

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**“CHINA’S OLYMPIAN CHALLENGE: CAN BEIJING DELIVER ON
ITS PROMISES?”**

**PANEL II: 10:45 A.M. – 12:00 P.M.
OLYMPICS AS A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE**

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JOSHUA KURLANTZICK: Can everybody please take their seat? Thanks.

We're going to begin. Let's take your seats.

I'm Josh Kurlantzick, also from the Carnegie Endowment. And in this panel, we're going to not necessarily explore how China is prepared, but basically explore whether the Olympics could or could not serve as a catalyst for different types of change. And obviously, we've seen, in the last months and years, all sorts of issues related to the Olympics: Sudan, Tibet, China's own human rights record. Recently, there has been some talk about whether, in the context of China's relationship with Burma, or Myanmar, whether pressure should be put on China related to the Olympics on that front.

And all our guests are going to examine aspects of the Olympics as a possible catalyst for change, both in places where China has influence, in China's own domestic environment, potentially in the U.S.-China relationship and then also whether it could be a catalyst for change at all.

And we're going to start with Jill. She's the director of Dream for Darfur, which is a global advocacy campaign and is using the Olympics to focus attention on Sudan's relationship with China. And I think it's – you have the whole bio so I'm not going to go into all of the details. But what I think is quite interesting is that this issue has really had a significant response from Chinese officials. She and other Darfur groups have had a number of meetings with Chinese officials, which might have surprised people two or three years ago if you mentioned this issue. And she's going to talk about both their own strategies and, I hope, a little bit about what she sees as the Chinese response. So, please

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JILL SAVITT: Thank you so much for inviting me here today. It was a really terrific first panel, and I'm looking forward to the comments here. I am not an expert on China at all. I'm a human rights campaigner by trade, which means I design and implement human rights campaigns. And for the past four years, I've been doing that on Darfur. Over the last nine or so months, though, I've spoken to a lot of people in the China expert community who have been unbelievably generous with their time in trying to help us figure out how to design and calibrate our campaign and what certain signs mean, what certain signals we're getting mean.

One of the first things that someone said to us was, China's Olympic challenge – would this be a rising China or rogue China? And that stuck with me as we embarked on this campaign as to how would pressuring China around the Olympics – how would China respond? And so, that then leads to the question, are the Olympics a strategic opportunity for change?

Right now, the jury is out, which I'll explain in a bit. So I want to start with – use the cinematic technique of telling a story and then jumping back a period of time to say where the roots of it were. Last month, a colleague of mine, Nicky Lazar, who works on Olympic Dream for Darfur, and I, were invited to Ollie's Noodle Shop in midtown Manhattan for lunch with the deputy consul general, the Chinese consulate in New York.

We had been writing to the deputy consul and had spoken with him on the phone and had met with him previously. So we went to the lunch, and we had a very pleasant lunch. All of our meetings with Chinese officials – and we've had three major meetings – have been really very diplomatic and the Chinese officials have been extremely engaged.

The meetings are somewhat similar, in that we cover the exact same points as we have in each previous meeting. And sometimes, we cover a set of points for the first hour and then in the second half-hour, we cover them again more quickly, and then in the third bit we cover them again and we agree to disagree. In the course of this meal we again reviewed our points. And then the fortune cookies came.

And I opened up my fortune cookie and I read it. And it was some big prediction as fortune cookie fortunes are. And I put it down and the deputy consul picked it up and smiled. And he said, "Oh, I see, don't link the Olympics and Darfur." (Laughter.) So I thought that was very interesting just how direct we were able to be with each other.

The organization I run is called Dream for Darfur. And our campaign is Bring the Olympic Dream to Darfur. We started about nine months ago, in January; there was a major Darfur advocacy summit that Save Darfur Coalition, of which we're a member, held. And there was a bunch of discussion about what's the Darfur advocacy community should do going forward.

And there was some sense in the room that China is the major obstacle to bringing peace to Darfur, and to some people that China was the only arrow left in the quiver. People wanted to focus on China, wanted to address China, but there was consensus from the experts, the China experts who people had been talking to, that strategy would not be very effective. Still, many of us were undeterred and so we pursued our strategy.

I want to talk specifically about first, China and Darfur. I'm going to get my water. So there's been no country that has done more to support the regime than China. They have provided diplomatic support to Khartoum at the U.N., providing the weaponry, both in terms of money to finance the genocide, and also, they have sold arms that are used against the people of Darfur. And China has done the most to insulate Khartoum from any accountability whatsoever and continues to oppose any sanctions.

At the same time, China has said – as I'm sure you all are very familiar – that it has a strict policy of not intervening and it undertakes its economic and trade relationships with no political strings attached. So in the face of this, that's what we kept hearing from China. So we, a group of people, had been talking about China before this

January meeting, including a professor at Smith named Eric Reeves and the actor and great Darfur advocate Mia Farrow.

And we wanted to focus on China. And as a first trial balloon, we spoke to the Washington Post. And that was really the first use of this term, Genocide Olympics. And it was the creation of a Washington Post editorial writer. It wasn't the advocacy community, which was interesting, because it's really caught on. And it didn't come from our community. So despite the concerns –it did register with people. There was a lot of talk within our community and we started to hear from China experts that there was murmuring about this editorial and some others.

So starting around December, January, February, we started to design plans to use the Olympics as leverage to have China act. China, only arrow in the quiver, what can we use for China to be sensitive. The only thing they care more about than oil is maybe the Olympic Games. So we're going to use the Olympic Games to focus on China.

So then in March, Mia and Ronan Farrow wrote an op-ed called "The Genocide Olympics" in the Wall Street Journal. And in it, they called on Steven Spielberg to withdraw as the artistic director of the Games. This set in motion a bunch of things. Now, this is of course highly complex, and I'm not suggesting direct cause and effect. There were other things going on as well. I just tried to pick out some of the high points of milestones along the road.

Shortly after the op-ed, we launch a campaign. Our campaign decides to do an Olympic-style torch relay from Darfur to Beijing. And we are going to only stop in countries that have experienced genocide. And along the way, we're going to build a community of genocide survivors, from every genocide, to call on China to address the Darfur issue. We're going to say, "Please China." We're going to be tactically very aggressive, but rhetorically, we're going to try to be somewhat moderate and try to be positive.

