EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY: MORE THAN JUST A MILITARY MATTER
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SPEAKERS:
Knut Hauge, Permanent Representative of Norway to NATO
Claudio Bisogniero, Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO
Kerry Buck, Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO — together with Michael Pearson, grandson of Lester B. Pearson
Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO
Paal Sigurd Hilde, Associate Professor, Center for Norwegian and European Security at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies
Roland Paris, University Research chair in International Security and Governance at the University of Ottawa
Stefano Stefanini, former Ambassador to NATO and Diplomatic Adviser to the President of Italy and Senior Nonresident Fellow with the Atlantic Council

MODERATORS:
Judy Dempsey, nonresident senior associate at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of the Strategic Europe blog.
Paul Taylor, Contributing Editor, POLITICO
LIZZA BOMASSI: Welcome, everybody, my name is Lizza Bomassi; I'm the Acting Director of Carnegie Europe. I'd just like to thank everybody for coming. I can see most of your faces in the room, and also esteemed guests and friends. I would also like to thank our partners in the lead-up to this event, NATO PDD especially, the permanent representations of Canada, Italy, and our hosts, Norway, for their excellent collaboration in the lead-up to this event commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Three Wise Men Report. We're running on a very tight schedule, so I'm going to get off the stage and pass the floor to Ambassador Hauge for the welcome.

KNUT HAUGE: Thank you very much, and good morning, everyone. As Norway's ambassador to NATO it's a great pleasure to me to welcome you all here to Norway House. It feels good to say it. From the high turnout I can tell that today's topic is of great interest, not only in NATO, but also in the European Union, in the media, and in the think tanks. NATO is fundamental to Norway's security; already in 1949 it was clearly understood that our interests are best safeguarded through cooperation with transatlantic and European partners. NATO is the cornerstone of that policy; as a military alliance, and as a community of values and political dialogue. A military matter, yes, but much more than that. One of the men who cemented that cornerstone, by signing the North Atlantic Treaty on Norway's behalf in 1949 was then Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, one of the Three Wise Men. Their report was approved by the North Atlantic Council on this day, 60 years ago, as an essential contribution to the development of the alliance as a political as well as military community.

Halvard Lange took an unlikely path, a path which reflects the changing times in which he lived. In his youth he was a pacifist and a Labour activist, and in his later years an elder statesman, long-serving Foreign Minister, and tireless advocate of transatlantic military cooperation. However he was, perhaps first and foremost, an internationalist. Lange travelled extensively through Europe in the early 20th century, here to Brussels, the stay cut short by the outbreak of the First World War, to Weimar Germany, paying two million marks for a cup of coffee upon arrival in Cologne, and four million for a second cup upon departing two days later. Then to Geneva, where he heard Fridtjof Nansen, the then High Commissioner for Refugees, addressing the League of Nations on the need for humanitarian aid towards the Russian famine in 1921, and finally on to London, to work for an international pacifist organisation. Returning to Norway a convinced pacifist, Lange argued for unilateral disarmament, he directed his political passion into the Norwegian Labour Party, in which he would be active for the rest of his life. Having spent most of the Second World War in a concentration camp as a political prisoner, he came to accept, however, that armed resistance could sometimes be necessary.

In 1946 he was appointed Norway's Foreign Minister, and Lange would remain in that position for almost 20 years. Early in his tenure he became a proponent for a transatlantic orientation in Norway's security policy, consequently he argued forcefully for Norwegian ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. Norway eventually became one of the original signatories of that treaty, with Lange himself signing on Norway's behalf. The former pacifist had successfully taken Norway into the new alliance. Today NATO and its members are part of a changed and still changing security landscape, which requires continuous dialogue about what NATO is and what NATO should be. I am confident that today's event will contribute to that dialogue. Thank you very much.

CLAUDIO BISOGNIERO: Good morning. I am Claudio Bisogniero, the Italian Ambassador to NATO. Secretary General, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, first of all thank you for coming to these celebrations here today at the Norway House, on the exact day of the presentation of the Three Wise Men Report 60 years ago. If he hadn't been a great statesman, Gaetano Martino, our own Wise Man, would have been remembered as a great scholar and a Professor of great international renown all the same. Martino was actually both things at the same time. As a Professor and a scientist, Martino was, among other things, the Rector of the largest university in Europe, the University of Rome, La Sapienza.
As a politician he checked all the boxes of an extraordinary career, both at the national and international level. He probably inherited his passion for politics from his father, who was for several years Mayor of the Sicilian city of Messina, and rebuilt it after the dramatic earthquake of 1908, this is the father, not Gaetano Martino himself. Gaetano Martino did other things, he did not rebuild Messina.

So the political masterpiece of Martino as Foreign Minister was the Messina Conference, which less than one year after the failure of the European Defence Community, relaunched in 1955 the idea of creating a European community, and for this success Martino is considered one of the fathers of Europe, with Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and Paul-Henri Spaak. His name is of course associated to the two other great statesmen of this time, Halvard Lange and Lester Pearson. Together these Three Wise Men shaped NATO’s political role at a time when the focus of this alliance was mainly based on hardening its military stance. And the adoption and the strengthening of political consultation among allies and the call for more internal solidarity, cohesion, and unity, permanently shaped NATO as a political military organisation. And even if the report had not at that time an immediate impact on the alliance, let’s recognise it was a visionary report for that time, the legacy and the ideas in it have deeply marked the alliance for many decades to come.

We tend to under-estimate it, or to forget it, today, but NATO is the only permanent consultative forum where the US and Canada, and the Europeans sit together. It is true, occasionally, maybe once a year, we have the transatlantic dinners in New York, or maybe an EU/US summit, but once again NATO is the only place where this happens on a permanent basis practically every day in the life of the alliance, the councils, the committees, not to mention the ministerial and the summit. And by the way, political dialogue is also at the core of NATO’s relations and cooperation with some of our strategic players, meaning our important partners. Another firm belief of Gaetano Martino, of this truly wise man, was that European communities and the transatlantic bond represented by NATO are inseparable, not alternative, not competitive, but rather complementary processes aimed at merging in a unitary one the unity of the Atlantic world.

We often discuss about the closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union, well Martino's views can be a source for inspiration in that regard, and I'm sure that he would agree about the notion that a stronger European Union and a stronger European defence actually make NATO stronger. Tomorrow we also celebrate the 61st anniversary of Italy's admission to the UN, also in this regard I want to pay tribute to the legacy of Minister Martino, who played a crucial role in achieving that target and that goal. At a time when Italy is about to sit for the seventh time in the UN Security Council, before handing over the baton to the Netherlands, Italians can be proud of the long path that we have walked since 1955, when we joined the UN, also thanks to Martino's vision.

Also the alliance of today represents the embodiment of his dream; NATO today is much more than what most people think. NATO is a contact based on fundamental shared values, in fact our meetings and discussions at all levels build a continuous fabric of political interaction that creates solidarity among countries that share a common vision on international affairs and common founding values. This, together of course, with the collective defence solidarity clause enshrined in Article Five, this is what NATO is all about, and we owe it, in a very large measure to Gaetano Martino, Lester Pearson, and Halvard Lange. Thank you very much.

KERRY BUCK: I am Kerry Buck, I am Canada's Ambassador to NATO, but I will not introduce Lester Pearson to you; I will leave that task to Lester Pearson's grandson, Michael Pearson, who also happens to be my husband; thus his travel to Brussels for this event was free. Thank you, Mike.
MICHAEL PEARSON: Thank you, your Excellency. Thanks to Carnegie for hosting this event, and to my spouse for giving me this opportunity to speak on Canada's behalf. I'm really pleased to be here this morning, to help commemorate the 60th anniversary of The Three Wise Men Report, and I am going to take a little bit more of a personal perspective, based on my association with Lester Pearson, although, as you notice, I'm not wearing a bow tie. Kerry tried to get me to wear one this morning, but I said no. When we think of anniversaries, usually the first thing that comes to mind is marriages; there's a popular saying that marriages have to make it through the seven year itch to be successful, well in 1956 the NATO marriage was seven years old, and there was clearly some itching going on. The alliance had already proven to be a success story, but it was largely a military one; it was not yet a political success story. The challenges to NATO unity and cohesion, just a few short years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, were significant; some NATO members were preoccupied with the realities that come with the end of empire. This led to differing perspectives on out of area conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, and what was then called Indo-China, even though the NATO council did not always formally discuss them. Nor was any comfort created by a US president who, while aware of the importance of the transatlantic link, was also defining his country as, quote, the most powerful of the anti-colonial powers, an asset of incalculable value to the free world, unquote. I think Churchill must have choked on his cigar when he heard that. Add to this the inability of the alliance for several years to implement the agreed accession of what was then West Germany. It all made for rather tense North Atlantic Council meetings. As a historian put it, quote, NATO in the early 1950s had forcefully closed the gates to the barbarians without, but it had not done enough to build a sense of community within, unquote.

For Canada's Foreign Minister at that time, Lester Bowles Pearson, for those of you wondering what B stands for, this was troubling; one of the architects of NATO, and of the so-called Canadian Article Two, Pearson was an Atlanticist, he had invested a lot of time and energy in promoting NATO's early growth, and did not want to be present at the dissolution, to borrow partially a well-known phrase. Though not all were enthusiastic about Article Two, everyone had at least a grudging respect for Pearson. He had already chaired a NATO review process that had led to the creation of the Secretary General with a mandate to, among other things, promote more inter-alliance political consultation. As an interesting aside, my grandfather was actually asked to be the first SG, but he demurred and supported the appointment of Lord, as he was called, Pug Ismay. We all know now, of course, just how valuable an SG can be, but the role apparently took a while to get noticed. Ismay told Pearson after a few months in the job that he had had more authority as a junior officer in the British army than he had as SG. Not to suggest that that's the case now, of course.

By 1956 the unity of NATO was so shaky that even Pearson said he was, quote, losing hope; I was beginning to have doubts about its future, unquote. The seven year itch was in full swing. Luckily our American friends began to worry about the state of the marriage too; it was in fact Secretary of State Dulles who proposed a ministerial committee of three that spring, to advise the council on how to improve non-military cooperation and greater unity. He then went out and told the press that Lester Pearson should chair it. As someone later reflected, quote, the constant harping by the Canadians may have been annoying, but it paid off, unquote. Did the Three Wise Men actually do anything useful? The short answer, I think, is yes. The, surprised, chair certainly was willing to do the job although as he recalled much later in his memoirs, quote, there were moments when I thought that it might more appropriately be called the Three Stooges, unquote. Any of you who know old American TV would get that. At the time he said to a friend, quote, some are born wise, some achieve wisdom, and some, I fear, have wisdom thrust upon them; we three seem to be in the last and most dangerous category, unquote.

