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# EVENT TRANSCRIPT

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## Next Generation NATO: A Conversation with Madeleine Albright & Jeroen van der Veer Monday, May 17, 2010

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**FABRICE POTHIER:** Madame Secretary, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of Carnegie Europe and the European Council on Foreign Relations, welcome to this public conversation with Dr. Madeleine Albright and Mr. Jeroen van der Veer. It's a real pleasure to have you here this afternoon. Dr. Albright and Mr. Van der Veer were earlier at NATO Headquarters to deliver as respectively chair and vice-chair of the Group of Experts on NATO's new strategy concept, to deliver the recommendations to the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Secretary General.

My name is Fabrice Pothier; I am the Director of Carnegie Europe, the pan-European Foreign Policy Forum of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Because now coalition politics is the new game, especially in the UK, I have the pleasure to co-host today's conversation with my colleague and my friend, Daniel Korski, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

First, I would like to say some few words of thanks, starting with NATO, especially Jamie Shea, who is at the back – he had promised to be at the back – so Jamie, who made this presentation possible, thank you. I also wanted to thank Ambassador Ivo Daalder and the US Mission to NATO who have provided generous support to Carnegie Europe and ECFR's joint project. Today, in fact, is the culmination of a journey for the Group of Experts which was brought in through cities, many issues, volcanic ashes, but it's also the culmination of a journey for both Carnegie Europe and the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Before I turn to our speakers, I just would like to say a few words about that project. In the summer of 2009, Carnegie Europe and ECFR joined forces to launch a series of regional round tables called Next Generation NATO. The principle was because the strategic concept is about the future, we wanted to engage with the upcoming generation of policymakers and analysts, but not only in NATO's land but also at the margins of NATO. We took the discussion to Russia,

to Eastern Europe and to the Greater Middle East. We started in Dubai, then went to Moscow, then finally in Sofia.

In each region we asked a very simple but important question about how do you define your security and where do you view NATO fitting in that world of yours. We obviously got some very interesting, thought-provoking answers and then analysts from Ukraine explained that NATO had lost the narrative in Ukraine. A participant in Russia explained that reciprocity in partnership, especially in Afghanistan, is key to building trust, and in Dubai a colleague from Kuwait reminded us that Iran's nuclear ambiguity represented a core concern and also a chance for cooperation with NATO. In all three regions the common thread was suspicions and misperceptions mixed with hope and desire to work together.

This is where this journey meets yours, Dr. Albright and Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, to talk about NATO's Next Generation. I think the part of the report that best encapsulates this question is in fact the very first two words, NATO 2020. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, almost nine years since 9/11 and the intervention in Afghanistan, this is clearly crunch time for NATO. That flows from the point of the report which tackles the very important question of what should NATO's purpose be for the future, what is the compelling narrative that NATO can build to remain the effective and important political and military alliance for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, especially in a very complex, fragmented world where security and threats are not as obvious as they were 20 years ago.

On the report I would just like to say a few words of congratulations. I think, to use Jean Cocteau, a French writer, who said that the true elegance was in simplicity, I think the true elegance of this report is to lay a very clear, crisp and simple language to tackle very complex issues.

Let me now introduce our speakers today, starting with Dr. Albright, who is the chair of the Albright Stonebridge Group, a global strategy firm, and principal of Albright Capital Management. In 1997, Dr. Albright was named the 64<sup>th</sup> and first female Secretary of State of the United States where you oversaw NATO's first military intervention and also dramatic expansion to the East. Before being in Foggy Bottom you were in New York as the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Mr. Jeroen van der Veer was President and Chief Executive Officer of Royal Dutch Shell until June 2009, where he started in 1971.

Just to explain bit on the way we are going to proceed today, following Dr. Albright's opening remarks we will open the conversation with Daniel and both Dr. Albright and Mr. Van der Veer, and we have a very solid list of pointed questions for you, so we will challenge you on the report. Then we'll open up the floor to a Q&A which we hope will be lively and engaging. I know that there are participants from College of Europe – I don't know where you are, College of Europe, you are maybe around – and Kent University. We are going to play Kent University against College of Europe, but before that please join me in welcoming Dr. Albright.

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Thank you very much, Fabrice, and thank you to Carnegie, as well as the European Council on Foreign Relations, for sponsoring this event. Guests and friends, good afternoon, I'm very happy to be here. I hope by now that most of you have had a chance to at least see the report released by the Group of Experts and, based on that assumption, I will keep my own remarks brief so that we really can have time for a discussion.

Now, to begin with though, I'd like to clarify one point. My friend and colleague, Mr. Van der Veer, who will speak after me, was asked to offer his remarks this afternoon from, quote,

unquote, a European perspective. I think that's fine but that you should not conclude from this that I'm here to present the American perspective. Besides, I was born in Europe. In the context of NATO, the only perspective that truly matters is the Euro-Atlantic one.

The Group of Expert was, by design, a diverse group and we really did have some very spirited discussions. The fundamental question that we considered on each and every issue was not what might be most convenient for any one part of the alliance, but rather what is best for the alliance as a whole. Our analysis and recommendations reflect this and most of them flow from two basic conclusions: first, the alliance has an ongoing duty to guarantee the safety and security of its members.

Second, it can achieve that objective only if it engages dynamically with countries and organizations that are outside its boundaries. To safeguard security at home, the alliance must continue to treat collective defence as its core purpose and this reflects the primacy of Article 5 and our firm conviction that the security of each ally cannot be separated from that of all. NATO must maintain a flexible mix of military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear and missile defence.