As we launched this, others in our community took up the call. The Save Darfur Coalition and STAND, which is the campus movement, decided to do a U.S. relay in solidarity with this global relay. The Italians, the Canadians, the Australians, the French, Sierra Leone, South Africa, U.K., they're all doing either big events or national torch relays also in solidarity, all with the same theme, Bring the Olympic Dream to Darfur.

Right after all of this was hatched, we had the first movement that we had seen from China whatsoever. And this is, you know, four plus years of absolute, irresponsible obstruction. We have an assistant foreign minister urging the Sudanese to show flexibility. And this was the first inkling that we had that maybe there would be some change. Shortly thereafter, the next month, the Chinese government says that they're going to send 300 engineers to Darfur, which was very significant, because they would be building barracks for the eventual troops that would come in. So it was symbolic that they were sending these engineers.

So just to give you the timeline, in May, Congress did a bunch of things, among them, a very strongly worded letter from 108 congressmen that linked China, Darfur, and the Olympics. And then there were resolutions in the House and the Senate, also very strongly worded. On May 10th, Steven Spielberg, who had come under fire from the Darfur advocacy committee, sent a letter to President Hu saying he has just learned about the complicity of China in the Darfur issue and he urges President Hu to press Khartoum to do all it can. And he gives him – the next day, a press release goes out giving China 30 days to respond.

So then we see, right in the same time period, China announces that there is going to be a special envoy for Darfur. And he takes, later that month, his first fact-finding visit to Sudan. And he says that his general impression is that the situation is improving. This represents this dynamic that Sharon talked about, much more articulately than I've been thinking about it, which is that of a welcome face, but tightening of the controls behind. And this is this dynamic of, look over here, look over here, and then something's going on behind in the background.

So we appoint the envoy; we send him to Darfur; it gets a lot of press attention. But then, as it's reported in the media, he says things are basically fine because they still have to please Khartoum. So then, you know, just along the timeline, the Save Darfur Coalition begins running full-page ads in many media around the world linking Darfur, China, and the Olympics. At the same time, there's a lot of divestment activity that I don't record here of the Darfur advocacy community encouraging companies to divest their holdings; and that's getting a lot of publicity and is also a lever.

Congress holds a hearing, "Darfur and the Olympics: An International Call to Action." Olympic athletes are invited to testify, Darfurian refugees are; again, a lot of attention. We have the envoy going back and forth to Sudan. And then we have President Hu really pushing in a public way. And it's one of the first times that President Hu comes out publicly and says that the international community needs to push the peace process further. As a public statement, it was a milestone.

Then – it was very interesting. So I've been doing human rights campaigning for a while and I've sent scores of letters to government officials and never heard back from them. It goes into the circular file in the deep, dark hole. We overnighted a letter on a Tuesday night to arrive Wednesday at the Chinese Embassy – called that afternoon to make sure it had arrived; could we be in their office on Friday? Absolutely shocked that we were being invited in to talk about – with the ambassador no less – about our campaign.

We were encouraging the ambassador to imagine welcoming athletes from a peaceful Sudan to the games and the amazing international statesman role that China would be playing and what a victory, a PR victory they could score. The questions that were asked of us: What would our banner say; who are our local partners in the countries that have experienced genocide? We met for an hour and a half; it was a very open and engaging meeting. We brought an expert on Sudan and there were two from my

organization. And the ambassador was leaving for China the next day, and he promised to bring our message back to China, which was very interesting.

In July, China became the president of the Security Council. And a resolution that had been up several times before to deploy peacekeepers was coming up again while China had the presidency. And our community said, this is a moment of truth. You know, you either allow the troops to go in; you get Sudan's consent to allow peacekeepers. That will show you are truly committed to Darfur.

At the same time, the media reports that Steven Spielberg is contemplating quitting his post, which got enormous media coverage, just even the fact that he was thinking about it. And then, we have really a new milestone of progress in our advocacy that China votes for – or does not vote against; I mean, doesn't abstain – a resolution that allows, with Chapter VII authority, the deployment of troops to Darfur.

It is true and again, one of these, look over here while we do something behind the scenes – China did weaken the resolution significantly. They led an effort to take out any sanctions and to not have the ability to seize illegal weapons that were in Darfur. So, you know, again, a public face, a really good move, leadership, a milestone. And behind the scenes, de-clawing it.

So we've been trying to paint China's efforts as modest and insufficient. And we've been asking for China to condemn Khartoum and call for a credible ceasefire and immediate deployment of troops. And we've launched our relays. All of this happened towards the fall.

So just to give you a sense of these torch relays, they – Mia Farrow, who is the chair of our board, comes to them and we do our outreach to partner countries and then we get a lot of media attention for these torch relays. August 9th, we launched our first one, and we were in Africa. And our office back in New York got a call from the Chinese consulate saying, can we meet with you – the day our press releases went out. And with the time difference, once coverage of this event started to appear, we got a call. There's another picture of the torch being lit.

We were planning for Rwanda. We heard from our colleagues there, as we tried to plan this event, the Rwandans said, our heart is with Darfur, but our stomach is in China. And they were very reluctant to have any China messaging related to that event. And so, we actually had to get the president of Rwanda to sign off on our event and had an agreement about the language that we would use at the event.

We then lit our torch in Rwanda. And we had 200 Tutsi survivors of that genocide passing the torch with Sudanese; Mia again. So you know, in our meetings, we came back and we met with the deputy counsel. And these are the messages that we routinely hear: China has done all it can and the vote for the Security Council resolution is pointed to; the international community has recognized China for its leadership, which is true. The U.S. envoy and the foreign minister of the U.K. and a lot of people, Jimmy

Carter, have praised China. We hear that China is a poor developing country and not that powerful, that China's efforts should be recognized, linking the Olympics to Darfur offends the Chinese people, and it is not fair to link the Olympics to Darfur.

