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Transcript

## **THE IRAN DEAL: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES**

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Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference  
2017

March 20, 2017

**(Transcript not checked against delivery)**

**KIM GHATTAS**

Welcome to this last session of the day. I'm Kim Ghattas; I'm a BBC correspondent covering international affairs and politics for the BBC. I will be your moderator for this session. Thank you for joining us, and for attending the first day of the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy [Conference].

This panel is about the Iran deal, and the international perspective, and I'll be introducing our excellent panelists in just a second, but first a couple of house-keeping notes; just a reminder that immediately after this session you're all invited to the opening reception in the ballroom. It's just across the hall, the same location as where you had lunch earlier today. It's from six p.m. to eight p.m.

We're going to have a moderated conversation between the panelists for about thirty to forty minutes, and after that we'll take questions. To ask your question there will be microphone stands in the audience, so you can get up to the stands and state your name, organization, for the question, keep it brief. We'll try to get as many as possible into the session.

So, without further ado, let me introduce our panelists for this discussion, which I think will be very lively and interesting, and timely as well. Sitting next to me is Director General Yukiya Amano, he's the IAEA director general since 1<sup>st</sup> December, 2009. Next to him is Baroness Catherine Ashton; she served as the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy from 2009 to 2014, and she led the Iran negotiations for four and a half years. She's also a Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Fellow. Next to her is His Excellency Yousef Al Otaiba; he's the ambassador for the UAE to the United States. He's been here since 2008; he's seen quite a lot unfold in this capital. And, last but not least, Eli Levite, he's a nonresident senior fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program and Cyber Policy Initiative, Carnegie Endowment.

Now, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known for short as the Iran Deal, is seen by many, perhaps most people, as a consequential, the most consequential development for nuclear diplomacy in decades, but of course it faced a lot of criticism, a lot of opposition, while it was being negotiated, and we'll get into that just a little bit, but the opposition, the concerns, the worry, were from Arab countries, from Israel, and others in the region, and of course from the Republican party here in the United States.

But while so far its implementation has proceeded smoothly, and we'll get more on that from the director general, its future is to some extent uncertain. As a candidate, President Trump described the deal as disastrous; he's also threatened to dismantle it, or renegotiate it, and police it so tough, he has said, that they don't have a chance. He's tempered some of those statements more recently.

The new Congress is also likely to impose additional sanctions on Iran; we'll have to see how that unfolds, and if they do so, Tehran will say that these new sanctions are possibly a violation of the deal.

And then of course we have the possibility of non-compliance by Iran itself, for technical reasons, but also because we have elections coming up in Iran and we'll have to see whether [Iranian] President Rouhani gets another term, or not.

Now I want to say that we're not here to re-litigate the details of the deal, but to look at the future; how confident are regional parties about how well this is being implemented? What are the deal's prospects? What is the best way to manage its implementation and the pressures facing it? And how will it fare over time, including under this administration?

I'd like to start with you, director general, and ask you a question about your latest visit to Washington, just before this one; you met with the Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, at the State Department on March 6, and you came out sounding quite positive. You said that you were expecting very good cooperation on the implementation of the nuclear deal, and your assessment so far is that Iran is complying with the terms. But as I just mentioned, the Trump administration has also been very critical, very straight, saying that they wanted this deal to be implemented with great strictness; that of course is better than saying it's the worst deal ever negotiated, which we heard on the campaign trail last year, but what are the challenges when it comes to the interpretation of saying great strictness? How does the IAEA work to verify and implement this agreement when there could be different interpretations?

## **YUKIYA AMANO**

Thank you very much for inviting me to this very important conference. Yes, I had a meeting with Mr. Tillerson some time ago, early in March, and we had a discussion on Iran nuclear issues and others. First, let me start from basic things; the IAEA has a role to play, and the role given to the IAEA with respect to the JCPOA is to verify and monitor the nuclear related commitments made by Iran under the JCPOA. We are serving as eyes and ears of the international community, we are on the ground 24/7, and we can state that the JCPOA is being implemented.

That said, I would like to make it clear that this JCPOA is an agreement among E3, EU+3, and Iran, eight parties, and therefore in the end it is the responsibility of such a party or parties to provide the implementation, interpretation, or enforcement, and the same rule applies; the same principle applies to the judgement whether or not in compliance. Whether the interpretation is strict or not is not a problem for the IAEA; the important thing for us is to be communicated a consensus view, a clear view, to the IAEA so that we can verify and monitor.

The IAEA's monitoring and verification continues to be careful, impartial, and [unclear]. The verification regime that we have in Iran now consists of three elements; one is the standard safeguards agreement, which is called the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and some more additional protocols, which is a more powerful verification tool, and transparency measures, unique to the JCPOA. This is the strongest verification regime existing now in the international community.

Under the JCPOA Iran also accepted the many restrictions, for example, maintaining the stockpile of LEU below 300 kilograms, and to maintain the centrifuges at 5,060; this is a clear and significant gain from a verification perspective because we have the strongest verification regime to monitor and verify the smaller nuclear activities by Iran.

Turning our eyes to the future, we can identify a number of potential risk elements; for example the stockpile of heavy water or the low enriched uranium merits closer attention. Access may be a sensitive issue for Iran, but Iran needs to continue to provide access to the IAEA. And another very important issue is under-funding on the regular budget, and without a voluntary contribution it is not possible to implement the Iran-related activities under the JCPOA in Iran.

We are requesting a modest increase, about two percent this year, and we would like to see countries accept this.

In conclusion, I can say that JCPOA is a clear and significant gain from a verification perspective. The JCPOA is being implemented. Eight parties to the JCPOA continue to have a role to play and risks can be overcome if all the parties discharge their responsibilities. The IAEA is firmly committed to discharge its responsibility to verify and monitor the nuclear-related commitments by Iran under the JCPOA. Thank you very much.

## **KIM GHATTAS**

We'll come back to some of these points. Thank you, director general. I know you said, I don't claim the verification system is perfect, but it is the best we can expect under these circumstances; you've just described it as the strongest regime possible, and we'll get back to some of those points you've just made during the conversation but, Baroness Ashton, I want to come to you because you were there as well, at the very beginning, and almost to the bitter end, or the joyful end, depending on which side you sat on. There was a lot of satisfaction amongst the parties who were able to negotiate this, but the Iran deal happened in a very difficult regional context as well. There were a lot of fears, a lot of opposition, criticism that it did not take into consideration that context, Iran's role in the war in Syria, didn't take enough into consideration Israel's concerns, or concerns of Gulf countries. Was there too much emphasis being put on that context, to the detriment of the achievement that it did represent, which is take this massive issue off the table, this big concern off the table?

