Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective
An Evolving Threat

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In 2006, the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba entered the Afghan theater, necessitating its increased presence in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The group is often mentioned during discussions of the Punjabi Taliban, militants from Punjabi jihadi groups, who arrived in large numbers at approximately the same time. But these militants follow the Deobandi school of Islam and are close to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Lashkar is also a Punjabi group, but its Ahl-e Hadith faith and close relationship with the Pakistani military establishment have contributed to a historically rocky relationship with Deobandi militant groups and other pro-Taliban elements.

Sharing physical space in the NWFP/FATA and operational interests in Afghanistan has created the opportunity for increased conflict and collaboration with al-Qaeda and the various pro-Taliban elements there. As collaboration increases, so too does Lashkar’s threat to Pakistan and the West.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first assesses Lashkar’s historical relations with the different actors operating in the NWFP/FATA. The second discusses the nature of Lashkar’s expansion in the area from roughly 2006 onward. The third explores its collaboration and conflicts with other groups operating there, and the nature of its involvement in anti-Western and anti-Pakistan activities emanating from the region. The paper concludes with a brief assessment of Lashkar’s threat to the West, particularly the impact of its presence in the NWFP/FATA.

A Group Apart

Although the majority of Pakistani Muslims belong to the Barelvi school of Islam, the major jihadi groups are Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith. Multiple militant groups adhere to the Deobandi school of thought. They are tied to one another as well as to the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by the same madaris [plural of madrassa or Islamic school], many of which are found in the NWFP and FATA. During the 1990s in Afghanistan, Pakistani Deobandi militants trained at camps in Taliban-controlled areas, their cadres fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, and some of their leaders held posts in the Taliban government. In addition to solidifying their bonds with the Taliban, this brought them closer to al-Qaeda.

The Ahl-e Hadith are an even smaller minority in Pakistan than the Deobandis and their infrastructure pales in comparison. Since its establishment, Lashkar has differed from the mainstream Ahl-e-Hadith movement over the interpretation of jihad. Thus, it had to build its own support structure. State support for the Kashmir jihad enabled Lashkar to build a vast infrastructure, which it has since

sought to protect. Given that it has no close allies on which to rely, it is not surprising that Lashkar is more susceptible to state pressure than other militant actors and refrains from launching attacks in Pakistan.

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Despite ad hoc cooperation in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir, Lashkar historically has had antagonist relations with Deobandi militant groups. Further, unlike these groups, Lashkar had no loyalty to the Taliban government or infrastructure in Afghanistan. Because of its Ahl-e Hadith background, and possibly because Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) sought to keep it separate from other actors, Lashkar’s freedom of movement was constrained in Afghanistan during the 1990s. It primarily trained at separate camps in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, and did not fight alongside or otherwise work closely with the Taliban. While significant numbers of Deobandi militants crossed the border to fight alongside the Taliban after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Lashkar did not dispatch militants to Afghanistan to counter U.S. troops. This decision created additional tension with the Taliban and its Deobandi allies.

Lashkar’s closest Salafi allies in Kunar, the militant Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Sunna, initially supported the U.S. counter-attacks and the nascent government of Hamid Karzai.²

However, Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Sunna quickly turned against the United States and is now part of the multi-headed insurgency in the Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley. Lashkar had been providing logistical support to Jamiat al-Dawa for a number of years and increased this assistance after 9/11.³ In roughly 2006, as the Afghan insurgency picked up steam and Lashkar’s militant operations in Indian-controlled Kashmir became more constricted, the group began working with Jamiat al-Dawa to infiltrate fighters across the border into Kunar province.⁴ This decision necessitated increasing its presence in the NWFP/FATA.

Expansion

Lashkar’s post-2006 activities in the tribal areas were geared primarily toward waging war in Afghanistan. The group was recruiting, training, and housing militants as well as facilitating their infiltration across the Durand Line – the disputed border dating to the late 19th century. It was reported to be doing some recruiting in the NWFP/FATA for the Kashmir jihad as well, though it is difficult to know if this was merely part of the group’s attempt to maintain its Kashmir-centric reputation.⁵ In the NWFP/FATA and in Afghanistan, Lashkar has operated through like-minded groups or affiliates, rather than under its own banner. This was done to preserve its reputation and avoid embarrassing entanglements with the state.⁶ The group, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and the United Nations, is officially banned in Pakistan. However, it has maintained a closer working relationship with the army and ISI than many other banned militant groups in Pakistan.