We heard these with the ambassador; we heard these in our first meeting. These are the messages that we hear in our regular correspondence. And we've been urged by the Chinese government and its officials to reconsider our campaign. These meetings have been, as I understand it from the experts in your community, a bit uncommon that we would have such access and on such short notice and even not prompt these meetings, but be invited to have them ourselves.

So we have continued our campaign. We also went to Armenia. The foreign ministry in Armenia was approached three times by Chinese officials to try to have our event shut down. We were worried that Turkey would maybe approach the Armenian government and try and have our event shut down. But there, the third torch was lit in Yerevan.

It's interesting, because at the same time that China doesn't want to – that they don't have political strings attached and they don't want to seem as interfering in the affairs of other countries, they do want credit for what they have done. And so, on September 11th, there was – China had a “unique role” in Darfur peace bid. The special envoy came; he met with the Save Darfur Coalition; they had an exchange of ideas in a long meeting. And after that, this was the message that the Chinese government wanted to come out with: the “unique role.” And even, they said that they got Khartoum to consent to allowing troops in. So there is credit-taking on one hand.

At the same time that all of this has happened – our campaign focuses on anyone associated with the Olympics so the corporate sponsors, the International Olympic Committee, the national Olympic committees, athletes and we have engaged – we have either – asking them to do things: put pressure on the Chinese government, put pressure within the Olympic movement to urge China to urge Sudan to allow security on the ground.

And as we've undertaken those activities, we've heard from some of those actors. And I just will tell you one anecdote. One of the corporate sponsors who we spoke to – we are putting out a report card. We've asked the corporate sponsors to do a number of things, very modest things. And we're putting out a report card on whether or not they've done them. So in talking with one of the sponsors, we were explaining the report card, and she said to us, we want an F on your report card. An A does not help us. How do you know we're not doing things, she asked us. How do you know we're not calling the International Olympic Committee? How do you know we're not having our colleagues in China talk about this within the government? But we don't want to be publicly getting an A from you, which I thought was very interesting, because we've been trying to use other levers to reach the Chinese government.

The report card is going to be coming out later this month. And the grades aren't very good. I'm a parent. And if my son came home with this report card, I would not be pleased. No one really has had the courage to speak out about the Darfur genocide. No Olympic sponsor has been willing to say anything publicly about it.

So then we wonder if any of this has made a difference. The last week has been among the worst in terms of violence in Darfur. The situation is absolutely deteriorating. We've had, within Darfur, two towns bombed; scores of people killed. Thousands have been forced to flee these areas. And Khartoum reports on the ground today say it's amassing troops around six other towns. It looks like the regime is going to be really going into those places and doing a lot of damage, including in Nyala, which is the largest town in Darfur.

And humanitarian groups, including Doctors without Borders, are absolutely pulling out. The resolution, 1769, the first deadline, which was an important one, was missed. China voted for it with such fanfare and pointed to it; the first deadline was missed. Again, not a peep of concern about it.

So I guess my interim analysis is that it seems China is having it both ways. It's a perfectly calibrated effort on China's part that they would vote for the resolution, take out sanctions, and then never say a word about it not being implemented. They tout they role and win praise, but allow Khartoum to continue everything that it has been doing. Nothing changed on that front. Send humanitarian aid in terms of money, but deepen their economic relationship in terms of oil and trade at the exact same time. Keep your eye on one thing while another thing is happening.

And in closing, I'll just show you one more thing. I'm a devotee of the Beijing 2008 Olympics site. I don't know if others of you visit it regularly. But on September 18th, Tiananmen Square was dressed up. That's a replica of the Parthenon and the Olympic rings in Tiananmen Square which I think is just another – there's this desire to use the Olympics to cover up or to reintroduce China. And, I don't know, I just thought that photo in terms of what the Olympics mean to China, was a very telling statement. Okay, thank you.

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you very much. (Applause.)

We are now going to turn to Sean Woo. Sean is general counsel for Senator Sam Brownback. He previously served as chief of staff at the U.S.-Helsinki Commission. He has been involved in China and Asia issues on the Hill for a long time. And he's going to give us a sense of – both in the contexts of the Olympics, but also at a time when, on both sides of the aisle, there is not only your typical contentious issues, but in some ways, in many ways, a kind of changing view on China on both sides of the aisle, how the Olympics fits into this over the next year or two in Congress.

SEAN WOO: Thank you, Josh. First of all, thank you and Minxin for putting this excellent program together and also to Carnegie for hosting this. When I mentioned

that I was doing this to a friend of mine out in California who is an entertainment attorney, he sent me a prop. Back in the '80s, back in 1980, he was involved in attempting to go to the Moscow Olympics in order to talk about anti-semitism and to quietly protest. So he bought up a whole bunch of these passes to the Moscow Olympics. And of course, as you know, what happened at that time was that President Carter canceled and boycotted the Olympics. He's stuck with a whole bunch of these passes, which he gave to me.

And two points that I would make about this. By the way, on this particular pass, if you had this back in July 21, 1980, you would have been able to see the boxing match at 12 o'clock. The seats aren't that great. The two points I would make about this is that – one is, by the way, I don't know if any of you work on eBay, but I'd like to talk with you if there's a way to move this stuff. (Laughter.) The other thing is that the country that issued this no longer exists. The Soviet Empire, as you know, the Berlin Wall fell about a decade later.

Now, I don't know if that's what's going to happen to China, but the conventional wisdom is obviously in a totally different direction. The 21st century is the China century. I think – and you know, companies are moving in in droves, foreign investment is rising at a phenomenal rate, half of the cranes in the world, as one of the panelists mentioned, are all located in China.

I think this is a profound misreading. And this is something that the West has often done with the East. At least for those of us that work on China issues on the Hill, there are some serious problems as Sharon and many others have mentioned and outlined very, very helpfully. And Jill laid out very vividly, particularly in the area of foreign policy, the way that China deals with some of the rogue regimes in the world: Sudan and Darfur; North Korea, which is not often in the news, but that is a tragic story – hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees are essentially trafficked on a daily basis. Almost 90 percent of the women are working in brothels and things like that. And the men – young boys and men are outworked in construction sites probably for the Olympic venues itself.

