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EVENT TRANSCRIPT

Turkey and the Middle East: A Fruitful Relationship?

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FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much for choosing to attend this roundtable discussion on Turkey's role in the Middle East.

The Turkish foreign minister was recently in Pakistan and Afghanistan; the region has definitely acquired a higher profile in Turkey than it had years ago. We should ask ourselves where Turkey is looking today. Is it looking to the East or is it looking westwards? Or perhaps both?

Today we want to move beyond the usual discussion about the Turkey-EU relationship and to explore Turkey's burgeoning role as a foreign policy actor in its own neighbourhood. We will ask what motivates Turkey to assume the role that it does with its various neighbours and also consider its involvement in the Israel-Palestine peace process.

We have invited two expert speakers to offer their analysis on this issue. Henri Barkey is a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Programme in Washington D.C. and Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor and Chair of the International Relations Department at Lehigh University. Before that, he served as a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning staff, where he worked on issues pertaining to Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and Intelligence. He has edited numerous books, including Turkey's Kurdish Question with Graham Fuller, and also Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East.

Heather Grabbe is currently the director of the Open Society Institute based in Brussels, and is also the director of the Soros Foundation Network, EU Affairs. Previously, she was a senior advisor to the European Advisor, Olli Rehn, from 2004 to late 2008 and before working at the Commission, she was based in London at the Centre for European Reform.

HENRI BARKEY: Thank you for coming and thank you for that, Fabrice. What I will try to do is talk broadly about Turkish foreign policy in a sense of how it has changed, what its goals have become and, ultimately, link it to Iraq, which is, I think, the one area where it can directly impact it.

Let me start: for many, many decades a lot has been written about how important Turkey is, how pivotal a country it is, given its geographical and strategic location, and so on and so forth. In

fact, this is one of the main reasons why in the United States we've been pushing for Turkish accession to the European Union, in other words, recognising its importance.

Yet, if many people think that Turkey is important, Turkish foreign policy-makers, until recently, did not really push for that, shall we say, pivotal role. In fact, it was very much an insular look at the world that Turkish foreign policy had.

This started to change, and it has changed, under the AKP, and Davutoglu, who seems to be the main architect of this policy, has really made a tremendous change in the way the Turks think about foreign policy and the way Turks approach foreign policy issues.

It is also safe to say that, until recently, the Turks have always punched well below their weight in international affairs. The Turks were always interested only in their issues and no other issues whatsoever. The same thing is true in terms of American-Turkish bilateral issues; when they came to talk to us, it was always about their issues and nothing else seemed to matter.

Now you have an activist foreign policy, where you saw in recent years Turkish, Fabrice called it the near abroad, I'm not sure the Middle East would like to think of itself as Turkey's near abroad, but nonetheless, it is a Syrian talks intervention in Lebanon in the Hamas issue, offered to involve the Europeans; in fact, so much so that now the Turks basically were told to [?] keep saying, there's not a single problem that cannot be solved if the Turks put their minds to it.

We used to think that the only problem they would not tell us they could solve was North Korea, but even that has changed, because in the United Nations, in the Security Council, the Turks now have the North Korea file. So be assured that North Korea will also be solved thanks to Turkish intervention.

It's an interesting change, in the sense that if Turkey was punching below its weight, now it is punching, or at least attempting to punch way above its weight. What I will try to talk about is whether or not this can be successful, what the drawbacks are, and what the benefits are.

Let me just also say that this new change is not really that new, in the sense that, if you go back to 1996, to the infamous or famous Erbakan government, it is at that time that Erbakan, who had campaigned in the elections about creating an Islamic NATO, an Islamic Observation

Centre (IOC), an Islamic EU, and obviously against the EU itself, did try to create new institutions: the only one, and it still remains, I don't know what it does, but it still exists in name and has some bureaucracy attached to it, is the DA, the Developing Aid, which actually started as the MA, which was Muslim Aid, but then they changed that. That brings together countries like Egypt and Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, essentially fairly sizeable Muslim countries that are economically important and politically important. This was part of the conception that Erbakan had at the time of Turkey leading the Muslim world, while creating the institutions to achieve that.

Guess what, at the time the main, shall we say, implementer of this, was none other than Abdullah Gul, who now is the president of Turkey. So it was during his time, when Abdullah Gul was kind of the shadow foreign minister; there was another foreign minister: it was Tansu Çiller in the coalition, but all these things were put in place.

So there is an antecedent to the current change; so when AKP came to power, it first had to deal with the shock of the Iraq War, and also it did say, and it did try to deliver on the EU reforms. The initial, if you want, attempt by AKP was to create pivot on the European axis and then think about this. As time went by, you see now this new strategy that has come to pass.

So what is this new strategy? In part, people talk about Davutoglu's book, Strategic Depth, where he has argued that Turkey has to create, essentially, more than one base to build this foreign policy: it can't just be on the part of the West, and when I said it cannot just be based on the West, by the West I mean NATO and the EU, that it has to extend to Asia. To him, Asia is broadly defined; I mean Asia that goes essentially from the Suez Canal to Japan, is the way he has conceived of.

With this came this notion that if Turkey is that important, it has to be active internationally, and it has to get involved in issues other than the issues that are immediately of concern to it.

Again, to go back to the pre-AKP period, whenever you talk to Turkish officials, it was always about two issues: the EU accession and the Kurdish question, or the PKK issue. Nothing else really mattered.

Now, the first thing they tried to do is to push for much greater international visibility, and we see the general secretary of the Islamic Organisation of Cooperation, you see a major, major push to become a member of the UN Security Council. That is not something that happens overnight. The Turkish government put in an enormous amount of resources, lobbying efforts, over a long period of time, to get that seat.

You have to remember that the last time Turkey was on the Security Council was in the early 1960s, 1960, 1961, where they actually shared a seat with Poland. So it wasn't there for two years; it was there for only one year, and since then had never tried even to become a member of the Security Council. Now, that was partly related to issues which we explained.

In order to become a member of the Security Council, they opened up embassies all over Latin America, they opened up embassies in Africa, they created networks with African countries; so this was very, very different than anything we had seen on the part of the Turks until recently, and it has paid off.

There's also an attempt to push for the wrong people to become heads of international organisations; Kemal Dervis was the head of UNDP, and so on and so forth; but it's also in terms of becoming active in regional disputes. Obviously the region is the place where they can be most effective, or at least that's what they think.

