NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SHARED SECURITY: NATO’S NEXT 70 YEARS

Tomáš Valášek, editor
CONTENTS

PART 1
ADAPTATION: UNDERSTANDING NEW STRATEGIC TRENDS

CHAPTER ONE
NATO’s Future Role in the Multilateral Rules-Based Order 7
Alicia von Voss and Florence Schimmel, editors

CHAPTER TWO
The Transatlantic Bond and the Tussle Between Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism 11
Peter Rough

CHAPTER THREE
EU-U.S. Consensus and NATO-EU Cooperation 15
Sven Biscop

CHAPTER FOUR
NATO in the Era of Global Complexity 19
Jamie Shea

PART 2
RESILIENCE: RESPONDING TO NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

CHAPTER FIVE
Wars of Ideas: Hybrid Warfare, Political Interference, and Disinformation 27
Jovana Marović

CHAPTER SIX
Web Wars: Preparing for the Next Cyber Crisis 31
Nicolas Mazzucchi and Alix Desforges

CHAPTER SEVEN
Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Conflict 35
Can Kasapoğlu and Barış Kirdemir

CHAPTER EIGHT
The Geopolitics of Energy Security in Europe 41
Václav Bartuška, Petr Lang, Andrej Nosko

CHAPTER NINE
Military and Environmental Challenges in the Arctic 45
Henrik Breitenbauch, Kristian Søby Kristensen, Jonas Groesmeyer

CHAPTER TEN
The Security Implications of Crime, Terrorism, and Trafficking 51
Thanos Dokos
PART 3
INNOVATION: ADAPTING THE TOOLKIT

CHAPTER ELEVEN
The Future of Arms Control and Confidence-Building Regimes 59
Dick Zandee

CHAPTER TWELVE
The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures 63
Łukasz Kulesa

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Policies and Tools for Dealing With Nonstate Actors 69
Alessandro Marrone and Karolina Muti

CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Strengthening the Role of Human Security in NATO Operations 75
Lindsay Coombs

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Expanding and Integrating the Agenda on Women, Peace, and Security 79
Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association

CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Adapting the Counterterrorism Toolbox to the Postcaliphate Context 83
Félix Arteaga

Conclusion 87
Tomáš Valášek

Appendix: Contributing Think Tanks 91

Notes 93

About Carnegie Europe 100
ABOUT THE EDITOR

**Tomáš Valášek** is the director of Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on security and defense, transatlantic relations, and Central and Eastern Europe.

Previously, for nearly four years, Valášek served as the permanent representative of the Slovak Republic to NATO. Before that, he was president of the Central European Policy Institute in Bratislava (2012–2013), director of foreign policy and defense at the Centre for European Reform in London (2007–2012), and founder and director of the Brussels office of the World Security Institute (2002–2006). In 2006–2007, he served as acting political director and head of the security and defense policy division at the Slovak Ministry of Defense.

Valášek is the author of numerous articles in newspapers and journals, including the *International New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Financial Times*. He advised the Slovak defense and foreign ministers, the UK House of Lords, and the Group of Experts on the new NATO Strategic Concept.
Nothing is forever, not even the world’s most powerful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Other regional bodies modeled on NATO, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, have long ceased to exist. However, the need for a common, principled, effective, and adaptable institution to help allies in North America and Europe look after their defense requirements is hardly going away. The world remains an unpredictable and, at times, violent place.

The most fitting way to celebrate NATO’s seventieth birthday is therefore to reflect not on the alliance’s past but on how NATO can best serve its member states’ interests in the future. This collection of essays from some of the world’s leading think tanks aims to do just that. It offers insights from the brightest minds in allied countries on the challenges facing NATO, as well as recommendations on how the alliance should respond if it is to retain its centrality to its members’ defense thinking for decades to come.

The focus on how best to secure NATO’s future might seem misplaced. After all, the alliance has outlasted the many phases of the Cold War, a decade of near unipolarity, and two decades of an increasingly fractured geopolitical landscape, successfully adapting to each new period while growing in size. Why should the future be any different?

The answer lies in how NATO has adapted. It has flourished through these changes because, at each stage, the allies had the foresight to ask a group of eminent experts to provide counsel and steer the alliance into the new period. Whether it was the 1956 report of the Committee of Three, the 1967 Harmel Report, or, more recently, the 2010 report of the Group of Experts, it was deliberate human intervention, rather than good fortune, that prompted and guided each successive adaptation. That is what this collection of essays—building on sixteen policy discussions held across Europe and North America on NATO’s next seventy years—humbly proposes to do.

The essays do not provide definitive answers on how to future-proof the alliance. The collection is meant to start, frame, and guide such a debate, not end it. The reader may find, on closer inspection, disagreements among the authors on subtler points of their recommendations.
and assumptions. That, too, serves a useful purpose. An alliance of democracies will want to think through its steps and policies in a deliberative process, while weighing alternative approaches and divergent views. We hope that you find the reading informative and, above all, that it inspires the sort of reflection that has periodically rejuvenated the alliance through its first seventy years of existence.
The need to occasionally rethink NATO policies is well understood and broadly shared by the allies. The alliance has endured in part precisely because it takes the time to reflect and readjust. What may be less evident is whether the time for another such adaptation has come—and if it has, why now. After all, NATO’s seventieth anniversary on April 4, 2019, marked a date, nothing more.

