

Democracy and Human Rights: Policy Allies or Rivals?

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FOR MANY PEOPLE involved in the field of democracy promotion, the relationship between U.S. efforts to promote democracy and to promote human rights abroad is simple—the two areas of activity are two sides of the same coin. This view is based on the assumption that human rights, or more particularly, political and civil rights such as the rights to free expression, free association, freedom of movement, and equality before the law, are defining elements of democracy. It follows from this assumption that *by definition* promoting democracy entails promoting human rights and conversely that promoting human rights is a form of promoting democracy. The persons who subscribe to this view tend to believe that the essential complementarity or even identity of democracy promotion and human rights promotion is self-evident and they are often mystified by the notion that there might be any contrary view.

But there is in fact a contrary view.

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Some members of the U.S. human rights community do not see any natural or inevitable complementarity between U.S. efforts to promote democracy and to promote human rights. These persons tend to be deeply skeptical of U.S. democracy promotion policies and programs. As Aryeh Neier wrote in his previous capacity as executive director of Human Rights Watch, “by and large the human rights movement would prefer not to be associated with a global crusade to promote democracy.”¹ Some members of that movement believe that democracy promotion policies pursued by the U.S. government differ from human rights promotion in fundamental ways, that those policies sometimes involve the forsaking of human rights goals, and that the programs they generate sometimes actually work against human rights.²

This rift between at least some members of the U.S. human rights community and what may be called the U.S. democracy community dates back to the beginning of the current wave of democracy promotion activity, that is, to the early 1980s. It has its origins in the early association of democracy promotion policies with President Ronald Reagan’s fervent anti-communism and his related desire to reverse the Carter administration’s human rights policies. Somewhat surprisingly, the rift has not substantially healed during the intervening years,

despite the evolution of the world away from the Cold War and of U.S. foreign policy away from anticommunism. If anything the rift gained a certain renewed intensity in 1993 with the arrival of the Clinton administration. The new administration is attempting to emphasize both democracy promotion *and* human rights in its foreign policy. The democracy community favors the idea of such a dual approach and sees it as confirmation of the view that promoting democracy and promoting human rights go hand in hand. At least some members of the human rights community, however, are uncomfortable with a dual approach and argue that human rights alone, not democracy promotion, should be the centerpiece of the Clinton administration's foreign policy.

The Clinton administration has not really tried to resolve the rift between the two communities but has proceeded instead on the probably mistaken assumption that the rift will gradually disappear if the administration tries to be all things to all people, that is to say, if it swears equal fidelity to the agenda of each group. In fact, however, the first step toward resolution of this division is not to try to assume it away but to air it thoroughly and submit it to a systematic analysis—analysis that has been notably lacking in the rhetorical salvos and sloganeering that have dominated both sides of the debate to date. This article attempts to identify and analyze the main points of the debate and to suggest various lines of rethinking necessary on both sides if movement toward a middle ground is to occur.

Throughout this article repeated reference is made to "the democracy community" and the "human rights movement," two shorthand concepts that in this context can be defined as follows. The "democracy community"

is a loose amalgam of people who work on democracy assistance programs either at the small but growing set of quasi-governmental and nongovernmental organizations exclusively devoted to promoting democracy abroad,³ or at the very large number of nongovernmental organizations, including many major U.S. universities, foundations, and policy institutes, that have established at least some activities aimed at promoting democracy abroad. The democracy community also includes various academic specialists and policy commentators who publicly advocate democracy promotion. Depending on how one defines the borders of the community, it can also be said to include the growing number of persons in the U.S. government who work on democracy promotion policies and programs, primarily at the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department, and the U.S. Information Agency, but also at the Defense Department and the Justice Department.

The U.S. human rights movement is the semi-organized network of persons in the United States who work in domestic and international human rights organizations,⁴ or who work at development institutes, universities, law firms, or other organizations but devote some significant amount of their time to human rights work. Again, depending on how the borders of the movement are defined, it may also include those persons in the U.S. government who work on human rights issues. The democracy community and the human rights movement overlap somewhat, but are nonetheless identifiably distinct communities. The human rights movement is by no means unified in its view of U.S. government efforts to promote democracy abroad. Some persons in the movement share the view of the

democracy community that there is a very close relationship between U.S. efforts to promote democracy and to promote human rights. Others, however, do not. Although those who are critical of U.S. democracy promotion efforts do not necessarily represent the whole movement, they are an influential and vocal group.

