

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

“PAKISTAN – CONFLICTED ALLY IN THE WAR ON TERROR”

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GEORGE PERKOVICH: Welcome. My name is George Perkovich here at the Carnegie Endowment. My pleasure to welcome you this morning. For those of you who stayed up late to watch the Redskins last night, it was worth it.

We're here basically to launch the recent policy brief – well, not recent; it's coming out today – by Ashley Tellis, “Pakistan – Conflict Ally in the War on Terror.” I think when you have a chance to read it, you'll find that it's extremely interesting analytically, and then it also makes policy recommendations, which as we'll find in the discussion here today are always a good subject of debate, especially when it concerns Pakistan these days. And I think we'll have some of that discussion or possibly debate here.

I also should highlight that the policy brief is reader-friendly in the sense that it's relatively short – about 3,000 words. For those who need less friendliness and are more welcome or open to challenge, Ashley has a much longer paper that will be out in January, I believe, that really kind of amplifies and magnifies this work with a lot more research and data and analysis. So stay tuned to pick that up.

We're going to start with Ashley presenting the basic outline of his brief. And then, we're very lucky to have three distinguished folks to comment on that, each with a different view of his or her own. Dan Markey will go first who, as you all know, is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, And before that was a key person at the State Department policy planning staff working on South Asia.

Chris Fair is a senior fellow for India – no, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She recently got back from Afghanistan where she spent, I think, six or seven months – four months – as a political affairs officer in the U.N. assistance mission to Afghanistan. What I remember – I have to say – Chris has a wonderful sense of humor and so, for me, that always goes a long way. And I remember, before she left Afghanistan, she said her major mission was, she was going to come back with a leopard-skin burkha. And so, the first time I saw her when I got back, I said, did you get it? She said, well, it's a long story. So maybe she'll tell that story. But Chris is an outstanding analyst of South Asia, military affairs, terrorism.

And finally, Frederic Grare whom we've had the pleasure of having here at Carnegie as a visiting scholar from France who has himself written recently a major report that we published on the back table there covering a lot of these issues, especially the Afghan-Pak border questions. And so, Frederic will wind up the discussion.

So let me get out of the way and turn it over to Ashley.

ASHLEY TELLIS: Well, let me start by thanking George for taking the trouble to pull this together and Frederic as well. I just returned from South Asia late last night, and all the organization that was done to pull this together was really done while I was absent from the country. What you have before you today – the panel before you – basically consists of

all my friends. I figured that was a good way to conduct the proceedings. Everyone of them has actually contributed in very substantial intellectual measure to the product that you have before you, and also to the longer piece, which George mentioned will come out in January.

The received wisdom about Pakistan and the war on terrorism, especially as it applies to the problems in Afghanistan, the received wisdom in our country is that Pakistan must do much more for a successful outcome in that conflict. This view has been articulated on several occasions by members of the administration and with varying degrees of intensity by public policy analysts throughout the country, especially in the last several months. This issue, obviously, grew in salience after the National Intelligence Council released its estimate on the regeneration of al Qaeda in the FATA. And with the backdrop of that estimate, the received wisdom that Pakistan ought to do much more only grew in intensity.

I do not challenge this received wisdom, at least up front. I think it is incomplete. I think what we need to do – and this is in a sense why this PB and the report was written – was not to deny that Pakistan ought to do much more, but to first try and understand when we say Pakistan ought to do much more, what exactly do we expect them to do because the “much more” as a policy prescription can become so vague and so generic that it actually becomes the opposite of what a sound policy should be, which is to clearly specify what exactly the innovations that we expect Pakistan to undertake are.

And so, the effort in this policy brief and in the larger document is really to analyze the nature of Pakistan’s involvement in the war on terror, to make sense of its contributions. And from that perspective, to then say, what is it that Pakistan ought to do to bring its current performance in alignment with what our international expectations about its role and its contributions to success, particularly in Afghanistan.

The bottom-line conclusion – and this is a very crude conclusion because you will see that the policy brief has a lot of nuances, and the larger document has even more data and even more nuances – is the following: Although the war, the effort to eradicate the Taliban and al Qaeda has not been as successful as we would like, my argument is that this lack of success is rooted both in Pakistan’s motivational deficiencies with respect to counterterrorism operations. And in other factors, that in varying measure lie beyond Pakistan’s control.

And my argument is that if you want to have a sound U.S. policy towards Pakistan, we have to take into account both dimensions of this conundrum, that if you forget that there are parts of the problem, which are simply beyond the immediate control of the Pakistani state, then we forget or we might end up expecting too much of Pakistan and the fact that it may be unable to deliver will then just bring in trail more problems than we might imagine.

So the bottom line is that winning this war, particularly insofar as it bears in Afghanistan, will really be, in my view, a long endeavor. It’s not something that we will be able to conclude with any measure of success within a matter of months or even within a few years. And so, part of the effort here is simply to remind the body politic that if we want to win this war, we’ve got to remain engaged in it for the long haul; we are not going to have the option of any quick and easy solutions.

I'm going to divide my remarks in the next few minutes in essentially three parts. I want to talk briefly about what I think is Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy, or what exactly Pakistan's strategy has been since 2001. I want to then spend a few minutes talking about its counterterrorism performance. And then, I want to end up with a brief review of what the U.S. can do.

Let me say a few words to start about the strategy itself. I think it is, by now, quite widely recognized that Pakistan was a very reluctant entrant into the war on terrorism. It was essentially pushed into supporting the United States in this war because of the terrible catastrophe that 9/11 represented for the United States. And the U.S. response to that 9/11 event compelled Pakistan to choose sides. And if you read President Musharraf's speech, which was made publicly in January of 2001 (sic) – January 12, I believe – where he laid out why Pakistan has to make the choices that became public over the next few years, the sense of constraint is palpable throughout the speech. And it becomes very clear that this is a conflict that Pakistan would have preferred to sit out, but really didn't have a choice.

Given that Pakistan has been, in that sense, a constrained actor or participant whose entrance into this conflict was forced, my reading is that the Pakistani state has essentially pursued a very segmented strategy with respect to counterterrorism. And you have to understand this segmented strategy by looking at the nature of the terrorist groups it has had to cope with as being really the drivers that account for the strategy that I will describe in a few minutes.

There were four major terrorist groups that President Musharraf had to cope with after he made the decision that he was going to enter this war on terror. The first set of groups were the domestic sectarian groups within Pakistan, the rabid Sunni and Shi'a groups that essentially, by 2001, had been engaged in a campaign of murder and mayhem, going back several years, and which had become at various points really embarrassing to the Pakistani state. So that's the first category.

The second is the terrorist groups that were operating against India, primarily in Kashmir, but not restricted only to Kashmir. I mean, there are terrorist groups that have now moved long beyond Kashmir into the Indian mainland. So that was the second category of groups that Pakistan had to deal with.

The third, of course, were the Taliban cadres and the leadership – the guys who were defeated in Afghanistan as a result of the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom – crossed over the Pakistan-Afghan frontier, and settled into the frontier areas of Pakistan. So the third category, conceptually, is the Taliban, the cadres and the leadership.

And the fourth, of course, is al Qaeda. And by al Qaeda, I mean, essentially the non-South Asian core of the characters that surrounded Osama bin Laden and his immediate leadership. These are Saudis, Yemenis, a motley grab bag of terror international. But when I think of al Qaeda, I'm really talking of the non-South Asian cadres, the Arabs, et cetera, et cetera that surrounded him.

Now, what did Musharraf do when faced with this spectrum of terrorism groups? I think he decided that the war on terrorism offered him a great opportunity to go after the domestic sectarian groups that had begun to embarrass the Pakistani state. Now, in saying this, I am making two propositions simultaneously. Musharraf did not go after all sectarian groups uniformly. He went after those sectarian groups whose strategic objectives were not aligned with the strategic objectives of the Pakistani state. And so, those sectarian groups, which were primarily Deobandis, which – and one Shi'a group who were involved essentially in internal bloodletting and really began to pose serious law and order problems to the Pakistani state, these were the groups that Musharraf figured ought to be eliminated because they did not serve, in some sense, the national interest.

The second set of groups, the terrorist groups operating against India, Musharraf adopted a somewhat different strategy. He focused on modulating and controlling their activities, but not defeating and eliminating them. And the reason why he adopted this more restrained approach towards the anti-Indian terrorist groups was because he saw these groups as essentially being assets in Islamabad's longstanding war with India.

Now, because the war on terrorism put him in an awkward situation where he could not be seen to openly acquiesce or encourage these groups, what the Pakistani state essentially did was to tack down on these groups under pressures of tactical necessity. And you saw this most clearly during the 2001, 2002 crisis where the Pakistanis made efforts to control these groups to prevent these groups from acting as catalytic agents that might provoke a new Indo-Pakistani war that would be both problematic to Pakistan and to the United States. But he did not make the fundamental decision that he was going to eliminate these groups or get them out of the terrorism business.

The third group was the Taliban cadres and the Taliban leadership. In my judgment, what he did here was again settle on a segmented strategy. He went after those Taliban cadres who essentially could create problems for the Pakistani state. So Taliban remnants, this is now we're talking of the Pashtuns – the Afghan Pashtuns and the Pakistani Pashtuns who had become part of the Pakistan movement, and came back to the frontier areas after they defeated Afghanistan.