In an interesting technique, the three decided to acquire wisdom via the sending of a questionnaire to NATO members, the answers to which formed the basis of the report, which was delivered on this 60th
anniversary day in December, 1056. In his memoires, Pearson quoted some of the intro to the report to convey what he saw as its essence, quote, NATO political and economic cooperation, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day, or by a declaration, but by creating over the years the habits and traditions and precedents for such cooperation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best, slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure, unquote. Fair to say that 60 years qualifies as slow and gradual, but the satisfaction of steady and sure progress is also to be celebrated.

Are there any lessons from the Three Wise Men effort that are worth noting? In his introduction to the 30th anniversary publication of the Three Wise Men Report, which I see is part of everyone's package there, then NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington, wrote, quote, few events in the life of the alliance have left so lasting an imprint on its purposes and operating methods, unquote. Others can speak to the specifics and relative success of the slow and gradual implementation process of the Report's recommendations, but let me conclude by offering two or three thoughts on possible lessons we can learn from the effort; first, perseverance matters. When one considers the other rather significant events happening in the fall of 1956, the Hungarian Revolt and its brutal suppression by the Soviets, the Suez Crisis, it is amazing that the Three Wise Men Report even happened. Suez in particular seriously divided NATO members, and could easily have undermined any effort to forge better alliance unity. It is a testimony to the commitment of NATO governments that, despite these differences, all were prepared in endorsing the Report to, quote, restate their vows, unquote. Quite an accomplishment, given 50 per cent of marriages fail within seven years. And, as we know, this marriage has now passed its 67th anniversary, which tells its own story. Second, personal relationships and reputation matter; in 1956 LBP had been Foreign Minister for eight years, in short he knew everybody, and just as importantly, the sometimes annoying Canadian, was trusted by everyone. Clearly many of his fellow NATO ministers had the same confidence, and his close, warm relationship with fellow stooge, Norwegian Halvard Lange, who he remembered in his memoirs as, quote, one of the best and the wisest, unquote, also mattered. Having as his third fellow stooge Italy's Gaetano Martino, like LBP a former professor, added to the unity of purpose that prevailed. Third, pragmatism and humility matter; LBP was good at both, and to be successful in diplomacy and politics you need both. He was pragmatic when considering how to get NATO members' support for the Three Wise Men Report, for example he wanted one recommendation to be that members would appoint permanent representatives who had a political connection to their governments, a not uncommon practice for many Ambassadorial appointments. But some NATO members objected to this, feeling that regular ministerial meetings were sufficient, and otherwise diplomats should be the permanent representatives. So Pearson didn't push it, which is just as well, otherwise Kerry would not be Canada's permanent representative today. He also had no illusions about what it meant to the average NATO member citizen in the broader scheme of things; after telling his constituents all about the value and benefits of NATO, and Canada's role, he recalled a farmer putting up his hand and saying, quote, that's all very well, Mr Pearson, and you are obviously very good at representing Canada in the world, but you won't get very far with voters around here if you don't arrange for the building of a new post office, unquote. Thank you very much.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Thank you, Ambassadors, thank you, speakers. It was very stimulating. Maybe I'll have to revise my paper. Welcome; without further ado, I'm going to invite NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, to give this keynote speech, and I'm going to sit over there, and I'm afraid, question him afterwards. Thank you.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Good morning, everyone, and since we are in Norway House, I will start by saying god morgen alle sammen; that is Norwegian. And thanks to the permanent representatives of Norway, Canada, and Italy for taking the initiative to this event. And also, many thanks to Carnegie Europe for organising it, and for being a think tank which is constantly so focused on the transatlantic
relationship. As you all know, we are now approaching Christmas, so I found it extremely natural that we focus on the three wise men, but today it's not Caspar, Melchior, and Balthasar, but it is Martino, Pearson, and Lange. And even if I heard a lot of nice things about the report they presented 60 years ago, I think it's too much to call it a miracle, so it's not fully possible to compare it with what happened more than 2000 years ago, but at least it is also an important event.

But even though the report was not a miracle, it has had a great influence on the alliance, and the influence on the alliance cannot be over-estimated. The report, in many ways, paved the way for the alliance as we know it today; a political and military alliance, and not just the latter. Let me just start by a brief personal note, or reflection, and that is that back in 1987 I was the Chairman of the Young Labour Party back in Norway, and the Young Labour Party in Norway was strongly against NATO, and very much in favour of Norway leaving Norway, and that was a very fierce debate going on in Norway. It was probably what we today would have called the Noxit debate in Norway. But one of the things I am most proud of from my time as leader of the Young Labour Party was that I was actually able to change the position of the Young Labour Party from being strongly against to actually being in favour, not knowing I would end up as Secretary General, but knowing that one of the most important arguments I used back then was that NATO was not only a military alliance, but NATO was also a political alliance where 16 allies met regularly, and also developed common policies and common political positions on many different issues. So, without really knowing it, I was, back in 87, echoing the message from the Report, that NATO is not only a military alliance, but NATO is also a political alliance, and I used that as one of my strongest arguments for turning the Young Labour Party from being against to being in favour of a Norwegian membership in the alliance. And, as you have already heard, in Norwegian politics Lange is one of the giants; he was Foreign Minister for almost 20 years, he signed the NATO treaty for Norway, and like the other wise men, he's honoured with his own room at the NATO headquarters. In that room I sometimes have press conferences, and meet the press, and I think about the three wise men, but I also think about the fact that I actually have lived in another room which is named after Halvard Lange, because the residence where he lived for 20 years as Foreign Minister was upgraded later on to become the permanent residence of the Norwegian Prime Minister, so I also lived in the house of Halvard Lange for many years, until 2013. And it was a nice house, but it's hard to get in there.

But let's be honest, reports from NATO committees don't generally receive a great deal of public attention, certainly not 60 years after they were published, yet this report has proven its enduring value over the past decades. It deserves to be read and re-read, studied and re-studied, not as history, but as a living document with a great deal to offer us in our own time. NATO itself deserves credit for launching this report; the North Atlantic Council knew something was missing, something had to be done to strengthen the organisation. It took courage and wisdom to embark on this internal review process, to ask the necessary questions. The report helped to change NATO from being almost entirely a military alliance into a political and military alliance. That might sound like a subtle difference, but it has made a profound difference; the three wise men helped ensure that NATO is what it is today, that our alliance has continued to adapt, and remains as important as ever.

We are, first and foremost, a defence alliance, dedicated to the security of our nations and our people, but the long-term cohesion and durability of our alliance goes far beyond military matters. In reference to NATO's Article Five commitment, the report makes clear that there must be a whole-hearted acceptance by all members in the political commitment to collective defence, and there must be confidence in the will and ability that all members will honour that commitment in response to aggression. These words are important, and they are relevant and important also today. Our commitment to Article Five remains as strong today as it was 60 years ago, and, as the three wise men wisely recognised, alliance unity is the backbone of our deterrents and defence. They also saw that
greater unity could only come about through increased political consultation, increased cultural, economic, and scientific relationships, and increased public understanding and support for the alliance.

A culture of political consultation on a wide range of non-military issues and military challenges, and combined with a wide range of non-military relationships, have helped the alliance adapt to changing security challenges. Consultation leads to more listening and learning, and to greater political understanding among allies and partners. This has also contributed to consensus-building within the alliance, and this strengthens NATO's unity and cohesion, and you can see this in our engagement from the Western Balkans to Afghanistan. When NATO makes a political commitment, we keep our word; we do what we promise to do. Over the past few years NATO has responded with unity and determination to the most serious challenges in a generation. We are undertaking the biggest reinforcement to our collective defence since the end of the Cold War. These are political decision, reached by consensus by the NATO political leadership in close consultation with our military commanders.

We remain firmly committed to a two-track approach to Russia; strong deterents and defence, coupled with meaningful political dialogue. And allies have committed to spending two per cent of GDP on defence within a decade. Again this is a political commitment based on the strong consensus within NATO, and we are now implementing that commitment. And let me just underline for a moment the importance of delivering on the defence investment pledge, because the reality is that we need the capabilities that we can finance by more investments in defence, but we also need the cohesion and the strengthening of the transatlantic bond that will follow when European Allies and Canada invest more in defence. We have a long way to go, but I am actually impressed by the fact that we have turned a corner and, after many years of declining defence spending across Europe and Canada, we are now seeing that, at least on average, the defence spending in Europe has started to increase again, and this year expect three per cent real increase in defence spending, which is an important step in the right direction. The picture is still mixed but it is better than it was just two years ago when it comes to defence spending.

We also made a commitment to step up efforts to project stability beyond our borders, through more capacity-building, training, and political dialogue with partners, and we have the momentum for closer NATO/EU cooperation. All of this shows the positive role of NATO's culture of political consultation and consensus decision-making. Consensus is not always easy, and sometimes it may take a lot of time, and I can see a lot of people in the room that know everything about that. But consensus is the basis for the strength of the alliance and when 28 democracies come to consensus, we can move forward and take action as as strong alliance. So consensus and unity are two sides of the same coin. Thanks to the insights and the recommendations of the three wise men, NATO became a more adaptive political organisation. The essence of the committee's wisdom boils down to this: quote, non-military cooperation can be as important for the security of a nation or an alliance as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army, unquote. We are all grateful that the three wise men put forward a blueprint for more consultation to achieve greater unity in the alliance by recognising the importance of non-military cooperation, by building on the core values that unite members of the alliance, and by pointing the way toward creating a true Atlantic community. Our duty is to carry out that work, to keep this unique political and military alliance between Europe and North America strong, flexible, and united so we can preserve peace and security for our nations for the next decades. Thank you.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Now comes the hard part. Thank you very much, Secretary General, and may I just add very briefly to our previous speakers, thank you very much for sticking to the times, a great challenge, this, and thank you all for being.
JENS STOLTENBERG: Only the previous speakers?

JUDY DEMPSEY: I haven't dealt with yours yet. This comes now. I'm going to ask you the easy question first, if that's okay? And in all my conversations with previous Secretary Generals I've always talked about the easy question, because I'm always afraid they will walk away if I start with the difficult ones.

JENS STOLTENBERG: But I will leave early.

JUDY DEMPSEY: We'll let you leave on time. My first question, and interesting the Wise Men Report didn't make one reference to the EU because the EU really didn't exist at that time, it's going to be celebrating...we hope celebrating, not commemorating, its 60th anniversary in Rome in March. My question is this; if you look ahead, how do you really see the NATO/EU relationship developing?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I see the NATO/EU relationship really developing in a positive way; I think that's something we have achieved together, NATO and the European Union, on many different levels, from the top political leadership in the EU working with the leadership in NATO, with me, and staff to staff talks. We have really been able to strengthen the political cooperation between NATO and the European Union. We have just agreed, last week, on a package; we endorsed a package for more than 40 concrete measures on how to further strengthen our cooperation on a wide range of different topics. The NATO/EU cooperation has always been important, but in many ways I think it's even more important now because we face new kinds of security threats, which are this combination of military and non-military means or aggression, hybrid cyber threats really call upon the joint efforts of NATO and the European Union, so we work there. And we also have seen the will in the European Union to strengthen European defence; we welcome that, but of course it has to be done in a way which is not competing with NATO but complementary. So all this calls upon more NATO/EU cooperation, and we are really delivering. I'm quite impressed by the way we have been able to move forward.

