Chinese Views of Foreign Policy in the 19th Party Congress

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Foreign policy priorities and initiatives addressed at the 19th Party Congress confirm the end of China’s “hide and bide” period and demonstrate its growing interest in becoming a more influential player on the world stage. While emphasizing that China has entered a “new era” during his report to the Congress, Xi Jinping suggested that China will be not only a major economic power, but also a cooperative, influential power that will serve as a model for other developing countries. Yet with the wide range of foreign policy goals mentioned at the Party Congress and in related Chinese sources, the question remains as to whether China’s peaceful and beneficial foreign policy line will be fully reflected in its more confident and assertive approach to the international community.

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held October 18-24, 2017. Although party congresses normally do not address Chinese foreign policy in any detail, they nonetheless have invariably provided assessments of the external environment, descriptions of China’s development goals, and a summary of broad initiatives and priorities relating to foreign and defense policy since at least the early eighties.1 The 19th Party Congress was no exception. Indeed, it offered some very significant statements that not only reaffirmed great continuity in many elements of Chinese foreign policy under the reforms, but also struck some new and controversial themes.2 All of these elements were primarily contained in the Central Committee work report delivered by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General-Secretary Xi Jinping on October 18.3

Given their obvious relevance to the future foreign policy orientation and behavior of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the next five years, and probably beyond, such 19th Party Congress statements have understandably generated a considerable amount of attention among leading Chinese officials, scholars, and policy analysts. While generally agreeing on and applauding the main foreign policy features of the Party Congress, these Chinese observers have also at times chosen to notably emphasize different elements and offer differing (and often sharper) implications of those features for overall PRC foreign policy, and for the United States.

This article first presents a brief overview of the foreign policy contents of the 19th Party Congress divided into three areas: 1) the overall features of the global and Asian diplomatic, economic, and security environment; 2) China’s basic national development goals and achievements of direct relevance to foreign policy; and 3) the country’s major

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foreign and defense policy principles, initiatives, and priorities. This is followed by a summary of Chinese observations and assessments regarding those contents and other issues relating to PRC foreign policy emanating from the Party Congress. As usual, the summary distinguishes between authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese views. The article ends with some concluding observations.

Main Foreign Policy Themes

The Beginning of a “New Era”

The most significant overall foreign policy element of the 19th Party Congress was the strong affirmation of the ability, need, and intention for China to play a more active and influential role in the world, thus ending the so-called “hide and bide” approach dominant since the advent of the reform era.

According to the work report, China has entered into a “new era” marked by greater self-confidence, expanded goals, and an unambiguous desire to occupy a position of global leadership alongside the United States and other major powers. Although many of these themes were evident at the 18th Party Congress, and in some cases even earlier, they have never been stated as emphatically nor linked so decisively to China having turned a corner toward greatness.

The External Environment

China’s regional and global environment remains characterized by continuity and dynamic change. As in past work reports, peace and development constitute the dominant trends of the times. Meanwhile, global multipolarity, economic globalization, and changes in the global governance system and the international order are seen to be “deepening development,” with countries becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent. The report also notes that “…relative international forces are becoming more balanced,” thus signaling a belief in the continued relative decline of U.S. (and Western?) power.

At the same time, again as with past reports, the world is also seen to be facing increasing uncertainties and destabilizing factors. In particular,

Global economic growth lacks energy; the gap between rich and poor continues to widen; hotspot issues arise often in some regions; and unconventional security threats like terrorism, cyber-insecurity, major infectious diseases, and climate change continue to spread.

Of particular new significance, the report asserts, in a thinly veiled reference to recent protectionist and “me-first” sentiments in the U.S. and other Western nations, that these features of the external environment mean that “[n]o country can address alone the many challenges facing mankind; no country can afford to retreat into self-isolation.”
National Development Goals and Successes

In confronting these opportunities and challenges, the work report cites a wide range of recent foreign policy-related accomplishments in China’s effort to “…become a proud and active member of the community of nations.” These include, most notably, the pursuit of new economic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the hosting of many major international summits and conferences, the calls for reforming global governance to better reflect the interests of developing countries, the “historic breakthroughs” in military modernization and reform alongside increases in “cultural soft power,” and the significant progress in “building an ecological civilization.”

