

What Happened to Democracy: Society at the Crossroads

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Nearly twenty years ago, a democratic revolution swept through Russia. In resisting the State Committee of the State of Emergency in August 1991, the people broke through Russia's Berlin Wall with their own hands. Acts of courage and a general sense of resolve and unity created widespread expectation of change. Though the three men who died in clashes near the Russian White House during the night of August 21 (Dmitri Komar, Vladimir Usov, and Ilya Krichevski) were the sole victims of these events, they personified the country, representing three classes – worker, intelligentsia, and entrepreneur – and three ethnicities.

The revolution, however, remained unfinished. It changed the means of production but not the ruling class. Those who made it happen did not come to power. The people, who had suffered so much, proved capable of making the breakthrough, but neither those in the White House nor those who kept vigil at the bonfires and manned the barricades had any clear vision of the future.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, which followed the events of August 1991, was a drama for most of its citizens. There may have been consolation in its relative bloodlessness, in its overthrow of totalitarianism, and in the freedom it provided those who escaped the debris to build their own destiny. But for the vast majority of people (who had expressed a preference for national unity in the Gorbachev referendum of 1991), the lost country remained their homeland, for which their fathers and grandfathers had fought. Tens of millions of people, including 25 million ethnic Russians, found themselves “abroad,” the economy and the cultural landscape in

tatters. What is surprising is not that Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a major geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century (though the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, the World Wars, the Holocaust, and the repression of millions of people in the USSR, China, and Cambodia were also major geopolitical catastrophes of the 20th century), but that so many national and international politicians and experts took these words to be evidence of a nostalgia for totalitarianism.

The reforms of the 1990s were inconsistent, and socio-political breakdown and economic disruption led to a sharp decline in production and the standard of living, the exacerbation of social and interethnic problems, and the spread of violence. But the democrats who were blamed for these failures had never been “in power” (or were at best only “near power,” given that Yegor Gaydar was prime minister for only nine months). The history of the decade was the history of the attempts by democrats to influence the decisions of those in power – sometimes more, sometimes less successfully. And since 2000, the new government has focused on building a “power vertical,” with authoritarianism essentially restored and the fragile democratic structures of Yeltsin's time eroded and diluted.

The pendulum has swung back. The people, who twenty years ago had anticipated change (even among members of the Communist Party in the late 1980s, 80 percent favored change), now advocated “stability” and “order.” The most peaceful of countries in the early 1990s now applauded bullying neighboring countries, and the interethnic tolerance that once ensured “friendship between peoples” became a thing of the past.

This trend was a logical outcome of the poignant “leap” of the 1990s and the difficulties associated with it. Paradoxically, however, the tendency toward authoritarianism was accompanied by a growth in personal liberty. Crimson jackets and gold chains became artifacts of a distant past. Attitudes toward work also changed: employed by companies with modern work practices, many Russians now perform on a par with Europeans and Americans and still stand up for their rights. At the end of the Soviet period, labor productivity in Russia was (by some estimates) fourteen

times lower than that of Western countries; it is now only four times lower, and in Russian branches of Western companies, productivity is the same as in their head offices. During the 1998 crisis, Western companies in Russia replaced the majority of their foreign managers with Russians, which turned out to be an effective step. Also, Russian public opinion surveys now list self-worth at work as a key factor in personal fulfillment.

The “apartment–car–dacha–wife–lover” formula for success is fading. Orientation toward family has become more common, as well as the acceptance of common-law marriage, single motherhood, and divorce. If, in the early nineties, stress on education dipped as it lost its association with income, its position has now been fully restored, and the majority of parents would not dream of sending their children into the future without a university diploma. With less intrusion from the state, relations between parents and children have also changed greatly. A new trend, though by no means universal, emphasizes a cooperative approach to the harmonious upbringing of children, and fathers are more closely involved and recognize fatherhood as one of the main criteria of a successful man. The perception of abortion as a tragedy has been revived, and the number of abortions has declined sharply, from 8 million in the USSR in the 1980s to 1.2 million in Russia in 2009.

To the deep regret of many, belief in heroism and interest in our national literature have faded into the past. But Russians have been building and renovating their homes – doubling the number of square meters per person, the most important statistical category in Soviet times – and, for the first time in centuries, altering the rural landscape. Many families have bought their own cars, and yet the number of road fatalities (adjusted for the increase) has fallen by almost 80 percent.

Deep problems remain in all these areas, yet the positive turn toward a more civilized domestic life cannot be ignored. Even the endless radio and television talk shows, the broadcasts allowing online input, and the ephemeral surveys on popular issues, all of which can be seen as a distraction and a dumbing down of intellectual life, nevertheless can, through repetition,

prompt reflection about Russian society's development. Some experts believe that, with the growth of capital and formation of a middle class, Russia, on its own, will inevitably follow the same path as other European countries; those with more to lose will have an interest in the supremacy of the law and guaranteed rights for themselves and their children.

Meanwhile, according to the latest annual national viability rating (the Failed States Index), published by the Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy* magazine in late June 2010, Russia is a country with a "less than average level of stability." This characterization is based on the country's record of limited civil liberties, growing corruption, and strong autocratic tendencies. According to the estimates of Freedom House, in ten years Russia has deviated further from democracy than any other post-communist country. Of course, democracy in itself is no guarantee of modernization or effective management. At the beginning of the 1990s, Adam Przeworski, citing Latin America as an example, showed that, of the eleven countries in the region that implemented democratic reform, only four had achieved meaningful socio-economic development. Of the countries that had taken the path toward authoritarianism, however, not a single one had prospered. Exceptions such as Chile and China are rare and possible only at the stage of industrial development, not at the post-industrial stage.

Democracy in Russia has never had a fortunate path, in theory or in practice. Every Russian knows that the 19th century revolutionaries Alexander Gertsen, Nikolay Chernyshevsky and Nikolay Dobrolyubov were called revolutionary democrats. Even Lenin's "new type" party, which did not shun expropriations and advocated the use of violence, was called socialist/democratic. For the entire Soviet period it was customary to bash "bourgeois democracy," contrasting it to "socialist democracy." Eastern European countries were called "peoples' democracies." This nomenclature has led to a great deal of confusion within Russia around the concept of "democracy" (confusion that, incidentally, affects many other concepts that are understood differently within Western political science: socialism, nationality and nationalism, fascism, terrorism, etc.). During the 1990s,

on top of everything else, democracy became associated with illegal privatization, economic chaos, impoverishment, and gang violence, while now, on the other hand, paradoxically, most people in Russia are convinced that the country is on the road to democracy.¹

When it is proclaimed that Russians hold “different values” from those held by people in the West, it is important to ask what this means. According to public opinion surveys, Russians value property rights, personal and family safety, the right to change their residence, and the right to travel abroad no less than their counterparts in the West. The overwhelming majority of Russians advocate freedom of the press and freedom of religious belief. Romano Prodi, former chairman of the European Commission, once said that Western countries and Russia will have everything in common “except their institutions.” But such institutions are the very tools that, historically, have developed to ensure that, when the reins of government are passing over to the “majority,” they don’t end up in the hands of power-hungry tyrannical groups – just as the Marxist slogan “Factories to the Workers” inevitably led to totalitarianism. These institutions include competitive and replaceable political authority, subordination of government to the people by means of free elections, an independent alternative mass media, and an autonomous judicial system. It is, however, via these institutions that Russian “values” do, in fact, diverge from Western ones: the realization that one can participate in political processes through elections has not yet taken hold in the country (it has not had the time to emerge.) There has traditionally been an ambiguous attitude toward the law and the courts (as a Russian proverb goes, “A law can be turned in any direction”), and the media have not yet become a true fourth power.

A special feature of Russia is also its national search for meaning. In order for such institutions to sink into the national consciousness, they must not only become rooted in everyday life and be patently useful, but (especially important for the Russian national consciousness) also perceived as a force for good. This can only be possible if they are genuine institutions, rather than imitations. As it turns out, institutions must actively operate so

that people can become accustomed to having them, yet it is the people who must implement them. Though the contradiction is obvious, in the analysis to follow, an attempt is made to explore the state of principal institutions alongside the dynamics of the prevailing attitudes toward them. Since the author is, by professional specialization, more familiar with developments in the United States than elsewhere, citations in a number of cases are made to similar experiences in the United States. The volume of this collection of articles makes it impossible to illuminate the topic completely; this is not an in-depth expert analysis, but a series of sketches on the topic that in many cases can only outline problems and trends.

Patrimonialism and Paternalism

Other than during the so-called Times of Trouble (the early seventeenth century, the two revolutions of 1917, and the recent upheaval at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s), Russia has always been power-centric, and this power has always been marked by despotism and coercion. The trend toward liberalism (to use the modern term) has existed for most of Russia's history: during the 12th and 13th centuries, cities were governed by general assemblies called *veche*, and self-rule in Novgorod continued until the last quarter of the 15th century. Liberal reforms were carried out under Catherine II, Alexander I and Alexander II, Nicholas II, and in our day under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Liberal thought, which, as Lord Byron put it, is "brightest in dungeon," has existed in Russia for many centuries. Aleksander Yanov traces to as early as the 16th century the roots of the classic confrontation between advocates of Russian uniqueness and adherents of development along Western liberal lines (Slavophiles and Westerners), which lasted for the entire 19th century and has spilled over into current times. Attempts to move forward have always ended in failure, but it is equally true that after periods of reaction, such attempts have always continued.

