A Common European Security Space

TRANSCRIPT

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FABRICE POTHIER: Your Excellency, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this panel discussion hosted by Carnegie Europe. My name is Fabrice Pothier. I am the Director of Carnegie Europe - the pan-European foreign policy forum of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. As you can hear, I have a slight cold. I apologise. I suspect it is a gift from my kind colleague, Dmitri Trenin from when we were in Berlin last week. I am yet another victim of Russia’s foreign policy assertiveness.

I would not normally mention the punctuation, but in the case of ‘A Common European Security Space?’, the question mark is significant. The point of the panel is to ask the questions: what is this concept? How can we define it? What would be the specifics of a common European security space?

To do that we have three great speakers, Ambassador Martinusz from the Hungarian Permanent Representation to NATO; Dr. Dmitri Trenin on my left, the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre; and on my far right, we have Dr. Bobo Lo, the Director for the China and Russia Programmes at the London based Centre for European Reform (CER).

Before I turn to our first speaker, Dr Dmitri Trenin, I am going to give a brief background on the proposal for a common European security space. It was brought back to the agenda by President Medvedev last summer in Berlin and in Evian at a meeting in August 2008. Even if the Medvedev idea of a treaty is not necessarily the right answer, it does raise the very useful question about whether or not we need a new framework; a new concept to bring Europe, Russia, and to an extent, the U.S., around the same table and to develop a more positive type of cooperation than the one that we have now.

I would now like to turn to the first speaker, Dmitri Trenin, who, as I mentioned earlier is the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. He has been with Carnegie since the creation of the centre in Moscow. He is also a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before joining Carnegie he was in the Russian Army, and before that in the Soviet Army.

And so, first I would like to turn to you, Dmitri, and ask you what is the rationale behind this Medvedev proposal? What is the good stuff and what is less pertinent? What type of strategy
perspectives does it open for improving relations between the United States, Europe and the West?

DMITRI TRENIN: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, let me thank you for giving us your time. Second of all, I would like to thank Fabrice for his introduction, and I would also like to say that his cold is not the result of any assertiveness, but rather the result of closeness and friendship. So, beware not only an assertive Russia, but a friendly Russia too, getting too close that it could be infectious. But people recover.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you.

DMITRI TRENIN: And you will, very quickly I’m sure.

Let me say this, last August, at the time of the Georgia war, the relations between Russia and the western world plummeted to their lowest point in a quarter century. I would even say they went back as far as pre-Gorbachev times, the Andropovs, the Chernyenos and the rest of them.

One illustration of how deep and dangerous a misunderstanding could be between Russia and the West is this - much of the western world at the time of the Georgia war was wondering where Russia would strike next, i.e. after Georgia. At the same time the Russian leadership in Moscow, all the way to include Mr Medvedev and Mr Putin, were probably wondering if the United States would start a new war of proxy against Russia. In their thinking, the war in Georgia was a U.S. inspired war of proxy.

Both groups agreed on one thing only - that the next possible hotspot would be Crimea. I don’t think it requires too much imagination to say that had it actually been Crimea, for whatever reason, then the Georgia story would be seen as some small skirmish. The situation in Europe would probably be very different. It is a good thing that both visions were paranoid.

The real situation did not point to the need for a collision, but the fact that we came so close is very disturbing. I think, ladies and gentlemen, that last fall we had a close shave with history, and hopefully we can draw lessons from that.

I believe that the economic crisis, among the many things it did, was a saving grace for the Russian-Western relationship. At the very least, Russia switched back to the 21st century, switched back to issues such as due economics, away from the issues like the Great Game and the Caucasus.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the fundamental problem in Europe is that 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia is still not included in a meaningful Euro-Atlantic security community environment. For that matter, neither are Ukraine or Georgia. With all due respect, I would say that the idea that European security at the beginning of the 21st century can be built on two main pillars, one being the NATO Alliance and the other one being the European Union, has been successful, but only up to a point. It has produced great results, but it is lacking in some areas.

Moreover, watching the developments in and over Ukraine and in and over Georgia, I think it is possible to make the admission that the process of NATO enlargement has probably reached its safe limits. I am not saying that it has reached its limits - I would like to stress the word safe. The Georgia war has marked that point very clearly.

If you look back before you look forward you might agree with me that whereas the big traditional security problem for Europe in the first half of the 20th century was the problem of Germany. In the second half of the 20th century it was the problem of the Soviet Union, of communism. At the beginning of the 21st century it looks like it is Russia. Not in the same way
that Germany and the Soviet Union were before, but in a different and yet serious way. Unless that problem is solved, unless that challenge is met, Europe security could only be sub-optimal.

On to Medvedev’s proposal - I would not describe this as a proposal but as an idea. I think that President Medvedev has put his finger on the right issue, but the use word architecture is misguided. Before we decide whether we want classicism or baroque, we need to build a foundation.

We have one thing for the foundation - a very deep hole into which the relationship has stumbled. Now we need to pour some concrete into that hole, start maybe by building confidence in some areas, expanding that confidence so that that concrete could build the pillars of a future structure. Even the word structure may not be appropriate. When I think about what a security compact for the Euro-Atlantic region could look like, I think more in terms of networks, arrangements, understandings, and less in terms of specific structures, treaties. Relations between nations, among nations, are not made by treaties; they are codified by treaties. I think Medvedev, a lawyer, could be forgiven for thinking too much of instruments, but I think we need to give him credit, that lawyer, for putting his finger on the right problem.

I think that I would stress one thing very strongly. There can be no European security that includes Russia that does not include the United States of America. This is not optional.

When I look at the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and at the new administration, I see reasons for hope. I think we can proceed to build on some of the points of confidence between Russia and the West by acting constructively about some of the irritants in that relationship - whether it’s NATO enlargement; the security of the Ukraine; post conflict resolution of Georgia; the situation of the caucuses more broadly; or, ballistic missile defences in central Europe.

We need to embrace the idea of a strategic dialogue which would flow out of the negotiations on a new start agreement between Russia and the United States. Just a new Cold War style agreement will not do. I think we need to have a platform for ongoing strategic dialogue between the two countries and hopefully at some point it will be joined by others, namely, China.

At the same time, we need to proceed with practical collaboration on the issues where the interests are close enough. The ballistic missile defences for Europe, Afghanistan and of course, Iran. If we also add the economic dimension to that - all these things could lead to something like a security compact emerging for the 21st century.

