

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**BLOODBATH IN BOMBAY: INDIA'S
LEADING VOICES SPEAK OUT**

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ASHLEY J. TELLIS: Good morning, everyone. I'm Ashley Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. And it's a pleasure to welcome all of you to this meeting that we are having with a very distinguished visiting Indian delegation on the very tragic events that have occurred in Mumbai in the last several weeks. I think all of you know the facts as well as anybody in the room because they transpired, unfortunately, on public television and took place in a rather ghastly way in slow motion.

And beyond the tragedy and the casualties, the attacks have raised a whole series of questions about the nature of global terrorism itself and the kind of threats that it poses to not only India but free societies around the world, including to the United States.

This morning, we have with us a very distinguished delegation of Indian public figures who were in Washington to attend a dialogue of the Aspen Strategy Group and CII [Confederation of Indian Industry]. In fact, it was in one of the great achievements I think of the first Bush term that CII and Aspen managed to put together this very, very productive and very influential private sector dialogue which has occurred now continuously since 2002. I was at the embassy in Delhi, in fact, when we had the very first round of these meetings.

The Indian delegation today is led by two individuals, one of whom is unfortunately not with us; he had to leave very suddenly last night, Tarun Das. But we have the co-chair, Ambassador Sati Lambah, who's leading this delegation of individuals that you see before you today. The delegation actually is divided into two parts. Because it's a large delegation, every one of whom is actually competent to speak on the subject, I've just asked a subset of them, in the interest of time, to speak for five minutes on what the implications of the attacks in Bombay are for a larger set of issues.

We don't need to go over the facts because I think the facts are well understood. But I've asked each of them to speak on what the attacks in Bombay mean for the challenges of terrorism, how we understand it, how we appreciate it, its implications for India, India's relations with Pakistan, India's role and place in the international community, and the threats that these events pose to India and the United States. And I'm going to ask each of the presenters this morning who are at the table, Ambassador Sati Lambah to my extreme right, followed by Mr. Jamshyd Godrej, then General Sati Nambiar, Ambassador Parthasarathy, and Mr. Sudheendra Kulkarni, to speak briefly – and where is Suresh Prabhu, I thought we had –

MR. : Yeah.

MR. TELLIS: – Suresh Prabhu here –

MR. : He's coming.

MR. TELLIS: Okay. And Suresh Prabhu, who is a member of parliament, who actually represents Bombay in the Lok Sabha, will be the last panelist. Now, after that, I'm going to invite the rest of the members of the delegation who are sitting in front of me here to join us at the table and then the Q&A will proceed pretty much with an interaction between the floor and all the members of the panel here.

I want to take the time to just say something administrative. We would not have been able to put this event together were it not for two organizations: CII, of course, which brought the panel

here to the United States and which oversaw the very productive conversations that we've had over the weekend and the conversations that took place yesterday with the senior leadership of the U.S. government, both in the executive branch and the legislature; and Lockheed Martin, which made a very critical contribution to helping us actually pull this event off with very short notice and in a hall like this. So I can see Chuck Jones there; Chuck, thank you very much for your support. And CII, which has been a long partner, not only of the Aspen Strategy Group but actually of Carnegie, too, going back many, many years. We did a lot of work on trade together. Thank you very much for the help and support.

Without further ado, I'm going to ask each of the panelists to speak for about five minutes on the issues that I raised and then I'm going to open the floor to a conversation between both sides. Ambassador Lambah.

AMBASSADOR SATINDER K. LAMBAH: Thank you, Ashley. Well, September 11th exposed as never before the vulnerability of even a superpower to terrorism. But long before September 11th, 2001, India had been campaigning for a resolution in the U.N., for an early adoption of a comprehensive draft convention on suppression of international terrorism. What came after September 11th was UNSC Resolution 1373, which was adopted on September 28th, which, amongst other things, called for prevention and suppression of financing of terrorist acts, freezing of financial assets, exchange of operational information regarding movement of terrorists, and stopping the use of asylum status for terrorists. It said that the states have a fundamental responsibility to curb terrorist activities. I thought I'll begin with this. And now I'll come to the Mumbai blasts.

You will all agree that India has shown restraint. This was an attack on our sovereignty. Even after the Mumbai blast of 2006, we had continued with the peace process. This was 9/11 for us. What happened there was segregation of the Americans, U.K., and Israeli citizens. It's now virtually confirmed that Pakistan soil was used and there is no guarantee that such a thing will not be repeated.

But I want to mention two or three things that happened. While this was going on, one-fifth of India went to the polls; successfully we had elections in five states, results of which were announced yesterday. So there was a peaceful continuation of the democratic process. I don't want you to look at what happened in an Indo-Pak context, only in an India-Pakistan context. President-elect Obama has been mentioning that the next hub of activities is Pakistan, so you have to look at it at an international aspect rather than purely Indian context.

So one, democracy continues. And secondly, I want to assure you that Indian economic development continues and India will be as good a place to do business with as it was before the Bombay blast. I want to mention a word before I conclude about the Lashkar-e-Taiba. And for that, I will just recommend three readings for you, all three Pakistani books. Amir Rana's "A to Z of Jihadi Organizations," and Amir Mir's "True Faces of Jihadis." If you read these two books, you will find how the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other organizations evaded sanctions. And finally, a book that I just saw here is by Mr. Husain Haqqani, and I just read and saw the pages, it's 306, which says that severance pay was given – has been given to the Lashkar-e-Taiba by the ISI. So the links between the two are evident, as the ambassador of Pakistan to USA has himself said.

I don't want to take more of your time because I promised Ashley that I will finish in four minutes. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Sati. Jamshyd, please.

JAMSHYD N. GODREJ: Thank you. I want to just focus a little bit on the business aspects and the effect on business as a result of this attack. I think the confidence level amongst businesses within India actually was not destroyed as a result of these attacks. The Bombay stock market was closed for one day, but the day immediately after, when it was open on the Friday, it actually went up slightly. And I think there is a general feeling amongst the business community that things will go on and we will get the growth that we're looking for.

I think the confidence that has really evaporated has been in the foreign business community. I've been – I was to host a number of programs even in the coming year and all of them have called to say that we'd like to defer these programs. So I think that we need to build back confidence in the international community that this is an event that could take place anywhere in the world, but that specifically in Bombay we have to now take action on improving our security levels. I think that we had let our guard down. I think this was one of the problems that we face. Earlier, there was a heightened sense of preparedness, especially when we had the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra in Bombay, just a month before this happened. And I think that level of preparedness has just – so I think what we have to understand is that this is a constant threat and we have to work on it.

I think there is another aspect of this on the business community, which is basically that I think there is a huge opportunity for firms both domestic as well as foreign to actually look at the type of hard and soft infrastructure that we have against terrorism. And I think there is – this is something that we must really focus on in years to come because it's not something that has been at the top of the mind. Inconvenience and all those other things which we see in the U.S., like at the airports, et cetera, is something that we will have to learn to put up with. I think people – memories are very short; but this is a long-term threat and we need to look at it from that point of view.

I think that there was no doubt that the business community was targeted and that, yes, of course, there have been many foreigners who were caught in this terrorist attack. But the overwhelming number of those who died were the security agencies and staff at the hotels, et cetera. So I think that this type of preparedness is something that we have to learn to build and live with.

MR. TELLIS: General Nambiar.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR: Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'll just focus on three issues. The first, of course, is the fact that this was a very much closely-planned and well-executed operation by a bunch of well-equipped and motivated persons. In fact, it had all the hallmarks of a classic military raid, the sort of thing when I watched it unfold, I was reminded of one's own experience. I had undertaken a thing like this almost four decades ago as a young major, so that's the sort of thing one was struck by. Gone are the days when we only have to focus on some lunatic driving a loaded – a truck loaded with explosives into something. It's much more sophisticated.

