A NEW STRATEGY FOR NATO’S SOUTHERN FLANK
June 30, 2016 | Brussels

SPEAKERS:
Tacan Ildem, NATO assistant secretary general for public diplomacy
Ana Santos Pinto, research fellow at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations
Panayotis Tsakonas, professor of international relations, security studies, and foreign policy analysis at the University of the Aegean
Sinan Ülgen, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe

MODERATOR:
Jan Techau, director of Carnegie Europe
JAN TECHAU: All right, everybody is falling silent all of a sudden. That probably means that we should get started. Let me welcome all of you very warmly to Carnegie Europe, our favorite foreign policy living room in Brussels. It’s great that you are back here again for a discussion on NATO’s Southern flank. It’s a great evening for this because it’s also a football evening and the Eastern flank is playing the Southern flank in tonight’s quarter finals so we have half of the NATO discussion also today on the football pitch.

Ana, who is sitting next to me here, is a great football fan, I was just told, and she is our guarantor tonight that we will actually end on time, because the closer we get to the eight o’clock mark, the more nervous she will get and she will just leave at some point because something bigger and more important and strategically relevant is happening elsewhere, so that will be a huge disciplining force for us.

So, welcome again. First of all I would like to say that this is for us a very important event, not only because Sinan has written a new paper for us, one that I think tackles one of the big strategic topics of the day for NATO but also for Europe, but also it continues our work on NATO as a whole, so in a sense in the tradition of Carnegie activity in this field.

It is our great pleasure and I am really thankful to NATO PDD, the public diplomacy division, for bringing further guests tonight and a few folks that are attending, but also more importantly for supporting this undertaking by covering some of the production costs of the paper, the hard copy, and also giving us some of the food that you will be served after this event.

People who have been here before with us know that after the discussions on the podium end we will remove this blue screen over there, then we will have two minutes of chaos where all the chairs have to be removed, and then you are most heartily invited to join us for some good, sturdy, Mediterranean food tonight, so that’s important as well.

This is a discussion that happens just before the NATO summit and it addresses of course apart from the strategic issues themselves that are playing out in the region, also the delicate balance inside the alliance, about finding that right kind of mix between the east and the south that has kind of emerged as one of the fault lines in the alliance but that is needed to keep solidarity intact.

You can be of the opinion that the south is more important than the east or you can be of the exact opposite opinion, but you can’t really challenge that fact that you need to keep it in balance if you want to keep the alliance as one, so part of the discussion today I think will probably be about that as well.

We have four speakers tonight; that requires extra discipline on our behalf. Sinan will start by introducing the key findings and recommendations that he has put into his paper. I hope that most of you have a hard copy in your hand. That’s good, I can see that most of you do, and then we will have a few comments.

I would like to ask Ambassador Ildem from NATO, the assistant secretary general for public diplomacy, to start with comments from the alliance’s side, his perspective, and then I’ll move over to Ana Santos Pinto, and then after that to Professor Tsakonas so that we have the full range of issues from scholars, from the alliance and from Carnegie here on the podium.
I won’t give the endless lists of affiliations that my guests have and their previous careers because everybody can read this. You have that in your invitation and documents, but let me just say a huge thanks to the four of you for coming here tonight and for filling us in on this.

I have one more announcement to make, very important, and that is that you have found on your chair when you sat down this questionnaire, and this is a customer satisfaction exercise that we’re doing today and it would be great if in the course of this event, probably towards the end when you know whether this was good or not, you fill this in and you hand it in with our staff.

Francesco, can you indicate very quickly where we are supposed to put these things when we have filled them out? Please drop them in a box at the entrance so that we get an idea what you really thought about this, after applauding us enthusiastically of course, as you always do.

Good. I think those were all of the announcements that I had to make here. I think we should just get started. Sinan, the floor is yours. Please give us the key findings of your great NATO paper.

SINAN ÜLGEN: Thank you, Jan. In deep water, sharks go after blood, and us think tankers go after tension. When we try to decide about the issues that we’re going to address, wherever there is tension, that’s good material for us. That’s one of the fundamental reasons why I’ve tried to take this issue over the Southern flank strategy for NATO because there is tension within NATO about the Southern flank, and more particularly about the balance between the Eastern flank and the Southern flank.

There are two reasons for that tension. One is historical, because traditionally NATO has been set up to deter and to provide for collective defense against an enemy, against a state enemy that’s on the Eastern side. So we already know the type of evolution within NATO that has tried to develop the policy responses to a rather well-known, if you want, source of tension in security matters. So NATO has really developed a strategy, capabilities, operational assets in order to address this particular tension, but the Southern flank is rather different.

When you look at the Southern flank, the type of threat landscape that you see there is not a particularly NATO suited threat landscape. Sometimes it’s diffuse, sometimes it’s murky, it’s complex and therefore when you look at the traditional NATO, how NATO has evolved, the type of answers that were developed for the Eastern flank challenge do not necessarily correspond to the type of answers and policy responses that either have been developed or would need to be developed for the Southern Flank.

So that’s the fundamental reason why I tried to develop and to draft this paper. The way that I have tried to do this is really to bring a matrix to solidify the type of analysis and the ensuing policy responses. The matrix, we can’t project it here but it’s in the paper, is a two by two box. The two by two where you have on the one dimension the type of actors that are the source of this threat, whether they are state actors or non-state actors because, one more time, one of the clear differences when we look at the Eastern flank and the Southern flank is the variety of non-state actors that are part of that threat landscape when we discuss the south.

The other dimension is the security objective, whether we want to pre-empt or prevent these types of threats, and then the whole effort, not to perhaps oversimplify, but nonetheless the whole effort of the exercise was essentially to populate these four quadrants. So imagine one quadrant being, how do we prevent threats from state actors? Another quadrant, how do we pre-empt threats from state actors? A third quadrant is, how do we prevent threats from non-state actors and how do we prevent
threats from non-state actors? So this is the logical framework that I’ve tried to expand on in order to
devolve the type of policy responses which ultimately could provide the basis for a NATO Southern
flank strategy.

So I’m not going to walk you through all these different quadrants, I’ll be happy to do that at the
Q&A since we have received a stern warning from my director, Jan Techau, that we should be strict
about our initial allocation, but let me just underline three points of the main issues here.