To conclude, the challenge for us, if you look ahead, can only be compared to the challenge that was met by the wise men of North America and Western Europe in the 1940s when they created NATO. The wise men of Europe, from Germany on, who created the European Union. The task of including Russia is of the same order. I am not talking about the same structures or similar structures. I am not talking Russia joining NATO or NATO ceasing to exist or to lead to a new organisation. I do not talk about the organisations that already exist – these are not the right models. The right model is yet to be devised. But the idea is of the same kind, the same scale, and the same historical importance. The current generation of leaders, both in Russia, in Europe and in the United States of America, will be judged by how they meet that challenge.

**FABRICE POTHIER:** I would now like to turn to Ambassador Martinusz, who is talking from a model which has been existing now for more than 50 years, NATO. Ambassador Martinusz is the Permanent Representative of Hungary to NATO. Prior to that, he was Deputy State Secretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And before that, he was a senior advisor to the Hungarian Prime Minister. So, I would like to turn to you, as a representative of NATO, and ask for your perspective on how you look at this notion of a common European security space, whether you think it’s a Russian trick, or whether you think it has promise. Could NATO have a helpful contribution?
ZOLTAN MARTINUSZ: Good evening to all of you. Fabrice, thank you very much for the invitation. I would like to thank Carnegie Europe for organising this event. Probably as far as your cold is concerned, you see that even when the bear is a friendly one, getting too close may be risky, right?

DMITRI TRENIN: The risk is a short term risk, it is the risk of getting acquainted, not more than that.

ZOLTAN MARTINUSZ: Okay.

This a subject on which I really envy my nongovernmental colleagues, because they can speculate much more freely than an ambassador can. On this issue, there is a lot more speculation going around than really details and specifics. But based on that very little detail, let me just give you a brief description of how we perceive the situation.

Firstly, this rhetoric is not new – it was around in the 90s and possibly even before that. There has been little concrete progress - painfully little specifics have been made available. We do not see concrete proposals. Ideas float around which on the surface seem to be politically correct, and of course are very acceptable, like the primacy of international law, corporative security and others, but without substance and without specifics these ideas mean very little by themselves and in themselves.

Secondly, there seems to be a very strong focus on hard security. To what extent is a focus on hard security relevant in an age when we define our most important threats as the negative consequences of globalisation; the security consequences of global warming; energy security, terrorism; weapons of mass destruction; proliferation; cyber attacks; failing states; and powerful non state actors? In such an age, how a redesign of the European hard security landscape offer any solution to these challenges?

Thirdly, to what extent is this thinking in line with the Helsinki principles? 35 years ago we came to an agreement that the “European security space is much more colourful than just hard security.” Now we have a concept which focuses mostly on hard security. So, is this a new concept or is this something old?

There is a notion that the European security architecture, although I agree with Dmitri that perhaps architecture is not the best word here, but there is a notion that the European security architecture needs to be somehow fixed. Then there is this other traditional conventional wisdom of if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. In Hungary, we certainly don’t think that it is broken. Some pieces don’t work, that’s quite clear, others need some find tuning, but we do not see a major need for a general overhaul.

Yet it is quite clear that a self-sustaining predictable and stable European security construct space, architecture, whatever, cannot be built without Russia, let alone against Russia. And certainly nothing could be further away from the truth. It is not Hungary’s intention to build a security structure without Russia. Neither is it NATO’s intention to build a security structure without Russia.

Allow me to offer some considerations, and here I may disagree a little bit with Dmitri. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) offered joint decision making with Russia. If there is one privilege that NATO guards with absolute suspicion towards everybody outside NATO, it is involvement in decision making. Even though the Australians have sent 1,000 troops to Afghanistan, they are absolutely not a part of NATO decision making. This is something that they simply have to accept. Involvement in decision making has not been extended to any of our closest partners, but it has been to Russia. Although the system didn’t work as we all expected, it was offered. The NRC is the only other structure in NATO that has decision making powers.
With regard to enlargement, there are military and political modalities. These were agreed to before the enlargement of NATO with Russia. There is, for instance, a deal that no nuclear weapons will be deployed on the territory of new members. There is also the deal that no major conventional forces are going to be deployed on the territory of new members. These have been agreed with Russia before NATO enlargement. These were agreed, for instance, with Russia before Hungary became a member of NATO.

As such, it is difficult to say that NATO enlargement would be hostile towards Russia. Certainly from a Hungarian point of view, we have not felt threatened by Russia and we do not feel to be threatened by Russia. NATO accession was not a move against Russia. Yet I know from personal experience that it is extremely difficult to convince the Russians about this.

Let me offer some further considerations and contradictions, certainly not a conclusion but just to point it out that there is a school of thought which says that if Russia has a problem, we all have a problem. Well, I would say I disagree, but it is certainly true that if Russia has a problem we must listen, and we must pay attention. But we also must recognise that in each and every one of the issues that Russia raises as a problem, Russian behaviour and Russian policies are certainly part of the problem. It is certainly true that our own policies have not always been perfect, just to mention the CFE Treaty, but I guess Russia is certainly part of those problems that it complains about.

Finally, the only way forward here is to talk and cooperate, not based on the illusions of the 90s, but perhaps on the interests of the first decade of the 21st century, because after all, the challenges are quite common. Whether the way forward is through a new concept, so to speak, remains to be seen. Perhaps there are ways that we haven’t not yet thought about.

FABRICE POTHIER: I’d like to turn to Dr Bobo Lo, who is the Director of the Russia and China Programmes at the centre for European Reform. Previously, Bobo Lo served as Head of the Russian and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London. Before that, from ’95 to ’99, he was the First Secretary and then Deputy Head of Mission of the Australian Embassy in Moscow.

So, Bobo, I would like to turn to you, because we talked about NATO, but there is also a European dimension to this discussion, and as you noted when we met before the meeting, you are not speaking for the European Union, it’s on the other side of the street, but you can certainly maybe bring a European perspective on what will this notion of a common European security base mean for European countries. Or what would be the European elements to it.

BOBO LO: Well, thank you very much, Fabrice, for inviting me and it’s great to meet Ambassador Martinusz and my old friend, Dino again. You asked about a European reaction to this common European security space and the associated proposal of President Medvedev. Well, the idea of President of Medvedev. I think, because Europe is so diverse, there have been so many different kinds of responses, none of them I would argue especially concrete.

