THE INF TREATY AND BEYOND: WHERE DOES ARMS CONTROL GO FROM HERE?

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Welcome. Thank you very much. It's great to see so many people who are interested in where arms control goes from here. I'm the moderator, Susan Koch, so I have the luxury of just asking the questions, because I fear I have no answers to the basic topic.

We're very pleased indeed to have a terrific panel. To my immediate right, Jon Wolfsthal, who's Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation at the White House National Security Council Staff, and was most recently Deputy Director of the James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies.

Dr. Alexei Arbatov, who's Head of the Centre for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science, and also, given what conference we're at, we have to mention, a Scholar in Residence at the Carnegie Moscow Centre's Non-Proliferation Program.

Ambassador Christoph Eichhorn, which I hope I've pronounced, is Deputy Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, and was before that, Minister and Head of the Political Department at the German Embassy here in town from 2008 to 2011.

And finally, but definitely not least, Mr. Franklin Miller. He's a Principal of the Scowcroft Group and was previously Senior Director for a Defense Policy and Arms Control in the National Security Council Staff.

I think it was about 21 months ago, but it feels like several lifetimes ago that President Obama gave a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, where he outlined an ambitious arms control agenda, including negotiated cuts of deployed US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by up to one-third, quote, bold reductions of US and Russian shorter range nuclear weapons in Europe, and always continued hope for entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and successful negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

That was June of 2013. The immediate Russian reaction to the Brandenburg proposals was somewhat less than positive. Some months later, the Ukraine crisis began, depending on when you count it, and a few months after that, the United States declared Russia in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, followed later by Russian counter-claims of US non-compliance.

Meanwhile, we have to remember, the United States, Russia, and her allies, continued to cooperate on important questions like the elimination of chemical weapons from Syria, the continuing negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program. But the bilateral and multilateral arms control picture has not been a positive one. So again, in the theme of this panel, where do we go from here?

You're probably pretty familiar with our panel formats now, but we'll spend 40-45 minutes in discussion up here, and then open the last 30 minutes to questions from all of you, ending promptly at noon for lunch.

I'd like to begin by asking the same question to each of our panellists. Asking that they speak very briefly on how he sees the prospect for US-Russian arms control over the next two years, and what the implications of those prospects are. I'd like to start first with Jon Wolfsthal.
Thank you very much, Susan. Thank you all for being here. It's really a privilege to be on the panel with people that I’ve known, learned from, and respect greatly, and also be back at Carnegie. I used to help run this conference, many years ago. I can't say I miss being here. I guess I'd rather be there, but I'm glad I'm not there.

So I took this position in December, having been outside government for a couple of years, and one of the first things I delved into was our concerns about Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. And I think it's very clear for those that have been able to examine this inside the government, that despite our efforts to try and develop a strong, sustained, arms control process with Russia, that we're now facing a real challenge. Not only because of Russia's behaviour on a variety of security issues, and as Susan said, not across the board, because we continue to cooperate in a number of important areas, but for those of us that have focused on arms control, and having literally come of age as the INF was coming of age, we're gravely concerned about Russia's violation of this important bedrock treaty.

The evidence is compelling, and it is conclusive because of the sources, we are in, I would say, a disadvantaged position, but it's been made very clear to Russian government authorities the nature of our concerns, and we provided more than enough information to engage in a substantive discussion.

Unfortunately, instead of trying to deal with this in a quiet and sustained way, as we have preferred, we have been responded to with a series of baseless counter-charges. And from our point of view, this makes it extremely difficult for us to try and resolve the outstanding INF issues, and also to continue to make progress on what the President has laid out as a very ambitious set of ideas for continuing the arms reduction process with Russia; one that has served our country's security interest for decades, and one that I believe, over the long term will still be something we will want to rely on, but will be increasingly difficult if we cannot engage seriously on the INF issue.

I do want to indulge the panel and the audience for a couple of minutes, because I think, until now we really haven't made an effort to try and respond to some of the counter-charges that have been made by Russia. I just want to spend a minute or two, if I can, on that.

In response to our finding of non-compliance, Russia, which had not raised US compliance issues for many years under INF Treaty immediately threw up what we regard as a kind of smokescreen to shield allegations of their own non-compliance related to three issues. The booster rockets that we use for targets for our ballistic missile program, armed UAVs, and our Aegis Ashore missile defense launchers.

And in terms of the specific details, again, I don't want to get into too much arcane arms control language, although, in this audience, you probably dig that. But from our point of view, I want to talk just for a second about our process and then about the specific charges.

One is, we have a very clear regulated and legislated process for ensuring that the United States is in compliance with all of our arms control treaties. They are the law of the land. And as people here understand, the United States is very serious about ensuring that we abide by our legal obligations. And this is a process that's run out of the Department of Defense but with a full inter-agency to ensure that our military programs are compliant with international treaties. And to put it bluntly, if they're not compliant, we don't do them, period. That's the law of the land.
In terms of the specific allegations, on ballistic missile targets, the INF Treaty - and I had to go back and reread this, because I haven't since my history thesis - Paragraph 12 of Section 7 of the INF explicitly permits the production and use of existing types of booster stages to create such ground launch booster systems for use as ballistic missile targets. The goal is that these systems not be used for research and development for missiles, but that they be used solely for testing the ballistic missile defense systems, and that is exactly what the United States does. And so we view this as basically just a chaff that's being thrown up to counter our serious concerns.

