Host: Paul Haenle
Guest: Xie Tao

Episode 149: US-China Relations 2020:
Coronavirus and Elections
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Welcome to the China in the World podcast series of discussions, examining China's foreign policy and shifting engagement with the world, brought to you by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing and hosted by Paul Haenle.

**Paul Haenle:** Welcome back to the China in the World podcast. I hope our listeners are staying safe and healthy during this difficult and uncertain time. Today I'm glad to welcome Dr. Xie Tao back to the China in the World podcast. Xie Tao is the Dean of the School of International Relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University. We the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center are pleased that Dr. Xie Tao has been a strong contributor to the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center over the past 10 years. He's been an active participant in our Center's programming and scholarship. Xie Tao's research focus includes US politics, US China relations, and Chinese foreign policy. He received his PhD in political science from Northwestern University in Chicago. And he's the author of US-China relations-China Policy on Capitol Hill, and also Living with the Dragon - How the American Public Views the Rise of China. Xie Tao has published dozens of articles and prominent Chinese and English journals. And he's a frequent guest on prominent Chinese and international media. Xie Tao, thank you very much for joining us for the China in the World podcast.

**Xie Tao:** Oh, thank you, Paul, for having me.

**Paul Haenle:** Now, you're joining us from Beijing. I want to just first ask how you've been doing these past few months, given the situation with COVID-19 and China. What's the situation like on the ground there? I think our listeners would be interested in knowing. Are things getting back to normal?

**Xie Tao:** Yeah, Paul, you know, yeah, I've been doing rather—very—well. We are in Beijing. And so, because of this outbreak of the virus, I have not travelled outside Beijing since late January. That is the couple of days before the Chinese Lunar New Year. Since the lockdown in Wuhan, you know, the whole country has basically been on the kind of emergency situation. So, we began to wear face masks anywhere we go. So, I think for about a month and a half, I did not even venture outside my campus. And then starting around late February, if I remember correctly, some of these restrictions were loosened a little bit. So, I began to take my two kids out to some of these parks in the outskirts of Beijing. And occasionally, we would go to the Summer Palace and some of these parks around. Now, I would say the situation's getting much better, with a few hotspots in the eastern part of Beijing. I live in the western part of Beijing. You can see the traffic is getting back to normal, but not as busy as it used to be. We can now travel around and some of these restaurants are open. So, we can go in, but you have to sit just one person per one table. You have to keep proper distance. So, in general, you know, things are beginning to look very good right now.
Paul Haenle: I saw you mentioned the eastern side of Beijing. That's, of course, where I live. I'm in the US now, but in the Chaoyang district where I live, I noticed there were reports this week about an outbreak there that raised the level there to the highest level in Beijing – in China actually, across China. There's been outbreaks in Guangzhou, also in Heilongjiang province up in the north, along the border with Russia. Are these concerns that you read about, of a second wave in China, a resurgence of the virus in China? Are they, in your view, quite serious? And what's the government doing to prevent that?

Xie Tao: Yes, absolutely right, Paul. On the eastern part of Beijing, and there are reports about you know, several new imported cases that people travel from outside China and they got in. Somehow originally, they were tested negative, but then somehow the tested positive.

Paul Haenle: Even after a 14-day quarantine.

Xie Tao: Even after a 14-day quarantine. So, this raises obviously a question of technology. So, does this technology really work in detecting people who are already infected with COVID-19? In Guangzhou, I think that it's also imported cases. So, the Chinese government does appear to be extremely concerned about a resurgence or second wave of COVID-19. After all, we spent more than a month and a half locking down nearly every part of China. Right. That's a huge cost. So, in the rest of the country, it's just beginning to reopen its economy, people are going back to work. So, if you have a resurgence, that could, you know, get many of these things back to the old situation of lockdown, and that could create chaos that will delay this reopening of the economy. So, you're right. The Chinese government is indeed very concerned about this.