And not just in, at least from the Hill perspective, not just in the foreign policy arena. As you know, recently we've had some very dramatic recalls of toys, of drugs, of food, I think which also demonstrates massive regulatory issues within the country, lots of labor issues, which I hope is something that I hope will be more pronounced on the Hill now that the Democrats are in charge. And of course, you've got religious issues and press freedoms and other issues that were raised by the first panel.

So at least from the Hill perspective, you know, the linkage to the Olympics I guess is sort of – there isn't much appetite for that because there are so many other issues in front of it. Now, there are a few bills. There's H.R., H. Res., I should say 610, which was introduced by the usual, but reliable suspects: Frank Wolf and Chris Smith, as well as Dana Rohrabacher, I think, has introduced a resolution on the House side. I don't believe there are any Democratic members on it, which is surprising because, you know,

Nancy Pelosi has been such a strong advocate on China human rights issues. Dr. Coburn is shopping around a similar resolution, but with a very strong focus on Burma and North Korea.

And then I am also hearing that there are members who are making trips to China. This happens on a regular basis, but they are going there to look at some Olympic-related issues such as security for athletes, the air pollution issue. So as we get closer, I think, to the Games itself you will certainly see more hearings which would generate more press. I don't know if there would be an explicit effort to link some of those issues to legislation. I just don't see as strong an appetite and I certainly don't see a bipartisan effort to do that because, you know, some of the other issues can be pursued in other ways as opposed to linking it directly to the Olympics.

So, just to go back to this prop, I think, at least for me and for Senator Brownback and some of the other members of Congress who have looked at China for a long time, the issue for us is that the China after the Olympics is going to be a different China. I mean, change is going to happen. And the question, on a long-term basis is how China is going to manage that change, how we are going to deal with that change. But apart from that, I say that there isn't really a lot that's going on on the Hill at the moment. I think as we get closer to the Olympic dates itself, we may see some more things happening. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you very much, Sean. We're going to –

MR. WOO: By the way, I have a bunch of these passes. So I'd be happy to pass them out.

MR. KURLANTZICK: (Chuckles.) We're going to finish here and then take questions. We're going to finish with Jeff Bader who is director of the Thornton China Center next door. He was previously deputy assistant secretary of State for China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. And he's going to give us a sense, within China's own domestic environment, whether this advocacy on Darfur, other issues, the hope for change within China's own political environment, how this is received in China, and whether in the Chinese environment any of these things talked about is actually feasible. So, please, Jeff.

JEFFREY BADER: Thanks, Josh and thanks, Minxin for inviting me and pulling together this excellent set of panels. A theme of today's discussion, as I've heard from the first panel and this panel, is what we Americans think that the Chinese should be doing in order to produce an Olympic games that we would judge to be a success.

Before I join in the fray and offer my own opinion about what the Chinese should be doing, I think it's useful for us to stop and think about how our opinions are received by the Chinese. Americans are not the world's greatest people at seeing themselves as

others see them. I have a quote here from candidate George W. Bush from the 2000 campaign which many of you will recognize.

During the debates, he said, "I just don't think it's the role of the United States to walk into a country and say 'We do it this way. So should you.' But I think one way for us to end up being viewed as the ugly American is for us to go around the world saying, 'We do it this way. So should you.' I think the United States must be humble. It must be proud and confident of our values, but humble in how we treat nations that are figuring out how to chart their own course."

Many of us will remember this quote, and usually, when people recite it, it's followed up by a George Bush joke. I'm not going to do that. I think that, actually, it's a very good quote. I think that George Bush is not the only one who needs to heed it, and I think there are people all across the political spectrum in the United States that ignore the wisdom of this quote.

So how do we look to others, specifically to the Chinese, as we're approaching the 2008 Olympics? I was very struck by the Washington Post editorial a couple of weeks ago with the headline "The Saffron Olympics." Jill has referred to the history of the phrase "the genocide Olympics," and these editorials have been accompanied by discussion of possible boycott of the Olympics. I'm sure that before we reach the Olympics, we'll see a few more of these. My Tibetan friends, I'm sure, will come up with a colorful nickname, as will Taiwan independence groups - "the toxic lead Olympics," "the toxic air Olympics," "the lead paint Olympics." You know, we can all do this and an awful lot of advocacy groups are going to follow the example set by the Save Darfur groups.

But I'd like you all to try a little thought experiment and think back to the 1984 and 1996 Olympics in Los Angeles and Atlanta. In 1984, we had a close relationship with South Africa. How does the phrase "Apartheid Olympics" sound? Or both times, we were strong supporters of the state of Israel. The phrase "Occupation Olympics" comes to mind. We were supporting *mujahideen* in Afghanistan, and President Zia-ul-Haq as he was establishing an Islamic Republic in Pakistan: "the Jihadi Olympics." Or our relationship with Saudi Arabia, whose security we guarantee, but whose policy towards women many of us do not admire: maybe "the Misogynist Olympics."

Suppose Chinese newspapers had been filled with stories, with these kinds of nicknames, leading up to the Olympics. How would we as Americans have reacted? Would we have been impressed? Would we have been amused? I think the answer is that we would have not been impressed. We would have taken this as a clear sign of enduring and undying anti-Americanism in China. We would not have seen this as a spur to change our policy towards Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan or any of these other countries.

I think it's very, very likely that ordinary Chinese, seeing this steady drumbeat about how their foreign policy is being featured in Americans' approach to their Olympics, take this as a sign of enduring anti-Chinese sentiments by the United States.

Now, that's not to say that I think that politics have no role in the Olympics. I think that Sharon Hom was absolutely right when she described the history of the Olympics, and being a fanatic sports fan myself whose first memory as a child was watching television in October 1951, my heart was crushed at seeing Bobby Thomson hit the homerun that defeated my Brooklyn Dodgers in the playoffs.