JUDY DEMPSEY: You brought up this issue; do you worry about the competitiveness...frankly both organisations do compete with each other in some ways. Nobody wants to say this inside NATO or the EU, but both completely different cultural mind-sets. How would it work in detail? Would one do the soft power, would the other do the hard power; what's the nature of this complementarity?

JENS STOLTENBERG: The EU has its own capabilities, and NATO has its own capabilities, but none of us have all the tools to respond to all the different security challenges we are faced with. So, therefore, if we combine we are able to provide a formidable force, and that's exactly what we do. For instance, when we address hybrid threats, one of the things we have done is to develop a play-book describing who's going to do what if one of our member countries are under hybrid attacks. We need to defend infrastructure, we need to look at energy security, we need to defend our cyber networks; the EU has some capabilities, we have some capabilities, we have to make sure that they work together. NATO has some unique capabilities, for instance, when it comes to collective defence, major military operations; we have the command structure which the European Union does not have, but I think that we have a much more relaxed relationship to these issues now than my impression was the case ten or 20 years ago.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Indeed.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, it's easy to work together with...

JUDY DEMPSEY: Do you think the EU should have a joint command structure?
JENS STOLTENBERG: The EU should not develop command structures which are shaped like, or compete with, NATO. They need, of course, the ability to plan, and to conduct the kind of military presence which we have seen the EU has, for instance, in parts of Africa, but it's absolutely possible to do that without competing, or establishing something which is competing with or parallel structures of NATO. And my impression, after attending several EU ministerial meetings, but also on Thursday I will attend the European Union summit, and what they have told me, again and again, the EU leaders, is that this is not about creating a European army. This is not about competing with NATO. This is not about creating parallel command structures. But this is about European defence, and strong European defence, that is something NATO is in favour of because we have asked the Europeans to invest more in capabilities, to increase defence spending, to coordinate more their efforts; that will strengthen Europe, the European Union, and NATO, and therefore I welcome it, as long as we avoid the pitfalls, where the European Union starts to compete with NATO.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Now I'm intrigued by this answer; now imagine if you told a teenager this, having EU defence ambitions, you have NATO, imagine if a teenager said to you why don't you just join together.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Well I have tried twice to convince Norway to join the European Union, and that was not a success. That's the problem with democracy; so you cannot just decide, in Brussels; there are some people out there and they have different views on, for instance, both NATO and the European Union.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Oh yes, oh yes.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, the reality is that Canada and the United States, they will never become members of the European Union, but they of course contribute to the security of Europe. Norway, well you can try; good luck, but I have lost two referendums, so I know exactly how to lose and not to win them. And then you have Turkey, so the thing is that there are six allies, Norway, Iceland in the north, Canada, United States in the west, Albania and Turkey in the south-east, which all are essential for the security of Europe; 80 per cent of NATO's defence spending after Brexit will be non-EU.

JUDY DEMPSEY: After Brexit.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Key are the four battalions which we will have in the eastern part of the alliance will be led by non-EU allies, so there's no way...we have to work together to protect Europe.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Well, just before we end this discussion on the EU/NATO, and I see our Turkish ambassador here, I wasn't actually thinking of those not in the EU joining the EU, or those not in the EU joining NATO, I was thinking of maybe a different kind of Atlanticist construction. I'm just throwing out the idea before my next difficult question.

JUDY DEMPSEY: By the way, you were quite modest; you never did mention that you negotiated the Norwegian Border deal with Russia.

JENS STOLTENBERG: No, but Russia is not a member of the European Union, so...

JUDY DEMPSEY: Nor NATO, but it brings me to my next question; now it's interesting, the Warsaw summit, and the EU Global Action Plan, both of them make references to resilience, and resilience has different meanings, but as an EU citizen, although my country isn't in NATO, but that's another story, I mean resilience is not just about outside our neighbourhood, it's about being able to recover quickly in
an event...It doesn't even have to be a terrorist attack, but an explosion of some sort, the degradation of the railway system, the enormous effect it would have on western democracies; is NATO ready for this resilience?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yes, and we are stepping up our efforts because we see more threats and challenges related to, for instance, civilian infrastructure, and again this is an area where we work closely together with the European Union. But recently we agreed on guidelines for how to have the necessary resilience and sustainability of our different kinds of civilian infrastructure, energy, the continuation of government, and cyber and so on. So these are issues which we are now also doing more to address; resilience was one of the key issues we addressed at the Warsaw summit. So we are ready, but we also understand that we need to do more, so that's something we are working on.

JUDY DEMPSEY: But you brought up this consensus thing, I don't mean to call it a thing, but this consensus, you know how debilitating it is; but imagine if part of the railway or the airport system was destroyed, how could NATO and the EU, particularly NATO, kick in really quickly to respond to this?

JENS STOLTENBERG: First of all, the first responder is always the nation, and the whole idea is to enable them to take care of their own railway system, or ports, or whatever it is; but then of course both NATO and the EU have different capabilities to assist and help different member nations, partly by providing guidelines to set some kind of standards for what kind of quality and what kinds of systems the different nations have to have in place to protect their systems, and to re-establish them if they are under attack. And that's especially when it comes to cyber; we have developed that by also having teams in NATO, and being able to deploy quickly out to member states and help them to protect their cyber systems if they are under attack. But the main focus is always what we can do to enable nations to protect their own systems, and to have the quality infrastructure which is good enough.

JUDY DEMPSEY: This is really interesting; you mentioned the cyber security issue, given the whole, the constant worries by the Baltic Six particularly, but we've seen it with the German Bundestag, we've seen what has happened to the communications system there, last week the Deutsche Telekom was attacked, do you think Article Five should be updated to include this idea of cyber security, because these nations are threatened, and they are coming under a new kind of modern attack. Should Article Five be updated?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Article Five is already updated because NATO is a modern alliance and we have agreed that a cyber-attack can trigger our collective defence. So actually cyber-attack is now regarded as seriously as a conventional or other kind of military attack, because we know that cyber-attacks can destroy infrastructure, it can also cause human casualties. So we have already defined that cyber-attacks can trigger Article Five, but more than that, we also decided at the Warsaw summit in July, that we will establish cyber as a military domain; we have sea, land, and air, and now we also have cyber, because it's impossible to imagine a military conflict without the cyber dimension. And we have to be able to protect our own networks, be it when we are in operations in Afghanistan or in Kosovo, and any military conflict will have a cyber-dimension, so cyber is part of Article Five.

JUDY DEMPSEY: That's interesting; you don't have to change the text of Article Five, clearly, but it's implied. If you say that NATO is prepared for this, and updating it; I wonder about this, what about the intra-operability issue? Because one of the weaknesses of NATO is in fact, not the lack, that's far too strong, but intra-operability is a problem, not only between the European allies, but particularly between some of the European allies and the United States. This all plays into resilience and cyber security; do you worry about the lack of...or this issue of intra-operability?
**JENS STOLTENBERG:** I won't say I am worried, but we are focused and we are very much aware of the importance of intra-operability, and as you said, intra-operability is perhaps one of the most important tasks of NATO, to make sure that forces from 28 nations, soon to be 29, and also with partner nations, are able to really work together and to fight together. And that needs a very high degree of intra-operability, both when it comes to equipment, that equipment can work together, but also command, control, that we understand when we talk to each other. And of course we always have, let us say, room for improvement, but I think that one of the lessons we learned in, for instance, Afghanistan, a big military operation where hundreds of thousands of soldiers from NATO allied countries and partner countries participated; we learned that we had to develop better intra-operability, and actually we have been able to do so, partly based on big military operations like Afghanistan, but also more and more training. So one of the reasons why we are now doing more exercises is to increase our ability to work very closely together.

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** But intra-operability is just not about military capability, making things click together, it's also about, I suppose, the intra-operability of trust and intelligence sharing. Let's leave aside the EU intelligence, it's a different matter. The intelligence sharing is a problem inside NATO.

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** Of course we can be better, and that's the reason why we have just established a new division in NATO, and a division which is only going to be working with intelligence, and we have just appointed a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence. And the reason that we have established a new division, and the reason why we are going to have a new Assistant Secretary General, or that they have appointed him, is that we can do more when it comes to both improve the way we collect intelligence, but also the way we share and understand and analyse intelligence. And that again, it has always been important, but in the more unpredictable and more uncertain security environment, with all the instability we see in Iraq, Syria, North Africa, and around NATO, of course the importance of early warning, the importance of situational awareness, the importance of sharing intelligence, has just become even more important.

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** Yes, but I mean this is where the Three Wise Men Report is still relevant, because they discussed in detail the idea of trust, and the lack of trust, but intelligence requires trust and frankly it would be hard to see...I see Ambassador Luke there; hello, Ambassador. It would be hard to imagine maybe the Americans sharing intelligence with certain other NATO countries. This isn't there yet; trust is a very difficult commodity in any case, but a little bit more trust is needed inside NATO.

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** But, you know, NATO is the most successful military alliance in history, and that is because we have made a strong political commitment to defend each other, to stand together, and to provide the necessary deterrents to prevent the conflict. The reason for NATO to be strong is not because we want to provoke a conflict but because we know that as long as we are strong, as long as we are united, we prevent the conflict. And of course if we trust each other to fight together, then we should also trust each other to share intelligence. And we are sharing intelligence, and also some big allies, which of course have more intelligence than smaller allies...Actually I know about one small ally which has a lot of intelligence, up north.

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** Yes, and you're not going to share it? It depends, case by case.

**JENS STOLTENBERG:** I think they are quite good at sharing too. So we have mechanisms and systems for sharing intelligence, but of course always some nations will perhaps keep some intelligence just for themselves. But we have developed; we have a long history of sharing intelligence, much more than any other international institution or organization.
JUDY DEMPSEY: Well that's not much of a comparison, because other international organisations are different.

JENS STOLTENBERG: That's true; I just used it as an example because it sounded good.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Now, since you bring in the north and the intelligence, it brings us to Russia, because this all feeds into resilience, cyber warfare, hybrid warfare; first of all the easy question, inside NATO, is there now a common threat perception about Russia?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yes, and more important, it is a common agreement on how to approach Russia, based on the strong message from Warsaw that we want a strong, firm alliance delivering the necessary defence and deterrents, but at the same time striving for a more constructive and cooperative relationship with Russia, keeping the chance for political dialogue open, and trying to keep tensions down, avoid escalating the situation, and avoiding a new Cold War or a new arms race. This is a balance, this is not always easy, but we have a very strong, united position in NATO that that is what we are working for. And I have many times used my own experience as a Norwegian politician, but even during the coldest period of the Cold War, Norway bordering the Soviet Union and then later Russia, were able to have a pragmatic working relationship with Russia on energy, on border relations, on military matters, on visa-free travel, on fishing quotas, and a lot of things, and that was not despite of Norway's membership in NATO, but it was because of Norway's membership in NATO, because that provided the predictability, the platform, for a small nation as Norway to engage with Russia. That benefited Norway, but it also benefited Russia; for instance, when you agreed on the border line up in the Barents Sea, now both Russia and Norway are exploring for oil up there, which would not have been possible without the border line. So this is good for Russia, good for Norway, and good for everyone.