In a sense, the vagueness of the notion of a European common security space, and the vagueness of President Medvedev’s new European security architecture, has provoked a countervailing vagueness and diversity in responses from the Europeans. So, I think among these sorts of reactions I would say the first is one of cynicism and, oh, haven’t we all been here before? Ambassador Martinusz flagged this - isn’t this to some extent a replay of the 1990s?

There is a belief that the relations between Russia and the West are so difficult that the notion of a common European security space is not especially useful or meaningful. There is a belief that the reality is that Russia’s security interests in Europe differ fundamentally from those of NATO, of EU, of European states - although of course there are some commonalities. There is a reaction to Russia which perceives that although Moscow is more sophisticated in the
presentation of its policies, fundamentally, geopolitics remains central to Russian foreign and security policy. There is a belief that the ideas of the balance of power and spheres of influence have lost none of their importance. There’s also the idea that there’s little confluence in values between Russia and the rest of Europe. Of course, there are universal norms as enshrined in the Helsinki final act. But the trouble is, the interpretations of these norms differ so fundamentally that really, they’re not really a viable basis for common action on security matters.

This background informs European reactions to Medvedev’s security architecture initiative. Again, there is a degree of cynicism here that Medvedev’s proposal is not really a proposal, but some sort of anti-proposal. It has a certain objective, a broad vision, which is that Europe should be redefined to include Russia as a more influential player. You have Russia in and the Americans out, or at least reduced.

Frankly, this is not really surprising. I think there is a general cynicism and lack of surprise across Europe that there is actually no real detail to Medvedev’s proposal. What it really reflects is that Russia knows what it doesn’t like, but it is much less certain about the specifics of what would best serve Russian interests. What it doesn’t like is a European security environment dominated by NATO, and for NATO you can read, from the Russian perspective, the United States.

There is also a degree of suspicion towards a Medvedev proposal that it is deliberately vague. There is a suspicion that its vagueness is intended to sow creative doubt among the Europeans. So, for example, in contrast to Moscow’s tough approach on missile defence, on Georgia, on NATO enlargement, the Medvedev initiative is a kind of public relations stunt to showcase Russia’s reasonable and constructive face. This ambiguity is seen by many in Europe as a deliberate attempt to exacerbate already extant divisions among the Europeans - some of whom say that ‘this is all a trick’, and others who say, ‘no see, Medvedev is actually different, he is pro-engagement’.

Both the global and regional circumstances have changed, so we need to be more conciliatory, more constructive towards Moscow. But I think fundamentally most people are still waiting for, ‘well come on, show us what you’ve got’.

On to how I think the Europeans should react: it is obvious that NATO and the EU and Europeans generally need to react to Medvedev’s proposals, notions of common European security space, etc, etc, in a reasonably disciplined and coordinated fashion. I believe that they should show public receptiveness to the Russian proposals, but they should say, okay, we’re interested, it sounds good, but they should also call the Russian bluff, they should say, what can you deliver? What do you mean?

It is really vital to emphasise that we want to see specific proposals, not abstract principles, many of which as we know have been replayed, not just in the 1990s, but even in the Soviet period. It is important for the Europeans to concentrate on specifics, to emphasise as President Sarkozy did, that NATO remains a central element of any European security architecture, by no means the only element, but really the prime and most effective element, with all its flaws of course.

The point was made earlier that Russians have a rather different conception of the primacy of types of security. The Medvedev proposal fundamentally comes down to hard security. Yes, it is dressed up a little bit, there are soft security elements there, but it is about hard security. And so, if we do decide to go down the path of a Helsinki plus, a Helsinki two, whatever you like to call it, then we have to emphasise elements like political security, democratisation, civil society, and respect for sovereignty. It is really important to try and push Moscow to address some concrete issues.

Dmitri, for example, spoke about, you know, we have a big hole, we need to build the foundations. ‘Treaties can codify relations, but they can’t make relations’. What we do need are confidence building measures; we need to concentrate on the concrete, the specific. What this
means, for example, is that Europe and NATO should strongly encourage Moscow to resume participation in the CFE; should encourage Moscow to play a much more active and constructive role over Iran. Ultimately these, rather than any sort of abstract European security framework, architecture, these are the real tests of Russia’s commitment to engage substantively on security matters of interest to all of Europe, including Russia.

I am just going to finish with where I see things going. Dmitri is right when he says that the economic crisis was a saving grace for Russian-Western relations. Suddenly there was this much more critical immediate issue that concerned us all. But I think we need to distinguish between the impact of Russian foreign policy style and the substance of Russia’s foreign policy, because certainly it has underlined to Moscow the need to engage constructively with Europe and the West. There has been a return to post 9/11 talk of common solutions to universal problems.

We do have to be careful that in the same way that the post 9/11 consensus unravels when it came from general principles to actually how you implement concrete policies. There is a danger in how we respond to the global financial crisis. There is a danger that we will think, 'oh well, we can agree on the broad principles'. This consensus could unravel quite quickly when we actually come down to the concrete. It is a matter of concern that when the West looks at Russia it lurches from one extreme to the other. It lurches from excessive expectations and optimism to a kind of dismal misanthropic fatalism.

In these circumstances, Russians, Europeans and Americans need to turn their attention away from the broad, vague and often somewhat empty initiatives, and words like strategic partnership; common European security space; universal norms; common interests and so on. There is a need to instead focus on specific priorities: nuclear and conventional arms control; counter proliferation vis-à-vis Iran; security stabilisation in Afghanistan; conflict resolution or at least, conflict alleviation in the south caucuses, because it’s going to be a long and hard and frankly, rather messy road.

It is important for both sides not to be overly discouraged by disagreements and inevitable fluctuations and downturns in our relations. There is also a need, as Ambassador Martinusz emphasised, to rid ourselves of these types of illusions. We all need - Russians, Europeans, and Americans - to retain a sense of perspective and exercise strategic patience.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Bobo. I think that opens the next question I would like to address to Dmitri, and then to the other speakers. In an attempt to move away from empty concepts and PR operations, what could be the specifics of a common European security space? Please give us maybe some specific areas that were mentioned by all of you, like arms control, energy security and common neighbourhood. How would it work? What difference would it make to the opportunities but also problems we have today?

DMITRI TRENIN: Bobo has given us a list of things that need to be looked at and that are being looked at right now.

When Medvedev’s proposal was first aired, I took it as a headline without anything beneath it or beyond it. It could be useful if we think of it now as a long term vision about where we would want Russia to be vis-à-vis the West 20 or 25 years from now. Where would Russia see itself vis-à-vis the West 25 years from now? For the purposes of having a meaningful strategy, the various capitals should try to give an answer to that question.