Paul Haenle: Well, we noticed that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress will meet at the end of this month. And perhaps we'll hear an announcement of the rescheduling of the National People's Congress, the two meetings, 两会, at the end of that meeting, and I think that would be pretty significant. But let's turn to an issue that you and I watch pretty carefully. And that is the U.S.-China relationship. Many of our listeners who heard the most recent episode with Evan Feigenbaum know that the US-China relationship is in a pretty bad place. And that is the U.S.-China relationship. Many of our listeners who heard the most recent episode with Evan Feigenbaum know that the US-China relationship is in a pretty bad place. And it appears that there's little indication it’ll get better anytime soon. Speaking on a virtual panel hosted by Bloomberg New Economy forum this week, the former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd described the relationship in a tactical pause of hostilities, but he also argued that, strategically, the US-China relationship is in a state of fundamental disrepair. The Chinese ambassador in the US, Cui Tiankai, followed up on that same panel, followed up Kevin Rudd by saying there's a need to "rethink the very foundations of US-China leadership.” So, a long way of saying and asking you, how do you currently assess the relationship between the US and China? And does it surprise you or does it concern you that we haven't really been able to set aside our growing antagonism to cooperate more on dealing with COVID-19, which is now a global pandemic, and is affecting huge parts of the globe?
**Xie Tao:** I largely agree with the assessment by Kevin Rudd and other experts in the United States and in China. That is, the bilateral relationship is arguably at its lowest point since 1972. Some of my colleagues disagreed with me, but I would still insist that this is, you know, apparently a very low point for US-China relationship. I was actually surprised for the sudden change of winds between the two countries at the very beginning when the outbreak happened in Wuhan. I thought this would have been an opportunity for the United States to show its support, provide some help to China. And then with those, you know, those tweets from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, and then remarks by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and some other Republican senators, and this situation began to really deteriorate. So, there's really kind of a war of words. You know, who is to blame, and somebody is going to sue the Chinese government. So, I was expecting that this is COVID-19 would be an opportunity for non-political cooperation—that is medical or purely technological. But it turned out like you said, this is making the two counties getting into even worse political arguments against each other. You know, accusations, conspiracy theories. So, I feel very bad about the trends of the relationship.

**Paul Haenle:** Yeah. And we recall, of course, there were times in the relationship and the history—in the beginning of the Bush administration, for example, where we were moving towards a more hostile relationship, 9/11 took place and we managed to sort of rise above that and find ways to work together, cooperate. In the global financial crisis, of course, in 2008, you know, I mentioned that President Bush's first phone call was to the Chinese president. So, these transnational issues are issues where both an official channel and an unofficial sort of track two channels—we've always agreed between the US and China that global pandemics is one of those issues where you set aside your differences to deal with the problem at hand. And we haven't been able to do that. You published an article in the Diplomat last week, entitled “How the West Failed the Rest in the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Now, I found an interesting that in your piece, you note that in international politics, as in domestic politics, the law of expectations often matters more than objective indicators of power. Can you explain to our listeners what you mean by this and how this concept has played out for both the US and China in the case of the global pandemic that we're dealing with today?

**Xie Tao:** In that article, Paul, my basic argument is that, you know, for at least a half a decade, the West, led by the United States, has been a vital provider of global prosperity and peace, right? So, it's kind of playing a global leadership role. And there were widespread expectations that because the United States and its allies are economically so powerful, and so they should contribute to international public goods. However, in the COVID-19, you get a strong perception, at least you look at Chinese media and some non-American media in Europe, in Africa—that the United States, the Trump administration seem to be more concerned about deflecting attention away from its own crisis management to blaming China. Also, the Trump administration appeared to be kind of caught off guard by this whole thing. Even though China was waging this unprecedented war against the virus for nearly two months, the United States should have plenty of time to brace itself for similar public health crisis, right? So, my argument is that United States was expected to
be very well prepared and otherwise expected to play a leadership role in coordinating
governments around the world and international organizations such as the WHO to fight against
the global pandemic. However, the performance of the Trump administration comes across as
below international expectations. And so, when your performance is below expectations, your
legitimacy and authority suffer. Now by contrast, even though at the very beginning the Chinese
government also had a learning curve, but they decided to lock down Wuhan. And after that, the
Chinese government comes across as pretty swift, decisive and especially when the situation
stabilized in Wuhan, the Chinese government began to provide the medical supplies to countries in
need around the world. And so, China's performance, I would argue, it's actually above the
expectations from many countries. And in that sense, China's authority and international
legitimacy has been bolstered.