## **CATHERINE ASHTON**

The most important thing for me was the mandate we had come from the Security Council, and the mandate was to find a way to demonstrate confidence in the purely peaceful nature of what Iran was doing; it was no more, it was no less.

And we were very mindful of many other issues of great concern about what Iran was doing, not least for colleagues in the region, but also for the whole of the international community. It was a deal that was what it was; it wasn't designed to do more than. It would, in my personal view, have been wrong for it to have strayed into different issues because there were concerns that needed to be addressed with the support and with the inclusion of countries who are directly affected.

But this was the permanent five plus Germany, because it had started from a European initiative many years before that—was designed to do what it said on the tin, to provide that confidence, if at all possible, and it was by no means, in all of the years that I was involved, and there are colleagues here who had been involved at least as long, if not longer, in trying to do what we said we would do.

Were we mindful of the regional context? Yes, we were; we were mindful of it in two different ways, one was of course what Iran was doing, but you should also remember that we were negotiating in a period of time when our relationship with Russia was quite complex, with the problems and crisis in Ukraine. The negotiations that I was involved in, coordinating and working with the political directors from the six countries, was at a time when we were also deeply worried about what was going on in the context of Ukraine, and yet Russia was a key partner inside the room. And so context was important but our focus and our mission was absolutely clear; our hope was that if we were able to resolve this one issue, that it would maybe

give a bit of confidence in the proposal, or proposed ideas that were kind of floating around to be able to then talk to Iran about other issues, not by us but by those who needed to.

**KIM GHATTAS**

But by conducting these negotiations without necessarily taking into consideration the context, when you look back at how these negotiations unfolded, do you think that was the right approach? Or was it a mistake?

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

I don't think it was that we weren't taking into account the context because there's a lot of traffic and discussion going on with all sorts of important partners and key interests in what the negotiations were and were not doing, but for my part I felt that it was important to do what we were told to do within the mandate. I don't think you can go beyond it and expect to get support for what you're doing necessarily, but also it felt to me to be wrong to do that. So, that's why I think it's important that we stayed within it.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Ambassador Al Otaiba, let me draw you into the conversation about the regional context; last year you wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* that although the deal was holding, Iran remained hostile, expansionist, and violent. This year you wrote an op-ed that said Gulf States are ready for peaceful coexistence with Iran, and that the UAE believes that the nuclear deal should be strictly enforced. Today, is your key concern Iran's regional behavior, or the continued implementation and verification of the deal?

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

Thank you, Kim, and first let me thank George and Bill Burns, and everybody from the Carnegie team for having us. Our concern has always been, and I think will continue to be, Iran's behavior. The Iran threat for us, in our part of the world, breaks down into two categories; first, the nuclear program, and what that means over the long term, but also Iran's behavior. And Iran's behavior has been a threat way before there was a nuclear program, or before there were talks, or before there was a JCPOA. So, if I were to prioritize my threats, no, by far the biggest issue for us is Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah, missile tests, subversive activity, the rhetoric that we hear, the increased sectarianism; that threat is far more significant for countries in the geographic proximity of Iran. So, while I can't dismiss the nuclear program, I'm concerned about what happens while there is a nuclear program that's being monitored by the IAEA.

Let me take this opportunity to also clarify the UAE's position, because it has been often mischaracterized; we supported the JCPOA because we felt it took a major set of issues off the table, but if you ask me whether it matters whether they keep 2,000 centrifuges or 4,000 centrifuges, it's irrelevant. What I care is that this deal allows us to theoretically focus on pushing back Iran's behavior in the region. So to the extent the policy towards Iran pushes back Iranian behavior, expansionist policies, support for terrorism, we will judge this as a good deal. To the extent we are held hostage by this deal, and look the other way when Iran continues to behave this way, then we will judge it as not a very good deal. And that's the UAE position, and a largely Gulf position on the deal; we supported it so we can continue to deal with the other set of challenges that has been largely ignored.

## **KIM GHATTAS**

We want to come back to that, but first, Dr. Levite, can I ask you about the position in Israel? The Israeli government was very critical of the Iran deal at the time, you're a bit more nuanced, perhaps, on this; you don't speak for the Israeli government, but what's your understanding of what Israel today would like to see coming out of this administration when it comes to verification and implementation of the deal, and policy towards Iran, taking into consideration the comments that Ambassador Al Otaiba just made?

## **ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Well, let me put it this way; I think that the Israeli government was not oblivious to some gains inherent in the deal. It may have been less explicit about those publicly but there was not a failure to recognize that there were some positive elements. That being said, I think on balance the deal left us concerned, and I think over time even more concerned that we had been when it was actually signed.

The reason that Israel was concerned was that many of the gains were either temporary and would lapse over time; some looked uncertain, or even elusive. Implementation of the UN Security components on missile tests and arms sales and so on were thought to be weak. The resolutions were weakened, and have proven to be even weaker than that in terms of the implementation. And the gains in terms of trying to promote domestic change in Iran was seen as uncertain, and remains uncertain; so, notwithstanding all of the benefits in terms of the gains, you could say that some of the gains are temporary, and others are uncertain. And at the same time the risks are very real in terms of what happens when most of the elements phase out, and even more importantly, what the deal had done was essentially to de-link between legitimate requirements of Iran where it claimed that it had peaceful nuclear energy and what it actually does in terms of its nuclear behavior.

And Iran has not met any of the major milestones associated with legitimate nuclear energy pursuits that most other countries engaging in this domain do, and at the same time was allowed to keep that activity and scale it up at the end of the process. And finally, that the costs, and here I want to build on what Ambassador Otaiba had said, was that in practice Iran has gained immunity to engage in highly provocative escalatory behavior; I think we've only seen the tip of the iceberg in the last couple of days in Syria. And I think the potential for escalation there is enormous; Iran is really doing absolutely reckless behavior in what it does there, in addition to what it's doing in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Yemen, we can go on and on with the list.

So, from the perspective of the Israeli government, the hope is that the U.S. government on the one hand would try to use instruments built into the deal into more vigorous enforcement again, again as Ambassador Otaiba has made, but at the same time try both to check Iran's regional behavior and prevent Iran from scaling-up its nuclear activity as the provisions of the deal begin to phase out, unless Iran fundamentally changes its political, strategic, and nuclear orientation.