He went after those cadres that engaged in what you might think of as atypical violent activity that would challenge the Pakistani state. If they didn't engage in any such conspicuous violence or did not draw attention to themselves, he preferred to just let them lie. And he preferred to let them lie because it was a sociologically sound strategy. The frontier at that point was already faced with a significant degree of restlessness after the cataclysm in Afghanistan, and he didn't want to kind of exacerbate his security problems by going after the foot soldiers of the movement. So unless they did something egregious, he just let the foot soldiers basically rest in tranquility, if not in peace.

But he did make, in my judgment, a tactical decision about the Taliban leadership. And that tactical decision was to basically leave them alone. Again, the decision with respect to Taliban leadership ended up being similar to the decision with respect to the anti-Indian terrorist groups involved in Kashmir. And again, the calculation was the same. These were essentially the instruments of Pakistani foreign policy. Pakistan had invested in these for almost a decade. They were forced to, in a sense, renege on this investment under American

pressure in the aftermath of the first phase of OEF. And so, the Pakistanis, I think, made the decision that they were not going to add insult to injury by attempting to vigorously apprehend the Taliban leadership, given that they were just forced to give up their investments in the Taliban movement as a whole.

And the fourth terrorist group, which I flagged, was al Qaeda. This was essentially the non-South Asians who had come back with the rest of the Taliban movement after the first phase of the war. What Musharraf did was he went after the al Qaeda remnants who had basically come to the Pakistani frontier. And he did this for very obvious reasons. First, because the United States was on his back, and the United States was now engaged in a worldwide war against al Qaeda. Given that this was the terrorist group of global reach par excellence, I don't think the Pakistani state had the luxury of in a sense slacking up in this campaign.

And so, the bulk of Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts were directed against al Qaeda. And he, Musharraf in particular, and his commanders and the Pakistani intelligence establishment, went after this group because this was the group that provided the highest payoff in the war on terror. It was essential to defeat this group; one, because, of course, Pakistan's own interests lay in eliminating some of these more egregious or dastardly characters; and two, and more importantly, the U.S. would not give Pakistan the option of doing otherwise. This was a very important target to the United States, and given the shift that Musharraf made post-9/11, I don't think he could reconcile any slackening in the war against al Qaeda.

So this is essentially, I think, the outlines of Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy post-9/11. Now, what are the consequences of this strategy? First, the point I want to make is that the strategy implies a segmented response. And when I say segmented response, I'm mentally comparing it to the kind of counterterrorism response that the administration hoped – or at least the administration outlined in the president's very, very inspiring presentation before the joint session of Congress, when he basically laid out the war on terrorism in extremely universalist terms, where he basically said we are now going after this pathology called international terrorism. And we are going to have to go after state sponsors, and people will have to make fundamental choices, either you're with us or against us, et cetera, et cetera.

So the president's definition was a universalist war against terrorism, and certainly against terrorist groups. And in contrast to that universalism, the Pakistani strategy towards the terrorist groups that it confronted was far more muted and far more differentiated. And it was differentiated for some of the strategic reasons that I outlined in the last few minutes.

Now, the consequences of that I think are the following – a least three. One, over a period of time, we have seen al Qaeda regeneration. The NIE relating to the threats of the U.S. homeland very clearly states that the leadership of al Qaeda is regenerated. And it's regenerated because, I think, they have had the opportunity to work in the sanctuary in the Pakistani frontier areas, which is dominated in many ways both by local tribes that are now sympathetic to al Qaeda ideology, as well as by large numbers of Pakistani Pashtuns – Afghan Pashtuns who had links with the old Taliban. So clearly, you have al Qaeda regeneration.

What you also have, unfortunately, is Taliban regeneration. And this Taliban regeneration takes two forms. There are large number of Taliban remnants in the Pakistani frontier areas, and there are Taliban adherents who have developed roots within Afghanistan itself. I'll come to that in a few moments. But so that's certainly the first consequence.

The second consequence is that the anti-Indian terrorist groups that Musharraf in a sense kind of slacked off on, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jaish-e-Muhammad. There is now increasing evidence that these groups are actually cooperating with al Qaeda and the Taliban. Now, whether this is actual operation planning and actually working together is harder to say. But there is increasing evidence that these are not terrorist groups that are now hermetically differentiated from one another by their orientation. Rather, the anti-Eastern orientations of the Kashmir terrorist groups seems to have bled over at least in some kind of hazy coordination with groups that previously operated only to Pakistan's west. And so, there are multi-kinds of interlinkages that have been developed between these two entities that previously had very different geographic orientations.

The third consequence is that the sectarian groups that Musharraf went after mercifully seemed to have gone into remission. But the problem of sectarianism in Pakistan has not entirely been resolved. This is still a cancer that I think is developing intestinal kinds of roots, and which could, at some point down the line, manifest itself more virulently.

So if one were to do a net assessment, in a sense, in 2007 on what Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy has yielded in the last several years, I think one would have to in a sense draw at least these three bottom lines as being important as a baseline with respect to going further. Now, if this is the case, what can we say next about the CT performance itself?

Before I talk about the CT performance itself, I just want to emphasize something that I said very early on in the presentation. And that is, what I've described so far in terms of Pakistan's strategy goes to that one half of the puzzle, which is Pakistan's motivational deficiencies. I said there are motivational deficiencies, and these motivational deficiencies are manifested in the segmented strategy or this differentiated strategy. I now want to talk about the other half, which is not issues of motivation, but real limitations that surround Pakistan in its ability to win the war. And so, it's when one puts these two halves together that one, I think, gets a more comprehensive view of what the problem is.

But let me talk about the CT performance. I think Pakistan's counterterrorism performance has been compromised; not simply because of motivation. I spoke about the motivational issues. Beyond motivation, there are three broad reasons why they've been compromised. To do good counterterrorism, especially in the areas where counterterrorism operations are being conducted, in my view, that success is intimately linked with the resilience and the quality of one's human intelligence. Our technical intelligence systems are certainly important, but since counterterrorism involves a lot of very shady characters who can do a lot of damage without having the most sophisticated communication devices in the world, it becomes extremely important, in my judgment, to have good human intelligence.

In the PB and in the larger piece, I argue that Pakistan's human intelligence capabilities, especially in that part of the world, especially in the frontier, have really decayed quite dramatically in the last several years. And that is because the old governing arrangements that the Pakistani state had, which really pivoted on the relationship between the political agent, which was Islamabad's representative to the territory, and the tribal leaders, which are the maliks (sp) who essentially manage that affair of the tribes on a day-to-day basis. This fundamental relationship between agents and maliks has deteriorated.

And it has deteriorated because, over the last 15 or 20 years, the FATA – that's the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan – have been undergoing a sociological change wherein the great struggle among the Pashtuns, between whether the tribe becomes the principle for organizing social action versus religion becoming the principle for organizing social action, the pendulum has shifted from the primacy of the tribe to that of religion; and that a whole new generation of radicalized mulvis (sp) whose origins and roots were nourished in the first anti-Soviet jihad, and have now become real powerbrokers in the region, these mulvis have, for all practical purposes, dominated if not supplanted the old relationship between the political agent and the maliks.

And because the old relationship between the political agent and the malik were so critical for the maintenance of a human intelligence system, because that relationship has died, the Pakistani state cannot get the kind of information that I think is necessary for the success of counterterrorism efforts. And as the radicalization of the frontier continues and the mulvis become even more dominant, in effect, the old secular order is being replaced by a new religious order of authority and legitimation

What you are going to see is a social order where people look at the issues of terrorism and counterterrorism primarily through ideological lenses, where they will not see the adversaries that the Pakistani state and the U.S. pursue as being the real adversaries that they have to go after. And so, you get now ideological efforts to defend the characters that both the Pakistani state and the United States have an interest in going after.

And so, if this transformation in the social system, in the frontier areas, continues – and there is no evidence that it's going to be turned around anytime soon – then the kind of human intelligence assets that have to be developed will be developed, but will be far more difficult to develop, will take a much longer time, and will require a much greater level of focused investment. So don't expect any dramatic changes anytime soon. And again, this is the first fact that I see as being beyond the immediate control of the Pakistani state.

Second, I think the Pakistan army's ability to do counterterrorism in a way that is both effective, responsive, and discriminate, I think is very suspect, because the Pakistani military's ethos – like the Indian military's ethos about 25 or 30 years ago – was not an operational ethos that was driven by the needs of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. The Pakistan army is essentially an infantry-heavy field army whose primary planning, whose primary orientation is defending national territory in conventional wars against a conventional ally, India.

Pushing them now to do counterinsurgency and counterterrorism with the kinds of approach to the use of force are quite radically different, is not something that they are

capable of doing or capable of acquiring in short notice. And so, you get a whole lot of complaints about their excessive use of force, their overwhelming approach to reliance on firepower, et cetera, et cetera, all the kinds of complaints that you can imagine come out of a force that is not really a serious counterinsurgency force.

Now, there are paramilitary forces in the FATA, which the Pakistanis have relied on, primarily the frontier corps, the frontier constabulary. These are levies that are raised from the residents who live in those areas. But in my judgment, these elements are compromised elements. These are compromised forces. They're compromised because their ties to the locals are a tad too close.

