

*Recorded Voice:* You're listening to a podcast from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

*Sarah Chayes:* I wrote something out. I don't normally do this, but when it's the commandant, I have to sorta get it right. So I'd like to first of all welcome you here today. My name is Sarah Chayes. I'm a senior associate here at Carnegie, in the South Asia Program. It's my distinct pleasure to introduce the 35th commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Jim Amos. It's my privilege too, largely because that gives me a few minutes in sole control of the microphone. So, sir, what was that call sign from way back when?

*General Jim Amos:* I can't remember it. It was disgusting.

*[Laughter]*

*Sarah Chayes:* Tamer, was it? Lion tamer?

*General Jim Amos:* Yes.

*Sarah Chayes:* That is how General Amos –

*General Jim Amos:* Sort of.

*Sarah Chayes:* – was known when he flew F-4 Phantoms and F/A-18 Hornets for thousands of hours, landing them on carrier decks a lot of time. Talk about taming a beast.

General Amos has commanded at every echelon, including a fighter attack squadron, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing in Iraq, and, more recently, the Combat Development Command. All this gives me another name to call him: a flyboy. What's a flyboy doing commanding a muddy-boots service like the Marines? Well, any Marines who were asking that question when General Amos took over in 2010 get it by now. When you're off the ground, you can see further, and that's the kind of strategic leadership he's been providing to the service, the smallest and perhaps the most dynamic in the U.S. military, as it adjusts to some pretty deep changes after more than a decade of bruising combat.

We're asking General Amos to emphasize that long view this afternoon. What does the world look like ten years out? As the United States seeks to reshape how it does business abroad, how should our instruments of power be rebalanced?

The way we're gonna do this is I will reluctantly turn this mic over to General Amos for a few minutes for some opening remarks, and then I'll take it back to launch what I know is gonna be a very rich question-and-answer session with a few of my own. Thanks very much, and thank you, General, for being here.

*General Jim Amos:* Thanks, Sarah.

*[Applause]*

Very nice. Very nice. You're absolutely right, Sarah. There were plenty of people wondering what the hell happened on October the 22nd by giving the command of the Marine Corps to an aviator. Interesting, I don't look at myself as an aviator. I've grown up that way. It's my community. There's a couple of my squadron mates that are out here in the audience, that I grew up with flying Phantoms and Hornets, but the truth of the matter is I look at myself as a Marine officer. And I'm not trying to be corny, but that's exactly the way I view the world. I view it from the lens of the Marine Corps now, not as an aviator.

If you all would just – first of all, thank you for being here, folks. I think it's Tuesday afternoon. I'm pretty sure it is. It's hard for me – my life is a series of linked recoveries on any given day, so I think it's Tuesday.

So we've all got day jobs, and I appreciate you taking the time to spend maybe the next hour and a half with us, because I've got a few things I'd like to talk to you about as it relates to our nation. I think our global strategy, the threats around the world, I'd be happy to talk about those kinds of things, things that I think that we probably should be very concerned about as citizens of this country and as folks all part of the global alchemy.

So let me get started here. I'd like to talk primarily, to begin with, from my view as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I always try to begin everything that way. Those of you that have been at different places I've talked, I almost always begin as a member of the Joint Chiefs. I think that's very, very important. That's a solemn responsibility that I have, along with my four other brothers, led by the chairman. And I take that very seriously, because it deals with the defense of our nation. And then finally, I'll talk just briefly on a couple of points wearing my service chief hat.

First of all, I believe that our nation is at a strategic inflection point. I've used that terminology now a couple times. I picked it up from some other people. And I go all the way back to the '90s when General Krulak was the commandant of the Marine Corps in 1995 and he said America was at a strategic inflection point at that time. It's interesting to think it was 1995 that Chuck Krulak said that, but the world is entirely different today than it was in 1995, and I do think we are at a strategic inflection point. By the end of this year we'll have concluded the longest war in our nation's history. You know that. We're confronted by economic challenges amidst a world that is characterized by competition for natural resources. I'm gonna take a minute and describe how I see the next two decades.

I spent some time working on this when I was the CG, commanding general, of Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Spent almost a year with a very small team, trying to determine what we thought the world would look like over the next couple of decades, and we put it in a publication that we drafted for General Conway, then the commandant, called the "Strategic Vision 2025." And we did that because you can't have a vision unless you have some sense for what it is you're going to be placing that vision against. So back to the world and the economic challenges, it'll be a world characterized by competition for natural resources; we see that today. By the map, I could show you where not only the drought areas are, but also the area where people are starving to death.

There's gonna be increased prevalence in security of natural disasters. We just went through one in December and January, in the Philippines. Social unrest throughout the eastern and southern Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa. You see that in the Central African Republic today, and you saw the Marines go into South Sudan in the early part of January. There's gonna be cyber attacks, there already are; violent extremism, there already is; regional conflicts; and the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Intelligence estimates indicate that more than half of the world's population live in fragile states, vulnerable to ruinous economical, ideological, and environmental stresses. In many regions, ever-present local instability will inevitably erupt into crisis, prompting calls for humanitarian assistance in some cases, disaster relief in others, or perhaps even more vigorous responses. Many parts of the world remain dangerous places. The rapid increase of globalization and reliance on computer networks gives both rogue

nations and other maligned actors increased ability to impact our daily lives.

In this challenging environment, this thing we call in Washington now, we've dubbed it "the new normal," is beginning to emerge. And because of this, my sense is there will be no peace dividend following our conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan later this year. The world will remain a dangerous place, and while we as a nation may be done with the thorny and nasty entanglements of this new normal, they are likely not done with us. There will be no shortage of work for America's forces or, in particular, its United States Marines.

That said, both here in the Beltway and across the nation, there is a national dialogue beginning to emerge about what the American people want their military to do in the future. After 12 years of war, some believe that it's time for America to furl their flag and come home. I understand that sentiment and the sense of fatigue that generates it. While wariness of foreign entanglements is a healthy American instinct, it's almost a pastime. I argue that we cannot afford to disengage from the world. In many critical areas, only the United States has the ability and the will to change the world and help the world through some of its thorniest challenges. Given the fiscal realities of budgetary challenges, the question of necessity then becomes: Where do we engage and how much, and how much can we afford?

From my perspective, the United States must remain a global presence, a presence that is vital to deterring aggression, one that underwrites a stable global economy, which is critical for all of us and all partners in the world, and one that builds trust among our allies and our partners. This forward presence allows us to build strategic relationships that truly matter when the chips are down, when time is short, and when lives are on the line, just like we saw recently in the Philippines in December and South Sudan in January.

I've heard some of the Pentagon attempt to advance a concept of what they call virtual presence. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I consider this to be pure folly. Virtual presence is actual absence. Nothing takes the place of face-to-face engagement. You simply can't surge trust when things are unraveling.

I believe that the Marine Corps is America's insurance policy. We buy insurance for our cars, our homes, and our lives as a hedge against uncertainty, a hedge against the unknown. The same logic

applies to the United States of America. None of us can predict when or where the next crisis might arise, but when it does, our nation needs to be able to address the matter quickly and efficiently, in line with our nation's national interests.