JUDY DEMPSEY: But since you bring up Norway, then it brings up the whole Arctic issue, which I presume will become a political discussion inside NATO.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yes, but the Arctic issue, I think you have to remember that in the Arctic area we have seen more military presence, we have seen also more Russian military presence, but at the same time I think the Arctic issue is also an area where we have been able to maintain cooperation, and maintain a relatively low level of tensions. I know that several NATO allies, Canada, United States, Norway, Denmark, work closely with Russia in the Arctic Council. The Norwegian army meets every week with the Russian army, the sixth fleet, up in the north, and discuss search and rescue and other issues. So in the Arctic area we have managed, in close cooperation with Russia, to at least avoid the same tensions and problems we have seen in other parts of Europe.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Secretary General, I'm going to stop now because I'm sure everybody wants to ask you questions. And I didn't mention the T-word, by the way; no doubt somebody will, Trump Atlanticism. We have five minutes, we're going to stick to a very tight schedule; one question, identify yourself. First here, second here, third here. Yes, please. And identify yourself, keep it very direct; we have very little time. Thank you. And the question here, raise your hand again.

MOHAMED RAJA'I BARAKAT: Thank you, my name is Mohammed Rajai Barakat; what do you think about the liberation of Aleppo by the Syrian army, Russians; don't you think that, as Europeans, we have to be happy that Russia and the Syrian army are fighting against ISIS? ISIS and the others are our enemies, but I notice that it's not the case. Thank you very much.

JUDY DEMPSEY: We'll take two; next question, please identify yourself.
NIKLAS NOVAKY: Hi, thank you very much. My name is Niklas Novaky, and I'm happy to bring up the T-word, as you mentioned; there is some anxiety about the incoming Trump administration and that the US ties to its European allies might weaken, so since the topic was civil, non-military cooperation, so what can NATO do to ensure that unity among its European allies will be strong, despite what happens across the Atlantic?

JUDY DEMPSEY: Thank you. And the third question here; then we'll go on to another group of questions. Thank you.

JULIAN BARNES: Julian Barnes, with the Wall Street Journal; to follow up on your cyber question, could interference in a political election by a foreign power constitute an Article Five situation?

JUDY DEMPSEY: Great, thank you, Julian. Thank you very much. So, Secretary General, I think we should work backwards; the cyber security Article Five.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, any outside interference in a democratic election is of course unacceptable, and it's important that we have all facts on the table. But it is up to the United States and the US authorities now to decide the next steps, and how to look into the alleged meddling or interference in the US elections. What I can say is that we have seen more and more reports about states being behind cyber-attacks against NATO allies, and that's one of the reasons why we are stepping up our efforts to strengthen our cyber defences, to strengthen the cyber defences of NATO networks, but also help allies to strengthen their defences. And one important part of that is of course to develop the techniques to make sure that we are able to attribute who is behind, and that's one of the important and difficult challenges related to cyber-attacks, is that you don't always know who is attacking you. So attribution is a key issue, and one of the key challenges we are addressing.

JUDY DEMPSEY: The European allies reassuring the other side.

JENS STOLTENBERG: The transatlantic bond, yes. First of all we are an alliance of democracies and in democracies people elect different political leaders, coming from different political parties; that has always been the case in NATO, and we have seen different political leaders from different political families disagreeing on many different issues, and that will always be the case in an alliance of 20 democracies. So different views, open debates, discussions, disagreements, is not a sign of weakness, it is a sign of strength, as long as we are able to agree on the most important thing, and that is that we stand together and defend each other. And that has been the case for almost seven decades, and I'm absolutely certain that that will continue to be the case. Yes, there are different views, different opinions, but yes, we are always able to agree on the core task of NATO, to defend each other, and I'm absolutely certain that the US will continue to maintain its NATO commitments.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Look forward to the Brussels summit. The ISIS question, please.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Sorry. Aleppo; Aleppo is a humanitarian catastrophe which has become even worse because of the renewed offensive by the Assad regime, supported by Russia. The important thing now is to do whatever possible to have a ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities, as soon as possible, and then enable the resumption of humanitarian aid and have a ceasefire which can be then the first step towards a political solution to the conflict in Syria.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Would you have time for another set? It will be very brief, I promise.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Very brief.
JUDY DEMPSEY: Thank you, a few more questions. One here, second, and okay, there are only two. I think that's Pauline Massart there. Yes.

PAULINE MASSART: Thank you. I'm Pauline Massart from Friends of Europe. Secretary General, you mentioned resilience obviously, and you mentioned that we are 28 democracies, but we're seeing very, very dangerous paths being taken throughout several allies, it would be too easy to focus only on Turkey; does NATO have a plan for resilience for when we are still 28, but not all democracies?

JUDY DEMPSEY: Okay, and there was a question near you, Pauline, somebody put up their hand. Yes, please.

TOM SAUER: Tom Sauer, Professor from University of Antwerp, in Belgium, about nuclear weapons policy, also more political than military, maybe; now all NATO member states are also members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they have the obligation to start negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons; now in 2017 the move to lateral negotiations will be started up for a nuclear weapons ban treaty, first step towards elimination in the United Nations, so how do you explain that all NATO member states, except the Netherlands, voted against that proposal a couple of weeks ago?

JUDY DEMPSEY: I'm going to stop here. Will you take the nuclear question, and then...

JENS STOLTENBERG: Because we believe that the best way to address the important issue of nuclear disarmament is to use existing tools, like for instance the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We think to establish other platforms will only undermine the important work which takes place in the NPT. So NATO has clearly stated that we will remain a nuclear alliance as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, but we have also stated that our long-term goal is a world without nuclear weapons, but we do not believe that the world becomes safer if we have unilateral nuclear disarmament. So NATO and NATO allies, especially the United States, have actually been able to agree on substantial reductions in the numbers of nuclear warheads, and the United States has also clearly conveyed the message that they are ready to continue to reduce, but it has to be a balanced reduction. So we don't believe that to establish other platforms for addressing the same issue will make it easier, actually we believe it will make that work more difficult.

JUDY DEMPSEY: I know you're running late; the last question, resilience and democracies.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So we are always in favour of resilience among all NATO allies, and I don't know exactly what you are hinting at, but democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, are core values for NATO and I have stressed the importance of respecting these core values in my meetings with many NATO leaders, and they are important because I am absolutely certain that in the long run open, democratic societies are more resilient than closed, autocratic societies. So I really believe that democracy will win because we are stronger when we are open and democratic than when we try to be autocratic and not respect democratic values.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Your time is up; thank you for giving us an extra round. Everybody remain seated. Thank you very much, Secretary General.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you.
PAUL TAYLOR: My name is Paul Taylor, or as I sometimes say, I used to be Paul Taylor. In an earlier incarnation I used to write about NATO quite a lot, I was the permanent Reuters NATO correspondent during a very interesting phase of the Cold War, which was 1983 to 1986, the Euro missile crisis, the deployment, the standoff between NATO and Russia followed by the arms control dialogue that began and led, as we know, to arms control agreements, and in some way also to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Like NATO, I've survived; I'm a bit of a relic. We had a fascinating presentation this morning, I thought, both by the Secretary General and by our earlier speakers of the three wise men's report. And in the spirit of wanting to refresh that three wise men's report, we have one wise woman from a country that isn't even in NATO, so if you haven't already read the one wise woman report, it's in your going home present, in your gift pack there, so please do read it.

It's a good read – as I can as somebody who used to be a journalistic colleague of Judy. And then to discuss it we have, on my far right, Paal Sigurd Hilde, who's associate professor at the Centre for Norwegian and European Security at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, on my far left, Roland Paris – who says it's Roland Paris and only his dad calls him Roland Paris – University research chair in International Security and Governance at the University of Ottawa, and also an advisor to Justin Trudeau both in his transition to government and then in his first months there. And last but certainly not least Stefano Stefanini, former Italian perm rep to NATO, but also diplomatic adviser to the Italian President, and somebody who has a deep knowledge of how NATO works in practice.

So without further ado, I'm going to give the floor to Judy, she has about ten minutes…

JUDY DEMPSEY: No, no.

PAUL TAYLOR: Okay, sorry. She has renounced her ten minutes.

JUDY DEMPSEY: I’ve spoken enough, Paul, and given that it’s a Tuesday dinner/lunch where everything secret is discussed, we thought we’d go straight into the discussion.

PAUL TAYLOR: This is what, in cyber terms, would be described as an ambush.

JUDY DEMPSEY: It was for me too. I shouldn't be here.

PAUL TAYLOR: It’s a bit like NATO; somebody forgot to tell the Secretary General. Okay. Well then let's start straight in, assuming that you’ve all read Judy’s paper, let me ask Judy a couple of questions and then we'll move on to our speakers. So Judy, you think NATO ought to be more political, more of a forum for political dialogue. What’s the problem, what needs to be fixed, and how would you go about fixing it?

JUDY DEMPSEY: You give me five questions; I'm going to pick the easiest one. NATO has the same problem that it has had in 1956. And it says it's a political organisation, but in practice it doesn't actually discuss the issues that she be discussed. They duck the most important issues. And it was really interesting in our other discussion, and Secretary General’s speech, and the presentations by the three individuals – NATO doesn’t discuss Syria. NATO doesn’t discuss Iran. NATO doesn’t discuss the South China Sea. Maybe you do it on a bi-lateral, informal basis, but these are big global issues that are
homming in on Europe, and as an alliance, a European alliance with Canada and the United States, these are political issues and they should be discussed head on. Otherwise, take the words NATO is a political organisation out of its lexicon.

PAUL TAYLOR: Well, what value would NATO add if it had discussions about these issues?

JUDY DEMPSEY: I've thought long about this. It would reduce the element of surprise, firstly. Secondly, it would break down a cultural mind-set, particularly held by the Europeans, that when an issue is brought up, largely by the large member states, there's an immediate agenda, oh, this is going to be a military issue. So if there's a feeling that anything political will have a military agenda, the issue will never be discussed. And therefore a kind of paralysis sets in.

I mean, there is no sense of separating political from security and military issue. They are all intertwined, and NATO must actually embrace this triangle.

PAUL TAYLOR: But doesn't the fact that NATO takes up an issue and discusses it lead automatically to certain expectations? Expectations of some form of action, and NATO's action mostly is in the military/security area.