Lashkar built a small presence early in the decade in South Waziristan, where it conducted training not far from al-Qaeda. It is strongest in the Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies, where it relies on relationships dating to the Afghan jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. In addition to recruiting and training fighters in Bajaur and Mohmand, Lashkar also began using its bases there as staging areas for inserting fighters into Afghanistan.⁷

Under the banner of its above-ground social welfare wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar established mosques, madaris, schools, and offices throughout the NWFP and
expanded its relief work in the region. Some of these venues were used for recruiting. For example, Lashkar was one of a number of jihadi outfits to open liaison and recruitment offices in the Lower Dir and Swat districts. Alongside other groups including Jaish-e-Mohammed, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and al-Badr, Lashkar also allegedly set up a base camp near Darra Adam Khel, a town devoted to producing weapons and ammunition.

Collaboration and Conflict

Lashkar’s proximity with al-Qaeda as well as various Deobandi militants and other pro-Taliban actors created opportunities for collaboration and conflict. During conversations with high-ranking members of JuD and Lashkar militants, they criticized the Deobandi groups’ jihad against the Pakistan state and made clear their ideological disdain for these actors. Conversely, the Taliban and other Deobandi militants remained upset because Lashkar did not take part in the jihad against the U.S. after 9/11. The group’s decision to focus exclusively on the Kashmir jihad was troubling, but not as much as the fact that its relationship with the ISI heavily influenced that decision. According to several of the author’s interlocutors, including one activist close to the leadership and another who was a high-ranking officer in the security services, the Taliban and al-Qaeda continued to question Lashkar’s loyalty even after it entered the Afghan theatre because of its historically close relationship with the ISI.

Lashkar patched up its relationship with the Taliban and other Deobandi elements in the years after 9/11. However, this has not stopped local rivalries from occasionally developing into violent conflict. According to one former senior officer in Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau, whose account was confirmed by a high-ranking JuD official, the TTP killed approximately 15 JuD members in Swat in 2008. The TTP killed three more of the organization’s members in Bajaur in April 2009. The most infamous conflict occurred in Mohmand tribal agency during the summer of 2008, when the pro-Taliban Omar Khalid group clashed with the Shah Sahib group, which was essentially a Lashkar front that also received support from al-Qaeda.

Some sources suggest this battle was fueled partly by suspicions that the Lashkar-associated Shah was collaborating with the ISI, though local commander rivalry no doubt played a role. During the clash, approximately 10 members of the Shah Sahib group were killed and many more were captured, including Shah Sahib and his deputy, Maulvi Obaidullah. Lashkar leaders intervened but failed to secure their release, and both were executed.

Despite these episodes, Lashkar’s collaboration with al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban groups was increasing from late 2006 or early 2007 onward. Lashkar-linked groups appear to have the highest degree of integration and cooperation with other actors in Bajaur and Mohmand. There are two likely reasons for this. First, Lashkar’s networks are strongest in these two agencies, where a number of other actors also operate. Second, the location of these agencies makes them ideal for infiltrating militants across the border to take part in the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. However, collaboration is not limited to Bajaur and Mohmand.

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infiltrating fighters into Afghanistan and on other logistical matters related to that front.\textsuperscript{18} Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and the TTP run a number of camps in the Waziristan agencies to indoctrinate and train young Pakistanis to become suicide bombers, and Lashkar has helped to recruit potential trainees. For example, Lashkar is believed to have recruited men from the Jalozai refugee camp in Peshawar for training at al-Qaeda camps to become suicide bombers in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{19} Lashkar has also collaborated with other groups on attacks in Afghanistan, the two most notable being the ambush of the U.S. combat outpost in Wanat in July 2008 and the vehicle-borne suicide assault on the Indian Embassy that same month.\textsuperscript{20}

Although Lashkar still refrains from launching attacks within Pakistan, some of its members are believed to provide support to the TTP and other actors who do conduct such attacks. Support includes facilitating the movement of men and materiel within Pakistan, providing safe houses and possibly identity papers to would-be terrorists, conducting target surveillance, and providing information.\textsuperscript{21} Freelancing increased at the mid and lower levels after 2006; some of these individuals have provided manpower for the TTP while others have offered logistical support.\textsuperscript{22} Despite this anti-Pakistani activity, however, the greater threat from Lashkar’s collaboration with other actors in the NWFP/FATA is to the West.