Lastly, let me speak just a minute about Afghanistan. We're coming out of Afghanistan about as well as we can expect. As far as the mission goes, we have exceeded expectations within each one of the provinces at the military level. None of us know how the future will turn. There are simply too many variables to predict. The NATO ministerial meetings at the end of this month are critical to the future of Afghanistan. That said, I believe that we need to be very circumspect and take a lesson from Iraq. We spent our nation's treasure there, and then we pulled out. It's yet to be seen how Iraq is going to turn out, and I don't want that to happen in Afghanistan. In fact, I would argue that when viewing Afghanistan and Pakistan as what I call a whole set piece, that we can ill afford to simply pull out and go home.

Now, a couple of comments about your Marine Corps, then I'll conclude. After a decade of war in the most morally and physically bruising environment, the area that we call human combat, we are resetting the Marine Corps mentally, physically, and morally. We have 75 percent of our equipment completely out of Afghanistan as we meet here this afternoon, with almost all of it now headed to our depots to be reworked and overhauled. We are realigning our equipment and our battalions and our squadrons back to the Pacific area of operations, all in line with the president's defense strategy.

To address where our institutional fabric has frayed – some of this has been in the press over the last two years – we instituted an effort within the Marine Corps called the "Reawakening." It focuses on returning our Marines back to the eternal attributes that have served our corps for over 238 years. They're simple. There's nothing new here.

The first attribute is discipline: getting to being disciplined warriors and disciplined men and women who wear my cloth. Adherence to instructions, faithful adherence to instructions: doing what you're told to do, not doing what you think you might like to do. Concerned and engaged leadership 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Simple: Marines defuse leadership. We do it in combat probably better than anybody. And yet when we come home, we seem to be willing to stop that leadership at 4:30 in the afternoon and let our youngsters go back to the barracks, and then

we wonder why bad things happen back home. And lastly is obedience to orders.

I reminded all the senior leaders of the Marine Corps that when we crossed the border into Iraq in March of 2003, we had 70,000 U.S. Marines poised across the border. We had the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division on our left flank, and we had the 1st U.K. Armoured Division on our right flank. And so all those forces crossed the border roughly around March the 23rd. And in our 70,000 Marines that we had that crossed and went into the **Al Amarah** oilfields, and turned left and met destiny at Nasiriyah, and then split and joined again just outside of Baghdad – that out of the 70,000, there were probably less than 500 experienced combat veterans.

Yet how did they do so well? How were they able to execute the mission so well? They did it because of discipline. They did it because they'd been highly trained; they became experienced at doing things that they had been trained to do. There was obedience to orders. There was engaged leadership. And that's what we're going to get back to. There's nothing new to that. That's who we are as Marines.

So thanks for indulging my opening comments. They're fairly short. And I think, Sarah, now it's time to kind of get on with some questions.

*[Applause]*

*Sarah Chayes:*

Well, like I said, I'll take the privilege of the first couple. Thanks for touching on Afghanistan. Obviously, we are at a turning point within a turning point on Afghanistan, and it is the South Asia program here that's invited you. That was a long experience in a rough patch of ground, which I know fairly well having spent time quite nearby. What are the lessons that you want to ensure the Marine Corps, but the U.S. military in general, doesn't forget out of that war?

*General Jim Amos:*

I think first of all, first and foremost, it's not – the courage part and the determination, that just goes with who we are as military men and women, so that will be enduring. I think the lessons coming out of this is that, number one, it's never as easy as you think it's going to be. We make plans, and I don't think anybody can plan better than the military. I mean, I'm a little bit – I don't mean to sound arrogant about it, but we actually do this for a living, and we know how to red-team and we know how to think through the

thorny parts. But my sense is we always have a rosier picture, so we think it's gonna be easier than it actually turns out to be. So that's the first thing.

Afghanistan has been very, very challenging for all of us. It is a war among the people. And it's not war at all times among the people, because all the people of Afghanistan are not at war with us, and you know that. But it is operations among the people. So that's the first order of business.

So how do you persist in that as you move out of Afghanistan and move to other areas around the world? And you do that with education. You do that with things like language training. We do that with professional military education. I get asked the question often, "Are you done with counterinsurgency operations? Do you see that, or are you gonna go the way of 1973 when we seemed to have forgot a lot of what we did in Vietnam?" And the answer is resoundingly no.

Part of why I took the time to describe the world, this thorny, kinda tough world we're gonna live in and operate in – I mean, that's where the U.S. forces, all of us, are gonna be operating in. It's not all gonna be an insurgency, but it will all be among the people. It will all be in areas that maybe are thornier, hard to deal with, way less recognizable than what we might think. Kabul is recognizable. Some of the other places in the world where we're gonna be, you would get off a plane or out of the back of a helicopter and you'd go, "Where am I?" That's where we're gonna operate over the next – so it's among the people. That's the first lesson of war. And people count. The people, the villagers, the chiefs, the tribal leaders, the sheikhs in Iraq – their opinions count. And I think the weaponry, the tactics, or all that – we'll keep that, we'll persist in that. I think the greatest lesson coming out are, these are operations among people, and you can't ignore that when you do your planning.

*Sarah Chayes:* Why do you think it turned out to be harder than we expected? Was it that we were overestimating ourselves or inadequately acquainted with this human terrain that you're talking about?

*General Jim Amos:* I don't wanna say "a little bit of both," but I do think it was probably harder than we anticipated with regards to the human terrain. As Americans, it's hard for us to understand – and I saw this in Iraq. It's hard for us to understand why people don't look at what we're doing as goodness. In other words, people don't – "Why is it that you think I'm the enemy, when in fact I'm actually

here away from my home and my family, risking my life, to be a source of goodness?" So why is that difficult?

That's probably the – for me, that was one of kinda the cold shots to the heart. And in Iraq it took a lot longer than I thought it was gonna take in Iraq for, in our case, the people, the tribal chiefs in Anbar, to realize that we weren't the enemy. And once that changed, it became a tidal wave. I think down where we are in Helmand and Nimruz, it just took longer for the people to understand that we're not the enemy, that we're actually there to help. And once that's happened, then it changes, and you saw that. They actually begin to trust us. So my sense is that.

*Sarah Chayes:* You mentioned Vietnam, and that is a sort of classic – it's very similar lessons. The Marines knew at the end of the Vietnam War, so how do we not unlearn them again, the way we did last time?

*General Jim Amos:* I think when we came out of – and I was on active duty. I came on active duty in 1970. So you can do the math; I'm a real old guy, okay? So I watched this, and we were so happy to be out of Vietnam in 1973. And in my service – I'll just talk from mine. My service was struggling so much with quality Marines, leadership, drugs had become the way of the day, race riots – I mean, genuine race riots on base where First Lieutenant Amos was the duty officer. So I'll be honest with you – my sense, we took a lot of what we did in Vietnam and what we learned for us, and we just set it aside. We were so happy to be out of there. We didn't go back to North Africa, 1950, and all the lessons we learned in counterinsurgency operations there. So I think that's what happened.

So why would it not happen now? Because we're not going to let it. I mean, the Marine Corps right now has got more combat veterans in the service. We've got 194,000 Marines. We probably have 165,000 combat veterans. And if you believe – that's why, again, I go back to if you believe what the future security environment holds, then you know that we're gonna be operating in that kind of environment in the future. We're gonna need those counterinsurgency skills. We're gonna need the skills of language training and culture training and all that, so we're not gonna let it – I'm not gonna allow it to happen.

*Sarah Chayes:* You're talking about how you operated very close to the ground in villages in Helmand. How well do you feel that the way the Marines were deployed – where, when, how they were deployed – did that fit within a coherent war plan, in your view?