Previous bursts of adaptation have generally been prompted by a rupture or crisis. The 1967 Harmel Report, for example, was a response to France’s decision the previous year to leave NATO’s military command. This coincided ominously with the potential expiration in 1969 of the alliance’s founding Washington Treaty, which states that twenty years after its entry into force, any country may leave the organization.4

Arguably, no comparable drama has directly afflicted NATO countries in recent years. However, a slow-motion shift in the global distribution of power, turmoil to the east and south of Europe, and gradual changes in the functioning of allies’ economies and societies have now added sufficient cumulative weight to warrant a pause for reflection.

Let’s take geopolitics first. China has become the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity.5 In the process, it has jettisoned its policy of a harmonious rise and grown more comfortable with asserting its national interests in its near neighborhood, including by unilaterally claiming and fortifying disputed territories in the South China Sea.6 This has affected the way NATO works, including in the realm of technology. But arguably, the biggest single change is that the United States is now far more focused on China than on any other economic or military priority.7

This poses questions for NATO: Will the alliance, with its focus on Russia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, remain critical enough in U.S. thinking to justify the commitment of U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic resources? If not, what role, if any, is NATO to play in East Asia? And how, if at all, can the European allies balance their military responsibilities in and around Europe with a possible expanded role farther east?

Russia lags far behind China in both economic and soft power, but it has used its more limited resources very effectively. Moscow’s general strategy has been to deter
what it perceives as challenges to its political order and territory, assert itself as an indispensable power in solving the most pressing global security challenges, and dominate its immediate neighborhood, including the rapidly melting Arctic.

To this end, Moscow has built up the military capacity to complicate NATO’s ability to operate in the Black, Baltic, and North seas as well as in the North Atlantic and the Arctic. Russia has changed its policy and posture to lean toward the use of nuclear weapons in early stages of conflict. In the minds of the country’s leaders, at least, this has deterred adversaries from moving against Moscow or countering Russia’s moves against its neighbors.

Russia has used force twice, in 2008 in Georgia and in 2014 in Ukraine, mainly to deny its neighbors the freedom to set their foreign policies independently of Moscow. Twice in the past decade, Russia has cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and allied countries farther downstream, demonstrating its willingness and ability to use energy as a weapon to bend other countries’ policies to its will. And Russia has deployed forces to, and established or reestablished a military presence in, a number of Middle Eastern and African countries, including Syria and the Central African Republic.

The allies have responded by reinforcing their Eastern flank, updating or completing NATO’s contingency plans, and redoubling their efforts at meaningful dialogue with Moscow. Nations have revamped the gas grid in Europe to better withstand attempts at energy blackmail. But that, in hindsight, was the easy part. In recent years, Russia has also begun financing extremist anti–European Union (EU) and anti-NATO political parties across Europe. And it has spread fake news in an apparent attempt to subvert the existing security architecture and weaken the Western democratic order and institutions.

These moves raise difficult questions for the alliance: Is Russia still a defensive, status quo power, or has a revisionist mind-set taken over? If the latter, how far is Moscow willing to go in undermining the European security order and democracies? Does Russia have a point that some elements of the security order in Europe, such as arms control treaties, need to be updated? If so, how can this be done without weakening allied cohesion and deterrence? What role, if any, does NATO have in safeguarding democracy and political order at home?

If state-sponsored challenges are difficult enough to deal with, then those below the state level are even trickier to grasp and counter—and increasingly prominent. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have generated hope and encouragement since the Arab Spring revolutions first roared in late 2010 but also plenty of concern to the allies, including in the form of mass migration and terrorism. These challenges might seem a world away from NATO’s 1949 Washington Treaty and its state-centered worries about conventional and nuclear threats. But the alliance has fared well over the decades precisely because it has continuously evolved to address its member states’ changing defense and security needs. NATO does what its members want it to do, and since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, this list has included the fight against terrorism.

The nature and sophistication of terrorist organizations themselves is evolving. The self-proclaimed Islamic State was able to control territory through its caliphate project. Elsewhere in the MENA region, from Yemen to Libya to the Sinai Peninsula, terrorist organizations are taking advantage of state fragility to set up smaller pockets of post-Westphalian governance. In addition, these groups are becoming better at fundraising for their activities, and this includes increased collaboration with smugglers of drugs, people, and antiques.

As terrorism increasingly profits from organized crime, how should NATO respond to member states’ calls for protection? How can the alliance improve its collaboration with the EU and other international
actors to deny terrorists and other criminals access to Europe? How does NATO balance the military and political exigencies of the fight against terrorism with its defense and deterrence responsibilities in the East? And what strategies deployed in service of deterrence on the Eastern flank might also be useful in discouraging terrorist attacks against NATO?

The impact of the technological revolution on the alliance's work has been no less bewildering than geopolitical shifts or troubles in the neighborhood. Only a few fleeting years ago, military might was relatively simple to calculate. Leading Western think tanks still track defense budgets, manpower, and essential platforms in an attempt to decipher relative shifts in power. Yet the situation is no longer so simple. With so many critical military and civilian networks now built outside the West and connected to the internet—and therefore vulnerable to cyber attacks—adversaries and NATO countries alike have gained the ability to inflict unacceptable harm on each other's economies and armed forces with the click of a mouse.

The allies need to rethink how they can avoid being blackmailed into inaction in times of crisis and how they harden their military information technology systems. Power, after all, is a function not only of the possession of capabilities but also of the freedom to use them. And here, modern technology has given NATO's adversaries and allies potential ways to paralyze each other's governments—tactics that were undreamed of only a decade ago and are yet to be fully reflected in allied plans, strategies, and exercises.

