Introduction

The analysis of geopolitical trends in the Indian Ocean has always constituted a uniquely challenging undertaking. For decades, strategic pundits have cyclically recognized the region's growing importance, yet struggled to define both its boundaries and its precise geopolitical significance. Part of the difficulty lies, no doubt, in the very conceptualization of the region. Should the Indian Ocean be construed as a unified geopolitical space or simply as a series of overlapping, but distinct, strategic spheres? Is it an economic thoroughfare characterized first and foremost by trade and cooperation or a breeding pool for future great-power rivalry, where growing fears of resource vulnerability may come to exacerbate preexisting security dilemmas?

In such a light, India has demonstrated a remarkable consistency in its conceptualization of the Indian Ocean, viewing the region holistically—and as a potential launching pad for its rise to great-power status—rather than solely through a narrow geographic lens. Although New Delhi has long recognized the importance of the Indian Ocean, it has begun to display the underpinnings of a true maritime geostrategy only relatively recently. This chapter aims to explain the reasons behind such an evolution by examining one of its most central components—India's evolving attitude toward plurilateralism and multilateralism in the Indian Ocean.

The chapter proceeds in four parts, which are structured both thematically and chronologically. First, it examines the early years, when postcolonial India's approach toward its maritime environs was proprietary, exclusionary, and deeply rooted in the rhetoric of nonalignment. It argues that New Delhi's
strong animus toward foreign presence in the Indian Ocean was not only normative in its groundings, but also highly instrumental in its motivations and deeply intertwined with the young nation’s particular set of strategic circumstances at the time.

The second section charts India’s gradual move away from a reflexive sense of maritime embattlement and toward a more self-confident and inclusive stance in the Indian Ocean. A variety of factors explain such a shift in attitude, which occurred in an era when there was a singularly benign maritime environment. These favorable geopolitical conditions opened up a new era of opportunity—or maritime peace dividend—during which India could focus its growing naval capabilities first and foremost on projecting soft power throughout the Indo-Pacific maritime sphere. The Indian navy’s embrace of its role in soft power projection became apparent via its involvement in a seemingly exponential array of plurilateral maritime efforts. On the multilateral front, India displayed a growing proclivity to shape both its maritime environment and the law of the sea.

The following section examines the various obstacles that could undermine New Delhi’s attempts to use coordinated collective actions as a means of emerging as the prime integrative power in the Indian Ocean. These challenges range from the institutional to the political and take place under the strategic backdrop of the growing presence of powerful extra-regional actors. Building on such observations, the fourth and final section suggests that India’s era of maritime opportunity in the Indian Ocean is rapidly drawing to a close. Various evolutions in India’s tactical and strategic environment will compel New Delhi to adopt a more utilitarian attitude in the practice of its maritime diplomacy. This will express itself through a stronger emphasis on bilateralism, most notably with the United States, and through a reprioritization of the harder components of India’s growing maritime power.

**Moral Strength and Material Weakness:**

On December 16, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution declaring the Indian Ocean “for all time a zone of peace.” This came a year after the Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference, which had called for “states to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great-power rivalries and competitions as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competitions . . . are excluded.” India, along with other nations such as Sri Lanka, had spearheaded the initiative. Fearful of a destabilizing power vacuum following Britain’s retreat east of Suez, India’s
attitude toward the Indian Ocean was both proprietary and exclusionary. It
was also profoundly reflective of a strong sense of maritime embattlement,
arguably inherited from the young nation's colonial past and considerably
reinforced by various incidents, such as the dispatch of an Indonesian naval
flotilla into the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistan War of 19652 or the
well-known deployment of the USS Enterprise Carrier Task Force in the Bay
of Bengal in December 1971.3

Throughout much of the period, however, India's prime strategic concerns
were situated on land rather than on sea. Indeed, after a series of brutal frontier
conflicts in which navies played at best a secondary role, India's main priorities
were to strengthen its land borders and build up its army and air force, which
were the primary actors in the event of a conflict with China or Pakistan.

Some analysts have viewed New Delhi's seemingly excessive fixation on its
continental borders as more than a simple response to strategic circumstances
and as a complex form of strategic path dependency. One such thinker argued
that India's continentalism should be interpreted as a legacy of the policies of
the Raj,4 whose administrators had historically privileged the Indian army
over the air force, whose role was largely confined to air policing, and the
Indian navy, which was almost systematically neglected. This vision is shared
by numerous observers since, who tend to ascribe India's various maritime
shortcomings to a wider malaise inherent to the nation's strategic culture.5
Regardless of the debate over the supposedly continentalist character of
Indian strategic culture, the empirical data clearly show that for the first
decades following independence the navy remained severely underfunded.
Nevertheless, even as it struggled to make its case vis-à-vis an occasionally sea-
blind political leadership, it remained a carrier-centric force, with a service
culture imbued with a strong understanding of the guiding tenets of sea power
and geared toward blue-water operations and sea control.6

Faced with the dual reality of its relative material weakness and the increasing
presence of powerful extra-regional navies in its maritime backyard, India
resorted to a tactic typically employed by smaller powers fearful of foreign
entanglement and desirous of focusing on internal development—strident
moral opposition.7 New Delhi's past embrace of the notion of the Indian
Ocean as a “zone of peace” can therefore be viewed in much the same light as
the former Yugoslav leader Josip Tito's call to designate the Mediterranean as
a “Sea of Peace.”8 Both nations, desirous of maintaining a degree of strategic
flexibility in a rapidly rigidifying bipolar world, attempted to use principles as
a means of preserving a modicum of autonomy while inhibiting potential
great-power aggression.
For India, the quest for greater agency was couched in the grammar of nonalignment and third world solidarity. Eminent scholars of the region have pointed to the complex, multifaceted nature of India’s policy of nonalignment, which cannot solely be understood through an ideational lens. One observer, for instance, astutely notes that India’s “policies had (both) normative and instrumental underpinnings,” before adding that “at a systemic level, the policy made sense as it enabled a materially weak state to play a role that was considerably more significant than its capabilities would warrant.”