The turbulent 1990s, despite their difficulties as a period of transition, were years of hope for the development of democracy. Reforms were carried out, although inconsistently, and fragile democratic institutions were created and began to function. The shelling of the White House in October 1993 and the war in Chechnya were tragic events, but political life continued throughout the decade and the press was free. The country attained the highest democratic rating of all of the post-Soviet states with the exception of the Baltic countries.

In the early 2000s, events began to move in the opposite direction. The unique parameters of this transformation have been described in many studies. Under the slogan of “sovereign democracy,” power in Russia became non-elective and essentially immutable and non-competitive. Ownership and government began to merge, leading to a growth in corruption, governmental intrusion into the economy, and monopoly of state-owned companies (which had long proven themselves non-competitive compared to private companies, both in theory and in practice). Totally dependent upon the state, business has been stifled. Development of small- and medium-sized enterprises has become very difficult. The government apparatus has grown beyond reasonable proportion and the ranks of bureaucrats have been filled predominantly by former *siloviki* personnel (a trend that has only recently begun to wane). In a number of regions, government agencies have been linked to organized crime, as was recently seen in the southern village of Kushchevskaya in Krasnodarsky Krai where twelve people – including four children – were massacred in a farmer’s home by a local agricultural baron – with connection to the authorities, the former pressuring farmers to hand over their land. Many articles of the constitution are being violated: gubernatorial elections have been canceled in order to create a power vertical, the procedures for forming the Council of the Federation have been changed, and the State Duma has been transformed from a representative body to the place where the Kremlin’s decisions are rubber-stamped. Presidential elections take place without open, competitive debate, or equal access to political process and the media for

all political parties. The selection of a successor and “tandem” rule have also departed from procedures specified in the constitution. The list of cities where mayoral elections have been cancelled continues to grow, and now includes essentially all cities with a million inhabitants or more.

This concentration of power, to a significant extent, corresponds to public expectation. According to Vladimir Ryzhkov, there has been a consolidation of society based upon authoritarianism, although it must be said that this means only a part of society, even if it is the majority. If in a poll in 1989 the largest group (45 percent) of those surveyed answered that “power should never, under any circumstances, be concentrated with one person,” by 2008 this number had fallen to 17 percent. The same number of respondents was convinced that “our nation always needs a strong hand”² (although recently the number of advocates of such a position has declined).

But as with many of the other parameters, people have an obviously ambiguous attitude towards the authorities. Over 60 percent of Russians believe that democracy would be the best system for Russia, but many take this to mean order and a fair distribution of produced benefits, and by no means necessarily the division of powers or competitive elections. About 70 percent advocate government control over the harvest of natural resources and key industries, while approximately the same number are convinced that government bureaucrats are thieves. According to the results of a Levada Center survey, 33 percent of respondents believe that power in Russia is maintained by “a tweed ring style of corruption” (the most frequent answer); 30 percent believe it to be supported “by the full force of a state machine that serves only the interests of those in power;” and 21 percent feel that it relies upon those “brought to power based upon personal loyalty.” Nearly a quarter of citizens polled criticized the authorities for the “lack of social control and contempt for the law.”³

Meanwhile, most Russians have a very different attitude towards government from people in the West: not as accountable and replaceable agencies that provide services, but rather as centers of power. Viewing the

government as something holy and God-given, with the chief ruler seen as the father of the nation anointed by God, is certainly a thing of the past. Yet government is perceived as a given – something impossible to influence. The majority of Americans are also convinced that politicians are dishonest and that politics is a dirty business. However, unlike Americans, Russians generally do not believe that anything depends on them and do not feel responsible for what the authorities have done to them in the past or will do in the future. In the summer of 2010, Putin's and Medvedev's popularity declined, yet the ruling tandem wields enough power to decide "between themselves" who should be nominated for the next presidential term.

Paternalism is a frequent topic in the press, but such assertions do not reflect the full picture. The expectations Russians have of their government are based more on the government's taking on itself everything, so it might as well do something. Workers in the USSR used to receive an average of 10 percent of what they had earned, with the remainder going to weapons and heavy industry – machines producing machines plus a centralized and largely ineffective social sphere. Moreover, during the lives of the current generation alone, the authorities have "changed" or "replaced" money four times, making decisions that led to sharp devaluation and evaporating accumulated savings within hours.

Only Western Sovietologists or people born since the collapse of the USSR could think that the Soviet government provided care for everyone. The citizens of prosperous Western Europe had become much more accustomed to the role of government services in their lives and to social benefits provided by the government. Living in the Soviet Union, people knew very well that they had to do everything themselves (tinker, fix, "arrange," "acquire," "ram through"). As a famous Soviet song went, they "were producing rockets and conquering the Yenisey," 80 percent by hand, lived within several square meters of space per person, stood in lines for four hours per woman per day, never knew of disposable syringes or Pampers, sewed and knitted, grew their own food in gardens and "canned" the bulk of all the vegetables and fruits consumed in the country. Services, in

the contemporary sense, were nearly non-existent or exceedingly few and of poor quality. People were resourceful and thrifty, though in an unusual way. It is no coincidence that Russians adapted to the totally new market conditions after the communist regime collapsed with an entrepreneurial spirit and ability that surprised the West. It is also telling that, based upon data from the mid-1990s, Russians were the highest paid immigrant group in the United States.

Contemporary nostalgia for Soviet times compares current conditions, which have never been easy in this country, with Soviet propaganda and mythology. Yet even for those who lack impartiality, housing problems and chronic shortages inevitably elicit a feeling that the government owes them something. Though people believe that the authorities “must do” (even judicial appointments and the provision of charity are expected to come through state auspices), at the same time they remain convinced that the government “must, but doesn’t.” In a recent poll, 60 percent of those surveyed said that they have had no contact with any state organizations over the past three years. The survey results, published in the *Moscow Times* in spring 2010, indicated that Russian managers, even in a crisis, were significantly less inclined to rely on the support of the government than their colleagues working in Europe.

Experts differ on the potential for the government’s transformation towards liberalism and whether it would be useful to work with the government the way it is and try to effect change “from inside.” Some believe that the point of no return has already been passed, and political modernization within the existing system’s framework of power is no longer possible. Others continue to hope for a gradual transformation of the country towards greater liberalism under pressure from market imperatives and globalization.

Within government agencies, understanding of the need for liberalization is only at a surface level – and even then priority is given to modernization of the economy. In 2007, when he was still the first vice prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev spoke in Davos about the need to “create new

institutions based upon the fundamental principles of a viable democracy.” However, his landmark article “Russia, Forward!,” published in autumn 2009, when he already had been president for two years, included no plans to revive any real mechanisms to implement society’s interests, or to use such levers for influencing government. Speaking at a forum in Yaroslavl in September 2010, President Medvedev said that democracy is a precondition for the country’s development, but his interpretation of democracy did not include restoration of the division of powers, fair and competitive elections, independent courts, or a free mass media. In November 2010, one week before his annual message to the Federal Assembly, Medvedev spoke in an Internet video message about the dangers of stagnation and the need for real competition between parties. A week later his televised presidential address, broadcast to a much larger audience, failed to mention these points.

We hear the authorities speak of “sovereign democracy.” Some government ideologues interpret this term as some special form of democracy in which the authorities determine which institutions should receive particular attention and when. Others see it simply as democracy in a sovereign country independent of external influences. However, both are convinced that “democracy should suit the level of development in the country,” and that the government sets and guides the agenda and uses political instruments to control the people, rather than the other way around (when the people elect their government and require it to accountably execute their will). Chief Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov, first deputy head of the president’s administration and deputy chairman of the presidential Modernization and Technological Development Committee, asserted recently that consolidated government authority is the main and the only instrument of modernization.⁴

The Russian people have the government they *have* and not the government they *deserve* – as has been the case over nearly the entire course of their history. In order to change the situation, elections need to be restored from top to bottom with free competition and equal access to mass

media for all political candidates. The cynical assertions pushed by the government and its servile press must not establish that “it is this way everywhere,” that true democracy does not exist, that elections are manipulated everywhere and all courts are pressured, that in all countries the press is bought off and permission required to hold demonstrations, and if it hasn’t been given, then people are, using Putin’s words, “beaten on the head with a club.” What does exist everywhere, however, is the need for a significant number of people in civil society to exert pressure continually on the authorities – which will be further discussed below.

Parties for Show and Parties for Elections

In 1987, the process of establishing non-governmental organizations began, leading to the birth of a multitude of parties and discussion clubs. The not-yet-quite-free but still competitive elections of 1989-1990⁵ also helped to increase the number of parties. As in a number of other areas of political action, however, party-building resumed after an interval of nearly seventy years. As new as it was, without a tradition of practice, it differed significantly from the way such activity was conducted in the developed democracies. During the last years of the USSR and the first half of the 1990s, party-building was characterized by a lack of direct links between the new parties and particular social groups. Very few parties had a developed organizational structure with local branches. According to the joint research done in the summer of 1991 by the University of California and the Russian Institute of the State and the Law, only 42 percent of the population knew of the existence of any party other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the intelligentsia, business people, and the nascent middle class – which together represent the most independent and active strata of society – had parties they could vote for, and their votes actually counted. In the early 2000s, on the other hand, the govern-

ment pursued a line aimed at marginalizing democratic parties by preventing their access to broadcast media, complicating the registration of electoral candidates, confiscating whole editions of informational publications, and rigging election results. The declining influence of the liberal democratic parties also suffered from the reduction in the ranks of the intelligentsia, on which they had greatly relied. Many had emigrated (at a rate of around a hundred thousand per year); others couldn't find a place in the new epoch and became disillusioned and marginalized. Democratic slogans were being discredited not only because of the economic difficulties associated with reforms, but also through inadequate organization, and lack of action, flexibility, and initiative on behalf of the democratic parties themselves.