The second issue of armed UAVs, put very simply, a UAV is a UAV. It is not a Cruise Missile. A Cruise Missile is a Cruise Missile. And we do not have ground launch Cruise Missiles that are within the ranges of the treaty limits. It's no secret that we have armed UAVs. It's something that has been known for some time. It's an important part of our security strategy. But the INF provides no restrictions on such capabilities. Russia has maintained that armed UAVs meet the definition of Cruise Missile for that treaty. We disagree. We're happy to have that kind of discussion with Russia if we're prepared to have a two-way discussion, but from our point of view, this is simply an unsupportable claim.

And then the third charge of our compliance relates to the Aegis Ashore missile defense program. Russia maintains that this represents a violation because it is capable of launching a Tomahawk Cruise Missile. And I want to be careful here, because I have very specific points to make. The Aegis Ashore system is only capable of launching air and missile defense interceptor missiles, such as the SM3 which are not missiles subject to the INF Treaty. The system is not capable of launching any offensive type of missile, such as a Tomahawk Cruise Missile. The launching system for the Aegis Ashore Missile System has never been used for any purpose other than to launch missiles compliant with the INF Treaty. And Aegis Ashore has not and will not be designed, tested, or deployed to launch missiles other than those that have been developed and tested solely to intercept or counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, which again, are not INF missiles.

So I appreciate your indulgence there. I know that's a long litany, but I think it's important if we're going to have a serious and sustained dialogue. We want to have that, and we want to do that in a professional, serious way. But we are very concerned that that process cannot move forward if we engage in this increasingly public, and I think, difficult debate.

What we'd like to have is a serious discussion with Russian government officials to bring Russia back into compliance with this very important treaty. We think it's in our interest. We believe it is in Russia's security interest. Our allies believe it's in our continued mutual interest to have this treaty preserved, and we hope that Russia will see it the same way, and begin to engage us in a serious way. Thank you, and I apologise for the long comments.

SUSAN KOCH

Alexei, over to you.

ALEXEI ARBATOV

First of all, thank you for inviting me. It's a great pleasure to be here. What I will say now is in no way intended to downgrade great contribution of government officials and public figures in Russia and United States and in other countries, which is made to sustain nuclear arms control.

However, I think that we are facing a unique, historical, comprehensive crisis of nuclear arms control. Never before, during the 50 years of nuclear arms control since the 1963 partial test ban treaty did we have a situation where all negotiations are stalled, the progress is stagnating and the arms control is disintegrating. Not only with nuclear arms reductions, but also with
nuclear arms non-proliferation. And we are facing real threat of losing control over these most devastating weapons ever invented.

INF crisis is important on its own terms. But it's a symptom. Very vivid, very troublesome symptom of much more general picture. Picture of disintegration of nuclear arms control. It did not start a year ago. It did not start with the Ukrainian crisis. It started much earlier, after some dramatic positive breakthroughs of the 1990s.

From the end of the 1990s, the process started to stagnate, to lose its focus. It was not properly adapted to changing world order, to changing strategic balance of the world, and to technological developments. And now, after 2011, it all so to say, everything that was accumulated hit the fan, in this sense.

With respect to INF, Jon is right. There are technical accusations on both sides. The most serious one, I think, is the accusation of Russia of testing ground launch Cruise missiles at ranges higher than 500 km. Russian official position is that it has not done it. It tested it below 500 km. Russian most serious accusation is the one with launchers for Aegis. I would not argue about technical details, but in order for Russia to be satisfied, the launcher, which is to be deployed in Romania and Poland, doesn't have to be just different from the launchers which are deployed on surface ships. It has to have what under START 1 was called function-related observable differences. Not just different but functionally related. And that's why Russia certainly put forward this accusation.

Why didn't Russia do it earlier? This is a specific way of Russian policy and prior to that, Soviet policy in this respect. Russian never complained about American raiders in [unclear] before Americans accused Russia of [unclear] and then Russia came back with its own accusations. This is just the mode of diplomacy which is different in Russia from that of the United States. But it is a concern. I do not think it's a very serious concern, but it's a concern which is to be resolved.

10 years ago, or 15 years ago, we could resolve it at the technical level without much difficulty. But not anymore, because of the general crisis that we are facing. With respect to INF, I think that the west has some reason to be concerned about Russian attitude and Russian programs. Not because of this particular things. Our 500 missile or Rubezh-26 missile, not that. But the general attitude in Russia certainly is quite negative with respect to nuclear arms control in general, and INF Treaty in particular. It's not technical, it's strategic.

There are principally two arguments which are used in criticising INF Treaty. The first is that the treaty limits on the American and Russian missiles but other countries are developing them. What is more, United States is under no threat from medium-range missiles of any other state in the world. Russia is within range of all medium-range missiles of all states that possess them, because they are located closer to Russian territory. And hence, the conclusion is, Russia needs its own medium-range systems to deter third nuclear weapon states, and third missile states.

The second argument is related to ballistic missile defense. The US ballistic missile defense deployments existing and planned in Europe and Asia Pacific are considered by Russian political and military leadership as a threat to Russian nuclear deterrence, which is the centre pivot to Russian security. It's considered to be a threat to Russian retaliation second strike capability, which is at the basis of Russian nuclear deterrence policy.

Hence, the conclusion is, Russia needs medium-range systems to target bases of ballistic missile defense in Europe, and eventually in Asia as well. Both of these arguments are not undisputable, and there are debates in Russia going on. There was a strong pressure a couple of years ago for Russia to formally withdraw from the INF Treaty. For the time being, it's not happening and it's
not planned, but I am concerned about Russian reaction to first deployments of Aegis Ashore Systems in Romania and Poland. Maybe we'll face another stage of this unravelling crisis of nuclear arms control then, but not now.