The second aspect I wish to focus on, partly carrying on from where Jamshyd Godrej took off, that this was an attack on Indian economy, Indian business. And this is something that many of us in the strategic community in India have been talking of as something we should prepare for. But

it was quite evident that this was going to happen some time or the other because to hit us or strike us where our economic growth would be affected was obviously going to be a target some time or the other. So it's not surprising.

And what is more important in that context, I think, is that we will need to strengthen our laws, internal laws, the law-and-order mechanism, to deal with such things, which means as many countries in the West have done after the events, sad events of 2001. There would be some curbs on individual liberties, which all of us will have to accept. And this is not, of course, to suggest that basic human rights have to be violated; but some curbs on individual liberties will have to be accepted by us if this menace has to be dealt with.

The last is, again, something which Sati Lambah briefly touched on, this comprehensive convention on counterterrorism. Given the fact that the situation all around the world is so serious and this phenomenon affects everyone, I was a member of the UN Security Council's high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change in 2003-2004. And in this group, 16 of us who were from all over the world, we had come up with – we deliberated long on this subject and managed to come up with a definition of terrorism, which has, you know, sort of evaded the international community all these years. But despite everything, we managed to come up and we had come up with some suggestions. But it's a reflection of the bankruptcy of the international community that that aspect of the report didn't find acceptance in the international community and we remain where we are, without even a definition of what constitutes terrorism, leave alone a comprehensive convention.

And why this is important is, in my view, there is a need to review and revise all these sort of elements that we keep discussing, people's references to the root causes of terrorism, that it's due to poverty and deprivation, and depends upon a solution to the problems in Palestine, in Chechnya, in Jammu and Kashmir. I'm not too sure about that because there's much more now at stake. Even if those are resolved, I don't think this phenomenon is going to disappear because there is a larger agenda which is being attempted. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Sati. Partha, please.

AMBASSADOR G PARTHASARATHY: Thank you, Ashley. I'll focus on what we came here for, what we discussed with our American counterparts. We were sort of gratified to be received by the secretary of state and the deputy secretary of defense also. Basically, I think we found a great deal of congruence and the United States-India relationship is really looking upward. We hope to maintain that momentum on the immediate neighborhood, which is our strategic neighborhood from Malacca to Hormuz, whether it is tsunami or piracy, there has been a great deal of cooperation.

There was a substantial focus of attention naturally on Afghanistan and Pakistan. On Afghanistan, our broad view was America should stay the course and we were gratified that the American delegation was highly appreciative of the way India had coordinated its efforts with what the United States was doing. In the long term, it is our view that the scope has to be broadened. I think Russia, Iran, the Central Asian neighbors of Afghanistan have to be brought into the dialogue on the future so that we have an Afghanistan, which is nobody's strategic debt, nobody's pawn, and no threat to the security of anybody. I think there was a broad consensus on that.

On Pakistan itself, we did recognize that over the last three or four years, very substantial progress had been made in the dialogue, at a pace which we haven't seen in the past. Following the declaration with Mr. Vajpayee on January 4, Pakistan and India, where General Musharraf said that territory under Pakistan's control would not be used for terrorism, a huge number of CBMs, a lot of progress in SAARC, Afghanistan has joined the SAARC, a free trade area has come into being in South Asia. The line of control has been opened out for trade and travel. And most important, there has been a very sustained dialogue on Kashmir, according to Foreign Minister Kasuri, with substantial progress made.

So I think the ultimate aim should be to get back to the dialogue and carry it forward from where it ended around March, April 2007 when General Musharraf informed us he was rather deeply domestically engaged to carry it forward. We recognize that Mr. Zardari appears committed to this process. Whether he will be able to prevail over other elements in his establishment to take it forward remains to be seen.

On the Mumbai incident itself, a lot has been said. I just have the following points to make. Firstly, this is the first time investigations have involved friendly powers whose citizens were targeted: the British, the Americans, and the Israelis. So there's no question of India cooking up cases as some people are given to making. And much of the evidence you'll find that is coming out of Washington, the evidence of ISI involvement in the attack on our embassy in Kabul came out from Washington and from Kabul, not from Delhi.

On the Lashkar and the groups involved themselves, I will just say this: we are constantly told what is the evidence. When we give evidence about the Jaish-e-Mohammed attacking our parliament on December 13, 2001, there were flat denials. Yet on March 6, 2004, General Javed Ashraf Qazi, former director general of the ISI, then Pakistan's minister for railways, said the following – and I quote him in Pakistan's Parliament, and he said, we must admit that the Jaish-e-Mohammed has been involved in the killing of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, the attack on the Indian Parliament, the murder of Daniel Pearl, and an attempt to assassinate General Musharraf. So I don't know what further evidence we can provide for Maulana Masood Azhar and others to be prosecuted when Pakistan's former ISI chief makes this solemn assurance in the floor of Pakistan's Parliament and General Qazi is still a serving senator.

Similarly, in the case of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, I don't know what evidence we should provide, because it's all there in Pakistan. Shortly after the attack on the Red Fort in Delhi where civilians were killed, Hafeez Mohammed Saeed went in public in a meeting at which Maulana Masood Azhar and Qazi Husain Ahmed were present and acknowledged it very proudly that he had planted the Pakistani flag on the Red Fort, which was the ruling place of the country's past Muslim rulers. So what more evidence do we need to provide? Anybody who reads the *Da'wa* magazine brought out by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, I think on a fortnightly basis, will find all the evidence that is needed in that magazine.

And finally, on the Lashkar itself, I would conclude by what Mr. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's present ambassador to the United States, wrote in an article called, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihad and Jihadi Groups." And he says there that the Lashkar-e-Taiba has adopted a maximalist agent for global – agenda for global jihad. The elite or the army of the pure, he said, is backed by Saudi money and protected by Pakistani intelligence services. This is not an Indian – this is Pakistan's ambassador to the United States. So I don't think that there is any further evidence.

My own view is we are keeping a close watch on what is happening, the arrests which are said to have been made, but are then denied. And ultimately, I think we will have to – there can be no compromise on one thing: the infrastructure of terrorism, which includes the Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, whatever, the Jaish-e-Mohammed assumes a new name, the Lashkar-e-Taiba assumes a new name, and the United Jihad Council, they will have to be shut down irrevocably, if necessary mandated under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.

And then, we can go back to a very positive process, which we are engaged in, where we had met substantial progress, in fact even on nuclear confidence building measures, we had agreed in 2004 that our respective nuclear arsenals constitute a force for strategic stability, especially after the doctrine was spread out by General Kiyani. So there is a huge scope for getting back to a normal relationship. But we aren't going to accept any more Mumbais. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Partha. Sudheendra, please.

SUDHEENDRA KULKARNI: Thank you, my friend, Ashley. We have spent five days in Washington, D.C. to participate in this dialogue and every American diplomat who interacted with us expressed condolence for what happened in Mumbai. As Ashley said, the attack on Mumbai was not just an attack on Mumbai, not just an attack on India; it was an attack on all free society, attack on humanity, just as 9/11 was an attack on humanity.

I come from Mumbai. I happened to be landing in Mumbai just 10 minutes after a blast took place outside the airport. I witnessed the 1993 serial bomb blasts in my city which killed 257 people. I was in Mumbai in 2006 when again serial bomb blasts simultaneously in running trains killed nearly 200 people. And now again, nearly 200 people have been killed, many of them foreigners. And of course, as Jamshyd said, a lot many that belonged to the business community, but not only business community.