## **KIM GHATTAS**

There's clearly a divide here on the panel, between those who look at the deal squarely from a nuclear perspective, and those who look at it from a more regional perspective. Can I come back to you, director general, and Baroness, you just heard comments from the ambassador, and from Dr. Levite about their concerns in the region, about what this deal does and doesn't do; can I get your reactions about some of the points that Eli raised when it comes to the nitty gritty of the

implementation of the deal and the phasing out of some of those conditions over time? And for you, Baroness Ashton, you heard there Ambassador Otaiba talk about the fact that yes, it's a great thing that this issue of Iran's nuclear program is taken off the table, but is the region now hostage to this nuclear deal? Has Iran gained immunity from everything for the sake of upholding that deal? Let me start with you, director general.

**YUKIYA AMANO**

In my introductory statement, I kept on emphasizing that from the verification perspective this is a clear and significant gain. My job is verification, and I can say with confidence that it is a significant gain. I'm not discussing Iranian behavior on other areas, and it is not my mandate to discuss them. From the verification point of view, I repeat, it is a gain. The implementation of the additional protocol means submission of a very detailed declaration from Iran; we review it, and if we have the need, we request access to information or a site. Under this agreement we can have access to milling and mining of uranium, heavy water production plants, centrifuge manufacturing facilities. Normally, we don't have that access. It was said it is temporary, but no advanced centrifuges are allowed in eight to ten years, a limit of LEU at 300 kilograms is for fifteen years, and surveillance of centrifuge manufacturing is for twenty years, access to uranium mines and mills is twenty-five years, it's quite a long time.

**KIM GHATTAS**

[Overtalking] very differently in the region, and I'll get to Yousef with that in a second.

**YUKIYA AMANO**

Additional protocols, ESA, are on a permanent basis, so I would say this is not just temporary, it is quite a long time.

**KIM GHATTAS**

But if the Trump administration wanted to strengthen some aspects of that deal, are there any options? What additional restraints do you think would be most useful? What would be acceptable, even, to Iran? Would they be even open to that?

**YUKIYA AMANO**

For example, heavy water threshold is 130 tons, LEU 300 kilograms, and this will stay, that is an important part, but in order to strengthen we need to find a more sustainable solution. The best way to strengthen it is to keep on implementing; we have just started to implement it for one year and some, but to keep on implementing it for a long time is a very good way to strengthen and make the agreement sustainable.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Baroness Ashton, going back to the question about whether the region is now hostage to the upholding of the nuclear deal, obviously the deal was not meant to address all of these regional issues, Yemen, Iran's behavior and deep involvement in the war in Syria, and yet again it does happen in that context. And the criticism at the time, towards the Obama administration, was that they were not taking into consideration the sequencing of events in how they were implementing this deal, or approaching it, how they were bringing in allies into the fold, into

understanding what the deal meant or did not mean; is the region now hostage to the upholding of this deal? At what point do parties walk away because Iran is, I don't know, violating the spirit of the deal?

### **CATHERINE ASHTON**

I don't think it does give Iran immunity, nor should it in any way take the region hostage. I just have to repeat what I said before, it is what it is; it's meant to do one thing, and to do it properly, which is why what Dr. Amano and his organization does is so crucial in making sure that in a very straightforward monitoring and verification way what is said to be done is done.

And it was, if you wind back, a very important diplomatic effort on behalf of the Security Council, especially, to try and find ways in which we could resolve this issue in a world where it becomes increasingly difficult to see resolution of issues. I'm a private person, long now out of office, but I look around and see so many issues that people are grappling with that the solutions seem very difficult to imagine at this point in time. This was one element of a much bigger set of questions about the role of Iran in the region, and a region that was going through some dramatic and challenging changes of itself.

It doesn't do more than that; it's not meant to do more than that. The ambition for it was that if you are able to resolve one question that's considered very important, that has been on the table for a long time, effectively, well didn't this just show that maybe, just maybe, there were ways of resolving problems by sitting around a table, even if it takes a long time, that are worth going for?

And perfection in this case was this confidence that people could have in this thing, and that maybe alongside it the relationships that had been built up in sitting down and talking about this between experts, between political directors, as we call them, between ministers, would be useful in thinking about how on earth they were going to resolve other issues, not necessarily the same people, because the issues were different, but if you like the propensity to be able to sit down and take these things forward.

And I wouldn't throw that away by saying by doing one thing we've made everything else hostage, absolutely not; it does not excuse behavior beyond it, it does not take away from the need to deal with other issues, but it does of itself say we have been able to solve this, which frankly, when I started, nobody believed we could do, and I wasn't part of the final team so I congratulate them one hundred percent for what they were able to do. My responsibility ended a few months beforehand, but the building up of all of that, which was incredibly hard work and detailed work, was of enormous significance of its time, in its way. But it doesn't do more than that, and it shouldn't be seen to do more than that in the context of what we now we feel needs to be done, the dialogues, conversations, or other ways of trying to tackle these issues.

### **KIM GHATTAS**

Ambassador Otaiba, did the model of how the parties in the negotiations approached these talks, did it inform you about how you could approach dealing with Iran on other issues, as Baroness Ashton just suggested might have been possible? And how do you view this administration's approach to Iran regionally and in the context of the implementation of the deal, because it's very different from the Obama administration?

### **YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

In theory, yes; in theory we would like, one day, to be able to replicate the P5+1 model, and sit down with the Gulf countries to discuss Iran's behavior in the region. Unfortunately we have seen zero, zero indication from Iran's willingness to do that. What have we seen since the JCPOA has been signed? We've seen Iran increase spending on military programs by ten percent, we've seen Iran increase support of Hezbollah and Hamas, two groups on the U.S. list of terrorist designated organizations, we've seen twelve missile tests, we've seen increased sectarianism and increased rhetoric. And so while we would welcome, as we have publicly said repeatedly, we at some point need to think about how we sit down and live peacefully with Iran.

And, by the way, no country, no country, stands to benefit from a productive, cooperative relationship with Iran more than the UAE. The amount of trade, the amount of investment, the amount of cooperation on educational and cultural programs, are infinite, but we see that Iran is sending the signals that don't send that message. We see more belligerence, and so in theory it can be done, I don't see the climate as conducive to that conversation right now.