Those strategic arguments would be countered by counter-arguments. However, due to general political background, the opponents of INF Treaty have stronger position than proponents of INF Treaty. And this is the most important thing which I wanted to bring to your attention.

In Russia now, INF Treaty is perceived as a symbol of the beginning of Russian policy of indefinite unilateral concessions to the United States. This treaty was the beginning of Gorbachev new political thinking, Shevardnadze diplomacy, and in the nowadays Russia, this is something which is extremely unpopular. And not only INF, but the other treaties, START I, START II, START III and other treaties as well.

So against this background, INF critics have very strong position. And certainly, Ukrainian crisis has exacerbated that. It was not the reason for this crisis, but it was a factor which greatly aggravated the crisis. Without getting out of Ukrainian crisis through peaceful diplomacy, it will be not quite possible to restore and save nuclear arms control. But even if we do that, that will not be enough. A serious work will need to be done to adapt nuclear arms control to the new world order, to the new strategic realities, to the new technologies. That was something that was not done during the last 20 years.

Those problems were swept under the carpet. We pretended that we can go on, business as usual, and it didn't happen like that. We now are facing something which I will express in a funny formula, I would say. And that's the end of my remarks. You know, some people say that if you do not take care of nuclear weapons through arms control, and agreements, nuclear weapons will take care of you. And that's something that we are now facing, and that's a very serious problem.

SUSAN KOCH

Okay. Chris?

CHRISTOPH EICHHORN

Susan, thank you very much. The title of this session is... forgive me, is the microphone on? Okay, thank you. Thanks very much for having me on this very distinguished panel. You were very kind in mentioning that I served in Washington before. What you did not say was I was a transatlantic fellow also on loan to the US State Department with a US top secret clearance and everything, working on Ukraine, 1998 to 2000. And I’m not saying this because Frank sits next to me, but it has the additional value of being true. I was part of a team which you led at the time, and we all slept on the plane over to Europe. You had studied the book, and in the morning you grilled us with questions and I’m still in shock and awe, even a couple of years later.

The title of the session is INF and beyond. I guess what Carnegie hired me for was to play the and beyond part, which is not only looking into the future, but it also broadens the agenda slightly, because, of course, the US-Russia bilateral agenda is essential to all of this what we’re talking about. But there are allies and partners with their own agendas and their own interests.

You mentioned the President Obama speech in Berlin, which was very good for all of us, I’m sure, who sit in this room, because he made a very clear commitment for future arms control and disarmament practical steps and negotiations. And it is still on the table, and the last NATO summit referred to it, provided circumstances permit to do the next step. But it is important that you mention it and that it stays on the table.
That's very briefly, before I go to the and beyond. On INF, three lines. It was a groundbreaking disarmament success. It is of enormous importance to the European security structure. Undermining the treaty would pose a serious challenge to Europe's security. It also may have a sort of ripple effect on other arms control regimes, and therefore, to undermine the treaty would be a burden on international security architecture as a whole. Hence maintaining the treaty is in the interest of all of us. And we therefore fully support the ongoing consultations between the US and Russia to clarify these outstanding issues.

If I may just very briefly touch on the and beyond section, and throw a bit of light on the conventional side. Alexei Arbatov mentioned the Ukraine. The events there are a grim reminder that currently people are dying not because of nukes, but of conventional weapons. You follow the news very closely, the German government is trying to push very hard for solutions to this raging conflict. You know the role that German Chancellor, Angela Merkel plays, that Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier plays, together with others.

I would absolutely agree with Alexei that this is the key at the moment to overcome this deep crisis of trust which has developed in Europe over the last year. It will not be enough, but this is the first thing which we all have to put our efforts together to help and solve it.

I also speak very personally there, because I was in charge of these OSCE arms control verification officers who, upon the invitation of Ukraine, flew in very quickly within 24 hours, and tried to get onto Crimea, and they were stopped at gunpoint. And then there was a German-led team of four German officers, a Pole, a Czech, a Dane and a Swede, and their Ukrainian escorts, and they were taken hostage and thrown into a basement cellar in Slavyansk, Eastern Ukraine for a week.

So when you sit on the crisis rescue team, and try to get the boys out, and all of them, not only the Germans, of course, that gives you an acute sense of the threats we all talk about to arms control regimes way beyond the nuclear question. I think there is currently a discussion whether conventional arms control regimes have failed. I would argue they have not. For the last 25 years, they served their purpose very well, and developed during the last years of the Cold War, they served their purpose very well, providing transparency, increasing confidence and trust. So what we should certainly not do is under the current impression, throw out these arms control instruments with the bath water.

What they are in need of, of course, is reform. All of this will very much depend on whether everyone returns to playing by the rules. And that begins with honouring what is in the regimes and not splitting down regiment numbers and so forth to be then able to say, well, rule number so and so of the Vienna document [unclear] doesn't apply.

Returning to the rules would also mean stop flying little green men around, pretending not to have anything to do with them. And then once they've done their job, say, didn't we do it brilliantly? So we must take a very clear look at these three conventional treaties which is CFE and whatever we could come up with good ideas for a new approach there. That is the Vienna document and that is the Open Skies treaty. All of them have been bedrock regimes to European security and tried and tested CSBMs for over two decades. And we must make sure that they be modernised and be properly used again.

Last point, one of the ways we try to contribute is taking over the chair of the OSCE next year. Tall order, in the current climate. We put a lot of hard work and thinking into this, together with many colleagues in the OSCE world, to bring political dialogue, confidence building, openness back into the discussion. We think the OSCE can play a key role there, because everyone is a
member and from what we see, that's the place where still a considerable amount of trust is. So that is what we're very practically doing, as difficult as the situation currently is. Thank you.