Prime Minister Nehru himself noted that he “had not originated non-alignment” but that the policy was “inherent in the circumstances of India.” The fluid nature of the cold war environment meant that this same set of strategic circumstances evolved over the years, most notably when the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with China in the 1970s induced India to draw closer to the Soviet Union. Both countries’ navies substantively enhanced their cooperation, with the Indians importing and hybridizing an increasing amount of Soviet naval hardware and the Soviets assisting in construction of the Indian Eastern Naval Headquarters in Visakhapatnam. Despite this increased proximity, both navies never engaged in formal joint exercises, although they reportedly occasionally coordinated their antisubmarine warfare capabilities to monitor American submarine patrols.

As U.S.-Soviet naval competition gradually spilled over into the Indian Ocean, U.S. analysts drew attention to the renewed importance of a region they had long considered to be something of a geopolitical backwater. In an eerie foreshadowing of today’s geopolitical struggles, both superpowers sparred for influence over small, but strategically situated, island nations such as the Seychelles. With scant regard for the 1971 UNGA resolution, both Moscow and Washington gained access to naval facilities sprinkled at various points of the Indian Ocean. After the Iranian revolution and the energy crisis of 1979, the Carter administration decisively refocused America’s attention on the Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean. U.S. national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, famously observed that “an arc of crisis” stretched “along the shores of the Indian Ocean with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation,” before warning that “the resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.”

This vision of an Indian Ocean marked by political fragility and riddled with potential maritime security gaps remains highly relevant to this day. The Soviet Union, for its part, also decided to expand its naval operations in the Indian Ocean, not only to ensure the safety of its sea lanes of commu-
nication, but also to prevent the Indian Ocean from becoming its soft maritime underbelly. Indeed, many Soviet strategists at the time were concerned that the United States and its allies could attempt to “outflank” the Soviet Union by unleashing submarines capable of targeting the Soviet mainland from the balmy depths of the Indian Ocean.14

For much of the Indian strategic community, the dire warnings of the United States on the Indian Ocean’s looming “arc of crisis” served to mask other, more insidious motivations. Indeed, a parsing of much of the strategic literature emanating from New Delhi at the time reveals the extent to which India’s appreciation of its maritime environs was still permeated by a strong sense of embattlement and a lingering apprehension over the coercive effects of American sea power. This residual mistrust expressed itself through a strong indictment of the strengthening of U.S. naval presence in the region as well as through frequently relayed concerns over the enlargement of U.S. submarine pens in places such as Diego Garcia. During a joint Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the New Delhi–based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses event, in 1985, an unnamed Indian participant gave voice to such feelings: “I have felt for many years that there is an over-determination if exaggerated emphasis on the so-called vital economic interests of the West in the Indian Ocean . . . And based on this wrong assumption of the so-called vital interests, a large force structure has been projected into the Indian Ocean.”15 Such statements reflect India’s overriding anxiety at the time over the nation’s supposed vulnerability to maritime suasion, a concern that, paradoxically, often seemed to take precedence over more conventional fears of a naval defeat in combat on the high seas.

Despite the largely reactive nature of India’s vision of maritime developments in its region, the instrumental and symbolic value of the Indian navy began to be more appreciated by India’s political leadership in the mid-1980s, under the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi. During that period (1984–89), the Indian navy was a vital component of the Indian peacekeeping force’s operations in Sri Lanka (ferrying troops, providing off-shore fire support, and combating suicide vessels of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam, LTTE) and intervened successfully in support of the president of the small island nation of the Maldives, who was the victim of an attempted coup d’état. India’s navy was bolstered by the induction of several high-end platforms, ranging from a nuclear attack submarine on lease from Russia to a new aircraft carrier acquired from the United Kingdom. This rapid accretion of Indian naval capability—and visibility—stoked fears in Canberra and some Southeast Asian capitals, whose denizens tended to view India, somewhat incorrectly, as
little more than a South Asian surrogate of the Soviet Union. In April 1989 Time Magazine’s front cover featured a hybridized Indian frigate, INS Godavari, bristling with missiles and accompanied by the bold caption “Super India.” For the first time, India’s potential as a future maritime superpower was being noted, both at home and abroad. However, this recognition was not necessarily accompanied by the blossoming of a sophisticated form of Indian maritime geostrategy. As retired naval officer and strategic analyst Uday Bhaskar notes in an excellent study of the history of India’s naval diplomacy, “While the rapid development of the Indian navy boosted India’s image on the global scene, such development was not leavened in tandem with astute strategic communications and related naval diplomacy.”

