CHINA IN THE WORLD PODCAST

Host: Paul Haenle
Guest: Yan Xuetong

Episode 123: Paul Haenle and Yan Xuetong on Devising a New Formula for Global Leadership
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Haenle: Welcome back to the China in the World podcast. This is our third episode in our special series commemorating the five-year anniversary of the podcast. And as listeners of the past two episodes know, we celebrated the fifth anniversary of the podcast this year, and I’m interviewing five of the premier Chinese scholars focusing on international relations in the U.S.-China relationship. For those who missed the first two episodes with Cui Liru, former president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, and also with Wang Jisi, professor Wang Jisi, President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University. I encourage you to go back and listen to these episodes after this. For our third episode in the series today, we’re extremely fortunate to have with me Professor Yan Xuetong at Tsinghua University, where we’re recording the podcast today. Professor Yan is a distinguished professor at Tsinghua University. When I arrived in China in 2010 after joining the Carnegie Endowment, Professor Yan was the dean of the international relations department at Tsinghua, a position he had held for several years. Since then, he has moved on to establish the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua, where he is the founding dean. He’s also the Secretary General of the World Peace Forum, where he’s been a driving force in establishing this effort, which is now China’s premier annual international security dialogue held here at Tsinghua University every year since it was established in 2012. And I remember the keynote speaker of the first year was then-Vice President Xi Jinping. Most important to me, and my colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment and Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, is that Professor Yan was the inspiration on the Chinese side here at Tsinghua University for the establishment of cooperation between Carnegie Endowment and Tsinghua University and has served as a senior advisor to the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for the last nine years, of which we very, very much appreciated the Carnegie Endowment, and has helped to establish this partnership and the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center.

Professor Yan, it’s great to have you on the podcast.

Yan: It’s my pleasure.

Haenle: I want to start by asking you to look back over the last 40 years of the relationship. I mean, even before you were at Tsinghua University, you were also at CICIR for 18 years. And at CICIR, you were doing research on the U.S.-China relationship. So you’ve been looking at this relationship for a long time.

Yan: Yes.

Haenle: What in your mind are the major lessons that we should have learned over the last 40 years of our relationship? It’s important to understand those now, today, as we move forward. Many say we’re in an inflection point now in the U.S-China relationship, so what are the lessons we should have learned over the last 40 years, and how will they inform our approach going forward?
Yan: Well, if we recall the history of last 40 years, I think people will see that the relationship between these two countries cannot remain stable for a very long time, and from the 1980s, and we are semi-allies against the Soviet Union, and then…

Haenle: Right after normalization, of course. And President Reagan’s relationship throughout the 1980s…

Yan: Yeah, if we’re talking about 1978, we have formal diplomatic relations. And then, just 10 years after the Tiananmen events, our relations go down to hell, and then the U.S. set comprehensive sanction on China, and that situation lasted for almost about 10 years until 1997, when the two countries’ leaders met with each other. Well, then the relationship also gained advantage with the EP-3 events in 2001 and also certainly the bombing of Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999.

Haenle: I remember that. I was living in China at the time, working out of the embassy, and I remember the activities there at the embassy; they were throwing stones at our ambassador trapped inside, and that was in ’99. And then as you say, two years later, the EP-3 crisis.

Yan: Yeah, and so now we fell into the trade war. Well, I think because these two countries are so huge, and each of these countries has their own pride, so for these two countries have some troubles is very, very reasonable or understandable. So I think no matter Chinese or Americans should remember that our relationship is not always that desirable, so we have to get used to it and try to learn how to try to handle this kind of up-and-down relations.

Haenle: You know, as you talk about previous incidents that created crises for the U.S.-China relationship, whether it’s EP-3 or the Belgrade embassy bombing, one of the things that I note were sort of one-time, unanticipated incidents. Leaders both in China and the United States at those times decided it was in the best interests of their countries to find ways to resolve those and to continue to improve the relationship over time. What seems different about today’s challenges in the U.S.-China relationship is we’re dealing with a set of structural issues. This is not a one-time incident or some unforeseen incident or inadvertent clash. These are a set of structural issues that we seem to be arguing about, whether it’s, you know, on the economic side or the political side. Do you see the challenges today more difficult than we were presented with previously?