It must also conduct appropriate contingency planning and military exercises so that allies may feel confident that their borders will indeed be protected, and these measures are fundamental to NATO's identity and purpose but they are not sufficient. Between now and 2020 the alliance will face a new generation of dangers from sources that are geographically and technologically diverse. These threats include violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, cyber assaults and attacks on energy infrastructure and supply lines. Because such perils can arise rapidly and from any direction, the alliance must become versatile.

To this end, NATO should accelerate its military transformation, improve its capacity for rapid response, attach a higher priority to cyber defence and increase the efficiency of military expenditure through joint procurement and specialization.

Now, all this is vital for NATO must be strong but it also must be smart and, in our area, nothing is smarter than having capable partners. The Group of Experts was united, in our view, that partners should play an increasing role in NATO activities and that the alliance should explore every opportunity for strengthening its partnership ties, both as a pragmatic means for solving problems and as an instrument of political dialogue.

Accordingly, NATO should improve its ability to work with other countries and organizations, especially in situations where a blend of military, economic and political measures are required. Of course, the European Union, with its overlapping membership, is a NATO partner of singular importance. The experts are eager to see the alliance and the EU operate in a more fully complementary manner, based on the principles of reciprocity and cost effectiveness.

We encourage leaders in both organizations to agree on joint participation in meetings, fuller communication between military staffs and more extensive coordination with respect to preventing and managing crises.

A second partnership that attracted discussion within our group is that between NATO and Russia. For reasons of history and geography, some allies are more sceptical than others about Russia's commitment to a positive relationship. This divergence was reflected among the experts but there was no disagreement about what NATO's policy should be. It's clearly in

NATO's best interest to work with Moscow to respond to such shared concerns as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, piracy and drug trafficking.

Partnership, as we know, is a two-way street, but from the alliance perspective the door to cooperation with Moscow should remain open at all levels. NATO can also influence its security environment by continuing its policy of gradual enlargement. Prospective NATO members in the Western Balkans and elsewhere in the Euro Atlantic region have a right to fair consideration, based on the same guidelines that steered decisions about new members in the past.

NATO today is busier than ever, but this does not mean that the alliance must go everywhere and do everything. There are limits to its resources and to its responsibilities. Indeed, the new strategic concept should propose criteria for making wise decisions about when and where to commit NATO resources beyond its boundaries.

Now, NATO is more than just a military alliance; it's also a political community and therefore should make more regular and creative use of the mechanism for consultations under Article 4. NATO faces a continuum of threats and informed discussion can enable it to identify and act on timely options. Alliance leaders should also benefit from lessons learnt in Afghanistan, including the imperative of political cohesion, the desirability of unified command, the value of effective planning, the importance of public communications and the need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended period of time.

All these steps must be accompanied by a commitment to organizational reform. The Secretary General should have the authority and the mandate to streamline decision making, prune the bureaucracy and identify savings that can be used for military transformation.

In the past eight months the Group of Experts had to think deeply about issues that some fear could undermine the future cohesion of the alliance, and these include the apparent tension between homeland defence and expeditionary missions, the difference in attitudes towards Russia, the imbalance in military expenditures and the nuclear question. When we started out, I confess to harbouring doubts about whether we would be able to define a common approach towards these and the other issues and, in the end, I found that the desire for agreement far outweighed the dubious pleasures of argument and that, more importantly, the basis for a common approach was not that difficult to find.

No one can expect an alliance of 28 members to function without occasional grumbling and dissent. But I arrived at the end of this stage in the process with more optimism about NATO's continued unity and future success than when I began and I hope that others feel the same, and I really do look forward to having a very open discussion with the next generation, although I see some people that are slightly older in the audience. Thank you all very, very much.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** Thank you very much for your kind introductions. Ladies and gentlemen, rather than to give you more information, let me just emphasise one point: in the end, NATO can only be successful if there is sufficient public support in the countries that are members, and the fact is based on pure central data that whilst NATO support is still very high, it is slowly going down.

In most European countries the support, if you ask the question, do you think NATO is a good organization, you see the answer is that between 60% and 80% of people think that NATO is a good organization. That's quite high by the way, if you compare it to other international

organizations. Having said that, it goes slowly down, not such a surprise because if you have an enemy that no longer exists, the Cold War, it is much easier to explain what NATO is all about.

By the way, if I look at the States, you have the same phenomenon, but this time even a bit lower. If you think about public support, how can we do something in our advice [?], to help, to stop that public support going down, preferably even to improve it? Now, we gave it a lot of thought, and I gave it a lot of thought myself, and now you get at least my insight on how to gain public support on this circuit - and you have to pass three green lights. The first one is that for public support you need to have a good track record. Now, probably you know here what NATO has done, I give it the full green light.

The second one is you must have a clear strategy going forward and that strategy should be explainable for use in the Atlantic Council terms: it should be possible to explain it to the milkman; to me it was to the chef de cuisine, whoever you see. You see the point I try to make? It should be quite easy in a kind of elevator speech, this is what NATO likes to do and this is what NATO is not doing, so the lines that we used this morning, NATO is - you can sometimes better explain by what it is not - NATO is not a global policeman or NATO is a regional organization that can act globally, or NATO will not deal with all threats. With which threats do you deal? That is giving clarity of the purpose and role of NATO or giving clarity about its strategy and that happens to be the strategic concept.