JUDY DEMPSEY: That's what I'm saying. It should be broken down. Otherwise there wouldn't be a discussion. A couple of weeks ago, Nathalie Tocci was invited to the NAC to discuss the EU/NATO relationship, where it might be going and everything – well it's about time they brought in experts, or having more open discussions on this. Hiding behind the military element is short sighted now. There's issues out there which needs a third base – it doesn't mean that they have to be militarised. It means having a discussion. Does NATO have a role? Why are we discussing this? We're discussing this for resilience, because the challenges are there, because we face different threats. I mean, there has to be – and it started actually in NATO – the idea of common threats. They are out there, some are unknown, but NATO has to think politically – and if you don't think politically it's very difficult to think strategically.

PAUL TAYLOR: One other question. Would you need to create some sort of a new forum in which to do this, or could it be done in the existing process? And what about those forums which actually exist but which nobody likes to mention in polite company, like the QUINT or the QUAD, which have in fact been the inner consultation forum on all political issues in NATO, certainly since I was a kid.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Are you that old?

PAUL TAYLOR: I'm afraid I am.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Paul, another forum – I think it was de Hoop Scheffer, or Rasmussen, the former Secretary Generals, they wanted to cut back these committees, endless talking shops, those days are over. Use what you have, and even centralise some of these so-called committees. New fora are not the answer, it ducks the issue. And somebody, when I was researching this paper, said Judy, this won't fly. The NAC – the ambassadors have to go back to the nation states, they have to go back to their governments. Well, it's got to be more of a push. And the NAC cannot always hide behind their governments, they've got to go to the table back, whether it's London or what, and say listen, this is important, I need a freer hand.
PAUL TAYLOR: What about the idea of some Ministerial informal forum, for example, like the EU has, with these six monthly informal meetings of Ministers, where the idea is they get together without having to produce long conclusions, without having to agree action plans for once, but to try and thrash out what are our common interests and our differences on, say, dealing Russia, or dealing with Egypt, or something. How about that?

JUDY DEMPSEY: Yes, an informal might actually work. It’s interesting to note the Foreign Ministers now aren’t involved in the EU summits anymore. Foreign Ministries are really now held by the leaders more and more. And it brings up the whole question of the worth of a Foreign Minister – sorry if there’s any former Foreign Ministers here – but I mean the Chancellor of Germany looks after the most important dossier, as indeed to some other leaders across Europe. But you have to be very careful in setting up an informal – again, not just having another talking shop, but it might encourage a different kind of conversation. Oh, didn’t think you had this problem. It might lead to this; it depends who’s going to set up the agenda.

PAUL TAYLOR: Well let’s open the conversation. Paal Hilde, give us your thoughts on Judy’s paper, and do you think she’s hit on something that really needs to be followed up, or do you think that she’s pointing to a potentially perilous path?

PAAL HILDE: Thank you Paul, and thank you to NATO and to the organisers, and Carnegie, and the other organisers of this event for inviting me. I thought I’d start off by just giving three ideas that are related to Judy’s paper and the report from the three wise men. First of all, the first one is the main takeaway I have from – or the most important message from the report of the three wise men is what the Secretary General described as the emphasis on the core democratic values of NATO.

And democracy and values are under pressure in a lot of NATO countries now, and while the Canadian lighthouse might shine brightly, the southern neighbor might flicker a bit these days, just to use one example. The second point is connected to the role of NATO as a forum for discussing a lot of issues. Michael Pearson had an excellent introduction about his granddad – I could just add, I guess, that he got a Nobel Peace Prize in 1967 for creating UN Peacekeeping – but one of the ideas that he and his two colleagues had was to, and I’m quoting Pearson here from a speech he had at the Rotary Club in Belleville, Ontario, on the 2nd of May, 1950, to create more than a military alliance, to create the North Atlantic Democratic Union that will be above and beyond our sovereign states.

Now, that might sound a bit farfetched today, as in to have a supra-national NATO is not likely. But one of the aims of the three wise men – and other allies as well at the time – was to prevent the formalized domination of NATO by the big allies. And this is why they wanted – one of the reasons why they wanted political consultation. And this, I think, is very important still today, and I think Judy writes about it in her paper, perhaps not directly, but it’s there. And it’s the need for allies to share.

It’s not about necessarily sort of discussing things and reaching consensus in the NAC or at Foreign Ministry level or Defense Minister, but for countries to inform allies about their policies, and talk about what they’re doing, and thus help informing, and helping to maybe even get some feedback to their positions, not necessarily having to agree at 28 or 29.

My final point is this question of a trans-Atlantic democratic union or community, where I perhaps disagree slightly with Judy in the sense that she sees NATO as the really cool part of this, and that’s the center of the web. I actually encourage – to rethink the term that is now partly discredited and partly forgotten, but the term comprehensive approach that sort of emerged out of the ISAF conflict, where at its best the comprehensive approach is about how NATO, together with other international
organizations, as in national government and non-governmental organizations, can work together towards a common goal, as in to have a unity of effort, to use the military term.

So in the spirit of the three wise men I would also see this as the trans-Atlantic community, not as NATO being the trans-Atlantic community, but to NATO being an indispensable part of a multi-organizational web or architecture as we talk about in the 1990s, of this trans-Atlantic community of democratic values.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Well we all awoke this morning to a plug for – I suppose you would call the comprehensive approach, a joint article by the Secretary General of NATO and the leaders of the European Union institutions, playing up, talking up the relationship, the cooperation between NATO and the EU, which hasn’t always been the case. The three words that seemed to me to be missing from the headline were Educating Mr Trump. Isn’t the need for a more political NATO about bringing the Americans in, getting them pregnant on a lot of issues which – where the United States has often taken the lead, but under the Obama administration was a little bit more backward leaning, a bit more hands off, and under the Trump administration seems to have a fairly steep learning curve ahead of it?

**PAAL HILDE:** Yes, I agree. And NATO is obviously a very good forum to engage the Americans on these issues, but also invite them to talk about their own policies and their own views, etc. When it comes to Trump and NATO, he's said a lot of things, a lot of strange things I can say as well, but I think at the core, the United States is not in Europe because of altruistic reasons; they’re here because it’s in the US interest. So unless the US goes completely isolationist, they’ll be in Europe, because it's in their interest, for a number of reasons.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Now, as some of you know, I live in France, it’s tough but someone has to do it. And in France, when people think about NATO at the moment, and the incoming Trump administration, there is a palpable fear of a new Yalta, of some new in this case US/Russian deal that might be cut over the heads of Europe. Do either of you feel that that’s a real worry? Or is it overdrawn? Perhaps from a Norwegian perspective?

**PAAL HILDE:** Being an optimist again, I can say that Congress has come out strongly in opposition to any kind of ideas of making a grand deal with Russia, the new, or more Ribbentrop pact, to put it very sort of harshly, and there are obviously limits to what Congress can do, it has measures as well, budget being one, as in the European Reassurance Initiative, which I now understand has been renamed the European Deterrence Initiative, is one way Congress can actually force the US military to be in Europe, and spend money in Europe, and show that it’s here.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Roland Paris, give us a Canadian perspective on this. NATO is the forum in which Canada talks with Europe – not the only forum in which it talks with the United States. What would be the opportunities and the potential pitfalls or drawback of a more political NATO along the lines that Judy is advocating?

**ROLAND PARIS:** First of all, I also want to join others in thanking the organisers for the invitation to this event, and it’s a particular pleasure given the nature of the report, 60 years ago, which seems strangely relevant again today. Also, Paul, in your kind introduction you said I was an advisor to Justin Trudeau, I just want to clarify that I am a former advisor to Justin Trudeau, so I am here speaking only for myself.
I thought that there was a tremendous amount of important and interesting analysis in Judy’s report. Of course it’s strange to have this discussion at all given what you were just talking about, this uncertainty that’s looming over all of us, and every, frankly, every country in the world that has a relationship of the United States. The uncertainty of trying to discern from who might be walking through the entrance of Trump Towers, what the policy of this new administration might be. It’s really kind of an unusual spectacle.

And if our European allies are concerned about some of Mr Trump’s remarks regarding the alliance, imagine how we feel with the trade framework that we have with the United States which basically covers 70% of our exports, and one fifth of our GDP being described as the worst deal ever negotiated ever. Not just trade deal, any kind of deal. All that being said, I think that we are – again, I’m not speaking on behalf of the Canadian government – but there is a sense of cautious optimism about where the Trump administration will land on some of these key issues.

And that applies both to our trade relationship which supports millions and millions of good jobs in the United States, and ultimately the trans-Atlantic partnership.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** We are optimistic it will land firmly in the lap of big oil and Goldman Sachs, right?

**ROLAND PARIS:** Even as a former advisor I'm not going to jump on that one, but I would say that – just a quick note about Canada. The integrity, the importance of the NATO alliance is just not an issue in Canadian politics, it’s a given. And within the Canadian public. And also the notion that NATO is both a political and a military alliance, that’s a given. The notion the security of all the members of NATO is integral to our security, it’s a pillar of not just European security but international security, and ultimately Canadian security. That is not a controversial issue in Canada, which is why you could have the Canadian government announce the deployment of framework nation troops to Latvia, which is not close to Canada, last time I looked on the map, and that is…

**PAUL TAYLOR:** I’m told it’s somewhat closer to St Petersburg.

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** Indeed. So just coming back very briefly to Judy’s report, I guess my – in the interest of stimulating discussion, my critique of it would be that there’s a lot of recommendations to begin discussions on a lot of different vexed issues, and for NATO to take on new roles in a bunch of different areas, and there’s a risk in that, I think. There’s a risk of overburdening the organisation, of stretching, of launching into too many controversial debates at the same time. There’s also the risk of not having the discussion about what’s really important.

I think back to a Canadian humourist who wrote short stories 100 years ago, and he had this description of this Don Quixote like character who went off, jumped on his horse and promptly galloped away in all directions. That is something I think that is worth avoiding.

But I guess the last point would be that there is a much bigger strategic context here, and that’s where I would be inclined to start the discussion, and it’s bigger than NATO’s role, and it really touches on the integrity of our democracies, of the values underpinning the Article 2 in the Washington Treaty, and of Russia’s role. And the combination of alienation among important segments of our own populations which is real and home-grown, and the exploitation of that in a new media environment by an adversary. I'm describing Russia here as an adversary – I’m a strong believer in maintaining dialogue and trying to find constructive ways to continue cooperation, including the Arctic where we actually have quite a cooperative relationship with Russia.
But let us recognise that the degree of interference that is now coming into focus in our political systems, in our politics, potentially in our institutions, is a national country issue for all of us. We cannot just look the other way when, in the unprecedented circumstances, when the leaders of intelligence organisations in country after country are speaking up publicly and saying this is a matter of serious concern.

PAUL TAYLOR: In a way, several of the security issues that NATO allies face today are almost an unprecedented conflation of foreign policy issues and domestic policy issues. You've got ISIS which is fighting in Syria and Iraq, but also is present inside our cities and trying to attack and to proselytise within our communities. We have the cyber issue where you have a mixture of propaganda from abroad, the use of relays within, sabotage and so on. Is NATO properly equipped to deal with those things, in your view?