Yan: Well, I agree with your observation about the difference between this time and the difficulty in the trade war and the problems we’ve had and of course we’ve had the EP-3 events and a bombing of the Chinese embassy, and these two events actually only caused short-term damage to the relationship; very soon our relationship resumed. This time, it will be longer. But then, if you compare with the problem after the Tiananmen events in 1989, and I would say this time is not that difficult like in early 1990s. So my understanding is that this time is definitely a long-term
disturbance, and it cannot be resumed within a few years. And, actually, my understanding is there’s some similarities between the current problems and…after the Tiananmen event.

**Haenle:** You know, a lot of the debate in the United States — in fact Kurt Campbell’s article in *Foreign Policy* magazine that, you know, it was great disappointment in the trajectory of U.S.-China relations, the hope or the policy objective as he asserted was that China’s economy would become more market-based, and its political system would become moving towards more democracy — but that didn’t happen. In my discussions with Wang Jisi, he and I talked about it. He discussed a long-standing debate within China about whether or not the state-led development model or the implementation of market reforms and free-market mechanisms were responsible for China’s growth. Which one is responsible for China’s growth? Is it the state-led model or the market reforms? And he asserted that the winner of that debate would influence China’s further willingness to implement the reforms that were announced in 2013 at the third plenum. Looking back, what would you attribute to China’s miraculous growth and development? Is it the state-led development model, or was it the market reforms?

**Yan:** The market reforms. And I don’t think there’s a debate. But I don’t think this debate is real. But then, personally, I don’t think those scholars defending the state enterprises are honest enough. And, actually, they know. And the last 40 years of economic treatment based on the market economy or the private sectors, non-state-owned business. State-owned business — we cannot say they make no contributions, but their contributions are secondary, and very, very secondary.

**Haenle:** You know, 2013, of course, the line in the economic reform plan that caught…

**Yan:** …Well, I can make things like this: We cannot make today’s economic achievements without the private sector. But we can make the same or even bigger economic achievements without state-owned business.

**Haenle:** But the line in the 2013 economic reform plan — the Third Plenum — that caught everyone’s attention was that the market would play the decisive role in allocating resources in China. And there was a lot of enthusiasm in China behind that idea, but what you hear over the last five years is that that has not happened. In fact, it’s gone in the opposite direction. And if, as you say, the major factor contributing to China’s growth and development is the private sector. Will we then begin to see a shift back to what was laid out in the Third Plenum?

**Yan:** Well, that depends on the central government policy. If the government leaves room for the private sector to grow, they will grow very fast. So, my understanding, and in last 40 years, we could not make China so rich without having a private sector. But just because we did not make the country rich enough, especially in last few years, we can no longer keep the economic growth as fast as before. It’s because the state-owned enterprises have taken too many resources.
Haenle: Recently, two Chinese scholars, one from Beijing University, wrote articles suggesting that the main source of tension in the U.S.-China relationship is the fact that China has not moved ahead on its market reforms, and that if China were to move ahead, this would really help get the U.S.-China relationship back on…a more constructive track. Do you agree with that assertion?

Yan: Well, I think that is exaggerated. I think that the number one cause, or the reason, is the reduced capability gap between China and the U.S. If today’s China is as weak as Cambodia, I don’t think the U.S. would adopt their recent policies. And if China’s economy is just Russia-sized, I don’t think Trump would worry about the…trade deficit with China. So I think the number one reason is because the reduced capability gap between these two countries.

Haenle: So the comprehensive national power of the United States and China — the gap is closing.

Yan: Yeah, that’s what we call the “structural contradiction,” or the structural conflicts. And the second factor is what the other…

Haenle: …the economic side.

Yan: Yeah, it’s because China’s policy has become less open than before, and so I think that’s secondary.

Haenle: In the U.S., there’s a lot of talk. The buzzword these days in the U.S., let me say in Washington D.C., is that the U.S.-China relationship is becoming competitive. Competitive is the word. I want to know, I want to get a sense from you whether you agree with that, and if so, what in your mind are the central sources of competition that we’ll be dealing with for the future?

Yan: I think technology. Now, we move into the age of so-called information, no, the knowledge economy. And in the age of the knowledge economy, the wealth generated from inventions, not from natural resources, not from the land, not from the sea, not from the ocean, not from the sky. So from my understanding, and the strategic spots, or the strategic area is no longer these geographical locations. So that’s why — and now you find that it’s impossible to occupy the technology high ground through war. War can help you to occupy these geographical positions but cannot help you to occupy technologically strategic positions. So from my understanding, in the future, the competition between China and the U.S. will heavily focus on technology.