The government needs parties in order to facilitate control over political processes and to legitimize its candidates through elections. But it is also interested in having parties under its controls that represent the government's interests (which is why the United Russia party was created), or in having submissive decoy parties that it can use to attract and neutralize the votes of the discontented. Appropriating the ideas and the electorate of other parties, the government skillfully manipulates public opinion. It is content with the current "one-and-a-half party system," including the pro-Kremlin United Russia party and several "second echelon" parties of the "inside-the-system opposition" (A Just Russia, also created from above, but more socially oriented, the subservient but outwardly provocative Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) with its socially active but predictable electorate). Representatives of the government have declared on numerous occasions that the country has a well-established party system, making it clear that the authorities are not interested in having other political associations, although in his Internet video message aired in December 2010, Dmitry Medvedev admitted the desirability of political competition with the participation of other political parties besides United Russia.

The 2001 Law on Political Parties greatly complicated the creation of new parties. It introduced a requirement to collect 50,000 signatures in order to register a party, under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, and these signatures are to be collected in all regions. Seven parties in Russia managed to achieve registration. Four of them, United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party, and A Just Russia, are represented in the State Duma, while the other three, Yabloko, the Right Cause, and the Patriots of Russia, did not win elections to the legislature parliament. Thus, a significant portion of society has no representation in the upper legislative body of the state. When registration of new parties is excessively complicated, both legally and as a result of the government counteraction, it becomes more realistic to launch political movements, although under the 2001 law political associations lost their right to nominate candidates to federal or regional elections.

Still, a demand for new political forces in society does exist. According to Levada Center surveys, the majority of Russian citizens believe that Russia needs a political opposition, while 71 percent see the need for “Social movements and parties that would be in the opposition and could seriously impact the life of the country,” an opinion that is growing year by year.⁶ Over 20 percent of Russians also believe that there is a future for liberal democratic parties in Russia. About the same number are favorably disposed towards the coalition For a Russia Without Arbitrariness and Corruption, established in September 2010 by Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladimir Milov, and Vladimir Ryzhkov, which intends to register as a party for participating in elections.

United Russia, like the CPSU in the Soviet days, is not a party in the true sense, but serves as a lever for implementing the government’s decisions and mobilizing those who wish to advance their careers by participating in such activities. The United Russia party presents itself as having plans that reflect a variety of opinions, where there is “room for everyone’s interests,” whether a “statist” or an advocate of modernization. However, realistically it only has the support of the bureaucracy, military personnel,

and people with high-school or vocational education engaged primarily in physical labor or agriculture. The difference between how the educated people who use the Internet and the mass audience of federal television view the United Russia party was illustrated during the regional elections in March 2010. After its active television election campaign, United Russia received a decisive number of votes, but an online interview with Boris Gryzlov on Gazeta.ru provoked a sharp rejection by visitors to the website, who posted several thousand negative questions and comments. Beginning with the Duma elections of 2007, when the party gained strength by having Putin placed at the head of its candidates list for regional elections, the party's results steadily declined⁷ in spite of pressure from above and systematic wriggling of votes, and experts placed its actual rating at no more than 35 percent.

United Russia's declining popularity was influenced by governmental inaction during the wildfires of summer 2010, which coincided with the start of the primary election campaign. The dismissal of Yury Luzhkov, one of the founders and co-chairman of the party, also damaged its position. However, despite the recent decline in the tandem's ratings, the party's political levers, along with its ability to manage the elections, remains enough to guarantee United Russia's victory at the polls. Also, because other parties are kept "equidistant" from the airwaves of the federal television channels, the party's decrease does not necessarily lead to an increase in the popularity of its rivals. The ratings for the CPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia have fluctuated within the bounds of statistical error (under 3 percent); in summer 2010, 9, 8, and 4 percent of voters respectively were prepared to cast votes for them.⁸

The CPRF remains the only second party with real influence, developed organizational structures, divergent networks in the regions, and an active, though aging, electorate uncorrupted by political technologies. Predictions in the 1990s that the Communist Party would transform itself into a social democratic party have not been realized. Although the "first-stage" program for the CPRF allows for a "multiform" economy and

advocates creation of “conditions for the development of small and middle enterprises,” it continues to call for nationalization, first of the strategic industries, followed by socialization of production and the restoration of Soviet structures of power. At the same time, the communists consistently take anti-Western positions, explaining the fall of the communist regime as the result of a “Western conspiracy” and describing the reforms of the 1990s as the plottings of a “fifth column” and deliberate “national genocide.” They also consider globalization an imperialist reconstruction of the world. Reading the party’s documents and materials on its website evokes a depressing sense of *déjà vu*: “Nationalization will create the strong economic foundation needed for further transformation;” “social forms of ownership over the primary means of production will predominate;” “socialist forms of economic activity are more efficient in providing for the well-being of the people;” “science will clearly demonstrate its significance as the direct production force in society;” “the CPRF views socialism as a society free from exploitation, based upon common property and distribution of the fruits of life based on the amount, quality and results of labor.” It is a case of “been there, done that” – the seventy years of Soviet history were enough to prove what these postulates mean in practice. Moreover, the Communist Party in recent years has begun to use Stalin’s name more and more frequently.

In the 1990s, it was widely believed among liberals that the CPRF posed the greatest danger. In order to prevent its accession to power, the Yeltsin government instigated mortgage auctions and even went along with the rigging of the 1996 presidential elections. However, using all methods to exclude communists from power on the principle that “the ends justify the means” was hardly less of an evil.

The aging communist electorate still has the potential to grow because of the general dissatisfaction with the economy. This forces the other parties to play on the same field, trying to grab the agenda of defending social rights and pulling a portion of the social democratic voters to their side. During the elections of recent years, when there has been no viable

alternative, many of those dissatisfied with current policies have also voted for the communists as the only alternative to the existing government. At the same time, the CPRF has positioned itself as a party that calls for the observance of laws, honest elections, accountable government, and an independent legal system. Some experts believe that the CPRF has even taken steps to attract the business sector, promising to ensure that the established rules of the game are observed.

The real risk of destabilization comes not from the communists, but from the fascist and nationalist movements. The authorities are more favorably inclined toward them than toward anti-fascist associations and even try to play them for their own purposes, steering nationalist groups in a direction that creates support for the regime. The Rodina party was registered to participate in the Moscow Municipal Duma elections in 2005 with a nationalistic video clip that for a while ran on TV. On Peoples' Unity Day in 2010, as it had been the preceding year, permission was granted for Russian Marches to take place on central avenues in Moscow and St. Petersburg, while demonstrations planned by the anti-fascist movement Antifa were allowed only on the outskirts of the two capitals. On November 4, 2010, there were even two Russian Marches in Moscow, one of which (passing along Taras Shevchenko Naberezhnaya) included the pro-Kremlin movement Nashi. Their participation was probably intended to maintain their leadership and dilute the nationalist implications of the actions, giving it a patriotic flavor. But playing the nationalist card is dangerous, given the increased number of crimes based on nationalism. Nationalist groups are quite capable of using force to serve their interests, as demonstrated by the events of December 7 and 10-11, 2010, when the Spartak soccer club fan Yegor Sviridov was murdered and dissatisfaction with the investigating authorities led to thousands of soccer fans and nationalists blocking Leningradsky Prospekt, rioting on Manezhnaya Square, and mass beatings and pogroms. During the course of that week, there were also demonstrations and clashes between Russian and Caucasian nationalists in Moscow and other cities.

In Russian domestic political life, there continue to be no mechanisms that allow various groups and individual citizens to defend and consolidate their interests. However, there is a demand in society for new political forces. The imitation, bureaucratic, and clone parties created by the authorities cannot fill the political vacuum and cannot aid in creating an effective process for developing solutions. Despite the government's obstruction of the registration of new parties, and its blocking of equal access to the mass media and meaningful political competition, liberal democratic groups will have to built relations with social circles of broad appeal and establish coalitions of citizens interested in open and competitive elections, representative and non-corruptible government, and an uncontrolled and honest mass media.

Laws for the Non-Abiding

The new Russia has inherited a challenging situation with respect to courts, laws, and the attitudes of the people toward their observance. Lawless years of war communism, Stalinist repression, and the subsequent "stagnation" rest upon many centuries of a scornful attitude toward the law. The new country also inherited legal codes in which one law contradicted another, with priority given to the one preferred by party leaders or local officials.

Post-communist Russia retained many of the old "superlegal" habits: the subordination of the courts to the government, the entrenched system of "telephone law," and selective application of the law in general, not to mention widespread abuse and corruption, the scale of which has grown exponentially since.