ROLAND PARIS: I think that the Secretary General hit the nail on the head when he said that NATO has certain capabilities, but that it's a much bigger picture. It's even bigger than, I think, the way that I'm framing these strategic challenges. He is even bigger than NATO and the EU cooperating on cyber security for example.

If we are in a situation now, as we seem rapidly to be arriving at, where fake news is blending with information bubbles, and malicious disinformation campaigns, then there is an element of resilience here that goes way beyond counter-hacking and counter-propaganda, that includes, among other things, thinking about how we're educating our children, and whether we're equipping them, throughout their primary education, year after year, with the ability to be able to differentiate for themselves fact from fiction.

And that alone might be one of the critical challenges that we face to maintain the integrity of our democratic systems. So when I think about this question, I start from that challenge, and then think how NATO can contribute to this broader issue, as opposed to starting with NATO and the EU. But in any event I'm opening up a gigantic can of worms.

JUDY DEMPSEY: One thing, Roland, thank you very much for your comments. And first of all, I'm not saying that NATO should run off in all directions. It would be counter-productive and I think that's clear from the paper. But secondly – you mentioned education. The one thing NATO could do and it would be one really solid direction, to get out of the bubble. And what NATO and the EU have in common, that they are very weak communicators. It's all very well speaking to the cognoscenti, and those who support NATO, or those who don't like NATO, but this means doing town hall meetings. It's going out to the provinces, going to the towns.

It doesn't cost that much energy. Chancellor Merkel has done it, and she has actually stunned some AfD supporters in southern eastern Germany, she was down in last week, and they said oh gosh, I didn't think it was like this. And so this is part of countering the fake news, it's going out with the self-confidence to say this is who we are, this is why we exist, and this is our story.

PAUL TAYLOR: Stefano Stefanini, can I come onto you? You are the one person on this panel who's actually sat in the NAC, who's seen what it's like at its best, and no doubt occasionally at its worst, when it's blocked because one or more allies don't want to discuss an elephant in the room. You arrived, you told me, just after the Iraq war, which was my enduring memory of such an event at NATO, where NATO just kind of didn't exist, in a way, didn't happen during the Iraq war.

First of all, fundamentally, what do you think about Judy's thesis that we need a more political NATO?
STEFANO STEFANINI: Thank you Paul, and thanks Carnegie for having me here. Yes, I am the only sort of practitioner here, which – the difference is that as much as I am interested in ideas, I always, by my professional deformation I tend always to go to the next step, what can be done? What should be done? So I’ll first go to your question regarding my opinion about Judy’s paper.

I think Judy makes a very convincing case about the need for NATO’s immense political dimension, in the wake of the three wise men report. I also think that your paper is not totally realistic; I will tell you why. NATO does only what NATO allies allow NATO to do. And when I say NATO allies, I mean NATO allies, of course, within NATO, there are allies that are more equal than others, are you would know. But I can assure you that many – it’s not just one. There are many allies that can prevent NATO to do what it wants to do.

I write columns for an Italian newspaper now, in my retirement. Last year I was asked to grade NATO for its reaction after the Paris November 13 bombing. I gave NATO four out of ten, which in Italy ranks pretty low, because I thought it absurd that NATO had not even discussed this. I should not have graded NATO; I should have the nations that prevented NATO to discuss it. We all know that it was mainly a French choice not to bring the issue up to NATO, but from what I know – I wasn’t there – the US did not insist for any discussion in NATO.

NATO started talking about – had the discussion about ISIS, it took the downing of the Russian jet, and Turkey asked for an Article 4 discussion on that issue. So I am going to my – should NATO have a more political dimension? The answer is yes, and the reason is mainly that because the security challenges that it is facing now are too complex for being dealt only militarily.

I like your point that the nexus between NATO discussions, military action should be broken. This is not what NATO was meant. Can NATO actually raise it political dimension? Yes, it can, if it focuses a bit more narrowly on issues that are somewhat related to European security. When I say European – so it’s European security at large. And even if you have to restrict, like some allies might think NATO security to Russia, don’t forget that now Russia is also in the Mediterranean, quite strongly so.

And the rationale about NATO being raising its political dimension is strengthened by the two major events that happened in 2016. One is Brexit, and the other is the Trump election. Why? Basically Brexit make NATO like the main forum where you can have representing the west unit. It would be tricky, because UK usually acts as a bridge between the Europeans and the US, the non-written deal was that by being in the EU, the UK would deliver the Europeans to the Americans, but it will – and because of its special relationship with the US, would explain America to the Europeans.

That failed in Iraq...

JUDY DEMPSEY: Yes, exactly

STEFANO STEFANINI: But at the time, I got to NATO in 2007, it was actually healing.

PAUL TAYLOR: Well in a way we’ve had several failures, haven’t we? We’ve had a failure of the UK to deliver the Europeans to America; we’ve had a failure perhaps of the UK to explain America to the Europeans. It’s interesting that you don’t say that the UK had a responsibility for delivering the Americans to the Europeans. Let’s remember what Gerhard Schroeder that it seemed to be all one way traffic on that bridge.
But we’ve also more recently had a failure of the United States to deliver Britain to Europe, as President Obama tried to do.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Exactly, exactly

STEFANO STEFANINI: You don’t deliver the Americans. But you can try to explain the Americans. And that might become more difficult with a Trump administration.

JUDY DEMPSEY: But then it’s really interesting you say this, because actually the special Anglo-American relationship, I think the Americans have more or less said now I’m sorry, it’s not special any more. I mean, that’s why the Americans wanted a stronger Europe with Britain inside the EU for this.

PAUL TAYLOR: Not even with Nigel Farage?

STEFANO STEFANINI: I mean now, especially with a Trump administration, we have no script. So we will have to play by ear. The reason why the Trump election makes it the more important NATO is because there will be a temptation by the Trump administration to go bilateral, with allies, with partners, with foes, because that’s the mind-set. I was told – I had a most interesting discussion about Trump foreign policy. Don’t pay attention too much to what he says. That’s a businessman mind. He says something provocative to make an offer, and he expects the counter-offer from the counterpart.

But this is not how they would leave anyone who is not Trump and a counterpart, completely out of the game. If we Europeans and Canadians hang on to NATO – I didn’t say Turkey because I consider Turkey European, don’t worry – that’s the time we have to hang on to NATO. Because if we lose NATO we lose the Americans. Of course America will still be in Europe, there is no way they do – but we would not have any sense of what they’re doing, except on a bilateral level where each one of us is weaker than the United States.

PAUL TAYLOR: So in a sense we’ve gone from a phase where we needed NATO for the United States to be able to engage most European countries that weren’t former colonial powers into getting serious about defence and international security, to a situation where it’s the Europeans and the Turks amongst them who need NATO to engage the United States, or re-engage the new US administration in international security. Perhaps that’s a message that needs to get home in Paris as well, although the French have become more forward leaning about NATO in recent years than they used to be.

But they’re still very prickly. And if we have a Gaullist President next, let alone if we have a National Front one, it might get quite difficult there.

STEFANO STEFANINI: That’s exactly my view. And this is where European defence come into play, because by having a stronger European defence we make the relationship more attractive also to the United States.

PAAL HILDE: Just a very brief sort of optimistic note again, the historical experience is not that bad. If you go back to 2003/4 and the Iraq crisis, which is one of the darkest moments in the near death experience, to use Nicholas Burns’ words, what happened? Well, NATO reacted, and allies reacted, and they pushed – as one of the main drivers of NATO taking over ISAF is the Iraq crisis, because European allies wanted to compensate for their unwillingness to engage in Iraq by taking the burden off the United States in Afghanistan.
And you can say in hindsight that was perhaps not the best decision, but it was clearly politically motivated, and one that I'm sure had an impact.

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** It's interesting you say this, because there were such heated discussions about this issue at the time, and I'm sure the Ambassador from Canada will know this, like she was pre-political director days, but actually there was big misgiving about this, whether they should go to Afghanistan, what is NATO after 9/11, Americans weren't particularly happy about invoking Article 5, and the Afghanistan NATO experience was deeply troubling, even now that it's over.

**PAAL HILDE:** I know, but my point is more what happened in 2003, 2004, which was that a political reaction to the dispute over Iraq was that NATO, as an alliance – a German initiative, very much Germany pushing this – engaging in ISAF and taking over the responsibility of ISAF to compensate and sort of smoothen the...

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** Yes, against all the odds, yes. I see now.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Which is one of the natural sort of shock absorbers of the trans-Atlantic relationship, and so NATO clearly performs a useful function there, however you would grade for your Italian column the outcome of that lengthy engagement in Afghanistan.

Now, we’ve got train back on time. We left the station ten minutes late, but the train is now on time, and I am determined to give you half an hour to put your questions to the panellists. Please when you do say who you are, wait for the microphone, ask one question or make one brief comment please, we can’t take multi-point questions, or multi-questions, and if appropriate say who you are addressing with your question or point.

And I'll take them in groups, and I'm going to abuse the privilege of the chair to start with Luciano Bozzo, if he is around, is he? Viola.

**LUCIANO BOZZO:** My name is Luciano Bozzo, I teach international relations at the University of Florence, in Italy, obviously, and if I may I have three short comments on Judy’s paper, and I don’t know if these are also questions to some of you, I suppose so. First, Judy, in the paper, was stressing just referring to the three wise men report, that NATO is not just a military organisation, it is also a political one, and then looking at what happened in Iraq, or even in Libya, or over the last three years vis a vis the inflow of refugees in southern Europe.

She is lamenting a lack of strategic thinking or, I quote, a reluctance to think strategically. But strategy, it’s simply a ring binding together political and military means, or non-military means. So do you think that the crisis of strategy reveals to go deeper a crisis of politics. The lesson learned from the above mentioned crisis are not that military means cannot be easy substitute for policy.

Second, if I may, very quickly, of course over the past six years NATO was very effective in providing its members both deterrence and reassurance, but today, as it was recognised in the Warsaw Summit, the alliance has to face new threats and challenges – hybrid threats, asymmetric warfare and so on that is not military, or not only military threats.

Don’t you think the alliance needs something else? I mean, a capability for stability projection, especially down to the south. In the paper Judy mentioned the infamous, I quote, ring of fire, terrorism, instability and so on.
JUDY DEMPSEY: This is really interesting, Luciano, very nice to meet you in person. What is happening – there’s a similarity about what is happening in NATO and the EU, and they may not acknowledge this. And it is this: that the transformation that drove NATO and the EU to make Europe whole and free is coming to an end, because of the different threats we are facing, firstly. Secondly, the transformation, while bringing in countries to NATO and the EU, is not going to be extended any further because of what’s happening in Russia and the south.

Instead – and I’m worried about this, but it’s interesting what’s happening – instead, and if you read the commission paper on this, the new word is not only resilience by stabilisation. And stabilisation first, then the hope is that slowly, slowly, you build up the infrastructure that will develop to transformative politics. But the era when NATO and the EU believed this was the mantra, this was the raison d’etre, I think it’s coming to an end.