FRANK MILLER

Thanks. To Christoph's point, I have learned to sleep on aeroplanes now. I will start with a note to conference organizers and just note for the record the fact that you chose a non-partisan, retired, senior civil servant who, through my work in leading a massive overhaul of the [unclear 00:30:08] from 1989 to 1992, and following that review, leading the initiative to create START II, reduced the US strategic stockpile by 65%, and yet I'm chosen to anchor the right flank of this panel. So, conference organizers, Houston, we have a diversity problem here.

Contrary to popular belief, in this town, arms control is not and should not be an end in itself. It's a means to an end, and usually that end is enhanced stability, it's predictability and it's mutual security. Arms control is a process whereby one state seeks to limit or constrain or even end the other side's programmes. The US has no INF programs and, consistent with NATO's view of a post-Cold War world, no programs for new types of short-range nuclear systems. And therefore, Russia has no incentive to engage in new arms control discussions in this area.

The prospect for talks on additional mid- and short-range arms control are slim. But should tomorrow, President Putin and his faithful companion Sergei Lavrov have a Damascene conversion and ask for new talks about nuclear weapons in Europe, the US and allied answer must be a sharp and emphatic no.

Why do I take such a seemingly harsh position? The basis, the very basis of an international agreement must be... and I repeat, must be that both sides will respect the terms of that agreement once it has been negotiated and signed. It's what diplomats call good faith. The Putin government has not demonstrated good faith. Rather, it has displayed outrageously bad faith. And, for the record, let's just consider the following list.

Helsinki, final act. Russian government is in violation of at least Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. The Istanbul Commitments of 1999 that Susan and I had a hand in, whereby Russia agreed to vacate its troops from Moldova and Georgia, another violation. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, which Russia has violated by deploying nuclear-tipped short-range ballistic missiles and nuclear-tipped naval Cruise missiles on general purpose submarines. CFE, The Budapest Memorandum.

Through the development of fourth generation agents, the intent of the Chemical Weapons Convention. And, last but not least, the INF Treaty. And, for the cognoscenti in the audience, there are also probably violations in the Biological Weapons Convention and the CTBT.

The United States and NATO simply cannot afford to enter into agreements which we respect and Russia violates. And that, put simply, is why there should be no future arms control on INF systems or even short-range nuclear systems in Europe where, I would note, the Russian position is the same wedge-driving position, formerly advanced by the Soviet Union, that the United States must withdraw the small number of nuclear weapons based in Europe for the protection of allies, before any discussions can begin.

And if you're interested in moving forward in this area, there are at least two conditions that need to be met. As a first condition, Russia must respect the agreements it has signed previously, and get back into compliance with them. Full stop. As a second condition, I would advance, and one that I would hope would draw the support of everybody in this room, but probably won't, the Russian government must forego issuing statements and conducting publicised exercises threatening nuclear attacks on the United States and on NATO.
Russian nuclear sabre rattling is at a level we have not observed since the Khrushchev era. And this attempt at blackmail poisons the atmosphere of reasoned dialogue between civilised states and necessarily casts a pall over any possible future arms control dialogue. Thank you.

SUSAN KOCH

Thank you. I suspect there are a lot of questions out there, and my clock says that we have little time for discussion among ourselves, so rather than posing another question, I’m first going to ask all of you whether any of you have comments or questions of each other? I would think you do.

JON WOLFSTHAL

I really appreciate all the remarks that have come this morning. I think I would want to ask Alexei, just because he's such a long-time and keen observer, about really where the Russian strategic thinking is in the future. My understanding, my sense has been that Russia has, just as the Soviet Union did before, always values the codification of the nuclear peer relationship with the United States in treaty, but that is something that we saw President Putin push for under George W. Bush, when we talked about a gentleman's agreement, that there was a commitment that we would turn that into a treaty, that that was seen as important. Is that still a valid assumption, that in the future, as we get to the expiration of new START that Russian strategic leadership will view that predictability and stability as valuable, or because of all of these geostrategic changes you've talked about, do you think the Russian government is moving away from that, as a priority?

ALEXEI ARBATOV

I think that in the future, if the political tensions which are now very high, around Ukraine, are removed, Russia will be interested in nuclear arms control with the United States, and will be interested in its unique status in the world as the only equal counterpart to the United States in nuclear arms control, and in particular, strategic arms control.

However, Russian major concern is not with American nuclear forces. Maybe after the year 2020 when America starts modernizing its strategic triad, this concern will return to Moscow. But as of present, Russia major concern - and when I’m saying Russian, I mean Kremlin and the Minister of Defence, foreign ministry, major concern is with American long-range precision-guided conventional systems. Existing ones, which are primarily Tomahawk sea-launched Cruise missiles, and even more with the new ones, which are being tested and developed under the concept of conventional global strike system.

So without dealing with that, it would not be reasonable to expect Russia to go for new strategic nuclear arms reductions, as much as Russia is valuing its parity with the United States, especially now, when another pillar of Russian world status, which is oil and gas, has been greatly devalued. Now nuclear weapons are the principal pillar of Russian status in the world and Russian security.

Another concern is ballistic missile defense. I think that this concern is not as big as concern about precision guided systems, but still it is a concern and it would be necessary to find some accommodation on that. Maybe not through joint ballistic missile defense, that would be hardly realistic. Maybe not through legally binding commitments of the United States, but through agreeing on the thresholds and parameters that would be permitted for development of such defenses. Against CERT countries, but would not endanger strategic stability between the two countries.
So a more permissive regime, in particular since Russia is also developing its own defenses. Its more massive programs than American ones called Air Space Defence. Includes ballistic missile defense and air defense and space defense, and integrated command and control early warning system.