### **KIM GHATTAS**

Do you want to see more sanctions imposed on Iran? And how does that then affect the nuclear deal?

### **YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

I don't want to pre-judge, and say I want to see this, I don't want to see that; I want to see a more responsible policy, based on Iran's behavior. I think we have been pulling our punches with Iran, we see weapons shipments going in to the Houthi rebels in Yemen and we pretend it's not happening. We see more support going in for Hezbollah, IRDC in Syria, and we pretend it's not happening. There's a lot of things that are taking place that are actually not being honest with how to deal with the Iranian threat in the region.

I would like to see a more pragmatic policy; a policy that pushes back on Iran's behavior, and once I see that then we can address a larger set of questions, but I don't want to cherry-pick one or two things and say that's what we should or shouldn't do.

### **KIM GHATTAS**

Dr. Levite, you just heard the director general say that the best way to strengthen the deal is to continue implementing it and verifying it, good enough for you?

### **ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Well, let's distinguish between the nuclear component and the non-nuclear components; I think on the nuclear component, as far as the IAEA mandate goes, we all have to salute the work that the agency has been doing under the leadership of Director General Amano. I mean really exemplary professional behavior So, that goes without saying; that being said, I think we all need to be very, very clear in how we interpret the nuances in what Director General Amano had said, namely that there are some things which fall within the safeguards domain, where he is the ultimate authority as the arbiter of safeguards, and also passes judgement on them, and there are some provisions of the deal that do not, that the IAEA has to carry out based on guidance from the Joint Commission. And those issues leave a lot to be desired in terms of implementation, but that's not the fault of Director General Amano, or the Agency, for that matter, it's the question

of what kind of guidance the Joint Commission actually gives the director general on what happens on procurement and Section T and so on, that's one.

Two, it would have been ideal if the IAEA had been in a position to be more transparent about implementation of, for example, the additional protocol, and yet, again, he has his hands tied because the Iranians are not cooperating in a way that would actually reassure us about some implementations. So, I trust Director General Amano about those issues and so on, but what I'm trying to say is there are parts which are outside his hands, and therefore we shouldn't hold him accountable for their performance, and yet there is something to be done.

But I think there is one area which is in the grey area; if we confine ourselves to the nuclear stuff because I think Ambassador Otaiba talked about the non-nuclear stuff, the nuclear stuff, there is one component which does lend itself both to more European and Agency; the Agency has been promoting the norms of good behavior in the nuclear energy domain, conventional nuclear safety, conventional physical protection of nuclear materials, joint conventions on handling spent fuel, liability conventions, and so on and so forth. Early notifications. Where is Iran on those?

Only Iran and North Korea stand out of those ones. So I would have hoped that the director general, in the context of anywhere from his personal capacity, good offices capacity and so on, would have been more supported in his efforts to bring Iran into compliance with this, and we would have at least been reassured that its nuclear energy program is less of a threat to the region, and covers more of the activities in Iran in the nuclear domain than it currently does.

## **KIM GHATTAS**

Director General, why don't I let him respond to that, and the question of transparency as well.

## **YUKIYA AMANO**

The transparency issue is quite misunderstood; it is obvious that we provided more information before the implementation day, and less after the implementation day. Why? The base is completely different; before implementation day our activities were based on the former UN Security Council Resolutions, which stated that Iran is requested not to engage in enrichment activities, for example, but they were doing it. If that is the case, as a verification organization we have to inform other member states to which extent Iran is not implementing the Security Council resolutions. So, the basis was the former Security Council resolutions. Now, after the January 16, 2016, the basis of our activities are completely changed, UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and it doesn't prohibit the enrichment activities by Iran. And what we were requested to monitor if that is 300 kilograms or not, and we report it.

Another thing, you may have noticed that in the March report I provided more details compared to the previous report after the implementation date. It has a reason, because in December last year, and in January this year, we were informed, we were communicated of the memorization documents from the Joint Commission, and it gave more clarity, and in light of that we could tell the details of the inventory of LEU, and that's the reason why the level of transparency changed before the implementation day and after the implementation day, and before and after the March report.

On top of that, I have to tell you that the Safeguards Agreement stipulates very clearly we have to protect the confidential information, and we have to protect the information that we obtain through the activities of the inspectors. This rule applies to all the countries, including Iran, and

we say that a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the additional protocol are the agreement between state and IAEA. We apply these agreements without discrimination, without special favor either, to Iran.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Ambassador Otaiba, you want to say something briefly?

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

I was going to make a comment based on Eli's comments; I just want to offer this at the risk of being provocative. The view from the region is Iran, a country on the U.S.'s list of state sponsors of terrorism, negotiated a deal that lifts tens of billions of dollars of sanctions and continues to keep an enrichment program, where a country like the UAE has negotiated a 1-2-3 agreement that voluntarily foregoes our right to enrich, our right to re-process. And so if you're sitting where we're sitting, the country that is largely unfriendly to the United States and the West seems to have gotten a better deal than the country that puts its money in this country. So I offer this as just a perspective of how the deal looks, not on the technical merits but as friends and adversaries go.

**KIM GHATTAS**

And that's probably a message that the Trump administration is quite open to. Baroness Ashton, are you concerned about the possibility that the United States, rather than just withdrawing from the deal, several candidates having said that they'd like to shred it apart, that the U.S. government would rather ramp up sanctions on Iran for its non-nuclear behavior, thereby potentially undermining the deal, if Iran feels that somehow violates the deal? And would the EU, would Europe be on board with sanctions like that? I realize you don't speak for the EU, but in your personal capacity as an observer and keen analyst, continued.

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

I think the sanctions regime that's connected to the nuclear question is a very distinct set of sanctions, and there have been great concerns about, for example, human rights issues in Iran, that have led to action, certainly in the European Union has been taken, so it is always possible to look at different areas and say we're going to do this based on this activity, and we're going to take measures, or sanctions, or whatever, on this activity as opposed to something else.

I think the question, though, underneath all of this is that this was a crafted agreement that involved a number of nations; I often think of it when you listen to reports of it as if it was a bi-lateral agreement, and although I never, ever, ever underplay the role and importance of the United States of America in anything, particularly not when I'm sitting in Washington, it's also the case that without the other nations it wouldn't have happened because I can assure you, coordinating what happened, the role of each one at various times was absolutely vital to moving it forward, and I take nothing away.