So you get this very ironic outcome that the Pakistan army, which draws its manpower from elements outside the FATA, is less than successful because it does not have the intellectual and the operational tools to fight a counterterrorism war successfully in the FATA, whereas the groups who are actually rooted in the FATA – which is the frontier corps and the frontier constabulary, the tribal lashkars – these are guys who actually have the roots there; they're drawn from levies from within the region. But they're also affected by the same social forces that I just described a few minutes ago as dominating FATA. And so their incentives to play the kind of counterterrorism role that we expect them to play, which is going after the bad guys, that is extremely hard for them to make good on. And so, they've been a real disappointment.

And so, when you look at it operationally, both regular army forces as well as the paramilitary forces, which, in theory, because of their social links with the denizens of the area, both these elements are compromised in different ways. And that has real implications for our ability to conduct successful counterterrorism. And again, this is something that is outside the motivational element of the Pakistan army.

The third point that I want to make very quickly is that the political context of counterterrorism operations in this part of the world has changed quite dramatically since 2001. The Taliban today is far more fragmented than it was in 2001. But even worse from my judgment, it is now no longer an exile force that is constantly crossing the border and attacking Pakistan from the outside, because if it was, then the only thing we would have to do is somehow seal the border. And I don't mean to suggest that that is easy at the best of times. But at least conceptually, if it was an exile force constantly crossing the border, then in theory, the solution is simply to seal the border and prevent them from crossing.

What has now happened is that the Taliban has actually nurtured and developed local roots within the southern and eastern Afghan provinces itself. And so what you have is essentially Taliban revitalization that is manifesting itself to two sources: the Pakistani Pashtuns that were affiliated with the Taliban's crossing over hasn't been required (?), and the Afghan Pashtuns, particularly in the south and the east who are operating in situ in Afghanistan.

Second element, which is part of this political context, is the increasing failure of the Afghan government's ability to govern in a way that makes successful counterterrorism possible. And this is where, despite all the international community's efforts in helping President Karzai actually rebuild a state in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is very far from what

the criteria of success would require. There is great degree of corruption within the government. The state does not have the kind of control that it ought to, which means that development is – there are development gaps; there are security gaps. There are all the kinds of inadequacies that allow an insurgent movement to thrive.

And in the face of these insurgencies, there are three solutions that in principle could allow Karzai to defeat this. But all the three instruments that I'm about to just tick off in a few minutes have their own weaknesses. The first is if the Pakistanis really did the job of preventing the bad guys from coming across the border. For all the reasons I pointed out, the Pakistanis can't do that.

The second instrument is if NATO and ISAF in particular could actually deliver, through the PRTs and through the stabilization function, within Afghanistan itself. That is, if the NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan could actually contribute to defeating those Taliban groups in situ in Afghanistan, that would at least make one important contribution to the problem. But I don't think NATO and ISAF are anywhere near being able to do that, partly because they have resource limitations, partly because of national constraints that the individual elements have.

And the third is, of course, the U.S. in OEF. But the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, particularly the counterterrorism mission, is a very narrow mission. It's not focused directly on stabilization; it's focused on counterterrorism, going after al Qaeda. And our troops in Afghanistan are very small in number. You're really talking about 10,000 troops. And their primary objective is essentially conducting mobile combat operations against these bad guys as and when they are identified.

This solves one part of the problem, which is going after the diehards who actually dare engage us in combat. But it doesn't solve the larger problem of how do you create a political environment that allows you to win the counterterrorism war? That's where NATO comes in and NATO hasn't been able to do it.

Now, I'm going to end very quickly because I suspect this is going to be the subject of our discussion. What are our choices? I think there are four choices that have been looked at in the debate. One is conditionality. In today's conditionality, in assistance to Pakistan, I argue that's probably not the best way to proceed at this juncture.

The second is conduct unilateral U.S. military operations along the Afghan-Pakistan border. I think that is an option we already have. We don't need to elevate it to the level of national policy without making things worse for our relationship with Pakistan.

The third is simply declare that Pakistan hasn't delivered because it has got seriously motivational hazards. In effect, treat them as an adversary and proceed accordingly. I argue that that policy is fraught with great risk.

And so, it leaves us with the last option, which is the current policy. And in the policy brief, I talk about some of the things that we can do to modify the current policy while keeping its broad parameters in fact. I'm just going to flag one or two of the things that I've highlighted. The first is, keep the policy of engagement with Pakistan going. I

don't think we have a realistic alternative to that policy. However, change it in at least two or three important ways.

The first is, focus Pakistani efforts on dealing with the Taliban leadership, which exists inside of Pakistan, and which the Pakistanis have been very careful not to pursue thus far. So focus on the leadership; I think it is extremely important. And if we don't do this, we will inevitably lose this war.

The second is restructure the nature of our funding of the Pakistani CT effort. Instead of giving them a check for whatever bills are presented at the end of every month, let's use our funding for predefined missions and objectives. So we need a little rationalization of how we do this. So that's the second thing that I've argued.

And the third thing that I've argued is that we need to have a very serious conversation with Pakistan about the necessity for focusing on some of these new targets that have appeared in the political mix. I have taken the view that the kind of conversation that they ought to have with Pakistan ought to be closer to the kind of conversation we had with them on September 13th, rather than in flavor closer to the kinds of conversations we've had subsequently, which have been extremely generous and extremely willing to be far more forgiving, in a sense, of Pakistan's approach.

Why don't I just end on that note because I'm very eager to hear what my commentators have to say? Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Thank you, Ashley. We're going to start with Dan, then Chris, and Frederic. And what I'd like to do to get as much time as possible to open it to the broader discussion is work in two categories, if you would – one kind of issues analytically where you dispute or would adjust what Ashley said, and then shift to the kind of policy issues where you would dispute or adjust what he said. And kind of keep that analytic policy distinction that he had, if we could. But Dan, go ahead.

DANIEL MARKEY: Okay, great. Can everybody hear me? Is this working? Okay, great. First of all, I'd just like to thank Ashley for including me on this and thanking me. I'd like to thank him for including me as a friend. So that's a good start.

I really enjoyed reading this, and I enjoyed reading the longer paper as well. It's well worth your time. Let me just step through a couple of things that I thought were especially useful, and I think Ashley laid out exceedingly well in his presentation – so I won't spend a lot of time on that. But what I thought was especially useful for me was a very clear identification of some of these challenges that Pakistan is facing, so this is on the analytical side.

And in particular, the sort of multiple and overlapping challenges that they face that I think tend to be overlooked by most observers on the outside of Pakistan, or at least downplayed. He talks about this breakdown in terms of governance capacity and intelligence capacity within the tribal areas. And I think this really tends – often, the way

that it is portrayed as a problem is that if Pakistan simply wanted to do more, it could do more. Why aren't they sort of flipping the light switch and getting it done?

And I think that the answer is that they lack a capacity to do that. And the sociological aspect of that that Ashley identified – this breakdown in a traditional tribal-oriented social structure within the tribal areas, and a shift towards one that is more dominated by religious leaders – also deserves real attention. So I thought that was very helpful.

The point that he makes about, again, a weak capacity on the army side, this also I think is often overlooked. I think the army has tried several approaches to the tribal areas. A sort of heavy-handed occupation, a military first strategy – that doesn't work for precisely the reasons that Ashley identifies; it alienates the local populations and it hurts the chances of winning over what is essentially at some level an insurgency. Winning those hearts and minds doesn't happen if you're using that military first and a bludgeoning heavy force strategy. So that's important.

And yet, at the same time, the Pakistani army was simply not created to do effective counterinsurgency work. And so, that's a deep problem. Now, of course, the obvious question would be, well, it's been a few years, so what are they doing to actually improve that capacity? And by extension, what is the United States doing to help them improve that counterinsurgency capacity within their armed forces? And here, I think there is work that could be done.

And third, the point that Ashley makes about how Afghanistan is itself a part of the problem because it hasn't become the solution; it hasn't worked; it hasn't been effective; and how the weakness on the Afghan side of the border and to the extent that the United States and NATO are to some degree responsible for some of that weakness also plays into this. So I think that to me, those were the things that really stood out as worth paying attention to, because I think all too often, they're overlooked.

I also liked how he characterized the poor U.S. options. And here, he sort of glossed over it very quickly in his presentation. But I think it's important to recognize the extent to which what is usually tossed around as the most obvious U.S. policy lever, which is conditioning assistance, threatening to cut it off, threatening to target sanctions against various members of the Pakistani leadership, of the Pakistani army or intelligence services, could in fact be quite counterproductive.

If what we're trying to do is work with this organization, the army, ISI, the Pakistani state writ large, if we're trying to use them or work with them as a partner and we're trying to convince them that in fact their long-term interest lies in working with us rather than essentially just doing this for this, a quid pro quo strategy, which is what's implied if you followed the path of imposing sanctions if you don't like what you're getting. So if in fact, you want to pursue a long-term partnership with Pakistan, the only way to do it is to try to convince those you're working with that you're going to be there a very long time. And threatening sanctions does just the opposite, so I think that's an important point that he makes.