Now, of course our advice tries to help with that; that was the second green light. The third green light is that in the end if you have a clear strategy and a track record, you still like to understand which people are leading that organization - do I trust those people? That's why I very much appreciate how Madam Secretary led a very transparent process to make our advice; that's why I very much appreciate the open style of the new Secretary General and the way he gives speeches and takes questions, and how I think it will go, leading to the new strategic concept in Lisbon in November, because by clear transparency I think you instil that trust.

If we achieve that we have the third green light and then I would be delighted if indeed, in some years' time, we see that public support is moving the other way. This is the end of my introduction.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Thank you very much for that. You've spent the last couple of months in a sort of listening mode, the last couple of weeks in a writing mode and hopefully, in the next couple of weeks, in a talking and speaking mode because I understand you'll be travelling around NATO to explain what it is that you've come up with, shortly leaving for the United States to address Congress.

My question, reading your report, is to start off: you lay out what the main challenges are and I noticed you talked about ballistic missile defence or threat of an attack, you talk about cyber attack and you talk about terrorism. These are very much the things that NATO allies need to worry about, but they're also the things that NATO is only partially involved in. How to make the elevator speech convincing when the major threats that you outline aren't really the major tasks that NATO currently contemplates?

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, first of all, I think that what we are trying to do is take an alliance that is 61 years old and that started under a very different concept and modernise it to deal with those threats. I do think that one of the aspects that we pointed out is that while we can't pinpoint each one of the threats, we know that NATO has to be agile and flexible to deal in an environment that's very unpredictable.

One of our hard points, I think, is to try to persuade people that the threats that we outlined, whether they're terrorism or proliferation or cyber, are really threats to them because people have different views of what threatens their daily life. When you heard daily about the fact that Soviet troops were amassed on borders or tanks were coming over the Fulda Gap, that was much more visible.

The way that we're dealing with your specific question is through the fact that I think perhaps the most innovative thing we talked about in this report is the need for partnerships. What we learnt is that there are more partners than there are allies, that a number of these issues that don't come from inside or not just at the borders of NATO are somewhere out further away that you do require partners for that.

I think that that works in terms of including more countries and more people that have a vested interest in this working, but also does explain that there are shared responsibilities and that we are all responsible for each other; but it is harder to explain it. We were talking earlier about the fact that not everybody in Europe feels the same threats from terrorism that the United States does, and so I think we need to have more explanations of the commonality of the threat and the fact that there are partners out there that can help.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Can I push you a little on this because I think the report does a great service by taking the next step in consideration of threats and says it isn't just a question of conventional threats; political pressure is a real concern for some allies. Cyber attack is a real concern; and I think there's a sentence saying that NATO should help defend allies in their political independence, but how does NATO do that? Is that where the consultations that you addressed in your speech come in? Is that what that's for? How does NATO do that?

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, first of all, NATO is an alliance of democracy so I think that is a very basic aspect of it, and democracies not only want to see their own democracy safe and secure, but like to see other countries where people are able to make their choices and there is a sense of stability.

We have, I think, put more of an emphasis on Article 4 than had been done before, which was the fact that NATO is a political community where there can be consultations among the ambassadors at the NATO Council and that, the better part of valour is try to prevent problems and if, in fact, there are discussions and consultations, that that political stability can be maintained by sharing evaluations and problems and thinking about what other methods there are to preserve that political independence and stability short of using military force.

**FABRICE POTHIER:** I would like to press you on a key element that Mr. Van der Veer mentioned in his speech – this is a question for both of you- about this paradox where we indeed real crisis in the European resolve to engage in tackling threats, to commit troops abroad, like Afghanistan, but yet Europeans still as a majority feel confident about NATO. Yet we see the very opposite picture in the United States where there is a resolve to act, there is a resolve to go and take risks, but yet there is also a real public opinion crisis on NATO, which you mentioned when you were in Washington during the Group of Experts tour. I would like to know how we can square this circle of the lack of European resolve but a growing public opinion crisis in the United States where people don't see what NATO's purpose is about.

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, let me just state that, as Mr. Van der Veer mentioned, and data has shown, support for NATO is actually lowest in the United States, which I find very

depressing, frankly; but part of it has to do with the fact that there is a discrepancy between the amount that the United States provides for NATO in terms of military support and budget and what some of the other allies do.

There has been a little bit of a sense of free rider and there is a sense that, in fact, it would be nice if the contributions were larger from NATO members. I can to myself explain some of this by saying that, in fact, I wish there had been a different approach to Afghanistan early on. NATO activated Article 5 but the whole concept of how NATO would respond to Afghanistan was not fully carried out until recently, and so there's a little bit of a sense of what do we need a bunch of allies for that don't do what they're supposed to do.

I think that if people understand that there is strength in an alliance of united democracies on behalf of the kinds of problems we were talking about, that it is definitely worth it, but we are going to have to go round and explain that. I think there is no question about that, and that will be part of the discussion that goes on. I happen to believe that the United States is much stronger with partners; I also happen to believe that the alliance, the relationship between US and Europe, is the key alliance in terms of value systems and how we operate in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but I think the onus is going to be on us to explain what this is all about.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** First, the fact is that more than 40 countries are involved in Afghanistan and all NATO members are involved, maybe not at a shared, an equal size of the burden, but overall it is still quite impressive. The second, if you try to think, if you advise about strategic concept, in fact whilst many people are busy with Afghanistan today, you advise about a strategy after Afghanistan or beyond Afghanistan, NATO 2020.

