

Turning Nuclear Swords into Plowshares

Leveraging the U.S.-Japan Alliance for Meaningful
Denuclearization in North Korea

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Scope of the Denuclearization Challenge and Necessary
Conditions

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Issues over Denuclearization

- ▶ Is North Korea really willing to completely dismantle its nuclear weapon program?
 - ▶ Optimist view: disarmament and return to the compliance with NPT and IAEA
 - ▶ (For the young leader, a vision for reining thirty years or more would be necessary)
 - ▶ Pessimist view: arms control, not giving up nuclear weapons
 - ▶ (The survival of his regime would be a priority, and does not seek rapid economic change. therefore, retaining nuclear arsenal is necessary.)
- ▶ CVID or FFVD(Final, Fully Verifiable Denuclearization)? (by Sec. Pompeo on July 9)
 - ▶ Doesn't completeness matter?
 - ▶ With FFVD, denuclearization is not the entrance, but the exit?
- ▶ Approaches to Denuclearization: Non-proliferation or Arms control?
 - ▶ What North Korea seems to pursue: "Eliminate mistrust first, and then disarm (if lucky)." → Arms Control Approach
 - ▶ What Japan and (hopefully) the United States have been seeking: "Disarm first, and it means to deal with mistrust." → Non-proliferation Approach

What North Korea Offers in the Pyongyang Declaration?

- ▶ “Shutdown” of Yongbyon nuclear facility (*if the United States takes corresponding steps in line with the spirit of the June 12 DPRK-US joint statement*)
- ▶ “Shutdown” of the Tongchang-ri engine test ground and rocket launch pad
- ▶ They are **not actions to disarm/dismantle** DPRK’s existing nuclear forces.
 - ▶ What does “shutdown” mean? Does it include the destruction (in an irreversible way) of facilities? Or does it only mean “disablement” as they did in the past?

Japanese Concerns over Denuclearization Based on the Pyongyang Declaration

▶ Nuclear

- ▶ Possible second, and more enrichment facilities
- ▶ Already accumulated enough amount of Pu stockpile
- ▶ No reference to thermonuclear material program

▶ Missile

- ▶ No further test for liquid fuel missiles necessary. But Tonghang-ri has no facility for solid-fuel missiles. Instead, possible expansion of solid fuel missile program
- ▶ April 20 declaration of the moratorium of nuclear and missile testing referred only ICBM and IRBM, but not MRBM which would pose most imminent threats to Japan

- ▶ Japan has no positive reason to change threat assessment of North Korea's nuclear missile capabilities, given that measures that North Korea offers in the declaration would not contribute to threat reduction for Japan.

Lots of Questions

- ▶ So, do we have to accept a new normal, co-existence with a nuclear Korean Peninsula, rather than a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, at least for the time being?
- ▶ What is the United States willing to offer as “corresponding steps”? (Japan wants to be reassured that such steps would not undermine the US commitment to the alliance and to the security of East Asia.)
- ▶ How can we get the confidence that measures in the Pyongyang Declaration will lead to the total elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program, not stall the process?
- ▶ What are the conditions for North Korea to agree with the United States on an action plan toward the CVID and to submit the declaration of its nuclear activities and materials?

Declaration on Nuclear Facilities and Materials Matters

- ▶ For Japan,
- ▶ Without North Korea providing a full list of activities, facilities and materials in its nuclear program,
 - ▶ We do not know whether we are safe
 - ▶ We do not know the end game
 - ▶ We cannot establish the baseline for assessment of compliance.
- ▶ For the International Non-proliferation regime,
 - ▶ Tolerating the absence of a declaration based on an IAEA safeguards agreement implies *de facto* acceptance of North Korea's nuclear armed states status
- ▶ If CVID is our goal, the non-proliferation approach with an initial declaration is essential.
- ▶ But North Korea's attitude indicates otherwise. It has not referred the IAEA even once.
- ▶ For North Korea, however,
 - ▶ A full declaration of nuclear activities and materials means to provide the list of targets for US attacks.
 - ▶ Intrusive inspection reveals the vulnerability.
 - ▶ In a sense, it is natural for them to seek confidence building first, and arms control rather than non-proliferation.

Different “Effective Verification” by Different Approaches

- ▶ Confidence in verification= technical confidence + confidence in political will
- ▶ In the context of arms control, tech. conf. < poli. conf
 - ▶ Paul Nitze stated: “we want to be sure that, **if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such a violation** in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.” (testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on the INF Treaty in 1988)
 - ▶ Focusing on establishing confidence, and achieving strategic stability
- ▶ In the context of non-proliferation, tech. conf. > poli. conf.
 - ▶ Through IAEA inspectors’ activities, IAEA concludes with the confidence that **declarations are complete and correct**, and safeguards activities are properly in place with regard to facilities and materials for peaceful purposes so that they are not diverted into military purposes.
 - ▶ Focusing on minimizing the risk of militarization of nuclear program. The declaration must come first, followed by safeguards and the IAEA verification.

Final Thoughts or Conditions for the Progress in Denuclearization

- ▶ While confidence building is necessary for now, playing with terms and conditions of “arms control” approach would not lead to CVID nor FFVD.
- ▶ It is necessary to shift to “non-proliferation” approach with an initial declaration followed by inspections, which would provide a full picture of the work of denuclearization (also indicate the end goal).
- ▶ It is important to strike a fine-tuned balance between incentives and measures to implement denuclearization. Do not give in too much! (But it may be useful that North Korea would share its vision for the future economic and social development if possible.)
- ▶ Close communication and reassurance between allies essential during the period of co-existence with a nuclear North Korea.
- ▶ Japan and North Korea need to engage in dialogue.

Thank you very much.