I completely agree with those who feel there is little need to talk about the things that have been codified in the Helsinki Final Act. I do not think that we will think up anything that is radically different from what is contained there, what is contained in the UN Charter, what is contained in so many other documents. I do not think we need to spend any amount of time on those things. We just need to keep it as a vision.
The specifics will be absolutely key. There are clearly things which need to be done - the list is long and contains all sorts of elements. This is precisely what would lead to more trust and confidence.

In August 2008, the U.S. had zero trust in Moscow, and Russia similarly had zero trust in Washington DC. I leave it to you to tell me where it was with regard to Europe. But that’s where we were. We need to start doing something specific to lead us to points of confidence.

The new administration’s approach, new administration in Washington that is, that administration’s approach, is helpful in terms that for the first time, and this does not only apply to the Russians, it applies to the Europeans as well, when the United States administration is telling the Europeans or the Russians, we need your help. And they do not stop there, they continue, ‘where can we help you? What are your problems?’ That is the key difference from the approach taken by the Bush administration. This is potentially very effective as far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned.

Let’s take Afghanistan. Afghanistan is, you can argue, a common security problem, both to Russia and to NATO and many other countries. Russia clearly does not want to see the NAT/U.S. operation fail in Afghanistan. Russia’s been tinkering with the rules of the game, that we know. The message from Russia sounded to me at least something like this: ‘Next time General Petraeus wants to visit the region, let him come to Moscow first, and then he can go on to finalise the details to wherever’. Well, it may sound unhelpful, but it’s as unhelpful, ladies and gentlemen, than a studied attitude toward Russia’s nominal allies in the region.

Russia doesn’t really believe that you can have bilateral relations with Russia’s allies and again, I’m talking about Russia’s nominal allies in the collective security treaty organisation, without bothering to talk to Russia about that. The smart approach lies somewhere in the middle. You need to engage Russia, you need to talk to Russia. Of course you do not prejudice the sovereignty of the nations involved, and in fact the nations themselves have been very careful in steering among the various bigger neighbours and bigger players in the region.

Afghanistan is very important for Russia, for example, in terms of stemming the narcotics trade. Russia has been suffering increasingly from the flow of heroin and opium from Afghanistan, and we all know that drugs - and Fabrice of course is the expert on that, having spent time in Afghanistan - that drugs economy is an important element of the overall situation in Afghanistan and you would say it has an impact on stability. So, there are tradeoffs here, as there would be everywhere.

Russia has been encouraging NATO to start serious cooperation on the narcotics trade; it hasn’t gotten very far. It is an important issue – we can get supplies to Afghanistan across Russia. Political collaboration is something useful which could come from Russia – there are some people who used to fight the Russians who are now Russia’s partners in Afghanistan. They could be instrumental and again, they were instrumental in 2001, they can be instrumental again. The countries where Russia, to the north of Afghanistan, where Russia has some presence, again, if you want to do Afghanistan, then let’s do it on the basis of this new deal coming from Washington. So, we have interests here, we want you to do something, and can we be helpful?

Iran - again, I don’t think that there’s a fundamental difference in the objectives as far as Russia and the West are concerned, or Russia and the United States are concerned. I think Iran actually will be the make it or break it element of any new relationship. I think that within the next 12 months we’ll get to know how the Iranian issue will be resolved, whether it will be resolved through diplomatic, political channels, or whether other channels or other means will be used.

With Iran we have a window of opportunity of around 12 months. We can at least hope to have some cooperation between Russia and the U.S. However, Russia will not be bandwagoning on the U.S. position. We should learn from the lessons of the war in Iraq. The radical approach
taken by the United States led to their being a lack of a common front of the outside powers on Iraq. That was then employed and exploited by Saddam Hussein – eventually against himself, but also against many other things. In North Korea, on the other hand, we have this common front amongst all countries dealing with North Korea.

Those are just two examples. I am not talking about creating confidence out of thin air. Instead, I am talking about moving ahead on open avenues. I am calling for a more co-equal relationship - which I think makes a lot of sense if we’re talking about confidence.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you, Dmitri. Before I open the floor for questions, I would like to turn to Ambassador Martinusz who I’m sure would like to respond to Dmitri’s points.

I would like to press you on a specific point. I think you were quite specific in saying that the NATO Russia Council is a kind of functional forum for the type of relationship that we should have with Russia. The key is to listen to Russia - not necessarily to give Russia a veto over decisions that fundamentally involve the Europeans and the Americans.

But, if the Georgia crisis has shown one thing it is that there is something missing. The Georgia crisis was not just an accident, it was a system failure. Perhaps it was a failure of us having a clear security strategy towards countries that were not necessarily yet part of NATO or part of the EU.

Will there not be the need for a super framework without being an institution, but more as Dmitri said, a compact? That means a flexible platform where Russia, the U.S. and Europe could be equal and could define some shared interests and shared actions.

ZOLTAN MARTINUSZ: I’m not sure I agree with the statement implied in your question - that the Georgian war was a sort of a system failure of the NATO-Russian relationship. To me it much more seems to be a very unfortunate accident. I can only be hopeful that we will learn a lot more about the genesis of the conflict, but I don’t think that was a system failure in itself.

Now I would just like to go back a little bit to what Dmitri said. I would like to start from a point that perhaps 20 years ago, global security was about, or was defined by European security, more or less. Now the relationship has changed, European security is defined by what’s going on in the world. Against that background, overhauling the European hard security architecture is increasingly irrelevant to the problems that we face.

You asked for specifics. Here I would agree with Dmitri. Although we may disagree on the theoretical or sometimes theological background of this, in the practicalities there is pretty much a lot of thinking going on in going in the same direction. On Afghanistan, for instance, I absolutely agree – although perhaps not on the Petreaus part.

On Iran, I also agree. There needs to be a political solution to the problem and it is quite obvious that without Russia and for that matter without China, there is not going to be a political solution to this problem.

It is quite clear that we need to work together. On the CFE Treaty, we absolutely must work together and we must get out of this situation, we must get out of this corner into which we both painted ourselves. I have no idea how to do it, to be honest with you. I know where I would like to be in ten years, I’m not talking about even in 25 years. I just don’t know how I get there next month, what are the steps that I should take next month, or Russia should take next month.