There are a couple things that I thought might be expanded, and probably not in the context of this short paper, but at least worth discussing. And the first one, I think, is probably on the minds of a lot of people here, which is how you fit this piece of the Pakistani story into the broader political context. This is a very effective slice into the Pakistan problem. It identifies the challenges that face Pakistan and the United States, the international community in the tribal areas and just outside, and talk about the institutional weaknesses and so on, that make it very difficult to confront those problems. But how do we place this slice of the story into the broader story of what's going on in Islamabad of sort of the national political crisis that the country has been undergoing over the past several months. So that's more of a question or a suggestion for ways.

And to sharpen the question a little bit more, I would ask whether what we see emerging out of this past several months, the likely elections that we're likely to get – we've already got President Musharraf to step down out of the army chief role, moving into what may eventually look like a troika system – an army chief, a president, a prime minister – how that's likely, if we play this out over say six months and then longer, to make Pakistan more or less effective at overcoming the challenges that Ashley has correctly identified.

I guess in terms of other questions or going more towards criticism, I would say first, in terms of the way that this was presented at least today on the motivational side, I think – and I don't think Ashley would disagree with this, but I think that it sounded like there was a kind of rational and comprehensive motivation behind the segmentation strategy that he laid out for President Musharraf.

And here, my only point would be, it was much more of an ad hoc and gradual approach, an approach that each segment that I think is correctly identified came into being not all at once – and certainly not on September 13th – but over a period of years. And it's been a very dynamic strategy. So if you cut in at different points – 2002, 2003, 2005, and so on – I think you would have seen different segmentation, and a different sort of emphasis at different times. So I think that's important to recognize too, because it's been an evolving Pakistani strategy and set of motivations, rather than all at once they realized what their goals and stuck to these sets of goals from the beginning to the end. And I think it's still likely to be evolving.

When we get to the policy options – so, switching from the sort of analytical to the policy – here I would say one of the criticisms I would have is that the paper tends to focus on a cross-border issue more than I would. I think that if we're looking at trying to build Pakistani capacity, it's not as much a matter of just stopping the flow of militants across the border; it's really a matter of seeing Pakistan as being at the center of the policy challenge in terms of building up and fighting against militants who are based in Pakistan, and not just militants who were crossing over the border, and trying to resolve, presumably over a long-term period, this challenge of building up the governance structures that are likely to make that part of the Pakistan-Afghanistan world, the Pashtun tribal areas, how to make them actually work over a longer period of time. So that strikes me as that's really where the meat of the policy discussion should be.

And in particular in the paper, in passing, is mentioned the \$750 million assistance pledge that the United States has made to help Pakistan in this area, and I think that's where

we need to really sharpen our focus in terms of policy options because that's where we've already committed – and the question would be whether this is actually going to make a difference, and how best to make a difference there.

Also, just along these lines in terms of building up a long-term strategy, part of the challenge, I think, that the Bush administration faces is on the Pakistan side; that's obviously the significant one. But it's also a challenge in terms of explaining and selling politically, here in Washington and throughout the United States, the nature of this problem. And I think here, we have fallen short in terms of explaining that this is going to be probably a decades-long struggle, not just the global war on terrorism but specifically the problem of working with Pakistan and building up a partnership, and working in these tribal areas. And I think here, the sales job has been weak; by this administration I think a lot more could be done. And so, I'd suggest that maybe some attention needs to be given to that.

And then, in terms of how to shift Pakistani mindsets because this is what I think Ashley is getting at, trying to make them into better partners, trying to make the Pakistani government, and especially the army and intelligence services, look at the United States as a partner and look at the problem of militancy as their problem as much as it is the West's problem or Washington's problem. Here, my suggestion has been for some time, is to try to engage in what I'd call a coercive embrace of these individuals; so, rather than sanctioning and slapping them down, drawing them ever closer. So all assistance programming, military operations, training, intelligence sharing should be designed with an eye towards bringing them closer and making them recognize that we intend to be there; we intend to be in the region, in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, for literally decades to come, and that looking at us as part of their strategic vision for the region is really the only rational way for them to approach us. And so there, I would suggest a slight shift.

And finally, let me leave Ashley with a question which may interest him especially, is in terms of what I've seen over the past, you know, months and years, it appears to me that U.S. and Chinese interests are fairly well aligned in Pakistan these days. You know, we both very much share an interest in sort of ending this militancy; the Chinese have significant investments in Pakistan. And what I'd ask for somebody who follows both Pakistan and China and the wider region, is whether this is an area where more could be done on our part to leverage the Chinese role in all of this, or whether in fact that's not a bridge that we'd like to cross. So let me leave it there.

MR. PERKOVICH: Thanks, Tim. Very nice setting of distinctions and questions. Chris?

CHRIS FAIR: Actually, I'm going to pick up on what Dan just said about China. I think for many months, a number of us have been asking the question, why isn't China more engaged on this issue. And at least initially, the response that I think would be given is that China's not interested in Pakistan's domestic affairs, and probably historically that's true. But I think for all of us that were watching the way in which the Lal Masjid unfolded in July really demonstrated that China actually is interested in Pakistan's domestic affairs. And when China says, please go free our prostitutes, prostitutes are freed.

But going back to – sorry, if you didn't follow the Lal Masjid thing, that just went right over your head. But going back to Ashley's paper, I was very thankful that in fact he did focus upon the connections between Afghanistan and what's going on in Pakistan. We all know that since 2004, particularly with the onset of Pakistani military operations in FATA, what began is a Pashtun-come-Islamist insurgency centered in Waziristan quickly spread not only throughout the many, if not all at this point, of the tribal agencies or at least significant pockets thereof; it's also expanded to the adjoining Pashtun areas next to FATA, and as the Lal Masjid or the Red Mosque crisis demonstrated, there are even connections in FATA that go all the way into the Pakistani heartland.

Now, Ashley talked about or had mentioned that NATO has to live up to its obligations in Afghanistan. And having come back from Afghanistan, really do believe that what happens in Afghanistan affects significantly not only what happens in the tribal areas, but also what happens within Pakistan. There are a number of very obvious social networks that makes it very difficult to disaggregate what happens in Afghanistan from what happens in Pakistan. So, for example, the Dale Bundy (sp) political, militant and educational institutions are one clear example of the kind of social networks that bind these populations in ways that really matter.

So, for example, if you take a look at who the students were in the Lal Masjid or the Red Mosque, they were largely kids from the frontier. And where did you see the repercussions from the Lal Masjid affair; back in the Pashtun areas. So I'd like to push the envelope a little bit more on Afghanistan. We don't just need to live up to our commitments; we actually need a strategy to win. And I'm not sure what win means in Afghanistan, and I haven't been very satisfied with the metrics that I've seen put forwards for victory.

I think it's important that we understand that one of the reasons why the Taliban fell so quickly, in the immediate weeks following the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, is that Afghans immediately sensed who were going to be the winners and who were going to be the losers, and they defected away from the losers. In large parts of the south and southeast, where Ashley rightly noted you have Afghan Taliban; this is not just a Pakistan problem. Folks are really on the fence. It's not clear who's going to win, so it's important that we not only have a strategy to win, but that we can convince Afghans that we can win.

I was actually quite heartened by the Musq Allah (ph) victory last week. It had relatively few civilian casualties; that was very heartening. When I left Afghanistan, we were killing as many civilians as the Taliban were, and this was certainly making it difficult to so-called win hearts and minds. It's not enough to build a clear-a-town, we have to build a hold-a-town. So, just to sort of wrap up my comments on Afghanistan, people in FATA see this, you know, they have family ties, they have all sorts of ties going across the border in Afghanistan. So what we do in Afghanistan has a number of impacts for Pakistan.

I think it's also notable, and maybe it's just a convergence of coincidence, but in 2005 is when the U.S. began talking about NATO standing up and us sitting down. It was also in 2005 that the Taliban comes springing back; it's also in 2005 that you have the beginning of the induction of suicide attacks. Of course, they became much more apparent in 2006. Fortunately, the suicide attackers in Afghanistan remain the world's most

incompetent suicide attackers. But I think it's an important signal that we sent to Pakistan – you know, Pakistan has to live with this neighbor, so anything that we can do to signal to Islamabad that the international community has an intention to prevail in Afghanistan and stay is a good signal, and what happened in 2005 was probably orthogonal to our ultimate objectives in Afghanistan.

Karzai should be supported, but he should also be held accountable. I was really struck when I was in Afghanistan. Very few people, despite his poll ratings – poll ratings that President Bush would die for – a lot of folks have some serious concerns about Karzai. If we're going to really believe that counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency operations are linked at the hip, then we should hold Karzai accountable for these governors that are involved in poppy trading all the way from Babachan (ph) down to Nimruz, the chiefs of police and so forth.

So we need an Afghan strategy that is really going to win, one that can contain the civilian casualties. And I think this would have an important effect in FATA. And as Ashley noted, nothing has been as inflammatory as the unilateral U.S. military actions in Bajaur. And they probably wouldn't be so inflammatory if they actually succeeded, seriously, because then Musharraf could have claimed, oh, you know what, we took out Zawahiri. But that's not what he had to then deal with. So it's not just that we've done these operations, but that we've done them with high civilian casualties and that they have failed. It was following the Bajaur 2006 strike that we actually saw, for the first time, suicide attacks in the tribal areas against Pakistani security forces. So let us not underestimate the disutility of failed unilateral attacks in FATA

I was also thankful that Ashley talked not only about Pakistan's will, but also about capacity. But I'd like to sort of hop in here and sort of be very clear that in some measure, the U.S. has some culpability for the larger Pashtun-come-Islamist insurgency that is roiling the entire tribal belt and make inroads into settled parts of Pakistan, explicitly, we told the Pakistanis to do more. I think we have come too early to appreciate the very significant operational limitations of that force. And what happened in Waziristan in 2004 has just been the beginning.