Warfare is about to become even more complex and complicated. Artificial intelligence is already revolutionizing military logistics and recruitment and is on its way to being applied to military equipment and weapons. NATO and nonallied countries have tested the first swarms of autonomously operated drones. These hold the potential to transform warfare by greatly increasing the speed of decisionmaking and engagement and by defanging many defensive and access-denial systems. A technology from another corner of the information technology universe, quantum computing, threatens to wreak havoc on encryption and secure communications.

The sheer speed of these changes is testing the alliance in unseen ways. Most existing armaments standards and experts deal with the physical world of bullets and armor. At the very least, the allies may now require far greater cohesion on digital policies.

Western societies are digesting the ever-closer fusion of computers and warfare at a time of unprecedented soul-searching about democracy itself. Technology is partly responsible: the proliferation of digital platforms, while hugely beneficial in many regards, has helped reduce the average news consumer's exposure to views that challenge existing beliefs and willingness to accept another point of view, which is essential to open societies. This matters to NATO. The organization has always been more than a military alliance of shared need and convenience. Its endurance is directly attributable to the sense of community among the allies, which have bound themselves together through shared values while respecting each other's differences.

Those differences have proliferated in recent years. Globalization and interconnectedness have produced unprecedented prosperity but have also spawned a search for a more nostalgic, nativist way of life. In some cases, this backlash has been tinged with undemocratic hues and a rejection of international institutions. Established Western democracies are reopening long-dormant discussions about the meaning and boundaries of the rule of law and freedom of expression. Countries in transition to democracy have fewer role models to follow and more nondemocratic alternatives to consider.

Can NATO continue to play one of its most important post–Cold War roles—that of helping to make Europe whole and free again—if its own members begin to question elements of the political order that NATO is sworn to defend? Can divergences in political systems
and beliefs break allies’ will and ability to use force jointly if a crisis calls on them to do so? Can allied governments maintain public support in NATO, including necessary levels of defense spending and military assistance to other allies, if they see each other less and less as part of the same political family?

The essays that follow may not fully satisfy readers’ yearning for definite answers. But they aspire to serve as a guide in the search for solutions to the challenges NATO faces at the start of its eighth decade.
ADAPTATION: UNDERSTANDING NEW STRATEGIC TRENDS
INTRODUCTION

NATO celebrates its seventieth anniversary this year. Since the end of the Cold War, many have been predicting the organization’s death—or, at least, its irrelevance. While such predictions have so far been proved wrong, NATO, widely hailed as the most successful security alliance in modern history, has consistently been in turmoil. NATO’s members generate political support for the alliance and forge agreement on its missions through constant conversation, even if not always cordially. Lately, however, disagreements among the allies have been more disruptive than usual.

As NATO looks forward to its next seventy years, it must adapt its institutions and strengthen its partnerships with likeminded countries.

ISSUES AT STAKE

The New Test for NATO

As historian of NATO Stanley Sloan has long argued, “NATO in crisis” is the oldest refrain of the post–Cold War era. And although that era is changing, the international order is not necessarily in any more or less of a crisis. The strains are severe, but they are not creating any fundamental fissures that did not already exist. Since the 1990s, secretary-generals of the United Nations (UN) have warned that the UN is becoming marginal to international security. The international trading order has been stagnant at best since the failure of the Doha Development Round of talks to lower trade barriers around the world. And Chancellor Angela Merkel is not the first German leader to state that Europe cannot completely rely on U.S. security guarantees, nor is President Emmanuel Macron the first French leader to issue calls to arms for European strategic autonomy.

The main underlying causes of the current strains on the post–Cold War era are rapid political, economic, and technological changes. These shifts, together with the failure of national governments to adequately address concerns that stem from them, have created a sense of unease among significant portions of the electorate in most democratic societies. This trend has corroded norms, challenged institutions of both the national and the international order, and strengthened states that do not share Western values, especially China and Russia.
These developments confront NATO member states domestically and on the international stage and add a new element to allies’ usually constructive discord.

**The Shifting Balance of Power**

Turmoil in the West is changing the relative relevance of the four major players in international relations: China, the European Union (EU), Russia, and the United States. That has implications for the global order in general and for NATO’s purview in particular. Today’s central question is whether liberal societies will agree on means to prevent the emergence of a new disorder with which China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers are comfortable. Europe and the United States—despite their navel gazing—can still prevent that outcome, because they continue to dominate the international institutions that set global agendas and rules. But the window of opportunity is closing.¹⁶

Russia is punching far above its weight. With an economy smaller than Italy’s and only two products on world markets—weapons and energy—Russia hardly seems suited for the digitized twenty-first century.¹⁷ However, President Vladimir Putin has found a way to compensate for these shortcomings. He has partly fulfilled his great-power ambitions by weakening Russia’s perceived adversaries through disinformation, political interference, and even military action against neighbors such as Ukraine. In the process, he has also undermined a security order in Europe that Russia considers unfair.