The Dutch-American strategist Nicholas J. Spykman famously observed, “A land power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a central point of control, while a sea power thinks in terms of points and connecting lines dominating an immense territory.” Until the end of the cold war, India’s focus remained resolutely that of a land power, whose strategic outlook radiated outward from the central node of New Delhi rather than into the yawning maritime expanses of the Indian Ocean.

Understanding India’s Turn toward Maritime Engagement:

With the end of the cold war, India’s foreign policy underwent a radical shift. The collapse of its erstwhile partner, the Soviet Union, and the crippling economic impact of recurring balance of payment issues moved New Delhi’s decisionmakers toward greater pragmatism in their dealings on the world stage. This shift was ideological and substantive—ideological, as it represented, to a degree, a departure from India’s former attachment to third worldism and Nehruvian ideals of nonalignment, and substantive, as it manifested itself through a desire to engage, both economically and strategically, with multiple partners. On the economic front, India’s reformist finance minister, Manmohan Singh, who gradually prized open India’s statist and regulation-ridden economy to foreign investment and business competition, spearheaded reforms. As a result, the share of mercantile trade in India’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by leaps and bounds. Indeed, as of 2011, maritime trade constituted close to 41 percent of India’s overall GDP. Nearly 90 percent of India’s trade in volume, and more than 77 percent of its trade in value, is maritime in nature. This stands in stark contrast to the prereform era, when overall international trade accounted for little more than 16 percent of the country’s GDP. India’s rapid economic growth has been fueled by
steadily rising sea-borne energy imports. India now imports close to 73 percent of its oil, the bulk of which flows into India via the western Indian Ocean, from the Middle East and Africa.22 As an element of comparison, China, which faces what former president Hu Jintao famously described as a “Malacca Dilemma,” imports only 55 percent of its crude oil.23 The underlying difference lies in each country’s perception of its maritime environment. While Beijing, confined within its so-called “first island chain,”24 fears that its seaborne trade and crucial energy flows could be imperiled by the initiation of hostile economic warfare by the United States and its allies, New Delhi does not appear, at first glance, to confront a similar array of potentially hostile actors—even though, arguably, it faces a “Hormuz Dilemma” of its own. The Indian navy has endeavored, in both iterations of its Maritime Doctrine, released in 2004 and in 2009, as well as in its Maritime Strategy, released in 2007, to alert the civilian leadership and the public writ large of the importance of the navy’s role as the ultimate guarantor of India’s economic growth, by virtue of its role in upholding freedom of navigation and ensuring the safety of the region’s sea lanes of communication.25

Most significantly, India has been increasingly proactive in its desire to shape the multilateral discourse pertaining to the law of the sea. Having ratified the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea in June 1995, thirteen years after initially signing the treaty in 1982, India is now deeply involved in a bevy of UN bodies relating to maritime issues—whether it is the International Maritime Organization, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), or the International Seabed Authority.26 In addition to this, notes Indian naval analyst Vijay Sakhija, Indian jurists have developed something of a niche expertise in maritime matters. For example, one of the judges of ITLOS is a well-known Indian legal expert—P. Chandrasekhar Rao.27 Most recently, India has sought to capitalize on its presence within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to exhort the international community to craft a more comprehensive antipiracy strategy in the Indian Ocean. In November 2012 the UNSC adopted an India-initiated statement encouraging member-states to coordinate their efforts and to criminalize acts of piracy under their domestic legislations.28 The statement was novel in the sense that it called for a more holistic appreciation of nonstate threats to the global maritime commons, whether they be in the Gulf of Guinea, which has experienced a recrudescence of acts of piracy over the past few months, or off the coast of Somalia. The statement also sought to lay the groundwork for the development of more stringent, and commonly accepted, rules of deployment for private security contractors. This issue has gained relevance in India
after two Italian marines shot Indian fishermen in the Arabian Sea after purportedly mistaking them for pirates.  

While there is an animated discussion surrounding the issue of whether or not contemporary India has a readily identifiable grand strategy, there is a widespread consensus that sustained economic growth remains the nation's overriding strategic priority. As a result, notes a recent and much-discussed report, "India's primary strategic interest is to maintain an open economic order." The clear prioritization of economic growth should therefore logically correlate with a decisive rebalancing in favor of its navy, which appears best placed among the three services to protect the nation's growing seaborne equities. For the time being, however, it remains unclear whether this is the case. Although the latest Ministry of Defense Annual Report observes, "There is a growing acceptance of the fact that the maritime domain is the prime facilitator of the development," this recognition has not yet been translated in budgetary terms. Indeed, from 2010 to 2011 India's "Cinderella Service" only captured 15 percent of the defense budget. In 2012 the navy's allocation was hiked to 18 percent. Although this is an encouraging development, it remains to be seen whether it marks the advent of a new, more sea power-friendly era in Indian strategic planning or whether the additional funds will serve primarily to pay off previously acquired platforms. The underwhelming nature of these figures can be attributed, no doubt, to the absence of both a clearly discernible threat to Indian shipping and trade and of an existential threat to the Indian navy.