It is quite clear that we must get out of this situation of the CFE Treaty, because we are going back to a level of military lack of confidence and we kept talking about confidence measures, military confidence building measures and systems in the ’70s. Are we back now at the level of
the ‘70s that we need to rebuild and restart this confidence building structure or can we do something more meaningful now? It is an absolute must.

There are some other areas where NATO is certainly not going to be a central player, but I think Russia and the West must work together and that’s energy security for example. It became quite clear just a few weeks ago that this interdependence that we keep talking about is much stronger than we thought.

There was always a complaint that, yes, there is interdependence, but it is a short term dependence on the consumer side and only a long term dependence on the energy provider’s side. In light of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis at the beginning of the year, I think this is not true. On the supplier side, the dependency is actually very short term, and very strong – at least in political terms, although not necessarily in financial terms.

On the 25 year vision that this should be sort of a network of nations, not necessarily institutions as well. To my best understanding, the European direction is a slow but certain development of institutions which create a reliable, stable and predictable picture. Our historic experience is that networks tend to be big boy networks. Now, I understand that from a Russian point of view this is not necessarily a problem. From a Hungarian point of view it’s a bit more worrying.

FABRICE POTHIER:

Thank you very much, Ambassador Martinusz.

Bobo, I would like to invite you to react, and then we will open the floor. Bobo - Where do European values fit in all of that? You’ve talked about Europe and as you know, Europe, especially Brussels, is often keen on having a cooperation agenda that includes values such as human rights, democracy. So, where will those values fit in such a concept?

BOBO LO:

Well, actually in a previous Carnegie Europe debate with Dmitri Trenin and Michael McFaul, I advocated that we really needed to move away when we are dealing with Russia from a value centred debate to one that is based much more on hard headed perceptions of concrete interests. It was interpreted by, I think Michael at the time, that somehow I was retreating from European values. This was not at all the case.

European values are great for most of Europe, they are what made Europe great. Such values also made the United States great, but right now we are in no position, in no state in the world where we can actually push a values agenda onto Russia. I am suggesting that we don’t waste time on that. We can argue, we can emphasise things like territorial integrity, national sovereignty, by all means, but our interpretations of democratisation, of civil society, of so many other things that we understand differ so fundamentally as I mentioned before, that really, we are talking about different things even if we’re using the same vocabulary.

Now, it comes back to again this common European security space. Although people think that we do have a common security space, and because we do share some interests, and we do want things to be less unstable in some areas, I do actually question how close European, American and Russian interests are in areas such as Afghanistan and Iran. The assumption is that we want the same things, but actually I am far from convinced that we do want the same things.

For example, in Central Asia, it seems to me that yes, we both want to restrain the Taliban, or eliminate them preferably, but Russia sees itself as the clear regional leader for the foreseeable future. That is its strategic objective. That is clearly not ours.

Equally, Iran. Iran, yes, the Russians don’t want Iran to develop missile and nuclear capabilities, that’s true, to some extent. But their sense of urgency is far less than the Americans and far less than ours in Europe. For Russia, Iran in a sense is a ticket to ride, it’s a ticket to being a global player, because the fact is, Iran is at the centre of global attention. So, Russia, instead of being
this regional power with some sort of global interests, suddenly with the Iran issue up front and
centre, Russia is up front and centre as a global power and not a mere regional power plus.

I think also, we need to be a little bit cautious about the rapprochement between Russia and the
United States, because there’s a real danger of misinterpretation here. On the one hand it’s good,
it’s great that the Obama administration is engaging Russia more constructively than the Bush
administration did. Certainly we need to work together on strategic arms control, Iran,
Afghanistan, and certainly Russia can be a player there.

But one of the reasons that Moscow has been so responsive is because if they are front line
issues for the Obama administration, that means by definition, Russia once again, is a global great
power, and hopefully, from a Moscow perspective, will get the recognition as such with all the
sorts of rights and privileges that go with this.

In fact, in Europe, I’d be a little bit cautious about being too thrilled about the rapprochement,
because I see Russian foreign policy becoming much more America-centric, rather than
Eurocentric, and actually I see it becoming more geopolitical than geo-economic, because the
issues like strategic arms control, Iran, Afghanistan, are from Moscow’s perspective, geopolitical
issues. So, I’d just like to sound a note of caution here. Thank you.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Bobo. We have a bit
less than 20 minutes to go, so I’m going to open up the floor for questions. If you can kindly
introduce yourself before asking your question. I see Simon is the first, then you and you and
then the gentleman with the yellow tie.

SIMON ALLEN: If we assume that there are these various areas
of cooperation with which the future relationship can begin to be put back on a normal footing,
what happens still to the problem of enlargement that is still in the background?

Everything that has been said so far suggests that the two themes that have been prominent in
Russian foreign policy is this sense of exclusion from the very early ’90s and then exclusion from
a central configuration which was NATO, and then seeing NATO enlarging until we got to the
Georgia and Ukraine episode, or at least the Georgia episode and Ukraine of course in lesser
events.

But, of course, we have the Bucharest Commitment, so how on the one hand do you perceive
this building the normal relationships as a corporation, and at the same time, this issue in the
background? How do you reconcile these two things?

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you. If you can speak with the
microphone close, thank you, so we can hear the question.

DANIEL BUCHKERO: Dr. Trenin, you mentioned this concept of
integration of Russia into Euro-Atlantic security structures and you mentioned that it would
become a big project in 25 years. Can you be more precise and speculate on what forms would it
take, formal ways of integrating Russia into the Euro-Atlantic, for instance? Would it be a
specific security treaty with the U.S. or a new structure or integration with NATO?

And the second question is for Ambassador Martinusz, Your Excellency, you mentioned the
NATO Russian Council and the joint decision making in the NATO Russian Council, could you
be more precise and say which questions are being discussed jointly and which questions are
being excluded from discussion? Thank you.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you. And I think there was the
gentleman with the yellow tie.
BJORN FAGERBEYER: I agree completely with the notion that we need to focus on concrete things rather than lofty principles which we might sign up to, but then when it comes to interpreting them, we get into problems. But how do we get some positive and concrete things happening on the ground?

We are good at telling each other and others that we have common interests in the neighbourhood, and that the so-called frozen or protected conflicts are one of the things that we would like to deal with. But if you put the CFE dimension into this and if you look at what is the major sticking point there, then end up thinking about what could be done to the conflict of interest this year. There was an attempt a couple of years ago that didn’t go very well for reasons that I’m sure everybody in here is aware of.

