

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT  
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**“CHINA’S OLYMPIAN CHALLENGE: CAN BEIJING DELIVER ON  
ITS PROMISES?”**

**PANEL I: 9:00 – 10:30 A.M.  
HUMAN RIGHTS, MEDIA FREEDOM AND AIR QUALITY:  
IS BEIJING READY?**

**WELCOME AND MODERATOR:**

MINXIN PEI,  
SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND CHINA PROGRAM DIRECTOR  
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**SPEAKERS:**

SHARON HOM,  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

RANDY WILBER,  
SENIOR SPORT PHYSIOLOGIST,  
U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

BOB DIETZ,  
ASIA PROGRAM COORDINATOR,  
THE COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS

**THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2007**

*Transcript by:  
Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.*

MINXIN PEI: Good morning. I'm Minxin Pei, the director of the China Program. I'm one of the organizers of this event. I have received help from many people, especially Sharon Hom. Even though she is listed only as a speaker, she should be given a lot of credit for thinking through the issues and helping me pick the speakers. I also want to thank Josh Kurlantzick, my friend and colleague, who recommended many of the speakers today.

Now, China, as we all know, will hold the Olympics in about 10 months' time. This is, as they say, history's biggest coming-out party for a country, especially a country of 1.3 billion people. But the challenge is enormous. In bidding for the Games, China has made explicit and implicit promises, and 10 months before the Games are supposed to start, I think we should take stock to see where China is, what the challenges are for China. We could not have a better panel than this one.

Sharon Hom from Human Rights in China, and one of the most, in my book, knowledgeable observers of human rights conditions in China. I recommend the publication of "Human rights in China: China Rights Forum," which is very objective, detailed analysis of human rights development in China.

Then to my immediately left is Randy Wilber, who is a specialist on air quality. I don't know the exact title, but he of all of the people I have contacted, knows the conditions on the ground and in the air in Beijing better than anybody I can think of. He just got back from China, so he has first-hand information on how the air in China is, how good, or how bad, and whether it will be a serious problem for the Games in August next year.

Then the last speaker will be Bob Dietz, who is from the Committee to Protect Journalists, and their report, "Falling Short," is really a very thorough, carefully documented study on the issue of press freedom in China. And I think press freedom is one of the key ingredients for making a successful Olympics game. So Bob will focus on the issue of press freedom in the context of the Olympic Games.

So each speaker will have around 15 minutes, and we will have time for questions after their presentations. So Sharon will start.

SHARON HOM: Good morning, and thank you, Minxin, for that very generous kind introduction and plug for the journal. I have the challenging lead-off task--what I will focus on are the Beijing promises, reference recent positive developments, and highlight some key human rights issues. I will leave to Randy and Bob's presentations to cover in greater detail the media press freedom and the environmental issues, but I of course will touch on them because they are absolutely part of the human rights challenges that China is grappling with at the moment. But first let me make two general observations:

The title of our panel, “Can Beijing Deliver on its Promises?” uses the verb “can” which raises the issues of possibility or likelihood of delivery. . Certainly there is a great deal of official effort currently on trying to deliver or at least presenting to the world these efforts. In the final count-down to 2008, recent media op-eds and public discussions, have invoked past Olympiads-- Tokyo (1964), Seoul (1988), Mexico City (1988)-- both as examples of significant improvements in human rights or raising of international status for past host cities that also presented human rights concerns. In Mexico City, the military opened fired on student demonstrators 10 days before the opening of the Games. Seoul was not exactly the bastion of democracy at the time, and for Tokyo the Olympics was its big international coming-out party. So these past Olympic Games have been invoked as precedents that, yes, the Olympics can be a lever for greater opening, democratization, political reforms, and greater integration into the international community.

However, on balance –I don’t think these are really good precedents. To state the obvious--China is not Mexico, Japan, or South Korea. China and the IOC also protest that the Olympics are not about politics, but about sports, despite the fact that the history of the Olympic Games reflect not only past politicization of the games, but also the ways in which the games were absolutely not able to isolate itself from the challenges of the times, whether it was Nazi Germany, or the social unrest of each respective host country,– the games were always located culturally, historically, and politically. So the real question facing the IOC -- since we don’t choose the times we find ourselves in-- is what it will do with this time and the challenges of 2008

Secondly, the Olympics promises as far as we can understand from what’s been disclosed, are complex and technical, particularly in the environmental area, (e.g. includes air quality standards and benchmarks). So it may be more accurate to pose the question as to what extent China delivers on its Olympics promises, measured along a range, as a scale, and as part of an ongoing process of meeting China’s international obligations such as trade, environment, and human rights obligations as a member of the international community. So how and whether China is meeting those obligations, remain challenges.

These are also questions and issues which will not be resolved by 2008. However, the time frame for addressing these questions is now, yet must also look beyond 2008. As we look ahead, what will be the legal and technology platforms left behind? What reforms will be lasting, what will not be sustainable? Even with a sunset date like the regulations for foreign journalists, is there a way that these can bootstrapped beyond the Olympics, and secondly, moving away from double standards and extending it to domestic journalists and media as well.

There are real costs to the answer to this question of whether China delivers, is delivering, or can deliver on its Olympics promises. There are real costs, something like \$35 to \$40 billion that is being spent on infrastructure and environmental improvements, costs for the specific venues. There are also human investments – in many cases for the

athletes, lifetimes of preparation for this opportunity to come home with the Olympics gold.

There are also political and social costs, that is, even if, or especially if China actually delivers on all of these promises which were set forth in their bid to host the Games. Ironically, if Beijing actually delivers on its promises for example, related to media access, richer content and greater access to the Internet, the Chinese authorities would actually face political costs of having their social and political control weakened by this greater information flow.

#### Selection of and obligations of a host city—

It's very difficult to be selected as a host city. Beijing didn't succeed on its first bid. The process is a very complex bureaucratic process, particularly after the Salt Lake City scandal that exposed massive corruption and bribery in the bidding process with millions of dollars in some cases were given as gifts, travel, scholarships, vacations, and other kinds of perks to IOC members. After the Salt Lake City scandal, the IOC implemented new bid procedures aimed at introducing greater transparency and accountability back into the Olympics movement and specifically into the host city selection. An Ethics Commission, was also established, but currently appears to be focused on doping, anti-doping, and some conflicts of interest cases. There was at least one human rights complaint filed—a petition alleging torture of one of the Olympic team athletes by Iraq.

Interested cities express interest in hosting by first applying to be an applicant city. The candidate cities are selected from these applicant cities. Candidate cities are required to make presentations to the IOC Executive Board, submit a candidature file, and host an IOC site visit. One of five candidate cities-- Osaka, Paris, Toronto, and Istanbul—Beijing was selected at the IOC session in Moscow in 2001. Throughout the process, in its applicant city file, the full candidature file, oral presentation, and finally, most importantly, in the detailed, technical, host-city contract, Beijing made specific commitments it would honor if selected as the host city.

However, getting a copy of the host city contract is quite difficult. HRIC sent a letter, in September 2007, requesting disclosure of the host city contract. We pointed out that in light of the IOC's concerns about managing "reasonable expectations," greater transparency, assessing progress, it's very hard to assess reasonable expectations and progress if the key document that lays out the legal obligations in each of the respective areas of technology, social and economic development, the environment, and a free and open Olympics, is not made public.

To give you some sense of how this is so out of synch with recent developments, since the Salt Lake City scandal in 1998, all the Olympic host cities-- Salt Lake City, Nagano, Sydney-- though not required to, have all, made publicly available their host city contracts in the interest of greater transparency. Even London (2012 Host City), has made their city contract publicly available. So the one city that has not made its contract publicly available is Beijing.

With less than one year remaining, it is very difficult to do a really full assessment of the compliance or the implementation of the host city promises since we don't have the city contract. What we do have, however, is the Beijing Action Plan (March 2002) prepared and issued by the Beijing, which can reasonably be assumed to reflect its bid and candidature file.