In the long run, military overreach, coupled with a weak economy, is likely to weaken Russia’s position. Yet, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and one of the two major nuclear powers, Moscow will remain an important actor with the potential to cause inconveniences. But Russia is, in effect, a regional power, as former U.S. president Barack Obama put it in 2014: a potent threat to its immediate neighbors, but one with a limited ability to shape international politics on a global scale, despite Russia’s use of asymmetric strategies and Putin’s recent muscle-flexing in Eastern Europe and Syria.¹⁸

On the other side of the spectrum, China has become an emerging power—an economic and political heavyweight. For the time being, however, Beijing does not pose a direct military threat to NATO.¹⁹ President Xi Jinping’s China is a competitor in the sense that it supports changes in the global order that contradict the liberal international order that NATO is explicitly dedicated to preserving.²⁰

While China’s long-term strategic goals are global, its short-term ambitions are regional.²¹ Beijing focuses, in particular, on extending its economic and political influence in East Asia and on building political alliances supported by investment deals with countries across the globe, with an emphasis on Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. China is moving westward via its Belt and Road Initiative to assert strong influence over countries that sign up to this major development project. In Eastern Europe, China supports leaders and governments who follow an opportunistic and often euroskeptic agenda, which ultimately weakens the EU as a force for democratic progression.²²

The United States, with its economic strength and military capabilities, remains the sole superpower.²³ Moreover, it benefits from a network of global allies and from its soft power. These qualities have given the United States a global leadership position. Yet America increasingly appears tired of its leadership role. Under Obama, the United States started to incrementally reduce its international commitments, not only in Europe but also in the Middle East.²⁴

The fourth great power, the EU, has lost political cohesion in recent years. With the United Kingdom’s planned exit from the bloc, some Eastern European politicians’ open contradictions of European values, and economic and fiscal problems in the South, European integration is under fire.²⁵ Idle boasting of
global ambitions and strategic autonomy cannot hide the fact that the EU is in a difficult position.\textsuperscript{26}

None of these trends is likely to reverse in the near future. The consequences of these changes for NATO and the transatlantic security relationship should not be underestimated. For the alliance to remain the prime transatlantic security institution and counter the challenge to European and U.S. security posed by China and, to a lesser degree, Russia, NATO needs to widen its strategic perspective to include the Asia Pacific region as well.\textsuperscript{27}

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

If NATO sees itself as an alliance that supports the liberal international order as much as the defense of Europe, it must prepare to help its partners counter—or, better still, preempt—the challenge to this order from China and Russia. That order is worth defending for the simple reason that it remains the best framework for a system comprising many players.

That said, institutions such as NATO that reflect the past will need to adjust to the new reality of global power distribution. Institutions have to solve problems for people to consider them relevant.\textsuperscript{28} When those problems and circumstances change, so should policies. For NATO, this means that the alliance may need to make contingency plans to relieve U.S. forces in the Atlantic, the Middle East, and Africa if they are required in the Pacific. The alliance may also need to strengthen its support to the EU in Eastern European countries that are being actively courted by Chinese and Russian diplomacy backed up by promises of developmental projects.

NATO can also shape the emerging global order by holding steady to, and universalizing, the principles and practices that make it successful: being a magnet for countries in transition to representative government, protecting countries that share the alliance’s values, and working hard to mold national interests into cooperative internationalism.\textsuperscript{29} More specifically, NATO needs to strengthen partnerships with like-minded countries such as Argentina, Australia, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Korea. The alliance needs to find ways to penalize Russia and China for assaults against weaker states. And NATO must effectively motivate countries in transition, such as Ukraine, to keep adopting better governance and rule of law practices that align with the coalition’s expectations.

Finally, NATO can help forge the coming multilateral world order because it has the capacity to constantly evolve and adjust to new security environments. The allies should apply that spirit of adaptability to support reform of the UN Security Council, which is woefully unrepresentative, and strengthen the UN’s powers to enforce rules that have been adopted by consensus. Stronger institutions help free societies prosper and constrain illiberal challengers.

Fortunately for NATO, the alliance is representative, and its members are empowered, active, and used to finding mutually agreeable solutions. That is why NATO is both perpetually in crisis and the most successful security alliance in modern history.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Alicia von Voss is a program officer in the Security, Defense, and Armaments Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).}

\textit{Florence Schimmel is a program assistant in the Security, Defense, and Armaments Program at the DGAP.}

\textit{This essay is based on written contributions by Kori Schake, deputy director general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute; Karl-Heinz Kamp, academic director of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy; and Florence Gaub, deputy director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies. The editors thank these individuals for their insightful input.
CHAPTER 2

THE TRANSATLANTIC BOND AND THE TUSSLE BETWEEN COSMOPOLITANISM AND NATIONALISM

PETER ROUGH

INTRODUCTION

The West is in the beginning stages of the most profound societal change since the end of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century. New technologies are disrupting established social and economic patterns while generating unprecedented opportunities. These trends, enabled by information technology in particular, will only accelerate, perhaps even exponentially, in the coming decades. At a minimum, the pace of change in society has increased markedly.

These breakthroughs have also spawned the rise of new transnational epistemic communities. In 2011, Chrystia Freeland, now Canada’s minister for foreign affairs, described a “21st-century plutocracy” of globe-trotting conferees, operating largely unmoored from their local communities. Joining them today is a new category of social media mavens to form “a global community,” as Freeland put it, whose “ties to one another are increasingly closer than their ties to hoi polloi back home.” The ethos that unites them is a decidedly cosmopolitan, globalist worldview.

In large parts of the West, citizens searching for meaning, grounding, tradition, and identity in an era of globalization have rejected these elites and their consensus. Instead, they have turned to new nationalisms that define the West as a mosaic of cultural and historical entities rather than an interwoven community of cosmopolitan ideals. The 2016 election of Donald Trump as president of the United States stands as the most obvious rebuke of cosmopolitanism. For transatlantic observers who had grown complacent on the assumption of ever greater economic and political integration, this setback has come as a bitter shock. At present, nationalism and cosmopolitanism are battling over the future of the West—and with it, over the political foundations of NATO.