One is, overall when we look at the readiness of NATO to counter these developing and rather new
elements of the threat landscape of the south, there already is quite a well-diversified NATO strategy
that has been developed over time, starting with a strategic concept and the follow-up to the strategic
concept, readiness action plan and so on. So it’s not so much that we are in need of a totally new
overhauled NATO strategy; the exercise should rather be, how do we use the current framework to
first raise awareness about what is out there in terms of the Southern flank, and then try to get the
type of political mandate that’s needed to drive the momentum in order to operationalize the type of
policy responses that are needed.

So the discussion should not really be about whether we need a new strategy, but how do we use the
existing framework, which is quite robust I think, quite diversified, but nonetheless how do we, using
this current framework, how do we still build the type of policy responses necessary for NATO when
we look at the Southern Flank? There, there are essentially three fundamental problems that I’ve tried
to underline.

The first one is of course the perennial problem of budget cuts, burden sharing, defense expenditures.
Now, that’s certainly not unique to the Southern Flank. I’m sure all of you have attended many other
sessions in advance of the Warsaw summit where this question was raised, whether European
governments will be able to upscale their commitments to defense. There is a bit of good news there,
I’m sure Ambassador Ildem will also want to touch on that, where we see a rebound of the
commitment to defense expenditures. That’s one part of the problem.

The second part of the problem is what I started with, the inherent tension between the Southern
flank and the Eastern flank, to the extent that there are going to be budgetary implications for what
we’re discussing in terms of the policy responses to the threat landscape of the Southern flank because
their governments will have to choose. Of course at some point it would be easy to say we need to
develop these strategies, we need to develop these operational capabilities and we don’t need to
duplicate them; they can serve as well to deter threats from the Eastern flank and deter threats from
the Southern flank. As long as we can say that, we’re fine.

But at some point we can’t say that anymore. At some point we have to choose between where we
invest our resources. Do we invest our resources in areas that will be more attune to answering the
needs of the Southern flank countries, or do we invest those resources to answer the needs of the
Eastern flank countries? There, so far, there also has been a numbers game going on because just by
virtue of the fact that the countries that champion investing of these resources in the Eastern flank are
just numerically superior to the countries that champion the investment of the resources in the
Southern flank.

So the fact that the summit will also be in Poland, which is a country that very legitimately has a focus
on the Eastern flank, may skew the debate towards an investment in resources more particularly suited
to the Eastern flank, so that’s the second type of issue that I wanted to raise here to try to perhaps
balance this perception.
The third one is really a discussion that goes even beyond this tension between Eastern flank and Southern flank, and that's ultimately about the role of NATO. At a time with Brexit really, what we see is the possible weakening of the ability of Western democracies to provide security not only for themselves but also as one of the ultimate objectives of NATO to project stability across the border.

Because if we are going to be with this rise of populous movements that have a rather simplistic agenda about how the world is run and how to respond to these challenges, if the Western democracies are going to be hijacked by such a debate, then the consequence for an institution like NATO and the Western alliance as a whole is that we are likely to see a much more introverted Western alliance as opposed to the type of alliance that we need not only to develop its own resources for its own security needs, but even more than that, try to project stability across the border, which I think will be one of the main themes of Warsaw.

So ultimately what I underline here is really the need for NATO to operate as an enabler, as a platform where this type of high-level political/security dialogue can happen and should happen to really foster and to solidify the political mandate, the willingness, the cohesion among Western democracies about the role that NATO should play in providing security within and outside the borders of NATO.

Jan Techau: Sinan, thank you very much for those introductory words. I have one quick question to you. You mentioned the skewed debate in NATO and that means that basically what you're saying is that the alliance has not been great at finding the balance yet. Do you expect from the summit a correction of this? Do you expect that there's even a chance to balance it out, or is this a futile exercise from the outset?

Sinan Ülgen: No, I think there have certainly been a number of developments since the Wales summit that tend to give us at least hope that in Warsaw there will be at least a component which will try to redress this balance. What are those developments? First, obviously the emergence of Islamic State, which we see most tragically in Istanbul two days ago. Secondly, Russia is a new actor in the Southern flank which I think is certainly not going to be temporary, but we are to look at it more as a permanent bastion in Syria. So these are at least two considerations which will move NATO in the direction of redressing the balance.

Now, concretely what does that mean for the Warsaw summit? I would tend to think that what we are likely to see is really at the political level an analysis of the situation, and really an assessment that at the political level demonstrates that there is now an understanding that there is a need to focus more on the needs of the Southern flank and the evolving threat landscape on the Southern flank.

Now, I don't expect in minute detail what this would mean operationally. But, as we know from NATO, the experience, at the end of the day these summits are for building that political cohesion for that political messaging. Then once the summit is over, the NATO momentum will carry this work forward and operationalize some of these policy aims.

Jan Techau: Thanks, Sinan. Ambassador Ildem, you told me in our discussion before we came down here that you've just returned from Georgia. So you were out there on the deep Eastern flank to do some public diplomacy, I assume, with Georgian audiences who have their own expectations vis-à-vis this NATO summit which will be disappointed. You heard Sinan about the skewed debate inside NATO, which you might see differently. You've also read his paper. Give us your initial comments on this and how you would react to what Sinan has just explained to us.
TACAN İLDEM: Well, first of all I would like to thank Carnegie Endowment for this meeting, and Sinan who I have known for so many years and respect his intellectual capacity and all the deliverables with many papers in different subjects. This one contributes a lot to our own discussions at NATO, although I must say that it is quite natural for every country belonging to a certain region to promote its own priorities and expectations, but I can assure you that we don’t feel that tension that you’re referring to in our work.

First of all, if I can say a few words about our expectations from the Warsaw summit meeting. There is no doubt that the heads of state and government will be taking stock of what the achievements have been in terms of their decisions of 2014 at the Wales summit meeting, and there is a good story to tell our public that a readiness action plan was implemented, but it is not going to be only a stocktaking exercise but also to agree on a number of decisions.

If I may put our expectations in two pillars, one is to protect our citizens. Citizens are at the core of our work, to provide better security for them and for the next generations. In order to do that, we need to further what the readiness action plan has provided us with, with strengthening and modernizing deterrence and defense, with additional means and capabilities.

Yes, it is true that since the meeting is taking place in Warsaw, a country with an expectation to deal with threats coming from the East and we will be seeing the decisions and announcements related to enhanced forward military presence towards the East, nobody can say that the threats coming from the South are neglected and the alliance would not be in a position to deliver on that.

There will be definitely a framework in which we will enhance our capacity. First, in terms of elevating our situational awareness regarding what developments are taking place in the Southern periphery. Second, to enhance our defense capabilities to deal with certain challenges and, third, projecting stability beyond our borders by working with those countries who are partners in the South to help them enhance their defense capacities.