Friends, an attack took place in the railway station, ordinary people, commuters, poor commuters, 58 of them were killed. Between 2004 and now, more people have died in terrorist attacks in India than anywhere in the world except Iraq. And if we see the number of people who have been killed in terrorist attacks since the late '70s when cross-border terrorism from Pakistan began, the number actually runs into 70 (thousand), 80,000 people. India has been the worst victim and also India has tolerated the most.

There's no doubt, as evidence after evidence has established, that this is coming from Pakistan. And those who perpetrated the attacks are doing so in the name of Islam. But this is not a confrontation between one faith and other faiths, not one community and another community. In Mumbai attack itself, not less than 30 Muslims were killed. This is an attack. This is a confrontation between an evil force and humanity, an evil force that is giving bad name to a faith, to a community, and it's a responsibility of all faith communities, all countries in the world to fight this evil force together.

As my colleagues said, Pakistan has been giving assurance after assurance. In 2004, I was in Islamabad as part of the official delegation that accompanied Prime Minister Vajpayee for the SAARC Summit, on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit. President Musharraf gave a solemn

assurance that the soil of Pakistan will not be used or will not be allowed to be used by anybody for terrorist attacks against India. Where is that assurance? How should India react?

The United States reacted in a particular manner after 9/11. You were justified in doing so. We would like to know from all our friends in the international community, how should India react? There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that if Pakistan does not do what is required to be done to prevent more Mumbais from happening, as Mr. Parthasarathy said, India will react.

The infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan has to be dismantled. It's a threat to Pakistan itself. We have seen recent events. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, more than 130 people killed when Bhutto arrived in Karachi last year. It's a threat to Pakistan's own survival. And therefore, this is a fight in which India, the people of Pakistan, all the right-thinking people in the political establishment, military establishment in Pakistan, and, of course, the international community, we have to work together. This is a threat, not only to India.

I was with Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2000 when he visited the United States. And in his address to the U.S. Congress, Prime Minister Vajpayee said, giving an account of all that India has suffered, he told our American friends that distance does not provide immunity to the United States from the threat of terrorism. And just a year later, 9/11 happened. In the past seven years, we are very happy; it's very reassuring that the United States has not faced any more terrorist attacks. But friends, let there be no complacency. Just as what happened in Mumbai is not the last attack that India is going to face, 9/11 is not the last attack that the United States has faced. We have to work together. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Suresh.

SURESH PRABHU: Thank you, Ashley. You know, India has been facing terrorist attacks for the last I don't know how many decades. Unfortunately, despite the fact that India has been – (inaudible) – the international community, however, the impact of this on the entire global community unfortunately we didn't realize it until 9/11 happened in the United States, when people suddenly realized it is no longer a problem which is some Third World problem affecting some countries in a faraway place; but it is something which is a problem which is going to be affecting me.

And then we started talking about 9/11 as the beginning of terrorist attacks on the humanity. But unfortunately, if we had actually realized the importance of this problem when India was talking about it, probably 9/11 would never have happened. If we acted on it in time, probably this phenomena, which now assumes such a serious proportion, would never have reached this type of a problem.

What we are seeing now in Mumbai, what we are discussing today, is a different type of a terrorist attack India has been facing, as I said, for a long time. But the frequency and the intensity of this attack is now increasing. Post-9/11, the type of steps that the United States took and they are very commendable, very welcome, has resulted in American citizens now being targeted all over the world. The vulnerability of American citizens, the British citizens, the Israeli citizens has now increased, not just confined to the countries in which they live, their home countries, but all over the world. And this particular attack is an example of how the terrorists are now targeting their enemies not just in the countries where in they live but all over the world.

And therefore, this is a new dimension of terrorism that is now manifesting itself. And therefore, our response should be commensurate with the reality of the challenge, in terms of how we should try to now fathom the reality first and then try to respond. Pakistani president, who lost his wife in the terrorist attack, said the other day that it's not Pakistan which is responsible; they are non-state actors. So he's acknowledging that Pakistani soil is used. He's also realizing that there are Pakistani citizens maybe involved, but they are operating outside the state, which is right, that I'm not responsible as a head of the state, but there are some others operating outside the state who are perpetrating such crimes.

Now, we should try to therefore realize that we should also help Pakistan in the process of solving this problem of terrorism because we don't want more Benazir Bhuttos to die on Pakistani soil, who are part of proper democratic process, and therefore we really need to solve this problem in a manner that will go to the root cause of it. And if we don't do that, we'll find now, we talk about Mumbai – maybe some other time we'll talk about attacks in some other country, some other nomenclature, but probably will still exist. And therefore it's a time that the global community must get together to address the challenge. This is not a Mumbai problem, though it happened on Mumbai soil. It's a global problem and unless you realize that, recognize that, you fail to recognize and risk repeating it again. Twenty-five years ago, had the world listened to what India was saying, the problem probably would never have reached these proportions.

So therefore, we really need to address the challenge. I'm from Mumbai; all my life I lived in Mumbai. I'm a member of parliament and therefore I live in Mumbai and I know exactly how strongly the people in Mumbai, for that matter people in India, are feeling about it. Again, let me tell you, unfortunately, the terrorist design is to divide the community on religious lines. They wanted to make sure that there would be a backlash of non-Muslim communities to this attack against the Muslims living in India and this – to the credit of the Indian society – didn't happen. In fact, the Muslims in India brought out a huge march on Sunday in which they protested against the attack. The Muslim religious leaders who came together to say that these people who came and attacked our Indian brothers, we are not going to bury them in our own burial grounds, so they refused the permission to that. So this is the type of response that Indian society has already provided. But Indian society is waiting for the government to respond to this challenge. Because we can't keep killing people, innocent people dying in marketplaces, in railway stations, in roads, in hotels, in airplanes. So they are expecting government to act.

Now, it's the global community's turn to respond, because some might say, oh, this happened, but just ignore it because this happened in your country, so we advise you to be patient. If this is something, the type of response you want to give, then we are encouraging terrorism globally. We are telling them that, don't worry, nothing happens, you keep killing people, and there is good advice, sound advice, very patient advice which will come to you, and that advice should be used as a bomb to suppress the feelings of the people who are now infuriated. That could be another way of looking at it. So I think this is a time that global community must rise to think how we should tackle this problem.

There are many ways we can tackle it. And I'm not the one who's going to give you an answer, probably there are people, experts like my friend Ashley who can provide an answer. And in fact, we don't answer. Something like this we don't know the solution, we know the answer, everybody talks about it. But do we have the political will? Do we realize that it's not a challenge

only to India? Is it something which we have to face it collectively? If we realize that, we realize that – because otherwise the intensity will rise again.

There will be some other attacks taking place somewhere. What happened in Copenhagen, if somebody comes out with a cartoon, there is an attack, if something happens – then probably we have to think about it – and this is my own submission – that Pakistan itself, I would not blame Pakistan state as a whole for that. There are some Pakistanis involved in it, but not Pakistan, the state as a whole. So we, as India, we also have a stake in ensuring that Pakistan becomes a stable state. We want Pakistan to be a democratic state. But a democratic state cannot survive if Pakistani president himself feels that there are non-state actors who are actually trying to subvert the state. So we have to work on that, make sure that we really go to the root cause of terrorism and root it out completely so that no innocent people will die anywhere in any part of the world in future. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Suresh. In the aftermath of the Second World War, after we all saw the horrors of Nazi terror, Hannah Arendt wrote a book called “The Banality of Evil.” And when one listens to Indians describe their experience of terrorism since the 1980s, it’s not hard to remember Arendt’s description because there’s something about terrorism in India that has become routine, that become banal, that has become part of the mental architecture of Indian democracy. And this is, of course, unfortunate. And all of us watching from the outside sympathize with it. But those who are victims of the process, to them terrorism is anything but banal.