This long history has led to a situation where the laws are not perceived as an expression of the collective will of society and do not correlate with concepts of morality: it is no accident that legal cases in Russia over the centuries have been judged "not based upon law, but based upon justice." This

is why the Russian writer and philosopher Alexander Gertsen, a believer in social-democratic ideals, wrote in the 1850s, “the legal paucity that has plagued the [Russian] people from the beginning has become something of a school. The scandalous injustice of one half of their laws has taught them to hate the other half as well; they submit to laws as they would to force. The absolute inequality before the law has destroyed any respect that they might have had for the law. A Russian, no matter what his title, will skirt the law or break it at every turn, when he can get away with it unpunished; moreover, this is exactly the way the government acts, as well.”⁹

The Russian intelligentsia has always abided by its own internal laws, believing that they were better, stronger, and more just than the written laws. Its self-image was formed in large part in opposition to the government ...and the laws. A major stage in the development of jurisprudence in Russia was the legal reform by Alexander II in 1864. It separated the courts from administrative and legislative authority, introduced the presumption of innocence, and competitive and open court proceedings, and established trial by jury, as well as the irreplaceability (and therefore, independence) of judicial investigators. However, even this reform, though a colossal leap forward, did not lead to the replacement of the dominant anti-legal paradigm. As Bogdan Kistyakovski wrote in the famous collection “Landmarks,” published in 1909 with contributions from leading Russian thinkers of the time, “the Russian intelligentsia consists of people who have no individual or social discipline, and this is due to the fact that the Russian intelligentsia has never respected the law and has never seen any value in it; of all their cultural values, law is off to the side. Under such conditions, our intelligentsia has been unable to establish a solid appreciation for the law and has, on the contrary, left it standing at an extremely low level of development.”¹⁰

Nevertheless, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, institutions of jurisprudence have been developed within a framework of liberal reform and under the influence of the market development imperatives. To a significant degree, they inherited the core of judicial reforms undertaken by

Alexander II: courts of arbitration, the Constitutional Court, and magistrate courts were established; beginning in 1993, initially as an experiment in a number of regions and then gradually throughout the country, jury trial courts were set up, although subsequently the sphere of their activities was subjected to many restrictions.

In recent years, the Federal Service for the Execution of Punishment has been reformed.¹¹ Incarceration under guard has been abolished for people accused of economic crimes, although this provision is frequently ignored or openly sabotaged, especially in the provinces or in political cases. Prison conditions have improved (although they still do not satisfy modern requirements), largely because of the demands of international conventions to which Russia belongs, as well as financial input and monitoring by the Council of Europe. As of July 1, 2010, Law № 262-FZ came into effect, calling for information to be provided on court hearings in the Russian Federation and to be posted on the Internet, except in cases when it represents a state secret or other information protected by law. The Pravosudie national Internet-based system has been launched to broadcast all open court sessions.¹²

There has also been some progress in people's perceptions of the role of the legal system. They have begun to appreciate the constitution as unconditionally valuable. In response to questions posed by the Levada Center ("How is power maintained in Russia?" and "On what basis and under which principles should power be maintained in the kind of country in which you would like to live?"), 51 percent noted that power should be based upon "observance of the constitution."¹³ The authorities also make reference to the constitution (Putin did not venture to go for a third consecutive term as president), as has the opposition in protesting violations of the constitution under "Strategy-31," a movement to defend the rights of assembly and free speech, which are constitutionally guaranteed though not observed by the authorities.

Recent research by the INDEM Foundation has noted an increase in people's trust of the court system, especially by those who have had some

experience in court.¹⁴ As long as a case does not involve politics and the citizen is not suing the government, government agencies, or VIPs, the courts more or less manage to perform their function. In another study conducted in December 2008 by the ZIRCON Research Group jointly with the Carnegie Moscow Center, dedicated to social activity during the crisis period, the largest segment of respondents (33 percent) stated that of all of the ways to protect their rights after being dismissed from work, the most preferred is to go to court, although less than 10 percent actually do so.

Over the previous ten years, the percentage of those who chose observance of the law as the most important social value had almost doubled, from 17 to 34 percent. Many of the respondents, especially the young, choose unwillingness to comply with bribery, as a matter of principle. Many Russian citizens have traveled abroad, in particular to Europe and America, and thus have been exposed to the way things are done in other countries. Many have also had work experience in Western firms and subsidiaries of international companies with structured rules for conducting business and corporate governance.

The development of law in Russia has also been aided by Russia's membership in European organizations and by its obligations under international agreements. The ability to turn to the European Court of Human Rights, where complaints from Russia represent the greatest number of cases from a single country under consideration (28 percent in 2009),¹⁵ not only often serves as the last resort for those seeking justice but is also an impetus for the development of citizens' awareness of their rights and, indirectly, acts as a lever to influence the government. There are also the obligations under the Helsinki Accords and the Council of Europe. In 2009, Russia's Constitutional Court, guided by the obligations that Russia had taken upon itself in connection with its membership in the Council of Europe, upheld what was essentially a moratorium on the death penalty (for its full prohibition, Protocol 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would need to be ratified.) In January 2010, Russia was the last of 47 member states of the

Council of Europe to ratify Protocol 14 to that Convention, providing for a more expeditious judgment by the European Court.

Paradoxically, two processes have proceeded in parallel: more Russians have come to expect civilized norms, including compliance with the law and the ability to have their interests legally protected; and at the same time corruption within government organizations has continued to grow. Based upon many indicators, the country usually ranks toward the middle of surveys that measure quality of life, which generally (although this isn't pleasant for those who are accustomed to believing that we always have to be "leading the world") corresponds to an average income *per capita*, average lifespan (sixty-five years), availability of the Internet, etc. Russia was rated number 51 among *Newsweek's* 100 best countries to live in published in August 2010 (but compiled just before the wildfires!).¹⁶ However, Russia ranks number 154 out of 178 based upon the Transparency International rating for the extent of corruption, and 116 of 131 according to Global Economic Forum data for the condition of the legal system. Per these rankings, we have rolled far downhill, approaching the lowest 10 percent of the countries in the world on the list. According to surveys, only 9 percent of Russian citizens believe that Russian courts are independent.¹⁷

The campaign against corruption and for reinforcing the law has been encumbered by the passage of imperfect, incorrect, unjust, and even bad laws. Law bills are frequently drafted by the very agencies they regulate and are rushed into the agenda of the State Duma in raw form, with no public discussion. This was the case with, among others, the laws on expanding the authority of the FSB, the new law on the police, and (outside the sphere of politics) the laws on healthcare and on high school education. The hearings on the YUKOS affair were a travesty of jurisprudential procedure: in the second court case, former managers and employees of the company were accused of stealing the very same oil for the failure to pay taxes on the sales of which they were convicted the first time. Not surprisingly, the prosecutor's allegations were convincing only to 13 percent of the population, and only 8 percent felt that the main motive in

the criminal affair had been a desire to restore the rule of law and justice (Levada Center survey from September 2010).

The government has been acting as though the law applies to the people but not to itself, placing state interests and the personal interests of its representatives above the law by adopting and interpreting laws to solve their own utilitarian issues. In the eyes of many in society, there are two kinds of corruption, yet both caused by the government. The first is related to big business and nationally important affairs and amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars per year; the second affects the everyday life of the people in obtaining certificates, medical assistance, education, etc. The only possible or cost-effective solution for many is to skirt the stodgy legal system or to bribe a bureaucrat to do his job. This, however, is a dead-end: there is no way to modernize, other than by reinforcing the preeminence of the law.

Some experts believe that the rebirth of institutions in Russia must start with independent courts. Business needs the courts to settle disputes, elite groups need the property they have acquired to be legally documented, and broad layers of the population need protection from arbitrary treatment and for seeking justice in civil or criminal cases. However, others believe that the independence of the courts is impossible without restoring true parliamentarianism. Be that as it may, without independent courts, all other efforts at modernization will be fruitless.

The Mass Media: Heroes and Pragmatists

An independent mass media is the most important tool of democracy, without which competitive elections, government accountability, and dialogue between the government and the people become impossible. It is the principal means of combating corruption and abuse. Journalists were the heroes of the *perestroika* period. Gorbachev only cracked open the door; it was the mass media itself that rushed in and seized

freedom of the press. The press became freer by the day: first they criticized Stalin, then Lenin, then the state structure, the CPSU, and the KGB – and after that all the skeletons came out of the closet. Newspapers were published in editions of millions, and half a dozen of the “thick” journals would frequently be ordered for an entire collective, so that as each reader finished an issue, it would be passed on, and then the whole collection would be saved. Crowds gathered at the newsstand in front of the *Moscow News* editorial office on Pushkin Square upon the release of each new edition, eager to read it. While there is no such thing in the West as “yesterday’s” news (newspapers are considered hopelessly out of date if they are a week old, and those who save and re-read newspapers are considered eccentric), in this country people used to cut out and save the best articles, passing them along to others to read – even if their liberties would have been taken away, they would at least have reading matter. Historical documents uncovering true stories of the past were seen as topical and timely. Newspapers and magazines broke down the Berlin Wall of state censorship and public awareness by criticizing, exposing, and condemning. The law on the press adopted in June 1990 (the last year before the collapse of the USSR) prohibited censorship, a prohibition reinforced in the Russian constitution in 1993 under free press rights.

At that time, our press was even more freewheeling than the American media. It may not have been the most professional at times, but at its best it engaged consistently with high culture. Of all public professional groups in the early 1990s, journalists enjoyed the greatest trust, more than the military, national politicians, or social activists. Freeing itself from ideology and repressive control, the mass media pursued the truth ...and the self-expression of journalists. Periodicals competed with one another in the depth and import of their content, elegance of language, grandiosity of phraseology, and the strength of headlines and *beaux mots*. The emotional effusiveness and opinionated expression of Russian journalism of those days was much like contemporary blogging.