India's overwhelming superiority over Pakistan enabled it to concentrate its eastern and western fleets in the Arabian Sea and engage in coercive maneuvering outside Karachi during the 1999 Kargil crisis without fear of severe repercussions. China's role in the Indian Ocean and its so-called "string of pearls" strategy is frequently discussed, often in sensationalistic terms, in the Indian press. Much is made of China's attempts to establish pockets of influence in the region, with several Indian commentators casting in a sinister light China's infrastructural undertakings in places such as Gwadar, a port along Pakistan Makran's coast, or Hambantota, on the southern tip of Sri Lanka. Most informed observers, however, believe that China, for the time being at least, is pursuing a strategy of "places rather than bases" in the Indian Ocean and that there is no compelling evidence yet to suggest that the Chinese navy has engaged in basing activities of an overtly military nature. The Indian Maritime Strategy and the Maritime Doctrine, for their part, only mention China in passing, with fleeting—albeit foreboding—references to "some nations' attempts to gain a strategic toehold in the Indian Ocean Rim"
or to “attempts by China to strategically encircle India.” The expansion of the Chinese navy and its presence in the Indian Ocean is taken seriously by both the navy and the civilian leadership, but is viewed, for the time being at least, as a long-term—rather than an immediate—challenge to India’s maritime security. In short, India’s oceanic surroundings are deemed secure from conventional threats for two reasons—one prospective naval adversary is considered too weak, while the other appears too remote. Both of these assumptions are dangerously flawed.

New Delhi’s sanguine approach to maritime security has had a profound impact on how the nation has regarded the use of naval power. In a relatively threat-free environment, India’s navy has focused on soft power projection and on benign and constabulary roles. This has been reflected both in words, via the 2004 version of the Indian Maritime Doctrine, which defined the navy as an “effective instrument of India’s foreign policy by generating goodwill through maritime diplomacy,” and in actions, as over the past decade the Indian navy has frequently displayed with a certain panache its desire and capacity to be viewed as a provider of public goods as well as a reliable partner. Indian ships have thus taken part in a wide range of humanitarian and disaster relief operations over the years, whether in the wake of the devastating 2004 tsunami or the 2008 cyclone Nargis. India has also engaged in noncombatant evacuation operations, such as in 2006, when four Indian ships successfully evacuated more than 2000 Indian, Nepalese, and Sri Lankan citizens from war-torn Lebanon. More recently, Indian ships were dispatched to repatriate Indian citizens from Libya. The Indian navy is also engaged in multiple, increasingly institutionalized, naval exercises with a plethora of both regional and extra-regional navies, ranging from France to Singapore. During the first decade following the cold war, the Indian navy conducted close to fifty joint naval exercises with more than twenty countries. Since then, India’s naval interactions have grown exponentially. In order to better coordinate this plurilateralist surge, the Indian navy decided in 2004 to establish the Directorate of Foreign Cooperation, devoted to managing the service’s diplomatic role and placed under the supervision a two-star admiral.

Large-scale collective naval maneuvers—such as the MILAN exercises (meaning “confluence” in Hindi), which include several navies from South-East Asia and take place biennially off the Andaman and Nicobar islands, or the IBSAMAR exercises, which involve the navies from India, Brazil, and South Africa—form the most visible, high-profile examples of India’s turn to maritime plurilateralism. New Delhi also engages in annual bilateral naval exercises with countries as varied as Japan (JIMEX), Singapore (SIMBEX),
France (VARUNA), and the United States (MALABAR). In 2008 the Indian navy took the lead in organizing and conducting the inaugural Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which is loosely modeled on the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. The IONS hosts thirty-five members and provides a forum for discussion for all littoral navies of the Indian Ocean, through a series of seminars and workshops on issues of common concern such as piracy or the effects of climate change.

New Delhi also seeks to expand its custodial role in the Indian Ocean and to demonstrate its ability to provide security. It has thus helped to ensure the safety of key sea lanes of communication and the freedom of navigation, by deploying a small naval task force in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, escorting U.S. ships through the Malacca Straits after 9/11, or deploying vessels near Colombo during the 2008 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation summit in order to provide protection against a possible LTTE attack. Significantly, India has chosen to accomplish such actions on a unilateral basis under the UNSC resolution and the Combined Multinational Taskforce (CTF) 151. This suggests that, while New Delhi is increasingly apt to engage in naval cooperation, it remains leery of joining groupings with rotating command structures, which could curtail its operational autonomy.37

Finally, India is an active member of several regional forums and institutions, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, which focuses on trade issues and was launched in 1997, or the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

The Limits to India’s Integrative Power:

A subtle blend of economic and ideological factors has therefore underpinned India’s maritime diplomacy in the Indian Ocean since the end of the cold war. Are these efforts being harnessed to serve a greater purpose? What are New Delhi’s primary goals in the region, and what are the potential obstacles to the fulfillment of India’s ambitions?

The question of whether India has a clearly defined Indian Ocean strategy is difficult to answer, given the absence of an official national security strategy or publicly released triservice white paper. Nevertheless, judging by various statements or writings issued by both India’s leadership and the country’s vibrant strategic community, New Delhi seems to have a relatively coherent and structured vision of its present and future role in the Indian Ocean region. The study of such pronouncements suggests that India is animated by two desires:
—Enhance its global prestige by being viewed as a responsible stakeholder and custodian of the global commons and
—Favorably shape its maritime security environment by emerging as an integrative power within a largely disaggregated region.