Sometimes there is a misperception; when we talk about deterrence and defense it is as if we are talking only about threats coming from the East. When we talk about projecting stability, it is primarily related to the South. When we talk about projecting stability beyond our borders, we should not forget that we are also aiming at increasing the capacities of those countries in the East, like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova to deal with certain challenges.

Now, if I go back to the South, you are right; in your paper you have dealt with the complex nature of the threats emanating from the South. We have there not only state actors but non-state actors, some non-state actors with state capacities, and it is not the known known; in many instance it is known unknown and some domains it is unknown unknown.

Therefore, the challenge for the south is how we better streamline the alliance’s own capabilities in dealing with different strands of activity, taking into consideration those threats and challenges, and also see the complex nature of these threats and join forces with other international organizations, the European Union in particular, in dealing with all these threats in the proper sense.

With the European Union we are working closely in terms of hybrid warfare regarding all the challenges emerging recently, and we are expecting a joint statement in Warsaw by the NATO secretary general and the EU leadership. When you take the threats and challenges of the South, we are talking about how to transform operation active endeavor from article five operation to non-article five operation, dealing with, in the broader sense, the maritime security challenges.
So I say that there may be a competition, but there is no tension. There are countries who are in the Eastern flank contributing to the endeavors we are having in the South and it is in show of solidarity, and I am sure that NATO will come out of this summit meeting with an expression of unity and cohesion, and also there would be political guidance to be followed up in the months ahead of us.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you. I have a quick follow-up for you as well because no tension is great. We’ve learnt there are no tensions inside NATO, that’s good to know. Let’s look at another source of tension, that’s of course money, defense spending.

TACAN ILDEM: I was about to talk about this, but since the time was limited…

JAN TECHAU: I have to press you a little more on this, because Sinan described to us how diverse those challenges are in the South and how they’re not really NATO compatible in the traditional way of thinking about NATO. So addressing all of these diverse threats is extremely expensive because you have to plan for so many contingencies and for so many comprehensive scenarios that it costs a lot of money. Now, the numbers are not really impressive in terms of spending going up, so if you have no East South divide you might have a spending problem inside NATO, or is that also a misperception?

TACAN ILDEM: Well, I think we have to see the threats and challenges and how NATO is going to deal with them in a proper manner. Take, for instance, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missile threat; if you are going to take it as a real serious threat, you have to come up with capabilities and this is what NATO has been doing with its ballistic missile defense project. It is with a view to giving protection to all European allies from ballistic missile threats coming from those areas outside the Euro Atlantic zone.

Therefore, I don’t see that we are spending money in terms of the priorities or threats coming from different directions and it will not be compatible with our claim that we focus on a 360-degree security perspective. We have to be ready for all kinds of contingencies and threats to deal with in a serious fashion.

On defense spending, yes, Sinan briefly mentioned it. Since the Wales defense pledge the numbers show that there is at least a stop of decline and there is a gradual increase in defense spending to meet the pledge of 2% of GDP. But the good story is that 20% of defense spending for new equipment, for defense investments is growing high, so it is something that we should not lose sight of, the importance of it.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you, Ambassador. Ana Pinto, you are from Portugal, an essential stakeholder on the Southern flank, and you are a professor at the university and you are also at various defense research institutes. Now, how do you assess what Sinan has written but also what we’ve heard about one of them saying there is not really a balance, others saying the tensions are actually much lower? How do you perceive that from where you are and how much energy is there in that summit from the Portuguese perspective?

ANA SANTOS PINTO: I would like to thank you for the invitation for being here. It’s a pleasure to comment on Sinan’s paper that is very, very interesting and this is the first point that I would like to raise; it’s exactly when we talk about the tension or the gap between the South and the East and I don’t know if it’s exactly like that. It’s not true that a country like Portugal or a country like Spain does
not worry about Russia’s role in Europe, or the perceptions or the action that is taken either on the East, or even on Syria.

I don’t think it’s true that Eastern countries do not worry with all the challenges that are raised in the paper on the South, being terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the conflict in the Middle East and the question in Libya. All of us, with different levels of course, have worries about these topics and this is one of the points that I would like to raise regarding the paper, is that it’s an in-depth analysis of the Southern challenges. There are not challenges only to Southern European countries; there are challenges to all the alliance.

This is the second point, is this paper reflects very clearly a dilemma that the allies and NATO have regarding North Africa and the Middle East. On one side we have a huge range of risks, threats, challenges, whatever we want to call them, of great complexity in different countries. It’s not easy to divide sub regions, North Africa and Middle East, Sahel, because they are interlinked in a very complex way with different actors, state actors, non-state actors.

On the other hand, not states, not organizations as NATO have an effective answer for this. We have traditional instruments. We are used to a conventional way of responding to threats. That is why it’s easier to activate instruments regarding the threats in the East and not so easy to activate answers to the South. If you ask the different Southern countries, being Portugal, Italy, Spain, they are going to have different answers about the instruments, or Turkey. They are going to have different answers about the instruments that should be applied to the situation, so the policy responses that are raised are very difficult to apply and be effective.

When the alliance talks about promoting stability in our neighborhood, as the European Union is also called, it’s very difficult to do that. You can raise the objective, but how do you in practice go…? You can have the policy orientations, but it’s very difficult. Sinan has a figure on page 29 with the synthesis of the policy instruments and you see a clear difference between a pre-emptive answer to state challenges and a preventive answer to non-state challenges because we don’t really have now the capacity and capabilities to do that.

Finally, I would like to highlight a last point and for me it’s central to all the discussion we are having this time, and that is the importance of domestic political orders and namely the populist movements that you do. I think this is very important because it goes to the core values of the alliance of the Western democracies and it’s going to condition the answers, negotiations, capability of having a consensus inside the alliance. I don’t think that we can foresee now the main consequences of these movements. We are beginning a new action period in all of Europe and could have different results, but I think that the raising and the media images of these populist movements can have two consequences.

The first is they’re going to limit the definition of perceptions and challenges. They’re going to try to influence foreign policy and defense policy and the way that each member country, each ally is going to manage their international role. They’ll also probably try to influence the alliances and the bilateral relations that national states will have with other actors and I think this of course can condition/influence the solidarity, the coherence of the alliance and the core values of the alliance, so I think we should be aware of this. It’s a very good point to finish your paper on, as you do, because I think it’s very, very important at this moment.