If I take your question there, I think there are two important things. The first important remark is that we set out in our report eight guidelines that if you ever would consider a new mission out of area, what are the guidelines and in fact you should take off all eight of them and it should be a threat against most members; it should be political will, it should be thought through as to what kind of, and how to work with civilian organizations. It should be [unclear] over time; it should be decision making, how it is arranged with international law, all those kinds of things.

Now, those are the international guidelines which I think improve the quality of decision making, we hope, if we have to consider another out of area mission to be needed. The second one is – and see that more in Europe of course than I see that in the States – if you join an out of area mission, then it may be that certain politicians will say, well, you have to do that in Europe because you are with the Americans in an alliance. I think that's a very bad argument of a politician. In my view, a local politician should explain why it is in the interest of his or her member country to be involved in something like that, and that is absolutely essential for the future otherwise you will never form a strong alliance and you get a problem if you try to indicate.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** I wonder if we can continue a bit on the European NATO dimension before we perhaps return to Afghanistan. There was a great hope some time ago that the Lisbon Treaty would relax a lot of Europeans, would make them more comfortable in their own institutional skin and therefore allow for much greater cooperation between NATO and the EU, particularly in places where both organizations are deployed, like Afghanistan. It strikes me that despite the Lisbon Treaty, we haven't quite reached that stage; there are still institutional rivalries, political problems and of course a much bigger problem for the Europeans now to concern themselves with in the broader economic crisis.

Now, you call on leaders in both organizations to collaborate, but I wonder what the roadmap to that collaboration is, because we've called on leaders to collaborate on this for some time now and we haven't really seen the progress that everybody would like.

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, first of all, it was very interesting because we did in fact have a consultation with EU representatives and felt that it was very important to have that. I have to admit it was at a time when the EU was feeling more robust and there was a sense that this was the organization that had the upper hand.

What we believed and we stated, first of all that the taxpayers for NATO and the EU are the same people and it behoves the political figures in both places to make clear to people that they're getting their money's worth. We did lay out some very specific suggestions in terms of more mil-mil consultations, of having greater interoperability, of sharing intelligence and a variety of ways of hooking the organizations together, and I think that rationally that makes a lot of sense.

The problems that are out there now – and we've been talking about this a little bit in the last 48 hours – is basically that the financial issues are deep-cutting and are the kind that affect normal, ordinary people and that, in fact, it makes it, in some ways, harder to argue, but in other ways easier because it shows that duplication and family rivalry is a luxury cannot be afforded at this point. We hope that some of the roadmap will be followed out in terms of very detailed consultations between the two organizations.

The thing that I really am very pleased that we came up with in the report is not a sense that NATO is the be-all and end-all and can do everything by itself, but in fact a sense of the necessity for partnering with a variety of organizations and obviously the EU comes first to mind. The other thing that happened that was very interesting was that in our first seminar we laid out all the problems that were out there in the world, and you had the feeling that NATO should deal with all of them.

Then somebody had a really fabulous image and said, NATO cannot be like a Swiss army knife that has all the things extended because it means you can't even pick it up. You have to figure out what is the appropriate job for NATO, what is the appropriate job for the EU, for the UN, for OSCE, for Russia or whatever, and that I think is where we came up with something quite novel about the fact that NATO is not alone and NATO is not the world's policeman, and that these partnerships are very important and a way of being a force multiplier.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** To be a bit provocative, the thing that everybody seems to be saying they want to focus on is crisis management. You said in your report and the EU says it in some of its documents, and Vice-President Joe Biden said it the Herald Tribune, that it should be about the OSCE. Crisis management is what everybody seems to gravitate towards and so my concern is how we divide the task. Is it geographical? Is it just more liaison between these organizations? It's a detailed question, but I hear what you say when you say NATO shouldn't do everything, but it strikes me that these three organizations still end up gravitating towards doing that same thing broadly described as crisis management.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** The interesting thing is that when I started this work and I thought about, for instance, Europe, EU, Brussels and NATO, I thought that with my experience from private business sector, this is easy. Because basically if there is rivalry, that means there are overlaps, so then you have to define the role and purpose on both sides of the rivalry, so there's clarity. There you can manage the overlaps away.



Then I thought, okay, why is that so easy, because NATO was hard power and EU was soft power, and then you work on that and then you manage the way and go happy together. I can tell you that it is not that easy because NATO, there's a lot of hard power in NATO but you can't... EU, without any hard power, doesn't work; I can explain that as probably not a fully logical thought. My next best idea, not personal idea after thanks to all the discussions we had in the Expert Group, and you can see it in the report, is basically that you have to address is – and Madame made that point – top down.

That's one, because otherwise you can't have a static solution, you can't say this is for the coming ten years EU and that is for the coming ten years NATO and there will be no overlaps. It is much better that you have a periodic review top down where hopefully that is understood to be important what the chemistry between the top two persons was. They then drive it down and if you see that there is no split all the time to tackle the overlaps, the productivity of the two organizations or the interoperability, then you may be amazed at how quickly it can go. That's how I advise how to tackle that, lead from the top.

**FABRICE POTHIER:** Let's carry on with the notion of partners and talk about the looming partner, Russia, because you spent quite a bit of time in the report talking about how to follow on this reset of US/Russia relationship, but is there a game changer in the way NATO and Russia should work together? Is membership something conceivable that should be on the table or is it just about managing Russia and managing a relationship that is made of good and less good?