The Anglo-Saxon journalistic tradition emphasizes facts and commerce. The U.S. press, for instance, from the beginning was created for two purposes: to provide information (the first American newspapers printed trade tariffs for maritime shipping) and to be sold – so that news had to be in demand, and this demand had to generate money. The first Russian private newspapers and journals were created for cultural and educational purposes. In the 18th and 19th centuries, outstanding cultural figures such as Nikolai Novikov, Aleksander Sumarokov, Denis Fonvizin, Ivan Krylov, and even Aleksander Pushkin started publications. Journalism in the 1990s was a continuation of traditions inherited through the lessons of Russian literature, which during Soviet times replaced religion, exiled from the life of the community. This journalism was more open and critical than in Western countries, though it continued to function under economic conditions that were more reminiscent of Latin America and Asia, where government control of the media is much stricter. The Russian free press of the 1990s was passionate and denunciatory. The “critical realism” of Russian culture, taught from middle school, resonated with the rebellious spirit of the times.

In 1993-1994, as part of a graduate seminar course in international communications at Marquette University in Milwaukee (U.S.), conducted together with James Scotton, chairman of the journalism department, the author led students in an analysis of the position of the mass media in Russia compared with other nations. Proceeding from one country to the next, we came to the conclusion that the mass media in post-Soviet countries were in a unique position, though not one that could continue for long. In trying to control the mass media so that it would no longer expose, or no longer only expose and rebel, the government chose to limit its freedom, mostly of television (in particular the national channels), but also increasingly that of radio broadcasts, newspapers, and magazines.

In the early 2000s, government control over the mass media steadily increased. Journalism and journalists lost much of the trust and authority they had enjoyed in the early 1990s, partly due to the commercial nature

of their activities, and partly from governmental pressure. Instead of fulfilling their informational function, many among the mass media outlets began to serve as a mouthpiece for the authorities. Within ten years, control had been established over the federal television channels and their audience of millions, and pressure on radio broadcasts had increased. NTV, the first private television channel, had its policies and broadcast content changed and many of its personnel fired, allegedly to satisfy the demands of a new business entity but in reality to change its broadcasting policy. Government control over the national channels concentrated primarily on news and political programs, but combined with the dictates of the ratings system, it also defined the style and quality of other television broadcasts. The rare exceptions, such as the TV Channel Kultura or the news programs on REN TV, only confirmed the general picture. Most broadcast television was filled with reports on meetings or trips by the president and prime minister, knock-off entertainment shows, and endless mediocre drama. Live broadcasts almost entirely disappeared.

As Leonid Parfenov said in late 2010, when accepting the Vladislav Listyev award for television excellence, “Television information has become governmentalized. Journalism and life itself have finally been divided into TV-broadcastable and TV-non-broadcastable themes. Every significant political broadcast speculates on the goals or tasks of the authorities, their moods, attitudes, friends and opponents. Institutionally, this is not information at all, rather a government PR or anti-PR campaign (which is what the airtime devoted to preliminary agitation against Luzhkov’s removal was) and, naturally, the government’s PR for itself.”

There is a Kremlin pool of journalists who are invited to report on government events. Meetings are set up for them on a regular basis, at which they are told what they are to report and how. At federal channels and in the regions, there are lists of people who may not be shown on television. There have also been odious instances of canceled broadcasts and programs. During the heated anti-Luzhkov campaign in September 2010, Andrey Karaulov’s program “Russian Hell” on the Moscow television

channel TV Center was removed for presenting an alternative position. Several episodes of Andrey Makarov's program "Justice" on REN TV were prohibited, since they dealt with the draft law on the police, after which the program was taken off the air altogether.

A number of regions and cities also block unfavorable radio stations or specific broadcasts. When the radio station Serebryanni Dozhd (Silver Rain) was interviewing Aleksey Dymovski live (the first of the "whistle-blowers in epaulets," the policeman who had posted an Internet video of his speech criticizing the abuse rampant in the Ministry of Internal Affairs), the transmission was blocked to the cities of the Moscow Oblast.

Compared with television, the print media have retained a certain measure of freedom, probably because fewer than 20 percent of Russians regularly read newspapers or magazines and such a low percentage, apparently, reduces their significance to the authorities. As opposed to Western countries, where newspapers are increasingly giving way to electronic editions, the Russian mass media have been less subject to competition from the Internet. Although the number of objective, high-quality newspapers has declined since the 1990s and their print-runs have decreased by many times, both in Moscow and the regions, many of them have continued to report on events with a variety of views. The leading Russian socio-political newspaper *Kommersant* and the business newspaper *Vedomosti* have been functioning successfully since their creation over a decade ago, and *Novaya Gazeta* and many local newspapers continue to give an unbiased picture of what is happening.

But pressure on print media is also increasing. Regional departments for press affairs and mass communication methods are used against the press. Local newspapers have directives dropped on them from above about the publication of particular materials, sometimes with special lists of "recommended" keywords for articles. There have been several instances of direct censorship, persecution of journalists, beatings, and arrests. In 2008, Mikhail Beketov, who had written about Khimki and its mayor, Vladimir Strelchenko, was brutally beaten and crippled. Oleg

Kashin, the *Kommersant* journalist and active blogger who had published articles on the Khimki forest affair, youth movements, extremists, and opposition demonstrations, was beaten nearly to death. Russia leads the region in the number of murdered journalists and is fourth in the world: according to data from the Committee to Protect Journalists, 52 journalists have been murdered in Russia since 1992 for reasons connected with their work.¹⁸ In 2010 alone, eight journalists were killed and 40 assaulted. Many cases remain unsolved: the murders of ORT TV station's anchor Vladislav Listyev, *Novaya Gazeta* correspondent Anna Politkovskaya, editor in chief of *Sovetskaya Kalmykia* Larisa Yudina, and Yury Shekochihin, a liberal journalist and State Duma deputy. Also, the beating of Mikhail Beketov has not been solved. Under a 2002 law set up to counter extremist activity, journalists and other media figures have often been accused of criticizing representatives of the government. Per an FSB decision, Natalia Morar, the Moldavian journalist of the Moscow magazine *The New Times*, was denied entry into Russia. Manana Aslamazyan, who headed the Internews NGO (which trained regional television journalists in how to work honestly and professionally), was forced to leave the country under pressure from the FSB. Newspapers and magazines have been hammered with court cases concerning the publication of supposedly slanderous articles.

According to the "Glasnost Map," compiled over four years by the Glasnost Defense Foundation, the situation for the press over the period of study has worsened, and the tools used to pressure it have increased.¹⁹ There remains not a single region in the country with a completely free mass media, and those territories that do have relative freedom of the press allow criticism of Moscow but not the leadership of their own oblast, region, or republic. New "technologies" that have appeared with the passage of anti-extremist legislation are used ever more frequently. Irek Murtazin, press secretary of the first president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaymiev, and editor in chief of the newspaper *Kazanskie Vesti*, received a real prison term for an allegedly slanderous piece in the social media source

Live Journal. According to the amendment to the law against extremism passed in 2006, criticism of government representatives also falls under the definition of extremism. A list of publications, articles, and Internet resources that the authorities deem extremist was published in July 2007 and is regularly updated. If a publication ends up on this list, it can only be removed by court order. By 2011, the list had grown to some thousand titles. Another widely used approach is the dismissal of journalists or editors for publications not to local authorities' liking, particularly around election time. During protest demonstrations, journalists are subjected to mass detention and beatings.

Paradoxically, approximately an equal number of people in the country (a majority in each case!) 1) advocate free speech; 2) believe that there is free speech in Russia; and 3) advocate the introduction of censorship, which they understand as measures to fight pornography and protect morals. At the same time, according to the aforementioned Levada Center survey, only 5 percent of Russians believe that Russian authorities rely on the support of public opinion, while 15 percent feel that the government manipulates public opinion.²⁰

Whenever mass media has been controlled in the country, the communication vacuum has always been filled by alternative means. From the 1960s to the 1980s, in spite of thorough prohibition, *samizdat* magazines were produced manually on personal typewriters. The amateur singing clubs (KSP) that spread throughout the country presented an alternative way of life and a kind of folklorish mass media, as did anecdotal humor, which served as the main entertainment and favorite pastime to accompany political and cultural discussion in kitchens throughout the country. However, since the inception of the world-wide web, centralized control over information has become more technically difficult. Polytechnological manipulation of mass consciousness via the mass media is increasingly stymied by modern communications technologies. This is somewhat reminiscent of the mid-1980s, when the start of satellite broadcasting inevitably set limits on totalitarian control behind the Berlin Wall; authorities

could not interfere with satellite signals as they had jammed the radio “voices.” As digital broadcasting (with its hundreds of channels) becomes more wide-spread, television will become less and less centralized and, accordingly, less subject to control. This is even more true of the Internet and other modern means of communication.

Although the total TV audience in Russia, in contrast to the West, has not declined (83 percent of the public watches television, the same as ten years ago), younger citizens and the intellectual elite have been moving toward the Internet. Accessible to about one half of the population, the Internet has introduced an additional layering to society, separating its users from those without access. Yet the former continues to increase, and the Internet remains a free zone in the Russian media universe. Along with the Internet, mobile telephones, which have practically covered the entire territory – more rapidly than in other countries – are also creating expanded opportunities for social communication.

The authorities are well aware of the growing significance of the Internet. Dmitry Medvedev maintains a Twitter account. In July the image-building Internet project “Modern Russia” was started, designed to promote the country internationally. Vladimir Putin’s speeches (in particular his press conferences during the trip along the new Siberian Highway) have been presented with a backdrop that shows the address of the government’s website. Medvedev has spoken of the goal of 90 percent Internet access over the next few years. Will efforts to control the sites match the spread of the Internet? Despite statements to the contrary (including Medvedev’s speech at Yaroslavl), control of the world-wide web by agencies and local authorities is distinctly possible, especially if it is technically achievable. However, the government’s priority is likely to create its own controlled Internet resources by the time the Internet begins to dominate the mass media (Internet media, social networks, video hosting, and search engines), and it is already taking specific steps in this direction.