Now, it is also true that, when you look at some of the things they did in the region, the enabling agent there was actually the Bush administration; not that the Bush administration wanted the Turks to be involved, but rather because the Bush administration created this vacuum into which the Turks naturally filled the void. Nothing was going on between Syria and Israel; and in fact, Syria's American relations had deteriorated significantly: we had pulled our ambassadors and so on and so forth.

So there was nothing going on; and both, I mean the Syrians and Israelis, but especially the Syrians, were very, very good at playing up Erdogan and Gul's need to become important. So they essentially pulled Turkey into that vacuum and gave Turkey a role. That also encouraged the Turks to do things in Lebanon, in terms of participating in the peacekeeping talks, which is something that Turkey usually doesn't like to do.

So this flurry of activity, and we saw it with doing the Hamas War earlier this year, that the Turks were active, trying to help create a ceasefire, and so on and so forth. Then, when Hamas won the elections, Turkey was the first country to invite Khaled Meshaal, the head of the political and military bureau of Hamas based in Damascus.

So what is it that they would always try to do, and what is the AKP? First of all, it's obviously to make Turkey what they call a central state and it will play a central role in a whole series of events. Partially, it is driven by geography too, if you look at the location of Turkey.

In the region itself they have been making much of this saying, zero problems with our neighbours; that they don't want problems with their neighbours. That doesn't mean that they have achieved that; Armenia and Cyprus are clearly two places where they haven't gotten there. I'm sure you know that better than I do.

They want to have non-problematic relationships with everybody in the neighbourhood; they want high-level political dialogue with everybody in their neighbourhood. So they want to be able to talk, being able to pick up the phone and talk to the leaders.

Third, and this is another argument that they make, is that Turkey wants to preserve what it calls the multicultural character of the region.

Then, finally, creating mutual economic dependence; the argument that they make is that the more, its old, traditional functions argument, if you want, that came out of this part of the world, is that the more you are interlinked the more dependent you are on each other, the less likely you are to have conflicts.

So this is a broad-brushed description of the thing. How effective is it? They seem to think it's very effective. A lot of people have made a big deal of these Syria and Israeli talks; I'm a little bit sceptical. I'm sceptical in the sense that what comes out, if you talk very often to Turkish leadership on this issue, is that they seem to think that, A, they know the region better than the rest of the world; and this is an argument that is always based on history and the Ottoman Empire. They know Russia better than the United States, because the Ottoman Empire fought the Russians for so many years. Well, 1711, the Battle of Pruth was a defeat for the Turks; that doesn't mean much in today's world; things have changed a lot since then.

Similarly, because they've had a long-term relationship with the Iranians, the border has been stable, they know the Iranians much better than we do, they know the Arab world better than we do, and to some extent they also take some, shall we say, courage from the fact that they told the Bush administration that the Iraq War was a mistake; and guess what: history proved that to be the case.

To some extent, I think there's an element of over-self-confidence, I think, on this, and at some point I think, and it will happen, is that it's going to backfire. It started with inviting Khaled Meshaal to Ankara. It isn't that they invited a Hamas person; the problem was that they invited Khaled Meshaal.

That goes back again to the relationship that they had built over the years with the Muslim brotherhood in the Erbakan years, and Hamas is part of that greater movement. But Khaled Meshal is precisely the guy who's been ordering the bombings. If you invite Hanir, who genuinely won the election in Gaza, and who's going to become the prime minister, okay, that makes sense, but to invite the most radical of all is really... So that was the beginning that created a shock in Washington also.

Since then, you get this feeling, and this is becoming now very apparent, with the crisis in Iran, and I don't know if you saw... President Gul was one of the first to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his great election victory, following Hamas and Chavez; and even Putin waited a couple of days before... When Davutoglu was asked about this, you could see that, to him, this notion of, that I mentioned earlier, political dialogue at the highest level, very good relations with everybody means that you deal with the power structures. He gave an interview to Der Spiegel the other day, where he actually has absolutely no empathy for what happened in Iran and the disappointment that maybe people may feel, the demonstrations, the violence that has taken place.

It is a little bit anachronistic for a country that is being regarded as a democracy and for what democracy should be, and he is an important part of the platform, to essentially say absolutely nothing about the demonstrations. In fact, basically, what he said was that participation was high: that shows how dynamic the Iranian political system is; basically, how wonderful it is. This is the kind of stuff that I think where it's going to start to backfire.

I don't want to talk too much, but I do want to point out to one thing: it is also true that the AKP government has also shifted policy on many issues: Cyprus; I'm not going to go into Cyprus, but I do want to focus on one area where they did make a major change; and I think that's the one area where the Turkish influence and importance of Turkey, where Turkey can play a very concerted long-term role, is Iraq.

From a position where they used to be completely hostile to Iraqi Kurds, they have shifted on that; and it took a while, and there was a great deal of military opposition to a change in policy, but they managed to overcome that, from a point where they still don't recognise the Kurdistan regional government, but now they talk to the Kurdistan Regional Government; before they used to completely ignore the Kurdistan Regional Government. They basically would have preferred if the KRG did not exist in the first place; the notion of a federal Iraq is anathema to them.

On all these issues, they have made a great deal of progress, and it has come to a point where you get the sense that on certain issues the Turks and the KRG have much more in common than the Turks and the Central Government in Baghdad, on issues of oil, on energy transfer, and that change has also enabled Iraqi Kurds to move on the PKK issue. Thanks to that, I think we are very close to a potential deal on the PKK in Iraq. It needs to be pushed by the Americans; I don't know if the Americans will do it.

Nevertheless that's the one area where Turkey has enormous ability to influence Iraq, because they have good relations with the Sunnis, they also have managed to create good relationships with the Maliki government; that's the only place where they've had multi-layered to the problem, maybe because Iraq is such a complex issue and also it's a society that's very split among all these different groups.

Initially the Turks just banked on Baghdad and the Turcomans, and they realised that the policy was not working; and to their credit, they changed it, and then they started to engage all levels of Iraqi society. That's where they've been very successful, as opposed to, for instance, Iran and elsewhere.

So it's a mixed bag, if you want, in this new foreign policy, but it is also very early, and we can talk about it in the discussion period.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Henri. So let me now turn to Heather. We were talking earlier about whether the EU agenda in the Middle East and the Turkish agenda in the Middle East were compatible, where were the synergies, and where were the possible tensions or gaps. So, if you want to go ahead.