Neither organisation will admit this, but I think it’s crucial to understand the quite disingenuous debate about enlargement in NATO at the moment, especially when it’s Georgia, trying to keep its democracy together, leaving aside Ukraine, we have these huge issues, and if NATO wants to believe in this united whole and free, they should have had Macedonia in ages ago. And now look, we’re picking up the pieces in Macedonia, largely because we won’t stand up and have a political discussion with Greece over the Macedonia name.

So I think we’ve lost our way, but this is about strategy. And we won’t deal with any of these thing until we actually define what strategy is. Strategy is not short term-ism. And we can’t identify the crisis tomorrow, it’s long term, and we have the tools for them, which gets back to your first point about the capabilities. They feed into it.

PAUL TAYLOR: Now I’m going to take a group of three questions. We have Carolina Diaz first, and the lady there, and gentleman here, and then the gentleman afterwards in the second round.

CAROLINA DIAZ: As Roland said, NATO’s political role is a given, from our perspective. There’s a political aspect when NATO uses its hard power, deterrence requires political resolve and communication of that political resolve using political channels, and there’s a political element to NATO’s use of soft power, so that part is a given.

But what’s different about NATO? NATO sits in an interconnected web of international organisations, but what’s different about NATO is that it backs up its political role with some pretty hefty military assets. So it occupies a particular space in that web of international organisations, so the question is how do you do the politics better. And I think that if we can validate, more consciously validate NATO’s political role, harness it and direct it. Where do I think it can be directed? I think that one projecting stability we have an interesting channel where NATO can start to occupy that zone.

Right now it’s a binary choice between big full-on missions and then smaller, small, discrete, a bunch of snowflakes, I call them. The defence capacity building projects. There’s actually a grey zone there that I think NATO could occupy more consciously. Stabilisation is actually an old world word if you’ve worked in the world of civilian security programming, but I think that NATO can help build that common purpose with countries on NATO’s periphery.

Some of that’s a slow project but some of it is pretty fast. If you teach or work with another country on NATO’s periphery to use defence assets to better build up their borders so they can stop terrorists crossing, this is not slow, it’s faster, and it’s in NATO’s security interest. So that’s one small example.
PAUL TAYLOR: Can you pass the mic to the lady behind you? Thanks.

JULIE LINDOUT: Julie Lindout of the NATO Association of Canada. Judy, you aid that NATO needs to do more to speak to others than the cognoscenti, but in fact there is a vehicle set up specifically for that purpose: The Atlantic Treaty Association, and it’s national members. And Article 79 of the three wise men report specifically references that, and calls upon NATO and its constituent nations to do more to support the work, especially in schools and town hall meetings, etc. And yet both NATO and the national governments have cut back on supporting them in the last 25 years.

PAUL TAYLOR: Next is Fraser Cameron here, in the front.

FRASER CAMERON: I'm Fraser Cameron, former EU official. I think Judy may have thought about this before the nomination or election of the President, Judy, because some good ideas, but the reality is it’s not going to happen. I mean, multi-lateral organisations including NATO, the EU, and all the others, are in for a really difficult time over the next four years. So we’ll be struggling just to keep the show on the road. Because what Paal said is the reality: the big decisions are taken by the QAD or QINT. That has always been the case, and that will continue to be the case.

So how do you actually mould a realistic task for NATO over the coming years? And here’s where I think we have to try and get the EU and NATO working much closer together. It doesn’t have to be exactly EU and NATO, but the Europeans simply have to get their act together and help in dealing with some of these new security threats that we all know about coming about. And we need some success stories. And we have to explain – I actually spoke in an Atlantic Treaty Association in Canada a couple of years ago, their average age was about 85. We are not reaching out to young people.

PAUL TAYLOR: And at that stage you still lowered it.

FRASER CAMERON: I still lowered it a little bit, yes. But when I go around teaching students around Europe, I always ask the question, would you fight if Russia invaded NATO? And it’s almost always zero response. So why are we not actually able to get this message out, is the real question.

PAUL TAYLOR: Thanks. Can you pass to the gentleman behind you for the next round.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Do I have to answer all of these…?

PAUL TAYLOR: Judy, you seem to be the main target.

JUDY DEMPSEY: I’ll be very brief. I’ll deal with our Canadian Ambassador colleague. It dovetails with the question behind, actually. First of all, a point to be made is that NATO does things very badly, and the one thing that it does particularly badly is acknowledging its mistakes. It made a huge mistake in Libya. And when I was doing research for this paper, I said did you learn anything from America’s experience in Iraq, as in the day after, and do you know what a few of them said to me? Oh, we didn’t bother. We thought the Libyan central government could take over.

This is intellectually irresponsible and lazy, and it gets back to the whole strategic issue. NATO actually went in – there was only eight or nine allies going into Libya – but afterwards, there was no post mortem on what went wrong, and there should have been. And if there’s a post mortem, it gives NATO I think a little bit more credibility that it can openly discuss – we should have done this perhaps in a different way. This is the first thing.
Secondly, I think, leaving aside the cutbacks, which is a great shame, there must be a greater push for the EU as well, but for NATO to go out – not just to the Atlantic Council, but to go out on much smaller levels of communities, and reaching out and explaining and having the self-confidence.

It feeds into Frazer’s pessimistic thing, struggling to keep the show on the road. Well, interesting. Not one member of NATO wants to leave the organisation, unlike the EU, so maybe that’s a plus side. But struggling to keep the show – the leadership must come both from the member states and Brussels, and there’s a dearth of leadership at the moment.

PAUL TAYLOR: NATO’s a bit like nuclear weapons, isn’t it? There comes a point where it’s kind of use it or lose it.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Is it? But that’s an ultimatum.

PAUL TAYLOR: If people don’t use NATO for their political dialogue, then it will wither on the vine.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Yes, and they’re not using it for the political dialogue. And maybe it might help to keep the so-called show on the road. And we don’t even know what the road is, but we can’t wait for Trump, what his statements are, who’s going to be Secretary of State or the culture that will come from the new administration. And I’ll say one thing on this. What Trump is saying is what former Defence Secretaries have said, in more diplomatic manner, but certainly – who was the…

PAUL TAYLOR: Robert Gates.

JUDY DEMPSEY: Robert Gates. I mean, frankly, Europe has been sleepwalking since 1989 – leaving aside Afghanistan – but I mean we have intellectually become lazy in our dependence on the United States. And we have to really shake ourselves out. This is our road.

PAUL TAYLOR: Paal.

PAAL HILDE: Just to, again, to put a bit of a positive spin, and perhaps leave the mission of talking good about NATO, because I do actually believe that NATO does achieve a lot of things, and if you look at the reaction to the Ukraine crisis, I think a lot of things have happened. You had wells, with the first steps, with the etc, and at the time, you had several allies, including a big one where they speak German, saying no, no, no, we cannot touch the partnership, the founding act, etc.

Two years later, we have German panzers in Lithuania. That’s a big move. So things are happening. And if you look on the inside, what’s going on at NATO now, things are happening. They’re talking about which bridges in Germany can actually take tanks of 70 tonnes. So I think the picture is not all black, albeit I truly agree that we are in for rough time.

STEFANO STEFANINI: Let me disagree with you. I think it’s unfair to say that NATO has been sleepwalking since 1989, and I’m not saying it because obviously I was part of the sleepwalking. Two things – first, you seem to completely forget the Balkans. Second, Libya. NATO did what it was asked to do. It was a political assessment, judgement, made in capitals, that Libya could heal itself, and all what is needed was that military action, period.

NATO was never asking to do any – so you cannot blame NATO for not doing what its stakeholders did not want it to do. The mistake was twofold: one was a wrong assessment made by European
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capitals, including Rome; and the other was the leading from behind of the United States. That’s the result.

ROLAND PARIS: On the issue of the perceptions of NATO, I don't think it’s primarily a challenge of public communication for NATO as an organisation. I think that, as you suggested, that this is a political leadership challenge. And the need is for our political leaders both to identify, recognise and articulate the new kinds of threats that we’re facing, and reaffirm the values that underpin the organisation.

That is what has a basis for mobilising people. Not talking about NATO in the abstract in about 67 years. And I’ve already talked a bit about the threat, I see it a significant, the new threats that we’re talking about. But on the values, here too, it’s not just a matter of kind of in a rote way making reference to democracy and the rule of law. And that kind of political leadership is actually facing down the people within our own societies who are articulating the nativist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, protectionist, you know, angry rejectionist positions.

And that requires some skill. And the skill is not just one of being able to present a positive vision which can be equally compelling, a positive populism to counter the attractions of the negative populism. It’s also about recognising that many of the people who are attracted to those negative messages have genuine concerns and anxieties, of economic dislocation, of feeling like they are being left behind, of feeling like they are losing control. And it is addressing those people, and even through the form of talking about jobs.

Taking those concerns seriously, and not pandering to the negative, lifting them up – in the way, I should say, the best example of this I’ve ever seen was by the current Secretary General of NATO, in 2012, at the time of those attacks in Norway, when he provided reassurance to fearful people, and he encouraged people to act upon their best instincts, not their worst. That’s political leadership.

PAUL TAYLOR: I’ve got time for one more round of questions. I’m going to take the gentleman here first. There are far more questioners than I could possibly take. I’m going to take you, I’m going to take the lady way at the back – because you, madam, have already had a question – and I’m going to take one gentleman there, because he’s an old mate of mine, I’m also going to take Tomas Valasek.

UN-INDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you very much. Current European official. Contrary to my ex-colleague in front. Let me just take a snippet – I was brought up by two parents who were both teachers, that’s the worst and the best you can have. You are never right at home, and you have the excellence of having parents to teach you anything. My late father taught me history, and military history. He said there’s a reason why the big boulevard in Stockholm, where he grew up, is called Narva. And another one, a small street, where nobody knows where it is, although they live in Stockholm, and it’s called Poltava. We won at Narva, and we lost at Poltava.

So then I understood who the enemy was, at least 200 years ago. And still, it is looking east, when I did my military service. And knowing that they were snooping on all the radio traffic at the time. Any case, what are we doing with Kaliningrad? We all know what’s happening there, and the response from NATO, albeit admirable, was before they armed Kaliningrad with nuclear weapons. So what is the response when you consider the fact that the Baltic Sea, which we’re talking about, is surrounded by nine countries, eight of them being EU member states, two of them being neutral, the rest being NATO allies. Are we doing enough?

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PAUL TAYLOR: Our next speaker has arrived, so let’s keep the questions really tight please. And the next one goes to the lady at the back.

MARYNA IAROSHEVYCH: Hi, my name is Maryna, I represent an organisation, Promote Ukraine, and I have two questions, if you permit, two different questions. One is about attribution of the attack, who is behind the attack, Jens Stoltenberg talked about it, but he didn’t elaborate on it, maybe you can give some more comments on how to attribute attacks faster. Because we know, as Ukrainian I know that it took months to attribute the attack to Russia, where there was already evidence.