Haenle: In that area, of course, the U.S. has complained about Made in China 2025, which covers many of these frontiers and emerging technologies you’re talking about. There have been efforts in the United States to enhance CFIUS — so to enhance the Chinese investment in the United States in many of these sectors. There’s growing restrictions on export controls. So, there seems to be movement in this area that aligns with what you’re talking about; this is going to be the central
source of competition and friction in the U.S. and China relationship. What are the major implications of that for the U.S.-China relationship moving forward? Because it seems to me, technology is not isolated in one specific sector. Really, the way technology evolves, it’s going to be related to so many, a broad range…

Yan: …Everything, everything!

Haenle: So how does that … it must have huge implications in mind then for the U.S.-China relationship.

Yan: First of all, I think it’s difficult for both sides to delink themselves from each other in terms of technology, and any important technological invention needs to be brought to market — because they want to make a profit from the invention. So, each side has a huge capability to consume this technology. So I doubt anyone can delink these countries’ technology relations. Because each side needs the other side’s market.

Haenle: But you hear this now. I mean, in the United States, where the radical, hardline advisors of President Trump talk about this notion of decoupling…

Yan: No, that’s another aspect. On the one hand, and each side needs the other’s market to consume what they invented. On the other side, each side wants to maintain their superiority in terms of technology over the other side. They prevent the other side from copying what they invented. So, I think the two things will go together. So I think you will find that, both sides — that means both China and the U.S. — they do not control popular technology which is already available to everyone. But meanwhile, they have very tight control about the very sophisticated new invention technology. So the policy will have two sides.

Haenle: And what would that — will we get to a point here where China is selling its technology or its technology is being used in certain parts of the globe, but Western technology is used in other parts of the globe, will we have a bifurcation of sorts? I mean, how do you see that developing over time?

Yan: I think that there’s a competition. And both sides have to compete for the market to consume what they invented. And so, meanwhile, they have to compete who can do better inventions than the other sides. So, these two things go together. So if any sides adopt the policy that ok, let’s stop any technology connection with the other side, that policy will ruin their own country rather than the other side.

Haenle: I tend to agree with you. I think that this technology issue is very central in the U.S.-China competitive space, and areas that will create tension. But Vice President Pence’s speech at the Hudson Institute last month, and his remarks when he was out in the region for ASEAN and
the East Asian Summit and the APEC summits went beyond that. He criticized China’s actions in
the South China Sea, criticized the Belt and Road Initiative. Let’s focus for a second on the South
China Sea, the growing rivalry in the Asia-Pacific between the U.S. and China. How significant is
this in terms of a central source of competition and potential confrontation?

Yan: First of all, I don’t think either China or the U.S. needs oil or the reserves in that region. And
so, I don’t think these two giants have really any…

Haenle: Not clear how much there is anyways, right?

Yan: Yeah, I don’t think that either of them have any interest — have economic interest — in that
region. So that means the competition between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea is for
political purposes or the so-called strategic purposes. Now the strategic purpose is not related to
the specific economic interests but related to the political influence. So this political struggle or
political competition is not economic competition, not for material interests, but for the political
influence. So I think they will continue, but not that dangerous because the either side knows that
there’s no substantial things, and just for a kind of international status.

Haenle: Let me tell you something I worry about and get your reaction. You know, when you
think about the Belgrade embassy bombing, or you think about the EP-3 incident, I often think to
myself, you know, what if something like that were to happen in today’s environment. With China
more stronger than it was, frankly, back 17 and 19 years ago? Just last month, a U.S. warship, the
U.S.S. Decatur, came within 45 meters of a Chinese warship. And I worry about an inadvertent
collision and our ability to control the, you know, the fact that that could get out of control, and the
situation could escalate. Do you think we are in danger there? And do we have the crisis
management mechanisms to deal with something like that?

Yan: Well, I think these kinds of accidents are not welcome. No one likes them. But then I think
that both sides already know how to manage this kind of a crisis. And I don’t think this kind of
crisis will cause a real war between these two countries. And the U.S. has experience in how to
deal with these kinds of military conflicts with the Soviet Union during Cold War. And I think
China also learned from these two previous events. And so, my understanding of that … maybe,
there’s some kind of a major conflicts will occur in the South China Sea, but I don’t think they will
bring about a war between these two countries.