With regard to the last accomplishment, the report boldly asserts:

Taking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization.

As a result of these and other successes, the report states that

...China’s international standing has risen as never before. Our Party, our country, our people, our forces, and our nation have changed in ways without precedent. The Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East.

This is seen to constitute the above-mentioned “new era,” in which “…the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics is now flying high and proud for all to see.” Moreover, in extolling the achievements of Chinese socialism, the work report for the first time asserts that a rejuvenating China “…offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.”

Looking ahead, the work report repeats, with some new additional details, the timeline for China to attain its ultimate goal of becoming “…a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” by the middle of the 21st century. Yet for the first time, it divides the remaining years of this timeline into two equal stages: the former, ending in 2035, will see the realization of social modernization; the latter will witness the full creation of “…a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.”

Key Foreign and Defense Policy Principles, Initiatives, and Priorities

The above foreign and defense policy successes and China’s ambitious national objectives for its external environment provide the backdrop for the work report’s more specific policy principles, priorities, and initiatives. Many of these features are a continuation, albeit often with greater emphasis, of past policies, while others are somewhat new or recent modifications.
Unsurprisingly, the work report includes Beijing’s long-standing rhetorical stress on the peaceful pursuit of policies designed to strengthen cooperation and “win-win” outcomes with all nations while avoiding “…acts that impose one’s will on others or interfere in the internal affairs of others as well as the practice of the strong bullying the weak.” This is paired with the usual emphasis on rejecting “the Cold War mentality and power politics” and favoring communication over confrontation and partnerships over alliances, all in support of China’s well-established “independent foreign policy of peace.” Moreover, these features are all again identified, as in recent years, as central to China’s effort to foster “a new type of international relations.” The work report also offers the usual support for an active United Nations in international affairs alongside support for “…the efforts of other developing countries to increase their representation and strengthen their voice in international affairs.”

In economic relations, the work report reaffirms the “…fundamental national policy of opening up” along with support for multilateral trade regimes and efforts to facilitate the establishment of free trade areas and to expand an “open world economy.” In this regard, the BRI is touted as a major driver of cooperation in shared development, involving “…policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity…” Moreover, in a pointed phrase possibly directed at the U.S., the report asserts that “[o]penness brings progress, while self-seclusion leaves one behind. China will not close its door to the world; we will only become more and more open.”

In the defense realm, the work report stresses the pursuit of a “…holistic approach to national security” that combines internal and external aspects, traditional and nontraditional security, and overall seeks “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security [a by-now standard phrase].” It also repeats the long-standing characterization of China’s national defense policy as defensive in nature, non-threatening, non-expansionist, and of course anti-hegemonic. At the same time, the report reiterates the standard commitment to “…safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and preventing “…anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form,” from separating any part of Chinese territory from China.

Finally, of particular note, the work report also presents the objective of building China’s armed forces into “world-class forces” by mid-century for the first time, and it notes that the military will obey the Party’s command and be able to “fight and win.”

Chinese Assessments and Observations

Although most Chinese comments on the foreign and defense policy elements of the 19th Party Congress simply repeat (and extol) the language found in the work report, it is useful to identify what is stressed and how different elements are interpreted by various authoritative and non-authoritative sources.

Authoritative Sources
Authoritative Chinese sources naturally praise the foreign and defense policy elements of the congress work report and, of course, Xi Jinping.25

In the process, however, some senior officials seem to go beyond Xi’s actual remarks to offer sometimes excessively lofty interpretations of the significance of China’s many claimed diplomatic features and successes.