This is not the first time that NATO has experienced acute political differences in its ranks. After the military coup in Greece in 1967, for example, relations between the so-called colonels and the alliance were strained. But that challenge, and others since, constituted discrete episodes rather than a general shift in the politics of the West. From Turkish nationalists to American progressives and all points in between, NATO features a growing diversity of political actors with varying preferences. How these politics will evolve no one knows, but there is a clear sense in Western capitals that change is afoot.
ISSUES AT STAKE

For a political-military alliance like NATO to function properly, its members must maintain two areas: first, their political commitment to the alliance and, second, the large-scale military investments to back it up. Cosmopolitans have long understood their countries as part of a larger order; in fact, it is rare to hear them make anything other than earnest commitments to the alliance. However, many of them, in Western Europe in particular, have neglected their national military capabilities. Germany, for instance, is scheduled to take as long to reach its target of investing the equivalent of 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product in defense—already a downward revision from the goal of 2 percent on which allies agreed at their 2014 summit in Wales—as the country took to fight World Wars I and II combined.34 In large parts of Europe, the United States is expected to pick up the slack, if military force is considered important at all.

By contrast, the new nationalists of the West seem to carry a certain martial vigor and esprit de corps. But these nationalisms also run the risk of devolving into narrow, even ugly parochialisms.35 In several NATO countries, self-proclaimed nationalists have questioned the wisdom of containing Russia—to name one alliance objective—despite the Kremlin’s obvious hostility to the West. Like France’s former president Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the country’s far-right National Rally, Marine Le Pen, has pressed for France to leave NATO’s integrated command structure. She has also called for an end to sanctions over Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.36

But what about the United States? It remains the center of gravity of the alliance as its largest and most powerful state, but it, too, seems divided between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. To sustain U.S. support for the alliance in the coming decades, NATO must not rest on its laurels. Principally, allies need to address the imbalance in the distribution of the military burden. The United States accounts for two-thirds of all defense spending in the twenty-nine-member alliance, despite the near economic parity between the United States and Europe. This makes it too easy for U.S. administrations of all stripes to cast the Europeans as de facto free riders. Burden sharing constitutes the most serious U.S. objection to NATO. In combination with the new temptation of parochialism in Washington, it risks hollowing out the U.S. commitment to the alliance altogether.

As a treaty-based alliance of sovereign states, NATO is the international organization that most easily traverses the cosmopolitan-nationalist divide in the United States. To date, the American people and their representatives remain broadly supportive of the alliance, evidenced by polling and the applause for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s April 2019 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress.37 So long as the United States stays supportive, NATO will remain a strong military force.

The alliance features prominently in the United States’ most important strategy documents, from the National Security Strategy to the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. For almost every major operation abroad, Washington looks to its primary European allies first for support and assistance. In that sense, the alliance also performs a valuable psychological function. The United States is most confident when it receives the support of its democratic partners, whose endorsement serves as a form of validation for especially thorny decisions.

The European Deterrence Initiative is an example of the best that NATO has to offer. It seeks to protect the alliance’s Eastern flank against potential Russian aggression through a battalion-sized group of multinational forces in the Baltic, with a brigade-sized force of U.S. troops in neighboring Poland. Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom lead the deployments in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, respectively. Farther abroad, NATO is leading a mission in Afghanistan.38 By virtually any metric, the alliance is a net benefit to
U.S. national security. But it requires shared sacrifice lest it decay to the point of losing meaning.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

As an international, rather than supra- or transnational organization, NATO has largely managed to sidestep the political divisions roiling the West. In the preamble of its founding charter, the alliance commits its members “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” NATO should remain focused on that core mission—one that allies of all hues should be able to embrace.

In the post–Cold War era, the West lost the binding force of a common enemy in the Soviet Union. Instead, it turned inward and focused on the important task of extending democracy to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Of late, however, this internal focus has served more to highlight differences between cosmopolitans and nationalists in the alliance than to develop a common front against external actors. Now is the time to turn NATO’s spotlight back on its core mission of deterring the West’s strategic challengers, a process that began after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The external threat to the alliance from authoritarians has increased markedly. In addition to direct military action, Russia has used energy, corruption, and information operations to undermine NATO members and countries on the alliance’s periphery. In Turkey and the Baltic, Russia has tested NATO borders directly. For its part, China has used debt financing as a lever over some NATO members such as Montenegro and employed unscrupulous practices to capture cutting-edge companies in key European industries. Today, China controls approximately one-tenth of Europe’s container-port capacity.

As NATO’s largest member, the United States has a special role in directing the focus of the alliance on a revanchist Russia and an authoritarian China. It should be able to count on all members to reciprocate in supporting the West against its challengers. These external responsibilities, rather than internal political standard setting, are the proper focus of a military alliance. And by distributing responsibilities for great-power competition across the alliance, NATO’s popularity would only increase in the United States, which has grown weary of the organization’s long combat missions in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Great-power rivalry is bound to spill across multiple areas of competition, too. NATO must shore up its vulnerabilities in the Arctic, where Russia and, to a lesser extent, China have intensified their military operations after decades of calm and in the target countries of NATO itself, where Russia has pioneered new modes of hybrid warfare. The creation of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki in 2017 was a good step in this direction.