Now, we're talking about putting money into arming the frontier corps. This is obviously very important. Frontier corps, they comprise an important element of the folks allegedly fighting in FATA. I'm not convinced that the money, though, is going to fix the problem. The problem is, they're not a professional force; they have family ties to the folks against whom they're fighting. They're not interested in engaging in some sort of blood feud. They've been traditionally the force used for black ops in Afghanistan and elsewhere. So for a number of historical and cultural reasons, a strategy that relies upon the frontier corps is probably not one that is going to result in victory anytime soon.

And when I look at the overall engagement towards Pakistan from the U.S., I ask myself the basic question: Is this aid portfolio going to produce a country that we'd like to have as an ally in the next, you know, 10-year time horizon? And I think probably the answer to that is no. The relationship is not institutionalized; it's dependent upon one person and his institution, the army. At some point, the United States has to begin supporting institutions. And at some point, the institutions that I think are pivotal in this

fight that Pakistanis must wage are going to be the entire set of institutions that provide justice.

If you look at how much money we spend on police reform, it is shameful. I mean, Pakistani police do not have the most rudimentary capabilities to secure evidence, collect evidence. And even if they did have this evidence-collection capability, no court in Pakistan would know what to do with evidence. So – and I'm not joking. I mean, they have a colonial-era evidentiary standard and efforts to reform the police in Pakistan have met with a number of political failures.

So, at some point, if we want to have a partner in Pakistan, we need to move away from the focus of the army and we really need to broaden this out to have a relationship with that country. Now, this brings me to very specific things that Ashley talks about in the brief. Dan also mentioned the \$750 million for FATA. Unfortunately, I think it's four years too late. I'm not sure who we would find to spend \$750 million on. If this money had come four years ago, it would have been much more sanguine.

And, unfortunately, the \$750 million for FATA doesn't come with any sort of conditionality upon political liberalization. And there's two major issues. I mean, I kind of feel like a broken record, you know, hit rewind, hit play. But I think they are really important, thus, it merits dilating upon them here briefly. One is the political parties act. The political parties act is what governs the activities of political parties in Pakistan as well as individuals who are, you know, members of those parties. It doesn't exist in FATA. Now, while it's probably true the mainstream and regional partners could do more in FATA, I mean they certainly have said, well, we can't do anything, therefore, you know. There probably is more that they can do. But statutorily, they are limited from operating in FATA. And what does this mean? It means that in 1997, when they had their first adult, their first exercise of adult franchise, they primarily elected Ulumah (ph) and that's because the religious parties were allowed to operate without any sort of restraint through the mosques and through the madrassas. So if we're talking about turning to politically liberalized FATA just by buying hearts and minds, this, to me, seems like a strategy for failure.

Secondarily, there is the issue of the frontier crimes regulation. You know, this is a hot potato, but, again, if we're trying to find ways of making Fattah a part of Pakistan, dealing with FCR needs to be one element of that strategy. I might just say, by way of aside, on January 7th, USIP, where I used to work and PIPA, who has some representation here, were going to be rolling out the results of some polling work that we did. And some of the work that we did in Pakistan involved public opinions about FCR reform. And contrary to what folks like to say in venues like this, Pakistanis – urban Pakistanis, to be clear – overwhelmingly supported either reforming or abolishing FCR altogether.

Finally, going to the sinews of U.S.-Pakistan relations, Pakistanis need to be convinced, in some measure, that this is their war that they're fighting. Now, the good news is, based upon our survey, is that in fact many Pakistanis do; 30 percent, depending on the question, view this as their war. The bad news is, in some cases, a larger chunk of folks don't see it that way. In fact, they view the U.S. actions in the region with great suspicion and great antipathy. So for the Pakistanis to be able to wage their own war, we need to

somehow figure out a way to get the atmospheric and the U.S.-Pakistan relation right. And it is maybe on the scope of this.

But I'm actually more bullish. Forget modifying the current policy. I think we can go further. I am struck that the – we talked about quid pro quo, you know, conditionality. But in fact, much of our relationship hinges upon a myth. And this is this F-16 myth. I am struck that when I talk to U.S. policymakers, the thing that they can do to demonstrate the commitment to the Pakistanis is get more F-16s and get them faster: rubbish, bullocks, bumfoot, whatever you want to call it. (Laughter.)

Let's go back and – and the reason why getting this narrative is right is so important is because both Islamabad and Pakistan frame the shortcomings of this partnership in the language of perfidy. Fact: press amendment written with Pakistani input to find some way to allow, you know, the president of the United States to continue funding money to Islamabad to fight the Soviets while the CIA and Congress were increasingly concerned about nonproliferation. Fact – Pakistanis were increasingly briefed: Please don't cross the red line that you said you wouldn't cross so we won't have to cut off your F-16s. And you could even go further in this narrative, but these are facts.

Pakistan made a strategic choice, not perfidious, a strategic choice that nuclear weapons mattered more than F-16s. Fact: we were not perfidious when we withdrew from the region; we were pursuing what was in our national interest. Unfortunately, when U.S. bureaucrats or folks in embassies and consulates deal with Pakistani counterparts, they always collapse almost sclerotically (ph) back to this F-16 fiction. We ditched you in the past; we're not going to do it again; these F-16s are coming.

Our relationship should be more important than a bogus narrative about something that really didn't happen and the way in which it's described. So I'm going to argue that we need a civilization between our two countries to get the narrative right. Without that narrative, this relationship – we've all talked about, will it survive regime change on Musharraf. I wonder if it will survive regime change when we have a new president in a year and a half and change.

So I'm going to wrap up with the only final comment that, consistent with getting this narrative right, I think we need to be a little bit more bold about the regional dynamics. You know, at the risk of sounding too tree-hugging – I'm not. Some things need to be bombed. Some things need to be bombed twice – but Pakistan actually does have some significant security considerations in our neighborhood about which I think we do have some ability to mitigate and about which I think we've been a little bit too insouciant. Kind of take a look at Pakistan's neighborhood. It has an ongoing security competition with India. We all know about that. By the way, the Taliban didn't deliver much for Pakistan in Afghanistan, but it kept the Indians out. Of course, that's no longer the case in Afghanistan.

So Pakistan has, in many sense, what it never really wanted to have, you know, active security competition on both of its borders. Its relationship with Iran is fraught; the Indians have a better relationship with Iran. India has two air bases in Tajikistan. So if we're kind of thinking about Pakistani behavior, I think we all sort of have to think about the strategic context in which that behavior is situated. And if we want to change the behavior in some

sense, we have to change the incentives. And that might involve thinking more seriously about regional solutions to the kinds of concerns that Pakistan needs to espouse.

MR. PERKOVICH: Frederic – and you’re the only one standing between all of these people and the speakers, so – but you’re a pretty big, strong guy so you might be able to take them on, but – (laughter) – go ahead.

FREDERIC GRARE: No, I’ll be very brief. I’m going to be struggling with some conclusion because it’s easy to say, well, Pakistan faces an uneasy environment. And this is true, but I mean, who is the revisionist power in the region? And therefore, there might be some agreements which provide security for Pakistan; I’m all for it, but at the end of the process, not at the beginning. And I think it would be a major mistake to go the other way around.

Similarly, I’m a bit surprised by the shift that we have operated between Pakistan to Afghanistan because it’s easier to blame a number of people there starting with, of course, NATO countries. And there is a lot to say about that. And I don’t disagree with what was said specifically. And similarly, with the performance of Karzai, which is absolutely true and all the deficiencies which were mentioned are actual deficiencies, similarly, it’s quite interesting to see that the U.S. is pursuing with Karzai exactly the same policy that it does with Musharraf which is, okay, we don’t like what you do, but, by and large, do whatever you want because we’ll accept it ultimately. This is not, of course, what has been said; this is what is being concluded from whatever action or lack of action is being taken.

Now, coming back to the paper, I mean, I’ll be extremely brief because I have no major issues with what is in the paper while I have a slightly bigger problem with what is outside the paper, of course, because I certainly agree that there is lack of motivation and ineptitude. But just as Ashley said that the question of political will is not the whole thing, I would certainly argue that not considering the political will is certainly an important issue as well. And if anyone had any doubt, just as a few questions about what happened this weekend.

What happened this weekend is, Rashid Rauf, the mastermind of the foiled attempt last summer in London, which, if successful, would have been worse than 9/11, escaped. Okay, interestingly, if you look at the details of what the EFP said this morning, I think this is quite an interesting story because here is a guy, which is a major asshole for international security. And all of a sudden, this guy is left alone with two policemen alone. Well, the interesting story is, those policemen were treated extremely well. The uncle of Rashid Rauf came apparently to the court and proposed to bring Rashid, along with the two policemen, in his own van back to the police.