For example, on the day after the work report was delivered, Foreign Minister Wang Yi provided a summary of China’s major foreign policy and diplomatic achievements under Xi Jinping’s leadership since the 18th Party Congress. Most importantly, Wang pointed to three particularly significant Chinese foreign policy accomplishments under Xi, all mentioned in the work report. First, the BRI has become “…the largest international cooperation platform in the world and the most popular international public product.” Second, China has “…taken the initiative to tackle various global challenges, …[and] become the most dynamic and active force in the process of global governance” [author’s emphasis]. And third, Beijing has “…enlarged its [China’s] right of making international rules and largely elevated its say in international affairs.”26

Beyond these points, Wang also stated that “…the most essential and meaningful results of China’s diplomacy as a major country with Chinese characteristics” is that, due to its many successes, China can now “…provide a new path for all developing countries to modernization” [author’s emphasis].27

Equally notable, a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs story asserts that the new type of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation aims “…to abandon the law of the jungle that leaves the weak at the mercy of the strong.” According to the story, this goal

…makes China's foreign policy and philosophy occupy the commanding height of human morality [author’s emphasis], and shows that Chinese Communists are able to and willing to make contributions to solving problems facing mankind. And it will be widely welcomed and supported by the international community.28

Other authoritative sources are somewhat more confrontational, associating the “law of the jungle” approach to a “certain country” (i.e., the United States):

[The Chinese] approach is in stark contrast to [a] certain country that only seeks for absolute security of its own and for that purpose, even conducts color revolution and tries to topple the regime of [an]other country.29

Authoritative People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sources naturally underline the objective laid out in the work report of China creating a “world-class” military by the middle of the century. However, they do not provide additional information or insights into the specific meaning of this term. These sources by and large simply emphasize the commitment of the military to implementing the policies and goals outlined at the party congress and
highlight the main elements of the work report relevant to the military. An example of the latter identifies points including:

- “The party’s goal in strengthening the armed forces in a new era is to build a party’s army that is capable of winning battles, has a good style of work, and will build the people’s army into a world-class army”;
- “The Party’s absolute leadership over People’s Army is an essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics…”;
- “Achieving the modernization of national defense and the armed forces is an important symbol and strong support for the comprehensive building of a powerful modern socialist country…”;
- The PLA will “…resolutely defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country and… [will] not tolerate the repetition of the historical tragedy of national division”; and
- “Building the thinking that science and technology are core combat capabilities [is] an inevitable requirement for strengthening the building of new combat capabilities and an important lead in comprehensively implementing the strategy of rejuvenating the Chinese armed forces.”

Non-Authoritative Sources

As with authoritative sources, most non-authoritative sources simply echo and praise, sometimes in very lofty language, various foreign and defense policy-related elements of the work report. But several sources provide interesting indications of what the PRC government, and perhaps many Chinese, regard as the main points and implications of the party congress in specific foreign (and defense) policy-related areas.

For example, a Xinhua piece listing themes from the work report highlights a greater openness to the world, the transformation of the PLA into a world-class military, and the rejection of hegemony or expansion. As general goals, these of course are not new, being implicit or explicit elements of economic reform, military modernization and diplomacy for decades.

That said, the exact phrase “world-class military” (世界一流军队) is fairly recent in origin. It first appeared in a Jiefangjun Bao (JFJB) article in March 2015, but then did not reappear until February 2016. On February 27, 2016 there was a JFJB “commentator” article that used the term. Then in March 2016, Xi Jinping used the term in a speech at the National Defense University. From that point on the term took off, and from March 2016 to the present, it has appeared 602 times — almost once a day.

Employing towering language, some sources stress that in foreign policy, the “new era” touted by the work report “…will witness China’s continual advance toward the center of the world stage” (见证中国不断走近世界舞台中). Indeed, in espousing the building of a new type of international relations centered on “mutual respect, fairness and justice, cooperation and win-win…,” China is seen as “…setting the agenda for the world order.”
The phrase “continual advance toward the center of the world stage” first appeared in *People’s Daily* in 2011. It has appeared 134 times in that newspaper beginning in 2011, but 44 of these have appeared since the 19th Party Congress.\(^{35}\)

A Xinhua commentary echoes this view in a more dramatic and challenging fashion:

> By 2050, two centuries after the Opium Wars, which plunged the ‘Middle Kingdom’ into a period of hurt and shame, China is set to regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the world… The new world order cannot be just dominated by capitalism and the West, and the time will come for a change…. Fingerpointing and questioning the legitimacy of the Chinese way are of no avail.\(^{36}\)