Paul Haenle: You mentioned in the piece, this decision to lock down Wuhan made by the Chinese
leadership is the single most important decision in the global fight against COVID-19, and I think
in your piece you mentioned that this action prevented more than 700,000 lives in China from
being infected. In internet, many international observers, in fact, have praised Chinese actions in
the mitigation and containment phase, being bold and aggressive. There's a report out of the
University of Southampton in the UK that says, “without China's testing, quarantine, travel
restrictions, the number infected in China could have been almost 70 times larger.” Now the
situation in China seems to be more stabilized, another indication that these efforts have been
successful. So, the US and other countries now are in the midst of this containment and mitigation
phase, which China seems to have moved out of. What lessons do you believe the US and other
countries should take from China's experience in this phase where you have mentioned China did
well – this mitigation and containment phase, after the initial early phase where you say China was
on a learning curve?

Xie Tao: Yeah, Paul, I think the most valuable lesson from the Chinese experience is that you do
have to enforce very strict stay at home rules and mandatory requirements for people to wear
masks. And to keep proper social distancing. I know some of these similar rules were also
announced and enforced in countries outside China. But my sense is that because of very different
political cultures, and people's view of what is individual freedom, many of these rules seem not to
have been strictly enforced. And so, you see in the United States, there are sporadic and small-
scale protests against these stay at home orders in Michigan, Virginia, and New York, right? So, I
think my own sense is that maybe because of political and cultural differences, people outside
China tend not to follow these orders as seriously and voluntarily as the Chinese do. But I think
these are very important because wearing masks, staying at home, and so you keep your contact
with the outside world at a minimum, that does reduce the chances of you transmitting your own
virus to other people or getting yourself infected by other people. I think that's perhaps the most
valuable lesson from China. That I think, you know, should work in other countries too.
Paul: You know, you've talked about the fact that the Trump administration seems to be caught off guard and its performance in dealing with coronavirus in the US has been below international expectations. In your article you mentioned the Trump administration did not take adequate precautionary steps early enough to effectively mitigate the spread of the virus in the US. I think a lot of Americans, frankly, including myself, would agree with you. And say this criticism represents a pretty fair assessment. You hear these kinds of critiques, frankly, from many in the United States, many Americans. Now at the same time, there's also been a good deal of debate in the US and throughout the international community, about what you described as the very beginning, the learning curve that China had in the very beginning. There are allegations that Chinese officials covered up the outbreak for several weeks for political reasons, maybe economic reasons, concerns about transparency, and integrity of the data. That same University of Southampton, the same study, said that if Beijing had intervened more forcefully in January, instead of waiting until February, the global spread could have been reduced by upwards of 95%. Are these kinds of critiques in your view, fair, and what lessons can be drawn? You know, I asked you about lessons to be drawn from the mitigation and containment phase. What are the lessons that we should draw from the very beginning, the early initial response, Chinese response to the virus?

Xie Tao: This is obviously a very controversial point between the two governments, as well as between some of these socially active or social media activists in both the United States and China. People say there's a lack of transparency, things could have been done more decisively, more aggressively. Like I said in the article, any country facing a situation like this, you know, this is kind of unprecedented situation hasn’t occurred in the past 100 years, you would have a learning curve. I remember at the very beginning, there were also reports that some American doctors thought that this was just similar to, you know, a flu, and not very much different from that. And in fact, some of these patients have who died of flu posthumously tested positive for COVID-19. So, in other words, every government, United States or Germany or UK, when faced a similar public crisis, it took them some time in to learn. One example is that at the very beginning, some scientists said that there is no human to human transmission. But then people corrected this, saying, actually the virus could mutate, and it will learn to adapt and develops the ability to transmit from one person to another. Again, this is science. This is medicine. We are not experts. So, I would really hope that you know, these social media activists and some of these politicians, they could just shut up a little bit and allow scientists at the CDC and their counterparts in China to work out, to work together, and to find out and give a scientifically substantiated conclusion about this.

Paul Haenle: It's interesting. Some of this critique is coming from outside the US as well. I noticed that Germany's largest newspaper had an article billing $130 billion for damages to China on the German economy and French President Macron said it's naive to say China handled the coronavirus well. Is it surprising to you that this this is not just in the US-China you know, channels where right now, the world relationship is filled with antagonism, but you're also seeing
similar responses from Germany, France and even the UK, where the UK announced they would drop Huawei as a 5G provider over concerns about Chinese lack of transparency? What I mean, does this catch you off guard, why do you assess that you're seeing these kinds of reactions? And from what parts of the world are you seeing more positive responses?