A national search engine has been launched with the Cyrillic domain name “.рф” that would not be accessible to a non-Russified computer. This

idea first arose when, during the conflict with Georgia, authorities discovered that in any search non-government sources would come up first. In this sector, where things are fine already (there is an effective domestic leader, Yandex, market relations are functioning, annual growth is large, and there is no monopolization), the government has nevertheless striven to give itself priority. It has been proposed that the use of the national search engine be made mandatory in organizations financed out of the budget (educational establishments, government agencies, and medical institutions) to serve as its launching pad. In parallel, national software is being created for the use of government authorities, educational institutions, and defense enterprises.

Two years ago, when Yandex emerged as a powerful national company,²¹ the government began efforts to place it under its control. In the spring of 2009, the government (represented by Sberbank) obtained the “golden share” of Yandex from stockholders, giving it veto rights on the sale of more than 25 percent of the company. Some experts believe that the authorities had decided to create a new national search engine in order to pressure Yandex and bend its owners to cede control over the company for possibly both commercial and ideological purposes.

In early November 2009, Yandex announced it would no longer publish its list of top Internet search subjects. The appearance of a subject on the list had been one way to get the government's attention, continually used by the public to highlight urgent problems. After the accident at the Sayano-Shukinskaya hydroelectric power plant, the main topic on the Yandex list was the people who were reported to be trapped under the rubble. Yandex explained its decision by stating that some dishonest bloggers had been artificially “inflating” their popularity. Be that as it may, Internet users were deprived of an effective instrument for drawing attention to important topics.

Direct attempts by government agencies to control the Internet, however, are also possible. Opposition and independent websites, such as Grani.ru and the website of the radio station Ekho Moskvyy have been

subjected to numerous DdoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, with automatic programs directing thousands of messages at sites in order to bring them down. Spoilers have been widely used on the Internet (so-called trolling). There was an attempt to close the left-wing opposition website Forum.msk.ru. In April 2009, the Cherepovetsk court prohibited the electronic journal Samizdat, after calling extremist an article criticizing the city-forming enterprise SeverStal. In July 2010, the Khabarovsk court forced a local Internet service provider to block YouTube and the websites Librusek, Lib.ru, and Zhurnal.ru for publishing “extremist information” (the nationalist video “Russia for the Russians” and excerpts from “Mein Kampf”).

Skype, which defies any control, has been accused of operating without a license, paying no taxes, and creating unfair competition. Although this action has probably been dictated by a desire to remove a competitor from the market (Skype provides an essentially free alternative communications service), the possibility of a political motive cannot be excluded.

Old-time Russian journalism, as a feature of high culture, may be dead, but long live Journalism. A society cannot function normally without an independent and objective mass media. The press need not necessarily follow in the traditions of the West (impartiality and impersonality, strict division of publications by genre, and the five “Ws” to start the article), but it must be professional, reliably presenting the facts and granting opposing sides an opportunity to express their opinion. An independent mass media, uncontrolled by the government and perceived as a true fourth estate, is critical for modernization. A professional journalistic community must also develop house rules that place “political technologies,” falsehoods, manipulation, and “black PR” outside the realm of acceptable practice. The Internet and other new means of communication define a fresh battleground: the new journalism is expanding its methods via these new technologies, but the authorities are keen to take over the initiative.

Society, Civil Society, and Active Society

In spite of Russia's uniqueness (a loaded term, as every country is unique), the country is European, from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. At the basis of the culture is the language which, in spite of the immense distances, is more uniform as a result of the imperial past and Soviet homogeneity than the language of, say, the city of London. However, divisions that have existed since the time of Peter the Great have still not been bridged and have been exacerbated and expanded by the removal of the Soviet equalizing paradigm: between the well-off (with an education and career potential) and the destitute; between the inhabitants of the capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg, and those in the regions, settlements, monocities, and villages; between those who grew up in the Soviet Union and those who were born after its collapse; and now, additionally, between those with access to the Internet and those without it. Such divisions lead to a parallel existence of two paradigms, two states: people who do not expect the government to be responsible for their well-being and are independently building a life, and the majority who are used to counting on the government's involvement in everyday life and are living in anticipation of its plenipotentiary will.

Previously, as Fons Trompenaars has shown, Russians have had the smallest room among nations for the present, and significantly more room for the future and the past.²² But things have changed; the new generation lives for the here and now, and despite perceptions of the prevalence of apathy, there are indications of increased social activity. According to joint research data from the Center for the Study of Civil Society and the Non-Commercial Sector of the School of Economics and the Public Opinion Foundation, two thirds of young people under eighteen years of age consider themselves to be socially active.²³ One half of young men and women under eighteen (and 40 percent of the eighteen to thirty-five group) have, during the past two or three years, organized independent collective action to address common problems. Civil activism has been encouraged by

an increase in the popularity of the social networks and the universal hold of mobile communication, which have simplified self-organization, especially among the young, in addressing common problems.

The popular Russian thesis that society is atomized, the social fabric disintegrated, the sense of collective good and collective responsibility gone missing, needs at least some correction. Russia's characteristic communal life has been destroyed over time by both the forced liquidation of the pre-revolutionary rural lifestyle and the natural process of urbanization and consequently the disappearance of communal apartments. Although social cohesion is less a feature of Russian lives than it once was, the levels of social detachment are comparable to those in other industrialized countries. Richard Pipes, the prominent American historian, was incorrect when he wrote of a general lack of trust within Russia. Surveys have revealed a slightly lower level of trust in people in general compared to Western countries, but a greater amount of trust in acquaintances, friends, and family. Friendships tend to be closer here than in the West (even the Russian word "droog" has nuances of kinship and sharing lacking in the English word "friend"), and the institution of the Russian "babushkas" – grandmothers helping raise children, the Russian tradition of offering the best food to guests even in times of hardship, the habit of borrowing money from friends or asking a neighbor to fix a fence or a computer – none of these characteristic Russian social patterns indicate detachment from society. Anyone who has gotten their car stuck in winter snow or slipped on a sidewalk knows that there will always be people around willing to help. Those who earn more in the family have traditionally supported the less financially secure. In the early 1960s, for example, it was the elderly who typically received help; on the other hand, in the 1970s and 1980s, when government-imposed earning patterns had changed, the families of elderly intelligentsia supported their "young" children (thirty to forty years old), "until retirement," as the joke went at the time. Although the intensification of life under market conditions and the lack of time mean that a third of Russians now feel that the level of friendly discourse has

declined, to a certain extent it has been replaced by new means of communication: electronic mail, mobile and digital telephone communications, and social networking. Studies have shown that about half of Russians have close friends and that relations with their friends are nearly as important as their relations with family members. Good, friendly relations with their next-door neighbors were reported by 60 percent of Russians.²⁴ More than half of the respondents (54 percent) reported that over the past year they have helped or supported someone on their own initiative, taken steps to improve the lot of others, or engaged in philanthropy, and this is not with respect to their close relatives.²⁵

It is true, however, that Russian society lacks the habit or tradition of collective thought, of solidarity in achieving common goals. The deep suspicion of mass action was a characteristic trait of the intelligentsia even before the Revolution, and in Soviet days most people were unwilling to take part in collective protest, as it could put an end to one's personal life and endanger family members, while official mass demonstrations were staged and hypocritical, and hence to no point. The pseudo-movements organized by the authorities over the past decade have reinforced this negative attitude. Many people are weary, skeptical, and suspicious of the idea of taking part in collective action and attempting to influence the course of events in this way, yet they do so if they feel that they can make a difference.

During the wildfires of summer 2010, seeing the helplessness of the authorities and the lack of centralized information, people collected clothes and food for those who had been burned out and found flashlights, shovels, face masks, motorized pumps, and fire hoses for the volunteers, and frequently for the firefighters themselves. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers, including city dwellers, joined in fighting the fires and delivering clothing to the newly homeless who had lost everything. In a survey conducted by *Pyatnitsa*, the weekly supplement of *Vedomosti*, to which 42 percent responded to the question, "Can the volunteers change the situation with the fires?" by answering, "Yes, because the current efforts are inadequate;" another 36 percent answered, "Yes, because no one will un-

less the volunteers do.” Only 20 percent answered, “No, this is something the professionals should do.”²⁶ There's paternalism for you!

From the onset of the 2000s, many experts have predicted an inevitable increase in popular demonstration and loss of control by the authorities. They have anticipated that an unspoken social agreement, formulated by experts as “stability in exchange for non-participation in politics,” and then, “limited rights in exchange for growing personal well-being,” will come to an end soon, when the government turns out to be incapable of fulfilling its social promises, and there will be mass acts of protest and a mandatory change in course. However, they have continually pushed forward the time when they expect this bifurcation to take place. As long as the economy was growing and oil prices were high, the government “could” (and it can't be said that the people “didn't want to”) continue to live “in the same old way.” There was also a certain sense of exhaustion following the stormy years of change and economic perturbation. Even the crisis did not provoke mass protest. Although the GDP declined by 8 percent in 2009, the government continued to use its exhausted financial resources to plug social holes.