For some Chinese observers, the 19\(^{th}\) Party Congress has confirmed the full replacement of the “keeping a low profile” (*taoguangyanghui* (韬光养晦)) concept with the notion of “striving for achievements” (*dili fenjin* (砥砺奋进)).\(^{37}\) In perhaps the most defiant expression of this shift, one Chinese observer states:

> Chinese diplomacy is likely to be unyielding following [the] 19th party congress, with no compromise at all in matters involving its core interests. Given its sizeable capital and strength, and rising nationalism at home, the Communist Party will no longer back down on many issues.\(^{38}\)

In a less aggressive but nonetheless critical manner, another Chinese observer from the People’s University states China’s commitment to building a new type of international relations based on common interests is reassuring at a time when U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America First” and unilateralism have “shattered the American dream” and “left international relations in a ‘dangerous jungle of interests.’”\(^{39}\)

Similarly, another source cites Liu Zhiqin, a senior fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at People’s University, who states: “As the United States closes its doors and withdraws from free trade agreements, China is further opening up its market and embracing economic globalization to confront the ‘America First’ stance.”\(^{40}\)

Yet another observer states, more pointedly, that China’s development experience serves as an alternative to “…the neoliberal model advocated by the Washington Consensus,” and as confirmation of the mistake of those who predicted “…the inevitable triumph of Western liberal democracy.”\(^{41}\)

Not all non-authoritative sources are as assertive or confrontational, however. In a more analytical vein, some sources interpret the work report’s stress on promoting cooperative international development as a primary example of the effort to address the “…ever widening global deficit in peace, governance, and development.” In particular, through supposed “win-win” undertakings such as the BRI, China is seen as a force against the rising tide of populism.\(^{42}\)
Other observers merely cite the positive role of win-win and major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in promoting open global economic development, improved governance, and the resolution of global hotspot issues, among other benefits.\(^{43}\)

And a “Zhong Sheng” (Voice of China) article in *People’s Daily* states that

> While being in a new and important historical era, China will continue to sincerely welcome advice from the world, and promote Chinese people’s desire for mutual understanding and friendship with people of all countries.\(^{44}\)

Such moderation is also evident in some comments by military observers. For example, a PLA senior colonel states:

> Looking to the future, we are willing to work with the U.S. to respect each other, deepen mutual trust, focus on pragmatic changes and cooperation, properly control differences, and continuously inject positive energy and new momentum into the development of bilateral relations.\(^{45}\)

Finally, some scholars of economic and diplomatic relations, when commenting on the work report’s views on global governance, strike a more modest and restrained tone, stating that “…more concrete proposals are needed to carry out the global governance solutions proposed by China, and more outcomes are needed to show for them…” and that “[l]eaders and scholars need to be patient and come up with more practical plans to advance China’s diplomatic agenda.”\(^{46}\)

**Conclusion**

The most notable foreign policy-related feature of the 19\(^{th}\) Party Congress is its strong emphasis on the advent of a “new era” for China as a more activist and influential player on the world stage, not only as a major economic actor, but also as a proponent of an all-inclusive, cooperative “new type” of international relations, a model for other developing states, and a “world-class’ military power. While most of these elements have been evident in recent years (and in some cases for decades), they have not previously been brought together as prominently, and with as much energy and apparent pride, as under Xi Jinping. In this sense, the 19\(^{th}\) Party Congress represents authoritative confirmation of the end of the “hide and bide” era and the beginning of a concerted effort to unabashedly place China among the first rank of great powers.