And I think one of the lessons that we ought to take from the recent events in Bombay is that this banality can strike very far from what the intentions of its perpetrators have been. I’m deeply grateful to the panelists this morning for having explored the experience of Bombay from a variety of perspectives and for not doing what often happens in discussions of this kind, which is a mono-causal accusation against any particular group or any particular country. This is a problem of enormous complexity and it certainly poses very difficult challenges to the United States.

The U.S. traditionally has looked at the problems of terrorism in India, of course, with a great deal of sympathy, but primarily from the perspective of trying to understand what its implications are for conflict between India and Pakistan and a great deal of our diplomatic efforts historically have been focused on preventing the terrorism that occurs in India, often supported by groups operating out of Pakistan from becoming the moment for another India-Pakistan conflict. Those objectives are understandable and they are often desirable. But they are ultimately insufficient because conflict management cannot be successful if, at the end of the day, it is not extended to appreciating the dynamics that will cause the constant provocation.

And today it is becoming very clear, both to policy-makers here and to policy-makers around the world, that the dynamics that drive terrorism within South Asia have transcended the “root causes,” quote, unquote, that originally might have given rise to those terrorists. And so dealing with this kind of a threat is going to be a challenge not only to India, but also to the United States, particularly in the weeks and months ahead because India’s final response to the attacks in Bombay have not yet occurred. This is a process that is continuing to evolve. And it will be a process that will pose challenges, of course, to India’s policy-makers who will have to make some hard decisions about whether what has happened in Pakistan over the last few days constitutes sufficient remedy for the tragedies. And from the decisions that they make, there will be policy challenges also posed to the United States.

All these issues are, in a sense, open for discussion. And I invite members from the floor to either respond or to direct questions to the panelists both here and to those who are sitting in the front row. And I want to recognize them. We have Mr. Harpal Singh, who has been associated with Indian industry, particularly its very successful pharmaceutical sector for many years. We have Ambassador Rajendra Abhyankar who was secretary when I was in Delhi and then India's ambassador to the EU. We have Mr. M.R. Srinivasan, who was associated with the Indian atomic energy program for many years, became the chairman of the atomic energy commission and was – played a very helpful role while we were negotiating the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement. We have Vice-Admiral Premvir Das, who was retired as commander of India's eastern command. And we have Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, who is now the foreign editor for The Hindustan Times. Gentlemen, I would deeply appreciate it if you could come to the front so that the audience can see you and I would also like you to be full participants in the discussion that follows.

Please raise your hands if you want to make an intervention, a question, identify yourself so that our panelists can understand who you are, where you're coming from, and there will be a microphone that I think is circulating around the room, which we will bring once I recognize you. By the way, the full biographies of all the panelists are outside and you should have received them as you came in. Yes, ma'am.

Q: (Inaudible, off mike) – with the Associated Press. I'm wondering if you can tell me what you think this group hoped to accomplish regionally, strategically, why they would have used the attack method that they used, small-arms attack as opposed to explosives. Was there some reason for that? And, at a minimum, what Pakistan needs to do in order for you to be satisfied that the problem is being appropriately addressed?

MR. PARTHASARATHY: There are two types of terrorist attack, one where there are sleeper cells within India, those have involved seeking out local collaborators and random bomb explosions. This was very, very targeted and I'll ask Admiral Premvir Das to explain really the graphic description of how it took place because he's in the Navy, I'm not.

Therefore, there is – as Mr. Godrej said, I see two serious sort of aims behind it. First there was one occasion where the supporters, the terrorist supporters, the terrorists themselves spoke to an Indian T.V. channel, spoke in Urdu. And those of us who live in the subcontinent know how to understand a Punjabi speaking Urdu. It was not somebody from India. Second, there was a reference to Deccan mujahadeen. Nobody – (inaudible) – Hyderabad Deccan; no Indian of any religious denomination refers to Hyderabad and India's Hyderabad as Deccan. If you read the magazines of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, it is referred to as Hyderabad Deccan, because in the various liberation – Muslim lands the Lashkar wishes to liberate – (inaudible) – of all the Muslims of India and they extend it to Spain and Andalusia as very much part of the Lashkar-e objective.

But the political objective was very clearly using this, making them seem to be Indian Muslims to create a communal holocaust between Hindus and Muslims. And I think both communities responded splendidly. The member of parliament has spoken about how the Muslim community has called these people as not human and refused to bury them in any Muslim graveyard in India. That objective failed. On the other objective, I think it was economic. Bombay – if you see the targets which have taken place recently in terrorist attacks: Delhi, political capital; Bangalore and Hyderabad, high-tech cities of India; and Mumbai. Very clearly, it is to erode international

confidence in India's growth, which incidentally has been 9 percent per annum over the last four years on an average. And despite the crisis, growth would go down to, I think, this year around 7 percent. So I think these were the two main political objectives.

What do we desire from Pakistan? Now, I speak here as an individual who has spent seven years – almost six to seven years in Pakistan. I have many Pakistani friends and I very clearly draw a distinction between those thousands of friends I have in Pakistan and the perpetrators of this. I think the minimum we would require is an irrevocable disbandment of the infrastructure of terrorism. Three organizations I have named, the Jaish, the Lashkar and the United Jihad Council.

And this time, no playing games. Last time, the Lashkar changed its name; the Jaish changed its name. The monies and their funds were spirited out before the funding crackdown came. We are not going to be satisfied with games. We want this seriously done. We are very gratified at the way the international community has joined us led by the United States. And we hope that this – ultimately, you have a mechanism. You have a body, which is Security Council Resolution 1373. Ideally from my point of view, the banning has to be done and effectively seen to be done under international inspection, under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.

MR. TELLIS: Premvir, do you want to say a few words about the –

VICE ADMIRAL DAS: You know, in a Hollywood movie, there are the principal characters and then there is a supporting cast. So the principal actors are all there and I am member of the supporting cast. But I have to refer very briefly to what General Nambiar said was a military operation. Actually, this operation can be broken into two parts: how they approached was a naval operation. And what they did thereafter and that is certainly not a military operation. So this is how this operation can be broken down into.

But let us just see – so we have read everything in the papers as to what has happened. But let us see actually what happened. There are 10 people who take a boat from Karachi. They come to the coast of India. They hijack a 40-ton fishing boat, a very unsophisticated type of fishing boat. And they put in this boat a GPS, a SATCOM set, and then they come toward Mumbai in this little 40-ton boat.

The sea is not very calm in Bombay at this time. As we saw from the video next day when this little boat was actually found, she was tossing around in the sea. But five miles from Bombay, these people now transfer from this 40-ton boat into what we call a rubber dingy – the height of a rubber dingy here. At best, in the navy, I would be hesitant to put more than six people in this dingy in that kind of sea condition. But in that kind of sea where the boat – the parent boat is tossing around, they put into this boat 10 people with lifejackets inflated. And any of you who have ever worn a lifejacket inflated know how it encumbers your freedom of action thereafter. Okay.

Now, so they lure this boat. And as each of the boats is moving around, they put in this boat first these 10 fellows. They put in this boat an outboard motor, which is then connected and started. They put in this boat 10 AK-47 rifles. They put in this boat 60 magazines all loaded, six for each person. They put in this boat 200 grenades, 20 for each person. They put into the boat a dozen containers of RDX explosive. This is what this boat is now carrying. And then it heads for the beach.

The beach is actually not a beach. It is a residential area of fishermen. About 5,000 fishermen live around the beach where these people have landed. When you are in a rough sea condition in a dingy, anybody who is on a dingy, anybody who has been there in a dingy knows that the visibility is not much more than 200 yards. And they have navigated five miles in this dingy and then landed ashore. Each – (inaudible) – walked around with something more than 60 pounds of weight with those grenades and those magazines and things like that and done whatever they did.