Relatedly, NATO can increase its public appeal by addressing new areas of concern that are of obvious importance to member states and their publics. From the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea, the alliance should consider freedom of navigation operations that ensure the unencumbered movement of energy and goods. Similarly, although there is little consensus on assigning NATO a role in stemming illegal immigration and the trafficking of humans and weapons that often accompanies it, such an effort would demonstrate in clear and unmistakable terms the value of the alliance to its citizens. Earlier this decade, NATO engaged in a broad-based antipiracy operation that could serve as a template for a similar mission to tackle human trafficking.

Finally, NATO members should guard against any attempts to create an EU military rival to the alliance. Such a development would lead to the unraveling of U.S. support for NATO. While EU defense consolidation could achieve some efficiencies of scale, the resulting
savings are unlikely to be reinvested in new capabilities. Instead, it would lead simply to a new bureaucracy that duplicates NATO functions. Moreover, any moves toward defense protectionism would undermine the industrial defense integration that developed across the Atlantic over decades.

Ultimately, for NATO to maintain its military edge, the West cannot neglect the foundations of power, from economic innovation and military strength to demographic growth and a sense of national purpose. These are matters for individual governments to address, but without healthy foundations, NATO will lose its ability to act.

As the West sorts through these questions, and as the duel between cosmopolitans and nationalists unfolds, the alliance must continue to provide the apolitical, militarily capable backbone that respects the diversity of its members and guards against external competitors. Member states can also add to NATO’s popularity by making it fit to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow, from migration to hybrid war, rather than solely those of yesterday. The alliance can and should serve as a steel vessel protecting its members from those on the outside who wish to do it harm. In the years to come, reinforcing that hull will require shared sacrifice.

Peter Rough is a fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC.
INTRODUCTION

A person can be a citizen of the United States or of the European Union (EU)—and of one of the union’s member states, of course. But a person cannot be a citizen of NATO. This simple fact is symbolic of a basic truth about the transatlantic security architecture that, consciously or not, is often overlooked: the United States and the EU are the two main political actors in the alliance. They operate at the level of grand strategy; they have the capacity to set objectives and apply instruments in all dimensions of power—political, economic, and military.

Whether or not a successful transatlantic alliance will continue to exist into the next decades depends, in the first instance, on whether the United States and the EU continue to share a broad outlook on the world. If they do, the transatlantic partners can optimize the functioning of their security architecture in light of the main strategic orientations on which Washington and Brussels agree. If they do not, the question of whether NATO and the EU will implement all seventy-four points of cooperation in their 2016 and 2018 joint declarations will be mostly irrelevant. An EU-U.S. strategic dialogue is therefore crucial.

ISSUES AT STAKE

Who Does Strategy?

In many instances, the EU does not use its capacity to act strategically, because its member states are too divided. But that sad fact does not detract from the centrality of EU-U.S. relations, because individual European states cannot step in. They are sovereign states but mostly lack the means for autonomous action on the global stage. Moreover, in many key areas of grand strategy, EU member states have pooled their sovereignty and can make meaningful decisions only through the supranational EU. For the EU, with its single market, single currency (for most members), and one external border, there can be only single decisions vis-à-vis third parties on trade and investment relations, sanctions, migration regimes, and the status of the political relationship.

If, for example, the EU had no position on Russia and Ukraine, it would be very difficult for the United States to bring Europe’s political and economic power to bear to support its own strategy, and a comprehensive approach would be well-nigh impossible. The United States could still mobilize the military power of individual European
states, because in this dimension, the EU—just like NATO—operates on an intergovernmental basis. This is especially true if the absence of a European consensus is the result of inertia. But if European states actively oppose each other, they will be as divided when they meet at NATO as when they meet in the EU. In such cases, short of a scenario that invokes the alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense clause and its obligation to render assistance, the United States may find that it can recruit only a portion of European allies and partners for any NATO military action. That was the case in the 2011 air campaign in Libya. Some states may even veto the use of NATO structures, leaving only a coalition of the willing as a viable option, as happened in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The United States and the EU therefore have a strong interest in permanent and structured cooperation on grand strategy. Yet, counterintuitively, no forum for such cooperation exists. Of course, the allies plan for collective defense in the military sense, and NATO standardization and the integrated military command structure are at the heart of the alliance’s capacity to act on Article 5. But when and where do Europeans and Americans systematically discuss, and make decisions on, the political, economic, and military aspects of strategic problems in an integrated manner?

Aside from the participation of high-level EU representatives in NATO summits, in permanent bodies, such as the North Atlantic Council, the United States discusses only with individual European countries. In such forums, at least one nation always blocks discussion of the EU dimension of the issue at hand. Conversely, someone always vetoes discussion of supposed NATO issues in any EU meeting. And there, the United States is not, and cannot be, present. Meanwhile, direct EU-U.S. strategic dialogue is intermittent at best and often nonexistent.

**EU-U.S. Strategic Divergence**

The absence of a true EU-U.S. strategic dialogue risks becoming increasingly problematic, because strategies have been diverging since the administration of former U.S. president Barack Obama introduced a pivot to Asia. This was a fundamental reorientation of U.S. grand strategy in response to a structural change in the global balance of power. The United States identified China as a systemic competitor, and that competition will first and foremost play out in Asia. Russia, despite having a lot of nuisance power, ranks second to the Chinese challenge in U.S. thinking.