So, I would be interested in asking Dr. Trenin, do you see is there a shared interest here? Might there be a willingness on the part of the Russian side to actually try to get something done on this conflict? If so, what should we have learned from previous efforts and how should we go about it from both sides this time? Thanks.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you. Any other question? Okay, so maybe we do another round if you don’t mind. Shall we start with you, Bobo, and then Ambassador Martinusz and then Bobo? And then Ambassador Martinusz and then Dmitri? Do you need me to summarise the questions?

BOBO LO: The first question was about where we go with NATO enlargement. My problem with this issue has been left completely unresolved because the commitment to eventual membership for Ukraine and Georgia that was made at the Bucharest Summit frankly is completely meaningless. There’s no time frame - it can be postponed endlessly. It is clearly not going to happen for the foreseeable future. So, as commitments go it is as non-committal a commitment as you can possibly get.

The problem with NATO enlargement is this. It’s quite clear that while we can listen to Russia, there cannot be any sort of so-called Russian veto. The thing is, people don’t talk about a Russian veto. Dmitri and I were at a conference in Rome about a week ago where the word veto was a dirty word, so no one used it, instead they said we mustn’t provoke the Russians, we mustn’t upset them. So, that is a veto, let’s cut through the sort of verbiage here.

The thing is, we need to be able to keep NATO open, yet also decide is it in our interests? Can we for example fulfil our Article Five commitments? And I think ultimately we need to move away from unhelpful symbolism like the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. We need to decide that basically there has to be popular support within the applicant countries, and they have to be ready and NATO member states have to have a consensus on it. If that consensus is unfair on applicant states, I’m sorry, that’s tough, that’s the way NATO works.

How does Russia become integrated in the Euro-Atlantic space? Well, integration is not really the idea, it’s more engagement. There are certain issues where we do have common interests, or certain areas, like Afghanistan where our long term interests may be different but our short term interests have enough continguities.

How do we get some good news, Bjorn? I think that once a genuine strategic arms control process begins, then the mere fact that we have a process, which will inevitably be protracted, let’s not kid ourselves that it is going to be easy, but the fact that we are engaging on stuff where people are sort of speaking a common language. They may have different interests, they’re trying to get maybe different things, but everyone’s speaking or the Americans and the Russians are speaking the same realist language, they’re coming from the same realist strategic culture. So, that works. That in a sense, the mere process is good news.
I think if the Russians for example were to downsize the number of peace keepers, so-called, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, I’m not saying total withdrawal, but even if they were to start downsizing it, that would be a confidence building measure. There are one or two places where you can have confidence building measures and they’re not spectacular, they’re rather boring and routine, but we need to move away from the grandiose and the grandiloquent to the boring and the routine and the everyday banal stuff, because ultimately that, over a period of time, builds confidence.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Bobo. Ambassador Martinusz?

ZOLTAN MARTINUSZ: The NRC and joint decision making powers. Well, that remained quite unfortunately an unmet potential, it remained an empty potential. The principle was that we will decide about everything that we do together, but unfortunately we didn’t do too much together. In fact, we almost did nothing together. So, it was, I think, a major potential which remained quite empty in terms of the joint decision making.

In terms of the political exchange and the debate, there were ups and downs. At this point we are pretty much in a down part but hopefully there will be a bit more political discussion in this thawing of the relationship.

Enlargement. Well, it’s sort of very difficult to complain with the same breath about the exclusive nature of enlargement and then stating that enlargement has reached a safe limit. I would say that it’s either inclusive and then we follow certain principles, or exclusive and then we follow a different set of principles. But the two together do not really work.

Simon, I must say that I’m not sure you wanted to say that, but it pretty much sounded to me as you implied that the either NATO enlargement or the NATO Russia relationship and the functioning of the NATO Russia relationship served as a major cause for the Georgia conflict, and if this is what you want to say, I would heartily disagree. I absolutely do not believe that NATO enlargement had anything to do with the Georgia crisis.

And quite honestly, I still have difficulties to understand why NATO enlargement up to now would be a major strategic threat or challenge to Russia. I mean, do you really see Hungary’s NATO membership as a strategic threat to Russia? Or for that matter, even Estonia’s membership as a strategic threat to Russia? I don’t think so. If you of course, if your perception is the geopolitical perception of the, not even the 20th but the 19th century, probably yes you could say so.

In the 21st century I’m not sure that NATO enlargement which actually created a lot of stability and paved the way for EU enlargement on the western borders of Russia is negative for the Russian interest. I would believe rather on the contrary. It served in a rather positive way the Russian interest, because it pacified Russia’s western borders - which has always been an objective of Russian policy in the past.

I think there is a further problem that enlargement has been a little bit tainted with this debate we had about Ukraine and Georgia. As of a year ago we debated about Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO membership. This debate was taken totally out of context and out of proportion. We discussed about MAP, which is the Membership Action Plan which everybody understood, that may or may not bring membership for Ukraine and Georgia in 20 years or even more. There were no specific commitments to membership in the Membership Action Plan. It’s a strange outcome of the Bucharest Summits that we couldn’t agree on the short term and as a compromise we gave a sort of a long term certainty, which nobody wanted at the beginning, not even the Ukrainians or the Georgians. So, it was a bit of a diplomatic accident, if you like.
But I don’t think that this discussion is really treated on its face value. At this point nobody discusses seriously Georgia’s and Ukraine’s imminent or even midterm NATO membership. Of course not to mention the fact that in Ukraine the vast majority of the population is currently absolutely not supportive of NATO membership. Some are even very strongly against NATO membership. So, it’s a very long road. I don’t think that we make a service to ourselves if we look at the NATO Russia or the West Russia relationship, only in the context of NATO enlargement.

And how to get some good news? Afghanistan, not just military but civilian development, political development, political involvement of Russia. After all, it’s a permanent member of the Security Council. I hope we will be able to move forward on missile defence and I very much hope that we will be able to find some progress or confidence building on the CFE although I must say that in CFE, I really don’t think that Transnistria would be the key to the solution. Just about a year ago we kept complaining that there are still a few hundred Russian troops in Gudauta and that’s why we cannot ratify the CFE, the modified or the adapted CFE Treaty. Now the situation is much, much worse, so it will be extremely difficult to get out of there. Thank you.

FABRICE POTHEIER: Thank you very much. Dmitri, you have the difficult task of answering the four questions and the responses in less than two minutes, so we can have another round of questions. Thank you.