HEATHER GRABBE: Yes, thank you, Fabrice, for inviting me. I should stress at the beginning that I'm giving my own personal views; I left the Cabinet of Olli Rehn in February, so I was obviously dealing very much with EU policy in Turkey; I was responsible for Turkey in the Cabinet until then. So I've forged my own views as a former academic and think-tanker, so not everything I say is by any means the Commission Party line or even Olli's own thinking.

I think it's very welcome to have a local debate about all of this; it's actually hard, and I think Fabrice would find it hard to find anybody in the institutions who could give this kind of overview, because in the EU in general, particularly in Brussels, I think we have a big problem with having discussions of a strategic nature. So this is a general problem with the EU foreign policy; it's not confined to the question of Turkey.

It would be much easier for somebody in the Obama administration to have this discussion, it's stock-in-trade, than it is for anybody at EU level, because enlargement policy is something the Commission very much deals with, so Obama's [?] not going to talk about it too much; and in the Commission it tends to be parcelled up, and who has the strategic overview [unclear].

The reason why I say that at the beginning is because I think this is quite a tricky issue for the European Union. I would say that the prima facie evidence is that Turkey, having a stronger and more active regional policy, and better relations with its neighbours, is unquestionably a massive strategic asset for the European Union; it's win-win; it's very good for the EU; and I'll explain the reasons why I think it's very good for the EU. Yet, it actually makes people a bit nervous.

So why does it make people nervous? Well, first of all, there's the fact that the EU doesn't really have a single policy towards Turkey's region, because you've got some issues on which there is more EU consensus, Middle East processes, particularly with the Obama administration in the

lead, people are pretty happy, on the whole, with where Obama is trying to lead; the question is whether it'll get there.

On Iran, reactions from the EU member states have not been so far apart, but on issues like Iraq, and especially once you come to issues like Syria and, certainly, Russia, you find the member states have different views; they have different priorities; they have different concerns; and that's what gives you this ambivalence about, oh, what's Turkey doing, do we like it, is it compatible with what we have?

Also, of course, there's this general European nervousness about the context in which this is being formed. Turkey is not Iran; Turkey is not Russia; Turkey's a potential member of the European Union - I very much hope a future member of the European Union. That gives a different flavour to the debate as well: this isn't about an ally, a partner, in the way that, say, other NATO members would see it, particularly the US and the non-EU NATO members, Norway, for example, who could see it very much in a strategic viewpoint. This is also a question of, it reminds people that Turkey in the European Union would mean that the EU has borders with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, Georgia; and that is, for many Europeans, still a thought they haven't really conjured with very much.

Now, again, I think that, too, is a big strategic asset, because if Turkey, over the next few years, while negotiating accession with the EU, is at the same time sorting out regional problems; and I agree with you, Armenia is a really key one; it would be hugely to Turkey's advantage, and also it would improve Turkey's image a lot in the EU, if there were a normalisation of relations and opening of the border.

Basically, to have Turkey sorting out problems with its neighbours, having an active regional role, building strong relationships, particularly on the economic and commercial side: this all makes Turkey even more important for the European Union. It makes Turkey even more of a big positive advantage to the EU in many, many ways. That's something that we don't actually debate enough in Brussels.

It seems to me there's just not enough of a dialogue about what kind of EU, with Turkey as a member, what we would have, how that would connect us into emerging markets that may well be growing rather more strongly in the future in its region.

So I think there is no necessary contradiction between Turkish EU integration and Turkey having an active role in its region. You could also draw parallels with other countries that have joined the European Union, bringing their regional concerns and interests, and an active regional role with them; for example, Poland joining in 2004, having had a very active role with Ukraine, also with Belarus, to the extent it could, certainly, with other neighbours.

The fact that Poland had good strong relations with the Ukraine was a big asset in 2004 with the Orange Revolution, the initial reaction. Remember that the people who went to Kiev were [unclear] with the Polish and Lithuanian presidents. There was no idea of the contradiction between Poland having a strong role in the region and it joining the European Union. So we need to think about it in those sorts of terms.

Similarly, you see strong links between current EU members in other parts of the world: Spain with Latin America; Spain often raises Latin America at EU discussions; France, Italy and Spain on North Africa as well. So there doesn't need to be any contradiction there.

Are there contradictions in practice? Well, the overall EU aim, to the extent that the EU has a common foreign security policy towards Turkey's region, and as I mentioned earlier, there are different views on this, particularly on the issue of Russia, and the Black Sea, and so on; on the whole, both the EU and Turkey are status quo powers in the region.

Turkey has traditionally been a status quo in its foreign policy. The EU is also, to a large extent; look at the reactions to what's happening in Iran at the moment. If you're aiming at the same goal of a stable region, which has progressed towards democracy and better governance, but certainly not aiming at regime change, and certainly not doing it through military intervention, then you've got a similar policy aim.

Also, I think the commercial and economic side is really important. The fact that Turkey has these very strong trading relationships with its neighbours: if there are improvements, like getting borders opened and improving transit with the Caucasus, for example; also with Iraq: this is going to be enormously important in terms of the long-term economic development of Iraq; also Iran, which remains a very important trading partner with Turkey. These are all elements which

the EU is very familiar with as a method of forging relationships and constructing positive future frameworks for cooperation with neighbours.

I think the big EU concerns in the region are the ones that we should look at in terms of potential contradictions. The first one is energy security, because energy security, it's all about long-term relationships and a predictable political environment. So, again, you come back to, generally speaking, having the status quo and not too much disruption as a goal. On the other hand, you also need to have a very clear sense of mutual trust between countries.

So, again, zero-problem policies is very welcome; maximum cooperation is very welcome; but it's all a bit fragile, energy security. It seems to me that Turkey has many different interests in energy policy; it would like to be a regional hub – that means buying and selling energy, as well as being a transit country. That's obviously not an EU concern; in fact, the EU would be much happier with Turkey as a transit country and having its energy security ensured by deals directly with the suppliers, not through Turkey as a regional hub, as an arbitrator. So that's a tricky issue.