*General Jim Amos:* It did. There were people that – when we went to begin with in Afghanistan, we kind of went in dribs and drabs. I mean, I remember going to visit – first of all, for those of you that have been to what is now Camp Leatherneck, which is huge, the only thing that was really there was a single-run lane, a small little turn where you could put two C-130s, you could offload. That was all that was there at the U.K. base at Bastion. I mean, that was it. And we had one infantry battalion on the ground, and that was part of – and we were part of a coalition force that was there.

And then we went in – we were kind of in and out, in and out, and then the president committed the 10,000 Marines in Afghanistan, and that changed things dramatically. So my sense is that we were – once that happened, once we said "Okay, you're going into Helmand Province. You're going to be responsible" – or Helmand and Nimruz, which is in the southern part of Afghanistan – I think we were employed probably just about right. We were given enough latitude where we could bring the Marine Air-Ground Task Force together. We saddled right up with our British brothers. We've got one of the Royal Marines that's in the audience here; he was part of that effort. And our coalition partners, the Jordanians, the Bahrainis, and the Georgians. So I think we all settle into that area, and I think we were employed probably as well, if not better than anybody else was in there.

*Sarah Chayes:* So raising the kinda aperture a little bit, you talked about we shouldn't draw back into a kind of fortress America as we turn this corner. I don't think anyone really thinks it ought to be all or nothing. I think the question really is one of kinda tradeoffs. And how do we as a nation, in your view, need to prioritize our missions as we try to do – it's a cliché now – better with less?

*General Jim Amos:* A couple thoughts, and you and I talked about this some time ago. And we do need to prioritize. How do you do that? We as a nation need to determine what's in our best interest, and what is it? What is it that serves our nation well? And I'd start with a global economy. You might find it interesting that a U.S. Marine's talking about global economics. And I did sleep at a Holiday Inn Express last night, so I've got some idea what I'm talking about. But it is the stability in the global market. When you just think about – I mean, that's what makes the strategy that the president has come up with, with kind of a focus on the Pacific, I think, so particularly meaningful, is that you think about that market and everything that flows through that region of the world, and you come away with a sense, well, actually it's pretty important to us

economically to have stability in that part of the world, to have stability and freedom of navigation, to have a market that actually can move across borders in that part of the world.

So I think we need to figure out where is it we can have some sense of assurance that we are participating in economic global security. And I would argue for my service – and my brother Jon Greenert, who's the chief of naval operations – the Naval Service provides that freedom of navigation. Sounds like some antiquated terminology from the Revolutionary War. But we are a global nation.

I mean, the United States of America, with the exception of the northern and southern borders, is surrounded by water. We're not only surrounded, but we've been protected by those waters for centuries. But those waters are also where global commerce travels. They travel all throughout the southwest Pacific area, through the Straits of Malacca. When you think about – there are nations where 100 percent of their oil passes through the Straits of Malacca. One hundred percent. And you think of commerce and all that stuff. So I think the first thing we ought to do is figure out as a nation, okay, where is it we can assist with global economic security. We can't go inside a nation and make a nation well economically. No, that's not gonna happen. But we certainly can set the conditions so that we can have global commerce, so that's the first thing.

The second thing I think we need to do is take a prioritize – where are the greatest threats? Not only where are they today, but where are they likely to grow from? Because it's like shooting ducks. If you take an aim at one in a duck hunt and it's in flight, you're gonna miss it. So you'll feel good because you shot, but you're gonna miss the duck because it's gone. We need to take a look and think about, where are these people that wanna come and do harm to our nation – and, to be honest with you, our allies? We've got friends that count on us. So where are the threats, where are they gonna come from?

And I would argue that in some cases, as things begin to build and foment around the world, I think you take a look at a place like Mali. I applaud the French for going into Mali six, seven, eight months ago. The whole world watched that. We participated and we helped them out as a nation, by the way. We partnered with them. So I think Mali's a great example. You can turn your back on that part of the world, but you will rue the day that you have,

because those kinds of threats will find their way around the world in some of the major cities of the world.

So I think we take a look and we say, "Okay, where are the threats? Not only now, but where are they likely to be?" And then we work with an engagement program, trying to help governments that want us to. We can't go enforce your will, but those that were partners with us and are willing to partner, some of them just would be happy to have 50 Marines to come in and help them train their border police on how to secure their borders, how to deal with narcoterrorism, how to deal with just fundamental crime as it relates to almost an insurgency kind of environment.

I think we need to figure out what's in our best interest, and we need to prioritize that. And then I think you need to apply the military where the military fits. I was asked a question about a week ago, as you look to the Asia-Pacific, and do you always see the military as the lead agent for these things, and the answer is no. We've got interagencies; we've got organizations, civilian organizations, that I would be happy to work with and be the supporting element, if we can just get in some countries and engage.

*Sarah Chayes:* So does that imply that as a nation, we need to rebalance a little bit of our own kinda emphasis, resources toward some of those other agencies too?

*General Jim Amos:* Well, I don't know. Then you get into "Okay, come give me a list of who. I want the list from A to Z," and I can't tell you who that is. I just think –

*Sarah Chayes:* Broadly.

*General Jim Amos:* Almost subjectively, though, I think we're gonna have to – again, I go back – it sounds really simple, and it's very hard to do. We're gonna have to prioritize what's in our national interest. What's in the best interest of the United States? Because we don't have enough money to be everywhere we wanna be and do all the things we wanna be, and quite honestly, the world doesn't want us to be a lot of that anymore. The world's kind of – they've grown weary of some of that.

So what is in our best interest, and where is it? Where does it lie, and then how do we react in that kind of world? How do we participate? I would argue that we tend to think of just my service: "Well, Marines, we're gonna go in there and just bulldoze this

place. We're gonna go in there and strut around it." It's just the opposite. I mean, we wanna go – we just did it in the Philippines. There wasn't a rifle on a single Marine that was down there, and yet they spent 45 days down in the Philippines, early on being the only sole source to include – I mean, globally, to help those 6,000 people that lost their – all the families that lost their lives and all that stuff.

*Sarah Chayes:* I got a couple more, as you can imagine, but I think it's about time to start throwing this open. What I'd just like to do – you wanna take it from the podium or you wanna hang out here?

*General Jim Amos:* No, I'll do this here. I'll do it.

*Sarah Chayes:* Okay. So what I'd like to do is – first of all, please, obviously, identify yourself when you ask your question. We're gonna take two or three and then throw it to the commandant.

*Audience:* General, Tom Bowman with NPR.

*Sarah Chayes:* Yeah, could you wait for – sorry, for the microphone. Great.

*Audience:* Tom Bowman with NPR. I wonder if you could expand a little bit on the Reawakening program and the reasons behind this. Are you seeing a spike in troubles, problems within the Marine Corps? Or is this a gut feel, that you feel something's amiss? And then if you put your Joint Chiefs hat on, as you know, Secretary Hagel is planning on appointing a senior general to oversee ethics training and reviews within the Pentagon. There've been problems with Air Force missile launch officers, all the way up to admirals and generals. Is there a wider problem in the military, do you think, or is this just a coincidence and a cluster of problems?

*Sarah Chayes:* That's one. I think there was one over there. Yeah.