DMITRI TRENIN: Fabrice, you put me on the spot. Quite frankly, Zoltan was complaining about his constraints of being the only official person, official representative on this panel. Now, I would say I am in even hotter waters, because I’m actually reduced to a position when I criticise my own people in Russia and have to explain which is seen as by some people as defending them when I’m abroad. Most people do the opposite. But that seems to be my predicament. Let me deal with the two questions, four questions. Two questions in four minutes do you say?

FABRICE POTHEIER: No, four questions in two minutes.

DMITRI TRENIN: Okay. NRC. With all due respect, Zoltan, you know, it never was a joint decision making mechanism, we all know that. Had it been so, Russia would have been a de facto member of NATO, because all serious questions, all the questions that Russia considers serious where decisions had to be made were questions that Henry Kissinger among others thought would make Russia a de facto NATO member, and Russia was never allowed to do that.

Why is NATO enlargement a bad thing for Russia? Actually personally I very much share your view; I don’t feel threatened by Estonia or whoever at all. Not at all. But I have to explain why so many Russian people, including the government people and I do not buy the idea that it’s just Soviet propaganda. I want to refer to Bobo’s very insightful comments. He said, and to me it sounded like a revelation in a way. He said, fine, we can accept Russia’s help in Afghanistan, but that would make Russia a regional power in Central Asia and we don’t want that. Okay? So, Russia as a regional power in Central Asia is bad for Western European interest...?

BOBO LO: I said regional...

DMITRI TRENIN: Russia doing something for us in Iran, but that puts Russia infront instead of globally. We don’t want that. Okay?

The veto thing. Of course Russia does not pretend to be... It would be foolish to claim veto powers, but we live in a world where we have to be reasonable when we deal with all sorts of people. Does China have veto power over Taiwan? Of course it does. Who in the United States administration would ever support Taiwan’s independence? They would rather go the opposite way, which they did, quite recently. Is that China’s veto power de facto? It is. And the United
States wields perhaps the greatest veto power of all in all corners of the world, and that’s a reality, and it would be foolish of the Russian Government and many other governments not to recognise the power of the United States of America. They can only do that at their own peril.

Enlargement to Ukraine. Had there been a reverse ratio in support of NATO’s enlargement, there wouldn’t be any power on earth that could prevent Ukraine from becoming a member state. But right now when the vast majority of 17 year olds in Crimea feel alienated from the Ukrainian state - people should not be playing with fire within Ukraine. It’s a country which, thank God, has not experienced armed conflicts in its territory. It’s a miracle that Ukraine has advanced as far as it has in peace and harmony, relative harmony. And those who want Ukraine well, and I certainly do, would not want a question to be imposed upon Ukraine that Ukrainian people would not be able to answer without splitting, perhaps the split could be deeper.

In Georgia, of course the situation is different. The vast majority of the population, the entire elite are pro-NATO but what kind of Georgia are we talking about? Is that the Georgia in its officially international recognised borders or the Georgia that is de facto controlled from Tbilisi? If it’s the former, then people will be importing armed conflicts with Russia. And people need to see that. I think people do see that.

Very quickly, Russia 25 years, what kind of...? A visa free regime between Russia and the Schengen and these are waivers from the United States of America. That would be the simplest. Free trade area, things like that.

The Transnistria - I think that the Georgia war also signified the collapse of Russia’s use of frozen conflicts as instruments to stop NATO’s advance. And in the aftermath of the war they tried to show that they were interested in solving the conflict in Transnistria. In principle it’s easy to solve, but I think it can only be solved if and when the Kremlin leadership decides that... Let me put it this way, that this is a priority thing for them and if they decide to do that together with the European Union that would signify the Kremlin’s decision to partner in real terms with the European Union.

I hope they will come to the conclusion that in the caucuses, i.e. Georgia no single power including Russia can be this famous security guarantor. You have a combination, whatever, network, the Europeans, the Turks, the Russians, the Americans, whoever. But I think that the Russians would probably prefer the Europeans as their partner. Again, this is for the future. I think I will stop here.

**FABRICE POTHIER:** Difficult to contain Russia. It’s half past, but I think we are ready to go for five more minutes, so let’s take a last round of questions. The lady with the blue jacket and then Roxanna and then the lady at the back.

**TERESA FALLEN:** The panel touched on energy security but that’s as far as it went. With the new accession states there are some built in vulnerabilities. In the past, the EU was never more than 25% dependent on Russian gas, and now we have countries 95% dependent, 99% dependent. And it seems that the EU has been oblivious to this strategic vulnerability.

Now NATO has said that they want to step in and protect, and no one really understands what NATO would do in case of a... What are they going to do, force them to pump the gas? Are they going to protect the pipelines? I was at a conference and I asked the Secretary General and he said well NATO’s not in the energy business, but it’s still very opaque what they could possibly do. So, I’m curious what the panel thinks about energy security, is the EU really doing anything about it, and what can be done? Thanks.

**FABRICE POTHIER:** Thank you very much. Roxanna, yes?
ROXANNA BULBAR: Thank you. Roxanna Bulbar from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The consensus on the panel seems to be that we should really try to focus on practical areas of cooperation. I understand that, but to follow up a little bit on what Simon was saying, the fact remains that the rationale, or one of the rationales for the Medvedev proposal was this feeling or perception in Russia that Russia is not an equal partner in European security issues. That issue is going to come back on the table regardless.

Could you please explain to me what has changed? I mean, the issues that you’ve mentioned, Afghanistan, Iran, the CFE Treaty, all these issues were on the table before. So yes, we’ve reached the bottom in the Georgia affair and yes, we had the financial crisis, yes we have a new administration in the United States with a new approach, but is this enough to really make a difference and reach an agreement on these practical issues? And a second question if I may. I was very interested in what Dr. Lo said right at the end of his presentation, or maybe his reaction on the risks of a possible disconnect between America and Europe of Russia basically turning to the U.S. more and less to Europe. And I would like to ask the panel if they could react to this comment that he made and I thought was very interesting. Thank you.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much. And the final question from the lady at the back?

CATHERINE WOOLLARD: Catherine Woollard from the European Peace Building Liaison Office. Just a couple of quick questions about the EU’s soft power. Eastern Partnership, negotiations are currently going on about the incentives that will be offered to the associated countries, and quite tense negotiations by all accounts. Presumably Russia’s reaction is an issue there. I would be interested in hearing the panel’s comments on that, given previous objections in a sense to attempts to exert soft power, for instance the almost closing down of international NGOs within Russia, many of whom received funding from the Commission etc.