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, first of all, let me say I am very pleased in the way that we handled the Russia issue in the report, I thought quite elegantly, by in fact saying that there had been some differences among the experts in terms of how they regarded Russia, some for geographical and historical reasons. No matter what those differences were, there was unanimity in saying that there had to be a different relationship with Russia and one in which there was active engagement. I think there has to be a recognition that not everybody thinks exactly the same.

Where I believe that this should go is that the game changer, in some ways, the NATO Russia Council fell into disuse. It has been revived, but also I think there are more and more discussions about what more can be done in the NATO Russia Council, what subjects can be discussed there, what is the mechanism for agreement. Are there some issues that don't have to be 28 plus one? Are there ways that various discussions that can happen? The other, I think, has to do with the fact that if you write down what are the new threats, some of them affect the Russians as much as they affect other people.

What we found interesting, for instance – it may seem like the least important out of the list, if you start with nuclear proliferation – but drug trafficking is something that undermines the stability of a country and is something that the Russians raised. Terrorism, there may be somewhat different definitions of who's a terrorist, but I think that it is important to think about how work can be done together, certainly on nuclear proliferation; there is no question, and the signing of the Star Treaty is a point in fact.

I think that what we advocated was a very transactional way of dealing with problems that we have in common with Russians, to work on them together, evolving a sense of confidence and a different narrative, frankly. The Russians were totally convinced that what we were doing in the 90s was against them when it's simply not true. That was not the issue, and so I think it's important to have a narrative now that does show a willingness to have an open hand and an open door.

We can't change the guidelines for membership and Article 10 leaves an open possibility of becoming a member of NATO if, in fact, you abide by the criteria that other countries have had there; being a democracy is one of them. I think that the very important point here is to try to figure out what are the avenues of working together.

**FABRICE POTHIER:** How will that concretely apply, for example, on regional security? I think we are talking about those transversal threats like drugs, terrorism, but we also have some real on the ground crises in Georgia, in various other parts of the Caucasus, so how will this new kind of relationship apply within the next ten years?

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, I think it will have to be on a case by case basis. We didn't shy away from talking about Georgia: we said that the events in Georgia had in fact complicated the way that NATO Russia council had worked, or that in fact consultations had not worked. I think that part of the way it would apply, for starters, whether there would be discussions and consultations about X issue in the Caucasus, for instance. But I think we would take it of building trust at one step at a time. I think the important point is to actually do things rather than make grandiose statements about the fact that we are now loving partners.

I think the issue here is how to take one step at a time, test the extent to which they want to be partners, and move forward with the idea, as I said, that everybody in the expert group felt that it was important to engage.

One of the issues that has come up is missile defence. One way perhaps of beginning to bridge the gaps and develop issues is over very practical aspects of how the missile defence system would work.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** I must just say, giving the same example, missile defence realised a year ago we were still talking about missile defence in eastern European states, and now we say explicitly in this report how we should co-operate with the Russians. I think this is not a grey advice; it is very clear what we mean how we need to engage.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** But do we need to set benchmarks for ourselves vis-à-vis the Russians of what we expect from them? Because often what we hear is there is a requirement for a reset, but what do we judge that reset against? Should NATO internally develop a checklist of sorts of what it would like to see that it can measure Russian NATO partnership by?

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Let me just make one thing clear back again: we did not write the strategic concept; what we have done is provide the building blocks for the Secretary General, who then has to do a lot of additional consulting, and then take the whole thing to the heads of state. I don't want to prejudge that. Speaking for myself personally, I think that it would be useful to at least mentally have something that would show the level of cooperation, because it takes two or 29 or whatever number to really do this.

What is interesting to me is that when we went to Russia there is not a monolithic approach to this. Meeting with academicians and students in Russia, there were a variety of different opinions. There may be different messages from some of the leaders. The bottom line is that there is a thinking process going on there in terms of what they want and how they see their threats; and I think it is a matter of a step by step process. In my own head, as somebody that used to do this for a living, you do try to have a set of benchmarks in your head; sometimes,

however, it's valuable to have them public, and sometimes it's better not to. That is what the decision makers have to figure out.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** I wonder whether we can switch the ground onto these new threats; because in the report you talk a bit about NATO's role in protecting global lifelines, or the alliance's lifelines, and of course this is an area that you know a lot about from your previous professional experience. What is the extent of NATO's role in this lifeline protecting business? Is it appropriate in the future for NATO to start thinking about its role vis-à-vis gas pipelines? Is it appropriate for NATO to start thinking not just about piracy of the Horn of Africa, but safe passage in the Indian Ocean? How did you come down on where you think NATO ought to focus when it comes to some of these lifeline questions?

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** When we started our work we made quickly a list on what some people thought – not necessarily experts, but people from whom we take input – what kinds of new threats NATO should deal with; at least according to their opinion. Now, you had, of course, the new terrorism threat after 9/11, the [unclear] of 99, you had piracy or marine security, you had the cyber attack, you had the energy supplies, climate change, the high arctic [?]; I must have forgotten some. And then we started to discuss that. By the way some other experts and people helped us as well.

Let me take as an example energy security. I thought a bit in my past about that. If you say energy security: what does NATO have to do. And we said, not seriously, a soldier on every kilometre of pipeline, or every [unclear] pipeline, it doesn't help. If you think it's true then you see that energy security means that basically a country has organised energy supplies; and why is that, because you have to import it. If you have your own stuff you have automatic security; it is not an issue. If you have to import it, now then if you make your country or yourself dependent on another country yes, you take a risk. So, what you learn about energy security is you have to invest secure means so you have alternatives if something happens. It is a kind of economic optimization. So, you can go from one gas supply to another gas supply; or if you can't make your electricity based on natural gas you can make electricity based on oil or on nuclear or what have you.