Points of Difference

The democracy community and the human rights movement differ on several specific points. Some are practical, others theoretical. Some concern the value of the U.S. government's democracy promotion efforts; others the question of whether democracy promotion and human rights promotion are closely related endeavors. Five points of difference, constituting a representative but by no means exhaustive list, are examined here.

Law versus Politics. For many in the human rights movement there is a very significant difference in formal status between human rights and democracy: human rights are international legal norms whereas democracy is a political ideology. In their view, U.S. government pressure on a foreign government to improve its human rights behavior is a form of entirely legitimate intervention in the internal affairs of that country because human rights norms are binding under international law on all states. By contrast, they consider that U.S. pressure on a foreign government to become democratic is of questionable legitimacy because democracy is just one of a number of competing political ideologies, not a binding obligation. Democracy promotion by the U.S. government, they hold, constantly runs the risk of veering off into neo-imperialism.

Some members of the democracy community reject the assertion of a law-politics divide between human rights and democracy. They point to a small body of recent international law scholarship in the United States that contends that democracy is in the process of attaining the status of a right under international law.⁵ Other members of the democracy community accept that there is a difference in formal status between human rights and democracy but do not believe the difference is particularly significant. When confronted with the distinction between human rights as law and democracy as ideology, they tend to respond that the U.S. government legitimately promotes, with both positive and negative inducements, numerous policies and principles abroad that do not have the status of international legal norms. Along with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for example, it promotes free market economic principles around the world even though such principles are not international legal norms. The legitimacy of U.S. government efforts to promote democracy abroad is ensured, in the view of many in the democracy community, by their strongly felt but not clearly defined notion that democracy is a universal aspiration and a universal good.

There is no simple resolution of this point of difference between the human rights movement and the democracy community. The human rights movement is certainly justified in being wary of any easy assumptions about the legitimacy of U.S. government efforts to change other countries' political systems. The human rights movement must also, however, be wary of overplaying the law-politics distinction between human rights and democracy. It is true that many human rights have attained the status of in-

ternational law and are therefore binding on all states regardless of the ideological configuration of any particular government. The fact remains, however, that the internationally established set of political and civil rights, and even some of what are considered the fundamental human rights, developed out of and are still intimately linked with liberal democratic ideology. Human rights advocates may believe that a viable distinction can be drawn between the U.S. government on the one hand pressuring another government to respect political and civil rights such as the rights to freedom of expression, thought, association, and movement, equality before the law, due process, and political participation, and on the other hand pressuring another government to move toward liberal democracy. From the point of view of many foreign governments, however, such a distinction is likely to appear formalistic at best.

Human rights advocates should also be cautious about overstating the significance of the distinction between human rights as international legal norms and democracy as political ideology because the boundary between international law and politics is both porous and evolutionary. A major source of international legal norms is the customary practice of nations. Although it is premature to state that democracy is an international legal norm, the active promotion of democracy may over time help engender the practices and beliefs that lead to the emergence of an international right to democracy. Human rights advocates should be particularly aware of this because international law in the human rights field has evolved greatly over the past 50 years and human rights advocacy contributed significantly to that evolution.

The weakness of the democracy community's position on this issue is an overreliance on the rather facile assumption that democracy is a universal aspiration in order to ward off charges of political interventionism or neo-imperialism. The democratic trend has certainly spread to many parts of the globe. In many cases, however, democratic undertakings in previously undemocratic societies appear more to be either pragmatic or desperate experiments rather than expressions of deeply felt aspirations of "the people." Even if it could be said that democracy is clearly a universal aspiration, it would not necessarily follow that external actors such as the United States could automatically assume that they are entitled to interpret for other societies what form democracy should take and to attempt to influence its development in them.

The Relative Urgency of Human Rights versus Democracy. A second point of difference between the human rights movement and the democracy community concerns the relative importance of U.S. government efforts to promote democracy versus its efforts to promote human rights. Some human rights advocates assert that human rights promotion is fundamentally more important than democracy promotion. They argue, for example, that systematic torture or murder by a foreign government should surely command the U.S. government's attention more than should the denial of free and fair elections. The idea of "lower order" and "higher order" rights is sometimes advanced in this vein. Some human rights advocates argue that "lower order" rights such as the right to freedom from torture are building blocks to "higher order" rights, such as the right to political

participation and that these categories should form a natural sequence for U.S. policy.