So the issue for me is that because this worked so appropriately with this group of countries, and it belongs to each of them, then whenever you think about what action to take on other issues, I think it's a good idea if nothing else, to at least be in conversation about what's happening, and to think about the consequences. But that mustn't be taken for, as has been pointed out, suddenly becoming a hostage to it, because that's not, and cannot be, what it's about. It doesn't

mean because this particular issue was to an extent dealt with in an appropriate manner, that somehow that takes away all the other problems and issues. It does not.

**KIM GHATTAS**

The new U.S. administration has already imposed a number of additional sanctions following Iran's ballistic missile test earlier this year; Director General Amano, are you worried that potential unilateral further U.S. sanctions against Iran could undermine your work, could undermine the deal?

**YUKIYA AMANO**

Normally I do not discuss other sanctions; I don't say I support, I don't support other sanctions, because there is no other sanction in the IAEA statute. That said, we send the inspectors to the site for many years and we have been observing the situation, but during the time when, and there were some very massive sanctions, we have not observed any decrease of centrifuges. The number of centrifuges increased constantly and the activities, and nuclear-related activities kept on strengthening. It was after President Rouhani was elected that we started to hear the different rhetoric, different people appointed, and we saw the substance. It would be helpful to consider if you introduce some sanctions, what impact will it have? As far as nuclear activities are concerned we haven't seen changes, and we will not see changes.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Eli, last question for you before we go to the audience; what would Israel want to see from a Trump administration when it comes to curbing Iran's regional activities, and how worried would you be that it could undermine the nuclear deal, or does Israel not care, or does it not really matter to Israel if this deal collapses or not? And what would come after?

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

I don't speak for the government, but let me try and present the concerns as best I understand them, and the expectations based on those. I think number one is to devise a framework that would reassure us about the long term, that unless there is a fundamental change in Iran's attitude, strategically, and specifically in the nuclear domain, then Iran won't be able to get within weeks of a bomb completely legitimately in whatever, eight to ten years. That's one, a huge concern; I should add in brackets, it doesn't necessarily require Iran-specific measures. Ambassador Otaiba has already implied that there are ways of going about it in terms of broader norms that the UAE complies with, that could also be relevant for checking the Iran problem and others and so on.

I think that the others are complaining that it's the gold standard, approximate the gold standard, let's do a silver standard, alright, if you can't afford the gold standard. So that's one, looking at this component in terms of the long, and reassuring us. And given that diplomacy takes its time, we have to start yesterday, not wait until the deal actually expires and Iran is able to do it. That's issue one. Issue two, I think at the moment Israel is left in an unenviable situation where it has to do the interdiction itself, and deterrence isn't really working in terms of preventing Iran from doing some of these [unclear] and so on, in providing the most destabilizing weapons systems to Syria, and deploying them against Israel from Syria, and handing them over to Hezbollah and Hamas. So the number two is to do much more aggressive interdiction with the hope of actually dissuading Iran, through the Revolutionary Guards and others, from actually carrying those. And

I think in the regional interests it's not just Syria and Lebanon, but it's also what you do in Yemen and other places and so on, so that's two.

Third, on sanctions, let me venture a little bit out of my zone of comfort in terms of not speaking for the government and say the following; whereas the government would like to see sanctions, not military attacks, but sanctions being applied more aggressively...

**KIM GHATTAS**

Additional sanctions on non-nuclear behavior?

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

On non-nuclear behavior, it shouldn't be, on the face of it, something that is ruled out just because of the deal, just as the Baroness has [inaudible]. I think I would love to see a serious debate in this country at the same time of relaxing sanctions on U.S. companies. I would like to see the Boeing deal go through, I would like to see GAM not discriminated against, against [unclear] and so on, or Caterpillar, or McDonald's. So, in terms of impressing on the Iranian people that the U.S. isn't after Iran as such, and freeze those things that are not going after the core of the issues of concern at the same time as you step up dramatically the sanctions you impose on the Revolutionary Guards and their highly-provocative behavior as a way of also helping convince those in Iran that the U.S. is actually going to be a partner if they change in a positive direction.

**KIM GHATTAS**

And that the dividends can be palpable for the people.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Exactly.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Alright, we're ready for questions from the audience; there are microphones in the aisles on both sides of the room, if you could line up, introduce yourselves, and keep your questions short, and if they're addressed to someone specific on the panel, please say so as well. I'll start on this side, please.

**ANDREA HOWARD**

Andrea Howard, I'm an ensign in the United States Navy, studying at the University of Oxford; the missing part of this conversation for me, from the two-level gain perspective is the domestic effects on the Iranian population. Has the JCPOA with its sanctions relief increased the threat potential of the IRGC, which domestically shields the supreme leader and other hardline institutions, and more specifically, has it legitimized the current government, which has been condemned for human rights abuses? In total, I guess, has the JCPOA essentially crippled the potential for a more democratic Iranian future?

**KIM GHATTAS**

Who would like to take that? Baroness Ashton, I think that you made very clear that the deal was just meant to be a deal. Eli, you said that there were some hopes, even though they were never expressed publicly by the Obama administration, that the nuclear deal would help the moderates inside Iran, the reformers, gain more power; we'll have to see whether they'll get any results when the elections take place in May, but perhaps between the two of you, you'd like to address this question? Baroness Ashton.

### **CATHERINE ASHTON**

The deal is the deal. Four and a half years most of the beginning part of my work was with the Ahmadinejad regime, and then we moved to Rouhani, and it was a very different set of behaviors, and also the potential for getting an agreement became very real much quicker than you might have expected.

There's no question that the way that we hoped the deal would work would be that it was a demonstration from the Iranian side that they were interested in moving their country forward in its relationships, not just with the P5+1, E3+ but actually, and especially, with the people of their immediate region. In other words, it was about them, because they were willing to do this deal, and they'd certainly not been in the previous regime, that this perhaps was an indication that things were moving in a different way.

Exactly as Eli said, inherent in it is that if you have a negotiation with someone and they're willing to negotiate with you, you like to think that part of that is because they're trying to move in the right direction. So I don't think it was of itself an attempt to say oh, it's become a more enlightened country, it will move forward, but the nature of the fact that you could do an agreement was, I think, for all of us an indication that perhaps, and it is a perhaps, there was a potential to do more than that.

### **KIM GHATTAS**

And of course this discussion is about the regional implications, and not so much the domestic implications of the deal, and that's why we haven't focused on that so much, but Eli, would you like to say something?