This should come as no surprise to anyone even minimally aware of Chinese policies and pronouncements, beginning even before Xi. What is somewhat surprising is the extent to which both authoritative and non-authoritative commentators have interpreted this effort as a confirmation of China’s superior qualities. Both types of sources use phrases such as: “the most dynamic and active force in the process of global governance,” at “the commanding height of human morality,” “setting [the] international agenda,” and others.\(^{47}\) Wang Yi’s statement that the notion that China can now offer “a new path for all
countries to modernization” constitutes “the most essential and meaningful result of China’s diplomacy…” also suggests a similar level of hubris.48

Such hyperbole cannot be dismissed as mere propaganda, given China’s growing ability to influence world events. While the Chinese have every right to be proud of their accomplishments, such language nonetheless raises concerns over the extent to which Beijing will actually seek “win-win” outcomes based (as such outcomes inevitably must be) on compromise, conciliation, and respect. If China believes it is the best, and has the best to offer, where does that leave everyone else? Of course, the same criticism can be leveled at the notion of American exceptionalism in the world. Neither view is particularly useful to the construction of a genuinely cooperative, mutually beneficial world order.

As is normally the case, many, but not all, non-authoritative sources are more blunt and pointed in assessing the meaning of China’s policies and national objectives, further raising concerns. Perhaps most notable is the effort to contrast China’s supposed myriad economic and other successes with the supposed dysfunctionality and destructiveness of “…the neoliberal model advocated by the Washington Consensus.”49 From this perspective, China is not just a new, beneficial force acting to stimulate and deepen peace and prosperity for all, but rather an alternative to the values and policies of existing democratic, industrialized states, whether in the West or in Asia. The obvious questions to ask are: Is this assertive stance about seeking common ground based on compromise and tolerance, or is it about replacing and winning? What does it mean when some Chinese observers assert that “…the Communist Party will no longer back down on many issues?”50

Of course, some Chinese clearly suggest (in line with the basic rhetorical thrust of official policy) that China’s more assertive stance is purely positive and beneficial, designed, for example, to address the “…ever widening global deficit in peace, governance, and development.”51 From this viewpoint, China is seen as “…a stabilizing factor and source of wisdom in a world troubled with uncertainties and challenges.”52 Still other observers strike a more modest and restrained tone, stating that “…more concrete proposals are needed to carry out the global governance solutions proposed by China, and more outcomes are needed to show for them…”53 Indeed, the hyperbole and grand goals offered in the realm of foreign policy at the 19th Party Congress and in associated commentary have yet to show exactly how they will serve the interests of other nations. On that essential point, the jury is still out.

Notes
Several types of PRC sources are considered authoritative in the sense of explicitly “speaking for the regime.” Authoritative statements include, in descending order of authority, PRC government and CCP statements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) statements, MFA spokesperson statements, and MFA daily press briefings.

Many types of low-level commentary and signed articles appearing in a wide variety of PRC and Hong Kong media convey notable yet decidedly non-authoritative views. Such articles appear in the PRC government news service (Xinhua), CCP and PLA newspapers, the Hong Kong–based (and People’s Daily–owned) Global Times (环球时报), and many minor PRC and Hong Kong newspapers and academic publications. See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,” China Leadership Monitor 44 (Summer 2014), 28.

Several types of usually homophonous, bylined articles appearing in People’s Daily are considered non-authoritative. A major example of this is articles using the byline “Zhong Sheng” (钟声). See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on the South China Sea Arbitration Case between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines,” China Leadership Monitor 51 (Fall 2016), 2.


During his speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi described how this new era “will be an era of building on past successes to further advance our [China’s] cause...” and stated that the CCP should “develop unshakeable confidence, work hard and work well to see socialism with Chinese characteristics display even stronger vitality.” See “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress.” Also see Buckley and Bradsher, “Xi Jinping’s Marathon Speech.”

The phrase “deepening development of world multipolarization and economic globalization” (世界多极化，经济全球化深入发展) goes back to 2000. I am indebted to Alastair Iain Johnston for this information.


27 Ibid.


29 “Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Lin Songtian at the Meeting with Media and Think Tanks on the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.”


33 I am indebted to Alastair Ian Johnston for this information.


35 I am indebted to Alastair Ian Johnston for this information.


50 Deng, “In Xi’s new era, Chinese diplomacy will be a display of hard power.”

51 “CPC-led China offers compass for bridging global government deficit.”

52 “CPC’s governance wisdom leading China to bigger role in global development.”

53 See Liu Youfa’s comments in Li, “New Vision.”