There's also the question of predictability: the energy industry and also energy policy is all about long-term commitments and investments, which people expect to pay off in 20 or 30 years' time. That's also the case with issues like Nabuco; it's also the case with the whole question of designing the future architecture of pipelines. That remains problematic, because there's not enough trust in the idea that Turkey will be a member of the EU, in order to guarantee it to, for example, the commercial sector.

They are always asking for a percentage; what's the percentage probability that Turkey will be an EU member in 2014, 2017, 2020, so we can plan our investments and decide on where to put the pipelines. This is very tricky, and I think that's why the sooner we can get the energy chapter opened in the negotiations with Turkey, the better. It's hugely important to do that in order to ensure that there's some stability and some predictability in energy security; that, again, both benefits Turkey and the EU.

Then there's the policy of zero problems with neighbours; this is very welcome, and certainly the Davutoglu policy, if we could call it that, gained a lot of kudos in the EU for Turkey. I was struck by the way in which the EU was able to have very serious substantive debates with Ali Babacan, when he was foreign minister, about Iraq, about Iran, about Syria, about the Middle

East peace process, about the Black Sea, and so on, and also about Armenia, about the future of the Caucasus, in a very substantive level, which was very encouraging. Because a lot of the EU-Turkey dialogue, I'm not talking about the bilateral member states' dialogues, but the formal sessions of the troika and the accession conferences, they're very focused on the accession process; they're very focused on the negotiations; and that's not necessarily healthy, if it means that you are just focusing essentially on the problems, on all the issues that need to be resolved, rather than on the mutual interests and the areas of common concern and of common vision.

I think it's very good when, say, troika dinners, for example, can actually focus on the issues of Turkey's region as a means of getting to the substantive issues, and not just focusing on: are we going to open this chapter, or that one. I hope that the Hungarian presidency will also be able to do this. It's been quite successful under the previous presidencies; and I know the Swedes have this in mind as well: to use the troika dinners as a serious forum for interactive discussion.

However, having said all of that, it's all very welcome, and it also, by the way, another positive thing, of course: it also shows what kind of an important role Turkey can play in CFSP, and could play in ESDP as a member; that's enormously important.

There are exceptions to the zero problems with neighbours, i.e. the problems that are left with the neighbours, and, as Henri was pointing out, these are really big issues for the EU. Cyprus is a huge issue for the European Union; this is the neighbour of neighbours, where a resolution to the Cyprus issue, particularly if it happens this year, would absolutely transform the accession negotiations, it would speed up Turkey's progress to the EU, there would be direct and immediate benefits to it. If things go horribly wrong, and the situation becomes more and more intractable, if it's an ongoing process, this is going to continue to be an obstacle in the access process. So that the sine qua non in terms of regional relationships.

Then there's Armenia: Armenia is very important, because in a number of EU countries, notably France, but also others, the Armenian Diaspora have a voice, it's a very important voice, and to have the normalisation of relations, the opening of the border, again, it would affect Turkey's image in these countries; in the French Assemblée Nationale, for example. Turkey would have a different image. That makes a big difference, as well as, of course, all the practical issues in the region about transit and the trade and so on.

Finally, there's the question of soft power too. In addition to the substantive relationships, Turkey's development in its relationship with the EU are very important indicators for the rest of the region. I don't much like the very common talk you get about Turkey being a model for other countries; you hear this much too often, and it's very superficial, and we know all the reasons why many countries are not interested in Turkey as a model.

It's true that Turkey's current process of major political and social change is being followed with great interest by its neighbours, and, indeed, by other countries. The fact that Turkey's so engaged, not just with its neighbours, but also through the UN Security Council, through African Union, for example, the, obviously, Islamic Conference, and so on, and as Henri was pointing out, engaging with countries like Malaysia, Indonesia: people notice what's going on in Turkey all the more because of that.

If Turkey can come out of this of major political and social change with a strengthened democracy, with a more open society, more comfortable in its own diversity - and this is where I think your point about the Kurds is vital, but it's not just the Kurds, it's also the issue of religious minorities in Turkey, the Alevis and so on - that would send a very powerful signal to other countries about what's possible in terms of having a successful mix of a market economy, democracy, national pride and Muslim traditions; Turkey's really important. That again benefits the EU; that's something that EU countries are also wrestling with.

It would be good if EU countries could be more comfortable in their own diversity too, including comfortable with 12 million Muslims living in the European Union, with the many millions of Roma. These are common issues, these are not things that are unique to Turkey, but the success of Turkey's mix makes a difference there and it also, again, affects Turkey's image in the European Union.

Of course, on the negative side, in terms of soft power, if the EU-Turkey relationship were to deteriorate, because of problems over Cyprus here, because of the other issues in the negotiations, it would really affect the EU's image in the rest of the world. Because if the negotiations stop, imagine what kind of a signal that sends to the whole of the Muslim world.

Even if people don't, in Indonesia or in Malaysia, for example, just think of more far-flung Muslim countries, even if they don't know very much about the EU-Turkey relationship, and

Turkey's EU membership is not a key concern of theirs, the idea, the perception that the door has been closed on Turkey, even if Turkey takes the decision itself, would have a hugely damaging effect, and I think the people in EU need to take account of that. This is about the EU's image in the world too; it's not just about Turkey's image in Europe.

So in conclusion, Turkey cannot solve problems in the region for the EU, but Turkey having an active regional role, having positive relationships with its neighbours is a big strategic asset for the European Union, and not having Turkey as an ally, as a strategic partner, would make the task much harder for the European Union. It's also the case for Turkey - to start to work against the EU would dramatically reduce Turkey's influence in the region, and also I think it would harm relations with a lot of the neighbours, because there would be a sense that they could play off one against the other.

So, what we need to do, particularly this year, in looking at all of the issues on the agenda for both Turkey and the EU, is to keep it win-win for both. I think it certainly can be; the risk is that if things go wrong, it doesn't stay that way.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Heather. That was a very impressive and comprehensive overview, and I think we have had two very rich presentations. Before I open the floor, I want to press our two speakers on one single point: we have been talking about Turkey's foreign policy and strategic depth as a clear and well-thought, well articulated policy, but surely there are some real tensions at the domestic level.

There is no consensus about where Turkey should go; it is unclear if they have decided. If you could tell us a bit more about that, about the kind of split or gaps between this Kemalist consensus inherited from Atatürk, and the kind of new auto-monism that is embodied by the current foreign minister. Henri, do you want to start?