However, according to public opinion surveys, social anxiety has increased. The number of people who are willing to participate in protest demonstrations is growing. According to data from the Public Opinion Foundation, in 2009 their numbers averaged around 20 percent,²⁷ while in 2010 they were no less than 25 percent.²⁸ According to a Levada Center study, nearly 40 percent of Russians tend to support actions similar to Strategy-31.²⁹ 85 percent of respondents believe that government must listen to the opinions of protesting citizens. Only 29 percent believe that this already happens in Russia, while 56 percent are convinced of the opposite. From March 2009, the number of Russians who think that the authorities are too severe in their reactions to protestors has grown from 18 to 28 percent, while the portion of those who are uncertain how to answer has declined from 47 to 33 percent.³⁰

Legal statutes adopted over the years that relate to civil activism have been primarily repressive. The law increasing the authority of the FSB,

allowing it to summon citizens and warn them about their “inappropriate behavior,” and the new law on the police, which in essence removes the presumption of innocence from citizens and grants it to the officers of law enforcement, are obvious examples. Characteristic was Vladimir Putin’s comment on unsanctioned gatherings. He referred to Great Britain, where, in his opinion, demonstrators are treated in the same way as they are in Russia: “[If you] go where you’re not supposed to, they’ll beat you on the head with a club. Not supposed to be here? You’re here? Take what’s coming to you.”³¹

Despite repressive laws, protest action has increased. The first wave occurred in 2005 in connection with the “cash for benefits” reform, changes to the pension system, and increases in the prices of residential utilities and services. The government then backed down and changed the procedure for replacing benefits. The second wave of protest began in 2010. In January, and then again in August, up to 10,000 people demonstrated in Kaliningrad against high tariffs and local and federal government policy. In February, there were mass protests by drivers against the chaos on the roads caused by state officials’ vehicles equipped with flashing lights. In March, under the framework of the all-Russian Day of Anger protest action held in over 50 cities, demonstrators protested against growing tariffs, increased taxes, unemployment, and declining living conditions, and also made certain political demands. Drivers in Vladivostok protested against the prohibition of cars with right-hand steering, and in Pikulev there were demonstrations against the mass dismissals that had resulted from the closure the city’s major enterprise. From mid-2009, and throughout 2010, protest meetings were held every other month on Triumphalnaya Square in Moscow as part of Strategy-31; the meeting was finally allowed by the city authorities only on October 31, 2010 (for the first time in a year and a half), following the departure of Mayor Yury Luzhkov. Aside from Moscow, Strategy-31 protests involved more than 60 Russian cities and have begun to be held abroad as well, mostly with the participation of expat Russians and émigrés from the former Soviet republics. The brutal beating

of *Kommersant* journalist Oleg Kashin in November of 2010 rocked the entire country, including the journalistic community, the blogosphere, and the public at large. There were protests and picket lines in many cities, with 2000 journalists signing a letter to the president demanding a fair investigation. In December, thousands of citizens of Samara, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Izhevsk, and Khabarovsk took part in demonstrations and signed letters against the previous year's presidential initiative to reduce the number of time zones, which could degrade their living conditions.

Protests by swindled people who prepaid for their apartments in buildings that were never constructed have never waned; neither have demonstrations against city building policy, which has proved detrimental to residential housing and historical buildings and led to highway collapse and corruption. In spring of 2010, the entire country watched the stand-off between local authorities and the inhabitants of the village of Rechnik near Moscow as their homes were being demolished. In Moscow, defenders of architectural legacy protested in Kadashi, on Bolshaya Nikitskaya, Strastnoy Boulevard, and many other parts of the city against the demolition of historical buildings. In Moscow, demonstrations were held against the new General Plan for the city's development as well as so-called dotty construction (inserting new buildings into the scarce remaining slots of historic districts). In St. Petersburg, there were continued protests against the construction of the Gazprom skyscraper, which would have destroyed its historical skyline. Unlike the story of the Khimki Forest, however, these protests resulted in victory for the defenders of the city when the authorities decided to move the construction to a different site.

Multivector protests have not necessarily overlapped with the liberal democratic agenda. The unprovoked murder in July 2010 of soccer fan Yury Volkov by a young Chechen at Chistye Prudy in Moscow provoked a demonstration by soccer fans demanding a fair investigation. In October, there were many demonstrations in support of Yegor Bychkov, who had been arrested for organizing a drug-free center at Nizhny Tagil, where compulsive and cruel methods were used to cure addicts (though many

were actually cured). In Moscow, on December 11-12, and then in other cities as well, mass demonstrations took place in reaction to the murder of soccer fan Yegor Sviridov.

As the Khimki Forest example and the demonstrations against the demolition of historical buildings in Kadashi in Moscow show, multivector protest movements do have the potential for solidarity. Hundreds of the people who had gathered to protest against the decimation of the forest subsequently took part in the Day of Anger, Strategy-31, and other protest actions as the movement itself collected over 20,000 signatures and gained the support of many organizations, including Moscow's Department of Natural Use, factions of the CPRF in the Moscow City Duma, the political parties Yabloko and Solidarnost, Anarchists, the National Bolsheviks, Red Youth Avantgarde, Greenpeace, the Moscow State University's Squad for Nature Conservation, the European Green Party, and the World Wildlife Fund. In Kadashi, the ArkhNadzor movement, the parishioners of the Church of the Resurrection, and several Russian Orthodox social organizations (Narodny Sobor and Svyataya Rus) joined forces with the defenders of architectural history, as have the youth organizations of the A Just Russia party and the Left Front. Solidarnost, the prohibited National Democratic Alliance, the Movement to Protect Khimki Forest, and other social organizations have taken part in Strategy-31 actions. Defenders of human rights, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a number of bloggers have joined their voices in support of Yegor Bychkov.

Authorities are most willing to consider the views of protestors when the demonstrations are large and the protestors are persistent. It also helps when the issues resonate within society. The government is much more likely to consider the demands of demonstrators for bread than for the abstract concepts of rights or dignity, and to tolerate economic or ecological rather than political slogans.

A clear example of effective all-out protest, though it did not lead to victory, was the campaign to protect the Khimki Forest. Over several months in spring and summer 2010, protesters had a letter published in *Novaya*

Gazeta, set up tent camps on the site, sent hundreds of letters and petitions to commercial companies and organizations that had been engaged for the planned construction or could exert influence over it (including the Vinci paving contractor, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Green Party), arranged for meetings with authorized officials and held numerous demonstrations, brought suits to court, established special websites, and posted video messages on the Internet.

In blocking such demonstrations, the authorities risk provoking a backlash that could lead to increased radicalization. There have been indications of such radicalization taking place: the attacks on police representatives by the so-called Vladivostok Partisans, young men who attacked police representatives in the Far East and who gained much support across the country (especially in the Far East Region and Moscow); the attack on the City Administration building in Khimki; the brawl at the Tornado Rock Festival in Miass on August 29, 2010; the actions of the Voyna group, during which police vehicles were overturned in St. Petersburg in early September 2010; and, finally, the previously mentioned mass violent protests provoked by the murder of Yegor Sviridov.

The social networks are increasingly a forum for activity and confrontation. The Internet was used to collect signatures on a demand to free Svetlana Bakhmina, former YUKOS lawyer and mother of two, which eventually led to her release. In the spring of 2010, bloggers organized an online investigation that revealed that attackers of vehicles in the Urals were connected with local United Russia activists. Automobile drivers turned to the Internet to appeal to others to join the opposition to the use of flashing lights by official cars by attaching blue buckets to the roofs of their own automobiles. In the Far East in the summer of 2010, social networks were used to expose a murder case. That same summer, social networks were the ones to name the policeman who had insulted and beaten participants in the protest action in St. Petersburg: he was identified from a video taken on a mobile phone and published in a blog. In September 2010, in the Moscow area, the Internet was successfully used to mobilize

hundreds of volunteers to search for Maria Fomkina, who had disappeared with her five-year-old niece Liza. Their bodies were later found in the woods by police and volunteers.

During last year's wildfires, users posting to Live Journal asked for help for the victims, and the responses dramatically exceeded expectations. It was bloggers who drew attention to the fact that a clip made by activists of the pro-government youth movement Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard) of their fire-fighting activity had been staged, leading to the dismissal of the leader of the movement and his deputy. Alexey Sidorenko, formerly a coordinator with the Carnegie Moscow Center and now a graduate student in Poland, started a website in Warsaw called the Help Map, containing information on the areas affected by fires and listing people who needed help. The Ushahidi platform used to create the website, which had been used after the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, allowed information to be collected and compiled from blogs and social networks. The same software is being used now to create a website for consolidation of information from blogs and social networks on human rights violations throughout Russia.

Civil society is frequently thought of as a collection of NGOs, which is inaccurate. In themselves, NGOs are not quite civil society, but still they enhance the coordination of action by interested citizens and reinforce the nascent beginnings of a civil society. The 2005 law on NGOs adopted by the government, fearful of the "color revolutions," has led to a sharp decline in the number of such organizations. A new procedure was introduced for registering them based on obtaining permission rather than simply notifying, which significantly increased the volume of paperwork. At present, however, their numbers are once again in the six digits. The amendments to the NGO law that were adopted in 2008 were intended to ease the burden of state control, but affected only smaller NGOs with budgets of up to one million rubles, which were freed from the requirement of submitting annual reports.

The government views NGOs with caution and suspicion, and in the best case as ancillary structures that should operate under the gov-

ernment's policies and its strict supervision. At the same time, citizens at large remain uninformed about the volume and scale of their work. This is the result of the lack of historical experience, as well as the control exercised over television broadcasting by the authorities, who have continually and consciously pursued campaigns to discredit NGOs. As shown by public opinion surveys, NGOs are in last place when measuring the trust placed in the various structures, and come after the police, the trade unions, and political parties. A Levada Center survey conducted in December 2009 indicated that only 12 percent of Russians consider the activities of NGOs to be useful, while 27 percent believe they bring both benefit and harm.