*Audience:* Al La Porta, retired Foreign Service officer. Part of our new mission under the new normal for the Marine Corps is to protect, evacuate, and – diplomatic missions kind of around the world. What does that mean in terms of U.S. Marine Corps force deployments and readiness to be able to conduct those missions?

*Sarah Chayes:* And why don't we take from this lady right here in the aisle. Great. If you could just wait for the microphone, thanks.

*Audience:* Hope Hodge Seck with *Marine Corps Times*. My question is about the near-term outlook for –

*General Jim Amos:* About the what?

*Sarah Chayes:* I'll get it.

*Audience:* The near-term outlook for RC Southwest and Helmand Province, where we might expect to see the last Marine battalion leave. And kind of in the interim, what will be taking place there?

*Sarah Chayes:* So we had three disparate questions here. One was to do with Reawakening and the whole ethics sort of tidal wave, almost, that seems to have broken over the military. The next on taking care of diplomatic installations throughout the world, which has become, some people would say, almost more politicized than the actual impact on individuals. And then tell us how you see Helmand and Nimruz Province going as the Marines draw themselves away.

*General Jim Amos:* Okay. Well, let me go to Tom Bowman's question first. Two years ago – in fact, it's almost two years ago this month, really January and February of 2012, Marine Corps had a series of fairly high-profile things that popped in the press. You're familiar with them. We would see them every morning on the press, some things that – behavior that Marines had participated in that brought shame on the Marine Corps.

There's a great author, Steven Pressfield. He wrote *Gates of Fire*, and it's just – I've read just about everything **he's written**. But he has a book on warrior ethos, and it's a short book, and he talks about all those warrior tribes that have gone before, and goes all the way back in history. And he concludes, interestingly enough – and I didn't know it was gonna be this way – he concludes in the United States Marine Corps. And come to find out that he got out of the Marine Corps as a lance corporal, and I didn't know that, and even through all his books, I'd never read anything about that.

But he says in his book, he said, "The Marine Corps is a culture of shame." And boy, I stopped and I went, "Okay, well, what does that mean?" And then you read on, and what he was saying, he said, "The Marines are motivated to not bring shame on one another, to not bring shame on the institution, to not bring shame on all those Marines that are laying in graves across our nation, at graveyards and cemeteries around the world." And so as you look back now, two years ago, and you think about some of those things and you go – it's what it did, it brought shame on our institution. There was a series of about four or five fairly high-profile things.

So back to the Reawakening. You take a look at that, and then you understand that we're coming out of Afghanistan. Today we sit with about 4,400 Marines in Afghanistan. Eight months ago we had 20,000 Marines in Afghanistan. So as we come out and we reset the Marine Corps – equipment-wise, people-wise, unit-wise, training-wise – and we get ready to redeploy for this world that I described, which I think it's gonna be chaotic and I think it's gonna be a very dangerous place to operate, we asked the commanders – we asked our lieutenant colonel and our colonel commanders and their sergeants and majors, we asked them last July: "Tell us what you're seeing. Don't let us at the headquarters, Marine Corps, divine this." And they came back and they just said fundamental, basic things. They said, "Commandant, we don't need any new programs. We just need to go back to those basic attributes that have defined the Marine Corps for 238 years."

And so we defined those. The first one, as I said in my comments, is adherence to standards – or, excuse me, discipline. Discipline. Well, what would that have to do with these high-profile cases? Well, if we were disciplined on the battlefield and disciplined back home in some of the things we did, we'd know what the standards are and we would adhere to them and, quite honestly, we wouldn't have brought shame on the Marine Corps. So it's discipline. It's adherence to standards. Everything from personal appearance to the requirement to run the physical fitness test, to – combat fitness test, to – just, I mean, the way we wear our uniforms, the way we conduct our lives.

One of the things that I asked him about was sexual assault. I said, "Give me the feedback from your end." Well, if you were a disciplined Marine, and if you adhered to standards, you'd probably reduce sexual assaults – they'd probably be reduced by some significant number, I mean, to include hazing; to include alcohol-related incidents; to include a variety of things that all the services are struggling with.

So rather than just target a single thing, what if you could change and kinda get us back to those things that are the core of the Marine Corps? Not to turn this into a spiritual comment, 'cause that's not what I'm talking about, but I talk about the soul of the corps. I use that term a lot, 'cause I want Marines to always remember the soul that resides inside of them that makes them different than anybody else.

So discipline, adherence to standards, engaged leadership, we're actually paying attention to kids, and we're mindful – 54 percent of

our sexual assaults take place on base. Now, some of those take place in housing. Some of them take place in other places on the base, but 54 percent. So if you were going to try to provide some sense of discipline in that area, then it would seem that you would probably want to have a little more oversight in the barracks. I mean, that's where the bulk of our young Marines live. And yet over time we'd found that the leadership had moved out of the barracks and were living in town. Well, why? Well, because we let them. 'Cause we had money. We could afford to let you live in town. You could live in Carlsbad. You could live in Sneads Ferry. So we asked the leadership to move back in the barracks – sergeants – and they have. And the last thing, of course, is obedience to order.

So that's the Reawakening, Tom. It's going back to what I call the soul of the Marine Corps. It's not a new program. I don't have mandatory instruction. You don't have to take four hours of Reawakening training. There's none of that. It's just going back to the fundamental basics of what had defined the Marines for 238 years. And when we explained it that way, and **Sergeant Major and I** do to the Marines, they get it. So that's what it's all about.

*Sarah Chayes:* Then it was about protecting some of our diplomatic installations.

*Audience:* And actually, the second part of the question, **the wider issue** within the Pentagon, within all the services?

*General Jim Amos:* Oh, that's right, the ethical business. So I do think that – I don't know that there has been a surge in ethical misbehavior. But I do think the misbehavior that has become public is bringing shame on the Department of Defense, so back to the shame issue. And I'll be honest with you, I think the Department of Defense, the military, has got an approval rating of something like 67 percent. We don't wanna lose that. I don't want anybody in here to think that, well, we're a bunch of hooligans and that we don't actually follow the rules and we don't care about people, we don't care about contracting, we don't care about doing things – 'cause we actually do.

These small percentage, for instance, in my service of 194,000 Marines, I'm guessing there's probably less than 2 percent that we need to kinda get back to on heading of true north. And I suspect it's that way in all of the services. I know these general officers. I don't know them all. I know a lot of admirals; I know a lot of generals. I think it's hugely – I think we gotta fix it. We gotta just – it's healthy to go back and remind us all, as generals and

admirals, that we have a sacred trust that America has given us. A sacred trust.

There's a great painting, and it shows a Roman general coming back into Rome after campaigning, being gone for a couple of years. And the Roman general comes into Rome, and after they get all cleaned up and – so now it's time for him to parade through the streets of Rome. And he's on his chariot, and all the soldiers are out there in front of him, and all the booty and everything he's brought, and the people are – the Roman citizens are praising him. And he's in the back of his chariot, and he's got a small little boy with a golden wreath, holding it over his head, as he goes through Rome receiving all the accolades. And it says – the caption at the bottom is "memento mori": "remember you are human."

*Sarah Chayes:* Mortal.

*General Jim Amos:* Mortal. So that's what we've got. We've gotta get back to that. We just need to go back. We don't wanna lose the trust of the American people. So Secretary Hagel is very concerned about that. He's talked about appointing a general officer to be a part of that. We support that completely, and I'm not sure what all is – I just know in my service what we're doing. We've done a series of things for the last two years because, quite honestly, two years ago it was kind of a – we saw the edges begin to fray.