I have followed the Olympics closely since 1956 and virtually every Olympics has been in some fashion overwhelmed by politics: 1964 Olympics was Japan's chance to come out and show that it had changed since World War II, as well as the first games in Asia; 1968, Sharon mentioned the massacre of Mexican students; 1972, you all remember Munich and the massacre of Israeli athletes; 1976, African boycott of the Montreal games; 1980, the U.S. led a massive boycott of the Moscow games. In 1984, retaliation by the Russians and the Soviet bloc against the L.A. games; 1988, in Korea, which I remember turning into basically an anti-American hate-fest because of the NBC coverage of the games; and 1996, a bombing in a park near the Olympic Village by an anti-abortionist survivalist.

The Chinese, of course, are seeking to use the Olympics for their own political purposes. That's why they want to have the Olympics. They did not decide to host the Olympics because of a newly discovered love of sports; they did it for political reasons. So I think it's entirely appropriate for those who want to shine a spotlight on China's shortcomings to do so exactly as China is seeking to demonstrate their own successes and, as Jill said, to pressure China. I think it's absolutely appropriate.

Personally, I think that it's counterproductive to do so with hints of boycotts because a boycott is not going to happen. First of all, George Bush has already said that he's going to the Olympic Games and, as Sean mentioned, it was Jimmy Carter who in 1980 requested that the U.S. Olympic Committee boycott the Games. George Bush clearly is not going to do the same thing in 2008.

Secondly, the main talk of boycott so far has been related to the Darfur issue and Africa issues. Is there anyone in the room here who thinks that Kenya is going to boycott the Games? Or that Ethiopia is going to boycott the Games? Or that Tanzania is going to boycott the Games? I just watched the world track and field games on TV in Tokyo, and every race between 800 meters and 10,000 meters was won by a Kenyan except, I think, 1500 meters, which was won by a Kenyan-American. The Kenyans will be there. Trust me.

The idea that Americans would boycott an Olympic Games over an African issue where all of the African nations are there strikes me as on the face absurd. And the same fanaticism that I've had towards sports my whole life is, I think, representative of Americans in general. Americans will not understand the notion that their athletes should not be participating in the Olympic Games because of China's foreign policy.

This is certainly the most controversial Olympics site since the Moscow Games of 1980. China is the country that inarguably presents the most issues that we in the West have problems with. So again, I emphasize that it's natural and healthy to shine a

spotlight on these misdeeds. It should be done in a way that does not seem designed to humiliate China at this moment of national pride, but to encourage positive changes. I was on a radio talk show the other day, and Minky Worden from Human Rights Watch called in and described the Asia Watch approach to the game, and it's exactly what I just described. It is not to favor a boycott, but to use the Olympics as a positive spur to try to induce positive change in China, to remind China of the commitments that Sharon mentioned and to try to hold them to it. That, to me, is the right approach, and that's what we should be thinking about.

This is, after all, an Olympic Games – I haven't seen polling on it – but I think it's fair to say that it is welcomed overwhelmingly by the 1.3 billion people of China. Those of us who have been in the diplomatic game for years with the Chinese are used to the Chinese coming to us and saying that we have hurt the feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese people. I think there is a translation problem, but this is a phrase that always leaves us scratching our heads. This is the one case where it would be true. If we mishandle the Olympics and we turn it into a China-bashing event, I think we will indeed hurt the feelings of a lot of those 1.3 billion. So it's important, at least in my mind, to remember that these are not the Saffron Olympics; these are not the Genocide Olympics; these are the Beijing Olympics.

And I myself have done some quiet diplomacy with the Chinese, including very senior Chinese officials, about the Olympics and the kind of attention that is going to be paid to China as a consequence of the Olympics. I began doing so quite some time ago, long before the Washington Post discovered the issue. The point I've made to the Chinese leaders I have spoken to is that the Olympic Games – and we've heard the dates, August 8th to 24th – coincidentally happen during the height of the U.S. presidential campaign, which will be framed by our party conventions. So at a time when Americans are trying to figure out who to vote for, and they turn on the television, they are for the most part not going to be turning on to watch whichever candidates emerge from our current campaign. Instead, they will be seeing Liu Xiang running the 110-meter high hurdles.

And they will be seeing China – 300 million American TV sets will be turned to China at the height of the U.S. presidential campaign. What I have warned the Chinese leaders is that whenever China is an issue in U.S. presidential campaigns, this tends not to be good for U.S.-China relations. The history – in 1980, 1992, 2000 – is not a happy one. I've warned that China runs a serious risk of seeing itself turned into a consequential issue in the U.S. presidential campaign in 2008. I've told them this could happen basically for two reasons. Number one is trade, product safety type issues about which we know what the Chinese are trying to do. But number two is the Olympics and how they handle it.

I thought Minxin's question about confrontational human rights exercises in Beijing in August 2008 was a great question. What's going to happen when someone at the end of the 1,500 meters comes trotting out onto the track with a banner saying Free Tibet or Free Taiwan or whatever, and the *Public Security Bureau* comes sweeping

down with truncheons or worse? And this is shown on television throughout the world, if not in China. What is going to be the reaction in the U.S. presidential campaign? That's just one scenario. You can all come up with your own.

Basically, what I've told Chinese leaders is that they want to think about projecting to the world through the Beijing Olympics a China that is successful, open, and tolerant. The successful part I have no doubt they'll do, and they'll do it well. The open part I think they can do. As for the tolerant part, I can see them stiffen when I mention it. That is going to be the real challenge for them.

As for the specific foreign policy issues and what they can do, I think we should understand that no nation, including China, is going to revise its core interests and its assessment of its core national interests just because of the Olympics. But there are things they can do, and I think that NGOs and foreigners should realistically try to get them to act on them.

My congratulations to the Save Darfur people and the campaign they've run. I think it's been masterful and I think it's been effective. I personally have believed for the better part of a year that the Chinese could change their position on it, and that there was not a position of principle obstructing that. Although it was sometimes ascribed to them as a position of principle, I did not see it as a position of principle. It was a position of interest and it was one where they could adjust their diplomacy. And they've begun to do so. I also think you're absolutely right to keep the pressure on them to get them to continue to do so.