The Beijing Olympic Action Plan lays out the overall guidelines and plan for the preparations of the Olympics shaped by the idea of "New Beijing, Great Olympics" with emphasis on "Green Olympics," "High Tech Olympics," and "People's Olympics" as the key to successful Games. The 2002 Olympic Action Plan, also includes specific standards, such as technical environmental standards, to which Beijing would hold itself accountable in governance and construction of venues and increasing social and economic development.

The high-tech cluster references enhancing information services and making them available to all, "enriching content," and access to the Internet. Both the Olympic Charter and the candidature application require clear commitments that there will be no obstacles to journalists covering the Olympics. So under the rubric of a free and open Olympics, full access by journalists must be respected. So those are the promises: people's Olympics, green Olympics, high-tech Olympics, and a free and open Olympics.

#### Recent developments and human rights issues

The fairly substantial investment in Olympics preparation and infrastructure can be viewed positively, in the sense that resources have been deployed to address some of the environmental problems. However, the infrastructure investment in Beijing and to a more limited extent Qingdao, for the sailing events, will not really benefit the vast majority of China's people, who are not living in those urban coastal areas or even those two cities.

Secondly, there has been some improvement and positive developments with respect to expanded access by foreign journalists. Yet, as I'm sure Bob will talk about, the actual access has not been as open. The foreign journalists based in Beijing have recently conducted a survey of their own colleagues, documenting numerous incidents where foreign journalists, despite the regulations, have encountered obstacles in their reporting activities.

Third, in the area of criminal justice, there have been death penalty reforms announced, including the reversion of the review of all death penalty decisions to the Supreme People's Court. Under the 2007 rhetoric of killing fewer, killing more cautious. The state media is reporting a decrease in executions; however that's difficult to assess since national statistics on death penalty executions are classified at the highest level under the State Secrets system

So it's hard for us to say whether has been a decrease if the benchmark numbers and current statistics are classified. There is some interesting speculation that since state media is claiming a decrease, that means there's going to be some pressure to actually

release the high numbers from the past precisely so they can say, there's been a decrease now.

There have been strengthened environmental efforts, which I'm sure Randy will also talk about, including increased spending, introduction of economic incentives and punishments, introduction of environmental impact assessments, and fines. But there remains major implementation difficulties.

The other inter-related human rights problem is a cluster of information control, surveillance, censorship, and crackdown on media and press freedom. This cluster of human rights challenges goes to the heart of both our understanding of the human rights situation and also hampers both China and the international community's efforts to develop an accurate analysis and assessment as well as sustainable, effective solutions.

We cannot develop solutions without information. HRIC released this past June a major report, *State Secrets: China's Legal Labyrinth*.. It's over 288 pages, so I won't recap it for you here, but it's available on our website – [www.hrichina.org](http://www.hrichina.org). We are also now producing short briefing pieces from the report targeted at helping different audiences understand the implications for them-- HRIC recently presented a briefing in Brussels and focused on the EU-China human rights dialogue benchmarks and linked these to specific examples of classified information. Our presentation underscored one reason the dialogue is not getting enough traction-- the types of information necessary to address, assess, or evaluate any progress—are classified.

One interesting note—on June 12, the morning that the HRIC State Secrets report was launched—at the weekly press briefing for foreign journalists, the Chinese ministry of Foreign Affairs official was asked for this comment on the report. He responds by challenging whether there was any country in the world that did not have state secrets. Our report addresses this clearly: every country has state secrets and national security concerns and laws. The real question is, what is the regulatory structure? Is it accountable? Are there procedural protections? Is there an independent functioning judiciary to review decisions?.

Information control is at the heart of all the other problems, including the lack of accountability and transparency in governance. This is particularly important as we talk today, because next week is the opening of the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. And as you can see already, the tightening of control, the roundups, the crackdowns on lawyers, on journalists, on petitioners, on activists, on grassroots activists, all of this is intensifying. and is not a good sign. Yet, the official tightening of control in the lead-up to the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress must be juggled with efforts to present an open and welcoming face to the international community in the final one-year count-down to the Olympics. Yet, it must maintain domestic, social and political control because that's the key imperative.

And that's what I meant by political costs. If the Olympics host promises – especially a free and open Olympic or People's Olympics--are even partially fulfilled, one of the social and political costs for the party will be a loosening of control. If there is

open media access, greater information flow, this fuels the very networks, the civil society groups that are forming-- the organized development that the authorities fear the most --that's why the crackdowns are intensifying—to send a chilling message to those who mobilize and organize—beyond individual expression or action. The ongoing crackdown on Falun Gong is a good example.

So one of the social and political costs of delivering on all its Olympics promises, actually, could be viewed by the authorities as quite damaging to their maintaining political control.

Finally, China's problems, the problems that China is grappling with are going to be and in fact, are, the region and the world's problems. The most recent high profile consumer cases including everything from toothpaste, pet food, seafood, toys (made by Mattel and Toys "R" Us), et cetera, illustrate one important point: The lack of transparency and accountability will affect the rest of the world. Pei Minxin has written an excellent op-ed piece looking at the damage to the made-in-China label.

Corruption, lack of transparency, and this whole mentality driven by market greed—is this marketization with Chinese characteristics? These systemic and structural weaknesses are also impacting China's ability to be the kind of international leader it wants to be and that it needs to be.

Let me end by sharing some of the critical voices growing inside China that we have presented in the most recent issue of our journal—*China Rights Forum* that focused on the Olympics. With the fanning of strong nationalism, when China decided to bid again to host the Games, you didn't hear any loud public voices of criticism. That is not the situation now. The domestic protests and criticisms of the Olympics are growing. In June 2007, over 10,000 people, mostly farmers in Fujin City, Heilongjiang Province, signed a petition titled "We want human rights, not the Olympics.

In August 2007, more than 40 mainland activists and intellectuals signed an open letter - addressed to Chinese leaders and the international community - called "'One World, One Dream' and Universal Human Rights," proposing measures to end human rights abuses and calling for the release of prisoners of conscience before the Olympics. An anonymous blogger set up a blog in August on Bullog, a popular discussion site, called "Beijing Olympics: I don't support it." The blog received lots of supporting comments and criticism about the lack of public discussion over the Olympics. It was later revealed that the anonymous poster was Chinese *Sports Illustrated* reporter and Sohu and Sina blogger Guan Jun (aka Gua Erjia) who said he started the blog "to let the outside world know that China does not only just have one voice." His blog was shut down

An Internet essay in 2004 entitled "Beware of the Gold Medal Ruse," argued that the shocking figure for the 'cost' of a single gold medal was 700 million *yuan* (\$87million). The author based his figures on the annual budget of China's General Administration of Sports and the number of gold medals won by the Chinese team in Athens. Although his figures and methodology may be questionable, official

figures still revealed astounding expenditures in the face of other pressing social needs.

Ai Weiwei, the Chinese artist who worked with the Swiss architects Herzog and de Meuron, who designed the Olympic stadium, has now said publicly, I want nothing to do with Olympic propaganda, and he's attacked the "disgusting political conditions in the one-party state." So there are growing critical voices. We hope that the Chinese authorities will listen to the voices of its own people that are raising serious, important issues. Responding to these issues in a transparent, effective way will be good for the country, will be good for these issues, and will be good for the Olympics. Thanks.

MINXIN PEI: Thank you very much, Sharon. Randy?

RANDY WILBER: And do we have a laser pointer, too? That's okay. I'll get started.

MINXIN PEI: We don't. We're low tech.

MR. WILBER: That's okay. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for being here. I want to thank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for your kind invitation to be here, and particularly to Minxin, and also to Doris for all of her help in logistics, and getting me here in Washington, D.C., this morning.

A little bit of background about myself: I'm out of Colorado Springs, United States Olympic Training Center, I've been there for 15 years. We're located at the base of Pike's Peak (14, 115 ft). Colorado Springs is about 6200 feet in elevation. I'm trained as an environmental exercise physiologist. Essentially, anything that has to do with altitude, heat, humidity, cold, air pollution, jet lag and its effect on Olympic athletic performance, I'm very involved with.