### **ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Just very briefly say the following; Director General Amano has already said we've only been about a year and a half into this, be patient, alright? I think that applies also beyond the nuclear domain. The jury is still out in terms of the domestic; what we know for sure is that the hoped-for changing and restructuring of domestic Iran has not occurred.

### **CATHERINE ASHTON**

Not yet.

### **ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Has not occurred to date; Iran is facing catastrophic threats in terms of climate change, desertification, the fertile land is diminishing, the water is getting polluted and so on; their president, President Rouhani says this is the existential threat of Iran. The hope was that freeing some of the international pressure and creating a more cooperative climate would actually allow

Iran to restructure and re-orient its priorities. That has not happened. We have elections coming up...

**KIM GHATTAS**

In May.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

In May, and we will find out whether the elections actually give more of a hope this transformation will begin to happen. Thus far it hasn't, and if I you ask me, it's much more important than intel to say okay, if they remain under the siege mentality the supreme leader wants to cultivate, we know where they're going to be on the nuclear front in eight years.

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

And I would just, in addition to that, definitely keep your eye out on the next elections in May but, more importantly, keep your eye out on who becomes the next supreme leader.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Of course.

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

That will be the key indicator of which direction Iran will go in the future, towards a more moderate or a more hardline look.

**KIIM GHATTAS**

But that happens at an indeterminate time in the future. Question on this side, please; if you could keep it brief and let us know if you're addressing the question to someone specific on the panel.

**DARYL KIMBALL**

Thank you. Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association; a yes or no question for each of you, which is, is this JCPOA re-negotiable or not?

**KIM GHATTAS**

In what context, or under what conditions?

**DARYL KIMBALL**

Can it be re-negotiated? Yes or no, can it be re-negotiated or not? Each one of you, I'd like you to answer the question.

**KIM GHATTAS**

It's a bit too theoretical, but let's give it a try.

**DARYL KIMBALL**

No, it's not theoretical.

**KIM GHATTAS**

It depends on the circumstance, but I'll let the panelists answer the question.

**YUKIYA AMANO**

I was not a negotiator, and I was not taken in the photo.

**KIM GHATTAS**

You would like to re-negotiate that? You would like to be in the picture?

**YUKIYA AMANO**

I was not in it, but I'm using common-sense; it took more than ten years to reach agreement, and it was a very difficult negotiation, one of the most difficult negotiations. Re-negotiating a drastic re-negotiation would be very difficult, but this is a very technical agreement and just an example; you have seen the memorization document specifying the details, I think there is room for clarifying or improving on some parts, like how to deal with the heavy water, or LEU that is in excess. Now it is yes or no; a drastic re-negotiation, I don't think it is likely. Improvement, or further clarity, yes, I think it is possible.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Baroness Ashton.

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

I did the interim agreement, so let me say something from that point of view; that the framework of the negotiation was set but, as Dr. Amano said, within it there may be bits where you still have to kind of work through the technical bit of what does that mean, and that was certainly true in the interim agreement. But if your question is could you just say oh, we don't want that any more, as one party, can we start again or can we re-open it? I think that's quite difficult to imagine how you could do that.

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

I don't know.

**KIM GHATTAS**

You weren't part of the negotiations, and you're going to leave it at that. Eli, theoretically, could it be re-negotiated?

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

We weren't part of the negotiations, although we were kept sort of in the loop.

**KIM GHATTAS**

So you complained that you were kept in the dark initially, but okay.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

I would give a typical Israeli answer; the answer is yes and no.

**KIM GHATTAS**

I think it's the theme of the answers to this question, because that's the director general as well.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

I would try to build on some of these elements and so on; on the one hand there are many working parts that are already subject to negotiations, right, within the Joint Commission and other places, as well as other instruments. I'll give you an example; we haven't talked about the broader conclusion; let's remind ourselves how important the broader conclusion is, but how actually it's a time-bound issue.

If the broader conclusion isn't reached within eight years, Iran is off the hook without the broader conclusion. What would it take for the agency to actually produce a broader conclusion in eight years? Does that require negotiations? Of course it requires negotiations. Who would do it? Is it the IAEA alone? Would it be the Joint Commission and its partners that actually encourage Iran and so on?

I am not saying this again; let's look again at how many years it has taken the agency to produce it. And I'm not saying this as a criticism, I'm actually saying the agency is very methodical in how it actually does it, so there are many moving parts that are subject to negotiations, should be subject to negotiations, and could ultimately produce a better deal. That's on the one hand. I am not suggesting now wrecking it, but at the same time I think we need to complement it by many elements.

**KIM GHATTAS**

You want to make a point?

**YUKIYA AMANO**

I have a different view [unclear]; the broader conclusion is drawn in light of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. These are the agreements between state and IAEA and there is no negotiation; it is up to us to decide, and we do not negotiate with other countries, with a counterpart, when to draw the conclusion. It is my responsibility; it is the agency's responsibility. This is not a time-bound issue. Eight years is mentioned, but it is not as a timeline for drawing the conclusion; I cannot tell how many years it will take, it will take a long time. But it depends very much on the level of cooperation from Iran.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

[Inaudible].

**YUKIYA AMANO**

We will continue verification after it is ended, we hope to come to a conclusion.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Can I just ask you, Ambassador Otaiba, because you were not party to the negotiations, you did not want to answer yes or no, but I do want to ask you about timelines, and as I mentioned earlier, we measure time very differently in the region, so for the director general ten, fifteen, eight years, twenty-five years is a long time. We do measure time differently in the region so are you in the UAE, with your partners in the region, already thinking beyond those eight, ten, fifteen years, and how do you prepare for that?

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

That's one of our main concerns.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Because it feels much closer to you.

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

If we were asked the question, how do you strengthen the deal, or how do you re-negotiate the deal, our answer would be let's focus on the aftermath, let's focus on after eight years, or fifteen years; that's for us where we see the risk, is at the expiry of the deal when Iran can then re-invest in its new and improved enrichment technology, and there's less restrictions. They have gained tens of billions of dollars, and so to us the risk is what happens at the end. For us, that's how you would strengthen it.

I'm not a nuclear expert, I have made that evidently clear to everybody at Carnegie before I was asked to come on the panel, but I think that's how you make people feel secure, or then we start getting into a conversation about well if Iran gets all the checks removed, what happens when country X or country Y chooses to do a similar program with an enrichment cycle?

**KIM GHATTAS**

Alright; question on the other side, please. Go ahead, sir.