In response, some members of the democracy community argue that the most dramatic reductions in human rights abuses in different countries during the past 15 years have not occurred because of changes in human rights policies per se. They have occurred, according to this argument, because of transitions to democracy. In Eastern Europe and South America, for example, the human rights situation, although still flawed, has greatly improved since the late 1970s, particularly with respect to gross human rights abuses. In both regions, democracy promotion advocates argue, the primary cause of the improvements is the shift to democracy that has occurred. In their view, efforts by the U.S. government to promote democracy may have less immediate impact on people's well-being than human rights efforts, but may in the longer term have much more wide-reaching and long-lasting impact. Neither side is completely correct in this debate over the relative importance of democracy promotion versus human rights promotion. Some human rights advocates have been overly skeptical of the democratic trend. They have underestimated both the possibility of dramatic democratic change in many parts of the world and the significance of such change for improving human rights conditions. Quick to point to the continuance of serious human rights abuses in some countries that have made transitions to democracy, these human rights advocates have been sometimes too grudging in their acknowledgment of the human rights improvements that democratic transitions have brought. And as a result they underestimate the at least poten-

tial contribution that democracy promotion efforts may make to the human rights objectives of U.S. policy.

At the same time, however, some proponents of democracy promotion have been too quick to move from the observation that in numerous countries democratization has led to significant reduction in human rights abuses to the conclusion that democracy promotion is therefore more essential or important than human rights promotion. In most of the countries that have undergone democratic transitions in recent years, during the generative period of the transitions (generally the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s), the emphasis of external actors was on human rights advocacy rather than democracy promotion per se. Therefore, just as human rights advocates should not overlook the fact that democratization has advanced the cause of human rights in many countries, democracy promotion proponents should not ignore the contribution of human rights advocacy to democratization.

Elections. A third point of difference concerns elections. Human rights advocates are often critical of the U.S. government and the democracy community for placing what they consider undue emphasis on the importance of elections in democratization processes or more simply equating elections with democracy. They argue that elections in transitional societies sometimes do not establish a representative government with genuine authority, that elections sometimes constitute only superficial political maneuvering that leaves underlying antidemocratic forces intact. Human rights abuses often continue even after the transitions from dictatorships to elected governments, they emphasize, and the U.S. government gives too much cre-

dence to the fact of elections while paying too little importance to the continuing human rights problems.

The democracy community, including those parts of the U.S. government that sponsor democracy promotion programs, does put a strong emphasis on elections in transitional situations, for several reasons. First, the community believes that national elections are the best way of concentrating the energies and attention of a society in transition away from nondemocratic rule and toward a broad, participatory act of political self-definition. Second, it views the establishment of an elected government as the keystone of any emerging democratic process. Third, it sees regular elections as the essential method for ensuring the accountability of the leaders of a country.

The critical view of some human rights advocates toward the place of elections in U.S. democracy promotion policies was primarily formed during the 1980s, particularly in reaction to the Reagan administration's policies in Central America. The human rights movement fought bitterly against that administration's dual tendency to proclaim as full-fledged democracies countries such as El Salvador or Guatemala that had held elections but were still controlled by underlying antidemocratic forces and to ignore the continuing human rights abuses in those countries. As discussed in more detail below, however, the U.S. government's cold war habit of using democracy promotion as a rhetorical cover for policies aimed at quite distinct security interests has greatly faded in recent years. And with that change has come a marked reduction in the government's previous tendency to accept a country as democratic merely because it has had elections. The Clinton administration

appears to be interested in promoting democracy abroad as an end in itself and to be aware of the pitfalls of simplistically equating elections with democracy.

Despite this evolution, the democracy community must guard against the tendency to overestimate the significance of elections in transitional societies. Many persons in the democracy community still harbor at least signs of this tendency, not because of an interest in using democracy promotion as a cover for other policy goals, but because of an American habit of conceiving of democracy in procedural rather than substantive terms and of failing to get beyond the most tangible level of political activity in a complex transitional society to the underlying realities of power and tradition.

