The Japan-U.S. Alliance in a New Defense Guidelines Era
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

A Japan’s View:
New Opportunities and Challenges
(Ver. 2.0)

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## Evolution of GL

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What is “SIASJ”? 

Situations In Areas Surrounding Japan
--“situations that has serious impact on the peace and security of Japan”
--”not a geographical concept, but focused on the nature of situations”
--Widely regarded as aimed at Korean Peninsula contingency
--Whether it covers the cross-strait contingency was never made clear
What is “Gray Zone”? (1)

“There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.”

--NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2014 and beyond, December 17, 2013
What is “Gray Zone”? (2)

“Air Sea Battle” vs. “Dynamic Defense”

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“Seamless Security” (1)

“The cabinet decision by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security legislation, envisions the expansion of the Self-Defense Forces activities consistent with the Constitution of Japan.”

“Seamless Security” (2)

“Japan and the United States will increase their presence in the western Pacific region and build a posture of **seamless cooperation** ranging from peacetime and to various situations, including cooperation in responding to ‘gray-zone’ situations.”

--NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2014 and beyond
Significance of New GL

➢ Strategic
  -- Deterrence against China

➢ Tactical
  -- ”CSD-capable”

➢ Operational
  -- Seamless response from “Gray Zone”
  up
  -- Beyond “SIASJ”
## Opportunities

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## Challenges

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Challenges--Specific (1)

How to operationalize POTUS statement?

“And let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.”

-- U.S. President Barak Obama at Joint Press Conference with Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe, Tokyo, April 24, 2014
Article 5 of J-U.S. Security Treaty

“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. “
China’s Position

Senkaku = China’s “Core Interest”

“Diaoyu Islands are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it’s China’s core interest.”

-- Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 26, 2013
華春瑩副報道局長
What to expect from U.S.?

Intel Sharing

Fly-by

Boots on the Ground

U.S. Fear of Entanglement?
Challenges-Specific (2)

How to avoid “security dilemma” against China?

- Enhance deterrence and response capabilities against China

  AND

- Prevent bilat/regional tension from rising
China’s Growing Demand for “Strategic Space” and “Accommodation” from U.S.

“I also said (to U.S. President Obama) that the Pacific Ocean is broad enough to accommodate the development of both China and the United States.”

-- PRC President Xi Jinping at Joint Press Conference w/ Obama on Nov. 12, 2014 in Beijing

How will U.S. respond?
Obama’s frustration with the meeting with Xi?

- “We believe that nations and peoples have the right to live in security and peace; that an effective security order for Asia must be based -- not on spheres of influence, or coercion, or intimidation where big nations bully the small -- but on alliances of mutual security, international law and international norms that are upheld, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”

- “So we’ll pursue cooperation with China where our interests overlap or align. “

- “We do not benefit from a relationship with China or any other country in which we put our values and our ideals aside.”

-- Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland, November 15, 2014
Structure of Interests Gap (1)

“Core Interests”

vs.

“Aligned Interests”
# Structure of Interests Gap (2)

-- From “Divergence or Convergence” by Prof. Wang Jisi

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<th>U.S. feels from China</th>
<th>Obstacles for Compromise</th>
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“Mutual Respect”/Compromise
China’s Frustration

--Demand for Mutual Accommodation--

➢ “Only when the U.S. respects and does not challenge China's fundamental political system or its domestic order subjectively, can China come to respect and accept U.S. leadership in the world and the international order it presides over. The reverse is also true.”

-- From “Divergence or Convergence” by Prof. Wang Jisi, Dean President of the Institute of International & Strategic Studies (IISS), Peking University (PKU)
What is next in GL review?

- Final Report originally due this year-end could be postponed to next Spring
- Problem is perception gap on CSD b/w LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito.
  - LDP—expand geographical scope for SDF Ops, esp minesweeping in Persian Gulf
  - Komeito Party—limit to immediate area surrounding Japan
  - Consultation stopped in July
- Without consensus within leading coalition, RMC consultation w/ U.S. is not possible
- National-wide local elections in April 2015
- Upcoming Lower House election may cause further delay

- Defeat of LDP-backed candidate in Okinawa gubernatorial election
Thank you