For the first time since World War II, Europe is no longer the primary theater for U.S. strategy. That does not render NATO irrelevant. But arguably, the United States is coming to see Europe in a more instrumental way: Washington has a much better chance of coming out on top in a strategic competition with Beijing if it has Europe on its side.

For European allies and partners, however, deterring Russia remains NATO’s primary role, and U.S. involvement in Europe’s defense remains essential for that purpose. Many European governments have realized that they have been too naive about China and should prevent Beijing—and other powers—from gaining undue influence in Europe. The EU has already taken initial measures in this area, notably by creating an investment-screening mechanism that allows willing member states to limit foreign ownership of critical infrastructure.

But Europe’s overall view of China, for now, is more nuanced than that of the United States: for the EU, China is simultaneously a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. Whether this strategy continues depends on how China behaves in the future, but the EU is unlikely to follow the same confrontational approach as the United States.45

The combative style of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has dramatized this divergence on China, while differences on Syria, Iran, and trade have further blurred EU-U.S. relations. The shift in
U.S. strategic focus toward China enjoys bipartisan support in Washington, however. A future president may act less confrontationally toward the European allies but will likely continue to pressure them into adopting a harder line against China.

The Americans and Europeans cannot manage this divergence simply by putting China on the NATO agenda. If the United States pushes hard enough, the Europeans will accept it, as they did at the alliance’s seventieth anniversary meeting in Washington in April 2019, but they will only pay lip service to it afterward. In the end, this EU-U.S. divergence requires an EU-U.S. strategic dialogue.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**EU-U.S. Strategic Dialogue**

The precondition for a useful strategic dialogue is sound strategy making on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, the National Security Council (NSC) can underpin the rational formulation of strategy—if the national security adviser and the president are so inclined.

In the EU, decisionmaking is more dispersed, as is the institutional capacity for strategic thinking. During the 2014–2019 sitting of the European Parliament, the European Political Strategy Center had the ear of the president of the European Commission for its out-of-the-box thinking, but it is at one remove from foreign policy and defense. In the European External Action Service, the EU’s foreign policy arm, strategic policy planning plays a role to support the high representative, the union’s foreign policy chief. Strategic reflection also takes place in the EU Military Staff, but it is not directly linked to political decisionmaking on the use of military power by the member states in the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament has its own research services but plays no direct part in the executive.

Given the EU’s institutional setup, the president of the commission, on the one hand, and the Council of Ministers and the high representative, on the other, both need a strategy service. But they could be significantly strengthened and create joint task forces to deal with challenges such as the rise of China that have an external and an internal dimension. The transatlantic partners could then establish a substantial permanent dialogue between these EU services and the NSC. NATO’s Policy Planning Unit could participate on issues with political and military aspects. Such a dialogue could underpin more regular EU-U.S. political consultation at the highest level.

The strategic dialogue between political leaders need not be institutionalized—that would probably just result in sclerosis. But if leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are serious about being allies, they need to develop the habit of consulting each other whenever they envisage decisions with a major mutual impact. The format and means of such consultation can vary according to the case at hand but must include the EU as an organization in addition to the individual European states. Having a substantial strategic conversation will not in itself make divergences go away, but it will make them easier to manage.

Obviously, a strategic dialogue makes sense only if it leads to decisions. For now, the EU lacks the agility that strategic action requires, because on foreign policy and defense, the union operates on an intergovernmental basis and makes all decisions by unanimity. It only takes one member state that prioritizes its bilateral relations with an external power to weaken or block any EU position. Governments may be more reluctant to break consensus in NATO on the military dimension of strategy, but they can easily hamper other crucial dimensions in which only the EU can take the lead. Not only the EU but also NATO and the United States therefore have an interest in strengthening the agility of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy by introducing decisionmaking by majority.
NATO-EU Cooperation

The more EU and U.S. strategies converge and complement each other, the more the pair can act together. In some dimensions of strategy, however, NATO and NATO-EU cooperation will remain the main vehicles for implementation.

One such area lies in the hybrid part of collective defense. A central question is how to deter attempts to subvert allies’ sovereignty, such as stealing data, spreading fake news, corrupting officials, supporting nondemocratic parties, and engaging in economic blackmail. Deterrence and defense, including retaliation, can take different forms and may occur in a completely different domain from that of the act that they seek to punish. It is entirely possible that an offending act targets military systems at NATO, while the response falls under the EU’s purview. This clearly demands much closer NATO-EU coordination than currently exists. Such close cooperation presumes a broader EU-U.S. strategic consensus on the political, economic, and military approach—for example, toward Russia, which is perceived as the main source of hybrid threats today.

The EU is also playing a growing role in developing military capabilities. In many areas of modern warfare, such as air reconnaissance or air-to-air refueling, individual European countries have become too small to make meaningful contributions. The union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism should therefore become the one-stop shop where EU member states—all of which except Cyprus are either NATO allies or partners—cooperate on jointly developing or acquiring new capabilities for NATO, the EU, and themselves. The commission’s planned European Defense Fund will be a core instrument to steer defense investment.

Taboos must be broken, however. NATO should accept that the most promising way for the European allies and partners to meet NATO targets is by using EU instruments. Consequently, when it comes to capabilities such as strategic enablers, it would make sense for NATO to set a collective target for the allies and partners that make up the EU and leave it up to them to decide how to generate the capability.