HENRI BARKEY: I agree with you, there are enormous tensions: all you have to do is pick up any Turkish newspaper on any given day and you will find that things are not as smooth as we would think, as it would look from the outside. Domestically, consensus on the EU, or any other matter, is actually quite elusive at this stage.

First of all, there's the ongoing tension between the military and the AKP. It's not just AKP, but it's broadly the Islamist groups, I'd say; there Turkey itself has changed and its leadership has not followed through. Turkey is not the Turkey of 30, 40 years ago, when you went in Istanbul and Istanbul was mostly, you could say, a very secular city. Now, with millions of people having migrated, and with a lot of people, very pious, very conservative people, having made a lot of money, who can afford houses, who can afford vacations, so the two societies are intermingling and it is not pretty, in the sense of the way they look at each other.

In one way or another, there's actually a very interesting type of class warfare going on, and when I say class warfare, it isn't working-class versus the bourgeoisie type that we've been accustomed to; these are wealthy, well-to-do pious people versus well-to-do, shall we say, remnants of the secular elite. They're all fighting to get a piece of the pie.

Until essentially the late or mid-1980s, that pie was always in the hands of one group, and now we have a new, thanks to Özal actually, the transformation of Turkistan with Özal. By opening the economic system he enabled essentially a huge segment of the population to participate in international trade and lift themselves up.

So you have a bourgeoisie that grew up in Malatya, in Konya, in Kayseri, etc., that could go out and sell textiles by companies in Europe and the United States, and basically said, yes, we are also part of this country. And when you talk to a lot of these pious people, that's when you see the tension.

So it is not working-class versus Bourgeoisie; it's Bourgeoisie versus Bourgeoisie; working-class versus working-class in some respects, and so it's a split... It isn't about religion; religion is one manifestation of that, but the way the military looks at it is purely from a religious perspective, which I think does disservice to the military institution, because they also have to deal with some of these people who are in their ranks. They purge them, but we know purges are not always successful. So it exacerbates the tensions – that's one.

Number two is the issue of the Kurds. Although I believe a lot of progress was made, I still think there is a great deal of resistance to a genuine resolution of the Kurdish problem. Of the 80 years that the Republic has been in existence for, of those 80, 85 years, in 95% of those years

you were essentially brought up thinking that there were no Kurds, that these people don't exist; suddenly making peace with them is difficult.

The war in Iraq, the end of the Cold War, also have galvanised the Kurds in a way in which they are not going to accept anything less than full cultural rights. I'm not saying independence, I'm not saying autonomy, I'm not saying even regional, shall we say, assemblies or provincial assemblies, no; but a genuine complete... That's why Iraq becomes so critical, because any deal that Ankara makes with the Kurdish Regional Government, it actually strengthens the commitment of Turkish Kurds to Turkey itself, because the way the Kurds look in Turkey at the KRG is the same way, if you want, American Jews look at Israel, in the sense that not all American Jews want to live in Israel, but they do want to know that there's a place, as a traumatised society, as a traumatised people, they do want to know that there's a place they can go to.

When you talk to Turkish Kurds, they say, Northern Iraq, I would never live there; but they do care about the long-term, shall we say, stability and prosperity of Northern Iraq, and the more the Turkish government collaborates with the KRG, the lower the tensions are in Turkey in this respect, and it kind of reduces the demands that the Kurds and Turkey have; and that's a very important relationship, that people are starting to catch onto in Turkey.

The problem with the EU, to me, came out very recently on a poll, a very serious poll that was done by a professor at Bogazici University, where he described an essentially xenophobic society, where something like 76% of the population would not want a non-Muslim neighbour in their apartment building.

Now, for a country that wants to become a member of the European Union, this is problematic; but things have to change, and things will change, I'm convinced. But there are very, very serious problems, very serious tensions that have to be worked on, and that's where, I think, the government and the political leaders in general fail, in a sense that they're not tackling those things.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you. Heather.

HEATHER GRABBE: Thank you, Henri. I thought that was a great analysis, and I agree with much of it - I've done a lot on Turkey - particularly this point about how in the EU, just to contrast the views in the EU with your analysis, which I think your analysis is the correct one, people don't understand how much what's going on in Turkey, this big political debate, the divisions are not really about religion.

Religion is, as you said, but one manifestation of a big social revolution that's going on, and the changing of [unclear] and of probability and so on. And that's something that's really not understood. The question you just keep hearing still in many parts of the EU: is Turkey becoming more Islamic or less Islamic? The answer is, that's not really what it's about.

So I really welcome that and it would be great actually if somebody wrote something big about that issue in, for example, Foreign Policy Magazine – that's quite an interesting publication. I think that's a really important point also about the military, really critical: how and when will the military's views on any of these things change, and that's a big issue as regards your accession, because there are many unresolved issues that depend on a shift of views in the military, not least of which the issue of Cyprus.

I wanted to quote to you actually a different poll, because you quoted the poll by Bogazici, about the one about 76% believe the EU's trying to divide Turkey. There's an awful lot of myth-making that goes on in Turkey: these things that get published about: here's the EU's official map of Turkey divided up between Kurdistan and the new Armenian autonomous area, and what part of it is going to go to Iran and change our 500-year old border.

There's an awful lot of conspiracy theory about the EU's plan; we're not quite understanding that the EU is very, very agnostic when it comes to its member states' solutions to their various issues of ethnic mix. Look at the difference between, for example, French and Greek policy on minorities, where they don't officially exist. With Finland, where, if you have a linguistic minority population in any town of more than 12%, then the town has to officially be bilingual. This is a massive difference in terms of cultural rights and so on.

I think this is one of the key issues in the misunderstanding between Turkey and the EU about the accession process, that many Turks assume that the EU is as interested in the issues that fascinate them as they are, and in fact the EU can't provide solutions.

The EU is an interested observer and is concerned to see a good societal consensus reached, but the EU cannot have a view on headscarves; the EU cannot have a view on the appropriate way of dealing with Kurdish cultural rights. They should be there, they should be protected, but how you protect them is a matter for Turkey to find its own solution, and this is something that's very difficult for people in Turkey to comprehend, is that the EU is not a government.

The nature of the EU, that it has enormous powers in regulating, to the last particle, the air quality in Istanbul, yes; the EU will have a lot to say about exactly how much industrial effluent there is in the Tigris, whereas the EU does not have any kind of standard to put on headscarves. So there's a mismatch there in people understanding what it is that the EU is really all about, and that's partly why people mistake what the EU's doing.