On a related point, the European security strategy places a great emphasis on regional cooperation, and this just isn’t happening. I wonder if this is a way to lead into constructive engagement with Russia. We see that now in the Balkans, regional cooperation has ground to a standstill and within the Eastern Partnership region there seems to be a lack of ideas about how to set up meaningful regional cooperation. I would be interested again to hear some of the ideas that the panel have put forward about substantive engagement with Russia that could be used. Thank you.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much. We have less than five minutes left, so maybe we can start with Bobo and then Ambassador Martinusz and then close with Dmitri. There are, if I’m correct, five questions, energy security, one about Russia’s status as equal or not equal partner, the risk of a wedge between the U.S. and Europe towards building a relationship with Russia, the question of the Eastern Partnership and the question of the regional cooperation. So, Bobo, you have one minute and a half. Thank you.

BOBO LO: Just a very quick response to Dmitri’s final points – there is nothing illegitimate about Russia being a leading regional power in central Asia. But, with being a leading regional power in Central Asia, there is naturally the control of a sphere of influence. While that is perfectly legitimate, it is not an interest that is shared by Europeans and Americans. Not to mention the Chinese.

As for Iran, absolutely right that Russia should be a global player on a global issue. However, there is a sense that Russia might have a vested interest, not in complete instability over Iran, but also neither in complete stability in prosperity, because in that case the Iranians wouldn’t go to Russia, they’d go to the United States and Europe and so Russia would lose its leverage. So, while there’s that sort of state of strategic uncertainty if you like, Russia has an interest. So, the question is whether it translates this into a constructive role. We don’t know, we need to see.
Now, energy security, what would NATO do? Nothing. NATO’s got no business doing energy security. This is an EU issue. It’s up to the EU to develop its sort of internal network, pipelines. And again, if I were Russian, I’d exploit European disunity like a shot. Of course, this is natural. We’re not in this for charity. But really, it’s up to the Europeans to get their game together, but they’ve got to do it through the EU. NATO is just irrelevant here frankly.

On the Medvedev proposal and creating a new format, the problem is, it’s not the format that creates a cooperation. If there is a more cooperative mindset, both in Russia and in the West, then you’ll either make the existing structures work, or it’ll be much easier to create a new set of structures and institutions that will work much better for both sides.

EU soft power, Eastern Partnership? Unfortunately the Eastern Partnership, I think it’s a worthwhile initiative, but it reflects the fact that NATO enlargement isn’t going to happen for decades, well, for a couple of decades I would argue. EU enlargement to the east, is pretty unlikely too. So, what do you give as a consolation prize? Ah, I know. The Eastern Partnership. But do you actually put significant resources into developing this Eastern Partnership? Now, we’ve seen from sort of some of the budgetary disputes that actually the commitment isn’t there. The commitment is, people are much more focused on what the global financial crisis is doing to their particular country, they don’t want this. Eastern Partnership, it’s like a little decoration. So, I’ll leave it to that.

FABRICE POTHEIER: Thank you, Bobo. Ambassador Martinusz?

ZOLTAN MARTINUSZ: Thank you. I’ll try to respond only to two issues.

Energy security. Well, NATO defined its role as a potential anti terrorist role, certainly not relevant to Russia, though we should not forget that our energy security issue is not only about Russia, I would say, and in many countries not even primarily about Russia.

Protection of the line of communications? Extremely important. Most of Europe’s oil comes from the Middle East.

And third, NATO may have a political role if energy dependence is abused for political coercion. But yes, NATO is not the primary player. In the short term the EU should be the primary player with a clear unequivocal support to the Nabucco Project. I think that’s quite clear.

And the other is the perception of inequality. I noted to myself what Bobo said in his introductory remarks. He said that Russian security interests in Europe differ fundamentally from those of NATO and the European Union. This is a statement with which I would slightly disagree. I would say Russian security perceptions in Europe differ fundamentally from those of NATO and the European Union. And yes, as long as the perceptions are vastly different, there’s always going to be a perception of inequality. I must say that if the concept of creating equality and inclusion outlines a sort of a need to dismantle everything that Europe has been building for the last few decades, just for the sake of including Russia on an equal basis, that just isn’t going to happen.

But I think we need to work on the perceptions as well. This will not be overcome very easily, this vast difference between the perceptions. This is why we need to focus on the practical issues where we can work together and we can leave the 25 years vision for a later stage, maybe not necessarily for 25 years but for 20 years. If we work together we’ll be able to coexist, we’ll be able to create some kind of practical partnership. Perhaps we can forget about the illusions on both sides, by the way. And I think this is the way to go forward, not to try to overhaul a whole system without any kind of specific idea as to how we would like to do it.
FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much. Dmitri, you have the concluding answers.

DMITRI TRENIN: On energy security. There will be a real need for more and more gas and oil in Europe. And the amount of gas on the market will not be growing that fast, so I think that the more pipelines there are, Nabucco, whatever, the better provided Europe is.

In terms of the vision I wouldn’t want the vision out, it’s not on the table, it should be here. But I’m talking vision as if it were just one of several items in your dossier. But the vision is where you want to go. And I think I would strongly recommend that we have it and we keep it, otherwise we may find ourselves in different destinations. So, in terms of vision, oil and gas, for Russia and the European Union, could be for coal and steel were for Germany and France after the Second World War.

The issue of equality. I think the problem is, the issue of equality’s essentially a domestic Russian issue. It’s how you feel yourselves. The problem with Russia is that the equality that they must be looking for and we must be looking for in Russia is an equality in quality not in quantity. Now Russia has institutions, and Russia has an advanced value system and things like that. That makes a Russian equal to anyone else in the Russian’s own mind. That’s the issue, it’s not how many missiles you have or how much your GDP is. It’s not that.

Russia going more to the U.S. than to Europe. Well, when the Russians tried the Europeans on the issue of ballistic missile defences they were told go to the United States. When the Russians tried to address the Europeans on the CFE they were told the same thing, not even NATO, go to the United States. Well, that is the structure of hard security issues, but on other issues Russia is dealing with Europe and I would like to emphasise that Russia does not disparage the European Union at all in this thinking. Europe is the most important single reality with which Russia has to live and actually enjoys living next door with.

And very lastly, Eastern Partnership, I don’t think it has created a storm in Russia, no. I think it has barely been noticed so far.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Dmitri. Thank you Ambassador Martinusz, Dr Bobo Lo, and thank you to everybody for staying a bit late and I think it’s a conversation worth pursuing. Thank you very much.