Haenle: Vice President Pence said also was very critical of China’s Belt and Road Initiative when
he was in Asia recently. How will the Belt and Road play out in your mind with regard to the U.S.-
China relationship? Is this going to be a source of friction, competition, confrontation … how do
you see it?
Yan: Well, obviously, currently, this One Belt One Road has already caused Americans to become suspicious of China’s international expansion. So concerning the bilateral relationship, it’s obvious it’s negative, not positive.

Haenle: There’s a debate here in China that I hear among Chinese experts that China has shifted too quickly from *tao guang yang hui*’s low-profile international approach to a much more assertive and, you know … an approach that’s captured the attention of the international community in just a few short years. Do you think that China has shifted too quickly from … ?

Yan: No, I think that people misunderstand the situation. It’s not that China shifted too quick; it’s China’s — the shift — has gone too far. And the problem is not the direction; the problem is the degree. That means that China should replace the keeping low-profile strategy with the striving for achievement, but this kind of striving achievement policy —

Haenle: This is your *suo zuo wei*.

Yan: And this *suo zuo wei* should be constrained within the Chinese, the surrounding area, and my understanding is that it has gone too far. And if the One Belt One Road is only an initiative with the neighbors, the situation would be totally different.

Haenle: Belt and Road covers almost, pretty much the whole globe now!

Yan: Exactly!

Haenle: It’s been expanding and expanding; it covers the Antarctic, I think!

Yan: So it’s not China. It’s nice to shift from the keeping low-profile to the striving for achievement. But I think the shift is right. The mistake is that they have gone too far. And they should focus on the neighbors, surrounding areas, but unfortunately, they go to global areas, and even to South Africa, and Latin America, Europe. It’s gone too far.

Haenle: I want to talk a little bit about the global arena, and the area of global governance, and the international order. I find it very interesting; this summer, I saw an interview you did for *Reference News* where you discuss the rise of China and the substantial changes to the global, political, and economic systems as a result of China’s rise. And you asserted in that interview that going forward, you think no country will want to bear the cost of global governance and the preservation of the international order, and that we could possibly see in the future a situation where there is no global leader. Can you talk a little bit about that, and, obviously, what are the implications for the U.S.-China relationship?
Yan: Well, I think the *Foreign Affairs*, the next issue of *Foreign Affairs* will possibly publish my latest article on the international order. My understanding is that…

Haenle: We can get a preview of it on the China in the World Podcast.

Yan: Yes, and I think the, actually, the Trump administration has a very clear policy and rejects international leadership and international responsibility for leading global governance. And for the Chinese government, no matter the will the Chinese government has, and China does not have that resources to provide that kind of leadership. So that’s why, when the U.S. does not want to, and China has no capability to, and then that means there’s no world leader, no global leadership to guide the global governance in the next at least five years, maybe a decade. So, without leadership, I don’t think that global governance will move anywhere.

Haenle: This “America First” policy of President Trump, which I agree with you, President Trump seems very inclined to abandon the traditional role of American leadership roles in the international political order. He may be in office for two more years, he may be in office for six more years. We see another change of administration in the United States. Is it possible in your view that we could go back to…?

Yan: No matter Trump stay in the office for two more years or six more years, I think the impact is already there. And Trump set up a model to take care of yourself and take less care about the rest of the world. And then, I think more and more countries will follow suit. And the question is not whether it’s good or bad; the question is that and more and more countries will feel that’s the right thing to do. And if you look at the current turmoil in France, and people blame Macron’s government for spending too much energy on international issues, too little energy on their domestic issues. I think in China that’s the same, the people want the government to spend more efforts on the domestic issues rather than international affairs. So I think this new trend is not only the occurring in the U.S. It’s just that Trump has taken the leading role and set up a model, and then, that model is being followed in more and more countries.