Regarding Burma, it is a much tougher nut to crack. Burma is on the border of China, and they see Burma as we would see Mexico. I don't recall in the L.A. Games and the Atlanta Games anyone talking about changing our policy towards Mexico to satisfy the international community. Burma is a complicated issue. I think that as China looks at Burma, what they're going to look at is the attitude of the ASEAN countries, which actually has been quite gratifying, and the way the ASEAN countries have moved on Burma of late. They've looked at the approach of India. And the Olympic Games will be at the bottom of their hierarchy as they think about how to deal with the Burma issue. It may affect the optics, but not the reality.

The last point I'd like to make is personal. Those of you who have known me for some years know that one issue I've spent a lot of time working on down through the years is Tibet and the Dalai Lama. If I could identify one issue where I would like to see Chinese movement before the Olympics, it would be this issue where I believe China would benefit more than they would on any other in terms of world perceptions.

Having mishandled the issue for almost 58 years, I think there's nothing that they could do that would more dramatically change perceptions of China than to reach out to the Dalai Lama. And again, speaking personally, I would rather see China judged for its own misdeeds in a case like Tibet than I would like to see them judged for the misdeeds of President Bashir or General Than Shwe. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you very much, Jeff, really excellent. We're going to open the floor to questions and take a trench of them and then have the panelists respond. I'm going to ask just one question to each person first. Jill, something that was brought up here sort of obliquely but to ask an activist group whether there is concern that the more issues you put onto the Olympics on China's plate that you lose your marginal utility that there is a kind of piling on effect, and so, whether activist groups would have that concern.

And to Jeff, this is sort of related to that, whether you think that in some ways – well, whether you have an assessment of why the Chinese have been responsive on the Darfur issue. I mean, we can make an argument about whether they have been truly responsive or not. And one question as to whether they were surprised by how quickly this issue gained momentum, and so that somehow separates it from Tibet, where for good or bad, they've been dealing with the Dalai Lama and his supporters for years. And Burma, you can go back 20 years; China was a different country then, but they have an experience of dealing with international community in Burma.

And then, Sean, my question is whether you see – not necessarily just specifically the Olympics, but a broader shift happening on both sides of the aisle in Congress towards China, and how that is related, if at all, to just broader concerns about trade and protectionism, and specifically on the Democratic side, several senators who won somewhat surprising victories in some ways running on some of those issues, and how that will play out in the fall. So please, let's take questions.

Q: This is a question for Ms. Savitt. Celebrities in particular have been remarkably successful in getting China to sort of respond – Mia Farrow, her column, et cetera. Also, the Cleveland Cavaliers – they're a team with the NBA – I can't remember the exact term they used – but their letter, is there momentum in that? Are we getting more celebrities? Is this becoming a cause or is it sort of decreasing? What's the momentum potential on that?

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you. Minxin?

MR. PEI: This is a question for Jeff. I'm intrigued by your last point about Tibet. Using what China can do at this point, will an invitation to the Dalai Lama to attend the Games change the political dynamics? If such an invitation is made without any conditions, should Dalai Lama himself consider accepting it?

Q: Thank you. I have a question for Mr. Wu. You said that it was perhaps a serious misreading that China's role in the future in the next decade will be what is projected by many here and the in the newspapers and media. I would just like to ask you to develop that claim a little bit more and talk about it, because you seem to relate

this issue to the Soviet-U.S., the Cold War era. And could you talk a little bit about economic interdependence and just really elaborate on why it's a serious misreading?

MR. KURLANTZICK: Why don't we let the panelists start on those?

MS. SAVITT: The first was the concern that the more issues you put on China's plate, the more there's a pile-on effect and could have the opposite reaction. I'd just first want to clarify something. No one in the Darfur advocacy community wants a boycott. We are staunchly, staunchly anti-boycott. We have not, will not, do not call for a boycott. It's against everything we believe in about the Games and the spirit of the Games and that that's the best place for countries to do battle.

That said, there are others in the advocacy movements that are focusing on China – Burma in particular – that are calling for a boycott. And we have been approached. For whatever reason, Darfur has been a squeaky wheel that got the grease among all these issues. And so, a lot of other organizations and issues have contacted us wanting to ally. And we are very clear that we're very mission-focused on Darfur, and we're not allying with other movements that are working on China – the thought being, our thought behind it – and we could change this – but our thinking right now is that to establish a precedent of China making some foreign policy change under pressure will be positive, but you can't do it on multi-issues. Setting the precedent is important, and then the rising tide will lift all boats. So I do think there could be a very negative effect of this pan-issue, pan-human rights pile-on on China.

The celebrity issue is – it's really been shocking to me how memorizing lines and being in front of a camera suddenly makes you an expert on a lot of things and that you are called upon to give that expertise more so than others. It's a pretty remarkable statement about where we are in terms of our national debates. So George Clooney is a big Darfur advocate, Mia Farrow – there are others who have dabbled in and out. I do think there is momentum in it. The NGOs are clawing at each other trying to get celebrities, because if you don't have a celebrity involved, it seems like you don't get the media coverage. These are pressure campaigns; they rely on media coverage, so it's really needed.

Darfur is really a complex one. The history of it is complicated, all the players. There are good guys and bad guys – it's not black and white in this situation. So there are not a lot of celebrities who want to take it on, we have found. Clooney is very well-versed in it. Mia has studied it now for four years. She is extremely well versed. I would love there to be momentum on it. But I think that Darfur is a tough issue for that.

MR. WOO: I thought your point, Jeff, about the Olympics happening in the height of the presidential campaign was a very cogent one. I only hope that my boss will be around to be able to criticize China – (laughter) – as someone who is running for president.

You know, speaking of Brownback, many members like him, back when PNTR was being discussed, sort of hesitantly, reluctantly voted for PNTR. There were issues regarding their ranking and the chamber in terms of free trade and so on. But I think that decision is being – they’re rethinking that decision because there are some really serious issues, maybe not at the surface, but beneath the surface. There is serious social unrest. I saw a statistic that there is something like 50,000 peasant revolts around the country. That’s a low estimate. It could be as high as 150 (thousand).