JACQUES ROSIERS: Jacques Rosiers. I represent the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium. My question might be a little bit out of the frame of this gathering, but since we discuss political role, from Suez to Syria, we also could discuss it from Vancouver to Vladivostok. So it didn’t hurt to know, and I don’t find it in Judy’s report, the OSCE [?] – the OSCE, which in 1975, in the midst of the Cold War, was able to politically discuss. Is this because we are in the Euro-Atlantic framework? I am a Euro-Atlantic representative, but I think the question is worth to be discussed.

TOMAS VALASEK: Thank you Paul, I will keep it short. 20 seconds each point and a question.

PAUL TAYLOR: And that was five points, right?

TOMAS VALASEK: The point was a QINT or a QAD. Fraser is absolutely right, in big organisations, smaller coalitions will often initiate. The trouble with that is that the 23 or the 24 remaining ones still get a vote, and they often hold things up just to make a point that they don’t like to not be consulted. So I think a well-structured political dialogue at 28 could actually make things easier, because it cuts down on the amount of man hours that we spent in committees simply to make a point that the 23 others have a say as well.

But a question to Judy – for the reasons I laid out, and for the many other reasons in your paper, I fully agree with the need for political dialogue, but even in the Three Wise Men report it’s always been a means to an end, and the end was to harmonise – and they use the word harmonise – policies. Now the trouble is, you’re not going to get the Perm Reps, as powerful as we are, to lean on the governments to harmonise their policies. This has to come down from the top.

So the question to you is, would you not want to start essentially where the three wise men ended, with a big intra-government report that doesn’t just mandate more political consultations, but actually makes it very clear that those political consultations ought to lead to more harmonisations, because that’s the eventual goal, it’s not just talk for the sake of talk.

PAUL TAYLOR: Thanks very much. Admirably concise. And because you were so concise – I saw a shaking of Ambassadorial heads in the front row at one point, and there was consultation among an informal cross-section of the NAC, and I think at that point Ambassador Bizoniero gingerly raised a finger. Does he wish to maintain that finger? The Ambassador’s finger has been withdrawn. Okay, that leaves us each one minute, and then I have 30 seconds to introduce Rose Gottemoeller, next speaker, who has already arrived.

So let’s go in reverse order, which means we start with Stefano. One minute. And it’s more than you deserve.
STEFANO STEFANINI: I’ll just pick up on OSCE, because that has to do with my view of NATO’s role in European security at large. When we talk security, NATO, because of its capabilities, and because of the fact it has in the same room a wide range of countries, I’m not going to list them, that no other forum has, have to be at the centre of – call it web, call it a network – which involves the other organisations. Like OSCE, like the EU, and like individual nations. The problem is when NATO is out of it. Or on the side-line.

NATO cannot take primary responsibility, say, for what happens in Africa, or maybe in Libya, but it has to be there also, because if something bad happens, it will be the lifesaver, we know that. Before the Bosnia operation, NATO was prepared to get in if things were going really bad, to rescue them. There were plans to take them out, extract, were used – reverse engineer here – were used to get in.

ROLAND PARIS: I guess I would end where I started, which is with the elephant in the room, Donald Trump, and you look back at the history of NATO, there’s a couple of things maybe that are the most recurring features of discussions about NATO. One is the periodic solemn declarations of NATO’s imminent demise, which I think began on the day after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. And the second is a continuous discussion about burden sharing. Now I think that we’re in for a discussion about burden sharing the likes of which we haven’t seen before, and we need to be – that us, we non-US members of NATO need to be very careful not to assume that this is the kind of discussion that can be deflected, as perhaps it has been at times in the past.

It’s too important not to take seriously at this moment. But even with – and as I said before, I’m optimistic about the outcomes here – but one of my areas of concern is not that Trump will go bilateral, but that even if, in the event of a successful discussion about burden sharing, that he will remain transactional. And of course the trust that is at the core of the Article 5 commitment, even deterrence and reassurance, these are all not just military, not even just political commitments, they are states of mind.

And a transactional approach to an alliance is not one that’s consistent with those goals. But I am, in the end, optimistic, because I think that US interests point in the direction of maintaining the commitment that the United States has had for very long. It may take a little while to work out. Who knows? It may take four years.

PAUL TAYLOR: So the deep state in Washington will ultimately prevail?

ROLAND PARIS: It’s not just the deep state. There are plenty of people who are in other branches of government, share this view, but what I was referring to is that I think the United States has an interest in having a trusting relationship with its European allies, a long term security interest, and I just think in the fullness of time, countries’ policy tend to revert back to where those core interests lie.

PAAL HILDE: I would like to end by stressing the fact that NATO, at some point in the near future, will start discussing its strategic concept again. Maybe next year. And the 70th anniversary in 2019 could be a time to actually agree on it. And this is why, to sort of tag on to Thomas’s question here, so this is a good opportunity to actually find a format where you can get buy-in from the capitals, as in have the heads of states actually discussed this?

The experience is that 1999 was a committee work – sort of a bit of a disaster, and there was a lot of back and forth in the preparing of the strategic concept then. 2010 was a short and pretty brutal way of doing it. Maybe something in between, where you don’t have the moving of commas and full stops in committees, but actually lifting it and having high level discussions on the core values, the core issues of
the strategic concept, would be a way of engaging the capitals to a greater extent than NATO normally does.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Judy, back to our one wise woman to sum up.

**JUDY DEMPSEY:** I actually don't know the answers. This paper was very difficult to write because there's so many issues going there. I couldn't bring up the OSE, that's a paper in itself. Kaliningrad, I think the EU has managed to hold onto the open border. There are so many issues out there. I think Thomas's point of harmonisation and intra-governmental – it might fly, there's got to be huge political will, and huge leadership from the capitals, and so far that leadership is not coming through, because there are so many other issues on the table. It's time to put NATO back on the issue table.

**PAUL TAYLOR:** Thank you very much. Please join me in thanking all of our panellists for a stimulating discussion.

And while they leave the platform, and the chairs are re-arranged, let me say a word of welcome to Rose Gottemoeller. When I writing about diplomacy and other things for Reuters in the late 1990s, my colleague Nick Doherty, the late Nick Doherty who I succeeded, flagged Rose to me as the absolute oracle, the go to person on everything to do with arm control, non-proliferation, trans-Atlantic relations and so on. And of course inexcusably within weeks of my taking the job she was called back to Washington to higher functions, and her functions have got higher and higher ever since.

So it’s in the function of Deputy Secretary General of NATO that I’m delighted to call on Rose Gottemoeller to give us her closing thoughts at this meeting.

**ROSE GOTTEMOELLER:** Truly, I am delighted to be here to help celebrate the 60th anniversary of the report of the committee of three on non-military cooperation in NATO. I know that you heard from my boss, Sec Gen, Jens Stoltenberg, earlier this morning. I heard that was quite a delightful panel, actually, with a lot of information exchanged. I'll try not to repeat too much of what he said – much. But I think there are a couple of points that are worth re-emphasis now, as we bring this really extraordinary event to a close.

First, though, because I get into that, I wanted to think Norway House for hosting in this lovely facility, and making it possible to all gather together this morning. I wanted to thank the organisers, with special thanks to the three permanent representatives from Norway, Italy and Canada, good friends and colleagues, for their generous support for the 60th anniversary events and activities, including at NATO headquarters, and some of you will have seen the exhibit that's going on at NATO headquarters right now. It's truly making me proud to be up here on the stage with your three flags. So thank you for your support.

And I wanted to thank my friends at Carnegie Europe for cooperating and organising this event. I have, as you know, some history with the Carnegie Endowment, including three years in Moscow when the Carnegie Europe centre was opened at that time, and at the time I thought oh, how great to have some close by allies. I mean, it was Carnegie Moscow and Carnegie Beijing, and it was really far away – although I did make several trips out there, but to have the Carnegie Endowment established here in Brussels was just a marvellous innovation for that organisation, and I'm glad to see you've gone from strength to strength in the intervening years. So thank you very much for cooperating on this event.
Also interesting – I don’t know if Sec Gen brought it up this morning, but the NATO Archives Committee did a fantastic job for putting together both the commemorative exhibit I mentioned at the headquarters, but also helping to pull together special historical information to enlighten and really strengthen our discussions throughout this period, so I wanted to say a big thank you to them, because archivists sometimes go unsung, but in my experience they are extraordinarily important, both to recollection and history, but also to bringing a new generation along, and what they need to learn about national security.

So today we are honouring a much admired report that has been impacting NATO for the past 60 years. I want to begin by acknowledging the enormous debt of gratitude NATO owes to the three wise men. They produced a report on non-military cooperation in NATO that has stood the test of time. It contains insights and recommendations that are as relevant – indeed, as urgent – as they were in 1956.

Also, I applaud the important decisions made by the North Atlantic Council, 60 years ago, for recognising the need for the committee of three, and that was an historic decision by the NAC at the time. I’d like to just run through a few of the key lessons from the report – again, a little repetition of what Sec Gen said this morning, but important to re-emphasise a couple of points.

One lesson we have all learned – the political commitment to collective defence requires more, much more than a military relationship. The report refers to confidence that other members will have the will to honour their Article 5 commitment, and I think it’s worth reminding ourselves of this key point from the report. A healthy NATO requires the confidence that all of its members accept the political commitment for collective defence.

And where does that confidence come from? I thought Roland made a great point just now, and it made me sad that I wasn’t able to be here for the entire morning, because clearly this has been a very, very rich discussion, just catching the last moments of this panel proved that to me. But Roland made an important point about all the layers that go into making up that political commitment for collective defence. It comes from confidence is built on a complete and holistic range of deep relationships. Political consultation, yes, but also cultural, economic, scientific, technological ties, public and political support in each nation, engagement of members of Parliament and the media, the building of a broad-based community, in other words. That is what makes up the fabric of the alliance.

The report of the three wise men helped to create a more responsive and adaptive alliance. I want to echo, again, one of Sec Gen’s main messages from this morning. NATO has always been a learning organisation, in this effort in 1956, to create this committee, and approve the report, speaks to that impressive quality over 50 years ago now. I think the term Atlantic community appears repeatedly in the report, and I think building a community of like-minded nations has been an important strength of NATO over the decades. I think, now, over six decades.

In closing, I would like to comment about some remarks that Gaetano Martino made on December 12, 1956, during the Council’s discussion about the report. It nicely sums up the situation in 1956, and also our current situation in 2016. He said, [in French]. And in English, we must recognise that there is only one way to overcome our current problems, by strengthening and expanding Atlantic cooperation. His word point to on-going imperatives, they are to deepen and broaden Atlantic cooperation, to build a stronger, more cohesive Atlantic community, and in doing so, this is ultimately what will keep NATO strong and our people safe in the years and decades ahead.

Thank you again to all of the organisers, and thank you to this audience for what I know has been a rich and intense discussion this morning. Thank you.