With respect to... this is a very tricky subject, of course... the recent Russian pronouncements on nuclear weapons. Frank raised it. I personally do not like this language. I think that Soviet and American leaders, after the Cuban Missile Crisis were much more cautious about what they said about nuclear weapons. The new generation of politicians does not have this experience. They invent things from scratch. They think that they're inventing something of interest without knowing that 40 years ago, it was debated and abandoned as a foolish and irresponsible concept. That's a very unfortunate situation.

Also, I'm not meaning President Obama, but in general strategic community of the United States and Russia, which is also populated by new generation of people, do not have that experience of 50 years of negotiations and agreements and do not give it such a high value as it deserves, and deserved in the past. So this is a serious problem.

With respect to loose talk about nuclear weapons, I do not approve of that. But that is more a signal of recognition of one's own inferiority and vulnerability, rather than attempt to threaten the west with possibility of nuclear aggression. It's not like that. We do not have time to discuss in detail what happened in Crimea and in Lugansk and Donetsk, but there is a lot of material on that in Russian public literature, which says that it did not prove very high level of Russian conventional forces.

Actually Russian army of 2014 was fighting with Russian army of 1995, which lost in Chechnya by the second army, they mean Ukrainian army. Ukrainian army is exactly Russian army of 1995 which they lost the war in Chechnya. So there is a sense of vulnerability and maybe because of that, and because of this very high tension, there is exaggerated perceived need to position itself as a very strong military power, with exercise, bombers flying, declarations of nuclear retaliation, but it's rather a sign of vulnerability than a sign of sense of superiority.

SUSAN KOCH

Thank you very much. I'm wondering from any of Alexei's comments and Frank's and Chris’s, if one of the answers to the question where do we go from here, is to go back some decades to an older definition of arms control. We've got very used to talking about arms control in terms of reductions. But you've been talking about things that are much broader. Transparency, predictability, declaratory policy, exercises, etc. And whether it will increasingly be important to think in those broader terms that no matter what one thinks about the pros or cons or feasibility of reductions, there are other issues. Very quickly, please, Chris.

CHRISTOPH EICHHORN

Just two lines. I couldn't agree more to what you say. I would just say, it should not be rediscovered, but we should remember that the dual track approach has served NATO well for decades, and that was security on the one side, and the hand stretched out to find common ground on confidence building, on transparency, on openness and so forth. This dual track approach is under stress in the inner NATO discussion, and personally, I very much understand that there are NATO member states who just want to let the shutters down and say, we're not talking to the Russians any longer.
We don't think this would serve our interests best. Nor would we think it contributes to a solution, so we should not rediscover, but we should just continue what NATO did very successfully together with Russia, over the decades, and that is be strong and talk at the same time.

**SUSAN KOCH**

Thanks very much. Well, we have a line, and again, even though I think we know most of you, please give your name and affiliation. I didn't see the second microphone, my apologies.

**Q**

I'm Dan Kubik from Frankfurt and I have two questions. The first one is, isn't it still too late to get the discussion back to where I think it belongs, and that is that the INF Treaty has created a commission, a panel discussing these kind of issues behind the curtain. And I think it would be most valuable to depoliticize the question and get it back out of Congress, out in the public where it belongs to at this point, and that is the partners themselves, behind the curtain.

My second question is, I think Mr. Arbatov is right. The situation has changed asymmetrically in favor of the United States at the expense, I would say, of Russia. And you mentioned various countries that have their programs on missiles. My question is, wouldn't it make sense bilaterally to approach countries like China to engage them into the talks, to express your asymmetric security concerns, and as a way of selectively multilateralizing of the treaty? There has been an attempt in October 25, 2007 before the United Nation General Assembly. And I think what we need right now is a great format and a new format and I think the United States should go an extra mile as a way of solving this crisis. Thank you.

**JON WOLFSTHAL**

On the engagement and pulling it out of the politicised congressional environment, we couldn't agree more. We have been concertedly and quietly seeking Russia's engagement. We have sought to discuss these specific issues so that we can work to bring Russia back into compliance. And to date, Russia has refused to acknowledge our concerns, and refused to be a serious partner in this dialogue. So we hope that we can achieve that. I think we've been very patient. I think we've been very calculated in how we're trying to get Russia to take this seriously, and we hope that they'll engage so that we can get to a point where the INF continues to serve both of our security interests and the interests of our allies.

**FRANK MILLER**

Just let me add that, again, you can't sign a treaty, a new treaty with a country that is breaking at least seven old treaties. So one of the things that the Russian government has to do is to get back into compliance with the treaties that it's already signed. If the Russian government believes it has a security problem with the Chinese, it need not be taken at the security expense of NATO and the United States. There are negotiations all the time between Beijing and Moscow, mostly about Russian weapons sales to China. So one needs to take these situations very carefully and get past the assertions to the facts.

**Q**

Bill Potter, James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. I have a question for Alexei, also for Jon. Alexei, you actually sounded more optimistic this morning than a number of things that you've written recently on the topic of the future of arms control, in which you also suggested that there were even rumblings in Moscow about possibly withdrawing from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. And I hadn't seen those, and I wondered if perhaps you could say just a little bit about whether this view has any resonance within Moscow because that would be particularly troubling, and it would be much harder to find an explanation for how that could serve Russian interests.

And for Jon, I was taken by Frank Miller's observations about what appear to be actions contrary to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives that Susan, among others, has written an excellent work. I haven't seen the United States ever pronounce that these Presidential Nuclear Initiatives no longer have standing, so I'm curious what the US government view is about the current standing of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.

**FRANK MILLER**

I didn't say they didn't have standing. I said that the Russians had violated them in at least two instances.

