1990s, the Sudanese government's concern has always been security. They know perfectly well that arms were run to the SPLA in the south under cover of humanitarian flights. They demanded to either stop flights to the particular destinations they suspected, or to inspect cargoes. When they were allowed to inspect cargoes for deliveries from al-Obeid, there were no problems.

So it seems to me that there are two options, broadly speaking, for humanitarian access across borders or across lines of control in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. The better one is to have an agreement to stop firing – just have a truce for humanitarian purposes. I helped broker one in Bahr el Ghazal in 1998. It lasted for two years. It was an informal understanding; it wasn't properly written down, but people stuck to it because of the international opprobrium that would have encountered had they violated it.

The other is to have some arrangement whereby the aid is delivered across border by people that the Sudanese can check, so aid via northern Sudan inspector cargoes inspected by the army or whoever, delivered by the Sudanese Red Crescent. But then the SPLMA-North would be reluctant to accept that, because they'd have – they have equal concerns and suspicions. So those are the issues that Princeton is wrestling with. It seems to me that – as I said in my opening remarks – that a cease-fire is the most desirable first priority, if it can be achieved. And of course, the SPLM-North would have to be engaged in that, too. And everybody would try and exploit it in the negotiations. That's why they're so difficult.

[01:08:24]

On the problem of women, I think that you can't just say put a woman in the negotiations like that. You have to work on the wider prospect of the status of women in Sudanese society – the wider issue over the longer term. The organization I'm associated with, Together for Sudan, does this with the help of Humanity United, which I'm glad to acknowledge, by promoting women's education, including scholarships, at the rather good,

by Sudanese standards, Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman. That, it seems to me, is an area which governments neglect because it doesn't produce quick results. And it's a modest program, but it's not – it's not a headline-stealer. After all, if you're sponsoring a girl through university, it's going to take five years, six years in Sudanese terms. There are no quick results. The politician who approved the program is going to be out of office by the time that the girl's even graduated, let alone appeared on a – in a position of responsibility.

[1:09:34]

Nevertheless, this is an area where we can help, simply by seizing opportunities to promote women's education at every level, not just university education – women's literacy classes. Illiteracy in the south is appallingly high. Illiteracy in the north is hardly – is hardly impressive. Supporting schools – the schools in both countries are inadequate. The south don't have a budget for schools. The north neglects schools for those from marginalized areas and the displaced around Khartoum.

These are areas where we can help and really make a difference. I think the best use of Western soft power, in many cases, in Sudan, would be no-strings-attached aid to schools of all sorts – yes, schools for girls, secondary schools, scientific equipment, books, computers – not with a – not with an expectation that the students, the girls, are going to – are going to turn pro-American. They may well not do so. When I made this point the other day, somebody put his hand up and said, we poured millions into Ethiopia and the students are as anti-American as ever. (Laughter.) Well, that's the risk you take, but it shouldn't be the objective. The objective is what our questioner said: to get more women involved in public life. Because as one Sudanese woman told my wife, men want power, women want peace.

[01:11:08]

MS. OTTAWAY: I just wanted to make a comment. Princeton said – you know, when you were talking about the goals of the international community, you said in the short run, is to keeping the conflict from degenerating again into full-scale war. But in a sense, the one other question is, by – and to be playing in the hands of the two parties by making sure that it does not degenerate into full-scale war, so that they can get very close to it and keep on pushing the envelope, because in the end, somebody will intervene.

And that theory goes back also to the issues of the refugees, because in a sense, keeping the pot boiling where it's almost to full-scale war but it does not boil over does increase – does also increase the issue of the suffering of the population, which I don't for a moment, you know, dismiss.

MR. WEHREY: Yes, please.

Q: Lawrence Freedman (ph); I'm African desk at ER Magazine. I think one of the problems in the CPA was the whole environment around going into the CPA, that since the NCP took power, there was a massive, fanatical, zealous, anti-Khartoum regime change faction in Washington and New York, and I won't name the current elected officials who still believe in that. So there should have been a development approach of a mission of food development, which meant infrastructure and water and power. To develop all of Sudan would have been that self-interest that could have united the two countries, and I was very

upset that that never happened in 20 years, so I think that's behind some of the problems of CPA.