What did they target? Two hotels. They have gone there. They have shot up all the – some Englishmen have died; some Americans have died. But even more important, they have targeted a house – a non-descript apartment building, which is known to be visited and known to be host to Israeli people. And they have killed everybody. In the hotel, they have not killed everybody. But in this building, they have killed everybody. This is how this operation has been carried out.

I do not agree with my principal actors who say that Lashkar is responsible or – (inaudible) – is responsible. They are the face of what has happened. This operation would not have been possible unless people had been trained militarily by military instructors, whether in service or retired, over a long period of time. If I were to be asked as a commander in the navy, please send 10 fellows in a dingy 10 miles away with this kind of equipment, I would have said my sailors cannot do it. I require marine commanders. And the same thing addressed to the U.S. CNO – I think he will say exactly the same thing that he requires SEALs for this operation. His sailors cannot do it.

So if anybody thinks that people have been picked up from some madrassa somewhere and thereafter have been trained by Lashkar, who have then come and done this kind of thing, I think they are living in a world of a different kind. This is not an attack on the Marriott, where some driver is told God is great; go and kill the infidels. Blow yourself up; you will go to heaven. This is not even an attack on USS Cole because what happened in USS Cole? One little boat went and rammed itself into the destroyer, tearing apart a big hole. You know, whenever a ship comes into harbor, there are a dozen of boats that come along the ship. Why? Because every ship wants to spruce up. They have come from sea. They want the bottom of the ship painted that the sailors don't like to do. So these little boats come and in exchange for a can of diesel oil or for a bagful of bread or whatever, they offer to do this job.

Until the USS Cole was hit, this was standard practice of every ship. And one of these boats went and hit the USS Cole in a suicide attack. So this suicide attack on USS Cole is not a planned military operation. But this attack was a planned military operation. It has been executed, planned and people trained for by a military institution – whether it is ISI or part military is difficult to say. I think if we recognize this and recognize that the ISI is the principal organization, we would be on track. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Prem. Yes? The gentleman here, please.

Q: Thank you, Dr. Tellis. Ambassador Lambah opened up by saying that India has shown quite a bit of restraint after this – at least so far. There are some calls from the table for perhaps more action, but in talking to some senior U.S. officials on this, they have all remarked about this restraint – not only in the last week or two, but since the July bombing in the Kabul – in the Indian embassy in Kabul.

I guess I am just asking if you can give us analysis of why that is. When you talk to U.S. officials, they give basically two rationales as to why they think India has been so restrained. One is the economic growth – that India – that the government is primarily concerned about economic growth in recent history. They don't want to disturb that through any military action against Pakistan. Two, the growing, I guess, confidence of India as a regional player and the looking toward more East, perhaps, than West because of the rise of China as an economic power and a military power. I am curious if you find either of those two arguments persuasive or anyone on the panel has any other reason why India has been so restrained in not acting against Pakistan or elements within Pakistan following these two incidents in the last six months.

MR. LAMBAH: I think these are theoretical arguments. The main reason for restraint is that we expect them – this is not just our problem. As we said, this is a global problem – not only our problem. And we are hoping that the international community will respond. Some have started. And we patiently wait. We have patience, but not infinite patience. And we will wait. And if it works well, we will be happy that if it can be resolved without any action of our part, which will disturb peace. And that would be our policy. We are in no hurry. But as I told you, there is limited patience, but we are hoping that this can be resolved with the help of the international community, so that we can face this common problem jointly.

MR. PRABHU: Can I add something?

MR. TELLIS: Sure.

MR. PRABHU: While we are talking about it, I just got a mail from somebody who says that Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent recently released a report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which concludes that terrorism is now growing in such proportion that terrorists will be able to use the weapons of mass destruction by 2013 and in the U.S. risk proportion is rising, not shrinking. And unless we treat it as a global problem to deal with terrorism, this is what we face. This is what two former senators of the United States are saying.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Yes?

Q: Kumar from Amnesty International. I have a comment about General Nambiar's statement that there may be need to curb some individual freedoms. My individual comment is that don't punish the victims. And Indians are the victims of this terrorist attack. And we are basically going to punish them by curbing their individual liberties. My overall question – I have two questions. First is the Kashmir issue has been raised as a cause of terrorism, and in India the civil society always says, 'we will talk to Pakistan directly. We don't want U.S. or anyone to come and mediate.'

So having said that, now the issue is primarily between U.S. – sorry – India and Pakistan. But you didn't go to Pakistan. You have come to Washington to talk. Is there any reason why you have done that instead of going to Pakistan – coming to Washington?

My other question is to Mr. Kulkarni from the BJP. Do you think Manmohan Singh's leadership failed in this attack? I am sure you used that in the recent elections. But I want to hear

from you why Manmohan – Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s leadership failed in this attack. Thanks.

MR. TELLIS: Kumar, I think I want to answer the first question just on a point of order. The delegation didn’t come to Washington because of the attacks. The visit to Washington was programmed long before the events in Bombay took place. They came to Washington, as I said earlier, as part of an ongoing conversation with the Aspen Scratchy Group (ph) – [57:39] – and their presence today is completely serendipitous. I mean, we are grateful that they consented to do this for us. But they haven’t come to Washington to make the case one way or the other on anything relating to these attacks. We just have been the beneficiaries of their presence here. And so I invited them to address these questions.

On the second question, Sudheendra, I defer to you.

MR. KULKARNI: You know, I’ll also first briefly answer the first question. We did not come here to discuss the Kashmir issue at all.

And secondly, I represent the BJP, which is now the opposition party in parliament. But we certainly will not comment on our government’s conduct on foreign soil. We are one. The government and the opposition is one in facing this challenge. And you will see that when the time comes – and if the time comes for appropriate action, again, the people of India will be one; the political parties will be one.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Kartik, please. The gentleman there at the end.

Q: Kartik Bommakanti. My question to the panel is – I mean, how we will react exactly to these attacks. I mean, what options does India have apart from just – can you lay out exactly what are those options in case Pakistan doesn’t really deliver on cracking down on these groups? What action would India take – covert operations, expanding intelligence presence? What would it do exactly inside Pakistan? Would it expand its intelligence presence in Afghanistan? So what would you lay out exactly? How would you react if these things don’t transpire?

MR. LAMBAH: Well, options are not discussed in seminars – (laughter) – firstly. Secondly, I want to tell you that we have been assured by the U.S. government at the highest level – at a very high level yesterday that they are ensuring that action is being taken by the international community. And we await the results of that.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Gentleman here, please.

Q: Hi, I am Naren Rustagi. I am a professor at one of the area universities. The question is – there are two kinds of responses. One is what Israel has been doing or U.S. did in a stern fashion. The other is what India is doing of wait and see. Why are the two approaches different? I mean, in one case, which is what the Israel and the U.S. did, at least there is no attack on the domestic soil. On the other hand, you have thousands of attacks in India every month. So, I mean, how do you make a decision in terms of – I mean, you can say that these things are not to be discussed on such fora, but if that is where you are, then that is where you are and then you are talking about policy. That is what I would want to understand as to where the policy discussion is in terms of how such decisions should be taken – one in a stern fashion or a more wait-and-see attitude.

MR. PARTHASARATHY: I think – you know, when I was in East Asia, I was told that we should emulate the East Asian tiger. I said, look, the Indian elephant turns slowly, but it turns. You know, we can't be an East Asian tiger. We can't be what we are not. I don't think we can be American or we can be Israeli in terms of our ethos, in terms of the values we imbibed in our freedom struggle, we are necessarily different.