On the way, you know, the cuisine is so bad in the jail that they are to stop at fast food on the way. (Laughter.) And because, you know, Eid is approaching, so they also had to stop at the local mosque, okay? Incidentally, in the good tradition of Houdini and David Copperfield and a few magicians in between – (laughter) – he got rid of his handcuffs and ran away together with his uncle. (Laughter.) So I know, Chris, that the police is poorly equipped, badly trained, all the rest of it, but, still, I have a little problem with this at the moment.

Now, I agree by and large with what is being said in the paper by Ashley about the Pakistan war on terror, you know, the sectarian, the jihadis, the Taliban, and al Qaeda. I mean, we all understand that, I mean, Pakistan is pursuing Pakistan's national interest, which is fine to me up to this stage, and that is trading a few bad guys, one of which the U.S. and others, by the way, needs badly – Rauf would be one of them – in exchange for leeway in some other places and in particular, you know, some sort of a blindness on the Taliban leadership.

But even then, even in the other thing which is quite unclear to me because even if you accept the fact that, you know, Musharraf has gone selectively against a few sectarian groups, I mean, still, May 2006 we saw in the Pakistani press, not here, that the SSP, for example, was reauthorized publicly, of course under a new name, Millat-e-Islamia, rather than Sipah and so on. So, that's all along.

Do you think that this is without any consequences on the war on terror? If you look at the sectarian issue over the past 15 years, what you see is – unlike what is being said very often – not an increase in the number of incidents. In fact, with two exceptions, the number of incidents decreased. What we saw in the process was an increase in lethality, meaning what: that they had connection with groups within or outside Pakistan connected internationally and so on. So this is not without an impact even on Western interest, U.S. and others again.

Similarly, refusing to dismantle the jihad infrastructure, one could well say, well, this is fine; this is the continuation of the Indo-Pak problem. Fine, fine, fine. And therefore, this is not a major issue. Of course we have a concern with the nuclear issue, but, you know, after all, we can probably manage. Providing that we get some insurance on that side, everything will be fine, except that the few Europeans and other young people incurred for adventure just arrive there and get the first taste of a juncture precisely there.

Of course, there is a lot of loss in the process; they will arrive, for example in Raewyn (ph) attend the major conference or just come here for “re-Islamization,” quote, unquote, and then move on to a much more radical group and so on. You know, the interesting thing is that just next to those things, you do have all of the radical groups around. Okay, so this is not totally innocent.

Just to give you also the kind of relationship which exists between the states, the first time I went to Raewyn I couldn't find my way there. So I asked to the local police – the local police actually came in a car and they brought me to the place. Okay, so that is the kind of relationship that we can see on the ground. Now, I agree also with the difficulty that the Pakistani state may have in the process, you know, weak intelligence and a few other things, which is all fine with me although with the weak intelligence, I do have at least two problems. The one is, I would perhaps except the idea that this intelligence has been declining over the past seven years, but if you look at the reform process of the intelligence agencies, what we see is that this has been the year where precisely the biggest effort has been to – has been made to make sure that they would become operational again. So you know, there is a question of at least the capacity of these intelligence agencies to reform themselves, that is, being us.

And when it comes to the tribal leaders, I do have another problem, because this is all fine to mention the erosion of the tribal structures and the increasing presence of the religious forces. As Chris has been said, this is also the result of a state policy; let's not forget that. But there is another aspect to it. This concern essentially south Wajiristan, okay? It's much less clear in other parts of the fallaz (ph). South Wajiristan incidentally is the place where the most successful operation by the tribes against al Qaeda have been conducted this year.

So I'm not reaching any conclusion. I'm certainly not saying, well, the difficulties do not exist; this is absolutely not my point here. But I think there are a few questions which have to be asked about what the process is really about.

Similarly, I do have another problem with equating, for example – well, the sociological dimension of Musharraf's fight against the Taliban. Why? First, because this is equating the Taliban and the Pashtuns. And another of Pashtuns feel quite uncomfortable with that. Even if we took the details of the Lal Masjid incident when a few parents, after they had seen what had happened, called back the daughters who were taken over, you know, the director of the local brotherhood and so on, okay, saying that we haven't sent you for that and so on. They wanted their kids to get a religious education; they were conservative, religiously conservative and that was – I stopped there. So I think this is not just also a purely academic question. This is something which are very deep practical consequences because what will you do with that. It also deals with the fact that if you have a policy which victimizes an entire population in the area, then you are making sure that precisely your tribe will align itself with the Taliban and then you increase the problem.

So, again, you can debate whether this is ineptitude – and there is probably a good deal of ineptitude – or whether this is something else. I am not concluding and I'm not being just polite or politically correct here. I just have no answer to that, but this is a question worth being asked, I think.

Where do we go next? Well, similarly, it's all funny to say, well, this is very difficult to find terrorism. It is actually difficult to find terrorism, but the whole that it raises, ultimately, was who do you trust when it comes to actually policy implementation because in Pakistan today, you have a different set of situations where, on the one side, you do have a situation which corresponds to an actual loss of control. In other parts, you can question the situation for not being perhaps a deliberate decision to let the situation there degenerate. I mean, if you look at the SWAT incidents, for example, the conflict between the TNSM and the MMA, it's interesting to see that the MMA, you know, the bad guys, supposedly, have asked the central government for months to remove the TNSM from the area with no response whatsoever from the central government until, of course, what was supposed to happen happened; people got killed and so on. And then, they moved in a big way in the region.

So we started with something which was just, you know, we're going to bother those mullahs over there although very few of them are actual mullahs in the government. And we ended up in this issue where no one controlled that. So when it comes to implementing policy, what do you do? Again, question the political will and question the capabilities. But

a threat is precisely a function of the political will and the capabilities. And if you have a negative political will and you increase the capability, you just increase the new results capabilities on the other side. So I don't think, again, that this is a purely rhetorical question.

Now, what to do? You know, I think it's all fine, actually, to say, well, you have to speak in one voice, right, to say what? To say what? So we all understand that you mean, you know, the stronger demand of what should be done to the Pakistani leadership, but then, when your words are not matched by your action when it comes to what we've seen over the past few days or few weeks, you know, serious constitutional crisis in Pakistan. And that we see that the major power and major ally in the whole business is ready to accept whatever happens, in a way, not by saying so, but acting in a way which makes sure that, you know, the guy is still in place, not that I would expect there would be a major change if only Musharraf was removed. But anyways – (inaudible) – that way, then what kind of conclusion do you draw, okay?

So the next question is, if you ask them to remove the Taliban leadership, again, this is all fine, but the question is, what do you do if they don't? What do you do if they don't? And then all sorts of questions that you have eliminated are open because you can say they decided that the guy is not exactly on our side and perhaps we should have – is definitely fraught with risk, but the risk exists in the present situation as well.

So believing that we are, you know, what we are doing right now is sounds to me is an illusion. We can all pray. Well, in France, it wouldn't be a state policy anyway – (laughter) – but, but beyond that – and I'll just stop with that.

(Laughter.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Let me ask you to raise hands. And what I want to do because time is short is have two questions in a row and then you guys respond briefly and I will act like a chairman and impose discipline on the time. Let's start back there with Henry and this gentlemen here; we're work our way to you. Okay.

Q: Yeah, I was wondering – is this on? Okay. I was wondering if the panel, Ashley, any of the folks could expand on the comments made by Christine Fair and Daniel Markey. It does seem to the layperson – and I count myself as one – that as soon as you get into the domestic dimensions of combating terror in Pakistan, your eyes glaze over. I mean, it just gets very complex. That's not to say it isn't important. It's just – it may not rise to the level of recognition. However, there was some discussion about India, some discussion about China. I didn't hear anything about Saudi Arabia, but generally, our foreign affairs efforts dealing with governments is a little easier. Could any of you comment on what could be done to leverage the behaviors of those countries in a way that would make Pakistan feel like we're on their side on dealing with some of the problems Pakistan has?

MR. PERKOVICH: This gentleman right here. The microphone is coming.

Q: My name is Bill Root, State Department retiree. Can we put this in historical perspective? Although the topic is Pakistan, most of the subject matter has been Afghanistan. And for the past 100 years or so, the British tried not once, but three times to

intervene in Afghanistan to keep the Russians from coming south. And then, the Soviets came and with the Taliban's assistance, they were kicked out. Is there any prospect that we'll do a better job than the predecessors?

MS. FAIR: Well, on the domestic dimensions, very briefly, like I said, on the seventh of July – is that right, Clay? It's the seventh. The seventh of January – we're going to be presenting the results of I think is a really novel survey that we did of Pakistanis. And, you know, while there's much in that survey that is certainly hair-raising, like 40 percent of Pakistanis don't think if they knew where bin Laden was that they should catch him. On the other hand, on issues about al Qaeda, the domestic militant groups, the Taliban being a significant or serious domestic threat, the majority of Pakistanis did, in fact, hold – shared the same kind of worldview that we would hope that they would hold.

And I was very dismayed over the course of the last three or four months that the very institutions that are, in fact, capable of combating the militancy threat within Pakistan – the Human Rights Commission, a variety of civil-society groups – they have been under lockdown. And so, it was, to me, quite ironic the day after, or even the day of, the emergency being declared, human-rights activists, politicians, people who actually can begin a grassroots discussion about the kind of Pakistan they want to have were being arrested whereas the Pakistani press was reporting at the same time that several important Taliban individuals were being released in exchange for the 300 frontier corpsman that were taken captive in August.