JAN TECHAU: I think you just made a very elegant reference to hybrid warfare in an indirect way. Let me ask you one question. When you look at what’s happening at the summit and striking that
balance and also reinforcing the Southern flank, if you were sitting in Moscow or in Riyadh or in Tehran or in any of these other places, would you be impressed by what you see?

**ANA SANTOS PINTO:** Well, first I would be delighted with the tension and the division inside the alliance because it’s a good way to profit the tensions when you have or you need unanimity to make decisions. But, secondly, I would probably be worried about the instruments and the way the answer could be given in the region. But the truth is Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict changed the Middle East dynamics. Iran’s nuclear agreement changed the dynamics in the Middle East.

Riyadh and Saudi Arabia are currently the third biggest spender in world military expenditure, so I think we need to be aware of this situation and the heads of state and government inside the Atlantic Council should be aware that this situation could develop in different ways according to political will, according to commitment, according to the way that we can answer these challenges.

The perceptions and I know that I talk a lot about perceptions because it’s my topic, but perceptions are very important inside the alliance, inside the allies and each political community, but also outside. We should be aware of the consequences of the message that we send outside, not only on the East, the South, globally, but we should be aware of the consequences.

**JAN TECHAU:** All right, thank you very much. Finally, Professor Tsakonas, you’re professor at the university in the beautiful island of Rhodes and we brought you to the beautiful weather island of Brussels. You have to forgive us for that, but we needed to…

**PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS:** There is too much humidity on both sides.

**JAN TECHAU:** Now we need to move towards the Eastern end of the Southern flank, which I think you and your country and your government are very much concerned about. We just heard about the changed dynamic because of Russia in the region, but before we maybe go a little bit deeper into that, give us a little bit of your assessment of what Sinan’s paper told us and how you predict this to be playing out at the summit and afterwards, perhaps even more importantly.

**PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS:** Of course. Thank you very much. Thank you for extending this invitation to comment on a very well elaborated and very researched paper written by Sinan. Due to the time limit I would like to touch upon two particular issues raised by Sinan’s paper. One has to do with the difference in threat perceptions, and the other has to do with synergies, which in my view are desperately in need right now for addressing the complexity of the threats ahead of us.

So there is a particular reference in Sinan’s paper about the need for taking into account the divergent interests of NATO allies which are guided by differences in threat perception, and from a Greek point of view I would say that although to a large extent Greece is sharing the view that some of the challenges or security threats raised by Sinan’s paper are indeed there – actually most of them are included the list of Sinan’s paper, such as hybrid warfare, state failure, violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, it seems to me that some other issues or security challenges are not there or are being interpreted in a way quite different from the ones suggested from a mainstream point of view I would say of NATO, which has been carefully promoted or raised by Sinan’s paper. For example, there is a strong example towards this direction. There is a reference in the paper that Russia’s offensive capabilities, for example, starting from the deployment of Russia’s (A2/AD) capabilities or
Russia’s Black Sea fleet, intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance, cruiser deployment and SS-26 Iskander ballistic missiles in Syria obviously should be viewed as detrimental to NATO security.

It seems to me that this is not the case from the point of view of Greek analyst’s security point of view. I doubt this is being served by Greece as a bad thing to NATO's Southern flank. To the extent this might work as a counterweight to Russia’s offensive capabilities, it might act as a counterweight to Turkey’s national policies vis-à-vis Syria, for example. So it seems that there is a kind of clash I would say in terms of perceptions within NATO that should be taken into account.

Number two, synergies. I think Sinan has rightly suggested that there is a need for a comprehensive strategy. It should be developed on the part of NATO. At the same time, he made some suggestions about certain initiatives or actions NATO should take, mainly towards increasing capabilities, enhancing capacities and intensifying capacities. I strongly doubt this might be a way out for NATO managing to address the plethora of security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, and particularly given the fact that those challenges and security threats are interlinked, are multidimensional.

So I doubt that, to simply put it, NATO can go it alone, I would say, and I would suggest that a sophisticated, by all means, synergy with the European Union means and capabilities should meet somehow so as to come up with a comprehensive strategy able to address some of those multidimensional means.

Sinan has also mentioned that there is a need for… I think he openly suggested that there is a closer need NATO-European relationship is actually motivated by the changing security landscape, meaning that the current political framework should be revised somehow. I’ll stop.

JAN TECHAU: Great. Of course I have a follow-up for you as well, and that has something to do with the usefulness of NATO. We have seen in the Syria case, and then the ISIS case specifically, when a NATO country like France has a security problem in the region, it did go to NATO. It actually went to the EU because it knew that they wouldn’t stand in the way and they would basically let France do whatever it wanted to do. So if a country, if a key ally like France has a security problem in the region but doesn’t go to NATO, what does this tell us about the usefulness of NATO on the Southern flank?

PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: Well, it does say a lot about how we should try to address, as I said, multidimensional threats, which is the case for now and for the years to come. The usefulness of NATO? I doubt this has been questionable, or it is questionable by…

JAN TECHAU: It’s questionable or it’s not questionable?

PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: It is not. I doubt it is. There are many reasons why NATO should remain in place and manage to come up with definitely much more sophisticated, more synergistic strategies for addressing a much more complicated environment. So what is mostly needed I think is to try to come up with some ideas about how the available means, NATO means, should be used for managing to deliver, for addressing those threats. Differences in threat perception is a key issue towards that dimension, and I think we should all work towards eliminating or ameliorating to a certain extent the division in threat perceptions and how NATO allies are still assessing threats coming from the external environment.

JAN TECHAU: Great. Thank you, all, very much for those introductory remarks and information. I now open it up to you. I hope that you have your questions ready. I’d like to take as many as we can.
We have about 45 minutes for the debate which is great; that gives us plenty of time. I hope that you can give me a clear sign with whatever hand you have available at the moment. The first one is over here. I would like to collect perhaps two or three. I hope that I get two or three because, if not, I have to invent them all myself and that’s not the purpose of this exercise. Maybe let’s start with this one over here.

**MEL MCNULTY:** Thanks, Jan, and thanks to all the panellists for extremely thoughtful interventions and extremely timely because a week tomorrow we’ll all be in Warsaw trying to grapple with some of these issues. I am Mel McNulty from the UK delegation to NATO. I’m not going to talk about Brexit, but I am going to talk about whether this paper, which is extremely well-done and, as I say, extremely timely, could’ve been retitled A Cooperation-Based Strategy for NATO’s Southern Flank rather than A Threat-Based.