FABRICE POTHIER: But you have the same thing in London or Paris?

HEATHER GRABBE: Oh, yes, definitely, you do. And then in London and Paris, you have a misunderstanding about what's going on in Turkey, and what I wanted to quote you on that side is a very interesting poll: in the Transatlantic Trend Survey, it was a really interesting correlation poll: they asked the same questions of European public and European elites, not in all countries, I think it was in six or seven EU countries, and one of the questions they asked was, do you think Turkey should join the European Union?

Then they asked the same people, what are your main foreign policy concerns? What are the biggest security threats that you feel? Top of the list came, some people putting climate change, others putting Iran getting the bomb [?], but one of the big ones that came out was Islamic fundamentalism: I'm worried about Islamic fundamentalism which leads to terrorism; and there were quite a lot of people who supplied that, both among elites and also among the public.

So then they correlated; the people who had answered yes to that question: were they in favour of Turkey joining the European Union? And among elites, they were overwhelmingly in favour. If you're worried about Islamic fundamentalism leading to ideologically-based terrorism, then you really want Turkey to run the EU, for all the reasons that we know, all the strategic reasons. In the public, it was the other way around: people who were worried about Islamic fundamentalism were not keen on Turkey coming anywhere nearer.

That's what I meant when I started off this afternoon talking about the borders issue, that for those of us, sitting in foreign ministries and big international institutions, that we look at the future, Turkey's border, and we think: how great, Turkey is a constructive power in its region, engaging really well with all of these countries which are vital to Europe's security and which are also important commercial interests and energy security and so on. How great to have Turkey as an ally and as a strategic partner.

For people who are primarily worried about, the only Turks they know are those who are living on their street in Berlin, for example, or whose only knowledge of Islam is about terrorism, because they don't actually know any Muslims in their own societies, they don't get that this is a strategic asset; it's just a different viewpoint. That's why these strategic arguments about Turkey need to be translated into a political narrative in the EU that makes them comprehensible to ordinary voters. I think that's what we, collectively, as European policy-makers, need to address; we really need to make that understood.

If I could put in a small plug for a forthcoming OSI attempt to help with that; OSI's been supporting something called the Independent Commission on Turkey, which reported in 2004 – some of you may have read the report – it's a group of eminent Europeans chaired by a Marti Ahtisaari, with various others: Michel Rocard, former prime minister of France, Marcelino Oreja from Spain, Emma Bonino from Italy and so on, Biedenkopf from Germany and others. They reported in 2004 with a report on whether and how Turkey should start accession negotiations with the EU, coming out in favour; and this year they're going to report with the launch in Brussels on the 7th September, on what's happening now in the EU-Turkey relationship, what's going wrong and what needs to be put right.

I think that's the kind of initiative we need a lot more often: trying to explain in an accessible format, for interested parties,, and we're not going to reach every citizen, but interested parties, why this relationship matters; and there's very little of that. There's an awful lot of debate about European identity and not very much about why the relationship has strategic consequences.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Heather. Let's open the floor. Just to add something: the struggles you have within the Turkish political scene and within the elites also sent some mixed signals to Europe about where does Turkey want to go vis-à-vis its own

religious identity, especially for a country like France which has the dogma of being liked, which I think is a bit also overdone, like now we are becoming more comfortable with the idea of having an American-style minority policy, as until now we were all saying, there's no minority in France, we're all Republican, we're all citizens. So I think it's also Turkey in this policy struggle which makes the reading of Turkey more complicated for Europeans.

So let me now turn to our patient audience to see if there's any question or even comments, and then, please, just introduce yourself before.

JOHN SYLVESTER: I'll be very quick; John Sylvester, and again thank you very much; it's very interesting and very poignant, obviously, from a US standpoint.

You touched upon one institution, which has a huge impact on Turkish politics, a little bit; I'd get to get more of your opinion about the military, the Turkish General Staff. Clearly, over the years they played large aggressive roles with coups, or within the [unclear] coup, to a very quiet role. Right now we're seeing in Turkey, the teachers of the military taking a kind of uncomfortable position: it doesn't appear they know where they want to be: a leading role or a little bit in the back seat.

So I'm curious to know, as Davutoglu and Erbakan and Gul, let's say, reaches out to the Muslim countries more aggressively; that certainly makes the teachers [?] more uncomfortable.

What do you think is a red line? What will the military do: are they going to continue taking a wait-and-see attitude? Will they step in? Obviously there's lots of components to this question because of the Cyprus issue, EU and others, but I'm just curious to know how the military will respond with Turkish foreign policy in the near future.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you. And the gentleman?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. There are some things that I read about that I would like to add to this beneficial lecture, and first of all, actually, I want to thank you for this picture.

Actually, it requires to be mentioned that the struggle that you mentioned between the social classes cannot be regarded as a big struggle between the social classes, because last year the

Constitutional Court of Turkey had stated that the current government obviously has activities against Turkish essential principle of secular reasons. So not only military, not only at the social classes, and you can also see that in judicial system, there are some criticism coming towards the AKP.

In addition to that, it's not worth it to mention that, considering the pre-AKP government, we really have to focus on those governments and the neighbours which they were confronting with. At that time in Iraq there was certain [?], and also in Syria, there was a [unclear], therefore the situation was confronted by the Turkish pre-AKP government, was not the same as current situation; so that's what I wanted to mention.

FABRICE POTHIER: Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I fully agree with everything said about the foreign policy relevance of Turkey for the EU and in the region itself, and that the EU had a lot to gain from this relationship.

At the same time, working on enlargement of the EU to South Eastern Europe, to the Balkans, I'm, of course, very aware of the internal discussions inside EU member states about enlargement, and that is already very negative regarding small countries in South-Eastern Europe. There we're talking about a region of maximum 20 million, which is economically not very strong, but probably is still stronger than many regions of Turkey.

So yes, there is a lot to gain foreign policy-wise, but from the discussions inside the EU, I really don't see the mood changing in the near future on the issue of Turkey joining the EU.

FABRICE POTHIER: And if I may add something to this question, is, I was talking to the Turkish ambassador today and we were talking about Sarkozy and him going to Berlin, making his big statement, waving the non-Turkish-joining-the-EU flag, but is it really in Turkey's strategic interest to join the EU? Can't Turkey be also relevant and important outside the EU? This is coming from someone who does not have a religious view about whether it should be part of the EU or not. I think it's a nice project, it's part of the EU, but can't it also be important as a regional power outside? So shall we start with you, Heather?