**ANDRE**

Oh, thank you. I am Andre [unclear], and I am a U.S. Army colonel, retired, and current associate member of the Vietnam Clean Energy Association and former presidential partner for Obama. My question is about whether you agree or do not agree with the statement publicly made by President Obama when he was president, and he was asked in a press conference, do you trust Iran? His answer was, no, but I trust our ability to catch them if they cheat. I would like your degree of concurrence with the president's statement.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Director General.

**YUKIYA AMANO**

Trust is a very scarce commodity in this regard, and by nature we are an inspectorate body and we trust but verify. It means our trust is limited, and everyone is operating under such circumstances. Does the United States trust Iran? Does Iran trust the United States? Does Iran trust the IAEA? It is quite limited but I am sure that the United States trusts me.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Anyone else? Does the region agree?

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

I trust in Director Amano's ability to catch or detect any cheating. Where I have a slightly lower level of confidence is what do we do when we detect that cheating? What's the response? Do we go to more sanctions and risk the deal, or do we look the other way because this deal is so important? So, I trust the ability to detect cheating; I am worried about the political consequences of it.

**KIM GHATTAS**

That's a very good point. Question on the other side.

**ADLIN MURGOYF**

Hello, my name is Adlin Murgoyf [?]. I am a consultant at Pierce Center, based in Moscow. The history of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program shows that whenever the international community wanted everything from Iran the deal was not possible at all, whether they wanted Iran to stop enrichment, or to curb all the nuclear program. Then in ten years the parties managed to come to an agreement, but it seems that after Iran fulfilled its obligations under JCPOA every country is eager to add up something to that JCPOA and say you have to change the behavior, you have to do this, that, that, and that; don't you think that this significantly undermines the sustainability of the JCPOA and in a couple of years we will see a situation when no deal will be in place?

**KIM GHATTAS**

We've talked a little bit about that during the conversation already, whether people are hanging too much onto this deal. Baroness Ashton, do you think that that is still a concern today, with the implementation, or have people moved on and just accepted the deal as is? We had the deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia in Washington last week, and one of his advisors put out a statement saying Prince Mohammed bin Suleiman stressed how bad and very dangerous the nuclear deal is in the region, which was a slightly strong statement, to say the least.

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

But there are countries and people who feel very strongly about what kind of agreement they would like to have seen, and I used to talk about this in the negotiations, with apologies to at

least one member of the teams who heard me say this about a million times, which was it's like a jigsaw puzzle in a sense, that the picture that you have when you put the puzzle together, you have to be clear about, you have to be certain that what you've done is that picture, there are no gaps between the pieces. But the size of the pieces, and the shape of the pieces can vary, and so one puzzle that's created by one person may look different to the puzzle that's created by somebody else.

So, one of the problems in any agreement is there are people that feel that the pieces were the wrong pieces, were the wrong shape, one piece was too big and one piece was too small, a piece they particularly wanted to see happen, didn't, or wasn't done as completely, but it is an agreement, and the agreement, as I've said, in the end, is about the picture that you see when it's done.

We hang all sorts of things on to all sorts of agreements because what we're trying to do as an international community is move everything forward. The Iran agreement was not just of itself, although I've said very clearly what it is on the can is what it is, but it was also part of an effort to try and make our world more safe and secure, and that means for the region especially that they've got to be confident in the future, and one of the issues will be, as people think now, is that the time scales are very determined and very clear, what happens next? What happens if? What happens after the elections?

It's not a case of doing this agreement and then saying we've done that, we can move on now to some other problem, not a bit of it. It's about saying we've done that bit, now what does that allow us maybe to do? What does that give us an incentive to do? What does that mean in terms of what we need to guard against for the future? Or what does that mean in terms of the relationships that have been built that just maybe can help take this forward and make the region a safer and more secure place?

That was what we intended to do. It was nothing other than that. Can we make the world better and safer? Can this deal contribute in a very small way to that? And is this diplomatic solution better than the alternatives? To which I say yes.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Can I say something?

**KIM GHATTAS**

Sure.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

Just very briefly, I think I take a different approach than Baroness Ashton; I think the issue is, was this deal transactional on the Iranian side, or Iran really was undergoing a profound transformation in reassuring the international community not about its immediate intentions, but it's about longer intentions on the nuclear and non-nuclear domain. It cannot be that the broader conclusion is subject to the IAEA will make the final judgement, but will Iran collaborate to facilitate that? No, well for the moment they are not, so the issue we have in front of us is whether Iran is actually going under the current leadership, or new leadership that emerges, going to be more reassuring in a way that is more than transactional?

Thus far we haven't seen much evidence of this; I hope they do. This deal was supposed to create the opportunity to do so, and to ease some of the pressure and give us more time in which this transformation occurs. It hasn't occurred.

**KIM GHATTAS**

The assumption that a lot of people make, which I think is not necessarily accurate also, is that if moderates or reformers in Iran have more power, the country's foreign policy would automatically look different, and we simply don't know that, as has been pointed out to me several times by people in the region. Director General.

**YUKIYA AMANO**

Yes. I have read the JCPOA many times of course, and it is crystal clear for me that this agreement is about nuclear commitments made by Iran under this agreement, and commitments for lifting nuclear-related sanctions, that is very, very clear.

Whether countries expect more, want to do more in other fields, it's a liberty of countries and they can get into dialogue, they can negotiate other things, or they can make joint commitments, joint declarations; they can do everything. On our part, by monitoring and verifying the nuclear-related commitment by Iran, we can contribute to create a better environment, but this agreement is about nuclear issues.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Over there, please.

**MARIE KIRKEGAARD**

Hi, Marie Kirkegaard from Oakridge National Laboratory in the University of Tennessee. As a scientist I follow the technical aspects of the Iran deal very closely; I've heard the JCPOA referred to as the first example of true science-based diplomacy, with scientists from both sides playing a crucial role in the negotiation so my question is directed primarily to Director General Amano and Baroness Ashton. I was wondering if you believe the JCPOA will serve as a model for future diplomatic negotiations in this manner?

**KIM GHATTAS**

Director General.

**YUKIYA AMANO**

I think this is a quite important achievement; in this case the United Nations, specialized international organizations like ours, and major stakeholders, each of them played its role, discharged its responsibilities, and we come to the conclusion of the JCPOA. Whether this will be the model for other issues, that I don't know; everything is different, and I rather hesitate to make a comparison to other issues. But I can say this is a rare case in which diplomacy worked.