I think we have touched on the idea that there is probably no shared threat assessment towards the Southern flank, but are we looking not so much at a failure of response but a failure of cooperation going back many years, which means that when the crises developed there wasn’t the basis of cooperation on which NATO could’ve responded much more effectively. Perhaps the contrast in the East is that NATO’s record there has been one of cooperation, modernisation and bringing the defense institutions of the former Warsaw pact up to NATO standards.

The states on the Southern flank, with one or two exceptions – Libya, Lebanon, Syria – are NATO partners and perhaps more could’ve been done over these years, over these 20 years when we were focused very much on capacity building and modernisation in the East to do that in the South and perhaps would’ve given us a stronger basis for a cooperation-based response that would be so keenly needed now.

**JAN TECHAU:** All right. Please get your questions ready. I think I’ll let the panellists answer this very specific one and then we’ll go to another one. Sinan, do you want to go first on this one?

**SINAN ÜLGEN:** Yes, two things, one internal to NATO and one in relation to NATO partners. Internal to NATO, I think one of the objectives of this paper is to basically raise awareness about the threat landscape, because in a way that’s the antecedent to a common threat analysis. Because we’ve expressed that one of the issues, and I think embedded in your question, is also an understanding that one of the barriers is that there is this different threat outlook among the allies. They don’t see things the same way. Their threat analysis is sometimes diverse. But how do you get to a common threat analysis?

One way to get a common threat analysis is to do, I believe, this type of exercise where you look at the threat landscape out there and then start to talk about the policy response. If there are divergences, then you deal with those divergences. But first you have to do this type of exercise, which has been done certainly within NATO, but perhaps pushing the frontier a bit is always useful.

Now, on the cooperative side about the countries in the Southern flank, there is a natural barrier to how much NATO can do and that is that those countries in the past have proved extremely sensitive in areas that may impinge on their domestic security and that’s really been one of the obstacles to developing further collaboration and cooperation with those countries. That’s also been the case in relation to how the EU operates.

But given that NATO has its own distribution of tasks and labour, even in areas where NATO operates, whether it’s defense capacity building and training and so on, there has been that sort of
resistance in some countries, especially because of the special status of their security apparatus. So there is that resistance that, for instance, you gave the example of Syria, in Syria the security apparatus and the special status of the security apparatus essentially precluded this type of cooperation with NATO, I believe.

JAN TECHAU: anybody want to comment on this specific question? I have you, ambassador and then, okay, ambassador Vandemeulebrouck, please.

AMBASSADOR VANDEMEULEBROUK: thank you. ambassador, you mentioned that on the forthcoming summit in Warsaw there will be a review of the stock, what has been realised since the Wales summit in 2014. we’ll have to wait another week in order to see that, but i wonder whether you could lift a bit of the veil and see what is better now in 2016 than in 2014 based on the statements, on the promises of what has been made? thank you.

TACAN ILDEM: well, in 2014 we were confronted with the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, the annexation of Crimea and the aggressive actions in Eastern Ukraine. therefore, the readiness action plan put in place with tripling the size of NATO’s response force and having a very high readiness spearhead force in the core of it were all steps/measures that have been taken. the heads of state and government, when they gather next week, would be content with the implementation of those measures. but now it is not only taking stock of these achievements so far attained, but also furthering it by strengthening the deterrence and defense of NATO, which is to protect our citizens and also to project stability beyond our borders.

If i may say a few words on the threats coming from the South? as you have dwelled upon in your paper, they are complex in nature and in certain areas NATO is not the first responder. therefore, i agree with you, and i was alluding to it briefly, that we require such synergies to be at the centre of our work in dealing with those challenges and NATO EU cooperation is one very good necessity to further it.

I agree in some countries the perception, since we are talking about perception, of NATO might not be a very good one for us to operate, but when you take all the countries that we are right now cooperating with Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, it is a demand-driven process and we are helping, assisting and training them in specified areas of their need and it adds to their capacity.

Regarding the populist politics at the centre of the shaping of the landscape in the future, it is a problem, but when you comfort yourself with transnational threats, if there is a flow of migrants, refugees to your country, or there are a number of terrorist attacks in different capitals of allied countries, there is no way but to concentrate on the means and capacities that you have individually as a nation and through the organizations that you belong to.

Therefore, the unfortunate incidents, the attacks taking place in different parts of the NATO geography would force us to concentrate on ways to deal with these threats and challenges properly. I agree that NATO could not be the only organisation to deal with it and that’s why cooperation with the EU is becoming extremely important.

JAN TECHAU: i always find that interesting when that thing is mentioned mantra-like, how it would be if the two could finally cooperate knowing full well that this remains an unresolved issue, that at the working level we have some good exchange but at the top level that’s not really possible in terms of a systematic approach. so i always count that as some sort of Brussels talk that never really
turns into something real, but that would be just my... this NATO EU context for me is one of those big stories that never quite get anywhere in this town.

**TACAN ILDEM:** Well, we should see it as a process. When I was serving here some nine years ago or seven years ago, we were discussing NATO EU cooperation, and I must say that now when I compare the cooperation between the two organizations with what we had then, there is incredible progress for the better. We know the political impediments and let us hope that finally there is a resolution to the longstanding Cyprus question which would make NATO EU cooperation in its full capacity.

If I may also take this opportunity, I being at NATO can feel the enthusiasm within NATO allied countries to further NATO EU cooperation, and I just hear voices in different discussions that the EU perhaps should be able to match this enthusiasm. So it’s a matter of a mutual reinforcing effort and that’s why the Warsaw summit meeting perhaps with this joint statement could give a strong signal in that direction.

**JAN TECHAU:** Thank you.

**SINAN ÜLGEN:** Can I just build something on this?

**JAN TECHAU:** Yes, and then Professor Tsakonas.

**SINAN ÜLGEN:** Assuming Cyprus is resolved, that’s certainly the first barrier but it’s not the only barrier. That’s a superficial barrier. The real barrier to NATO EU cooperation is the difference among both EU allies and NATO allies about the task distribution, about what each entity should do and should not do. One interesting question is basically what will the consequences of Brexit be for that relationship, because if the UK is not an EU member anymore but obviously a NATO member, what does that mean for the future of NATO EU cooperation? Again, talking about the scenario where Cyprus is settled so that the first obstacle on paper for that cooperation could be eliminated.

**TACAN ILDEM:** You are right on that. Even if the Cyprus question is resolved, still there may be other impediments on the way, but what I can say is that there is a qualitative change since those years that I was in Brussels.