I've been given the daunting task of first, assessing what we're up against in Beijing in terms of heat, humidity, and air pollution, and second, and more important, to help prepare Team USA athletes to compete in such challenging environmental conditions.. So my outline today will cover these topics: first, a quick tour of Beijing. I know most of you have been there at some time, but relative to where the Olympic venues are, I'll briefly go over that. Then, I will speak a little bit about heat and humidity. Most of my presentation will focus on the topic of air pollution in Beijing. I doubt that I will have time during my presentation to speak about strategies that we have implemented for Team USA athletes to deal effectively with heat, humidity, and air pollution. However, hopefully during the Q&A and discussion, I can come back to those and highlight a few.

This map shows the three main Chinese cities where the Olympics will be contested. First, Beijing, with a population of between 13 and 15 million people, depending on which source you read. Beijing is located on the north China plain, at a latitude that is very similar to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Down the east coast is Qingdao, where the sailing events will be contested. In Qingdao, the primary

environmental issue may be water impurity, as opposed to air pollution. Further down the east coast is Hong Kong, and due to quarantine issues, the equestrian events will be held there instead of Beijing.

This satellite image shows the topography of Beijing and surrounding area quite well. The central city itself is relatively low, located at about 180 ft (55 m) in elevation. And it is flat as a table. As you move north outside of the city, you get into an area of foothills around the Ming Tombs and Great Wall. Essentially you have the topography of an inverted U. It's a very similar topography to Los Angeles and that comes into play in the summer when the winds are primarily out of the south, blowing the pollution up against the northern hills and thus trapping it within central Beijing.

Using the Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square as a reference point, I'll quickly take you around Beijing and show you where the Olympic venues are. The heart of the Olympics will be in the northern part of the city, in the Olympic Green area. And here, you can see an artist's rendering of that area with the unique "Bird Nest" Olympic Stadium on your right, which will be the site of Opening and Closing Ceremonies, as well as track and field. The cube-shaped structure to the left is where the swimming events will be contested. Then moving north will be venues for gymnastics and several other major Olympic sports that you can see highlighted here in yellow text. In the top left of this artist's rendition of the Olympic Green area is the location of the Olympic Village, which will be very close to a large "green space" comprised of parks and acres of trees, shown here at the top of the slide.

Moving across Beijing in a counter-clockwise direction from the Olympic Green, we have the University District, where several of the indoor Olympic sports will be contested, including the ones that you see here such as wrestling and volleyball.

Moving all the way to the western part of Beijing is the Western District, which is a heavily industrialized area where air pollution is relatively high. The Western District will host outdoor Olympic events, primarily. All of the cycling events will be held here, as well as baseball, softball, and the indoor venue for basketball.

Moving eastward, we have the Eastern District, which includes both the "original/old" embassy zone, as well as the "new" embassy zone. The Eastern District will host a mix of indoor and outdoor Olympic events.

Way outside the city (at the very top of this slide), you can see the Northern Outlying venues. Just north of Beijing National Airport is the Shunyi Canoe and Rowing venue. It will also serve as the venue for a new Olympic event, 10-km open water swim, and event that can be described as a "swimming marathon", taking about two hours to complete. Directly north of the Olympic Green is the area of the Ming Tombs where triathlon will be contested. You see a picture of the Ming Tombs Reservoir in this slide. The triathlon swim event will be contested there. For both of these natural water venues, water purity may be an issue. We have recently completed a thorough analysis of the surface water at the Shunyi Basin and Ming Tombs Reservoir.

Finally, the last venue I'd like to show is the marathon course. With the information we have at present from BOCOG, the start of the marathon will be in Tiananmen Square and will loop south through the Tiantan Park area and then wind through the city streets north to the University District, where it will then turn eastward and head toward the Olympic Stadium for the finish.

Transitioning now to the topic of heat and humidity in summertime Beijing. I'll preface this section by mentioning that the Olympic Games will be contested from August 8-24, and the Paralympic Games will be contested from September 6-17.

This slide shows historical data for heat and humidity in Beijing during August 1951 to 2006. I'd like you to focus your attention on the data shown in red. You can see that the average maximal temperature in Beijing in August is typically in the mid 80s Fahrenheit, but it may soar as high as 101 degrees Fahrenheit.

However, I think the key environmental characteristic in terms of Beijing's heat and humidity pattern is what you see in the third highlighted panel --- relative humidity. In comparison, Athens 2004 was hotter; it was typically in the mid to upper 90s, but it was a dry Mediterranean climate pattern where the relative humidity was in the 30% to 40% range. The message I'm sending American athletes now is, don't get so wrapped up in air pollution that you forget about heat and humidity. And I can guarantee you that many athletes, even African athletes, will come unprepared for the heat and humidity conditions. This will be especially evident in the endurance-based events like the marathon. Hopefully, Team USA athletes will be prepared to compete well in the heat and humidity. We are working hard to ensure that.

This slide shows the "heat index". For those of you not familiar with the heat index, it is simply an objective method for showing the combined effect of heat and humidity on human health and performance. It is a similar concept to the "wind chill factor", except that it applies to heat and humidity. Across the top x-axis is "relative humidity" and down the left y-axis is "ambient air temperature". For any given combination of heat and humidity, we have a heat index value. For example, a typical day in Beijing (temperature in the mid-80s, relative humidity near 80%), it will "feel like" 95 degrees Fahrenheit, as shown in the small black box here. Using the scale on the right, you can see that a heat index of 95 degrees Fahrenheit puts an ordinary person in a zone that requires "caution" when engaging in exercise. For an elite athlete trying to win an Olympic medal, you can assume that the same heat index would put them into an "extreme caution" zone. In summary, I believe that heat and humidity will be as big a factor, maybe a bigger factor, than air pollution in affecting endurance performance during the Beijing Olympics.

Transitioning now to our main topic --- air pollution and its effects on athletic performance. The next four slides don't really need a description. I will preface these four images by saying that I took them over a four-day period in late August 2006 (August 21-24) at the same time of day, approximately 7:00 AM.

The first of the four images shown here is what I saw from my hotel room at 7:00 AM on Monday 21 August. In several trips to Beijing, I had never seen these hills located to the north outside the city. The previous day was Sunday, and we had a steady, gentle breeze move through the area and sweep a lot of the air pollution out of Beijing. Also, there was a bit less automobile congestion in the city on Sunday.

As you can see in this second slide shot on Tuesday 22 August, the air pollution had built up to the point where you have lost the northern hills as a visual reference point, and now you must use the little orange building in the foreground as a reference. The third slide shot on Wednesday 23 August shows significantly more air pollution. This third slide represents, in my opinion, what a typical day is like in Beijing based on several trips I have taken there over the past two years. The fourth slide was taken on Thursday 24 August. You can see that the air pollution is so thick that you can no longer see the little orange building that previously served as our visual reference point.

This slide shows one of the instruments I used to measure air quality on several previous trips to Beijing. You can also see the five primary pollutants that were measured: carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen dioxide (NO<sub>2</sub>), sulphur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), ozone (O<sub>3</sub>), and particulate matter less than 10 microns (PM<sub>10</sub>). As a reference, a single human hair is approximately 75 microns, so PM<sub>10</sub> includes relatively small particles of dust that get deep into the airways and lungs. I'll go through each of these five major pollutants in the next several slides, identifying the primary sources of each pollutant, as well as their impact on health and athletic performance.

First, we will look at CO. The primary source of CO is automobile exhaust. You've probably aware of the exponential increase in automobile ownership in Beijing over the past few years and simultaneous exponential increase in automobile exhaust. In this slide, you can see an image of the traffic you would expect to see on Ring Road throughout most of the day. You can see that it's almost bumper-to-bumper across several lanes. Also, you can see that there are no large, tractor-trailer trucks driving on Ring Road 3. The reason is that large trucks are restricted from driving in Beijing during the normal day and may only enter the city limits between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM. Trucks are restricted for two reasons. First, to reduce vehicular emission of CO. Second, to prevent gridlock. Unfortunately, because the trucks are allowed into the city at night, the buildup of CO remains relatively constant and prevents overnight dissipation.