Therefore, you know, the options which Israel and the U.S. took are not something we are going to take. But there have been shifts in policy. After Kandahar, government decided there would be no negotiations with terrorists on such situations. This is a government decision announced. So – (inaudible) – in Iraq or in this case, there were no discussions. The commanders were sent in. That is a shift.

Secondly, I think broadly we are moving towards setting our own house in order. How does a complex federal structure, where the states have their own rights and law and order is a state subject. But in a democracy, it takes time to build a consensus. And we are building a consensus towards having stronger, federal machinery for the investigations systems – courts – special courts to try these cases. So I am sure that consensus will be reached.

So I think we will have to recognize that the way we respond is different, but perhaps more sure. As I said, I was happy that three years after the attack on parliament, General – (inaudible) – made the admission that he did. I am waiting for the follow up of what he said in parliament. But as I said – and I think Ambassador Lambah said – no options are off the table. We want to give enough time, enough effort to the international community. And again, I particularly appreciate the efforts of the United States to wind up this infrastructure of terrorism because let's face it, all these groups are interrelated. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a founding member of bin Laden's international Islamic front founded in February of 1998 in Kandahar. So the U.S. has now an interest in this. And as everybody said – General Nambiar said and Admiral Das had said – this is now a global issue. So we are going by that route, but as Ambassador Lambah said, nobody's patience is indefinite. And in an ultimate analysis, elected governments in India are responsible to their own people.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. The lady there, please.

Q: My name is Meeta Vyas –

MR. TELLIS: Could you speak a little loudly, please? I don't think we can hear you.

Q: That is the first time I have ever been told to speak louder. Thank you. (Laughter.) My name is Meeta Vyas and I was born in Bombay. It is my beloved childhood land. And I have had the pleasure of being educated here. And I met Jamshyd when we worked together when I ran a business for General Electric and I was the secretary general of WWF-India. My specific question is related to what we think about in business. We generally assume the competitors will copy us. But what we try to do is anticipate where the market is going and what the competitors will do. And that is my specific question to Dr. Srinivasan and Mr. Singh related to the following.

You know, it is – when the U.S. had vulnerability through the Canadian border, that is where the terrorists came from. When there was less – when there was lax airline security, that is what they used as the weapon to hit the World Trade Center. So similarly, I would assume they are not stupid

when it comes to India. They are not going to do another naval-based attack on hotels in South Bombay. I mean, the question is that – my guess is that – the other – the larger question for India to look at is what are the other terrorist threats?

Well, there is bioterrorism, so that is my question to Mr. Singh. You know, what has Indian industry and Indian government thought about the biological threats that can be used to spread pandemic diseases and viruses and so on? And my other question is to Dr. Srinivasan on atomic energy background. Clearly, there is a nuclear agreement now where there is going to be nuclear reactors all across India. There is a huge threat of nuclear material being smuggled out and sold for a dime, so to speak. So what are India's thoughts about these other threats that go beyond physical security, airline security and security for business areas in major metros?

MR. TELLIS: Thank you.

MR. Srinivasan: Well, surely, the concern on security of nuclear establishments is a well-placed one. And I must tell you that we have a number of coastal establishments. One is in Bombay itself, which is in the Bombay Harbor. Then there is one close to Madras. There is a very large nuclear center there. And of course, the inland center is also there. So we are deeply conscious of the need to safeguard these facilities.

And I must tell you that even before this, a lot of security studies have been done and a considerable amount of money, training and manpower has been deployed to ensure that we can keep these installations safe from infiltration, and also the possibility of any terrorist, sabotage and things like that. Indeed, on the very day that this event took place in Bombay – in fact, I lived in Bombay myself from 1956 to 1990. And on the day this event took place – (inaudible) – invited the French nuclear – (inaudible) – to come to be honored in India. He and his wife – they were trapped at the Taj Mahal hotel. So they were already concerned. Of course, they were evacuated the next day. But apart from that immediate involvement, they are continuously reviewing this matter. It was with chairman – president chairman – joined the evening before I left for Washington. There is no question whatsoever that we have in place very good systems. And they are always constantly being updated. And they are being done.

Now, with regard to any possibility of material being taken out of the establishment – what you are thinking of in terms of any terrorist getting access to any sensitive material, especially a material or a highly radioactive substance – that also is another part of the problem. But I must assure you that those systems are in place and they are being constantly upgraded. Certainly, this is a not a matter for complacency at all. But we have fortunately invested a lot of money and training in terms of safeguarding these facilities.

MR. TELLIS: Harpal?

MR. SINGH: You know, before I sort of address the specific question of how would countries like India respond to challenges of bioterrorism and the like, I would like to say from sort of a citizen point of view – and this could be a global citizen anywhere – Bombay and the citizens of Bombay are just a microcosm of, I would say, global citizens anywhere. And in that sense, I think as citizens, they have experienced, if I may say, a breach of trust.

Since 9/11, the world has been aware – even though prior to that, for many decades, as many colleagues have mentioned, prior to that for many decades, the horrific aspects of terror have been impacting us in the South Asian subcontinent. But I think 9/11 brought it to a global sort of level. And as a citizen of the world, we began to say to ourselves, clearly, it is the onus of the global community to create rather than these breaches of trust that constantly seem to happen at ever-increasing frequency, we were hoping that we will now create some bridges of trust. And it was this bridge of trust that we wanted to create as we came to this dialogue. And we have been repeatedly coming to this dialogue.

These bridges incidentally – through these dialogues – are being created on a variety of platforms not only related to the security of the defense variety, but in a whole series of arenas. And I am glad that you asked that question because a key aspect of the dialogue, which was well before anything to do with what happened in Mumbai, this question of saying how do we engage with the global fraternity – and they are included. And in this case, in the U.S. – how do we engage with these two great countries, these democracies to see – to protect the global citizen and our respective populations from incidents of this kind?

Now, I have to say – and so we have talked about saying that our institutional frameworks in India – we were threatened, as you know, sometime back with SARS, then the avian flu. And there was a whole bunch of response mechanisms that were put in place. And what we were hoping and we are continuing to do is to engage between the two countries to say how can the institutional frameworks of both countries talk to be more cooperative with each other, look at what needs to be done on the preventive side, so that should such an unfortunate sort of eventuality happen, that at least there would be an ability to respond to it quickly.

So clearly, this is part of the dialogue – so to assure this is the case. But I think more fundamentally, if we don't build these bridges of trust – and this question of these bridges of trust are saying the global fraternity is acutely aware of the centrality of terror in Pakistan. All these years, we have been asked repeatedly to provide evidence. And I think now there is a body of evidence – and I can say again at the highest levels – in the U.S. government. It is now aware and they talk about the fact that they have this information and knowledge and they have shared it with both governments. That is with the Indian government, as much as also with the Pakistani government that there is this centrality of terror concentration in Pakistan that needs to be addressed.

And so the citizen of Bombay felt as let down that the global fraternity did not act collectively. And I think the fact that India has acted in a restrained manner is only reflective of Indian, if I may say, maturity of saying, 'knee-jerk reactions are not good reactions,' that we must share with our colleagues and our friends and our partners our anguish as they have – so if you civilly shared with us in all of the discussion that we have had. And this is clearly reassuring that this is the case.

So we will act extremely responsibly. And I think this is, in some sense, reflective of the rising global power that India not only is, but aspires to be and be a responsible citizen in this. So it is not acting hastily. We will respond decisively – we are required to act decisively. So I think in a variety of these areas including bioterrorism – and I could tell you that there are many, many other nature of challenges that actually speaking have an equally powerful potential impact. So I think engagement is good. Dialogue is good. Expressing anguish and anger is good. But the nature of responses should be carefully calibrated to make sure that we don't incidentally – and I might

mention that one of the very senior colleagues from the American side said, let's make sure that when we respond to terror, we decisively destroy terror, but we don't produce more terrorists because often I suspect that in the last few years, in our desire to destroy terrorism, we might have actually nurtured a whole lot of more terrorists.