**JAN TECHAU:** Professor Tsakonas.

**PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS:** I assume we are all aware of the fact that High Representative Mogherini has released a European Union strategic document a couple of days ago, so I think particularly for Carnegie Europe it’s a very good chance to come up with probably a study or organise a panel trying to see whether there are any overlapping’s or any possible paths of cooperation between the two organizations, given that there is now a way of moving forward based on that institutional document which was not there. We’ve been expecting it for some time now. It was decided a year ago, but now it has been released.

It seems that there is certain progress, at least with regards to the initiative taken by the European Union back in 2003 and then again back in 2008. There is some progress with regard to the threat assessment, the prioritization of threats in Europe’s periphery, along with some suggestions about ways for possible collaboration between the European Union and other organizations, NATO being at the top of course of that agenda and particularly of the transatlantic relationship, so it might be a good idea to try to elaborate on...
JAN TECHAU: Rest assured that we’re working on it already. We’ll be starting with a few blog pieces in the next couple of days assessing the strategy and then take it from there. I have a question. NATO EU is one thing and I want to leave that out of the equation for a while because I think we actually in essence have bigger strategic fish to fry than this. Let me ask this to Sinan or the Turkish analyst, but also to our two professors.

We had President Erdogan apologizing to Russia for the shooting down of the Russian fighter plane over Russian airspace which was widely seen as a defeat for him and as a big victory for Russia, which has actually turned this incident now into a strategic victory for itself. Turkey will be less inclined to do a similar thing to show that sort of resolve against violations of its airspace in the future. That doesn’t necessarily make the Southern flank more secure. Was this a strategic blunder, or is this just a footnote? Shooting down – well, either way, you pick the one. Was the shooting down the mistake, or the apologizing the mistake?

TACAN İLDEM: Well, I cannot of course speak on behalf of Turkey, but if I follow it correctly I understand that it is not a formal apology, but regret for the loss of life and readiness to alleviate the sorrow of the family of the victim. But I don’t think that it was an apology for shooting down of the Russian aircraft.

JAN TECHAU: It might not have been a formal apology, but it was a massive move on behalf of Mr Erdogan compared to his initial reaction to the incident. Sinan?

SINAN ÜLGEN: Just to follow up on Ambassador İldem, there is definitely an adept use of constructive ambiguity here, which is fine if it’s going to solve the problem. The Turkish interpretation is indeed an expression of regret, an apology to the family of the pilot, but the Russian statement is, yes, Erdogan apologized. So everybody speaks to their domestic audience; we’ve seen examples of that in the past. If it allows for the problem to be overcome, that’s fine.

More fundamentally to your question, I think it was an accident in the making, that was unavoidable, because the Russians prior to the downing of the plane had been doing this on a regular basis, just like in the north of the Baltics. At some point there was a high-level discussion with the vice chairman of the Russian air force coming to Turkey and they agreed on the rules of engagement. So the Russians gave a commitment that they would stop violating Turkish airspace and the Turkish side made it clear that the rules of engagement will apply from there on, so on 24th November those rules of engagement were finally enforced.

So with hindsight you may say that was a stupid move, but the decision to fully enforce the rules of engagement were taken before the violation. That’s when the strategic decision was made, and it was made with a view to tell the Russians that we will not allow this. Because the analysis on the Turkish side is that unless we make it clear to the Russians that they can’t go on doing this forever, they will continue to do this forever.

JAN TECHAU: Do you think there’s the same level of resolve now that there was before, because now it seems to me that Turkey from now on will be less inclined to do a similar thing.

SINAN ÜLGEN: Yes, surely, but then the underlying expectation was that this would essentially deter Russia from doing this. So it’s a failure of deterrence at the end of the day, that you had to down the plane because obviously the Russians didn’t believe that the Turkish would do it and the Turkish
government did it, even without the chain of command, because within 17 seconds you can’t go up the chain of command, so it was a decision that was taken before as per the rules of engagement.

Now, why did Erdogan decide to nonetheless sign an overture towards Russia? It’s really because essentially the country’s foreign policy has been shaken to the core by some of the ill-considered attempts of the post 2011 foreign policy leadership. So the fact that the country finds itself isolated, without the ability to establish alliances, eventually led to a position that we have to re-assess this foreign policy and start to make amends. So the first achievement was with Israel, the normalization of the relationship with Israel, and now with Russia, which also has an economic dimension because the Russian sanctions started to have an impact on Turkey and particularly on tourism.

But, more strategically, what does that mean? We’re not going to go to the status quo ex ante. I don’t see that. What was the status quo ex ante? The status quo ex ante was actually quite a remarkable achievement where Ankara and Moscow had deepened their relationship economically on the energy side and so on, while they were disagreeing totally on everything beyond their borders. The outlook was of course very different on Ukraine, on Crimea, on Syria, but despite that they were able to compartmentalize their differences and behave as if that hadn’t existed. I think there won’t be the possibility to do that anymore.

So even though the relationship will gradually normalize, Ankara will remain more lukewarm towards Moscow and so there is no going back to the period before November 24th, which in a way since we’re a NATO panel, that should be good for NATO. We are already seeing signs of that, for instance on the Black Sea where the Turkish traditional position has been, we don’t want NATO in the Black Sea and we’re happy to cooperate with Russia on the Black Sea. That has fundamentally changed, so Turkey is more receptive to NATO on the Black Sea now, with the caveat being that there are constraints with the Montreux Convention and so on.

JAN TECHAU: One question over here.

PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: Could we expand on that as well?

JAN TECHAU: Of course. To the same question?

PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: Yes.

JAN TECHAU: Please respond now. If you hold on for just a minute or so, because I would like to finish this question first.

PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: I agree with the analysis made by Sinan. Your initial question was whether that initiative taken by Erdogan would continue the de-stability of the Southern flank of NATO; I think it will. That’s a starting point for better relations. It should have been done. I think it came a bit late, but it is an initiative taken towards the right direction and I think it’s, to a certain extent, a lesson learned by the initial mismanagement of the situation immediately after the incident when Turkey, to a certain extent, has tried to get NATO involved in what has been happening in the area. For example, by calling for the active reinvigoration of article five, which was not the case for NATO, NATO did not respond to that.

SINAN ÜLGEN: They didn’t ask for article five.

TACAN ILDEM: There was no question.
PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: Okay, I thought there was. Then there was probably some thinking released by the government towards that direction. But, anyway, either a tendency or a fact, it seemed that Turkey at the time was interested in having NATO involved somehow in that, I would say, incident. So the way things evolve now, it seems to me that they do contribute to the stability and to the further normalization and stability of the Southern flank.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you. Please introduce yourself and a short question.