The major health/performance impact of CO, as I think you know, is that it competes with oxygen binding to hemoglobin and reduces oxy-hemoglobin saturation, and in excessive amounts is lethal. This slide shows CO data that I collected in central Beijing with the help of some colleagues at the USOC as well as US government sources. I'll describe the format of the slide because the other four pollutants I present will be shown using the same format. This bar graph shows CO data collected during the third week in August and the second week in September. The red bar shows the CO level for Beijing quantified based on an 8-hr average. The blue bar shows the CO level for Athens (2003-2004) and the yellow bar shows the CO level for Los Angeles (2006). Finally, the

hatched black line serves as a reference and shows the US EPA air quality standard (AQS) for CO for an 8-hr average.

This slide shows NO<sub>2</sub> data. The primary sources of NO<sub>2</sub> are automobile and coal-fueled power plants. Beijing gets approximately 75% to 80% of its electrical power from coal-fueled power plants. In comparison, a typical United States city gets 20% to 25% percent of its electrical energy from coal-fueled power plants. So you can see that coal-fueled power plants serve as a significant source of NO<sub>2</sub> in Beijing. The primary health/performance impact of NO<sub>2</sub> is on the lungs. Inhalation of NO<sub>2</sub> induces airway hyper-responsiveness (AHR), bronchial constriction, and is a major trigger of asthma and exercise-induced asthma (EIA). Studies done in our lab have consistently shown that 25% to 30% of US Olympic athletes experience EIA, both winter and summer sports. So you can see that high levels of NO<sub>2</sub> have the potential to have a negative impact on athletic performance during the Olympics.

This slide shows SO<sub>2</sub> data. The primary sources of SO<sub>2</sub> are petrochemical refineries and coal-fueled power plants. Like NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub> affects the lungs by inducing AHR, asthmatic responses and EIA. In addition, it also serves as a major eye irritant. This could have a negative impact on performance in sports such as shooting or archery that don't involve a lot of physical expenditure, but certainly require clear and accurate vision.

This slide shows O<sub>3</sub> data. Ozone is technically a "secondary" pollutant that is synthesized from the combination of CO, NO<sub>2</sub> and O<sub>2</sub> in the presence of bright sunlight. I'll next refer you to the small figure I have up in the upper right. If you follow the hatched line, you can see the O<sub>3</sub> pattern during a typical winter day in a US city. You can see how that pattern changes dramatically in the summer when the period of bright sunlight is longer and hotter. So we can expect to see the latter pattern in Beijing in August and September 2008. Ozone, similar to many of the other pollutants, affects pulmonary function primarily, and is a major trigger of asthma and EIA.

This slide shows PM<sub>10</sub> data. As I mentioned earlier, a single human hair is approximately 75 microns in diameter. So in the case of PM<sub>10</sub>, we're talking about very small particles of dust that are coming primarily from industrial plants, smokestacks and also the extensive construction that is taking place in Beijing. I have read a factoid that stated the city of Beijing has more construction floor space than the entire continent of Europe. And I've also been told – I don't know if it's true – that half of the world's construction cranes (like the one shown here in the upper right) are located somewhere in China. The health/performance impact of PM<sub>10</sub> is, once again, primarily on the pulmonary system. In this slide we see the effect of different particle sizes on different levels of the pulmonary system. Starting at the top, particulate matter on the order of 5-10 microns will affect the nasopharyngeal region, producing inflammation and congestion. Next, particulate matter on the order of 3-5 microns will penetrate deeper into the trachea and the bronchioles, producing congestion, bronchoconstriction and bronchitis. Finally, particulate matter on the order of 0.5-3 microns may penetrate all the

way to the level of the alveoli (where oxygen is transferred to hemoglobin), leading to congestion and bronchitis.

In addition to smokestacks and construction, another source of PM in Beijing comes from the dust storms that originate in the Gobi Desert and Mongolian Steppe region, located to the west and northwest of Beijing. This slide is a satellite image showing the effect of a dust storm on Beijing. Research suggests that, due to deforestation and overgrazing, the Gobi Desert is “creeping” eastward toward Beijing at a rate of about 950 square miles per year, which is equivalent to about two-thirds the size of Rhode Island. I guess the good news is that these dust storms occur primarily in the spring, when the prevailing winds sweep off the Gobi Desert and Mongolian Steppe in an easterly direction. We don’t expect to encounter any dust storms in August or September 2008. However, in the spring it is a very serious problem that results in hundreds of pulmonary-related fatalities every year.

This slide shows what is known as the “effective dose” of exposure to air pollution during exercise. Although it is a bit technical, I believe you can grasp the basic concept of the examples shown here. It’s one thing to sit in a chair like we are and be exposed to air pollution. It’s another thing if you’re an elite athlete that has one of those unique “Cadillac engines” and is able to produce very high ventilatory rates and thus, be exposed to a significantly higher “dose”, if you will, of air pollution versus you or I sitting in a chair. So I will ask you to focus your attention here where “effective dose” (ED) is defined (and calculated) as: pollutant concentration ( $\text{ug}/\text{mm}^3$ )  $\times$  ventilatory/breathing rate ( $\text{L}/\text{min}$ )  $\times$  exposure time ( $\text{min}$ ). During exercise, after you reach a certain point (for example, going from 4 mph pace to 5 mph pace if you’re running), you switch from nasal breathing to mouth breathing. In addition, your ventilatory rate goes up. Both of these changes combine to significantly increase the ED during moderate to high-intensity exercise. At the bottom of this slide, I’ve shown a couple of examples to illustrate the difference between resting ED and exercise ED. You can see in the example for rest, the ED over a period of 8 hours is actually *less* ( $4.32 \text{ ug}/\text{mm}^3 \text{ O}_3 / \text{L O}_2$ ) compared with the ED for an elite endurance athlete during high-intensity exercise for just 30 minutes ( $4.50 \text{ ug}/\text{mm}^3 \text{ O}_3 / \text{L O}_2$ )!

So which athletes will be most affected by heat, humidity and air pollution? As shown in this slide, the answer is those athletes/sports that are outdoor and require a sustained effort and/or exposure to the environmental conditions. This would be particularly true for the endurance-based events like the marathon.

So in closing, I’ll just tell a little bit of a story; I’ll go back in time. I think a lot of us in this room can remember the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. Going into those games, air pollution was considered to be a potential problem. It was a huge problem for this man, Steve Ovett, who was one of the greatest runners in the world at that time, world champion, world record holder. Steve Ovett also suffered from asthma and EIA.. Here you can see that in his first event, the 800-m final, he finished dead last with a time of 1:52.28. There are probably 10 to 12 high school runners in the United States who, at the end of their season, can run faster than that. So the impact on this athlete was huge.

As you can read in the caption, he was medicated and immediately hospitalized. And to his credit, as a great champion, he got out of that hospital bed and came back a few days later to run in the 1500-m final. You can see the result here; he was a DNF, a “did not finish”. He stepped off the track and was taken away on a stretcher. So this is a very, very sobering lesson from 1984 that certainly has motivated me, because I do remember those races. And it has helped me to stay focused and motivated in my job, day to day, as we prepare Team USA for the Beijing Olympics. So with that, I’ll say thank you, shey-shey, and hopefully I can contribute to the discussion in a few minutes.

(Applause.)

MINXIN PEI: Thank you. I’ve learned more about the air in the last 15 minutes than in the last, what, seven years, six years after the games were awarded. This is just terrific. Thank you. Now, Bob will be the last, but not least speaker.

ROBERT DIETZ: Thank you Minxin for the invitation here. For CPJ, it’s very encouraging that when people are discussing the Olympics that one of the important issues that comes to mind is media coverage. CPJ is an organization of journalists run by journalists and which works for the benefit of journalists. To have these issues included in a discussion like this and in the overall realization of their importance to the Olympics is very gratifying.