So I actually think that there are large swaths of the Pakistani nation who are our allies, but which singularly our policy has not supported. And we've kind of left them hanging, be it on issues of terrorism, be it on issues of domestic accountability, be it on issues of democracy. So I think that going back to my large focus, we need to depersonalize U.S.-Pakistan relations and have a relationship with the civil society of that country. I think that's probably the single most important thing we can do, over the long term, that's going to turn this tide back that Pakistan is encountering vis-à-vis militancy.

MR. PERKOVICH: Anybody else on – I suppose it's a long discussion to argue or explain why somehow we're going to succeed where everybody else has failed, but –

MR. TELLIS: I think that's about all you say – (chuckles) – in a few minutes. I just wanted to take Henry's question, though, a little more closely. It's difficult to imagine what the three countries that surfaced in the discussion – India, Saudi Arabia, China – could do in terms of leverages. China is the closest, actually, with realistic leverage because they have an interest in an outcome that is common to both the United States, the enlightened segments in Pakistan, as well as to China. Saudi Arabia – (chuckles) – is part of the problem because of the kind of support that has been available from various Saudi social groups to various groups in Pakistan over the years. This is all the Bahabi (ph)-funded money that has been going on now for almost about 30 years.

India is far more complex because there is a geopolitical competition between India and Pakistan which is now manifesting itself in Afghanistan. And I don't think anyone has come up with a good argument about how that competition can be attenuated. People basically end up saying things like, oh, you've got to lean on the Indians to kind of throttle

down their presence in Afghanistan. And, you know, that's easy to say, but, in practice, how does one do it?

India is now one of the largest contributors of economic assistance in Afghanistan and once you become a large contributor, you automatically, you know, what comes in its wake is the demand for personnel. I mean, you end up having consulates; you end up having people out there working the, you know, working the field. Now, that presence itself tends to raise the blood pressure in Islamabad and so I'm not sure how one can either lean on the Indians to kind of reduce their own presence. I think it's almost impossible to do. We have no control over that. And two, whether it's realistic because I think part of the problem with India implicates Islamabad's own objectives in Afghanistan and Islamabad's own desire to have an Afghanistan that is not within the Indian sphere of orbit.

But there is a big difference between saying, we want an Afghanistan that is not within India's sphere of orbit and Afghanistan which is in our – under our control. I mean, that's – it's between those two poles that I think you run into all of the political problems of leverage.

MS. FAIR: We both have comments, I think, on that.

MR. PERKOVICH: Okay, real brief, because I want to get – (inaudible).

MR. GRARE: No, I just had a very quick point about Saudi Arabia. Again, this is also a question of consistency of U.S. policy because of course, individuals in the state have been supporting various groups in the area, but I mean they have also been encouraged to do so, at some point, by the United States. For various reasons, it was convenient to support radical groups because of socialism at some point, and it became convenient to do so because of Iran. It then became convenient because of the Soviet, and so on and so forth.

Now, we are back to the Iranian question: Yes, but with a big twist in between. You know, the Saudis, we all find ways – Iraq as it was not because they liked Iraq, but simply because, you know, containing Iran and so on. Then, Iraq has disappeared. Then now, we are supporting all kinds of endeavors by the Saudis elsewhere, when they also have lost in Afghanistan an element which you've seen also as a part of the containment against Iran, okay, and we're blaming them for supporting anti-Iranian elements in Pakistan with a consistency there. So what I'm saying is not that you're right; I'm just saying that they can't be right or act properly unless we also act properly, unless we put some consistency in our policies and so on.

MR. MARKEY: I just wanted to pick up on Ashley's point about India because I think here, something's gone missing which is that the relationship between India and Pakistan is better than it has been in quite some time, and this is the dog that hasn't barked. I mean, this is the thing that, if this actually changed, would make our lives 10 times, 100 times harder in terms of confronting the kinds of challenges we face. So Ashley rightly points out that India and Pakistan have a difference of views in Afghanistan, but all of the other signs, the trends, over the past few years have been pointing towards positive, which has made everybody's life better, I think, and in fact shows what India has already done in

terms of leverage to make this situation more amenable to some sort of a long-term solution. So we're on the right path, at least in the broader Indo-Pak set of conditions.

MS. FAIR: Well, I have a somewhat contrarian view to that. Since I'm a dog person, I'm not going to say the dog isn't barking, but there is a cat meowing in Afghanistan. And I would argue that the major theater, the most apparent venue for Indo-Pakistan strategic competition is not anymore in Kashmir, it's now in Afghanistan. And I thoroughly agree with Ashley that, you know, it's unreasonable to ask India hey, you know, tone it down a little bit; can you go to nine instead of 11.

But I think it's not unreasonable to focus on the Afghans' contribution to this. So, for example, I see no compelling reason why they should have issued a contract to Border Roads' organization to rebuild part of the Ring Road. For those of you who don't know what the Border Roads organization is, it's an equivalent or it's tantamount to our Army Corps of Engineers, for lack of a better example. So, you could imagine in a comparable situation – you know, this is perhaps not the most stabilizing of choices the Afghans could make.

The other issue with the Afghans is, you know, perhaps emboldened by their partnership with India, they say ridiculous things about the Durand Line. If Karzai and other Afghan officials would simply stop – you know, as we are the revisionist power in that security dyad, not Pakistan. So if we could encourage the Afghans to enjoy Indian benefits in Afghanistan, while not engaging in inflammatory rhetoric and again, be pushing the Afghans towards trying to resolve their territorial issue with Pakistan. I mean, they're the ones who are rejecting the Durand Line as the principle basis of the boundary.

MR. PERKOVICH: This gentlemen here, and then Andrew and then Paul.

Q: Yes, hi. I'm Paul Richter, with the LA Times.

I wonder if the panel would be willing to share some thoughts about how the Pakistani prosecution on the war on terror will be affected by the upcoming elections, assuming that that shifts some power to Bhutto and Nawar Sharif.

MR. PERKOVICH: Elections and –

MR. GRARE: Well, I think you have given the answer yourself because you did, assuming that it shifts in power from Bhutto and the world, and Nawar's out of the loop anyway because he's not even in Tehran.

But without pre-judging what is being done, let's look at what happened over the past few weeks. We had a crisis in the country. Did it affect the fight against terrorism in any way? Absolutely not. Not a single unit has been shifted from one place to another. So, for any practical purpose, I mean, the political crisis did not affect the same problems elsewhere. We may have been distracted, and it didn't change anything. So, draw the conclusion yourself.

MR. TELLIS: I broadly share that judgment because the CTF efforts that are driven in Pakistan are really controlled by the army and the intelligence services. I don't see any fundamental changes occurring as a result of these elections in who controls decision-making, with respect to national security. And this is a core national security issue for Pakistan. So, you might get some changes on the margins, but I don't think you will get fundamental changes. And elections, assuming that you move towards a civilian regime that is relatively stable and autonomous, at least in some areas, the biggest changes that one is likely to see, possibly, is with respect to containing sectarian violence. I think in that arena, you have the opportunity for hopefully some changes.

But on the fundamental questions of the war against al Qaeda, the war against the Taliban, both in the cadres and the leadership, and the war against the Kashmiri groups or the anti-Indian groups operating Kashmir, I think this comes so clearly within the purview of army decision-making that I don't think that's going to change. If there is any other different view, I think would be useful.

MS. FAIR: Just to hop on there – I mean, the switch to Kayani, I mean, you never know which way this could fall. But then, there would actually be a space to increase the efficacy because Kayani doesn't have the baggage of being Musharraf. And when I look at this, my main concern is army morale; it's army regular officers that are serving with the frontier corps that are being captured without firing a shot by the Taliban, and I can only imagine how demoralizing that that must be, to serve with some of these individuals in those terrains under those circumstances. So it's entirely possible that the power shift between Musharraf and Kayani may be a net positive.

But, my only concern would be – with respect to the elections, would be the relationship between Musharraf and whoever gets elected. It's certain to be a relationship that dissipates very quickly. And then, the question comes in: How will Kayani, you know, respond to this power struggle between these two?

MR. PERKOVICH: Andrew, then Paul.

Q: Andrew Pierre (sp), Georgetown University.

My question's addressed to Mr. Grare, although others may wish to chip in. Your paper's entitled, "Rethinking Western Strategies Towards Pakistan, and Action to Judge of the United States and Europe." Europe? Where is Europe? Not in our discussion this morning. Europe is a victim of terrorism, somewhat centered in Pakistan, and Europe is going to be in this for 10 years or longer, just like we're going to be in Pakistan. But it doesn't seem to be a participant in what I would call a Western strategy for dealing with counter-terrorism, al Qaeda and Pakistan. I'd appreciate your comments on that.

MR. GRARE: Well, are you talking of Pakistan or Afghanistan?

Q: Pakistan.

MR. GRARE: Right.

I think that Europe is very much in it. But Europe is just like the U.S.; it doesn't exactly know where it's going, okay. And Europe, just like the U.S. on many accounts, thinks that it's better to have the full cooperation with whatever exists, in terms of international cooperation, international sharing, whatever you can imagine, that's not cooperating at all. Europe, on top of that – look at the U.S. being the leader in all those things. So, if the U.S. doesn't know where it's going then Europe, you know, is quite reluctant to act.