Strengthening Governing Institutions. A fourth point of difference between the democracy community and the U.S. human rights movement concerns what has been a common feature of U.S. policies to promote democracy—programs that involve assistance to governing institutions in transitional societies aimed at rendering those institutions more effective and more democratic. Some human rights advocates have criticized the general idea of such programs, arguing that they risk strengthening governing institutions that are not generally under democratic control and increasing the capacity of some institutions to enforce nondemocratic practices or to commit human rights abuses. To support this argument, human rights advocates frequently point to police aid programs, particularly U.S. police aid to El Salvador in the 1980s. Such aid, they argue, strengthened politically tainted police forces that were not under the control of the elected Salva-

doran government, thereby associating the U.S. government with human rights abuses and increasing the capacity of those forces to commit such abuses.

Those involved in police aid programs that are part of democracy promotion initiatives respond to such criticisms in two ways. In the first place they distinguish between police aid that is specifically designed as democracy assistance and other police aid programs, such as police aid that is part of antiterrorism or security assistance programs. They acknowledge that those other types of police aid may well conflict with democratic and human rights goals. They insist, however, that the assistance they give is specifically designed not to strengthen existing operational patterns, but rather to train police to commit fewer human rights abuses, both by teaching human rights directly and by training police in investigative techniques that will steer them away from abusive interrogations and other wrongdoing.

Police aid proponents also respond by noting that human rights groups seem to focus only on possible negative effects and never on the positive effects of such programs. These groups, they assert, seem to believe that one wrong committed by the U.S. government outweighs any number of rights. They argue that although police aid aimed at improving the human rights performance of police may entail some risks, the benefits of such assistance greatly outweigh any negative effects. In their view, the choice presented by police aid is that between working directly to try to change the institutions that have been responsible for many wrongs in the past or simply standing back in a critical mode without offering any assistance for change.

A definitive answer to this debate

over democracy-related police aid would involve considerable empirical inquiry into the full range of effects of such aid and is beyond the scope of this article. It is certainly the case that given the troubled history of U.S. efforts to reform military and security forces in various parts of the world throughout this century, the burden of proof regarding the overall positive balance for the recent democratic police aid programs in Central and South America lies with the proponents of such aid. As a general argument against programs aimed at building the institutions of democracy, however, the critical assertions regarding police aid are not especially powerful. It may be that some of the democracy-related police aid of the past 10 years has in El Salvador and several other Latin American countries had some negative human rights effects. Police aid is, however, only a small part of the overall set of U.S. assistance programs aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. There is little evidence that the other forms of institution-building assistance—constitution-writing projects, parliamentary training, judicial training, and the like—entail any broad risk of increasing human rights abuses. The harder question is whether externally sponsored training and reform programs can have any lasting effect at all on poorly functioning parliaments or judicial systems in countries with long histories of non-democratic rule and the absence of the rule of law.

U.S. Funds and Foreign Political Processes. A fifth point of difference concerns the effect of U.S. government funds on foreign political processes. Some human rights advocates are uncomfortable in general with projects funded by the U.S. government that directly involve foreign political pro-

cesses, no matter how pro-democratic the intent. They believe that in many cases local organizations that accept such funds will be contaminated by their link to the U.S. government and unable to maintain any credibility as legitimate democratic political actors. They also hold that U.S. funding of organizations involved in politics and governance will almost inevitably deform the local political process, giving too much weight to some actors and robbing the process of its own internal coherence.

The democracy community contends that with appropriate caution and line-drawing the U.S. government can legitimately carry out assistance projects related to foreign political processes without unduly influencing them. In countries where a non-democratic regime is being challenged by a rising group of pro-democratic political actors, for example, the democracy community believes that U.S. assistance to a wide range of the pro-democratic actors legitimately "levels the playing field" and promotes democracy without preselecting a particular part of the emerging democratic spectrum. In countries that have made a transition from a nondemocratic regime to a democratically elected government, the democracy community holds that assistance both to strengthen the fledgling governing institutions and to foster the broad development of civil society promotes democracy without deforming the process.

There is no easy resolution to this difference of views over the role of U.S. government funds in foreign political processes. The end of the Cold War has made it somewhat easier for the U.S. government to involve itself in political development assistance, although, as noted below, the democracy community sometimes gives too

little attention to the negative legacies of past U.S. involvements in the internal political processes of many countries. And the successful work of organizations funded by the U.S. government, European governments, and Western nongovernmental organizations in the many transitional elections around the world in recent years has given credibility to the idea that external actors can support democratic elections without trying to influence their outcome. Nonetheless, any U.S. government assistance related to foreign political processes is very sensitive and its effects on those processes are likely to be scrutinized and debated by local political actors. The question of what is development versus what is deformation of a local political process is exceedingly complex and cannot be assumed away or answered in anything other than a case-by-case fashion.