**Q**

I'm not sure they're violations, but the question is do they have standing, given the fact that Russia appears not to be abiding by their unilateral statements.

**ALEXEI ARBATOV**

We cannot resume compliance with the CFE Treaty because it was wrong.

**FRANK MILLER**

I didn't say CFE. I said the SS-26...

**ALEXEI ARBATOV**

No, you said Istanbul.

**FRANK MILLER**

Istanbul was a commitment to get out of Moldova and Georgia. We all know what happened to that. With the SS-26, short-range ballistic missile, which is nuclear-tipped, that is a violation of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin pledge to get rid of all ground-launched nuclear-tipped missiles. The reintroduction of submarine-launched nuclear-tipped submarine launched Cruise Missiles is a violation of the Gorbachev/Yeltsin pledge not to have nuclear-tipped Cruise Missiles on general purpose submarines.

The United States will continue... unless Jon contradicts me... to maintain all of its commitments under the P&Is.

**ALEXEI ARBATOV**

I would argue with that on technical grounds. It was never a commitment to get rid of sea-launched nuclear-tipped Cruise missiles on Russian subs.

**FRANK MILLER**

On general purpose subs.
ALEXEI ARBATOV

No, never. But I don't want to get into those technical details. And Gorbachev, Bush and then Yeltsin-Bush unilateral commitments on tactical nuclear weapons, Russia didn't say anything about nuclear [unclear 00:51:40] from attack submarines. It said about ground-based tactical nuclear missiles, but not submarine. But that's a technical difference.

FRANK MILLER

Alexei I hope you misspoke in saying that Russia had withdrawn from the CFE Treaty. I know that Russia had suspended its participation in the joint consultative group.

ALEXEI ARBATOV

Basically, Russia abandoned the basic CFE Treaty of 1990. That's how it's simply interpreted. Russia does not any longer consider it to be a member of it. Interestingly enough, Belarus, which is building a giant state with Russia, has not abandoned this treaty. That's mysterious. Politically, it's very mysterious.

Now, in response to Bill Potter, Bill, I gave this example to show to which extreme some of those Russian experts who come from military nuclear complex would go in their desire to destroy everything that was achieved during the recent decades in the area of nuclear arms control. It does not reflect Russian official position at all. But there are extremist views of people who are not just amateurs. They are professional nuclear people. And the fact that such proposals are published in popular professional military technological journals and newspapers is a great concern to me. But it certainly doesn't reflect Russian official position on NPT.

JOHN WOLFSTHAL

Bill, just on the P&Is, the United States undertook a series of commitments and actions to fulfil our obligations under the P&I. We expect Russia to do the same.

Q

David Cooper, US Naval War College. I wanted to pull a thread from an earlier question, but put it in broader terms. It's been noted that Russia has, for many years, expressed interest in broadening the scope of INF to include other states, with the idea of negotiating equivalent INF has always been seen as highly challenging.

Picking up on Susan's point, I wonder though, in terms of just thinking, among the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT, only one is going up, and only one is going up in INF ranges. Isn't that at least some source of converging interest for Russia and the United States? It's striking. Anyone interested in China at this conference isn't here, because they're in another room. China gets to have its disarmament cake and eat it too. Isn't that an area in some broad brush where Russia and the United States can start working towards a common interest in getting China to at least start talking about its nuclear programs, and, in particular, its INF range programs where Russia and the United States have, in common, haven't given these up.

SUSAN KOCH

Alexei, you're the designated speaker, as the Russian.

ALEXEI ARBATOV
Strategically, yes, Russia should be much more interested than the United States in limiting Chinese medium-range and short-range systems, because Russia is within reach, in contrast to the United States, which is out of range. And because China is building up a massive conventional superiority along the Russian/Chinese border, beyond the limits of the treaty on the limits on conventional forces. Chinese ground forces in the north are very powerful, so Russia should be interested in that, strategically.

But politically, with very high level of tension and confrontation between Russia and the United States, Russia is in no position to try to persuade or apply any pressure on China to go for limitations on its INF systems. It's only the United States can do that, out of concern for the security of American allies in the western Pacific.

But in the past, there were attempts to persuade China. You know the standard Chinese response was, you first get down to our level, and then we will join. But they never said what the level is, because they never said what their forces were, what the programmes were. But this is the Chinese way of dealing with that. It's a different culture, of course. Sun Zi and so on.

If we start seriously talking with Chinese about China joining in INF, I think the Chinese response would be that Russia and the United States have great superiority in all three legs of strategic nuclear forces. They cannot ask of China to do away with something in which China had a small leverage, because it's not party to their INF Treaty. Chinese problem is a very complex one. Maybe it deserves a special session. The prospect for Chinese engaging in nuclear arms control.

**JON WOLFSTHAL**

Just a very quick response. I think that if Russia had serious and legitimate concerns about Chinese expansion of INF range systems, they are fully capable of engaging with the Chinese on that issue. We take seriously our commitments under INF. If Russia feels that the INF Treaty no longer serves their interest, that's a different conversation to have, but that's not what we're seeing. What we're seeing is a violation of the legal commitment that makes our relationship even more difficult, and, from my point of view, and this is a personal point of view, if and when Russia decides that they do want to re-engage with the United States on strategic arms control, bilateral arms control, multilateral arms control, as Frank said, even if the administration wanted to, the environment in Congress will make that difficult under normal circumstances, let alone where Russia has a history of violating legal commitments.

**CHRISTOPH EICHHORN**

Just very briefly, China, Russia and the West. We're just commemorating 100 years of World War I. The Germans played a specific role there that included the so-called Schlieffen Plan. The Schlieffen Plan was you are in a state of war. Germany, Russia. And what the German general staff said, let's attack France.