The value of maritime diplomacy as a means of bolstering perceptions of India as a compassionate and responsible power has become something of a leitmotif among India’s strategists. Thus, when Sahuja commented on the Indian navy’s performance in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, he also added, “The international community acknowledged India’s capability and regis- tered its presence in the tsunami-affected region as a compassionate power capable of helping its neighbors even when its own shores are troubled.”

Underlying New Delhi’s embrace of the political use of sea power is the age-old observation that states which orient their power seaward can more easily calibrate and shape perceptions, and therefore appear less threatening to their neighbors, than those which remain wedded to a more continentalist mindset. In a region composed of a wide array of political regimes, many of which are characterized by severe democratic dysfunction or creeping authoritarianism, the Indian navy goes so far as to suggest that Indian ships compose not only “small mobile pieces of national sovereignty,” but also floating incarnations of the virtues of Indian democracy. The 2009 Maritime Doctrine thus posits that “the mere presence of an Indian warship, with its multi-ethnic and multi-religious crew in a foreign harbor, will contribute to India’s image as a vibrant democracy abroad.” The Indian navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy also emphasizes the need for the navy to be able to “project power” abroad. This aspiration is equally evident in the 2009 Maritime Doctrine, which outlines primary and secondary areas of maritime interest. The primary zone stretches as far as the Persian Gulf, whose narrow channels were once patrolled by the British Indian fleet, and the secondary zone extends all the way to the Red and South China seas. This pan-oceanic vision is shared, to some extent, by elements of the civilian leadership. The former prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, for example, stated that India’s “security environment ranged(s) from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean . . . and Southeast Asia,” and his expansive definition was reprinted a year later by his successor, Manmohan Singh, who declared that India’s “strategic footprint covers the region bounded by the Horn of Africa, West Asia . . . Southeast Asia, and beyond, to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean.”

In addition, maritime diplomacy is viewed as a means of favorably shaping India’s wider security environment and its emergence as a leading integrative power within a region beset by numerous challenges, ranging from
severe governance deficits to the risks associated with natural disasters and climate change.\textsuperscript{44} India’s ambition to form a more coherent and readily identifiable region with itself at the core is frequently manifested by both its political and military leadership. The 2011–12 Ministry of Defense Annual Report notes, “India’s location . . . at the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a vantage point in relation . . . to the IOR [Indian Ocean Rim].”\textsuperscript{45} A former chief of naval staff, Nirmal Verma, observed in his outgoing speech, “Given our [India’s] geographical position, our natural paradigm is to architect the stability of our region via our maritime routes.”\textsuperscript{46} This ambition to foster greater stability within India’s maritime backyard is being pursued via a two-pronged strategy. The first method is to discharge an increasing number of custodial duties within the Indian Ocean. The second is to implement a so-called “neo-Nixonian” strategy, which focuses on building regional capacity and helping smaller, weaker states to “help themselves.”\textsuperscript{47} The Indian navy’s expertise in the area of hydrography has proven particularly valuable to smaller littoral states, which frequently call on Indian survey ships and hydrographers. New Delhi has also worked toward generating regional maritime capability by training personnel from several smaller navies in the region and by assisting countries such as the Maldives to set up maritime surveillance networks.\textsuperscript{48}

Nevertheless, despite India’s efforts to emerge as a leading, integrative power within the Indian Ocean, numerous obstacles risk jeopardizing the realization of its maritime vision, many of which are embedded within the very nature of its neighborhood. Indeed, theorists of regional security structures have identified preliminary conditions that must be met in order to ensure lasting, self-sustaining, regional stability. External actors with interests in the region must refrain from interference; interstate frictions must remain at a relatively low level or be dealt with in an effective manner by regional institutions, and regional states must display a measure of success in resolving their own internal tensions.\textsuperscript{49} Unfortunately, none of these conditions have been met in the Indian Ocean. Extra-regional actors remain pivotal players, most notably the United States, which continues to boost the most powerful naval presence in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Although New Delhi and Washington have displayed a greater degree of strategic convergence over the past decade, as long as the United States remains the prime naval power in the region, India will be viewed as the foremost resident power—but not as the indispensable power—by smaller states within the region. Furthermore, China’s growing economic influence among smaller archipelagic and littoral states considerably dilutes any Indian bid for uncontested control over its maritime environs. An additional obstacle to any integrative agenda lies in the
fact that the Indian Ocean's waters continue to be roiled by a long succession of maritime territorial disputes and sporadic tensions over the nature and extent of countries’ exclusive economic zones.