I don't think that NATO is there because you've under-invested, which is basically good common sense, and domestic policies. You see on the last pages of our report we spelled that out.

Now, if you take this now to a wider message, what we say, and what Secretary Albright said very carefully, NATO is not a Jack of all threats, or everything to all people, or the Swiss knife; so you must have a logic. First of all, is there a threat? Yes. Is it applicable to many alliance members? If you say yes, fine. Are other organizations taking care of it? Yes, fine; nothing for NATO. If other organizations don't do a good job can our diplomats solve something? And they should try very hard. If you pass all those decision criteria then you may end up with a threat which is indeed a threat against most members, other organizations can't do it, politicians can't solve it and so on; then it's can NATO do something, and is there support to an international law. And that is how you should approach it.

You see in our report that whilst some people thought a year ago that we'd do something about energy security, you read it for yourself, pretty marginal climate change, basically we say yes, in theory something may come out that is a security aspect if people start to move because the climate has changed; basically we say for the time being.

Now, I can go through all those threats. But we did something very important as well. Let me explain that. We think if you make a strategy or strategic concept for the coming ten years, then I don't know what will happen in the year 2017 and the year 2018; and maybe that is quite different to what we expect now. So, you have to build these issue making mechanisms, which Secretary Albright called this agility to deal with unknown situations. And that is, of course, very important. And that is why we think you should use Article 4 for that. Maybe you can then solve in the context of Article 4, the consultation paragraph, or maybe it is one day that you have to refer to Article 5. But by doing it that way, and the language is not in the report, but the verbal language that we use is that you keep Article 5 pure. And I think that is better for the clarity of your strategy.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Right, I think we have come to the section in the programme where we are going to turn to you for the interesting and challenging questions. We've got half an hour. We've got some roving mikes, so do raise your hand if you would like to ask the panel a question or two. Please do introduce yourself and tell us where you're from. Perhaps we can encourage the next generation to have a go.

You're not the next generation, Richard Wright. Come on, some of the young people. Gentleman over there in the corner.

**SPEAKER 1:** I'm not from the University of Kent; I'm not from the College of Europe; but the University of Antwerp. I have two questions on arms control and what you called the mix of conventional nuclear and missile defence. My first is about the nuclear weapons. Why not fully recommending the withdrawal of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? The military say they are useless; politically their presence sends the wrong signal to potential proliferators; and in Germany even the government, and Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and probably even in Turkey, the vast majority would like to see them out. In short, why are you waiting on this? I think NATO's legitimacy is decreasing in these countries because of this status quo and inertia.

And the second critical question is about missile defence. It is a new buzz word and a new mission even. Are you aware that the current and foreseeable missile defence technology simply does not work? I'm not talking only about the strategic interceptors, but also the SM3 missile interceptors on Aegis ships because of the counter measures and decoys, as was recently written in an article by George Lewis from Cornell University and the post of MIT in "Arms Control Today". That has also to do with capability and legacy.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Nobody should say that the next generation isn't very well informed. We had Kent University; now can we have somebody from the other university, just so the competition continues? Nobody yet. One more question and then we will return to the panel.

**AHMED JILANI:** My name is Ahmed Jilani and I'm from the University of Sussex; so it's separate from the other universities. My question is regarding Russia NATO. Given the fact that there exists a long-standing trust deficit between Russia and the west do you think there is still a strong possibility of a NATO Russia cooperation? And secondly, what are the west doing to reduce that trust deficit.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Thank you. So, three questions. Why didn't you recommend the immediate removal of the tactical nuclear weapons? Is missile defence really realistic? And how do we actually work to address the trust deficit?

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, let me start with the nuclear. Let me say it is actually President Obama who has talked about moving ultimately to a nuclear free world. He has taken a number of very interesting steps in that regard: not only speeches, but moving forward on the START Treaty on having a summit, being very active in the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty generally. But until that moment NATO basically has been an alliance that really, in many ways, has been dependent on a nuclear deterrent. Our sense was that until we reach that time, and so long as Russia continues to have a very large number of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, that the following things made sense.

One is that there should be, whatever decisions were made about tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO countries, it should be as a result of an alliance decision. We made a number of references for the necessities for alliance decisions: that this is an alliance where there is consensus and it operates on that basis. The other point we made was that whatever decisions are made should be done on a reciprocal or mutual basis in some way that reflected the current situation in terms of Russia NATO; but that it should not be a unilateral approach, in terms of the alliance just making a unilateral decision; that it needed to be an alliance decision and there needed to be mutuality involved in it.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** The missile defence, you said does it work. I don't know, but I have to say we have had a lot of talks with the military, and that has certainly increased my confidence in their competencies. It's an obvious point: if it doesn't work you need good engineers or don't build it.

The strong NATO Russian cooperation trust deficit: I have gone through an experience in my capacity of Chief Executive of Shell, with the Russians where we have a very large project on Sakhalin Island, and we were not real friends, so to say. Maybe there are those who followed that in the past. At the end of the day the plant operates very well; the Russians are very proud of it. My point is that if you work together on specific projects that is what really instils trust. Whilst it is a really good idea in itself to invite the Russians for common missile defence cooperation, the more projects where you can really actually operate, I think that drives and that closes the bridge of the trust deficit. And I hope that, especially the NATO Russian council, as Secretary Albright says, which is the basic steering mechanism, and you don't have big disturbances like [unclear] was, then I think we can make a lot of progress.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Let's open up again for some questions.