There are many other issues, but even placing other issues under control, under process, is difficult, but in this case we could reach agreement and it is being implemented, and it is quite significant for me.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Baroness Ashton, would you like to say a few words on that?

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

I think most negotiations are sort of, if you like, stand-alone, that you have a particular group of people doing a particular thing. In the case of the negotiations with Iran there were a lot of nuclear scientists and technical experts that we absolutely had to have because they were crucial to our understanding and certainty about what exactly it was being discussed, and also the implications of what was being offered, or what was being requested, so that was absolutely vital.

I do think it's interesting, though, that the Security Council role in it, and the role of the permanent membership, in this case with Germany added to it, for me personally, having to coordinate that for many years, it felt like many years, it was a really good example of a very collaborative approach and I think when you're looking at how best to try and resolve particular questions you might look at some of the examples of what negotiation groupings or tactics or strategies have actually worked.

But my personal view, from negotiations I've done, is that each one is very different, requires very different people, and there is a danger that if you think too broadly about what it is you're trying to do that you won't succeed anyway because it becomes too complicated and complex to try and resolve all of the many, many issues that you would like to see on the table. So it is also about clarity of what you're doing, and more than anything it is knowing what your mandate says and what you do, and knowing what it doesn't say, and therefore what you don't try and do.

**KIM GHATTAS**

I'll take the last two questions in one; one on this side, go ahead.

**DEENA SVENDERRY**

Thank you very much; Deena Svenderry [?] from King's College London. The nuclear deal doesn't cover Iran's missile problem, but obviously it's part of Iran's problematic behavior, and while some Iranian officials have point blank refused to talk about it, others have indicated a willingness to negotiate on some aspects of the program, for example constraining Iran's ability to test missiles above a certain range. But for that they would require a more for more deal; they would want something in exchange for it, is this something that the panel thinks is possible? And, Ambassador Otaiba, is that something you think would be acceptable to the region, to give Iran more to get more back? Thank you.

**KIM GHATTAS**

And the question on this side, and then we'll get the panel to answer all in one.

**SHYLA SADIQI**

Shyla Sadiqi [?] from Voice of America Persian TV. This morning EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, said that she believes that Iran is not walking away from the deal because they have invested so much, especially with regards to political leadership and economy, and she

believes that they will stay with the deal. Also, it's a common established belief among the [unclear] that Iran cannot be trusted, and my question is that, in your belief, can Iran be pushed further? Do they give in to more pressure, perhaps, on their behavior, also towards re-negotiating, let's say, the sunset clause?

**KIM GHATTAS**

The two questions kind of are connected. Director General Amano, if I can start with you; do you think that the Iranians are sticking to the deal, will stay with it? Do you fear they might walk away at some point? And then for the rest of the panelists, if you want to start thinking about what more you can do to pressure Iran on its ballistic missile program, and do they get something in return?

**YUKIYA AMANO**

I went out to Tehran in December last year and I had a meeting with President Rouhani, Vice President Salehi and Foreign Minister Zarif, I also had a meeting with Mr. Zarif in February, in the margins of the Munich Security Conference, and all of them kept on saying that they will not be the first to leave the agreement. They re-confirmed their commitment to the JCPOA. However, the IAEA is not analyzing the remarks, but we are focusing on facts, and we are focusing on verifying and monitoring the amount of LEU, heavy water, and we keep on monitoring nuclear activities. So what is important for us, it is nice to have dialogue with them, it is helpful, but in the end the factual and impartial finding on the ground is most important, and we are doing that.

**KIM GHATTAS**

It's about verification. We've got about a minute left, if I can ask each one of you to very briefly answer the question about further pressure when it comes to Iran's ballistic missile, and whether it should get more in exchange for agreeing.

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

Well I'll answer the question; I learned long, long ago to not comment on something that begins with some people in Iran say, because that's got me into all kinds of trouble of the years.

**KIM GHATTAS**

And all kinds of less theoretical questions.

**CATHERINE ASHTON**

I'm not doing a theoretical question; the answer is I don't know.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Ambassador Otaiba, in the region, how is this seen? Would you like to see more pressure on Iran for its ballistic missile program, and give them something else in return?

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

If we're going to propose a notion of a negotiation on Iran's regional behavior I would not exclude it, or keep it exclusive to just missile testing; there are a lot of aspects of Iran's behavior that are deeply problematic, from support of terrorist groups to arming of militias, support for proxies. So if we're going to sit down and have this conversation, I would like to have the conversation revolve about everything, about how Iran operates outside of its borders in our region. So, if we entertain the principle, I would like to discuss everything, and I'd put everything on the table and not just...

**KIM GHATTAS**

And would you be willing to give something in return?

**YOUSEF AL OTAIBA**

In theory, yes, but what is it that we have to offer? We're not the ones who imposed the sanctions, we're the ones who enforce the sanctions, and so I don't think there's much in our toolkit to offer Iran that could be attractive to them. But I think this is ultimately a negotiation about how we co-exist together, and again we're willing to have that conversation, provided we see interest from the other side, which so far we haven't seen.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Eli, last word, briefly.

**ARIEL (ELI) LEVITE**

I think there is huge room for Iran to reassure others about its regional behavior and its nuclear program. What would it take? It would take pressure and incentives. I think it's pretty straightforward. The mixture of those will depend on what Iran is willing to put on the table. I think that the major hold-up for the moment is domestic political and strategic issues within Iran in terms of its willingness to do so. And we should, I think, be willing to offer more, but certainly demand a great deal more and threaten a great deal more if they don't do it.

**KIM GHATTAS**

Thank you very much to our wonderful panelists, Director General Amano, Baroness Ashton, Ambassador Otaiba, Dr. Levite; please give them a round of applause, but stay in your seats. Please stay in your seats for a few closing words from Toby Dalton from Carnegie Endowment. Thank you for this conference; he's going to bring us to a close for this first day of the session, and don't forget the reception right after. Toby.

**TOBY DALTON**

Indeed the most dangerous position is between the panelists and the food, so without further ado, thank you so much for coming today and staying throughout. It's great to see so many people stick around for a fantastic discussion here. We'll start again tomorrow morning, breakfast at seven o'clock, side sessions at 7:30, and then the main sessions again at nine o'clock, with Senior Director from the National Security Council, Chris Ford, in conversation with Bob Einhorn, that's at nine o'clock tomorrow morning. So, please enjoy the reception, and we'll see you again in the morning.