Toward a Middle Ground

As the above discussion illustrates, there is no simple resolution of any of these various points of difference between the democracy community and the human rights movement over U.S. government efforts to promote democracy abroad and the relation of such efforts to the promotion of human rights. Nonetheless, in each case a middle ground is at least visible if each side is willing to acknowledge the merit of some of the other side's arguments and avoid ritualistic positioning. In general, some broad rethinking on both sides could make convergence toward a middle ground possible. This middle ground would reject the contending notions that U.S. government democracy promotion and human rights policies are either inherently consistent or sharply at odds. It would hold rather that such policies can and

should enjoy a significant overlap of both methods and goals but that some theoretical and practical differences between them are nonetheless inevitable.

For the human rights movement, three broad lines of rethinking can be suggested. To start with, for some in the human rights movement, U.S. government efforts to promote democracy abroad are still viewed through a cold war lens and are strongly associated with the Reagan administration. The human rights movement formed a deeply negative view of democracy promotion policies in its various battles with the Reagan administration, particularly over the administration's militant anti-Communist policy in Central America. From those experiences, some human rights advocates came to see U.S. democracy promotion policies as self-righteous, rhetorical covers for the pursuit of other interests, particularly anti-Communist security interests. They also grew mistrustful of the U.S. government's apparent tendency to equate elections with democracy and to downplay the human rights violations committed by supposedly democratic allies.

Those policies, that administration, and even significant aspects of that historical period have passed. The human rights movement should leave behind its reflexively negative view and its cold war lens and confront the subject in today's terms and realities. Current U.S. democracy promotion policies and programs are not crafted as rhetorical covers for underlying goals. For the most part the Clinton administration is promoting democracy as an end in itself. Although it asserts that democracy promotion is helpful to U.S. security interests, it does so out of the belief that democracies tend to be more peaceful than nondemocracies rather than out of the habit of

using democracy promotion as a pleasing cover for less publicly presentable security goals. Similarly, the emphasis on elections has faded somewhat in U.S. policy. Although, as discussed above, the habit of overestimating the importance of elections has not disappeared, the Clinton administration does not simplistically equate elections with democracy and focuses much of its democracy-related attention on the need to help countries go from the achievement of an elected government to the consolidation of full-fledged democracy.

Another issue for reconsideration is the general view of some human rights advocates that U.S. democracy promotion is a highly self-centered activity rooted in the United States' habit of trying to transform the world in its own image. It is true that some democracy assistance programs embody too much of this tendency, yet considerable progress has been made in the past few years toward programs that impart a comparative perspective and promote the sharing of information and experiences *between* countries in transition to democracy.

Although an instinct to remake the world in its image has been part of the international outlook of the United States for generations, the current emphasis on democracy promotion cannot be explained—or dismissed—simply as an external manifestation of that reflex. The German political foundations have been carrying out large-scale democracy promotion assistance in many parts of the world for decades. The British government has recently established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, an organization devoted to promoting democracy abroad. The Japanese government and the European Union are both seriously exploring the possibility of creating democracy promotion organizations. A

number of international organizations, including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have established democracy promotion units or election units. Some of the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, are approaching political development assistance through the concept of governance. Democracy assistance today is not so much the product of U.S. self-centeredness as a spreading global practice.

A final point of possible reconsideration by the human rights movement concerns the relationship between democracy assistance and the overall state of relations between developed countries and developing countries. Although developing countries are still quite concerned about preserving their sovereignty and continue to feel aggrieved in many ways about their treatment by developed countries, the anti-imperialist, politically relativistic Third Worldism of the 1960s and 1970s has given way quite dramatically in many parts of the developing world to a hunger for information, knowledge, and skills relating to both the economic and political practices of the developed world. Democracy assistance from the United States and other developed countries and international organizations is not, as some human rights advocates seem to think, unwanted intrusive assistance being forced on reluctant recipients. Rather in many cases it is a hurried and still insufficient response to a powerful demand.