[01:12:50]

I have a specific question for Ambassador Lyman, which is that I've been told by Africans in the Horn, not just Sudanese, people in Washington, people in the U.N., that there's a host of American advisers in Juba – and we have some of their names – who have been egging on the South Sudanese and giving them very bad advice. And one of the reasons Sudan may have been gone into Heglig, which happened days – two days before I left Sudan, that happened, so I was aware of everything that was going on – is them being encouraged or emboldened falsely by a group of advisers in the West. And one person told me it's everybody. It's people from Europe, it's people from the donors, and it's people from Washington and people from New York. If that is true, that's pretty bad. But I also see a tilt for the first time. South Sudan's been criticized. Is there a reevaluation going on? Is this true? How do you see the problem? Because if South Sudan continues to destroy itself, then the SPLM itself is in danger of being overthrown. You mentioned some groups in your report. I don't think they're strong enough.

But it's not just Khartoum that faces a problem – and they do, I was there – but also the south would face a problem, and that would be a terrible mess if that kind of advice has been coming from the United States and other Western countries. So I'd like an answer on that, please.

MR. WEHREY: OK. Please.

[01:14:18]

Q: Hi, my name's Ian Schwab. I work with American Jewish World Service. I just had a question about processes. There's been a lot of stovepiping. There's Darfur, three areas, issues with two – between two sovereign states. And I was curious if we've reached a point where panelists think that there's a need for there to be a single process that deals with all issues intra-Sudan. Does that need to include the South? How does that work? What are sort of the long-term goals to maybe move beyond some of the limited objectives that can only be dealt with in these more stovepipe processes? Thank you.

MR. WEHREY: Yes, please.

Q: Thank you. Dan Griffin of Catholic Relief Services. In both the paper and your presentations you've noted that both the African Union's road map and the subsequent U.N. resolution are both predicated on the threat of credible sanctions. Can you tell us what those sanctions might be or give us an opinion as to what should be included or excluded from those sanctions?

(Off-mic conversation.)

MR. LYMAN: OK. Well, let me – let me – on the attitude, you know, as Alan mentioned, Darfur was a very important factor in the way the international community has operated over the last several years because it was a game changer in the sense that the

relationship, certainly for the United States but also for other Western countries, with Sudan changed because of Darfur.

The determination that genocide was being pursued, the indictment coming later from the International Criminal Court, this changed the relationship from what was going on in Naivasha and leading up to the CPA. And it has changed that we don't deal directly with President Bashir as a result. That's a different kind of situation from the process during the CPA and the role of the troika, et cetera.

[01:16:35]

And there's very strong feelings about what went on in Darfur and accountability and all the rest. And those are important. And they're significant. And they're an element not only in our policy but the policy of many of the – of the Western governments. And balancing that, if you will, with the need to try and promote peace and cooperation between the two countries is something we deal with every day.

Lawrence (sp), there is absolutely no truth to the fact that American advisers egged Juba on. On the contrary, we've had quite a long dialogue with them over some time about restraint and constraint. And when you saw the reaction – if you saw the international reaction to their move on Heglig, it was stunning in its unanimity and power. It wasn't coordinated. Everybody from the United States around the world said to Juba, this was a terrible mistake. So there's no – I don't know anybody outside that was egging them on to do that, there are people inside enough to do it.

On – your comment on stovepiping is very important because these issues obviously do relate. And you can see it in the Darfur situation as some of the armed groups – JEM and Minni Minnawi's group, et cetera – have moved less to – from a Darfur focus to a Sudan general focus. Yes, the processes have been separate. There was a long Doha peace process, et cetera, on Darfur.

The question is, how do you put these things together? The African Union panel, to some extent, has a mandate in this regard, but north-south issues have kind of overwhelmed them for a while. They were heavily involved in Darfur for a while, now less so. And then the biggest question of political transformation – particularly in Sudan, but also South Sudan has serious problems here too – how do you do that? President Mbeki was very articulate about it in his speech in Khartoum in November 2010 – a very bold speech and a very far reaching speech about what had to take place in Sudan now that the South was gone but the country remained diverse. But beyond that there isn't a process, quite frankly, for saying to Sudan, gee, you ought to – you ought to make political change, except in the fact that in our approach to the problems not only of Darfur but of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, that's the essence of it.

And that's why our response to their feeling that the only problem is South's support to the SPLA up north – no, it isn't. You've got a political process you've got to deal with, and it's not just in the two areas but it's fundamental to the governing of the country.

[01:19:35]

On the threat of sanctions, Mr. Griffin, I have no idea. The U.N. has put that in, and they would have to look at it, and I'm sure it would be a subject for a great deal of discussion at the time. And they didn't try to specify. The point though that was delivered that was significant was that they were talking to both sides. And I think that that was significant.