**REINHARDT BÜTIKOFER:** My name is Reinhardt Bütikofer. I'm an MEP, so to speak representing the baby boomers here. I have two questions. One, at the Munich security conference, Secretary General of NATO described one of its future roles as being the global hub of a network of security organizations. That description hasn't figured at all in what you've presented. So, I would be interested in how you see that.

The second question: to what degree do you believe the next NATO strategy should be discussed with new global powers?

**DANIEL KORSKI:** From the European Parliament to the European Commission; Richard, I'm coming back to you.

**RICHARD WRIGHT:** Richard Wright from the European Commission. I was very happy to have been consulted by Secretary Albright and Mr. Van der Veer in preparation of the report. And let me say, I think it is an excellent, well written document.

My question is on an aspect that hasn't been touched on so far, which is your rather strong endorsement of comprehensive approaches to crisis management, the non hierarchical, let's say, ranking of military means, political means, civilian means etc. And in particular to a passage towards the end of the document where you are rather critical of NATO's relations with civilian organizations, saying they have to be strengthened. Two of the solutions you put forward are one, to have a civilian planning unit within NATO; and secondly, to build up or to draw up a roster of crisis management experts who could be deployed even in certain circumstances. This is quite, I would suggest, far reaching. I'm wondering is there not an incompatibility, or potential incomparability between on the one hand wanting to strengthen your relations with civilian organizations, which would be the EU, UN and others, and at the same time building up some sort of capability yourself which could, in certain circumstances, overlap, or even, in worse circumstances, conflict with perhaps the goals of the civilian organization with whom you want to strengthen relations.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Let's do one more question in this round.

**STEFANIE BOLZEN:** Stefanie Bolzen, German daily Die Welt. I have a question for Dr. Albright. You are very clear and outspoken about missile defence shield, missile defences mission within the strategy. As the US government is very much pressuring on this issue, and want a decision by the Lisbon summit, what is your assessment? Do you think this is possible by November? And if not, what will the US government do?

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Reinhardt asked about what happened to the Secretary General's concept of NATO as a hub, and whether or not the future strategic concept ought to be discussed with the emerging powers; by which you mean Brazil and India and so on, perhaps. And Richard talked about whether some of the capabilities you call for, comprehensive capabilities, will preclude the kind of good natured cooperation with the EU that you also want.

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** First of all let me say that this truly has been one of the most transparent and consultative processes that NATO has been involved in. We talked to a lot of different people in different countries, and the idea of the hub kind of didn't work, frankly, in terms of the fact that NATO would look like a global organization, when it is not designed to be a global organization.

We however did think that it was useful for NATO to develop these much larger numbers of partners and partnerships, either with organizations or with individual countries. There is this sense that NATO has the capability of reaching out when in fact it needs help in a particular area; or vice versa, when a partner organization feels that it needs help. I did the consultation with the United Nations, and there was kind of a sense well, there is a global organization; how do they operate together and what is the consultative mechanism.

Also to your point about reaching out to other partners: this is supposed to be an organic aspect of just seeing where we help and how we can all help each other in dealing with these various threats. It in some ways laps over into the next question.

Where we came out with this was that NATO in fact – and it came again from the seminars, in terms of learning about how the comprehensive approach worked. And there was very much a determination that NATO itself needed a better way to plug into the civilian capabilities of other organizations. As somebody, again, who has been through this, it takes a while to get the other organizations organised and motivated, and so in the interim, for two reasons, one to have a

civilian component within NATO that can relate to some of the civilian components in other organizations, and also to fill a time gap it does not hurt. And we did not think of it as competitive at all, but more of a complementary way that the comprehensive approach could work if NATO had a section within the secretariat or within the organization that was able to relate to the civilian organizations.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** There was a question about – I’m not sure I understood it right – the missile defence system by November. Was that your question?

**DANIEL KORSKI:** I think Stefanie asked whether it was feasible to reach across allied agreement by the Lisbon summit on missile defence.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** I realised that in the press conference the Secretary General has already said that he really liked this statement about the missile defence system that NATO should be very active there, and that at least from a personal point of view he supported that. And then he said of course we have to get all the countries behind that. So, basically, if I decode that in normal language, that will be very much part of the discussions leading to the Lisbon agreement.

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** The missile defence issue: let me just raise it in a number of different ways. First of all it goes to whether it works or not. I think one of the issues that was out there in the previous eight years was whether the decisions that the United States had made in terms of placing various parts of missile defence in particular countries was the right approach, to go at it bilaterally. There really then became a discussion about the fact that this should be a NATO issue, a NATO discussion. Then there are also - and this goes a little bit to the Russia question - that the missile defence is against other places, and that the threat is coming from a different area, and that in fact that was a way that there could be a very legitimate cooperation on how to deal with the issue; both in terms of NATO’s decision making, as well as partnerships with Russia.

Again, I can’t speak for the United States government, but I think there is a certain amount of momentum behind this. As Mr. Van der Veer said, and again as was reiterated today by the Secretary General, he does see this as something that he approves of, but also has to be taken up by alliance heads of state at the November Lisbon meeting.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Let’s open up another round of questions, we have ten minutes.