Let me get right to the point. As of this morning, with less than one year to go until the Olympics 29 journalists and editors behind bars in China. That number is down from 31 last year. Most of the journalists are being held on vague state-security related charges, revealing state secrets, subversion of state power; these are all catch-all phrases that the government uses to round up journalists and lock them up. Using that tactic, China holds the dubious distinction of being the largest jailor of journalists in the world and they’ve held that record since 1999.

Despite holding that record, in 2001 as we know, the IOC awarded the Games to the – to China. And as Sharon pointed out, the agreement between Beijing and the IOC has never been made public, but there was plenty of skepticism voiced at the time. Both the IOC and the Chinese government put forward a scenario that once China was buoyed by Olympic ideals, the country would grow away from government control of the flow of information and stop jailing those journalists who would dare confront the system. The message was that the media, unfettered for the Games, would continue to be free after the world’s attention on Beijing moved on.

Well, Sharon pointed out that opening up has not happened and it doesn’t look like it’s going to happen. China did lift some restrictions in January of this year on foreign journalists, allowing them to travel more freely around the country and to interview anyone without asking permission, pretty much operating the way journalists in developed, industrial countries work.

Those rules applied only to foreign journalists, they do not apply to Chinese journalists, that was made very clear. Chinese journalists tell us that while they're very envious of the freedom that's been given to their foreign colleagues, they would be very cautious in exercising those freedoms anyway, even if the government had extended those freedoms to them, simply because they don't know what's going to happen in China once the spotlight of the Games has moved on and they're left behind to carry the wake of could become pretty aggressive news reporting.

Since the Games were awarded in fact, not only have media restrictions not gotten better, they've gotten worse. In the run-up to the 17<sup>th</sup> party congress, which is coming later this month, the government has silenced journalists. Journalists know, at this period of time before any large meeting like this, before the NPCC meetings or party congress meetings, that they are held under stricter-than-normal rules in terms of what they can report, who they should speak to, and how aggressive they should be in performing their jobs. And people have dialed back on their reporting just automatically.

CPJ maintains close contact with Chinese journalists, usually by phone. We find that people are reluctant to pick up their phones at this point. They're not ready to exchange in email exchanges. And when they do speak, they're very guarded and it's clear, it's a given that at these periods of time, journalists are under even more pressure than ever.

In the last few weeks, the government has shut down several IDCs, they're Internet data centers, which are basically services – companies, private businesses which house servers which host website and blogs and those sort of information. There's been a wholesale shutdown of those. The way the system works in China is that the Internet is seen as basically a private enterprise endeavour, just as it is in the U.S., but in fact closely watched and owners of facilities and sites are held responsible for what's posted on their sites.

A company that would host a site on which one of its bloggers or one of the people using their servers should say anything that the government doesn't like, will cause the government at this point, especially in this run-up to the party congress, to close down the entire server, close down the entire building of servers, which means that hundreds, thousands, many thousands of websites – good, bad, indifferent, pop star websites, political criticism websites, the whole range of sort of the blogosphere – is just closed down and just plummets in terms of use. This has been the response in the government's response in the run-up to the party congress.

To us, when the government has to take these sort of steps, these drastic kind of measures, it's an indicator of how desperately they're running, trying to stay ahead of this information flow, that they just really have to allow to grow because of its intrinsic value to an expanding economy. But, on the other hand, that growth is fraught with danger in terms of people expressing much more freely ideas than they're accustomed to. Frankly, we see the government as playing a catch-up game, a rearguard action trying to stay ahead of what the Internet has brought into the world.

It also extends well beyond the Internet: bulletin boards, message boards, phone texting, if you text with Skype, for example, if you use pretty much any digital form of written communication, the government is almost guaranteed to be watching it or at least has the capability to watch it. Given the massive number of people using these, it's almost impossible to monitor all activity, but China most likely has the most advanced Internet censorship capabilities in the world. They're kind of leading the way for a lot of other countries. We know that in Burma, for example, they had received advice from China on how to control their Internet activities.

That's a quick overview of the situation in the, and it's a mixed one. China media is growing; government wants to control the information, finds itself in a double bind. It cracks down on journalist, and as I said, it's the largest jailer of journalists. We throw these numbers around – 29 journalists in jail, people harassed and hounded. I thought I'd just take an opportunity to quickly go through a couple cases of the type of person that we're talking about, okay.

More than half of the journalists who are in jail in China at this point are in jail because of Internet-related activity. Many of the journalists who posted information on websites overseas, particularly Boxun News and Epic Times, the website closely related to Falun Gong, are in jail and they have been come down on very heavily. Another problem in looking at these journalists is that many of them straddle the line between journalism and political activism.

And the analogy that I like to draw here is, think back to Thomas Paine and "Common Sense" and how what he wrote really motivated and sustained the American Revolution. On the one hand he was a journalist, and on the other he was a political activist of a very clear, certain stripe. It's a fine analogy to draw but I think it applies to a lot of these people as well. You can see the problem now in a digital age in which just about everyone has the equivalent of a colonial-era printing press on their computer desktop.

Let me go down through some names.. Chen Renjie and Lin Youping were jailed in 1983 for writing and publishing 300 copies of a pamphlet called Ziyou Bao, Freedom Report.

Chen was sentenced to life in prison and Lin was sentenced death without reprieve. A third colleague, Chen Biling was executed. Their arrests came in 1982 and by CPJ's count, these two men are the longest held journalists anywhere in the world who are jailed because of their activities in journalism.

Their jailing came at a time when China, in 1982, when China was just beginning to open up and liberalize its economy and move forward out of its old hide-bound Marxist ways. If you fast-forward now in time to 2005, Li Changqing, who was the deputy director of Fuzhou Ribao– Fuzhou Daily, which is a provincial newspaper, he was jailed in February 2005. He investigated the case of a whistle-blower, Huang Jingjiao, a

party member who had written letters critical of other party leaders and corruption in the local party. Li was initially sentenced on subversion, again, the use of these catch-all charges which can mean anything; he was tortured, he was repeatedly questioned, and then **not** charged with subversion.

Because they were unable to convict him on a subversion charge, prosecutors came up with a charge that's called "deliberately fabricating and spreading alarmist information." That charge was related to an article that Li had posted for Boxun, the overseas website, in which he claimed that in Fujian province in that year, there were 100 cases of dengue fever. Dengue fever is a common occurrence in warm weather in Fujian every year. It just reappears annually and the government has been unable to control it, which is not necessarily a criticism of the government.

Li reported a hundred cases that he'd found by going from hospital to hospital and just basically doing a reporter's work of call up the sources, find out what's going on, get the information and collect it. The official tally for dengue that year was 20 cases and Li was thrown in jail for having done a better reporting job than the public service system in China.

A name familiar to many people in here is Shi Tao – he was the former editorial director of Changsha-based Dangdai Shang Bao. He was formerly arrested in November 2004 charged with providing state secrets to foreigners. He had sent an email on his Yahoo account to friends in the U.S. What he had done was transcribe the notes of a meeting that the paper had had with the propaganda department giving directives on how to report the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown and the aftermath of that, the shooting of students in the streets.

He sent those notes to a friend in the U.S. using his email account. He was given a 10-year term in 2005 and the prosecution was helped mightily by the information which Yahoo readily gave them with little resistance and pretty much acquiesced in his jailing.

Another reporter with an overseas connection is Zhao Yan, who was just freed September 15<sup>th</sup> this year. He was the Chinese researcher who worked for the Beijing bureau of the New York Times. He was originally imprisoned for three years in September 2004 on charges of fraud after originally being arrested for revealing state secrets, again use of this catch-all phrase. He had been accused of giving information to the times about the intention of Jiang Zemin to resign. Jiang had already stepped down as president, he had yet to resign as the head of a military commission. The Chinese government hates spreading this sort of this inside information; it's anathema to them and they were livid.