India is interlocked in several such disputes, and this abiding reality severely impedes its emergence as an integrative power within the Indian Ocean. For instance, New Delhi continues to differ with Colombo over the management of fishing in the Palk Strait and has joined Myanmar in a dispute against Bangladesh at the ITLOS over the demarcation of mutual maritime boundaries. Tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the dispute remain rife and have recently led to small-scale naval jostling in the Bay of Bengal.50 Most important, the Indo-Pakistani maritime territorial dispute, which centers on the delayed resolution of the land boundary in Sir Creek (a 40-kilometer-long spit of marshland in the Rann of Kutch) off India's Gujarat and Pakistan's Sindh provinces and the delineation of its maritime extension, has yet to be resolved. As for all territorial issues, India prefers to keep negotiations strictly bilateral and brooks no external interference. When it comes to questions pertaining to its own sovereignty, New Delhi is clearly not multilateralist at heart. Since 2007, leaders on both sides have frequently voiced their optimism over an eventual mutually advantageous accommodation. Yet both New Delhi and Islamabad continue to differ over the precise methodology for solving the dispute, and the latest round of talks was deemed unsuccessful.51 More recently, and somewhat ominously, Pakistan announced its decision to increase substantially the number of its marines, who are tasked primarily with patrolling the Sir Creek area.52 Both nations frequently arrest each other's fishermen for violating maritime boundaries, with Pakistan's Maritime Security Agency most recently detaining more than 100 Indian fishermen. These maritime tensions indicate a wider trend of Indo-Pakistani interactions, which have frequently led to standoffs and brinkmanship.53 More generally, Pakistan remains profoundly hostile to the idea of India emerging as a natural leader within the Indian Ocean Rim. Pakistan's navy invariably portrays India’s increased naval presence and activity as signs of New Delhi's latent hegemonistic tendencies54 and continues to articulate its own, distinct, strategic vision for the Arabian Sea.

Finally, numerous internal tensions still ripple through the region, which hosts some of the world's most dysfunctional failed states. Somalia constitutes a prime example of how a glaring lack of governance ashore can lead to “yawning maritime security gaps” at sea.55 The continued relevance of Brzezinski's notion of an Indian Ocean “arc of instability” suggests that the area may still be more of a “largely disaggregated oceanic and littoral zone and a collection
of subregions than a coherent, unified region.”56 The World Bank, for its part, has singled out South Asia as being the “least integrated part of the world.”57

In sum, three factors—the strong (and in the case of China, growing) influence of extra-regional actors; the persistence of interstate tensions, most notably the failure to resolve long-standing maritime disputes; and the continued lack of functional governance in some states—ensure that India’s ambitions to emerge as the region’s integrative power are likely to remain unfulfilled.

The End of an Era?

In addition to this depressing set of realities, India’s maritime security environment is undergoing a profound transformation. India’s more inclusive brand of maritime diplomacy will be superseded by a greater emphasis on utilitarian bilateralism. In particular, India will disproportionately strengthen its naval partnerships with the United States and U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan. This tilt toward naval bilateralism or select plurilateralism will grow to displace India’s other more inclusive efforts and induce leaders in New Delhi to privilege the harder facets of the nation’s growing maritime power.

Two major evolutions drive such a shift: first, the ongoing China/Pakistan maritime entente and the extension of India’s two-front threat from land to sea and, second, naval nuclearization in the Indian Ocean.

The Extension of India’s Two-Front Threat from Land to Sea

Pakistan’s increasingly offensive strategy of sea denial, when combined with its deepening maritime partnership with China, will enable Islamabad, for the first time in decades, to genuinely contest India’s freedom of maneuver in the Arabian Sea.58 Moreover, China’s progress in the field of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) could result in the erection of an A2/AD dome that arches over the entirety of India’s maritime backyard, from the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of Karachi. Finally, China’s future forays into the Indian Ocean could present New Delhi with a two-front threat extending from land to sea.

For Pakistan’s naval planners, closer cooperation with China is desirable on many levels. At a time when relations between Islamabad and Washington are increasingly strained and Pakistan’s economy is teetering on the brink of collapse, China’s technological support and provision of warships at friendly prices are invaluable. Second, it is in Pakistan’s interests to encourage Chinese naval power to move westward in order to counter New Delhi’s growing influence. In private, Pakistani officials have relentlessly urged Beijing to enhance
its naval presence in the Arabian Sea, suggesting that China's skyrocketing energy imports require that it stage some form of credible forward presence close to the world's busiest shipping lanes. Another argument advanced is that, by establishing a permanent naval presence along India's western seaboard, China would be able to neutralize India's attempts to exert greater influence west of the Malacca Straits.

Chinese strategists, for their part, are increasingly concerned over India's growing maritime influence in Southeast Asia, and more specifically in the South China Sea, which they view as a veiled Indian attempt to "generate a southward gravitational pull on China's maritime strategy" and to prevent China from enhancing its own presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus shoring up Pakistan as a proxy naval deterrent within India's own maritime backyard serves to divert New Delhi's attention from East Asia by keeping it focused on its immediate western maritime front. China's concerns are compounded by the fact that the Indian navy is currently revamping its naval presence along its eastern seaboard in response to what it perceives as a growing Chinese maritime threat. China's calculus may be that, by increasing India's threat perception along its western front, it can compel the navy to stage a less sizable presence in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Finally, Beijing is also concerned that, in the event of a conflict, India or the United States may attempt to establish some form of a distant blockade of its energy supplies, a large portion of which originates from the Persian Gulf. While the effectiveness of such a blockade in times of conflict is debatable, there is no doubt that its possibility weighs heavily on Chinese strategic planning.