And then the Security Guard. We've only had about – I think there are 300-plus embassies around the world. We've only covered about half of those. About 152 I think is what we've had with the Marine Security Guard detachments. That's usually one leader in five Marines. And their job really isn't to provide force protection for the ambassador. Now, the councilor as that ambassador travels around. That's not their job. Their job is to protect the classified equipment, protect the embassy itself, and then from time to time we've had to reinforce the embassy. We're doing it in Yemen right now. We've got close to 100 Marines on the ground in Yemen, reinforcing that embassy there.

So we've ebbed and flowed with those, but Congress just authorized a year ago 1,000 extra Marines to join that Marine Security Guard detachments, those elements. And so we have – plus, as we draw the Marine Corps down, we're gonna level off at 175,000. That would give us the extra 1,000 Marines. They've just been paid for in the budget. I'm pretty happy about that. That's always a good thing. And so we are going to – Secretary Kerry and his staff, as you know, have identified those high-risk



missions around the world, and we will put – we're training more Marines to go there and flesh the rest of these embassies out that are high-risk.

We've also put together what we call an MSAU, Marine Security Augmentation Unit, and these are Marines that have gone through the Marine Security Guard training. Some of them have come off MSG duty, and we've gotta collective body of them down at Quantico. And they are on what we call a strip alert, and their job is to go reinforce an embassy if something bad happens; or if you get indications and warnings that something may happen in an embassy, we'll fly these teams in. And they could be there for a month, two months. They augment the MSG det that's on the ground there, and then when things depressurize, then they go away.

So I'll tell you what, sir, we take that mission really seriously for us. That lance corporal that's sitting out there at what we call post 1 in an embassy, he's a lance corporal. He's probably 20 years old. And he's just waiting for somebody to come and try to take that embassy away from the ambassador. So we take it – so does that answer your question?

*Audience:* Well, you do have FAST teams and –

*General Jim Amos:* We do.

*Audience:* – other units that are stationed around in the various regions, and they need Air Force airlift capabilities and so forth. And that has to do with the disposition of your forces and being able to react within certain timeframes. So how is that kind of parsing out? Do you feel fairly comfortable with that mission, or are there a lot of issues still there?

*General Jim Amos:* No, I do, I feel very good about it. We've got two of these FAST teams in the Persian Gulf, two of them in the Mediterranean/southern Europe area too, and the Pacific out there. Each one of these FAST teams are about 55 Marines headed up by a Marine captain or even a Marine major, highly trained. And they're the Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Teams. So they would go into an embassy like Yemen. In fact, we put I think two FAST teams on the ground in Yemen, when things really began to get ugly, and then we eventually pulled them out, reset them, and put regular infantry Marines in there, which is what we have today. So two different missions, Fleet Anti-terrorism Support, all of a

sudden things have just begun to unravel. **Sending men in, too,** provides an element of security.

So I'm comfortable with where they are. I'm comfortable with their training. I think we got that right. This Marine Security Augmentation Unit actually belongs to the State Department. So that's the difference. Those FAST teams belong to the combatant commanders, to Admiral Locklear in the Pacific, General Austin in Central Command.

But this security augmentation team, the secretary of state can say, "Hey, I need some help here," and in anticipation of tensions – it could be we have a very high-ranking official going to some embassy around the world, and just to kind of gird that place up, we'll send an MSAU team in, and they'll be there for the preparation for the visit and then leave shortly thereafter. So I think we got it right. I think we got a right balance right now, and if we don't, then we'll work on it over the next year or two. So I feel pretty good about it.

*Sarah Chayes:* And then we got a Helmand question.

*General Jim Amos:* Hope, I think – and you've been there, I think – the provincial – in fact, I leave this Saturday night. We're flying back in, Sergeant Major Barrett and I, to meet with the governor and the provincial police chief.

My sense is it's about as good as it's gonna get. And when I talk to people about Afghanistan, I don't look at this thing – I never say "winning" or "losing." I don't use those terms. What I do say is, I am confident that by December of this year, that we will have set the conditions for the greatest opportunity for the people of Helmand and Nimruz Province to succeed. I'm not trying to mince words or dance around the issue, but that's really where I come from. In other words, we will have worked alongside the corps commander and his four brigades. We will have worked alongside the district governors as they set up governance. We will have worked alongside the police, and we'll have done all that we can do.

And to be honest with you, I think right now it's pretty good. It doesn't mean it's not frisky. Doesn't mean there are not issues. I mean, that's a dangerous part of the world. But I think we'll have done everything we can by this December, so I feel good about it. I wanna see Afghanistan succeed, maybe not to my standards, but to standards that work for them, because we've got too much

invested in there. I don't know how many soldiers the U.S. Army has lost, but we've lost three hundred and I think seventy-two as of this morning. Three hundred seventy-two, and we're almost 5,000 wounded. That's a pretty healthy price. So I think it's – I'm optimistic. But what we've gotta do is, we as a group of nations – and that's why this ministerial meeting is so important at the end of this month. We as a group of nations have gotta figure out how much commitment are we gonna have, post-Afghanistan.

*Sarah Chayes:* And how tailored?

*General Jim Amos:* And how tailored? How do you do that?

*Audience:* Just to **develop** \_\_\_\_\_ –

*Sarah Chayes:* No, there are a bunch of other people who need to ask some questions. There was a gentleman in the middle there, yeah? Did you not have a question? Yeah. Right there?

*Audience:* Chuck **Boyd**, old military guy. You and your fellow service chiefs and I think the combatant commanders met a couple weeks ago with Moisés Naím, and discussing his book, *The End of Power* – the proposition that we will be operating at weaker levels in the future than we're accustomed to, and much of the rest of the world will do so as well. Some of the instruments of power that we're accustomed to having, we may not have. Could you give me an idea of what kinda reaction came out of that group of a few senior military folks?

*Sarah Chayes:* Then there was a question all the way in the back, a young man all the way in the back and then a young woman in front of him. Could you wait for the microphone, and identify yourself, please.

*General Jim Amos:* **Trey Yingst**, NHK. Where do you see the U.S. Marine involvement in the Pacific in the next two decades? I know you discussed strategic planning for the next two decades. For example, do you see more Marines being based in Japan, for example, to maintain stability in the region?

*Sarah Chayes:* And then right in front of him.

*Audience:* Hello, I'm **Mai** with TV Asahi, and you can probably answer my question on top of his. So the governor of Okinawa said that he wants the Futenma facility closed within five years, but then the U.S. is saying that the replacement facility in Nago will take up to nine years. So on top of this gap in timing, the Nago residents and

mayor of Nago are staunchly against this relocation plan. So do you see all of this opposition having a negative impact on the U.S.-Japan military alliance, and do you think you can keep the promise to lessen the burden on Okinawa all while maintaining a strong U.S. defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

*Sarah Chayes:* So let's take – the first question actually has to do with a colleague of ours here, Moisés Naím, who wrote a book recently called *The End of Power*, quite provocative title, even, let alone the underlying thesis. So this goes back to the sort of rebalancing issues that you were talking about earlier. How did that conversation go? So Moisés went to meet you and some of your colleagues. Do you remember how that conversation went? What was the back-and-forth about this notion that the way the U.S., among other powerful players in the world, will be operating is gonna change fundamentally?

