JAPAN’S NORTHEAST ASIA POLICY UNDER ABE

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THE FRAMEWORK OF ABE’S SECURITY POLICY

- Main Problems: China > North Korea
  Perception of Japan’s reduced status in the world
- Key Concepts: “Active contributions to peace” (積極的平和主義)
  “Diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the globe” (地球儀俯瞰外交)
- Policies: Enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance
  Expanding & deepening cooperation with other states
  ex. AZ, ASEAN, India, NATO/the EU
- Team “Abe” Functioning Well.

→ Largely Successful, but not in Northeast Asia
THE ORDER OF TOPICS TODAY

1. Russia

2. The Korean Peninsula

3. China
RUSSIA (1): RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

2013 April: Abe-Putin Summit Meeting in Moscow
   The 2013 Joint Declaration
   Nov.: The First Russian-Japanese 2+2 Meeting

2014 Feb.: Abe Visit to the Sochi Olympics
   Abe’s televised press conference from Sochi
   Nov.: Abe-Putin Summit (10th since Abe’s 1st Term)
   Agreed to seek Putin’s Visit to Tokyo in 2015 despite the Ukraine Crisis.

"Japan’s interests in enhancing the bilateral relations in all areas." (MOFA)
The Four Islands Still in Dispute: ① The Habomais, ② Shikotan, ③ Kunashiri, ④ Etorofu.

Russia promised in 1956 to return ① & ② when a peace treaty is signed. Japan, in contrast, claims all four islands.

The U.S. government complicated the issue. ex. 1956 Aide Memoire

(Map: The Cabinet Office of Japan)
RUSSIA (3): LOGICS BEHIND JAPAN’S APPROACH TOWARD RUSSIA

1. The longer Japan waits, the weaker its position becomes.
   - Increasing business activities of third states’ firms in the disputed territories.

2. Widened areas of bilateral cooperation
   - Natural Gas & other energy projects, Economic & security cooperation in the Arctic Ocean.

3. The shift of Japan’s strategic focus toward the south.

4. Wedging Sino-Russian relations.
   - Bargaining leverage over China/Avoid Russia’s dependence on China.

+ Leadership factors
   - Putin willing to settle the territorial disputes and conclude a peace treaty.
   - Abe suited to control domestic nationalist/hawkish oppositions to a deal with Russia.
THE KOREAN PENINSULA (1): GOALS & PRIORITIES

Problems: North Korea’s BCN weapons, missile threats, and the so-called “Abductees’ Issues.”

→ Requires security cooperation with the ROK.

Obstacles: History Issues (esp. Comfort Women Issues)
THE KOREAN PENINSULA (2): WHY IS JAPAN RELUCTANT TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESOLVE THE HISTORY ISSUE?

1. Abe’s and/or His Close Followers’ Stance on History Issues

2. Lessons of the Past & the ROK’s “Commitment Problems”
   Cf. PM Miyazawa’s Apologies (1992), Asia Women’s Funds (1995)

3. The Worsened Perception of the ROK among the Japanese Public
THE KOREAN PENINSULA (3):
THE ABDUCTEES’ ISSUES WITH NORTH KOREA

Logics behind Abe’s decision to seek the bilateral negotiations on the issues.

- Not necessarily bad for the Six-Party Talk/U.S.-Japan relations.
- Miscalculation?
- Risk-taking probe of North Korea’s intention?
- Bargaining vis-à-vis South Korea?
- Diversion from the debate on collective self-defense?
- The December election as a means of diversion?
• Abe’s China Policy defined by policies toward states other than China.
  - The Absence of the positive vision about Sino-JP bilateral relations.
  - Not in a hurry to improve relations with China.

Reasons: Prospect of change in China’s Japan policy considered dim.

Lack of domestic pressure to improve relations with China
  - Little pressure from business lobbies.
  - Heightened anti-Chinese sentiments.
FEELING TOWARD CHINA (DEC. 2014)
CHINA (2):

JAPAN’S POLICY GOALS IN COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF THE U.S.

1. A moderate, cooperative China willing to live in the established rule-based order in Asia and the world.

While Japan and the United States share these goals, they differ on priorities.

The Obama administration: Seeking 1 as well as 2 & 3
- A relative emphasis on engagement with China
  (Byproduct: China’s disinterests in improving relations with Japan)
- Sensitive to entrapment

The Abe administration: 3 > 2 > 1
- A relative emphasis on balancing against China
- Sensitive to abandonment
### Table 4. Willingness to Suffer (Feb. 2012)

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<th>class 1</th>
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<th>class 3</th>
<th>class 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Threat of force</td>
<td>-8991</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>3246</td>
<td>2351</td>
<td>n.s</td>
<td>n.s</td>
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<td>Use of force</td>
<td>-14050</td>
<td>-1299</td>
<td>-2915</td>
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<td>n.s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of respondents</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
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<td>24.1%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
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Unit: Expected Japanese death toll

### Table 6. Willingness to Suffer (Oct. 2012)

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<td>125 (p &lt; .1)</td>
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<td>9178</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of respondents</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
IMPLICATIONS

• On Russia, Japan and the United States need to have a serious dialogue about what may be the best collective policy toward Russia.

• To promote U.S.-JP-ROK Cooperation against North Korea, both Tokyo and Seoul need to take steps to overcome the history issues. In the meantime, trilateral security cooperation should move forward.

• On China, the United States and Japan need to recognize that the difference in the order of priorities may cause some difficulties, which can be & should be managed properly.
THANK YOU/ ありがとうとうございました。
СПАСИБО/ 감사합니다/ 多谢