Naval Nuclearization in the Indian Ocean
In July 2009 India launched its first indigenously produced nuclear submarine, the S-2 (also known as an advanced technology vessel and ultimately named Arihant). It remains uncertain when the submarine will be truly operational. Recent statements from the chief of naval staff, however, indicate that the Arihant will be deployed on deterrent patrols as soon as it is commissioned, in early 2013. Pakistan, for its part, issued a press release in May 2012 publicizing the recent inauguration of the country's Naval Strategic Forces Command. In the course of the inauguration, it announced that the new headquarters would "perform a pivotal role in the development and employment of the Naval Strategic Force," which was defined as "the custodian of the nation's second-strike capability." For the time being, however, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty over the form that this sea-borne capability would take. Most analyses concur that Pakistan does not have the
technological or financial means to construct its own nuclear submarine. In all likelihood, Pakistan will opt to place nuclear missiles on surface vessels or, if it succeeds in the further miniaturization of warheads, aboard its growing fleet of conventional submarines.64

This development is highly troubling in many regards. Most notably, by blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear platforms, it risks leading to inadvertent or accidental escalation. The induction of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan's fleet would, in parallel, extend the more dysfunctional elements of current Indo-Pakistani nuclear interactions from land to sea. By threatening to use nuclear-tipped torpedoes or cruise missiles against advancing Indian carrier battle groups, Pakistan could inject uncertainty and, by so doing, drastically dilute the effects of India's overbearing advantage in the conventional naval domain.65

These twin developments, both of which are closely intertwined, signal the advent of a new, more threat-laden, maritime era. For the past two decades, India's navy has been able to maximize the strategic benefits derived from a relatively threat-free environment by engaging in an increasing array of multilateral exercises, forgoing any move toward the formation of alliances with countries such as the United States, and focusing on projecting soft power. Studies of the nature of military effectiveness indicate that diverse threat environments, where the challenges to national interests are numerous, low level, and not immediately perceptible, can complicate strategic assessments and result in uncoordinated policies. Moreover, the quality of threat (that is, its clarity) has more meaningful consequences for military effectiveness than the quantity or level of threat.66 For the time being, India's maritime concerns are numerous, but diffuse, and none of them is existential. This is changing, and as a result the Indian navy could find itself confronted with what Edward Luttwak famously termed the "visibility/viability" paradox, whereby navies used to influencing opponents' perceptions by being "visible" struggle to refocus on their war-fighting role and be "viable."67

Applying Luttwak's paradox to contemporary India, one can assume that, in the future, the Indian navy, absent a major hike in funding, will find itself compelled to focus less on the "visible" components of maritime power, such as maritime multilateralism and soft power projection, and more on the "viable" aspects of developing an effective war-fighting capability in the face of rapidly coalescing threats to India's maritime lifelines.68 The transformation of India's maritime environment will naturally also affect the conduct of New Delhi's maritime diplomacy, by privileging more utilitarian bilateral exercises over the more cosmetic effects of maritime inclusiveness. In particular, the
Indian navy’s growing partnership with its U.S. counterpart will come to constitute the nation’s defining maritime partnership. Astute observers have noted that, whereas the MALABAR exercises started with only basic maneuvers and communication drills, they have since expanded in scope and scale.Indian navalists have argued that the MALABAR exercises have “showcased the Indian navy’s capability to be interoperable with the most advanced navy” in the world, by operating smoothly alongside U.S. nuclear submarines or by engaging in highly complex aerial refueling operations. The growth of such an impressive level of synergy at an operational-functional level is perceived as a clear indicator of the Indian navy's own accretion in capability and hence is increasingly viewed as a core component of India's internal balancing and military capacity building. Former chief of naval staff Nirmal Verma openly acknowledged that, through its “foreign cooperation initiatives,” the Indian navy would gain “operational skills and doctrinal expertise.” The United States' unparalleled prowess in domains of growing importance to the Indian navy means that the Indo-U.S. naval partnership will naturally form the structural core of New Delhi's move toward a more utilitarian practice of maritime diplomacy. While this could never give birth to a formalized alliance, given New Delhi's profound attachment to its continued diplomatic maneuverability, one can well envision the emergence of a “tacit security compact” or “an informal balancing arrangement of some type.” This evolution should not be viewed as a major departure from India's traditions. After all, during the cold war, New Delhi, perceiving its own vulnerability, did not hesitate to draw closer to the Soviet Union. Rather, the Indo-U.S. naval partnership should be construed as the natural result of two profoundly realist powers suddenly confronted with a markedly wide panoply of convergent aims in the maritime domain.

The Triumph of Strategic Flexibility:

From a somewhat neglected zone of peace, the Indian Ocean has become, in the words of Robert D. Kaplan, the noisy, crowded center stage for emerging great-power rivalries. India, which used to engage in only an extremely limited form of naval cooperation, now takes part in an array of increasingly wide-ranging and complex exercises with a variety of countries. New Delhi, whose attitude was once governed by a reflexive sense of maritime embattlement, now embraces a more inclusive form of maritime diplomacy and plays an increasingly salient role in shaping the norms and rules that undergird the law of the sea. This oceanic overture has resulted in the navy growing,
almost organically, into a vital component of India's multilayered diplomacy. India's Cinderella Service has suavely demonstrated its growing utility through the launch of highly visible soft power initiatives such as the IONS. This evolution toward maritime plurilateralism and the Indian navy's concurrent involvement in numerous humanitarian and custodian operations have been rightly heralded, both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the substance of India's behavior at sea suggests that New Delhi's turn toward maritime multilateralism is far from absolute. The substance of India's naval interactions is to be found in its bilateral—rather than its collective—efforts. India's strategic elite remain as wedded as ever to their nation's freedom from foreign entanglement or interference. Long-standing tensions, governance deficits, and territorial disputes threaten to disrupt the rising nation's ambitions to emerge as the leading integrative power within a fractured maritime space. A future marked by growing competition, disruptive military developments, and rapidly calcifying security dilemmas will leave little time for the more vigorous and open engagement of these past two decades. More than nonalignment or the quest for autonomy, the governing principle of India's foreign policy since independence has been its extreme flexibility in the face of rapidly evolving, yet continuously challenging, strategic circumstances. Buffeted by increasingly choppy waters, India will be led—albeit reluctantly—to disproportionately privilege its bilateral naval partnership with the United States.