**Threat Assessment**

India remains Lashkar’s main enemy, but the group has been waging a peripheral jihad against the United States and its allies since shortly after 9/11. Although the prospect of Lashkar dispatching operatives to lead a major attack against a Western country should not be ruled out, the most likely Lashkar threats to Western interests lie elsewhere.

First, as mentioned above, Lashkar’s increased presence in the NWFP/FATA is largely a result of its decision to take part in the fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to U.S. military and International Security Assistance Force officials, coalition forces have not seen a great amount of impact from Lashkar. However, they consider those Lashkar militants who are operating to be among the most effective fighters in the region.\textsuperscript{23}

Second, though unrelated to its collaboration in the NWFP/FATA, Lashkar is prepared to fold Western targets into its terrorist attacks in South Asia. This was illustrated by the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which included hotels catering to foreigners. To mark the one-year anniversary of those attacks, Lashkar is alleged to have plotted attacks against the U.S. embassy and Indian high commission in Bangladesh. This does not mean every attack in India or the wider South Asian region will target Western interests, but the threat of such attacks now must be included within its wider targeting objectives.

Third, history suggests that Lashkar is capable and willing to provide support to other actors that are based primarily in the NWFP/FATA and intent on launching terrorist attacks in the West. Support takes two main forms: as a training provider or gateway to other organizations such as al-Qaeda, and as a facilitator for attacks in Western countries.

Lashkar’s training infrastructure is receiving more scrutiny than in the past, but the group still operates more freely than other militant outfits in Pakistan. This makes it an appealing destination for Western militants.
others in the NWFP/FATA that are actively seeking wannabe Western jihadis to train for terrorist attacks back home.24

The group’s transnational networks make it an ideal global jihadist facilitator. Evidence suggests Lashkar has support cells in the Persian Gulf, Britain, North America, mainland Europe, and possibly Australia. These cells could be used either by the group or by individual nodes within its networks to aid attacks against the West.25 Because Lashkar is financially robust, it is able to provide financial as well as logistical assistance.26

The Headley case
The October 2009 arrest in Chicago of two men charged with plotting attacks in Denmark illustrates Lashkar’s transnational capabilities and the nuanced role they can play in terms of terrorism against India and the West. One of the men arrested was David Headley, [a.k.a. Daood Gilani], a Pakistani American who trained with Lashkar during the early part of the decade and changed his name in order to perform surveillance in India. He made multiple extended trips to Mumbai in advance of the 2008 attacks that took place there. During each trip he took pictures and video of various targets, including all of those struck by Lashkar’s fidayeen in November 2008.27 After each trip, he allegedly returned to Pakistan where he provided his Lashkar handlers with photographs, videos and oral descriptions of various locations. Headley and his handlers are believed to have discussed potential landing sites for a seaborne infiltration. U.S. charges allege that Lashkar operatives in Pakistan instructed him to take boat trips in and around the Mumbai harbor and record surveillance video, which he did during a visit to India in April 2008.28

According to U.S. government documents, when Headley returned to Chicago in June 2006 he advised Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a native Pakistani and Canadian citizen living in Chicago, of his assignment. Rana ran First World Immigration Services, and Headley is alleged to have obtained his permission to open a branch office in Mumbai in 2006 as a cover for his surveillance activities.29 Rana also is alleged to have been in Mumbai prior to the attacks and to have played a role in performing reconnaissance.30

A month before Lashkar’s gunmen made deadly use of the surveillance he had provided for the Mumbai attacks, David Headley began planning the “Mickey Mouse Project.” Also called the “Northern Project,” this referred to an attack on facilities of the Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper responsible for printing cartoons in 2005 that depicted the Prophet Mohammed. Headley had taken great offence at their publication, and in October 2008 he set in motion a plan to take revenge. This included travel to Denmark in January and July 2009 for the purpose of reconnaissance, coupled with attack planning in Pakistan following his January trip.31 As with his surveillance in India for the Mumbai attacks, Headley also benefited from Tahawwur Hussain Rana’s assistance. Rana provided material support for Headley’s travels as well as helping to arrange them and disguise their purpose.32