HEATHER GRABBE: Sure. I'm going to immediately leave the question on the Turkish General Staff to Henri; he's much more expert on this than I am.

I just take your point that, yes, regimes in the neighbourhood have also got better, and this has helped Turkey to play this kind of regional role; it was much harder. So I think that's an interesting question, and I think also Turkey's reaction to what's going on in Iran has been very careful, very measured, no doubt with previous examples in mind because [?] they've got transitions.

Bjorn's question about the Balkans and the enlargement debate: yes, you're absolutely right. The problem is there's a lot of collateral damage from loose talk about the EU-Turkey relationship, to be frank. In particular, the Balkans tends to suffer damage, because you'll get European leaders making very negative statements on enlargement, with Turkey in mind, and the first one who gets shot is the Balkans, because Montenegro puts in an application, Albania puts in an application - everybody goes: oh! Enlargement, terrifying! Montenegro is 600,000 people: nobody will even notice if Montenegro joins tomorrow.

Now, okay, yes, it's very important to meet the conditions, and organised crime must be combated and nah, nah, nah; yes, but you're right, the enlargement debate, as a whole, is very much influenced by the debate about Turkey.

You said the mood on Turkey is not going to change in the near future. Well, yes, on the whole, yes, but there is a glimmer of hope. I think, on the whole, yes, because most of the debate in the European Union about Turkey joining is about the EU as it is currently constructed, and the domestic problems in the current member states; it's not about Turkey. It's all about: will these problems that really scare us and about which we cannot talk properly, we don't have a political vocabulary, will they get worse?

So they are issues of ethnic and cultural and religious diversity, they are issues about integration and lack of it, of ethnic minorities and migrant communities, which, of course, overlap to a certain extent. They are about: how comfortable are we really with our own diversity; they are about: how do we deal with the post-Cold War world, which is still something that's not fully there in the mental maps of many people over 50 in the European Union.

There are a lot of people who still haven't really adjusted to that, to the fact that... even the Poles having joined the UE, it's still a bit hmmm, let alone countries further east. So, for example, the war in Georgia, many people were surprised at how European Georgians seem when they appear on television, they drink wine, they're Christian, and even the Christian thing doesn't come out particularly strongly, but the way in which conduct themselves in Georgian culture: there's a lot of European things.

So I think there's a lot of issues there about otherness and about identity and culture, unresolved issues in Europe, which the European Union can do very little to resolve. These are issues for the Dutch society to resolve, Danish society, British Society, French society, German society, Austrian society. Look at the European parliament elections we've just had: an amazing election of openly racist candidates. These are all issues which affect views on whether Turkey should join, but which aren't necessarily related to the process of joining.

Plus there's the fact that in the opinion polls, which are the things that people pay attention to, people are usually just asked the very simple question of: do you want Turkey to join? Not: what happens if Turkey transforms itself into a vibrant democracy and an open society and a great ally of the EU, and let me explain to you all of the background and then maybe you could see what you think. Now this is where deliberative polling is interesting, but we don't have a process of deliberative polling very much in the EU. So I agree with you, the mood is not going to change that much because we're working within the existing political constraints.

However, the ray of optimism is that, certainly among the political elite and the political leaders, I think there are reasons for short-term pessimism and long-term optimism about how they view the EU-Turkey relationship and about accession as well. Short-term pessimism because things are pretty difficult this year: the Cyprus negotiations – this is a big question mark hanging over the whole thing. If they go well, it could really be a big turning point and shove the whole process forward, open lots of chapters, really give a sense of momentum.

If it goes badly wrong, it's difficult to predict the consequences, it's going to be very, very difficult to continue with this. It's difficult to predict what's going to happen. I don't want to call it either way, because we're into an unknown zone, and that's another reason why Turkey needs to be much more active, much more proactive on getting the process resolved. So do

many EU member states, but I think it's not quite appreciated in, I think, Ankara how much that needs to happen; there needs to be a real push to the process from the Turkish side as well.

So short-term things are pretty tough, and certainly the new European Parliament, for example, is going to be even more hostile, although, on the whole, European Parliament has always voted in favour. The next commission: lots of unknowns; the external action service, the new higher [?], what kind of roles will they play; lots of unknowns about it; but I'm a longer-term optimist.

Over the next ten years, I think time is on Turkey's side on all of these issues that really are important on the strategic side, including the ones that Fabrice was mentioning. These are all things which will become more evident to the public and will be very much more in the minds of policy-makers.

The key issues that the EU has to deal with, such as energy security, climate change, dealing with the economic crisis and getting more dynamism into the European Economy, labour market changes, demographic changes in terms of ageing population, skills shortages in the EU and so on; these are all areas where Turkey is a big asset and Turkey could help the European Union to forge a more effective solution; and to work against Turkey would be very hard for the EU. Vice versa for Turkey too: to work against the EU.

So I think the common interests will become more evident and stronger over the next ten years. The question is whether we can get through this difficult period that we're in right now and into that... Imagine even three or four years from now, where you've got some economic growth in the EU, people are feeling a bit better about unemployment, energy security, climate change, relations with Russia, Black Sea, regional cooperation, Caucasus are all the more important, Iran is maybe opening... There are a lot of kinds of things that could happen. Also, we haven't mentioned Afghanistan. Afghanistan is also an important area where Turkey is engaged. In all of these areas, Turkey will become more important rather than less.

So I think the key thing is to keep the process going now, just keep it going, make sure it's not delayed and make sure there's no interruption, and wait for a better political moment.

FABRICE POTHIER: Henri?

HENRI BARKEY: Let me start with the TGS question by piggybacking on what Heather just said. Well, I disagree with Heather on whether time is on Turkey's side or not; it really depends on domestic politics in Turkey. If things were to work out well in Turkey in domestic politics, yes; if they don't, nothing will...

I think the European Union law for Turkey is actually very, very hard. It's very hard also because there's almost an unstated assumption there, especially for the Turks, that once you resolve some of these problems accession will be fairly quick. The problem here is, I think, you need to start with a different timeframe, that accession is going to come, but it's going to be way, way, way down the road.