They tried to nail Zhao on that count, couldn't, and came up with a most likely bogus fraud charge stemming from his earlier career as a journalist and sentenced him to three years. He had two years in already when they sentenced him and was freed in September. He is the first person to be charged with but acquitted of revealing state secrets in China. Part of the reason is because the New York Times was so adamant in

their support for him that they hired several lawyers to confront this case, and to its credit, the legal system found that it couldn't convict on the more serious charge.

You can appreciate the fear of Chinese journalists who go down these lines and pursue this sort of information, not having the New York Times at their back, having most likely a very intimidated newspaper editor or owner or management team who, the last thing they want to do is run afoul of the government and have their operation shut down.

Zhao was lucky; not so lucky was Ching Cheong, a reporter for the Singapore-based Straits Times. He was arrested in Guangzhou when he tried to meet with a source to get an interview with ousted leader Zhao Ziyang. He was accused of gathering information for Taiwan. The way we know this now – all these trials were behind closed doors — is that somehow, sometimes this information makes its way online and the court records appeared online. They showed that he had written or researched openly for the Foundation of International and Cross-Straits Studies, which is a Taiwan think tank, not an intelligence-gathering operation.

Ching had openly signed his name to articles, wasn't writing or hiding or doing anything undercover; he was working openly as a journalist. He is set to be released in April 2010.

Pretty chilling cases, but they really don't show the entire story of what's going on in China. In fact, the overwhelmingly vast majority of journalists in China manage to stay out of jail, report in an increasingly expanding media universe in which there is a great amount of competition, come up with new stories in the fight for readership, viewership, or listenership in terms of radio. And these journalists are quite ready to pursue that and they work, operate in the same model that other journalists do.

What they do face is a system of a steady flow of directives from the propaganda department, which manages to make their way down to every publication, every journalist, every writer in China. It flows from the top, from the propaganda department, and it's a daily stream of directives, information covering everything from the most sensitive of how to cover Tiananmen Square demonstrations to not reporting on a doctor who picked up his phone while in surgery and answered a phone call, a terrific story that swept across China before the censors could get on top of it and was shut down.

I'm running out of time here, so let me cut this short. As I said, foreign journalists report fewer hassles; our concern lies more with local journalists in China. We see several opportunities to come to their assistance. One is that we've met twice with the IOC, once in Lausanne, and once in Beijing. We're attempting to meet with them again either in October or in January in Beijing. We see the IOC as very conservative, resistant to change, but we do feel that being that conservative sort of organization would respond to pressure from human rights groups and journalists to at least bring and put these concerns in front of their Chinese counterparts.

Our board of directors is very well connected, a sort of backbone of editorial management in American media, a lot well-connected journalists from the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, broadcast, and we see an opportunity to press the Games' sponsors, almost all of whom are American to, again, push these concerns to the Chinese government in their dealings with them. They can at least explain the pressure they're under and try and bring about some sort of change.

And finally, we are a journalists' group, an organization of journalists working for journalists. We work closely with a lot of journalists and we see as perhaps the best tactic and the one we're most accustomed to doing is keeping journalists informed of what's going on in China.

We released this report — Falling Short — which is on your chair, in August in Beijing. And our intention is to keep making sure that the 20,000 to 30,000 journalists who will be going to Beijing in August fully understand that while they're in Beijing, they're going to be covering the Games and every aspect of the Games in this wonderful country in which they're taking place, and that they have to keep the question of media concerns in the front of their mind; that the Chinese colleagues that they're working with, many of whom will be hired by news organizations to work as fixers, runners, assistants, producers, will be operating under a fully different set of rules than the foreign journalists who are there. Our job is to make them aware of that.

In the end our greatest tactic, our most forceful tactic will be to keep this issue in front of foreign journalists going to the Games, to make sure that they continue to raise it as they're covering the Games, as they're swept up in all this grandeur and these other issues and to use journalism as a way to continue to bring pressure on the Chinese government.

I think, with that I've run out of my time and Minxin, why don't you take it over, please?

MINXIN PEI: Thank you, I think we have about – (applause) – 20 minutes for Q&A. I suggest that we ask questions, we then let the speakers gather their own list so that we can economize on time. Let me use my privilege to ask each of them one question.

To Sharon, there's a lot of talk about disruptive tactics by human rights groups during the Games. Do you think that such tactics will work, will be more helpful to the cause of human rights, or counterproductive given the fact that most Chinese people want to see a smooth Games?

And to Bob, are you aware of any Chinese propaganda department strategy or instructions on how the media should cover the Games, domestically of course, in Beijing?

And then to Randy, the Beijing government recently put a third of the vehicles off the road for a week, any effect of improving air quality?

Jeff, please?

Q: Jeff Bader from Brookings. A question for Sharon, if I could, a question for Randy as well. To Sharon, as we know the Games is not the Chinese Olympics—it's the Beijing Olympics, and it's the city that has to make the commitments and the offer. You mentioned that the contract is not a matter of public record. I wonder if you could tell us whether there are commitments by the Chinese government as well as the Beijing government, or are the commitments only by the Beijing government, and do the commitments only apply to Beijing or are they China-wide?

And my question for Randy is, could you speculate about during which events the athletes are most likely to feel the effects of weather and pollution that you described?

MINXIN PEI: Who gets the next one? Yes –

Q: Kimberly Bennett, this question is for Randy. I've heard or read recently, and I can't remember where, that they're talking about moving many of the endurance events outside of Beijing to Qingdao, in particular the marathon. And I'm curious about whether that's true, whether the USOC might be working with other national Olympic committees and the Chinese to figure this out?

MINXIN PEI: Okay, let's start and then we'll get the second round after this.

Sharon, Randy, and then Bob.

SHARON HOM: Thanks, James, let me take that one because it's a fairly straightforward question.

Regarding clarifications of the commitments, immediately following the selection of Beijing as the host city, the Host City Contract was signed by the Beijing authorities, the IOC, and the China National Organizing Committee (NOC). Together with China's NOC and the Beijing authorities, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympics Games (BOCOG) is responsible for realizing the obligations set forth in the Host City Contract and the annexes. However, throughout the various stages of the application, the representations made by Beijing are commitments too.

About “disruptive” approaches or different approaches –we'll hear more about one of the campaigns in the next panel. A number of human rights groups, NGO groups, including the Save Darfur Campaign, Tibetan groups, have started more publicly aggressive campaigns, but I would not characterize them as disruptive. I'm not sure what you were actually referring to, but let me say that there is a range of approaches and some of these are focusing on more high visibility pressure tactics and some of those tactics may be more confrontational than others.

For Human rights in China, our approach and practice is a preference not to use direct confrontational strategies; however, we do believe that there's absolute need for multiple, simultaneous strategies because the problems are so huge and complex, no one group, no one sector, no one organization, no one government is going to have an impact in isolation. So, it's more like there's a huge pond of China human rights problems, huge, somewhat polluted, but then we throw little pebbles in or big boulders, whatever we can mobilize to the edge and then shove it in. I don't think you're going to really know and what the ripple effects will be, but it's very important that something be done.

And that's not a PC line; it's really how we try to work, including collaboration with number of groups who are involved in more of the confrontational strategies. We are not calling for a boycott at this moment. There may be a moment when we will, but at this point we don't, but that has not precluded us from working in a very, very collaborative, respectful way with other groups.

The real answer to Pei Minxin's question of approach is another question: why does the choice of tactics matter? Why does it matter if there's an impact? What's at stake is not only, and this is not to marginalize, Randy's excellent presentation on the technology of the air and heat, on the athletes themselves. Imagine, if you're not an elite "Cadillac engine," but a poor, impoverished Chinese citizen living every single day under these conditions. So, I think what's at stake is really the impact on the Chinese who have to live and work and bike under these kinds of conditions. Imagine the massive health costs, the health bill that's going to come due, all of these costs right now being externalized.

So, I think what's really important to keep in mind -- that groups involved, CPJ and the media more broadly, scientists and doctors like Randy, corporations, government representatives, think tanks -- we each have different comparative advantages and expertise to bring to the table and we need to bring all that to the table. And in the current issue of the China Rights Forum available in the back of the room, issue, Human Rights in China has identified different ideas in the "What You can Do!" section depending on who you are, say a tourist, an athlete, or journalist.