**HENRIK BLIDDAL:** Henrik Bliddal from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. You are both talking a lot about taking specific steps towards the Russians, and tackling small issues and step by step; but how do you tackle the fact that the Russians are almost saying the opposite, that they want to broaden the issues, whether historical, about the European security architecture and nuclear weapons detector? That also, on the other hand, also implies the conventional forces in the Europe treaty. How do you tackle this?

**PAUL ADAMSON:** My name is Paul Adamson, publisher of E!Sharp magazine. I used to be the next generation but many decades ago. Nobody disputes it is a dangerous world that we are living in, and they are growing by the day, it seems to me; but I’m trying to understand why under the backdrop, as you say Madame Albright, this lowering of public support for NATO, or even understanding of NATO, and the economic recession and the free ride aspect you were talking about, why there is not more support for this new turning point for NATO. It seems to me the problem is maybe the issue for this report and maybe for the internal discussions of

NATO – but this is based on my very cursory reading of this report – is that what you are doing basically is you are talking about, in terms of structures, in terms of new services, in terms of new functions, a further enlargement of NATO, just like membership enlargement over the past ten years, when people are saying we haven't got the resources, we haven't got the money to support that where people are free-riding. Again, I may be misreading your report, and maybe some of the little insights I have of NATO discussion, is that you are in effect trying to bolt on all these very important new services, new structures, new functions, onto an existing structure, which to many people, frankly, is seen as dysfunctional. Maybe what is missing is more effort being spent on saying well, we will do all these new things, it is impossible to find fault with your recommendations, clearly they are self-evidently worthy of support; however, if they are not done in a context of also NATO itself being restructured and revisited and reviewed, given that people are saying there are too many committees, too much talking, the structures are dysfunctional, then you are not going to have the full success of your recommendations going forward.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** Let's add one more question.

**ANDREJ KIRN:** My name is Andrej Kirn from the College of Europe. My question relates to the responsibility to protect. One of the points in the report also discusses the role of the NATO response force. My question is with regards also to the development of the EU battle groups: whether there was any discussion on R2P during your work, and whether you see NATO's role in the concept.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** The first question was, my mother used to say how to eat an elephant, bite, bite, bite; the first question seemed to be saying we want to eat the elephant, bite, bite, bite, but the Russians want to eat the entire elephant; how do we deal with that tension. Then the second question I'm going to interpret as where is the call for root and branch reform of NATO; isn't this just a bit of fixing the old car here and there, rather than a big call for reform. Then finally a question on R2P.

**MADELEINE ALBRIGHT:** Well, let me say the first and second question go together a little bit. I think one can always decide to disband the organizations that exist and start over. I actually think NATO is a pretty good organization that has shown its worth over its lifetime. It has certain aspects that have to be changed; and we have argued that in terms of reform measures and streamlining and a variety of different ways of acting. I am still willing to put my money behind what has been the greatest military alliance in the history of the world. The question is how it does adapt.

I think one has to look at the motivations a little bit of suggestions for new groupings. This is not simple. The question is whether every time you have a problem you invent some new organization, or whether you try to figure out how you operate with what you have.

When I was Secretary of State, I have to tell you, I had times when I could never find a European minister because they were always in some meeting. So, I asked the intelligence and research department in the state department to make a chart for me, and it looked a little bit like some astronomical or astrological chart with Bulgaria as Pluto. I said this is the euro mess. So, we cannot, in fact, keep creating new organizations; that is my personal view. There is a core aspect of NATO that one should feel confident about, and that we have a way of making it work.

I think the NATO Russia council actually has great possibilities of doing step by step; trying it out and seeing how it works. I hope that that will be the way done is, bite by bite. I think there is



great value in that. To pick up what Mr. Van der Veer said, if you are working on issues you may find cooperation.

Let me say the other thing: this has a little bit to do with R2P. It is very interesting that when you are a decision maker and something terrible happens somewhere and you want to do something about it, you look inside your toolbox and you try to figure out which organization will do the job. There is some necessity for rapid action, especially in a question of R2P or a question in terms of where people are dying, and you think okay. I can tell you - and there may be people in this room who are critical of this - but when people were being ethnically cleansed in Kosovo and the United Nations was not capable of doing the job, NATO was there to do the job. If NATO hadn't been we would have found something else that existed that had the capability of acting. R2P is a very complicated issue; it runs into questions of sovereignty; but we have in our report that we do think that there ought to be ways that people need to be protected or helped, either after a humanitarian disaster or a disaster caused by humans. So, we have that in there.

**JEROEN VAN DER VEER:** The fixing the old car: first of all the strategic concept in 99, these were intelligent people who tried to look forward. If you take it at the time I think it was a good strategic concept; but the world has changed, so you have to adapt. One day people will say yes, they worked very hard in 2010, but at this time... and that is how it is.

I think it is always a bit easy to say this old - I use your jargon, not of the person who asked the question - a bit of fixing up. I think if you really take the report, this is an absolutely not grey report. This report makes many choices, both we say regional organization, we say those threats yes, and then a lot of advice and reforms and all kinds of things; so if you really work through there are some very clear advices in it. I think that is real progress, and of course I hope it will be a real help to the Secretary General for the Lisbon agreement that has to be met.

About NATO response force, I think we acknowledge in the report that more progress should be made. Let me stop there.

**DANIEL KORSKI:** I think that is an excellent point to stop on: a lot of progress has been made but more needs to be made in the future.

Please join me in thanking Secretary Albright and Chairman Van der Veer. And let's also thank Carnegie Europe, and of course European Council for Relations for making all this possible. Thank you Fabrice.