And I think this is fundamental that we don't do this. And I think in all this activity of dialogue, we are very reassured that there is a much, much better appreciation between the countries. And I resoundingly want to say to the gentleman who said – this dialogue had nothing to do – we have been at this dialogue for the last five, six years. We regularly come on both sides – a very wide canvas of issues are discussed including the ones that you raised about bioterrorism and the like.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Right here in front, please. Oh, there is a microphone coming.

Q: Thank you. I am a diplomat in Washington. And my question regards two comments made by the speakers on the table. General Nambiar mentioned that the origins of this attack in Mumbai or terrorism at large can no longer be linked to specific causes. And he mentioned Middle East and Palestine, Kashmir, poverty and other issues, which were related to root causes. This goes parallel to a comment by Mr. Tellis. Professor Tellis mentioned that now it is a complex problem. And it is no longer a monothematic issue. And it transcends local causes, traditional causes. And it supposes global questions.

So my question is if these are not – the knowledge that we had about the causes are no longer the causes. What are the causes? What is it behind this alleged new phase of terror? It is so abstract that I wonder is it something like civilization that is behind going back to something like what Huntington wrote many years ago. So what is behind terror as it appears to be now?

MR. NAMBIAR: Yeah, the point I made was – you know, earlier we always had the discussion about deprivation, poverty being one of the – at the root of terrorism and also these various trouble spots in the world. I am not suggesting for a moment that that is not, you know, one of the sore points in regard to people rising against the establishment. But this particular instance – and some others before – have, I think, quite clearly established the ideology that al Qaeda and its affiliates are trying to propagate internationally. And that is the context in which I said we have got to look well beyond because there is this suggestion that they are looking for a caliphate, to something like that being established, you know, globally. These are the extreme elements of the al Qaeda who propagate this.

So we have to understand that that is going to be the theory that will drive their actions in the future. The philosophy which will – the ideology which will drive their actions in their future and address it – because if you don't recognize that, we will not be dealing with the real – the problem as it exists. We will be merely dealing with the symptoms of the bigger disease. While we have to continue to deal with those, I think we have to address this. But since I have this opportunity to speak, I would just like to express a view in regard to some of the questions that have been raised regarding the responses of the Indian establishment.

And my comment is a deeply cynical view in many ways because I think in the past, the Indian establishment has reacted more in rhetoric than in action. And that, I think, is – I hope – or it seems to be a bit of a change because we have to do what we have to do. I don't think we need

to, you know, explain to the rest of the world as to what we are going to do. Someone was asking what exactly – I don't think anyone is going to explain that. No one does anyway. And while we would expect the international community to take this issue up globally in the context of the fact that it is a global phenomenon, I think you have to reserve a right to react and we should react in the manner that we can and are capable of. And that is not a subject for discussion because we cannot do that in the public domain anyway. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Steve Cohen, please.

Q: Steve Cohen, Brookings. I want to thank the Indian Group for making themselves available for this discussion. I just have a footnote to an earlier question. And that is about four years ago, the Indian National Institute of Advanced Science and the American National Academy of Science organized a workshop and produced a book. And the book is about the application of technology to different kinds of terrorism. So there are chapters on urban terrorism, agriculture, protecting the infrastructure. And it is available online from the National Academy of Science website.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Yes?

Q: Thank you all for being here today. I am Jim Busis from the American Jewish Committee. We all know that over the past 15 years, there has been a gradual change in the strategic alignment – perhaps from being oriented towards the non-aligned world being – and towards the United States and the West in general. But that has been a matter of some contention and debate within India. And I wonder if this latest terrorist attack, after a culmination of many others, will change that dialogue in India and will accelerate India's movement towards the United States and the West?

MR. NAMBIAR: I think, you know, in fact, when one analyzes this particular attack, the fact that American tourists, British tourists and Israelis were – the Jewish community was targeted – I think in many ways, it reflected the purpose of the terrorist groups that operated in a sense that because of the closet interaction between India and the United States, even in dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, there is a great deal of cooperation. And, of course, the greater interaction between India and Israel in recent years.

It was also, in a sense, targeted at that cooperation, which was evolving and continues to evolve. And I think I speak for most of us in India in the strategic community that this particular attack will, in fact, strengthen our resolve to further this cooperation because it is in our mutual interests. And all of these things which are in our mutual interests, and when we look at it from the Indian point of view in our national interest, we will pursue it. And we cannot allow attacks like this to deter us from pursuing that cooperation. I don't think it will suffer any setback because of these attacks.

MR. TELLIS: Raj, and then – (inaudible).

MR. ABHYANKAR: I suppose it is working. I just wanted to actually take the point about whether this attack will take India closer to Israel. The question is that let's analyze the Bombay attack in a slightly different way because I want to also touch on the question of what the earlier question was about how was this different. This is different in the sense that the terrorists targeted

U.S. and U.K. citizens. The terrorists targeted Nariman House, which was the Jewish center in Bombay. Incidentally, I should mention that none of the Indian media ever referred to it as the Jewish center, being sensitive to this point. It was CNN, which went out of the way to say that this is the Jewish Center, Nariman House.

But that is just a footnote on this. Now, it was different because so far, we have had a number of terrorist attacks, which have been mentioned by my colleagues. But Pakistan has never been asked to pay a price for killing Indians in India. And this is because of what Ashley said earlier that at all times, all of these terrorist attacks, which have taken place before, have been looked at in the prism of India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Jammu, and not terrorism as what terror is all about.

This time it was different because the target has been clearly Israel, India and the U.S. This is quite in line with the documents that have been found – both al Qaeda documents, Lashkar documents, which always talk of these three countries as the enemies. But that, of course, does not mean necessarily. And there should be a closing of ranks as far as fighting this global terrorism is concerned. And I don't want to dilate on that because my colleagues have said enough about it.

But as far as India's relations with Israel are concerned, they have a dynamic of their own. They stand on their own and are not hostile to the fact that we still have more than 115 million Muslims in India, the second largest Muslim community in the world. This is an aspect that we have to take care in a very heartening and a reassuring point coming out of the Bombay attack was the fact that, as Mr. Prabhu said, that the Indian Muslims said we don't want these guys buried in our graveyards. And what is interesting is that since I live in Bombay, I can say that the ground-level reaction I got from Hindus – I should say Hindus – is that, you know, yes, this happened. But, you know, these are not our Muslims. This is the instinctive reaction. So the aim – at least, I think in this case – the aim of dividing India on a communal basis was probably subsidiary. The more important aim was to hit at the economic capitol of India.

And this is where I was quite disturbed, in a sense, reading an item in the Washington Post of this morning, which quotes some people in Bombay talking of how this particular attack has evoked so much of reaction, whereas the suburban attack on the suburban train in Bombay did not because poor people were involved. That is not the issue. I think they have got the entire thing wrong. Even that attack on the Bombay suburban railway system was also intended to stop Bombay in its tracks. Why it did not happen was that it carries a million people every day – the Bombay suburban railway. And these are all people who work in offices in Bombay. It means that their salary and their jobs are dependent on getting into Bombay and that is why it was absolutely incumbent that we get the suburban railway system working within less than 24 hours, so that all these people can go to work. It was not that there wasn't a concern.

But here the additional point of concern is that this was clearly aimed at the financial aspect of Bombay's character, Bombay's dimension because there are financial services, professionals who were there in these hotels. And the aim was that this will have a negative impact on the inward foreign investment. Now, this is going to happen and what we have to do for us is to actually strengthen our security as far as this is concerned, so that there is no element of insecurity in the minds of those who have been so well-invested in India. Thank you.