And this goes into your question. I mean, clearly, China is an economic juggernaut. But if history is any guide, economics itself will not determine how you will do in the long term. And I think there are many experts – and I suspect Jeff and others are thinking along those lines as well that if China does not get their infrastructure in place correctly – and what I mean by this is rule of law, the civic structures that we have, which takes a long time to build by the way, things like press freedoms. As much as we go after the Chinese, for example, on intellectual property issues, the fact is, there is probably some limits in terms of how much they can enforce and what those – (inaudible) – simply because they can’t go down to the local level. The infrastructure there is not set up so that they can. Even though it’s a command system, Beijing says something, it doesn’t necessarily translate all the way down to the village chief.

And that’s really my point about the misreading. I think there’s a lot of hype, and frankly, a lot of corporations have fallen for this. And I think they need to step back a little bit. And the Save Darfur coalition and some of those activists have really worked remarkably well through their network and the celebrity business and movie business to get some of those corporations to rethink their approach to the country. And you’re seeing it manifested in things like the toy recall and other things. And the recall affects some basic stuff, by the way, guys. I mean, it’s toys, drugs, and food. How much more basic can you get?

And I think it’s having a serious impact on China. We won’t see it right now, but we will see more of it. And as we get closer to the Olympics, we’re going to see a much more activated media. If there is lack of access into the country, and there is not as much tolerance, we’re going to see a lot more negative stories, I suspect, coming out of the media, which will gin up the public and then gin up the Congress.

MR. BADER: Let me first try Josh’s question about why have the Chinese been responsive in Darfur and did what happen there on this issue surprise them. I think that what you speculated there, Josh, is right. The fact that Darfur is the first issue out of the box linked to the Olympics – and linked with the word “boycott” in it – got the Chinese attention in a special way. It certainly surprised them.

Although it didn’t surprise them that Americans were concerned about the issue, I think the administration and State Department, Bob Zoellick and Negroponte, have made the issue pretty much one of their top-tier issues in their dialogue with the Chinese. So they knew it was a matter of concern, but they hadn’t heard the link to the Olympics before.

Why have they adjusted, as I think they have? I think that they have leverage there. Bashir does not have leverage over them – they have leverage over Bashir. The notion that China needs Sudan for oil is a complete misunderstanding of the way international oil markets work. If China didn't have the 250,000 barrels a day that they are pumping out of the Sudan, it wouldn't make one bit of difference to China's development. They would just buy that oil from Saudi Arabia or from Nigeria or somewhere else. The PetroChina investment in Sudan is an interest of PetroChina, but it is not vital to China's national security in any way.

So I think that the Chinese understood that they had some leverage, especially since Bashir – given the way that Sudan has been isolated from most of the rest of the world – didn't have an awful lot of choices, and they could tighten their diplomacy a little bit. And as I said earlier, I don't think it had to do with a matter of principle. It's a place far removed from China's border. I think it was a relatively easy call for China compared to, let's say, Burma.

Minxin's question about the Dalai Lama, about whether he could be invited and whether he should accept – the noises coming out of Beijing right now is unusually bad because of the Dalai Lama's imminent visit to Washington and the gold medal ceremony that is planned on Capitol Hill on October 17th. So their propaganda machine is in full force at the moment. It's just the sort of Cultural Revolution type of stuff that is coming out about the Dalai Lama nowadays.

On the other hand, there have been six rounds of discussion between the Dalai Lama's representatives and the Chinese since 2002, which have been – well, let's say – they've occurred in a decent atmosphere. The Tibetans have laid all their demands on the table, and the Chinese listen and take them on board. I would put the chances of something positive happening on Tibet such as the Dalai Lama being invited back at somewhere in the 10 percent range. I don't regard it as a high probability, but I don't regard it as impossible.

The Tibetans have mentioned it often enough to the Chinese, and the Chinese listen and take it on board. I think that the Chinese general perspective is they think they're playing a winning hand in Tibet. They look at the infiltration, the migration of Hans to the region, the railroad, the general pacification of Tibet in the last 20 years, the economic development, and the actuarial tables – the Dalai Lama presumably is not immortal, at least on this earth – and they have their own intentions for what they can do after he goes. So I don't see any sign yet that the Chinese have changed that basic calculation. We keep trying, and I don't regard it as impossible.

Now, should the Dalai Lama accept if he were invited? I would say unquestionably yes. I understand the argument that he could be invited back for a token visit and the fundamental concerns of the Tibetan people would not benefit in the process. That is a risk, certainly. But you've had, since 1959, no positive developments

in terms of Han treatment, in my view, of Tibet. That's perhaps an overstatement, but not by much.

If the Dalai Lama were to be invited back, even for a visit to a holy mountain or something like that, that would be a step that I think that the Dalai Lama should build on. The Dalai Lama remains the center of Tibetan Buddhism, and he doesn't want to go back as the leader of a Tibetan government. If the Dalai Lama were to go back, this would be tremendously gratifying for all Tibetans, in terms of their religious conviction, because of the Dalai Lama's central role in their belief structure. So I think that is something that he could not overlook.

The other point on the Chinese side about why the Chinese are unlikely to do it, aside from the fact that they think they're playing a winning hand, is their insecurity about the Dalai Lama and what would happen. Although they think they're playing a winning hand, they're still not sure. If the Dalai Lama were to come home, even for a visit, what would happen in Tibet? And trust me, they watched the television screens – what was going on in Burma the last few weeks – and they saw people in red robes, and they can picture them in orange robes just as easily. I think that the Chinese leadership still does not trust the Dalai Lama, and they don't know what direction he would go if he comes home. Now, we've spent a lot of time trying to convince them that that is an illusion based on a false reading of history and his current views, but I don't doubt that there is a real concern that if there were uprisings, could they be sure which way the Dalai Lama would go with it?

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you. Do we have other questions? Yes.

Q: Thank you. Thanks to the panel for three really wonderful sets of insights. I wanted to ask a question of all three of you. Based on flowing from Sam's reference to the misunderstanding of China, profound misreading, which I think has been more than 200 years. It's a long one. It's a longstanding misunderstanding. And Jeff's comment with respect to China's position as being one of an interest position, of which means, of course, you can recalibrate your position, depending on your shifting of what you see the perceiving shifting interests are.