*General Jim Amos:* We spent the greater part of a day, and we split the morning in half and spent some time on that matter right there. There was no conclusions that came out of that. It was just discussion. All it was, was just "Give me your perspective, this balance-of-power business, and talk to us about this as we look at Joint Chiefs." But there was no conclusions coming out of that. We were looking at this as it related to, what is it we should do and could do or can do for the future as we look at QDR, as we look at – I mean, that's what was driving it – the sequestration. What is it we should and can do in understanding what we believe the world order's gonna be? So there was no –

*Sarah Chayes:* What was most controversial? I mean, in terms of the response that your colleagues were providing.

*General Jim Amos:* I think probably the greatest discussion centered around forward presence. And by that I mean – forward presence is expensive. It takes money. It takes agreements with other nations. It takes host nations. It was, how much of that is enough? I'm a big forward-presence guy. Now, it fits the mold of the Marine Corps. Engagement/forward presence, I get that. But I believe it for the reasons I talked about up there: It builds trust and confidence in your allies. You can't surge that kinda thing, so I'm a big forward presence. There was discussion about, well, we can't afford a lot of that; maybe we need to kinda come back and just reset back in America. So there was discussion around that, so that was probably the great –

*Sarah Chayes:* So it was the global architecture, just like Carnegie, right?

*General Jim Amos:* Exactly. By the way, there was nobody – there was none of this "Well, I'm right, you're wrong, and this is the way we're gonna do business." There was none of that. It was just the Joint Chiefs talking, having an intellectual discussion about what we thought was the right approach.

You asked a question earlier: How do we proceed or – words to the effect, how do we proceed in the future? The future is – how do we – what balance is it? What balance can we afford, and what is it we should be doing? You can't turn your – you can, but you do it with great trepidation – turn your back on your responsibilities.

Look, folks, the United States of America – I mean, I realize in this audience we've got folks from all around the world, and I'm gonna say something, and I believe it with all my heart. The United States Navy has an advertising slogan. It says "Global Force for Good." That's what the United States of America is. I mean, whether we go, "Well, you shouldn't done that, you did this, why did you do that?" – I get that. But the United States of America probably – there's no other country on the face of the Earth that wants to do the right thing more and is willing to give more of itself to help other nations around the world. You can disagree with me, but I've been around the world once or twice and I see it. There's no other nation on the face of the Earth that does that, so how much, **then**, should we do? How much should we reach out to engage – not control, not manipulate, but support?

*Sarah Chayes:* So part of that is Asia, right? So there's a question both broadly, how – if you wanted to take a subset of global reach – Asia, what does it look like, and in particular, then, subset of that, Marines in Japan.

*General Jim Amos:* Marines in Okinawa.

*Sarah Chayes:* Yeah.

*General Jim Amos:* The Pacific – the question, as I recall, was, okay, how do I see the Marines engaging in the – what is our role and how do I see us engaging in the Pacific, as I recall.

*Sarah Chayes:* And I'd like to broaden that just a little bit, as we're talking in general, this whole – this multifaceted instruments of U.S. policy, looking toward Asia, what should it look like?

*General Jim Amos:* No, I think we ought to start there, and that's exactly right. Thanks for pulling me out of the gutter and getting me to open wide, 'cause I like to –

*Sarah Chayes:* The mud, right?

*General Jim Amos:* I like to talk. I actually like to talk about us as a U.S. – as a country, and engagement, by just dialing into the Marine Corps. That's easier for me to do at the – to go to the Marines. But I think us as a nation, I think you have to ask the question "Well, why the Pacific?" You've gotta start there. Well, why not someplace else in the world? Well, first of all, five of the seven major treaties the United States has with other nations are in the Asia-Pacific area. Sixty-two percent of the world's surface area is in that part of the world, and by the way, the predominant part of that is water. So that kinda fits our background a little bit.

But when you think about – I mentioned earlier – oil, and you think about 100 percent of the oil that goes to Japan flows through the Straits of Malacca, a large percentage, if not all – I'm not sure – I used to say 100 percent of China's oil goes through the Straits of Malacca; I'm not positive about that. I think they get a bunch of stuff over land. But you think about all the commerce, the travel, is not only coming into the Asia-Pacific area, but Asia-Pacific going out into the Indian Ocean area and headed westward. You think of the natural disasters that take place in that part of the world. Thirty-five billion dollars a year is the estimate of natural disasters – \$35 billion every single year. I think the figure is 70,000 or 75,000 people lose their lives every year in the Asia-Pacific area due to natural disasters. We lost 6,000 people in the Philippines. Six thousand people, I mean, they were gone – 195-mile-an-hour winds, the fourth-largest thunderstorm ever recorded came through that part of the world.

*Sarah Chayes:* So then how tailored? I mean, that's the why, but what does it need to look like?

*General Jim Amos:* I don't know. I just – we're rebuilding relationships right now with countries like the Philippines. It was, what, 35 years ago we were asked to leave the Philippines. That relationship is rebuilding today. We see military engagement with Vietnam. I mean, imagine that. I mean, think of that. And yet that part of the – think about where Vietnam lies. I mean, that's a great country to train with bilaterally or unilaterally.

So I think – I don't know the answer to that. I just know that we've got great allies that are, down in Australia is a classic case of a very, very strong ally. We are the link. We're viewed, my perspective, as the stability link, the stabilizing link between a whole bunch of countries and nations up there – North Korea. The United States is viewed as kind of a dampening effect, a stabilizing agent, in that part of northeast Asia.

So I think that's pretty important. I think if you swing down and you work your way down through some of the other parts of the Asia-Pacific area, I think we're seen as a link. We're the common thread that links a lot of the nations around there. We come with a lot of capabilities, a lot of it from sea. And so I don't know how much is enough. I just know from my perspective, as I look at that part of the world, I think: We need to have a very good relationship with Malaysia. We need to have a very good relationship with Singapore. We need to have a very good relationship with Thailand. We need to have a very good relationship with New Zealand. And you take a look at those areas there – and I think we do, and we're working pretty hard on it. But I don't know how much is enough. I just know that the president's reorientation has – that main beam on the headlights going to the Pacific is the right thing to do.

*Sarah Chayes:*

So then where do the Marines in particular in Okinawa kinda fit into that part?

*General Jim Amos:*

Well, I think it's not only Okinawa, but we're up on mainland Japan. We've got about 4,500 Marines up in Iwakuni. That's the Marine Aviation piece of this thing, and those are the squadrons that – if something bad happens tonight from North Korea, those are the squadrons that are airborne. I don't mean like tomorrow or a week from now; I mean like tonight. So we've got Marines that are there.

Today we sit – I don't know what the exact number is on Okinawa, but it's probably somewhere around 16,000, 17,000 Marines on Okinawa, I'm guessing, today. We have plans to put 4,700 Marines on Guam. So we're working through all the details of that right now, the planning effort, the budgeting, the finance efforts between the House and the Senate, because some of this is gonna be overseas military construction, to move into Guam.