Headley was coordinating with at least two Lashkar operatives: Abdul Rehman Hashim Syed, a former Pakistan army officer who oversaw Lashkar’s networks in Bangladesh, and an individual identified “Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A.”33 Although the U.S. government had not disclosed his identity at the time this was written, U.S. and Pakistani officials said that he is Sajid Mir, the former Pakistan army officer and head of operations for Lashkar’s international wing.34 Headley was also coordinating with Ilyas Kashmiri, a leader from the militant group Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) who is known to be very close to the leadership al-Qaeda.35 In an example of the gateway role Lashkar can play, Syed is suspected of introducing Headley to Ilyas Kashmiri.

Initially, Lashkar appeared eager to coordinate with Headley on the attacks in Denmark. The prime target was Jyllands-Posten, the newspaper that in 2005 published controversial cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad, but Headley also surveilled a nearby synagogue at Sajid Mir’s behest. Yet
when the opportunity arose to use Headley for surveillance in India, Mir suggested that he delay the Northern Project in favor of this new assignment. At that point, Headley began working more closely with HuJI to pursue the already-planned attacks in Denmark.\(^1\) He did not, however, abandon his relationship with Lashkar and promised to help with the India operations as well. The group is believed to have been planning to attack the National Defence College on the anniversary of the Mumbai attacks, with Headley once again slated to provide the reconnaissance. Two of India’s most prestigious boarding schools also may have been potential targets.\(^2\)

When U.S. authorities arrested Headley he was en route to Pakistan, where it is believed he would have met with Lashkar operatives about the attacks in India as well as with Ilyas Kashmir regarding the Northern Project. Rana was arrested soon after. The two men are believed to have provided information that enabled authorities in Bangladesh to thwart yet another suspected Lashkar plot, this one against the U.S. Embassy and the Indian High Commission in the capital city of Dhaka. Once again, these attacks also appear to have been planned to coincide with the one-year anniversary of the Mumbai attacks. Bangladeshi authorities alleged Syed provided the funds and issued the directive to launch the attacks.\(^3\) Indian sources buttressed this allegation.\(^4\)

The Headley case and attempted attacks in Bangladesh suggest several important lessons. First, Lashkar continues to prioritize attacking India. Second, the group appears to have been prepared to launch a blended attack in Bangladesh, striking its longtime nemesis India along with a U.S. government target. Attacking the U.S. government signifies a significant evolution in Lashkar’s peripheral jihad against the West, suggesting Lashkar has grown bolder in the year since the Mumbai attacks. Third, even if it were possible to deter Lashkar completely from undertaking or supporting attacks against the West – an unlikely proposition – the group would continue to pose a threat because of its connections to and collaboration with other militant outfits. The more entrenched Lashkar becomes in the NWFP/FATA, the more robust these connections and collaboration are likely to become.

\(^1\) For more on these shared linkages, see: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (Oxford: Pan Books, 2000).
\(^2\) Author interview with Michael Semple, deputy to the European Union special representative to Afghanistan in 2004-07, 23 December 2008 in Pakistan.
\(^3\) Author interview with Mohammad Amir Rana, executive director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 16 & 18 December 2008 in Pakistan.
\(^5\) According to Zahid Khan, spokesman for the Awami National Party in the NWFP, Lashkar has been actively recruiting fighters for Kashmir and Kunar in the Dir and Swat districts since circa 2006. Author interview with Zahid Khan, 31 December 2008 via phone.
\(^6\) Author interview with former member of Lashkar-e-Taiba, name withheld upon request, January 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with senior officer in Pakistan security services, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, executive editor of the News Peshawar bureau, 3 January 2009 via phone.
\(^7\) Lashkar’s presence in Bajaur and Mohmand and its activities there were confirmed by multiple sources in the Pakistani media, Western diplomatic community, and Pakistani security services, as well as by one former member of the group itself.
\(^8\) Author interview with high-ranking Jamaat-ul-Dawah official, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan.
\(^11\) Author interview with member ofJuD senior leadership, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with high-ranking Jamaat-ul-Dawah official, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with Lashkar-e-Taiba member and former Group Commander, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan.
\(^12\) Author interview with JuD activist close to Lashkar’s leadership, name and date withheld upon request, in Pakistan. Author interview with senior officer in Pakistan security services, name withheld upon request, May

13 Author interview with former senior officer in the Punjab Intelligence Bureau, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with high-ranking Jamaat-ul-Dawah official, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan.