Both the democracy community and the human rights movement need to rethink certain assumptions and approaches in order to achieve conver-

gence on a middle ground. In the first place, the democracy community must beware of a facile universalism in its view of the global democratic trend. Some persons in the democracy movement see other countries primarily in terms of a simple continuum of democracy versus nondemocracy and are satisfied with an almost completely ahistorical and even acultural approach to working in other countries. In the belief that democratization is a universal and therefore easily comprehended phenomenon, they make little effort to bring to their assistance efforts any real understanding of the societies they are working in other than certain barebones information about the current political situation. The result is often shallowness, in both the design of the specific democracy assistance projects and the understanding of their actual effects.

Second, the democracy community should give more due to the human rights movement's strong sensitivity to some of the negative legacies of past U.S. involvements in different parts of the world. Some in the democracy community do not seem to bear in mind that despite increasing demands in many developing countries for Western political and economic cooperation, they retain a deep skepticism about the potential value of any role played by the United States in their domestic affairs. In many countries the United States is still associated with the support of nondemocratic regimes and the use of both covert and coercive means of political influence.

Some persons involved in democracy promotion projects funded by the U.S. government tend to ignore such negative legacies. Others are aware of them but tend to see the policies that caused them as part of the distant past (i.e., pre-1989) and to assume that the

foreigners they are working with will simply accept the idea that the U.S. government's approach to such matters has changed. These negative legacies are not permanent obstacles to democracy promotion. They cannot, however, be ignored or assumed away. They will only be overcome through patient, consistent efforts to gradually replace the repositories of distrust with goodwill.

Third, the democracy community needs to reconsider some of its work methods and here, too, take a page from the human rights movement. The best human rights organizations approach their mission in a manner that is long-term, labor-intensive, and marked by strict adherence to well-defined goals. Democracy assistance organizations would do well to emulate such an approach. They have shown some tendency to pursue short-term projects and to move rapidly from one to the next while drawing little overall connection between them. And as funds for democracy assistance have mushroomed in recent years, the projects generated have started to become more dollar-intensive than labor-intensive. The rapid obligation and disbursement of money has begun to take precedence over careful planning and strategic thinking. Furthermore, most democracy assistance organizations tend to assume that the definition of democracy is self-evident and that therefore the goals of democracy assistance organizations do not require extensive elaboration. The result in many transitional countries has been multiplication of quite disparate projects, all being carried out under the rubric of democracy assistance. The danger is both that the impact will be diffused by weakly focused objectives and that the concept of democracy assistance will become associated with a

wide range of activities of dubious relevance or merit.

A cooperative, productive middle ground between the democracy community and the human rights movement is possible if both sides show a willingness to rethink some of their positions, to move away from the past and to learn from each other. It is important that both sides make the effort to narrow the differences between them. The differences divert the scarce resources and energies of the two groups away from their essential tasks abroad. The differences also weaken the general effort to bolster wavering U.S. public support for a sustained U.S. commitment to helping people in other countries lead better lives. If the Clinton administration wishes to succeed in crafting a coherent foreign policy that combines a bold emphasis on democracy promotion with a vigorous renewal of concern for human rights, it must attempt both to define and seize a middle ground between these two groups. It will do that only if it abandons its apparently instinctive tendency to paper over differences between competing constituencies and present as a seamless whole what is in fact a hesitant alliance. The administration should acknowledge the practical and conceptual tensions that exist between democracy promotion and human rights advocacy and attempt to forge a reconciliation based on the rethinking outlined above. In this way the seemingly natural but not yet existent partnership of democracy and human rights in U.S. policy may become a reality.

Notes

1. Aryeh Neier, "Asia's Unacceptable Standard," *Foreign Policy*, no. 92 (Fall 1993), p. 47.

2. Some of these views are expressed in Holly Burkhalter and Juan Mendez, "Rights, Wrongs, and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Legal Times*, July 19, 1993, pp. 27-28, and Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights in the New World Order," *World Policy Journal* 9 (Spring 1992), pp. 249-277.
3. These include the National Endowment for Democracy and its four core grantees (the International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Free Trade Union Institute, and Center for International Private Enterprise), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the Center for Democracy.
4. These include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the International League for Human Rights.
5. See for example, Thomas Frank, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *American Journal of International Law* 86 (January 1992), pp. 46-91.