**Xie Tao:** Okay, Paul, this is becoming extremely concerning to me, as well as to a number of my colleagues. You just mentioned in Germany, in France, in the UK, and you have probably also come across pretty bad media coverage in Africa too. And so, some people are saying China could face a very unfavorable diplomatic environment in the post to COVID-19 era. I actually don't know why this is the case. At least here you look at the Chinese government, spokespersons' remarks and the Chinese government's actions like sending out these medical supplies around the world, you should think that China's international image should be improved by what it did. Whereas the reality is that there are increasingly critical voices against China. So, I still need to figure out why this is the case. You know, even if we did not do something properly in the early stages, let's say even if, but we, after that, you know, we have been acting very swiftly, aggressively. And like you said, I cited this scientific research, which claims that the lockdown of Wuhan has prevented more than 700,000 people from being infected. So, these are very effective measures, right? So, I don't know why the international public opinion or government are turning against China. To many Chinese, this comes across as unfair. It's kind of like shifting blame from your own domestic troubles to the Chinese government and the Chinese people.

**Paul Haenle:** You know, you've talked about this new feature that we're seeing where China has really, you know, stepped up and has been very active in providing, internationally, in providing medical equipment and assistance and expertise to other countries that are now struggling to curtail the virus, to contain the virus. We saw China providing Italy with masks, ventilators, respirators, suits, other protective equipment, sending medical teams to Iran, supplies to Serbia, even providing 20,000 test kits and a hundred thousand masks to each of Africa's 54 countries. And President Xi and the premier seemed to be on the phone, you know, daily, talking to leaders around the world. Can you talk a little bit about this? Is this a new feature, in your view being put forward by the Chinese in this particular case? And, you know, what's the intent behind this? And how are countries responding to this outreach?

**Xie Tao:** Well, Paul, I think you know, what you just mentioned about Chinese leaders on the phone with their foreign counterparts, and China is on a very quick mission to send out these medical teams and medical supplies, shows that we are committed to fighting this global pandemic. Even though we are doing relatively well right now, with the situation stabilized, we want to help other people. But why is this the case that the more you do, the more you go out and reach out to people who do need this help, the more you actually get kind of backlash? That's a question for Chinese leaders, for Chinese analysts, people like me – what has gone wrong? Let me tell you this. You know, there's actually some speculation, I say speculation, or maybe you would call this you know, conspiracy theory. Some people say it's because the Trump administration is
whipping up, you know, this kind of anti-China sentiment, trying to use its political influence in Europe and in some other parts of the world to form a kind of a united front against China. So, this is I call this speculation or conspiracy. I personally don't believe this, but this is a question for us, absolutely.

**Paul Haenle:** And when you say backlash, so international outreach efforts and assistant efforts by China getting a backlash, are you referring to, you know, criticism that China's attempts are part of some effort to shift the narrative away from early missteps or from being the source of the virus to, you know, a more positive narrative, that there's a skeptical view that there's an agenda to this or to maybe China has aims to gain geopolitically or in terms of its soft power? What's the kind of backlash that you're describing that China's getting?

**Xie Tao:** So, when I say backlash, I mean, what you just described, right? With the Germans and the British and the French, they're saying, you know, China should be held responsible for this outbreak. And again, like I said, well, this is an unprecedented global health crisis. And at the very beginning, the Chinese government was caught off guard, just like any government around the world. And we actually had a very short learning curve. Now, I can make a very strong argument that the Donald Trump administration had at least two months of learning from the Chinese experience, but they didn't learn actually, proactively learn from this. So, like I said, my question is that, why the Chinese government, which has been doing much better than many governments around the world in controlling the spread of the virus within its own borders, as well as providing international aid, is now being criticized for its initial responses, and now there's a particular term that is getting very popular in the Western media. It's called disinformation. It's called the disinformation campaign. I actually don't know why you call this a disinformation campaign. Every government, I think, has its own logic of foreign policy and its own decision-making procedures. And so, if you just put, single out to China, as you know, the reason for this pandemic, I think that's quite unfair, to be honest.