MR. PARTHASARATHY: One point I wish to make to the gentleman who raised this issue about what was the aim. And I can do no better than to quote from the Pakistan ambassador,

Mr. Husain Haqqani's study of the Jamaat. And he quotes the Jamaat as saying – this is from Mr. Haqqani – “Muslims ruled Andalusia, Spain, for 800 years, but they were finished to the last man. Christians now rule Spain and we must wrest it back from them. All of India, including Kashmir, Hyderabad, Assam, Nepal, Burma, Bihar and Junagadh were part of the Muslim empire that was lost because Muslims gave up jihad.” It adds, “Palestine is occupied by the Jews. The Holy Qibla-e-Awwal, the first center of prayer in Jerusalem, is under Jewish control.” This is the mindset of the people involved.

And why it is an international problem now is people with this mindset are interlinked through Osama bin Laden's Islamic front. And while there is a huge focus in the United States, I find, on the al Qaeda, today it is al Qaeda's affiliates who came together under the front, who posed the danger across the world, whether it was the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan or some of the Chechen groups.

MR. TELLIS: Just to clarify – that quote was in the context of LeT?

MR. PARTHASARATHY: Yes.

MR. TELLIS: Okay, because you said Jamaat. Sorry. Yes?

Q: Hi, Ravi from the World Bank, but just speaking for myself. Well, first off, hello. Can you hear me? Ravi from the World Bank, but speaking for myself this morning. Thanks again for a very inspiring talk from all of you.

I was sort of thinking out aloud and wondering, I mean, given India's ascendancy – increasing ascendancy on the global canvas from a sort of international, public-policy perspective – I mean, was there hope that India and Pakistan could work together to resolve say, the big, burning issue, for example, of Kashmir, so that it proves to be sort of a best practice to the world on how to amicably resolve an issue and get together in a collaborative, non-ego fashion, if you will, albeit that might be a bit oxymoronic to set an example to the world. Again, just sort of thinking out aloud.

MR. PARTHASARATHY: I think – the quick answer is yes, we were in a very constructive dialogue, which unfortunately ended in March, 2007, which Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri, at a function where I was publicly present, called on opposition leaders not to – (inaudible) – India – not to – (inaudible). That dialogue was called off. And certainly once this is settled – I believe if that dialogue is taken forward, we have the parameters based on proposals from President Musharraf and from the Indian government to move towards a constructive, imaginative and out-of-the-box resolution. Thank you.

MR. SINGH: Yeah. I just want to sort of respond to the question that was sort of raised and with some emphasis. You know, it would be rather presumptive to suggest that one can sort of talk about underlying reasons for why terrorism has taken the kind of shape it has taken, but from poverty to injustice to a whole bunch of reasons that are oftentimes talked about as the reasons for why we have had this sort of problem. But I want to make sort of two comments.

One is that I see a huge sort of connection all the time about the connection between Islam and terrorism. And I think we need to disassociate the two in our minds. I mean, Indian Muslims have demonstrated with great, great sort of confidence and pointedness about their dislike for the

kind of terrorism that seems to be getting imported into India. Now, it doesn't mean that we don't have our own share of difficulties from time to time. For the complex society that India is, for the huge differences that we represent – and we celebrate this diversity – there are bound to be occasional differences and different points of view. And that is okay. I mean, you know, that is part of living together.

But this kind of stuff – and I am very oftentimes concerned that we seem to connect Islam and terrorism as if the two are one. And I think this is very, very important to start making this distinction solidly that it has got nothing to do – that different religions – people of different religions oftentimes take inspiration from their respective religious traditions to get public opinion behind whatever their causes are is not something only which is true for Islam. History has shown us that this has been true for many religions. And therefore, I think – and history has also said that if you painted any particular faith in that kind of light, it has not produced good consequences.

And I think in one aspect as a maturing entity – global community is not to equate the two. And I think India and Indian Muslims, certainly, and Muslims in many other parts of the world have clearly demonstrated that they do not stand for this. And I think this is very, very important for us to recognize, and in fact, if I may say, to celebrate that, in fact, this is a very small subset that is taking up this cause in the manner that it is. And that is, I think, very important. And I just thought that we should put some emphasis on the fact.

MR. DAS: Since this question has been raised by so many people, I just want to identify a qualitative difference between the previous attacks and this attack. There has been an element of Muslim-Hindu tension in the previous attacks. There will be discord between these two communities and so on. Here, there is no Hindu-Muslim scene at all. The aims are clearly two. Their aim was to humiliate India. That is aim number one – show to Indians that this is what we can do.

Two, tell the Indians clearly that your growing linkage with Israel is not what you should be doing. I think the rest is peripheral. So has the Indian state been humiliated? The answer is yes. And that is the reason for this great anger.

As far as the other scene is concerned, I fully agree that I don't think this will have any effect on what we do with Israel, which is for different reasons altogether.

MR. TELLIS: I am going to admit one last question because our delegates have to actually catch an airplane an hour or so from now. Let me give the lady here a chance, please. Thank you.

Q: Thank you. I am Alafia from the George Washington University. I was talking to one of the scholars on South Asia and her assessment was that maybe within six months, we could see a return to military rule in Pakistan. I don't know if that is possible. But my question is that it seems to be that unless there is a structural change within the political culture in Pakistan, wherein the military doesn't constantly seek ascendancy and it can get that ascendancy if there is an external threat. So I am wondering what your assessment is and whether you think that unless Pakistani political culture changes, these non-state actors will not be able to gain ascendancy.

MR. LAMBAH: Well, I would not like to comment on the internal situation in Pakistan. But it is a well-known fact that the army has a role to play, a function to perform in that country,

which is very clear. And over the years, we have found that there are certain deficiencies, and I think that – and in some of their organizations, which come under it. And I think it is for Pakistan and the international community to ensure that those are reformed. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Well, I am actually going to adjourn the session. But before I do so, there is one of the panelists here who happens to have not spoken and is under 50. (Laughter.) And so I wanted to give the microphone to Pramit for just a few minutes to give us his perspectives. Pramit has been in Indian journalism for the longest time and is the foreign editor of The Hindustan Times. So Pramit, if you can give us the last word, and then we will close for the morning.

PRAMIT CHAUDHURI: Well, I will just put a political spin on it. There were five state elections that were held during the Mumbai attacks. And two of them I should point out happened actually after the attacks took place or just after. It is noticeable that the ruling Congress party actually won the two states that took place after the attacks, and in fact, a landslide in Delhi. So you have to keep in mind that Indian politics still clearly has a very strong local color. And despite the public anger at the Mumbai attacks, when they went to the polls, it was not reflected there at all.

Now, this does not necessarily mean they will not have an impact at the national polls, which have to be held before April. But it is very difficult to call the consequences of this action. And I would argue that part of the government's own reaction to what has happened will be determined by what the government sees as public opinion regarding Pakistan's reaction, the international community's reaction and how much anger will actually be reflected in the polls as the elections come on. It is a sliding scale and it is not going to be very easy to determine. But the politicians in Delhi are looking at those elections, looking at the state elections and really trying to figure out where is the public opinion in India going. And it is a shifting – as I said, it is a shifting landscape.

MR. TELLIS: Well, on that note, let me first start by thanking the panelists for being very generous with their time with us this morning and for giving us a window into the way Indians think about this problem, which, of course, affects them first and foremost directly. I also want to take the opportunity to thank once again both CII and Lockheed Martin for helping us make this event possible. And to my own colleagues at Carnegie – Jessica Jennings, Katie Donaldson and her team who put this together on very short notice and without any assistance whatsoever from me. I just showed up. But thank you very much. And all of you for coming at, you know, even by Washington standards – an unearthly hour in the morning for this meeting. Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)