HAMAD RIJAI VARAK: Thank you very much. Yes, about the…

JAN TECHAU: Please introduce yourself.

MOHAMED RAJA’I BARAKAT: Mohamed Raja’i Barakat, About Russia and Turkey, don’t you think that Turkey is trying to put pressure on the EU to accelerate the negotiations for the addition? Trying to have good relations with Russia, maybe it’s going to make the European Union a little bit anxious about these relations and to accelerate the negotiations, because the declarations yesterday about these negotiations, don’t you think that it’s possible? About Libya, you spoke about threats from Saudi Arabia and nobody’s speaking about Libya now. Don’t you think that it’s a threat also to NATO what’s happening there? Thank you.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you very much. Who wants to go first on these two? Libya, a case for NATO, and then Russia’s pressure after the Turkey incident.

SINAN ÜLGEN: I’ll answer the first perhaps part of the question. I don’t think that the Russia issue has any relevance for the Turkey EU relationship, at least for the foreseeable future, because there will always be impediments to how close Turkey and Russia can become. Turkey is a NATO partner, obviously Russia is not. There can be no real strategic relationship between Turkey and Russia. The Turkey Russia relationship can never really be an alternative to the Turkey EU relationship, so I think that card, if there are people who believe that that’s the case, I think that’s the wrong way to approach the Turkey EU relationship.

JAN TECHAU: Ana, you wanted to come in as well?

ANA SANTOS PINTO: Yes, and I’ll use also the Libyan example. I don’t think there is pressure. Today they opened one more chapter on the negotiations between EU and Turkey and I think there are many things, many issues that pressure the EU Turkey relationship and not specifically the relationship with Russia. Even though on the Middle East alignments Turkey has a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia too and all this is mainly on the region more than with the EU with many other questions and problems with pressure, but on Libya, the paper debates on Libya and talks about that challenge.

In Portugal we pay attention to Libya in the last five, six years and it’s very surprising for me that everyone is trying to avoid the elephant in the room, even inside NATO, and I’m sorry for the expression. But we know that we have a problem, we acknowledge that problem individually each of us, but we don’t debate because we don’t know what to do. I think Libya is the problem and will be the problem in the near future.

On the Portuguese case, we passed from one main supplier of oil and one of the countries in North Africa where we invest a lot on construction, a lot on the Portuguese economy dimension that is not
so much but it’s important for us, on engineering and construction. Today we all know that Libya is in chaos and we don’t really see that topic discussed. We talk about a probable coalition of states operation, something that we don’t know what it is, but it’s a huge problem and I don’t know if NATO is the first responder on this topic regarding this story.

**TACAN ILDEM:** Well, I cannot talk whether NATO is the first responder or not, but NATO definitely in its considerations keeps Libya as a very important country in the region and when there is a request and need, we would be considering ways to assist the country in defense capacity building and strengthening it. Therefore, Libya is not something that we put aside and not paying attention, but it depends on the circumstances and the way NATO would be asked to make its contribution.

**JAN TECHAU:** Thank you. I have another question to you, Ana, but also to the rest of you. One of the other big elephants in the room in this entire context of course is the US. On the Eastern flank we have this discussion among countries on that Eastern flank that are very much looking at Washington for also bilateral reassurance and they’re sometimes questioning to what extent Washington is still dedicated to live up to its security and defense commitment. Is there a similar sentiment of US absence or engagement on the Southern flank? Is that very much the focus? How is the US position on all of this perceived? Is it seen as a reliable partner? How would you assess this from your perspective?

**ANA SANTOS PINTO:** Well, if you look to the article, Foreign Affairs, of General – I’m missing the name right now, the previous commander for Europe of NATO.

**JAN TECHAU:** Breedlove

**ANA SANTOS PINTO:** Yes, you see that there is a huge argument on the Eastern perceptions and worries and that is of course very important and in a certain way makes clear what the United States’ position is. Regarding the Mediterranean and the Southern flank, of course the United States for stability reasons and for security has worries, but probably they think the main burden sharing should not be from the United States. Leading from behind is the first sentence, but I think that the situation could be solved with other instruments besides the Southern shore of NATO.

We are talking on the NATO framework. I think the Eastern is more worrying and has more bilateral contact with its allies than the South I think, but it’s a worry of course because what happened in the South, a list of challenges that are well-perceived in the paper, are on the top of the list of worries of the United States of course.

**JAN TECHAU:** Yes, I was just about to say, if you say that people think that the US expects the Europeans to actually pick up the tab themselves, then they might be in for a big disappointment and that could in the end lead to strategic uncertainty on the Southern flank and that would be a big concern, I guess.

**ANA SANTOS PINTO:** Yes, let me just say that the global strategy, the European global strategy, that was and words matter, just welcomed by the Council of the European Union is the worst timing ever for a document like that to be publicly released and discussed. We can now make all our debates and panels about that, but I doubt that that document that could be very useful… this timing is just suicide for the document.

**JAN TECHAU:** Why exactly?
ANA SANTOS PINTO: Because we have the Brexit, all the… well, regarding security and defense, if the UK leaves the EU as such we lose the biggest budget for defense, the biggest defense industry and we need to reshape that. A global strategy with the UK or without the UK, I think it’s different. It’s the biggest development aid sponsor, so we need to reshape things if we want to be credible outside.

In this line of thinking, of course the United States want burden sharing, responsibility sharing, but the Europeans also need to think clearly and I don’t know if the European Union is going to do that debate. I’m fearing they will not. What is it going to do with this external action? It’s going well on humanitarian and probably on development, etc, but we have a problem on security and defense and I’m not so positive on that development after the Brexit, but I’m probably wrong.

JAN TECHAU: Anybody else want to come in on the US questions? First you and then we have another question from the audience.

PANAYOTIS TSAKONAS: I think the United States has been much more receptive, at least compared to the European Union on that, on the geostrategic regions or the implication just for these reasons in case there is a loss of Greece. I’m talking on the part of Greece. So it was important, I think it’s still important, for the United States to assure that there is stability in this particular part of the world.

To make a link with what has already been said about the ability of the two states, Greece and Turkey, to work together for creating, I would say, a common narrative with regards to external threats, a narrative that would manage to re-establish in a way the geostrategic linkage of the Greek Turkish airspace for NATO, for better serving NATO’s purposes and for addressing the security challenges in the area which seem to be common for Greece and Turkey, I think this is probably the way forward for both countries and for NATO as well. So focusing on common threats to, I would say, NATO’s collective security interests is probably one of the issues we have to focus on.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you very much. We have one more question. No, sorry, Ana wanted to come in, and then Sinan, and then we’ll get to your question. Please.