Human Rights in China also prepared an FAQ for foreign journalists in the last issue on the media regulations, To give you a preview, we are soon to release a beautiful 2008 calendar with images of China and that identifies over 300 individuals in detention on specific days. . So you can look at January 1<sup>st</sup> and know who's still in prison, and how many more years they have to serve. The calendar also features 12 individuals in detention, including Shi Tao. The calendar is a concrete tool, to think about a strategy that's both inspiring, remembering the human cost, but giving people an individual in detention to remember.

MINXIN PEI: Randy?

MR. WILBER: I'd like to answer, first of all, the question from the gentleman about which events will be most affected – certainly the endurance-based events, outdoor-based events. Let's say at one end of the continuum would be the marathon where the athletes are competing for over two hours, outside in that environment, in direct exposure to heat, humidity, and air pollution. So you could take any event that's contested outdoors and involves an endurance component, be it continuous or discontinuous; discontinuous being like softball, where the girls are out and in and out of the dugout, but they're out on the playing field for approximately two to two-and-a-half hours. So those athletes who have extended exposure (continuous or discontinuous) to the environment (heat, humidity, air pollution) will be affected the most and they will be the primary focus of our attention in terms of preparation for competing in those challenging environmental conditions.

However, a message that we're sending to an athlete like an indoor volleyball player, whose knee-jerk reaction might be, I don't have to worry about heat, humidity or air pollution; I'm indoors. First, of concern might be the air-filtration system of those indoor venues, which will be drawing from the ambient air outside the venue. Also, we emphasize to indoor athletes that they will be spending a significant amount of time outdoors doing things like walking around, shopping, going to restaurants, etc. We faced that same challenge in Athens. The historical central district of Athens --- Plaka --- was the social center of the city where the best shopping and restaurants are located. Unfortunately, it was also the most polluted and hot, due to traffic congestion and high population density. In Athens, we advised our athletes to avoid the Plaka until after they were done competing. We will make similar, more stringent recommendation to our indoor athletes competing in Beijing. So to answer your question: all the athletes will be affected to some degree, and if we don't take the right precautions, it could negatively impact their performance. At the top of the list would be the endurance athletes who are competing outside.

The second question I'll take will be Minxin's about the effects of reducing automobiles. I think you all know in that November 2006, when the Africa-Asia summit was held in Beijing, the Chinese authorities implemented an odd-even license plate system that apparently produced good results. When I was there in August, they also implemented the same odd-even license plate system over a four-day period of time. However, it's been difficult getting what I consider valid, accurate information from the Chinese government (via the media) as to its efficacy on reducing air pollution in Beijing.

I would suggest that the construction, industrial plants and factories may be an even bigger issue than automobile traffic. In fact, there's a recent study authored by David Streets in the journal *Atmospheric Environment*. His research team used satellite images and calculated that about 33 percent of the pollution that affects the city of Beijing actually comes from the adjacent southern and the western provinces, which are heavily industrialized. So whether governmental control will be extended to those industrial provincial areas during the Games, I don't know. So I think that industrial pollution and construction may be a bigger concern than the automobiles. Control of automobile pollution may be more of a superficial, highly-visible change that will

probably get a lot of press coverage and may convey the impression that the Chinese government is really doing something about the air pollution issue. Whether automobile restriction will reduce the degree of pollution I showed earlier, I question that.

And the last question that was posed, in terms of moving the Olympics or some of the events, the endurance events, from Beijing: I can say in general, I can't provide specifics; I'm not authorized at this point to provide specifics, but I can say in general that this is a serious consideration at this time by Mr. Rogge, the head of the IOC, and we have cooperated in sharing some of our environmental data with other countries and the IOC. I don't know what the status of that decision is at this point, however, typically once you get within six months, certainly four months, those types of decisions will not change; in other words, we won't go over there two months after the Olympics and find out that the marathon's going to be run in Hong Kong. There's a certain timetable that's set and established by which the competitors and the athletes that need to be aware of and know.

I can tell you from the USOC perspective, and it has been the same from the first day I went to Beijing in March 2006, the message that we have sent to Team USA athletes and coaches is "hope for the best, but prepare for the worst." In fact, that is the mantra that we would carry into any Olympics, be it in a polluted environment or not. I compare the Olympics to going to war in terms of preparation, logistics, equipment, mobilization, etc. The main difference, of course, is that nobody gets killed. Team USA has a real challenge in Beijing 2008. The Chinese would like nothing better than to topple us from the number one position in total medals and gold medals. They have an excellent team, and they have home-field advantage. So we have a real challenge ahead of us and we need to be totally prepared and focused to help our athletes perform at their best. So at this point in time, we've stopped measuring heat, humidity and air pollution and we are going on the assumption that it will be hot, humid and polluted in Beijing next August and September. We are now in a totally proactive, implementation phase and are putting into place specific equipment and strategies that will help our athletes compete optimally. If we encounter conditions like the ones I showed you in the August 2006 slides, then we'll be prepared to deal with it. If the environmental conditions are not that bad, then that will be one less layer of stress on the athletes' shoulders, and that's what we want.

MR. DIETZ: Your question was, have there been specific directives handed down about how to cover the Olympics. Yes, there's been a steady flow of them; ever since before the country made its bid for the Games, we're aware of directives telling reporters how to cover events, how to cover the bid, how to cover domestic unhappiness with the bid, how to encourage support for making the bid. And there's just been a steady run of that since, I don't know how far back our records go, but there's a steady stream.

The way the system works is that it's much more reactive than you might think, that when an issue arises, these directives come down. They come down very quickly, and through phone calls, faxes, text messages. Most official organizations have internal

Internet hookups in which this sort of information, these directives are handed down quickly, and there's a steady stream of them.

I think one of the indicators of how closely the government is driving these issues is if you start looking at the official publications, and then the second-tier publications, which are owned or operated by the official publications, and notice the similarity of headlines, stories, approaches, the extensive use of Xinhua, which is the official news agency, rather than a paper sending out a reporter to cover a story. And you can get a very clear sense of how closely the government is involved in controlling not only the flow of information but the attitude, the approach of reporters, their take on the situation. So, yes, I think it's been well-followed and censored and we don't expect that to ever let up, even after the medal ceremony.

MINXIN PEI: Last round of questions. Bert?

Q: Thanks for an excellent set of presentations.

First question is to Randy: What would be the comparison with Mexico City and Seoul at the time when they held the Olympics? The pollution problems have gotten less serious in countries as their per-capita GDP has risen.

And to Sharon: You said that the situation is clearly getting worse, and I think that was roughly the same time in your presentation that you talked about the Party Congress preparation. But what's your assessment about freedoms in China over the last five years, since the end of the Jiang Zemin era? Is it really getting worse, or if not, why not?

Bob Dietz, I just wondered, a lot of these problems are local problems, in provinces of 30 or 40, 60 million people, and national as well. I don't mean to diminish that. But what's the Chinese record on a per-capita basis, compared to other countries where journalists are regularly arrested?

MINXIN PEI: The gentleman in the back.

Q: Just a quick question for Dr. Wilber which is, in the good luck games, including the women's world cup, have you seen affects that you're expecting during the Olympics so far in these events?

And a question for Mr. Dietz is, with some of the limited press passes, particularly for the U.S., there'll be a lot more press going that is not accredited. And, you know, what do you expect the Chinese may do about that? And do you know what the U.S. press community is thinking itself, how they may have to deal if they are not an accredited member of the press but that they go to the games?

MINXIN PEI: The lady –

Q: My name is Angela Clubb. My question is for Randy. We know that Beijing has said that a smoke-free Olympics will be part of their green Olympics agenda. And I'm wondering if you know how effective their preparations have been to make the Olympic venues smoke-free, and if you think this will be an issue that will stick with Beijing after the Olympics, considering that China contains a third of the world's smokers and over 50 percent of Chinese men smoke, and the number of women is rising. And so this is a serious issue for China, and I'm wondering if you think that the Olympics is going to be a catalyst for change or not.