**Paul Haenle:** I think a lot of it stems from what we heard from the deputy foreign minister spokesman, that the virus may have been brought to China by the US Army, as an example of a disinformation campaign – in that even though a lot of people immediately cast it out as, you know, conspiracy theory or part of a disinformation campaign, it still muddies the water. And it makes it, you know, there are countries that seem to accept it. Iran, for example, Russia, they like this and they peddle it in their countries too. And, you know, as a former US Army officer, I took exception to it myself. And I think, you know, that really, I think, got the attention of many in the United States. And glad to see that, you know, after the two presidents talked, we don't hear President Trump calling it the Chinese virus or Secretary of State Pompeo calling it the Wuhan virus. And we've seen less of this effort to point to the US Army – although I think it seems like it's already out there. If you ask Chinese citizens whether or not the US brought the virus to China, what's your sense of how many would say that's a strong possibility?
Xie Tao: No, at least people around me, when this first got circulated on Chinese social media, many people asked me. I said, Look, if the United States had done this deliberately, then why would the Donald Trump administration appear to be so unprepared for this, right? That's just one way to reject your hypothesis or conspiracy. Now, Americans, if they know this virus is deadly, and they deliberately bring this over to China, obviously Americans would have a solution to this. So, they'd have all this protective gear, and they would probably have issued some internal warnings – we have sent out somebody to contaminate the Chinese population. It does not make sense. So, I think, like you said, that tweet later, actually, the person backtracked a little bit. And then you look at the interview of the Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai, where he basically said, “I know that's a view of my colleague, but I am the ambassador of China to the United States, so I represent the Chinese government's view.” And he did not embrace that those views about the virus.

Paul Haenle: So, you believe that he really distanced himself from the comments from the Foreign Ministry spokesman...

Xie Tao: Even that same person, I think, you know, you if you look at his tweets, he kind of backtracked a little bit. I think that's good. And it’s also good that you mentioned, President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo began to stop using the word “Chinese virus” or “Wuhan virus.” Yeah, I think both sides kind of backtracked a little bit.

Paul Haenle: Now, in looking at the US-China relationship, it seems clear to me that issues that have been difficult and contentious in the relationship prior to the coronavirus, the global pandemic – the South China Sea, for example, Taiwan, Hong Kong – those remain as difficult as ever to resolve. There's also some growing concern in the US and we hear the possibility that some in China may see strategic opportunities to consolidate objectives around those issues while the US and the West are focused on dealing with the global pandemic. I wanted to get your sense of how this is playing out in China. So, for example, at a time when there appears to be a view in China that the US military may be stretched thin by the coronavirus crisis, you know, we saw the sinking of the Vietnamese fishing vessel by the Chinese Coast Guard. We see more frequent military exercises by China around Taiwan. And I even have heard from Chinese experts that some more nationalistic articles in China have raised the prospect of whether this might be a good time to complete the unification of Taiwan, while the world is occupied and dealing with coronavirus.

As you and I have talked about, we don't have robust official communications between our two governments that we had in the Bush and Obama administrations. And that raises the risk, in my view, of misunderstanding and miscalculation. So, I really want to understand from you, you know, are we seeing these kind of policy changes on these issues from China? Help us understand what's happening on these issues and how they're viewed in China.

Xie Tao: I would say, some of these issues you mentioned, Paul, like the Chinese dispute with the Vietnamese fishing boats in the South China Sea recently, and some, you know, because of this
Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress. So, people are saying that the United States is actually using this to push a more pro-Taiwan policy and that Taiwanese politicians are also taking advantage of this, for example, the WHO. So, there are indeed, I have to admit, that there are increasing calls for Chinese government to adopt more nationalistic policies, more hawkish foreign policy, but that's more at the social media level. I do not see that the Chinese government has adopted a concrete policy towards, for example, the so called maneuvering of COVID-19 for its own geopolitical advantage. For Chinese leaders, if you read the most recent couple of Politburo meeting communiqués, you will notice that the number one priority for the Chinese leadership – and I would presume this is also on the top agenda of President Donald Trump and President Macron – is to restore the economy, to get jobs for people. It's not really on the top of the agenda for the Chinese leadership, at least the way you look at the Politburo meetings.