ANA SANTOS PINTO: One sentence I forgot. It’s something very important. Who is going to be the next president of the United States and on this cooperation of course. I forgot the most important.

JAN TECHAU: All right. Sinan, then the ambassador.

SINAN ÜLGEN: Again, very briefly, if I had drafted a paper on the Eastern flank it would have been unavoidable for me to reference the US. It was not for the paper with regard to the Southern flank. I don’t think I referenced the US even once in this paper. That already tells you that the types of responses that needed to be developed for the Eastern flank are different. We’re talking about reassurance, we’re talking about deterrence where the US role is unavoidable. You can’t escape that.

The responses to the Southern flank are a hybrid or a myriad of different, more flexible responses, if you have to use that analogy, type policy initiatives. There you don’t necessarily need the US. Of course it would be invaluable to have the US on board contributing, but it’s not as unavoidable as the Eastern flank and I think the paper reflects that.

JAN TECHAU: Just to clarify, is the US less interested or is it less needed?
SINAN ÜLGEN: Both.

JAN TECHAU: Is that a reason for worry?

SINAN ÜLGEN: It’s a reason for being more focused on what needs to be done on the Southern flank because you can’t expect US leadership on the Southern flank. You may have more higher expectations on the US regarding the Eastern flank and they’re already delivering.

JAN TECHAU: Ambassador Ildem?

TACAN İLDEM: Well, of course I have to inject some sense of fairness since the United States is very much aware of the challenges emanating from the South and making as much contribution as it has been doing for those challenges coming from the East. But the particularities and the nature of the threats and challenges we are facing from the South would also require, as you have referred to, different flexible arrangements. But, in any case, when it comes to NATO’s role and contributions the United States is at the forefront to make its contribution and to have NATO’s contribution be robust.

JAN TECHAU: I think we have one final question from the audience.

GERMANO DOTTORI: My name is Germano Dottori. I came from Rome, Italy so you could expect I would like to take the floor a bit to talk about Libya because I was impressed by what you said about your question on the absence of the United States and how it’s perceived. As an Italian I don’t want to unveil any state secrets, but it was for months that the Obama administration asked Italy to take the lead on a military operation of stabilisation in Libya just to discover that Italy didn’t have the strength required for such an ambitious endeavour.

The problem is that if we wanted to project stability or to bring stability to large countries in very big turmoil, we as European states, members of NATO, simply don’t have any more the means. So if we wanted to project stability, also contemplating the use of force, probably in the near future we will need a sort of land re-armament.

Most of the European countries decided after the fall of the Berlin Wall to get rid of the tanks, for instance. How can you go to Libya without tanks when, for instance, just the Misrata brigade possess some 800 tanks and armoured vehicles on various sites? So it’s very important in my opinion that the United States changes this attitude of staying behind because otherwise we are going to pay a very high price, at least as contributions given by state funds to military expenditure.

I would like also to add a sort of consideration in my question on projecting stability. I think we should be very clear about what we want to mean with this concept because the risk is high that we confuse projecting stability with supporting the status quo. If there is a very striking difference between what the United States and Russia have done in the last years, it’s just like that. The Russians entered Syria after a very important address by President…

JAN TECHAU: Can you please come to your question very quickly?

GERMANO DOTTORI: Yes. President Putin at the General Assembly of the United Nations proposed Russia as a champion of global stability. I think that projecting stability in the meaning of NATO is much more meaning accommodating change; is that true, or am I wrong?
JAN TECHAU: All right. That last question gives us the chance to give the word to everybody here again very briefly. We have reached our time limit, but I would still ask you, all of you, to have a final comment perhaps on this question or on anything else that comes to mind. I would start with, then Ambassador Ildem, and then Sinan, and then…

TACAN ILDEM: If I understood you correctly, you were asking whether we want to impose a change, right?

GERMANO DOTTORI: Accomodating change in the meaning just to help people to get stability after dissolve...

TACAN ILDEM: No, I think what we have to understand is that NATO tries to deal with those challenges and threats in such a way, not only by having its own capabilities but also working with those countries in the Southern periphery, and we are talking about partners of NATO, to make sure that they have enough capacity/resilience to deal with the threats and challenges so that those challenges and threats could not become major threats for NATO countries. So it is in fact helping them by assisting, advising and training in those areas that they wish NATOs contribution to be in place.

JAN TECHAU: Ana, please, and then finally with last words, Sinan.

ANA SANTOS PINTO: Just a short comment again on perceptions. When we hear stability, all of us are going to think about different things. I don't know what NATO is thinking about stability. The ambassador has explained. Probably someone in North Africa and the Middle East is going to think differently about what is expected on stability. One thing I can bet is on their mind is stability for NATO allies and not for them. I don't know what’s going to be the result, but I think when we use these kinds of expressions we should think about what the others have in the dictionary in the same words.

JAN TECHAU: Sinan, finally.

GERMANO DOTTORI: I agree with you.

SINAN ÜLGEN: I think when you look at eventually the role of NATO in relation to your question, NATO is at the receiving end of the international governments; it’s not leading the international governments. So if I understand you correctly, when you have this dichotomy between stability and change in an environment where, as you paint it, NATO should intervene, the decision is taken… there has only been one instance where NATO intervened without a UN Security Council resolution. Even for Libya there was a UN Security Council resolution. Even in that sense the question is more a question of international governments and the UN Security Council than NATO, because NATO does not… it has only once taken the lead in a way because the UN Security Council was blocked on Kosovo, so I don’t see that being replicated in the foreseeable future. So in that sense the question is a very relevant question, but practically NATO will be at the receiving end of whatever consensus emerges.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you very much. I hope that we can discuss or continue rather the discussion afterwards. You’re all invited to join us now after a quick moving away of the chairs for dinner. I would like to thank my panellists for trying to cut through the fog of what is conceptually a very difficult terrain for NATO, a very different environment, one that is fraught by many, many things
and where NATO in its limited mandate needs to work very hard to find its proper space. I hope that we were able to provide a little bit of information and guidance on the issue.

I would like to thank all of you also for your patience and for your questions, and please fill in the questionnaires right now and drop them in the box over there. This gentleman is holding the box at the far end of this room; provide him with the paper that he needs. Thank you, all, very much for coming to Carnegie. We'll be inviting you again soon. Have a great evening.