So by analogy, if we are looking long-term at the Chinese development, why on earth is Russia looking at us or flying little green men West, rather than taking whatever might come from China very seriously, mid- and long-term, and why is Russia ignoring what we've been trying to do over the last 25 years in terms of NATO-Russian cooperation, and the Council and the Founding Act, and exercises, and what the Europeans have been doing in terms of modernisation partnership and so forth.

We just chatted before the session about a fascinating discussion I had at Russia's second-oldest university in Kazan, one and a half years ago. Two world-famous alumni, one was Tolstoy, the other one was Lenin. And we had a fascinating discussion with over 120 students about old
thinking in terms of security, new thinking, smart power, all these concepts. I left very encouraged from this student discussion, because, frankly, they didn't discuss Lenin much, their alumnus. They had read Joe Nye's book on Smart Power. And our hope, this would be Russia and the future.

So why do we sit here and talk about a breakdown of trust, if we could, together, look at these mid-and long-term strategic developments?

FRANK MILLER

And I think, based on what Christoph just said, that perhaps President Putin should take [unclear 01:00:56] and go to Kazan, because if you're concerned about China, you don't have to have nuclear exercises that feature strikes on the Baltics and Poland and have 400 incursions into US, NATO and Japanese air space in calendar year 2014.

ALEXEI ARBATOV

Russia is concerned about China. And I think that the political establishment and the leadership is concerned about China. But there are two important vignettes to that. China is a long-term problem. And Russian government is not thinking now in long term mode. Neither in mid-term mode. Russian government is thinking about summer and fall of this year.

Second, which is more important, the greatest threat that Russian present political elite perceives is the threat of coloured revolution. It's not from global strike. And the threat does not emanate from China.

Q

Greg Thielmann, Arms Control Association. Two questions for Frank. Just wondered what your view was on whether or not the US made a mistake in signing the INF Treaty in 1987 because the Soviet Union was in violation of the ABM Treaty through the Krasnoyarsk Radar and the Biological Weapons Convention at least, not to mention other things. So that's a question for you.

And for John, and Alexei, I didn't really hear an answer to [unclear 01:02:32] earlier question. To put it more precisely, the INF Treaty created the special verification commission for resolving INF compliance issues. Why has not either the US or Russia convened the SVC to deal with the current issues raised by both sides?

FRANK MILLER

Okay. Well, the first, Greg, is a bogus assertion, because, yes, the INF Treaty was in our security interest. The violation of the Krasnoyarsk Radar was being addressed by both sides. There was much more transparency. The Russians were taking steps to undo the Krasnoyarsk Radar. And in 1987, if memory serves me right, and Susan or Lynn will know better than I, we did not have conclusive proof of Soviet violations of the Biologic Weapons Convention. That came, as I recall, in '89, '90, and I'm straying into classified areas. So we didn't know that at the time.

None of what you say provides an excuse for the violations of the seven or nine treaties of which I spoke.

ALEXEI ARBATOV
I wanted to tackle more this Krasnoyarsk Radar. In Russian tradition, the Russians do not think in strictly legal terms. They think more about the substance. And the substance, which is now cited by opponents of arms control is like that. They said look about the whole saga of Krasnoyarsk Radar. Americans accused us of violation. Eventually, under Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, this radar was dismantled in spite of enormous investment that was already done. That was a missile early warning radar. It was not a BMD combat management radar. It was placed there because it was more economical than to place two radars in the north.

Nonetheless, because Americans were so insistent, we dismantled that. What happened several years after that? They withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Why had we done it? Gorbachev and Shevardnadze made all those concessions, and what we received in response from the United States? Something very different from what was expected. So it's a good example which first of all provides an example of different mentality and also provides example of how Americans often do not read back into what they did in the past to make Russia estranged and to put it mildly, not enthusiastic about nuclear arms control.

JON WOLFSTHAL

Greg, on the SVC, the United States is very eager to have a discussion with Russia and have our concerns addressed and resolved. If we felt that Russia would be prepared to have that conversation in the SVC as opposed to a bilateral channel, we're happy to consider that, but we don't think that Russia is going to suddenly say, oh, well, the SVC is convening, therefore let's admit our violation and we'll destroy the offending systems.

Q

Have you asked? Have you proposed it?

JON WOLFSTHAL

We have had very intense discussions with senior Russian officials and we have yet to see any indication that Russia takes our concerns seriously.

Q

Thank you. Jane Baneman, George Washington University. I have a question for Alexei Arbatov. I wanted to follow up on some of the comments that you talked about, about the internal debate in Russia about the INF.

As you mentioned, Russian officials have occasionally opposed the INF or brought up issues about leaving for about the last 10 years. So what I'm interested in is going forward, in light of the arguments that are made by those statements, going forward are there going to be security threats, regional threats that Russia sees as becoming more problematic that would further fuel that domestic debate? As you seem to have already suggested, it's probably not China.

Alternatively, it's more important to assess the changes in Russian support for the INF in terms of the symbolic value of the treaty rather than its security role, then how can any security steps by the United States affect that kind of thinking?

ALEXEI ARBATOV

Of course one of the most serious arguments against destroying INF Treaty or withdrawing from INF Treaty is that in this case, Americans may come back with their medium-range, land-based systems which will be deployed much closer to Russian heartland than Pershings and
Cruise missiles in the early '80s. That's a strong argument. I think it's one of the arguments which has taken into consideration by the government when they discuss the future of INF Treaty.