Haenle: You know, in the United States, since the end of…World War II, the notion that the U.S. should play a leadership role. There has been bipartisan consensus, both Democrats and Republicans, have something to agree on. And you think this is not unique to Trump. You think that whoever comes into office may carry elements of it with, maybe not all, the whole package, but…

Yan: …My personal prediction — even if the Democrats win the election, two years later, and I don’t think they will change the general trend. And America has bipartisan agreements to take leadership over the world. It’s based on America’s absolute capability. That means American capability; it’s so huge, it’s much larger than the other countries’. And now, I think more and more American people said that they no longer have that kind of capability, the work has become too
heavy, and work becomes too big. It’s beyond America’s capability to lead the world. And now, then, you find that more and more countries will become pragmatic. The question is not whether we should provide leadership for the world. The question is whether we have the capability to provide leadership for the world.

**Haenle:** So as we think about the lessons learned over the last 40 years, as we think about the central sources of growing competition, and in some cases confrontation between the U.S. and China, the friction, and we think about the changes at the global level that you’ve just talked about. As we take all of that into account, and we begin to think about updating the framework for the U.S.-China relationship, what are the key considerations in your mind that should inform this approach?

**Yan:** The key consideration is that how much China and the U.S. can provide joint leadership for the world. Just like the Germany and the France to provide joint leadership for the Europe. And by now, personally, I don’t think China and the U.S. will organize a G2 … And so that’s the problem, and now, when both sides realize and none of them can provide unilateral leadership, then they must work together to provide joint leadership. Unfortunately, I cannot see any possibility for these two countries to work in that direction. For instance, if you look at the reality, you find that East Asia is the growing area, and that it’s becoming richer and richer, and very possibly will become the center of wealth of the world. But this region has the very poor, maybe the poorest regional population. Even poorer than the regional population than in Africa. Let alone compared with Europe or North America. Why? Because this region… no major power can provide leadership for regional cooperation — neither U.S., China, or Japan. And unfortunately, these three guys do not want to work together to provide joint leadership. China and Japan cannot work together.

**Haenle:** It’s a daunting task to provide joint leadership in the current environment, when the U.S.-China relationship is growing more competitive, there’s more friction in the relationship. In fact, the Singapore leader said in the ASEAN meeting, on the margins of the ASEAN meeting that it’s possible at some point — countries in Asia are going to have to choose between the United States or China.

**Yan:** They’re forced! I don’t think that they have other choices.

**Haenle:** So as we go forward in the U.S.-China relationship, I want to talk about something Henry Kissinger mentioned. He was here recently. He was at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore, and then he came here to Beijing, and he met with President Xi, and Wang Qishan, and Liu He. And when he was in Singapore, he talked in his open, public remarks, he talked about the speaking that the U.S. and China need to speak openly to each other about red lines, and where red lines are as a way to avoid conflict. Given that, what he said, where do you see the red lines on the Chinese side that the U.S. needs to.
Yan: I think neither side has a red line in their mind. But then, there’s already an objective red line, and for both sides to agree — and that means nuclear weapons. And nuclear weapons have already drawn a red line between these two countries, and I don’t think any of them dare to cross that red line. So I do not worry about the danger of war between China and the U.S., I think nuclear weapons can prevent these two guys from falling into war. But then, nuclear weapons cannot keep these two countries from falling into non-nuclear or non-military confrontations. Look at the trade war. There were no trade wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, so the trade war is so unique. Actually, it means that this is a new type of confrontation, a new form of strategic competition between the major powers. And so we have to learn how to deal with competition in different way from the Cold War. Nowadays, too many people want to use the Cold War as an analogy to understand the reality. I think they can never understand the reality with that approach.

Haenle: My final question is a question I asked Professor Cui Liru and Professor Wang Jisi as part of the podcast. I was at a conference in Washington D.C. recently, put on by Brookings and the Yale-China Center, very good conference. At the very end, they had a panel with the China experts (you know all of them), and they asked one question, and they debated this question, and it is: Are the U.S. and Chinese interests fundamentally incompatible? And I want to end by asking you your perspective on that question.

Yan: Well, I think if China becomes as strong as U.S., as competitive as U.S., that will be in the fundamental interest of the Chinese. But the question is that, how can we make China…to be like that? I think too many people suppose the main threats or dangers, or pressures, for China’s rise are external factors, and mainly caused by Trump’s policy. I hold a very different view from that. Trump did cause some troubles for China’s rise, but that’s not fundamental. That’s very, very secondary, and I think the fundamental problems we are facing today and in the future are domestic factors, it’s domestic policies. For instance, how much can we admit the private sector is more important than the state-owned sector. How much can we admit that leftist policies, leftist principles will cause damage to this country, bring trouble to this country, hurt our national interests, than the red lines? And so, how do we admit that? We have to make this country open rather than closed. And we must make the country more open, and we will make the country stronger. And the more closed off we are, the more we will make the country weaker. So I think the main obstacles are domestic issues, not external ones.