15 Ibid., p. 102.

16 Author interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, 3 January 2009 via phone.

17 Author interview with first Pakistan-based Western diplomat, name withheld upon request, December 2008 in Pakistan. Author interview with second Pakistan-based Western diplomat, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan.

18 Author interview with second Pakistan-based Western diplomat, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with senior officer in Pakistan security services, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan.

19 Kathy Gannon, a Pakistan-based reporter with the Associated Press, gathered this information during interviews with the families of recruits. Author interview with Kathy Gannon, 19 December 2008 in Pakistan. Several Afghan news organs have also reported on Lashkar’s activities in this area. “Pakistani party incites Afghan refugees against government,” Afghan State TV (in Dari) From BBC Monitoring (5 October 2006). “Pakistan needs to do more to prevent terrorism,” Afghan State-Run Hewad (in Pashto) From BBC Monitoring (17 October 2006).


21 Interview with Senior Official in Pakistani Security Services #2, (May 2009 in Islamabad, Pakistan).

22 Interview with Member of Pakistani Anti Terrorism Force, (May 2009 in Pakistan). Other current and former Pakistani security officials as well as one Western official affirmed this increase in freelancing. #2. Interview with Tariq Parvez, (14 May 2009 in Islamabad, Pakistan). Interview with Western Official, (1 May 2009 in Pakistan).


24 Author interview with second Pakistan-based Western diplomat, name withheld upon request, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with third Pakistan-based Western diplomat, name and date withheld upon request, in Pakistan. Author interview with officer in the London Metropolitan Police Service, name and date withheld upon request, in the U.K.


26 For example, circumstantial evidence suggests Lashkar provided logistical and possibly financial support via its networks in Paris to Richard Reid, the al-Qaeda directed “shoe bomber” who attempted to blow up American Airlines Flight 63 midway between Paris and Miami. See: Magistrate’s Court of Paris, Person’s Prosecuted: Ghulam Mustafa Ram, Hassan el Cheguar, Hakim Mokhfi, Kamel Lakhram, 16 June 2005. Lashkar operatives also are suspected of providing some of the financing for the 2006 attempt to blow up at least seven transatlantic airplanes using liquid explosives, as well as facilitating access for some of the alleged bombers to the FATA for training. See: Dexter Filkins and Souad Mekhennet, “Pakistani Charity Under Scrutiny In Financing of Airline Bomb Plot,” New York Times 13 August 2006. “UK police probe terror money trail: Investigators believe alleged plot tied to Asian quake relief,” CNN.com 16 August 2006. Praveen Swami, “Evidence mounts of Pakistan links,” The Hindu (12 August 2006).

27 Headley is believed to have pretended to be Jewish in order to surveil the Chabad House. When arrested almost a year later, the FBI recovered from his possession a book called How to Pray Like a Jew.

28 “Headley was charged in a 12-count criminal information with six counts of conspiracy to bomb public places in India, to murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, to provide material support to foreign terrorist plots, and to provide material support to Lashkar, and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India.” From: Department of Justice, Chicagoan Charged with Conspiracy in 2008 Mumbai Attacks in Addition to Foreign Terror Plot in Denmark: Additional Charges Unsealed Alleging Retired Pakistani Major Conspired in Danish Plot, 7 December 2009.

29 Ibid.
30 “Headley stayed at Taj, associate Rana in Mumbai days before 26/11,” The Times of India 13 November 2009.
31 Justice, Chicagoan Charged with Conspiracy in 2008 Mumbai Attacks in Addition to Foreign Terror Plot in Denmark: Additional Charges Unsealed Alleging Retired Pakistani Major Conspired in Danish Plot.
32 Ibid. See also: Criminal Complaint: United States of America v. David Headley, (United States District Court Northern District of Illinois 11 October 2009).
33 Justice, Chicagoan Charged with Conspiracy in 2008 Mumbai Attacks in Addition to Foreign Terror Plot in Denmark: Additional Charges Unsealed Alleging Retired Pakistani Major Conspired in Danish Plot. See also: Criminal Complaint: United States of America v. David Headley.
36 Ibid.
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