Another serious argument is that such a step would certainly estrange Europe from Russia, and would push Europe towards the United States, increase support for ballistic missile defence in Europe, something which Russia does not want to happen.

And finally, other countries which will be present at the NPT review conference would certainly blame Russia for that, if Russia goes against an INF Treaty. So all those arguments are important. But I think that we cannot salvage INF Treaty in isolation. The time is running out. It's just a fragment of the overall picture of disintegration of nuclear arms control, and the treaty is to be saved, together with the rest of nuclear arms control.

SUSAN KOCH

We have five minutes and three questions left. So if you could be brief, and if we could just bundle the three questions together, I'd appreciate it, and then the panel will answer.

JON WOLFSTHAL

Love a lightning round, Susan.

SUSAN KOCH

Yes. Sorry.

Q

Hello, my name is Jack McKechnie and I'm a Navy Fellow at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab. My question concerns a naval deployment of short-range tactical nuclear weapons, referred to before in the nuclear initiatives. Is there any potential, do you think, for an agreement among all the nuclear weapons states, not just only between US and Russia to look into an agreement to refrain from naval deployment of short-range tactical nuclear weapons. Thank you.

Q

Hello, my name is Elena Chernenko, I'm a correspondent of the Komersant Daily Newspaper in Moscow. A question to Jon Wolfsthal. It kind of picks up on what has been asked here before, but in the act which was approved by Congress and President Obama, Freedom Support Act for Ukraine, there is a paragraph on the INF Treaty. And Congress demands a report every 90 days from the authorities.

One of the points also it wants to have is inspections on Russian soil of its alleged violations. How is that at all possible from your point of view, if there's no bilateral consultation mechanism, and have you ever raised the question of inspections with the Russian authority? Thank you.

Q

Kori Schake from the Hoover Institution. I take very seriously Alexei Arbatov's description of the narrative taking shape in Russia, that arms control has been a way for the west to take advantage of Russia. And I wonder how non-strategic nuclear weapons fit into that, given that
the NATO countries unilaterally took a 90% reduction in their non-strategic nuclear forces, and were hoping that that would inspire the Russians to make reductions of their own. How does that fit in?

SUSAN KOCH

Thank you. Okay. And gentlemen, you have three minutes, collectively.

JON WOLFSTHAL

How are we going to do this? Frank, do you want to take the navy? I can just speak very briefly about the inspection question which is so far, our discussion has been roughly like this. Hi, we have a concern, you violated the treaty. They say, no, we haven’t. But no, you really have, and let us share some information with you about… no, you have to give us more information. We don’t know anything about it.

So of course, we take very seriously the legal requirements. We have developed and are prepared to engage in a serious discussion with Russia about what it would take to come back into compliance. We’re not going to take anybody’s word. It’s not even trust, but verify. It’s trust but verify in some cases. So there will have to be a very detailed process by which we are satisfied, but I don’t want to get into the exact requirements of what we might request of Russia at this point. But it’s going to have to be something that’s very real.

ALEXEI ARBATOV

With respect to tactical nukes. Russia also reduced and reduced tremendously compared to 1991, reductions were in order of magnitude. According to some data at that time, we had more than 20,000. now we have less than 2,000. Those are unofficial figures, but they’re commonly accepted.

However, Russia does not want to go further in that because of two reasons. First of all, conventional inferiority to NATO. Second, conventional inferiority to China. The second is not officially proclaimed, but always kept in mind. So those are basically two reasons. Another reason is diplomatic. American proposal to put everything in one basket, tactical and strategic does not make sense. If we resolve more the bigger strategic issues which I mentioned, then the approach should be very different, because of obvious reasons which everybody here understands.

Tactical nuclear weapons are not combat ready. They’re in storages in peacetime, and secondly, they use dual purpose delivery systems, and those two are the differences which preclude applying the same approach to tactical nukes as we have been applying for 40 years to strategic nukes. Something new, innovative has to be invented to deal with tactical nukes.

FRANK MILLER

We got out of that business in 1992, as I recall. And whether other navies are prepared to engage in it, I don’t know. I mean, given the Russian example of breaking its commitments in this area, I don’t know that others will. But I don’t know if there’s any forcing function to do this.

I would want to just comment on some of the three questions and what we’ve heard. At least with respect to treaty compliance, the Bush administration said that it was going to abrogate the ABM Treaty and it did. It got out of the treaty. It’s worth noting that there are twice as many ABM systems deployed around Moscow today than there are on the US West Coast, so let’s keep facts in perspective.
The second is on... and so if the Russian government says it's going to get out of the INF Treaty, that would be a terrible shame, but it ought not have this grey area where it says it's complying but it's actually not.

Second, with regard to TNF, 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is a huge number. What in God's name are you going to do with 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons? And there has been no transparency, since well before Christoph and I went to Ukraine in 1999. We've been trying to get the Russian Federation, either in the US-Russian context or in the NATO-Russia Council to have some transparency on tactical nuclear weapons without any luck whatsoever. So if you can't have transparency, you can't even get to talk about these things.

And again, 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons. How many of these things are you going to use before the world goes up in a ball of smoke? And finally, please, Alexei, we've been doing this a long time together, you and I. Conventional superiority. If you take all the manpower in all of the NATO countries that could possibly come under arms, you can create an illusion of tactical superiority for NATO. But there is no place on the NATO-Russia board where Russia does not today have conventional superiority. You could reinforce that conventional superiority. So we ought not to throw these terms around as if they exist. Facts are important.

ALEXEI ARBATOV

That's right. But that's because the border became much closer to Russia.

SUSAN KOCH

Well, now that we have answers to all of the questions, please join me in thanking the panel for a marvellous hour and a half.