Notes


2. At the time, President Sukarno described "India's attack on Pakistan as an attack on Indonesia." Two Russian-designed submarines and missile boats were sent to Pakistan, but arrived only after hostilities had come to an end. India's defense minister Y. B. Chavan clearly prioritized the defense of Andaman and Nicobar islands against a possible attack from Indonesia over the conduct of naval operations against Pakistan. Admiral B. S. Soman recounts this in the Indian navy's official history: "The defense of the Andaman and Nicobar islands from a possible attack from Indonesia which, in the Government's order of priorities, was more crucial than naval operations against Pakistan." See Satyinder Singh, Blueprint to Bluewater: The Indian Navy, 1951–65 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defense, 1992) (http://indiannavy.nic.in/about-indian-navy/blueprint-bluewater), p. 457.

3. During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, President Nixon dispatched a carrier task force, composed of the USS Enterprise and its escort vessels, into the Bay of Bengal. The task force had no orders to attack India, but was used as an instrument of naval suasion in order to prevent New Delhi from triggering the military collapse of West Pakistan. For
much of India's strategic community during the cold war, the incident was perceived as a potent symbol, both of the United States' supposed untrustworthiness and of India's susceptibility to foreign intimidation.


5. George K. Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1992).

6. A “blue-water” navy is a maritime force capable of operating across the deep waters of open oceans, in contrast to so-called “brown water” or “green water” navies, which are primarily oriented toward coastal defense and littoral operations. “Sea control” is a much-discussed concept in naval theory, which is essentially the attempt to control a maritime area for a limited amount of time. “Sea denial,” in contrast, seeks to deny control of a maritime region to an adversary. For an in-depth discussion of these terms and their multiple applications in naval theory and history, see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 145–57.


10. Quoted in David Brewster, "Indian Strategic Thinking about East Asia," Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011): 827.


14. See Harrison and Subrahmanyam, India, the United States, and Superpower Rivalry.


18. For a concise synthesis of this ideational shift in India's worldview, see C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy (Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

20. Ibid.


24. Chinese strategic writings frequently refer to the so-called “first” and “second” island chains, which act as geographic and strategic barriers to China’s naval ambitions. The first island chain stretches from the Kurile Islands, through the main islands of Japan, the Ryukus, the Philippines, and then over to Borneo. The second island chain encompasses a far wider expanse reaching deep into the Pacific and skirting the Marianas and Micronesia.


27. Ibid.


37. At the time of writing, Pakistan has taken over the rotating command for CTF 151.


44. Rising temperatures have increased the likelihood of significant variances in the monsoon season, which could lead to severe droughts. In addition to this, meteorologists have noted an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather occurrences in the Indian Ocean such as typhoons. Last but not least, rising water levels could have a devastating impact on millions of inhabitants throughout South Asia, ranging from the Maldives, whose archipelagoes are facing extinction, to Bangladesh, many of whose numerous inhabitants already live below sea level. See Lee Corder, “Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2011): 66–88.


48. India has helped several smaller island nations, such as the Maldives or Mauritius, to set up coastal radar chains for monitoring all aspects of their maritime traffic.


50. For a listing of extant maritime territorial disputes and divergences of interpretation over the law of the sea in the Indian Ocean, see James Kraska, “Indian Ocean Security
56. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
62. Interview with former Chinese official, Beijing, September 2010.
66. Emily O. Goldman has described how, over the interwar period, a highly diverse threat environment complicated Britain’s strategic assessment and undermined its political-military coordination. From this and other studies, she concludes, “In a diverse threat environment, one cannot easily focus on a single adversary and develop weapons optimized for a single purpose.” Emily O. Goldman, “Thinking about Strategy Absent the Enemy,” *Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 40–85.
68. This challenge has also been identified by an Indian security analyst who writes the following: “The danger, however, lies not so much in inability to win direct naval contests. Rather, it lies in non-state threats blunting its [the Indian navy’s] fighting edge, sapping morale, weakening resolve, and exposing naval personnel to moral dilemmas and dubious political economies…. Allocating naval resources for constabulary duties does come at the cost of preparing them for conventional naval warfare.” See Nitin Pai, “Non-State Threats to India’s Maritime Security: Sailing Deeper into an Era of Violent Peace,” in The Rise of the Indian Navy, edited by Pant, p. 173.


72. Rehman, “Air Sea Battle’s Indo-Pacific Future.”


74. The United States has relentlessly encouraged India to take on a greater role within the Indian Ocean. This has become even more apparent under the Obama administration, which has vigorously pursued a rebalancing toward Asia. For a survey of growing Indo-U.S. strategic congruence in the Indo-Pacific, see David Scott, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’: New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for U.S.-India Strategic Convergence,” Asia-Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (November 2012): 85–109.