Now, you ask, "Well, why Guam?" If you look at Guam in relation – Guam is about 1,300 miles kind of seemingly going in the wrong direction. But it's American territory. And if you're

gonna disperse forces in the Pacific and kinda spread them out a little bit, which seems to make sense – ease some of the burden off of Okinawa, which is exactly why the Pacific realignment agreement was signed between our two nations, Japan and the United States, was to ease some of the burden off of Okinawa, spread those Marines out some, and as is the Australian effort. We're not in Australia today, but as soon as the rainy season starts, we're gonna go back in with about 1,100 Marines, in Darwin. And that's phase 2. Our two governments have approved of that. Where do those Marines come from? A lot of them come from Okinawa. We will eventually go to phase 3 when the two governments say, "Okay, this timing is good. The facilities are there. We can do this." And there will be 2,500 Marines.

So as I look across around the Pacific, I go, "Okay, well, we're kinda dispersed fairly well. Admiral Greenert, the chief of naval operations **and sergeant to** the Navy, wants to put some amphibious ships down there. So now you can move around. You got Marines on Darwin, and you can move them around that part of the world and you can engage with your partners.

So that's how I see the layout in the future. I think it's good for all of us. As it relates to your question on Okinawa, I admire the prime minister of Japan, Prime Minister Abe, a lot. And he has been very supportive if the realignment of the Marines in the Pacific to include the building of the airfield up in the northern part of Okinawa, up at Camp Schwab. And the former governor of Okinawa signed the landfill permit; the current governor opposes it. I'm optimistic. I think what we're gonna find is the – I think within Japan, they'll sort this thing out. But when you think about how that part of the world is over there right – not Okinawa, 'cause that's a good part. But some of the other parts of the world are pretty tenuous. It's awful nice to have U.S. forces there to provide that interlinking sense of stability.

*Sarah Chayes:* Right in front here. Here, and then far in the back.

*Audience:* Thank you so much. You talk about – I'm going to ask some broader questions relating to China and Iran. So my name is **Ji Xiaojun** from China Central Television. As we know, China and the U.S. are trying to build a new model of great power relations. So how do you think this new model of relationship can embody from military aspect? And another question about Iran, so –

*Sarah Chayes:* Just one.



*Audience:* Okay, thank you so much.

*Sarah Chayes:* Sorry, there's a lot of folks. In the back there?

*Audience:* Good afternoon. My name is Antoine Huss. It's an honor to be here. I would like to get us back quickly on the stabilization effects. I just returned from three years in Afghanistan as a civilian advisor to the Afghan government. But part of my time there, I was also a civilian stabilization officer embedded in a U.S. military battalion in a key terrain district in Kandahar. And part of the effects that the battalion commander was looking at related to governance and development. And it was a fantastic time to work with military people who understood and were looking at supporting these effects, but I thought they were not always the best place to really support that level of effort, hence the presence in the civilian surge to accompany that. So I just wonder, what are your thoughts and lessons learned from civ-mil integration in a stabilization environment? Thank you.

*Sarah Chayes:* And why don't we see if there's one more. Yeah, in the aisle here.

*Audience:* Thank you. Jonathan Broder from *Congressional Quarterly*. General, there was a story yesterday that the administration has decided to wait until after Karzai finishes his term before signing the Bilateral Security Agreement. My question is, does that leave U.S. forces enough time to pack up and leave, other than those that will remain behind, by the deadline at the end of the year?

*Sarah Chayes:* So the first question's a really broad one, very interesting. Again, it almost follows on the *End of Power* question, a couple that we've been dealing with this afternoon – different configurations of great power relationships, and a really important one is a rising China, so a China that's rising not just economically, but increasingly taking on the responsibilities of a global power, the global power that it is. And I guess the question really had to do with, what is the mil-to-mil piece of that new relationship between perhaps rival, but co-great powers in the world? What does that start to look like? I know there was a carrier, and carriers and submarines have been at the center of that mil-to-mil, at least, exploration.

*General Jim Amos:* Well, that's not exactly what I would describe as mil-to-mil relationship building. But I think to your point here, the – just looking back, I've been a Marine for 43 years, and as I look back in our relationships with other nations around the world, those that we have as strong relationship – it doesn't – pick it – Norway, Jordan, used to be Egypt – we're working our way trying to figure

out how that's gonna work out. But you just kinda go all the way around the world. Those that are nations, the two nations have strong relationships, you'll always see, in every single case, there's a very strong military-to-military relationship.

So as China sorts out how it's going to act responsibly in that part of the world and be a responsible partner on the global scene, it's only in our best interest to have the military commanders, the leadership, connecting with one another. We had the chief of naval operations for the Chinese PLAN come by and spent some time in America not long ago. I had lunch with him. I've been invited this spring to go into China to visit my counterpart in China. I think the other service chiefs are doing it. This is kind of a burgeoning new – these are new opportunities. And I think that we're encouraged to do that as service chiefs, so stay tuned, 'cause I think over the next year or two, we're gonna find that that will really benefit us.

It will take away some of the misunderstanding, and when you really misunderstand and when you got carriers and ships that are out there, now the opportunity for miscalculation is probably reduced, because you actually know somebody on the other end of the phone. So I think it's very, very important. I think we're just getting started now with China.

*Sarah Chayes:*

And there are places where – Egypt being one of them in the past – where that is the lead diplomatic relationship, in effect, for the United States, where the military is playing a lead in certain governments. Do you think that the way those mil-to-mil relationships in those countries are structured is sufficiently sort of broad-ranging to carry the weight of that almost diplomatic aspect of it?

*General Jim Amos:*

Well, I think in those cases – I think Egypt's a good example. It's not what I would call a mil-to-mil. I mean, you get the mil-to-mil among the service chiefs and among the generals and the admirals. But when they say mil-to-mil in Egypt, I mean, you're dealing with the president and his chief of **Assar's** military. You're dealing with that level. That's almost a political military level that's a hybrid. So one is not doing something without the knowledge or the appreciation of the other one. So those are hybrid things.

I think there's probably a place in the world for that. I'm not looking for work, 'cause there's plenty of it to go around, but I do think there's probably countries around the world that it's just their natural way that they do business, and they prefer to do it that way.

So I think if you look back on our militaries, the chairman and some of the chiefs have been really important allies at the very highest level of negotiations and interactions with some of these governments. But I think most of it is probably done the way we would think of it. Civilian governments, things are happening the way that we would like them to happen in our country. But the service chiefs and those senior leaders are working at their level to kinda take away the opportunity for miscalculation.

*Sarah Chayes:* So then, obviously, continued interests in Afghanistan – why don't you take the BSA issue? How much time – well, you know, and I'll add another fill-up to the question. We have a SOFA, right? We have an indefinite SOFA with Afghanistan. Do we even need a BSA in order to stay – to maintain a certain troop level?

*General Jim Amos:* We do. Number one, it's a sovereign nation, and we always have to begin at that point.

*Sarah Chayes:* But we have a SOFA with them, right? We got a signed status of forces agreement.

*General Jim Amos:* Well, we have a – I don't know that we do. I just know that we've had an agreement on how we were gonna deal with – I don't know whether we would call it – whether it's officially a SOFA or not. Do you know whether it is?

*Sarah Chayes:* My understanding is we have one.

*General Jim Amos:* Okay, there might be.

*Sarah Chayes:* That NATO, that the allies don't.

*General Jim Amos:* Okay. All right. And you know more about that – I just know that we've had an agreement on how we would be able to do things and what happens if something bad happened, if – what is it that keeps our forces out of court in Afghanistan if they're accused of a crime? How does that happen? That's the agreement – that's part of the agreement, and the other part of the agreement's how many forces you're gonna – but I don't know whether it's a SOFA or not, so I can't comment on that.