**Paul: Haenle** It's interesting, the coronavirus, the negative impact on economies around the globe may in fact, from positive standpoint, make governments less assertive on other issues, as they're focused on getting their economies moving. I've heard that as well. I want to come to a close here, but I want to ask you a couple questions about US domestic politics before I do that. I know this is your area, one of your areas of expertise. Just days before President Trump assumed office in January of 2017, you wrote a piece for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, and it was called Assessing the China Challenge for Trump's Presidency. You predicted a very bumpy road ahead. Now, if you can recall that article, looking back on that piece, I wonder whether you have a sense of what parts of your prediction ended up coming true and what did you miss or get wrong?

**Xie Tao:** Oh, that's an excellent question, Paul. I need to pull out of my article and refresh my memory. But like I said in the article, so the road ahead will be quite bumpy. So now if you ask me if there's any correction I would like to make, I would probably say I underestimated the bumpiness of the road ahead. I knew that the Trump administration would probably adopt a very different approach to China, compared with that adopted by President Obama and President George W. Bush, but I did not really expect him to have this 18 month trade war, and plus, especially, his highly critical stance against China, even after his, I would say, pretty well-performed state visit to China. So, I would say probably I underestimated the grim prospects of the relationship.

**Paul Haenle:** Yeah. So, we're, as you know, we're nearing another round of a US presidential election this November. China is already shaping up to be to potentially be a bigger issue than in any previous US election in modern times. Over the past week, both the Trump campaign and Biden campaign have released ads condemning the other for their relationship with China saying the other side, you know, their competitor had been too soft in dealing with Beijing. So, there's a, you know, an effort to try to be tougher on Beijing than the other. Do you expect the rhetoric on China in the campaign to be worse than previous years? And who do you think most Chinese would prefer to see in office next January? Would they prefer to see President Trump because of the damage that he does to America internationally, in terms of its reputation and its alliances? Or
do you think the Chinese would prefer to see Joe Biden as president? How do the Chinese see the advantages and disadvantages of both?

Xie Tao: I agree with you, Paul. This is a probably going to be the worst presidential campaign for China in so far as US-China relationship is concerned. The last time you had, 1992, remember, this was after 1989. That was a difficult time. But nevertheless, China was not really a terribly big issue. And fast forward, I think the most recent time is 2016, when Trump as a candidate was ripping China for taking advantage of America, is ripping America, right, this trade deals, etc. But this time, you look you look at the rhetoric, I get you a lot of this, you know – for example, there's the headline from the Center for American Progress. “Trump’s Coronavirus Survival Strategy Blames China.” Another one, “Trump's Anti-Chinese Racist Campaign Strategy Mobilizes Right Wing Extremists.” Another one from New York Times, “A Key GOP Strategy: Blame China.” So, I agree with you that this looks like the worst year in terms of presidential campaign rhetoric bashing China. This could be worse than 2016. Now you ask me between Joe Biden and Donald Trump, who is preferred. My own sense is that you look at this, of course, this is not official Chinese government has ever said this. But I look at some of this comments and op-eds in Chinese media, you get a sense that people prefer Joe Biden to Donald Trump, at least among the analysts and pundits. I think they have good reasons because Biden so far, even though he's forced to say something not so favorable about China, but his rhetoric is much less critical, much less confrontational when compared to with Donald Trump and his associates.

Paul Haenle: Well, it'll be interesting. The Biden campaign has come out with a tough ad on Trump saying that he's too soft on China and that Biden would be much tougher. And so, you know, we will see over the course of this campaign how it plays out, and maybe we'll come back to you to see if you'd like to write an article again for your predictions after the election in November. But I really appreciate you taking time out to talk with me on the China in the World podcast and I know our listeners will appreciate hearing your views, perspectives and insights. So, thank you very much.

Xie Tao: Thank you. Thank you, Paul, for having me again, and stay healthy and safe.

Paul Haenle: You, too. Keep your family safe and healthy and look forward to seeing you in Beijing at some point soon.

Thank you for listening to the China in the World podcast. For more episodes and research, please go to carnegietsinghua.org. This episode was produced by Lucas Tcheyan, with assistance from Ethan Paul, Bernie Xu, and Duannong Yu.