


*“From Pyongyang to Tehran: U.S. & Japan
Perspectives on Implementing Nuclear Deals”*

At Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC
March 28, 2016

Lessons from the Agreed Framework with North Korea and Implications for Iran: A Japanese view

Nobumasa Akiyama
Hitotsubashi University

What to Achieve through Nuclear Deals?



Why Did the Agreed Framework Fail?

▶ North Korea's perspective

- ▶ Sense of insecurity
 - ▶ Threat of regime change remained.
- ▶ Delay in the delivery of incentives
 - ▶ US delayed in delivery of fuel oil




Gap on endgame:
regime change or regime
security?

▶ Other Parties' (US, Japan, China and ROK)

- ▶ Lack of North Korea's commitment to denuclearization
 - ▶ Unclear sequence of denuclearization process, verification and incentive provisions
- ▶ Different levels of threats
 - ▶ Different views on North Korea's nuclear threats
- ▶ Sanction loopholes
 - ▶ North Korea's arms export
 - ▶ Commitment of China?



U.S. Domestic Politics:
Lack of consensus and low
prioritization




Ambiguity of verification
arrangement




Ineffectiveness of
incentive/disincentive
mechanisms

Different Threat Perceptions: Incorporating them into One Deal?



Japan's Attitude Toward Agreed Framework and Six Party Talk

- ▶ Threat perception
 - ▶ Insurgency/terrorist-like attack
 - ▶ abduction
 - ▶ Not much on nuclear weapons (until Taepodong launch in 1998)
- ▶ Dominant agenda on North Korea in domestic political context
 - ▶ Normalization talks
 - ▶ Abduction issues



Japan's strategy in the 2000s

- 1) Try to achieve the stability through normalization and resolution of abduction issue,
- 2) While supporting US security agenda (Iraq War)

But...

Much attention to Abduction



- Nonproliferation agenda was overshadowed.
- Linkage between abduction and denuclearization (at Six-Party Talk)

Strategy did not work...

North Korea-Iran Comparison: Assessing Implications on Iran

North Korea	<u>Elements</u>	Iran
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Six Party Talk ✓ Key regional players included 	Framework of dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ P5+1 ✓ Key regional players not included
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Declared intention to weaponize ✓ Separated Pu, eventually weaponized 	Level of nuclear development (when negotiation started)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Denying its intention to weaponize ✓ Centrifuges and two reactors in place
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Very low ✓ Sanction loopholes 	Dependency on international market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Potentially high ✓ Stringent sanction scheme
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Dictatorial 'dynasty' 	Political system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Religious Supreme leader ✓ Relatively plural, and receptive of public
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Suggested withdrawal from NPT (and withdrawn eventually) ✓ Non-cooperation with IAEA 	Association with nonproliferation regimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reiterated its association with NPT ✓ Expressed its willingness to cooperate with IAEA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Survival of the regime from pressure for regime change 	Key strategic objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Establishing itself as a regional power

Iran is more sensitive to external pressures and incentives.

Iran seems to be more bound by international norms.


But Iran may have much longer term vision on the deal. 2016/4/1

Lessons for US-Japan Alliance

- ▶ Security: Reassurance
- ▶ Close communication on;
 - ▶ Security concerns on both side, and
 - ▶ Vision on regional security = how to shape the relationship among major stakeholders
- ▶ Reaffirm mutual security commitments including;
 - ▶ Ensuring the credibility of nuclear extended deterrence,
 - ▶ Building missile defense architecture, and
 - ▶ Working on joint operational capacity
- ▶ Diplomacy: Coordination and unified message
- ▶ Coordination in behavior at UNSC and IAEA
 - ▶ Keeping international momentum for compliance
- ▶ Working together for stringent export controls
 - ▶ Capacity building of other states
 - ▶ Intelligence sharing matters
- ▶ Ensuring Sanction schemes to work
 - ▶ Closing loopholes



Thank you!



Nobumasa Akiyama
QWR04165@nifty.com