Sorry, Alan, did you want to say anything?

MR. GOULTY: Well, I think Princeton has illustrated some of the questions Mr. Schwab's (sp) – you know, prior to Mr. Schwab (sp) – the sheer difficulty of organizing a single process, because you do have national issues, but you also have local issues. And which comes first, and how do you address it? I mean, what would be rather useful, perhaps, is if you were to organize an amazing war game, negotiation game where people actually played their parts. And those of us who are tempted by the idea of a single process would be able to see how really difficult it would be to implement.

Where these people, the opposition and so on, all come together is in the idea of regime change. But regime change does not of itself solve the problem. Any successor is going to be under immediate, very heavy political pressure in Khartoum, for example, if he makes more concessions to the south and moves back from the position that Bashir has staked out, because Bashir is already getting criticized for being weak. So how can a successor be weaker?

[01:21:25]

Suppose it were the SPLM north. If they proceeded to give their erstwhile comrades in arms in the south a whole lot of concessions, they wouldn't survive very long in Khartoum with the hostile army, the hostile militias, the hostile local people. No, it's not – it's not an attractive proposition. So the approach has got to be to address as best you can the issues. If that means dealing with the people who are currently in power in north or south, then pragmatically I think that's what we have to do.

I'm not a believer, Dan, in sanctions at all in the Sudanese context. They've been tried for a long time; they've not been successful. And the people who lose out tend to be the ordinary people who see prices going up, things difficult to obtain. And the humanitarian community – including, I suspect, CRS – who can't operate freely using a banking system, so have to run personal risks by doing their business with pockets full of dollars, making themselves attractive targets. It's really not a – not an easy answer. But as Princeton says, the shock administered to Juba by being lumped together with Khartoum in this context may be sufficiently salutary for the question of sanctions not to have to arise.

[01:22:59]

MS. OTTAWAY: I just want to address briefly the issue of a comprehensive solution versus stovepiping. I think the only – the – what a comprehensive solution would require is a change not only in the nature of the two regimes, but also in the nature of all the opposition groups. In other words, you'd have to have a – you know, the embracing of the

concept of compromise, of the concept of democracy and not just on the part of the government.

Now that's a very nice idea, but we know that, you know, not only it's very difficult to get there, but we are also – look around the Arab world, the road to try to get to more democracy: It's not an easy road. It's certainly – it's a road that entails a lot of conflict so that very frankly I don't see the – you know, the possibility in practice of trying to – of such a comprehensive solution.

[01:23:57]

MR. : Oh, there's a question there.

MR. WEHREY: One – we're actually out of time. Can you ask it off-line if there's time?

Q: Yes. My name is – (off mic) –

MR. WEHREY: OK. I guess – (chuckles) – go ahead, please. Sorry.

Q: -- (inaudible) – from Georgetown University. And I have been following professor – Ambassador Lyman's comments in the Gulf Times and The Peninsula. And I can't help but to ask you about the mediation of Darfur in Qatar. What do you think Qatar is doing right in terms of their mediation in comparison to the overall scope of –

[01:24:32]

MR. LYMAN: Right. Qatar has been – Qatar has been running – it's now more or less finished – for over two years, ran a peace process just on Darfur. And it resulted in an agreement with just one group in the government, and a relatively small group, the Liberty and Justice Movement. But Qatar has put a lot of weight behind it. It's part of a very proactive Qatar foreign policy all around the Middle East. And they've been willing to put a lot of resources behind it. And I – and, you know, I think they feel they are making a major contribution to peace in Darfur and on an issue that was, you know, of great international attention.

Actually, if you look at the agreement itself, it's not a bad agreement. But A, only the LGM signed onto it. Many of Minnawi's group, Abdel Wahid's group, JEM didn't sign on to it. That's a problem. And second, the key is the implementation – is it really going to be a – is there going to be a land commission, a human rights commission? Is there going to be a result? It's too early to even know.

But I give the Qataris credit for an enormous commitment and investment in the process. But I think it's too early to know. And we've all said if this was implemented, it would be a good agreement. But I think we're also struggling to see whether in fact it can be. And you have to give the Qataris credit; they're willing to put up resources behind it.

MR. WEHREY: We have run out of time, unfortunately. Ambassador Lyman, Ambassador Goulty, thank you so much for joining us and sharing your firsthand insights. And please join me in thanking all of our panelists today for their comments.

[01:26:18]

(END)