So my question is that what I think is not overall in the debates about the Olympics in China has not been really explicitly or critically focused on enough is the ways in which every actor is interested. That is, the corporate sponsors, and the U.S. government and the EU government, all of them have a position of interest. And to borrow from Al Gore, this is not an inconvenient truth. It seems to me more that in China, or with respect to China, there is this willingness to accept a convenient half-truth. And that the convenient half-truths flow from the need to keep one's own position of interest. So I was interested in you commenting on that, and also specifically to offer any insights about rhetorical or tactical kinds of thoughts, directions that we can go.

And Jill, a quick comment on showing the Tiananmen Square image, Hill & Knowlton was hired after '89 to help repair the damaged image. And Hill & Knowlton

was also hired first to be the international PR consultant for the Olympics. So the linkages are quite clear.

MR. KURLANTZICK: Let's take one more question. Yes?

Q: Lawrence Lu with the congressional executive commission on China. I had a question for Sean Woo. What kind of feedback are you getting from your constituents and the constituents of other members of Congress about their concerns relating to China? Is this going to be on their radar screen in the run-up to the Olympics? And are they going to be concerned primarily with things like – things that affect their daily lives, have more of a direct impact, such as food and product safety? Or are they focusing as well on issues of human rights and issues like Darfur. Just a question about sort of what your sense is as far as sentiments among just average Americans.

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you.

MS. SAVITT: To Sharon's question, we approach this campaign with the idea of privately engaging with everybody. Even though we're a public campaign and a pressure campaign, we did approach everyone first. And our thought was to give every of these actors – each of them – the chance to do the right thing. And we've been roundly disappointed. And we gave them not only the chance, but the time. And we set our bars pretty modestly.

For the corporate sponsors, for instance, we asked them to either have a public or private communication with the IOC, a public or private communication with the Chinese host, to sign a pledge, which was very complimentary of China and respectful of China, but also said there are key issues and you could play a leadership role. None of our rhetoric is slamming in the least. We constantly focus on the Olympic spirit and the Olympic values and tapping into those and China playing a leadership role.

So across the board, though, no one has decided that they are in a position, even in the face of genocide, to raise their voice. And it's been so curious about really the fear that we have seen among many different players to speak out, either because bilaterally there are other interests having to do with China and for the corporate sponsors economically. So that's been very frustrating. I don't know. I have not used the term Genocide Olympics. Our campaign doesn't use it. It seems to work though, so we might need to ratchet up to that.

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you.

MR. WOO: I If may just make a comment about something that Jeff had said earlier, and I think he's absolutely correct that oil is not the be all and end all for China. If they don't get it from Sudan, they can get it from others. But one observation I would make is – and this may be anecdotal – when I traveled to Khartoum with Senator Brownback back in 2004 on the Lufthansa airline, three-quarters of the plane were Chinese businessmen. Not all of them were in the oil business; these were construction

people, architects, traders. And so, there is an entire business infrastructure that is built around the oil business, which was the entre into the country.

And I think you see this not only Sudan, where the Chinese do business, the same thing is the case in Burma and North Korea, where there is actually wholesale takeover of the country; not just selling goods there, simply buying up land, because there is also a historical issue with respect to North Korea.

To Sharon's question, you know, the issue that people like me and others on the Hill are sort of dealing with is we don't really have much options, at least with respect to the Olympics. There is the House resolution calling for a boycott. Doesn't seem to be much appetite for it. Coburn is not getting much traction on that particular bill.

But the bigger question for us is, even if we pass the resolution, so what? I mean, is that the right thing to do in terms of the movement that we want in some really serious areas, and human rights and the trade imbalance that we have, which is sort of – to use Ross Perot's phrase of years ago – sucking away the investment from Central America and South America, where we really need to have investment, because we've got long-term issues of immigration. And I think the problem of immigration is that life here is better than life down there. And that's why we have those issues.

So that's where the investments, for example, should be going. But because of a rush to invest in China back in 2000, and just an unsustainable level of growth in China, it is creating, I think, for the long term, some serious issues that we really haven't grappled with. Corporations look at quarterly results; they don't look at five, 10-year results down the line. And just looking at – I forget the gentleman's name – Randy's presentation on air pollution, just that alone shows you the degree to which the things that are going on in China will have a worldwide global impact. The sandstorms in the Gobi Desert, you can see it in Seattle in the springtime. So I don't know if that answers your question, Sharon.

MR. BADER: Yeah, just a quick comment. Sharon, I understood your question in part to be about corporate interests and whether corporate interests could be shaped or engaged in some fashion in objectives relating to the Olympics. I think that for the focus on human rights, the short answer is no. In my many years of working with American companies on China human rights issues, I have never found one that wanted to get its profile above the trench line on such issues. There's been a long history dating back to the 1990s and Ron Brown and corporate codes of conduct and all that. Anyone that does get their profile above the trench line will find that they are shot. I think that the Chinese will have options and someone else will get the contract. That said, no one wants to be a Yahoo! and no one wants to have a Yahoo! type experience. You can get corporations to play defense but not offense.

Just on your phrase, an inconvenient truth, we and naturally the NGOs are focusing on China's shortcomings. But I think it's important to remember that China is, in my view, one of the great success stories of the last 30 years. What China has done,

considering where they were in 1978 and where they are now, is truly remarkable, and any of us who have lived there during that period know it.

I remember going to China with Bob Zoellick. In 2001, he had a press conference and began by talking about the incredible economic vision and leadership of the Chinese party and government over the last 30 years. As he said, I'm not talking about this in the abstract; I'm comparing it to every other developing country in the world that I've experienced. The decisions they have made with regard to their economic development have been consistently sound. That is not something you can say about an awful lot of other developing countries during that same period.

So the Chinese – I think there are a lot of inconvenient truths, and that this is a system which Americans don't enormously admire, but which has had tremendous achievements and tremendous successes, which have profoundly changed the lives of their people. And that is one of the things that the Chinese government is going to be looking to show off in 2008. At the same time we are highlighting all of these enormous shortcomings, both in the foreign policy and the domestic policy, we should not forget that.

MR. KURLANTZICK: Thank you. And please join me in thanking our panelists for a really excellent panel.

(Applause.)

(END)