JOHN SYLVESTER: And no one knows how much Turkey will change in that process, whether you will have internal backlash against it.

HENRI BARKEY: That's why I'm saying that domestic politics is so important, but also the change that Turkey has to go through, and it's very, very significant. If the polls that we just mentioned now are any indication, there's a fundamental change about the other that Turkey has to go through, which it happens to [unclear].

The TGS here is actually a very critical actor in many different ways. First of all, one of the major developments of like, shall we say, the last year or so, is how weakened the Turkish military has become as a result of all the scandals that have come out.

HEATHER GRABBE: Ergenekon.

HENRI BARKEY: Ergenekon is one. The other thing is that they made a critical error in 2007, when they issued this e-memorandum in the middle of the night, which was awfully badly worked [?]; everybody assumed it must have been some colonel who didn't go to a very good school, but now the former chief of staff says, well, I got it, then maybe Yugiv [?] got it, I don't know, but I can't write Turkish.

The problem is that it was a huge mistake, in the sense that they did. The society proved in the subsequent elections that they were becoming irrelevant; this is a very hard change for the Turkish Military to accept. The EU process itself makes the Turkish Military more irrelevant,

but it is now the backlash in society that is creating another, shall we say, impotence for pushing the military.

This is where it's tricky; it's very tricky in the following sense: the Turkish Military has accepted certain changes; the issue of foreign policy, as you put it, outreach to Muslim countries, doesn't really concern them; it is the domestic issues that concern them: the Kurdish question and Islamic [unclear], so to say. So it's on those two that they will decide.

Look, given the preponderance of the military to intervene, and when they can't intervene, to plot; and you see now in 2004, they plotted; now there's this Ergenekon. The issue with it: in the good old days, the Turkish Military, when they plotted they actually did things. Now it's a gang that can't shoot straight. When you look at these officers who were involved in the Ergenekon thing, it's a bunch of amateurs. Now, that's a joke, but the more important issue is that sometimes it.

We don't really know much about the Turkish Military's internal makeup in terms of where people fall, in terms of the major issues, in terms of what are the trigger-points, at what level would they trigger. Now, we know that individuals, ironically, have made a great deal of difference; the former chief of staff, who was chief of staff in 2004, Ozkok, single-handedly plotted a coup.

This current chief of staff seems to also be somebody who understands change in society; he doesn't like it, but is a realist. We know who the next chief of staff is, but everything I have read about him scares the living daylight out of me; this is a guy who thinks Turkey's main enemy are the European Union, globalisation. So it's not the current one. So under a different makeup of the Turkish Military hierarchy, would we have something different?

So I think the chances are still very low, but the fact that they were still in April trying to come up with new ways of undermining the government and religious groups, to me, is very significant. When you think about the EU and Turkish accession, until the Turkish Military is completely civilianised, Turkey's not going to go...

Now, on your point about the Constitutional Court: look, the Constitutional Court case, with all due respect, was a joke.

HEATHER GRABBE: It was a bit of a scary, bad joke.

HENRI BARKEY: It was a scary, bad joke! It was basically, they went on the computer and did a word search, and they put together all the codes [?] of people, what people said in the public, and then put this as proof; there was no proof. If want to make a case, you can try and make a case, but make a better case. That Constitutional Court case... I read the whole indictment word for word, and it was not a very serious document. The Turkish Judicial System has always been part of this now Kemalist elite. It's not really a very independent actor; it's not too far away from the Turkish Military command.

The changing environment: I take your point on that; that's why I'm saying on Iraq there has been change, but, look, on Iraq, the previous government prior to AKP, it was Ejoivit [?], and Ejoivit, in many respects, was Saddam's best friend. He tried very hard to... if you look at what he said and if you look at what he did... So, you're right, it's a different ball game, but Baby Assad I don't think is any better than Daddy Assad.

The more important question, that is a very difficult one to answer, is but this: can Turkey play an important role without being a member of the European Union? I don't see any reason; the objective answer to that is, of course, yes. Why not? Would it feel...? There's so much now weighing on Turkey as part of this EU process, that if it's jilted will it become from a [unclear] co-power [?] [cold power ?], will it jump to being a visionist power? There is that possibility.

I think, by and large, the public is so conservative in Turkey; this is what keeps Turkey, essentially, on a certain very stable part, in some respects. There's a great, great, big deal of conservatism in fact. This is not to say whether Turkey should join or not, but the answer, I think, is yes. The more Turkey improves or reforms itself, the bigger role it will play.

There was something that Heather said: this notion of Turkish soft power; I think this is where the Turks are making a mistake, because when you hear Davutoglu speak, they talk about Turkish soft power. Yes, there has been an increase in Turkish soft power, and you can see that in terms of [unclear] drawings [?], pictures on the Arab street, but look at what happened with respect to Iran: if the Turks had come out and said something critical on the immediate [?] actions, that's when they would have had.

HEATHER GRABBE: Huge impact, yes.

HENRI BARKEY: That's when they would have had. It's almost as if, yes, you can hit the Israelis because they are not a very important power, or there are not cultural affinities with Turkey; so that's an easy slap, but you don't have the guts to do it. Look what happened with Sudan and Darfur: where is the outrage on Darfur?

So when you talk about soft power, you can't have soft power if you have, essentially, double standards.

FABRICE POTHIER: So it's soft power, but not applied to hard cases.

HEATHER GRABBE: Yes, very good.

FABRICE POTHIER: Unless there is another comment or question, we need to close, but maybe someone would like to raise a question? Yes?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, to go back to the last point: this is that Turkey could be a regional actor on both fronts [?], without being part of the European Union, but I'm wondering about this; without having the positive [unclear] of the European Union, it will be weaker because of the internal forces in the political field, because what is making Islamists [unclear] it is the will and the positive influence of the European Union; what is preventing the Constitutional Court entering the political field is the European Union once again; the same for the military. So we can go on...

FABRICE POTHIER: This is the first of Carnegie's meetings on Turkey, and we are intending to do more, but to look at Turkey from a strategic point of view, not from a pure process EU point of view. So we will come back to that. I'm sorry, it's just because that's a huge discussion which I should have not triggered, so I apologise.

So let me thank Henri and Heather for their contribution; I think it was very interesting. It's the beginning of a process for Carnegie, not an integration process, but a discussion process. I would like to thank everybody for coming. Thank you.