International and foreign NGOs, as well as those Russian NGOs that operate under foreign grants, are the object of particular governmental suspicion. In September 2010, a number of NGOs that had obtained foreign financing were subjected to a review by the prosecutor's office, which required them to submit a large number of documents on their activities within a short period. In many cases the review involved the confiscation of documents. Aside from affecting legal rights organizations (Transparency International, Moscow Helsinki Group), this review affected other organizations that had received foreign financing, such as the Institute for Urban Economics, the Center for Fiscal Policy, Junior Achievement, and Sustainable Development. Many experts see this campaign as a way of putting pressure on NGOs, since it coincided with the beginning of preparations for the local and presidential elections.

The government has made other attempts to grab the initiative in the sphere of NGOs: it set up the Public Chamber (as the "place for discussion") and public councils within various agencies, and it has created and financed the pro-Kremlin youth organizations Nashi, Molodaya Gvardia, and Stal. Every year, the authorities hold a youth camp at Seliger Lake and allocate funds to NGOs for the "development of democracy." By order of the president, 1.2 billion rubles were allocated in 2009 to create Public Chamber grants for this purpose. However, the procedure for awarding

the grants is totally non-transparent, with money being allocated by so-called operators, which are also NGOs, but which are appointed by the president rather than selected on a competitive basis. Application to be considered for a grant requires the submission of a huge number of documents and entails a significant investment of time, which is not always possible for many smaller NGOs. In March 2010, amendments to the NGO law provided support to NGOs that pursue social activity directed at resolving social problems and working for the development of civil society in the Russian Federation. The Law on Endowments was adopted, intended to free NGOs from their dependence on individual contributions. So far about 50 endowments have been set up, some with significant amounts of capital; Russian endowments, however, remain for now oriented primarily at pursuing government programs and projects. Characteristically, the first endowments registered in Russia were the Fund for Development of the Moscow Institute of International Relations, the Support Fund of the Moscow Skolkovo School of Management, and the fund of the Graduate School of Management at St. Petersburg State University.

Ever broader segments of the population are becoming active in the civil arena: from liberal defenders of human rights to those people whose rights have been infringed upon, as well as citizens who simply are not indifferent. New political leaders may come from the ranks of these movements. In themselves, the NGOs do not equate to civil society; they are not a synonym for democratic progress, but they do encourage people to develop the habit of independent action and constructive civil activity.

After their dash toward liberty in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the citizens of Russia, as in the other post-Soviet states, lacked a clear picture of the way development should proceed, or of democracy as a goal. The authorities followed their own concepts of how the country should develop, which, beginning in the early 2000s, led to the curtailment of reform and the establishment of a unitary system to the detriment of democratic procedures, true federalism, and political competition. Unless,

however, democratic institutions are restored, no modernization can succeed. It is not the people who are the obstacle to democratic progress, but the government itself, as was accurately pointed out in the report “Russia in the 21st Century: Image of the Desired Tomorrow,”³² published by the Institute of Contemporary Development, whose chair of the Board of Trustees is Dmitry Medvedev.

The huge potential of the people, now being used to overcome bureaucratic barriers and simply to survive, could be activated to serve the goals of development. Only mass-scale citizen participation with fundamental democratic institutions functioning properly can make it possible to pursue a consistent program of development for the country, to establish normal living standards, and to ensure the competitiveness and attractiveness of its positions in the international arena.

The options for national development need to be carefully thought through in order to have a clear idea of what is possible and advisable for the future (rather than repeating the situation of the late 1980s). There will continue to be a place for education as the spread of knowledge and information in contemporary society significantly expands and changes. The de-Stalinization of civic consciousness continues to be of great importance.

In spite of authoritarian tendencies, a great deal of internal work is nevertheless being accomplished in society beneath the surface. Realization is growing of the increasing need for new political parties. The concepts of citizens’ rights and dignity are spreading. Civic activity has been increasing. Many people now try to defend their rights by appealing to the law. In the absence of other channels of interaction with the government, citizens have been taking to the streets in protest more and more often, as a way of being heard and to express their dissatisfaction. Their protests are usually directed not so much *against* the government as *to* the government. If, however, the government should ignore the opinion of citizens or try to play the dissatisfaction of some groups against others, it risks provoking an unpredictable upturn in radicalism.

The activities of NGOs, the Internet, mobile telephones, and the virtual social networks have expanded the sphere of public politics. The government has tried to play a leading role in all these areas, and its presence on the world-wide web over the recent period has grown sharply. But as the modern means of communication spread, it will become harder and harder to subject them to federal control.

Russia's engagement in the international process and its participation in resolving key international challenges will contribute to its social and political modernization. As a member of the Council of Europe and the Helsinki Accords, Russia has taken up the responsibility of following general democratic principles. One current opinion holds that democrats in the West should develop their cooperation with Russia only if its leadership begins to follow certain established rules, and that all future agreements with Russia should be dependent on concessions moving the country towards liberalization. However, democracy cannot be implemented under pressure from outside; it can only be built by Russian citizens themselves. An inflexible policy toward Russia will, on the contrary, play into the hands of those who insist upon the old antagonism with the West. At the same time, the most important factor in enhancing the position of democracy around the world will be for Western countries to work to perfect their own democracies and to implement the consistent domestic policies needed to accomplish this goal.

Notes

- 1 K. Rogov, "Democracy 2010: the Past and Future of Pluralism in Russia," *Pro et Contra* 13, № 5-6 (2009): PP. 6-30.
- 2 L. Gudkov, *Report on Discussions at the Liberal Mission Foundation*, "The Potential for Democracy in Modern Russia," November 26, 2009, <http://www.liberal.ru/articles/4509>.
- 3 A. Levinson, "Our 'We': How Power is Maintained in Russia," *Vedomosti*, Aug. 10, 2010.

- 4 See, in particular, the interview with Vladislav Surkov in *Vedomosti* of February 15, 2010, <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/02/15/225543>.
- 5 See details about this in the book: V. Sheynis, *The Rise and Fall of Parliament: Fateful Years in Russian Politics (1985-1993)* vol. 1 (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, INDEM Fund, 2005).
- 6 *Public Opinion-2009* (Moscow: Levada Center, 2009), P. 101.
- 7 <http://www.newsru.com/russia/24feb2009/reitingivlasti.html>.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 A. I. Gertsen, *Collected Works: 30 vols.* vol. 11 (Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1957), PP. 322-323.
- 10 B. A. Kistyakovskiy, "In Defense of the Law (the Intelligentsia and Jurisprudence)," *Landmarks; From the Depths* (Moscow: Pravda, 1991), P. 123. (Series "The History of the Fatherland: philosophical thoughts").
- 11 Separate confinement for first and repeat offenders was introduced, as was the requirement for certification and psychological testing of prison personnel, and the administrative staff of the regional departments was to a significant extent replaced.
- 12 According to the results of expert conclusions of the Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information, the extent of openness of Russian courts even after the law came into effect is somewhat more than 41 percent (calculated using the methodology based upon Article 14 of the Law, which describes in detail the kind of information to be presented on the court's website).
- 13 *Vedomosti*, Aug. 10, 2010.
- 14 *Judicial Authority and Entrepreneurs: Results of Sociological Analysis*, Chapter 8, "Dispositions of citizens and entrepreneurs" (Moscow: 2009), P. 8.2 "Trust in the Courts," <http://www.indem.ru/russian.asp>.
- 15 E. Vinogradov, "The Road to the Strasburg Court will be Blazed by the Going," <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5045698,00.html>.
- 16 <http://www.newsweek.com/feature/2010/the-world-s-best-countries.html>.
- 17 L. Gudkov, "Report on Discussions."
- 18 <http://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia>.
- 19 *Novaya gazeta*, April 30, 2010.

- 20 *Vedomosti*, Aug. 10, 2010.
- 21 Yandex's share of the domestic market is 59 percent (1.2 percent of the global market). The search system created in the 1990s from nothing by private entrepreneurs occupies position nine in the world rating based upon volume of processed requests, with an annual growth of users of 40-50 percent. (Google has 20 percent of the requests, Mail.ru 9.9, and Rambler 7.4.) Based on 2009 results, Google has earned 4.2 times less in Russia (processed 2.9 times fewer requests).
- 22 F. Trompenaars and Ch. Hampden-Turner, *Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Diversity in Global Business* (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1997), P. 74.
- 23 http://grans.hse.ru/public_sotrudnikov.
- 24 I. V. Mersiyanova and L. I. Yakobson, *The Practice of Philanthropy in Russia: Involvement and Attitudes of the Populace* (Moscow: State University School of Higher Economics, 2009), P. 32.
- 25 *Ibid.*, P. 24.
- 26 *Vedomosti*, August 20, 2010.
- 27 <http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d45protest.pdf>; <http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d50protest.pdf>.
- 28 "Uroven protestnykh nastroyenii," *Dominanty*, № 37 (September 23, 2010): P. 17 (<http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d37ypn10.pdf>).
- 29 <http://www.levada.ru/press/2010072805.html>.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 In fact, there is no law in Great Britain on meetings, but current practice and the corresponding precedents involve coordination of the parameters of the demonstrations with the police and avoidance of disruption of public calm by the participants.
- 32 *Rossia XXI veka: Obraz zhelaemogo zavtra* (Moscow: B-ka In-ta sovrem. razvitiya, 2010), P. 7.