MINXIN PEI: Last question, over there. Sorry, we are running out of time.

Q: Thank you. Greg Meisselbach, U.S.-China economic and security review commission.

I have two questions. First, for Mr. Dietz: To what degree of self-censorship on local Chinese level are you worried about for journalists because we hear stories of foreign journalists who do, in fact, go and interview, but, you know, in the background is a black Santana with four guys and, you know, a phone call to their cell phone that says, don't talk to – allow – (inaudible). And, you know, and so to what degree are you scared of that?

And Dr. Wilber, I just – is there any precedent with the university games or any other venues before 2001, where, you know, we had cloud-seeding in China, or where we can see at least a precedent for events like the Olympics in terms of sporting events in indoor air filtration and outdoor endurance runs. Thank you.

MINXIN PEI: Okay, quickly. Starting again from the other –

MR. DIETZ: Let's do the first question about per capita. On a per-capita basis, China's not the worst jailer of journalists in the world; Eritrea is, and I think it's Cuba which is second and China comes farther down that list. Partially, it's because of the enormous size of the number of the journalists, the large population in China; and partially it's because of the effectiveness of the censorship system, which allows me to segue to the next question.

China doesn't have to jail journalists anymore. Journalists know the rules. They know that someone is watching. They know that they can be brought to task. They know that their careers are very often on the line. But in fact, it's not a question of being frightened to death of going to jail. You can be detained, especially for Chinese journalists. Being detained locally is not a pleasant experience. The central government is able to control Beijing fairly well, but what happens at a provincial township level is very often very ugly and involves a lot of violence directed against journalists, anyone going in to report on a situation.

We did a wonderful report – our researcher, Kristin Jones, did a wonderful report last year – on how China has to cover up civil unrest at the provincial level, or the

township level, in villages where all the social change stemming from all this economic growth is really the focal point, and where people are paying the greatest price in terms of land loss, destruction of lives, just being forced to make a transition from what was a rural life into an increasingly industrialized society. And that's where the real pressure lies. At that level, journalists tread very, very, very carefully when they're reporting, when they're on the ground at the site of a demonstration, or when they get back to their papers and file their story. I think the great hidden problem of China is maybe not air pollution but social unrest at the local level across what remains of rural China. Covering that as a journalist is very difficult.

Self-censorship, the knowledge that these are the parameters under which I can report, why bother to go beyond this; Why aggravate my editor? Or the editor will look up the line and say, why take a chance on risking my position or the newspaper or news organization's survival, why push these stories?

And I'm going on a bit here, but having said that, the last thing I want to do is give the impression that Chinese journalists are dogging it, are not doing their jobs, and it's just not the case. There are plenty of problems with the profession of journalism in China, but there're so many people who go out on a day-to-day basis, who go after stories in the exact same way that I would have gone after a story when I was a journalist, and pursue them, write them up, and get them into the paper. And there are editors who are ready to say, I can't go as far as you want on this story, but we can go this far; let's deal with that, and they push that envelope constantly.

And those are the men and women, I think, who drive my concern about China and drive CPJ's concern about journalists in general, that they are doing a job. They are limited, they know the game, they know how it's played, and yet, so many of them still pursue that line of endeavor that it makes it worthwhile to raise all hell to make their lives better, frankly.

MR. WILBER: Four questions: First, Mexico City and Seoul relative to Beijing. Certainly, in terms of the data that I presented, air pollution is significantly worse in Beijing compared to Mexico City 1968 and Seoul 1988.

MINXIN PEI: How much worse? Do you have the figures? Do we know – is it about twice –

MR. WILBER: I would say that you could compare the environmental data of Mexico City and Seoul with the data I showed for Los Angeles and Athens. The key factor in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics was the altitude. If you remember, that's where the altitude-based East African distance runners emerged – the Kenyans and the Ethiopians exploded on the scene in 1968.

Question two, pre-Olympic test events or university games, etc. As you know, each of the sports will have what is called a pre-Olympic "test event" which is designed to pre-test the venues, pre-test the volunteers, pre-test the timing systems, etc. All of the

potential Olympic athletes from around the world are invited to compete in what is typically a pre-version of the Olympic Games for that sport. Two weeks ago, I was at the pre-Olympic test event for triathlon, and I was also there to do pulmonary function testing on the athletes to evaluate their response to air pollution. And I found that 55% of our triathletes had clinically defined exercise-induced asthma. So yes, we are seeing the effects of the poor air quality as shown in some of my previous slides.

Smoke-free Olympics in the venues: I feel very, very confident that smoke-free regulations will be adhered to throughout the Olympic Games. Make no mistake about it, the Chinese have done, and will do, an excellent job in conducting the Games. The Beijing Olympics will be run as good as any Olympics we've ever seen. Will it hold up afterwards? I'm very doubtful and I'm very skeptical. In my experience with Olympic Games, the legacies have been primarily bricks and mortar – beautiful venues, community development of athletics, etc. The behavioral changes such as a smoke-free environment, may not be as long lasting. And that's not a criticism of China – that's anywhere the Olympics have been held, including our own country. Many behavioral and environmental legacies just have not come to fruition.

And the last question referring to precedents such as the techniques of cloud-seeding to induce pollution-clearing rain. I know of no other Olympics that has proposed such methods. Again, Los Angeles. and Athens used conventional methods and strategies, and I really think the cloud-seeding is more fluff and, “wow, that's a pretty cool story”, than anything else, quite honestly.

Thanks for all your questions; those are great. Thanks a lot.

MINXIN PEI: Sharon has the last word.

MS. HOM: I do, thank you.

On the question of whether there have been greater freedoms over the last five years. First of all, with a caveat of course, of information control and the limits of what we know or can know, the overall human rights situation, including freedom of expression, and other rights including economic, cultural, and social at has generally worsened.

Now, having said that in a fairly fuzzy-logic way – which is also the logic that was used by the IOC Olympics Committee in evaluating the cities because evaluation is inherently subjective when information is incomplete and partial,– using fuzzy logic, I would say the situation is generally worse. But the second important question that needs to be asked is, worse for whom?. Now, for the elite, political and economic elites, and for the urban residents by and large, you can really say that things have gotten much better. And any of you who've been to Beijing or Shanghai recently, or Guangzhou can attest to the impressive modernity taking shape.

But if we look at the situation for the vast majority people, the 120, 140, or 150 million migrants, or the 700 million rural inhabitants, things have gotten dramatically worse. And if you're a woman or an ethnic minority or a child in any of those above groups, you will then be in an even worse situation. So I think that's the one real important aspect of assessing improvements.

Even if intellectuals and certain writers and groups, appear to be able to cross an invisible line, that does not address the question of, the structural sustainable of any improvements. That requires systemic protections and structural, cultural, social shifts and reforms. If we want more than a bricks-and-mortar legacy from the Olympics, we really have to address that really hard structural question. That means recognizing that rule of law and an independent media is not by a privilege or grant by whim.

The rise in thug-violence recently, which in many cases, appears to be officially sanctioned, including lawyers like Li He Ping abducted, trailed by cleared state security people, or lawyers on the way to court, or clients being beat up quite brutally. This is all in the presence of or being ignored by officials or police or security agents. This should raise real concerns about any progress. The shutdown of the China development brief is a cautionary tale. Operating for 12 years, very well-respected, widely read by development experts and funders, and then just paid a visit in July and told to shut down.

So you can't have progress where there's an invisible line, that civil society, media, intellectuals, journalists, cross but don't know until they cross it, and run right smack into the state secrets abyss. That is not progress-- anything that does not address the fundamental problems is temporary, cosmetic, and illusory. And that is not what I think all of us are working towards.

MINXIN PEI: We are going to have a 10-minute break, and we'll convene here for the second panel at 11:00 sharp, and we'll extend the second panel by 15 minutes because that's a wonderful panel too. Please join me in thanking the three speakers for their wonderful presentations.

(Applause.)

(End of session.)