Now, Europe has some concerns of its own, as the British, for example. They have been most reliable to whatever happens. As I look at the policy we've seen being conducted, the reason why I mentioned Ralph (ph) at the very beginning of my presentation is clearly related to that. And ask yourself, what can they do? So if they see also one country, the leader in the whole thing, going one way and refusing to act decisively against – whatever this decisively may mean, and we can debate that endlessly. I mean, do you think that Europe is going to take the risk to go in that direction? Of course not.

I would argue, and I have argued in Europe, that they say there are places that it should take a stand of its own. Not that it's because it would perhaps force also the U.S. to shift its position, but you know, so far the – (inaudible) – are that for the very same reason that nothing is being done in India, nothing's being done in Europe.

Q: Polly Niechem (ph), an independent consultant with a long background on South Asia.

I wanted to raise a couple of issues, one on the analytical side. I wanted to build a little bit on Dan's point about the importance of timeframes, and in relation – and a finer granularity in regard to Pakistani policies on militants, at various times since '01. I think that's a very important point, and I would like to extend that requirement of finer-grained approach to timeframes to the ties between various militant groups and al Qaeda, and among those militant groups because I think this terrain has been very dynamic, and I actually believe that refining that timeline would make an important contribution analytically to understanding both the government response and the effects of U.S. policy or non-effects of U.S. policy.

Also on the analytical side, I wanted to suggest that an area for focus really is to refine our understanding of how different Pakistani players perceive their own terrorism problem, the problem of militants and the options that are open to them within their frame of reference. I really believe that, to a great extent, American analysts and American policymakers are operating on many assumptions that are unverified. So, I actually think that's a huge area, and there are many ways to fill the gaps there, but I think if we actually seriously need to do that if we're going to come up with a policy that has the potential to make any kind of difference.

On the question of whether counterterrorism will be impacted in any way by the election, I totally concur with the general point that Ashley made, that counter-terrorism is a vital national security interest, which will therefore remain primarily the purview of the army. But the question of legitimacy, I think, will surge with the election of civilian leaders. And what has happened in many other societies may well happen in Pakistan, which is that the

means and the ends of counterterrorism will become a subject of debate, to the extent they're permitted to. And the U.S. can make a positive contribution in a couple of regards. Chris suggested engaging with civil society, and I think that's a great idea to the extent that it's possible, but there may be constructive ways that we can bring into Pakistan the experience of some other countries in trying to integrate the security-force side; the rule of law, peace, which, as Chris has pointed out, is fraught with problems in Pakistan anyway; and the effect of counterterrorism operation-side.

And I've been party to delegations; I've been a part of delegations in which people with experience in other countries have brought that experience into troubled areas, and spoken with both civilian and military leaders. This might be something that we could do; I'll be happy to talk a little more about it off-line. I don't want to take up too much time here. But this may be something that we could actually do to bring together the new military leadership, the residual Musharraf element and the elected folks, and to try to tamp down the temptation to play up differences, and to play with the legitimacy issue as a political football.

And one other point: When we're doing our PR strategy and refining our approach to the new establishment, one area where I think – and this point has been made in other venues, American policymakers just have to stop treading so heavily as the argument for, you know, secular education and secular lots of things, where we get ourselves into deep trouble and de-legitimate our involvement in Pakistan.

MR. PERKOVICH: Hold that for a second; let me get Lisa's question, and then you can take them all as part of a wrap-up.

Q: Hi. Lisa Curtis (sp), the Heritage Foundation, and my question and comment sort of builds on what Polly already raised.

It's been a very interesting conversation; I think one of the most interesting developments is what Frederic has raised, and that is the release or escape of Rashid Rauf. And I think if we could figure out exactly what led to his release or escape, we would move very far down the road in sort of cracking the overall problem of religiously motivated extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. So I think that if we – I'd like to hear others' comments. We've heard from Frederic on it, but I would like to hear others' comments on this. We all sort of had a chuckle, but I think had this plot been successful, and we would have been dealing with 1,000 dead civilians, we wouldn't be laughing. So it is an extremely serious problem, and I think we have to ask the question, is any amount of police reform, would that have dealt with this problem. Maybe it was simple mistake, we might believe that, or is there something deeper going on here that has to do with the ties of supporting religiously motivated extremists for so many years to accomplish strategic objectives, and that is the fact that there are still these linkages at different parts of the security establishment with these militants.

And I'm not saying, you know, there's direct responsibility, or somehow Musharraf was somehow involved; I'm not saying that. What I'm saying are, I think we would be ignoring a big part of the problem if we didn't admit that there still are various connections, and if the right person gets through and can pay the right person, then unfortunately you

have these cases of very dangerous people escaping prosecution. And it gets to the whole Afghanistan problem. Al Qaeda would not be able to exist if it didn't have the web of other militants that it's relying on, its connections to the Taliban and able to be in the tribal areas; its connections to some of the Kashmir-related groups, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the others. So, really, if we're trying to think about stabilizing Afghanistan and stabilizing Pakistan, I think if we go back to this simple case of Rashid Rauf and his ability to escape, is a key question. So, I just would appreciate, particularly Chris Fair, your comments on that.

MR. TELLIS: I think Dan's comment, which Polly reiterated, about doing a more dynamic analysis about how Pakistan's strategy towards different jihadi groups has changed over time. I think that's very important, and from an analytical point of view, we ought to do it. But I think we should be careful about inferring from the fact that the strategy has manifested itself in different ways. We ought to be careful about inferring from that fact that there have not been some invariant objectives. I think there have been some invariant objectives, and how those invariant objectives have played themselves out I think is a function of political opportunity.

A very simple example is, for example, Pakistan's approach of the Taliban leadership. In the immediate aftermath of OEF, the Pakistanis were simply content to ignore the Taliban leadership because they were not a problem. They were defeated; they were pushed out of Afghanistan; they didn't have any reason to go after them in a concerted sort of way. It's only after 2005 that the Pakistanis begin to re-look at this issue, primarily under American pressure, and then go after what I think are, in a sense, the operational leaders in the field rather than whom you might think of as the grand strategist sitting in a back room. These are obviously terrible descriptions because – (laughter) – you can't exactly find people who match the description. But at least mentally, you can say they went after some operational leaders who were causing them a lot of grief, causing us a lot of grief, but really still continue to leave, you know, the poobahs alone.

What does this tell you? What it does tell me is that, depending on opportunity, of course they have made some decisions. But there is a fundamental calculation that has remained quite invariant from 2001 to 2005, which is the Taliban are a strategic asset given their interests in Afghanistan, and therefore they're not going to go after that leadership, either unless the interests change or because the pressure on them changes to a point where they have no choice. And so what I would draw from the Rashid Rauf case is that – and I described this, actually, in the larger piece, is that what you have are certain invariant national goals, which they have tried to protect as best they can, given the dynamism of the pressures. And, two, there has been the intelligence community and the KCT community has had tremendous latitude, actually, in operational terms, about who they go after and who they don't. And so, even if there is a national decision to do something, the way that national decision is enforced makes a real difference to the kind of seepage that you can find in the system.

And so, I think the structure of ISID, for example, the way the CT efforts are coordinated between ISID and many other groups has much to account for the slipperiness of the CT operation. And, unless we are attentive to those organizational issues, married to

what I think are the invariant national goals, you don't get a story that accounts for these so-called anomalies.

MS. FAIR: Yeah, very briefly because I very much agree with Ashley's systemic assessment of what went down with the Rauf case. But I think you have to sort of distinguish between elements of the police, which are in a network of intelligence operatives, politicians and so forth, that are responsible for executing national decision-making. So, for example, Massoudas Har (ph) is equally another really good example of a deeply problematic person. His name has come up in a number of international conspiracies; he certainly figures heavily in activities in Kashmir. Yet, he, you know, remains under the watchful eye of the ISI, in whatever capacity that may mean. So, the fact that the police are part of this system of actors, that can act conveniently on behalf of Islamabad, doesn't mean it detracts from the other systemic problem, which is the entire provision of justice in this country is incapable of delivering justice.

So, for example, if you're living in a flat in Karachi, and you think there's a shady actor living two floors above you, you're not going to call the police. One, because chances are the police is in cahoots with the shady actor to begin with, and you don't know what's going to befall upon you. So the fact that the police – and it's not just, for example, their connections with the intelligence agency; that was really struck by – you know who the biggest assailant was in reforming the police in 2004 wasn't the intelligence agency, it was actually the politicians because the police order after 2002 was going to remove the police from the titular, you know – they were no longer going to be the goons of elected politicians. So, the police are certainly part of this network that has a lot of decision research, for the reasons that Ashley noted. But this isn't any reason, or in any way diminish the fact that over the long haul, counter-terrorism is a police activity, not an army activity.

And so, having an effective system that provides justice to carry out the wishes of Pakistanis, many of whom do not agree with the glide-path that Pakistan is currently on – so, I don't think that this particular incident in any way diminishes an argument for putting strong investments – not just American dollars, but anyone that will invest in this system. I think is the surest way of having a Pakistan that, over the 10- to 20-year time horizon is more at peace with itself.

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I'm going to thank all of you. I'm going to thank Ashley for running the policy brief, and Dan and Christine for commenting on it. It's there to read, and we will welcome you back for the next time we do something like this.

(Applause.)

(END)