Haenle: It’s interesting to hear you say that. I mean, one of the things that I’ve noticed lately is several Chinese friends quietly say to me, the Trump administration should keep the pressure on China because it’s actually good for China in pushing forward these needed reforms. Does that surprise you, that kind of…
**Yan:** Well, I think that some people may hope this kind of pressure makes China, forces China to adopt a right strategy to deal with — that’s understandable. But I don’t think Trump’s pressure can really force this government to adjust its policy. And the external factors are not that strong. And including America’s pressure, this country is already so huge, and economy is already two-thirds the size of the U.S. economy, you cannot expect foreign factors to change government policy. What I understand is that our own problem, and if we cannot keep our economy growing fast enough, if we cannot keep the unemployment down, if we cannot increase the pace of technological innovation, that’s our problem. So these kind of issues, and… the stagnation of social development will be a major factor for the government to adjust. And maybe foreigners didn’t realize that very recently, our leader held a meeting to commemorate Liu Shaoqi, the former president, and from my understanding this speech emphasized two things: first, the leftist idea that caused a lot of trouble for Liu Shaoqi, and the leftist ideas that brought a lot of disasters to China, especially the Cultural Revolution; and the second, that Liu Shaoqi is a model for admitting mistakes and adjusting — correct — the mistakes, so that means that we should learn, and the leader has already called on the people to learn from Liu Shaoqi. What we learn: first, fight against leftist ideas; and second, admit to mistakes, and correct our mistakes, not the mistakes made before, it’s mistakes we made today.

**Haenle:** The two presidents will be meeting this weekend. How important is this meeting, and what kind of outcome do you expect?

**Yan:** Well first of all, I don’t think it’s important. And, well, we made a prediction about the result of Trump’s state visit to China last year. And we predicted that Trump’s visit to China could maintain the stability of our bilateral relationship for 21 days. And actually, it only maintained it for only 20 days. And 20 days after he left China, and U.S. formally announced that it rejected the idea of giving China market status, market economy status. And so this time, my prediction is that the influence, or the impact, or the positive impact of this summit and the coming summit, will be shorter than the last time — fewer than 21 days. And so, that’s why, personally, I feel, and the summit plays — in general, in the whole world — the summit plays a less and less important role in international politics. Look at the APEC. At APEC, they could not even reach a very hollow communiqué. The communiqué issued by APEC is very hollow. There’s nothing in it. And now, even this kind of hollow communiqué cannot be reached. So what does it mean? It means that the leaders, no matter if the leaders met with each other or not, their roles are less important now.

**Haenle:** Well, I will forward you my article that I wrote. I agree with you; I think we need to lower expectations. A lot of folks think this can be a silver bullet, meeting can solve all our problems. And that, of course, is not possible.

**Yan:** Yeah, not only lower our expectations for the kind of summit at the G20. I think we should lower our expectations for any summit. Summits, from my understanding, are more costly. And in
terms of comparing the costs and benefits, I think the whole world wastes our resources for this kind of diplomacy.

**Haenle:** And this one, of course, is not even a summit. It’s a meeting on the margins of a multilateral meeting, which is even less significant.

**Yan:** These 20 countries’ leaders spent their own money, the people’s money, to have a meeting there. I don’t think they can achieve anything. What’s difference for them to have meetings there and for them to stay at home? Maybe a minor difference…not very much. So if you ask what I suggest, I would encourage their leaders to not have these kind of meetings. They can save a lot of their resources for something more important than summits.

**Haenle:** Well, thank you very much, Yan. It’s been a pleasure talking to you this morning. Thank you for joining the China in the World Podcast — especially for our special series of five of the top international relations experts, which everyone I talk to puts you in that category as well as I. And thank you very much, and thanks for your support to the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center.

**Yan:** Thank you, thank you very much.

**Haenle:** That’s it for this edition of the Carnegie-Tsinghua China in the World podcast. I encourage you to explore our site and see the work of all of our scholars at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center. Thank you for listening; be sure to tune in next time.