*Sarah Chayes:* So then let's talk about timing. Is there a sorta hard date by which we need to know one way or the other in order to get out in time?

*General Jim Amos:* Physics begin to play in here. It's a function of throughput with equipment. In a perfect world, you don't wanna leave your

equipment in there. That's why I made the statement up there, we've got well over 70 percent of our gear out. I'm actually very pleased about that. And we're working very hard to get it all out. Ideally what you'd wanna do is, on December the 31st, the last piece of equipment's loaded on an airplane or loaded on a jingle truck and it's heading down to Karachi, while the last Marine gets on a plane and flies out on December 31st. Never gonna work that way.

There is physics involved in here, not only on people, but stuff. I don't know what the exact cutoff time is. We need to get General Dunford in here to talk to us about that, but I promise you, he's thought through this. He and I haven't talked – we've talked often, but he and I haven't talked about – there is some point, as time moves along, and we get – is it the end of April, after the elections? Well, what if there's a runoff? So now we're gonna have another election, so when is that? Is that July? So then you come out the backside of that, and so then when does the new president get reinstated? That assumes that everything's moving along.

So I did see that same article in the paper today, by the way, that said we'll just deal with the new president. I don't know that that's true or not; I just read the same paper you did, so I can't comment on that. But I do think that we will reach a point – and I don't know when it is – that you're not gonna get – I think you can get everybody out. You just won't be able to get all the equipment. I think with enough airplanes and enough movement, you can get everybody out. It would be not ideal.

*Sarah Chayes:* Yeah, each day.

*General Jim Amos:* I worry about the equipment, I'll be honest with you.

*Sarah Chayes:* What about the military and civilian interaction? And I think it would be pretty interesting to discuss not only on the ground, on the sorta tactical level – were there, are there enough civilians doing the types of civilian – we get back to this "balance of the instruments of power" question with this.

*General Jim Amos:* You're thinking about Afghanistan?

*Sarah Chayes:* In Afghanistan, the civilians on the ground. But I would like to add to that also the amount of time at high levels spent thinking through the civilian dimensions of the Afghanistan problem, as opposed to incessantly kinda asking how many guys and gals in

uniform being deployed on what missions – the sort of balance between the focus both on what civilians are doing on the ground, but also civilian decision makers and decision making, civilian policy at a high level.

*General Jim Amos:* Well, to begin with, for the last – really, until just fairly recently, I think you'd – I'll just speak for the Marines in Helmand. There have not been enough civilians on the ground in Helmand Province. There's not been enough of the other forms of government to help us stabilize, teach governments, build governments, set up things like governance, a rule of law. So my sense, I'll just tell you, I don't think there's been enough of it.

Those that have been there have been enormously courageous, and I met them from time to time on my business going in and out. And they've been there under some very dangerous conditions. So when you travel to these villages – so you travel to these towns, to help them do the things that you hope civilians will help you do because they know more about it than you do, they have to be willing to put their life at risk, and that's an awful hard thing to get people to do.

So it's one thing to say there's not enough; it's another thing to understand that the environment around there for some time was not real secure. You've got to build security first before you can do any of the rest of the stuff. In a perfect world, you'd do it all at the same time. Doesn't work that way, not when people are out there getting killed. You get a truckload of your civilian workers, and then they all die in a single incident.

So I think that we've not done that well. I always get asked the question "Well, how can we fix that for the future?" And I don't know what the answer of it is. I just know this: that there's no military commander on the ground out there now, especially having gone through 12 years between Iraq and Afghanistan, that doesn't have a grave appreciation for the civilian part of the solution set for the way ahead. There's not a commander out there – I've got a bunch of them in the back of the room back there, and they will tell you that they truly appreciated those that came forward.

So at the strategic level, Sarah, I wasn't part of the discussions between state and between the other governmental agencies of how much is enough, what's it gonna take to stabilize the provinces, how much are we gonna have to parse out to the provinces. I can't speak to that. I just know that my sense is we've not had enough,

and even though it becomes contentious and it's hard and it's dangerous, those few people that have been in the Helmand Province have made a difference. I mean, they have made a difference. They just – they organize. They think and view things differently than we do. And we need that if you're gonna – because when we pull out of there in December, the fruits of their efforts, not only our efforts of security, but their efforts are gonna be governance, rule of law, stability in the provinces in the district.

*Sarah Chayes:* Do we have time for one more? One more question or one more round?

*Audience:* I would say one more question in five minutes.

*Sarah Chayes:* Okay. So then I'll take one right on the end here.

*Audience:* General, I'm Will –

*Sarah Chayes:* Do you wanna go **straight out after this**?

*Audience:* I'm Will Imbrie from DynCorp International. You were talking about civilians and their role in working with the military in an operation like Afghanistan. Contractors are now clearly part of the total force. What have you learned from Afghanistan, and how are you gonna plan for the inclusion of contractors in the future?

*General Jim Amos:* You know, it's an interesting question because, depending on who you're talking to, you're either in a friendly audience when you talk about contractors or you're in an antagonistic audience and they say bad things. I'm kind of a balanced guy on this thing, because I've seen the value of contractors. You mentioned contractors are part of the total force. I don't know that I would say it quite like that, but it doesn't matter. But your intent, I think, is correct. They are part of – they're gonna be a part of future operations, because they bring a skill set; they bring a capability to ease the pressure in certain areas to allow the force to go do something else. And in some cases, like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area, they're the experts. They know precisely what it takes to help out in a relief effort. So I think contractors are gonna be on the scene.

Have we gone – I think the question, have we gone too far? I don't know. I just know that – I'll give you examples for our contractors. If you went into Helmand Province today, you would find – and I won't say the name of the firm, but we've got a series of sets of contractors that have been rebuilding our equipment. When we were in Iraq and Afghanistan – in fact, if you'd have gone to

**Altakadaman** in Anbar Province, you'd have gone off to the side a lot, and there was a whole lot of equipment. There was a whole lot full of equipment, how's that? And they had a lot of equipment on it. And in there were guys in coveralls with little nametags and badges and sewn-on things, sewn-on badges, that had the front ends of MRAPs taken off and the motors taken out of them, and they were rebuilding our stuff, 'cause we didn't send it back to America; we kept it over there and we recycled it. We're doing the same thing in Afghanistan.

So I'll tell you what. Contractors in that case are – they've saved the government a fortune in shipment costs to moving things back and forth to America and sending it through our depots. So then you get into war-fighting contractors, some of the contractors that are dealing with security. How much of that is enough? I don't know. Is it bad? I think there's a balance there. I think contractors are gonna be part of the future.

And one of the things that, as service chiefs and, actually, the leadership of the Department of Defense, is the protection of the contractors. What is our responsibility to protect contractors? And then, really, how about the rules of – not only the rules of engagement, but kinda the law of war and those kinda of things as it deals with contractors? If contractors go do something unseemly – so what do we do? What's our responsibility to protect them or keep them out of the courts in the country that we happen to be in? So I think contractors are the way of the future. Do we have too much? I don't know, maybe we do. And we're a small service. To be honest with you, the Marine Corps's pretty lean. If you find contractors hanging around us, it's typically they're there for a very specific reason and they're doing a very specific job for us.

*Sarah Chayes:*

Thank you very much, indeed. Thank you all for coming, and join me in thanking General Amos.

*[Applause]*

*[End of Audio]*