Meanwhile, the EU should accept that the point of PESCO is not to raise forces for the mostly low-intensity operations that have so far been undertaken through the EU but to address the shortcomings in European armed forces in their entirety. This requires that EU member states aspire to produce a comprehensive and consistent force package that fulfills NATO, EU, and national levels of ambition. While capability development should ideally take place through the EU, this does not preclude the choice of command for any specific operation. The circumstances of a given crisis will dictate how Europeans act: through NATO (with or without their North American allies), the EU, the United Nations, or an ad hoc coalition.

An alliance that has endured for seventy years is more likely to endure a few decades more than to suddenly fall apart. But will NATO survive because of inertia or out of conviction? That conviction must be actively constructed, for there is a serious risk of ever-growing strategic divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic. The consolidation of the EU as a strategic actor is a prerequisite for an effective transatlantic security architecture. There is, alas, no guarantee that the EU will be entirely successful in creating a more agile foreign policy and integrating the defense efforts of its members.

But the choice is not between EU and national strategies. The real choice is between the EU being a strategic actor and an effective U.S. ally, on the one hand, and not being an actor at all and ending up as a mere hanger-on of the United States, on the other. That is a choice that only the Europeans can make.

Sven Biscop is the director of the Europe in the World program at the Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels and a professor at Ghent University.
NATO IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL COMPLEXITY

JAMIE SHEA

INTRODUCTION

NATO’s seventieth anniversary has attracted a good deal of attention. Many observers have marveled at the fact that the alliance is still here. Four factors explain NATO’s past resilience.

The first is the nature of the alliance’s initial principal adversary, the Soviet Union. Moscow posed a threat, but when this was countered, the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate and submit to arms control and transparency arrangements. It was also fragile domestically, particularly in the economic area, and had too many expensive overseas commitments. The Soviet Union could realistically compete only in the military sphere, and NATO was ready to meet this challenge through deterrence, avoiding the need for, and the unacceptable cost of, conflict.

The second factor is that NATO had to deal with only one major challenge at a time. After the Soviet Union, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall, then former Yugoslavia, and then Afghanistan. This gave the allies ample time to build consensus, try various strategies, and learn and adapt as they progressed. NATO could concentrate its resources and political and military solidarity on this single purpose.

The third factor is the former relative stability of the international system. Despite a number of conflicts and crises, the last seventy years marked the heyday of the liberal international order. Multilateral institutions increased their roles and memberships. New sets of rules began to crimp the sovereignty of states and authorize interventions to uphold universal norms. It was easy for NATO to thrive in such an environment and rebrand itself from an alliance focused on preserving the status quo to an agent of change and a pillar of a new, more peaceful, and more cooperative international order.

Finally, the United States was prepared to underwrite and lead NATO—not only because doing so was a formal treaty obligation but also because it was a means for Washington to shape global security and project its influence. Allies needed to be protected, but they also provided the United States with support for its actions. So burden sharing worked both ways. To relieve the burden on itself, the United States called on the Europeans to do and spend more. Yet the only way the Europeans would ever do this is through forming their own security and defense union based on autonomous defense industries. The United States saw this as a challenge to NATO, its leadership, and its markets. So
Washington grumbled about uneven burden sharing but largely stuck with the old state of affairs.

ISSUES AT STAKE

As NATO embarks on its next seventy years, the central question is whether these four enabling factors will still hold. The evidence so far is that they will not. This does not mean that NATO will disappear, even in the long term. But it does mean that the alliance’s luck is running out, and it will need to work harder and more creatively and strategically to sustain the security that its member states take for granted.

The Return of Competition

In the first place, the international system is far less stable and predictable than in the past. The major military players are revisionist in that they view the old order as unfair and constraining. Their perception of the decline of the West encourages them to be more assertive and take risks to probe the resilience and responsiveness of democracies.

Competition is the new constant. It has seeped into classic domains, such as land, sea, and air, and into new ones, such as the information arena, cyberspace, and outer space. Competition means that powers that used to be far apart geographically and functionally are now in constant friction with each other. As war between major powers remains too risky, given the destructiveness of modern weaponry, challenges there have to be gradual until one side has achieved a decisive margin of superiority.

But this also means the return of arms races in conventional areas, such as fighter aircraft, missiles, armor, and naval warfare, and in new technologies, such as offensive cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, bioengineering, and the automation and robotization of the battlefield. Here, speed and synergy across all offensive and defensive domains have become the key military challenges of the twenty-first century.

More competition has produced a more congested environment, in which more players gain the technology and the incentive to join the fray. Unsurprisingly, the security strategies of allies and NATO itself, today, mention multiple adversaries—or, at least, state and nonstate competitors that could easily turn into adversaries. Many of these, such as al-Qaeda and Somali pirates, have been around for two decades or more. But the return of great-power antagonisms after years of striving for great-power cooperation in dealing with common threats like organized crime and climate change has been sudden and brutal.

NATO is once again balancing Russia, but it must also look closely at China—not because NATO wants to go to Asia but because China has become a power in Europe in economic, technological, diplomatic, and cultural ways. Beijing may not threaten European security in the same manner as Moscow, but it increasingly affects the choices of allied governments and societies more than Russia does. After all, security is as much about freedom of choice and the ability to withstand coercion as it is about physical well-being.

Multiple Dependencies

The flip side of multiple adversaries is multiple dependencies. Economic wealth and technological innovation or investment no longer come from the same partners that provide security. This forces allies into difficult choices and balancing acts, such as the debate in Europe over whether to embrace or reject Chinese tech giant Huawei as a provider of fifth-generation cyber connectivity.

At the same time, the new dependencies—in technology, energy, media, or critical infrastructure—make hybrid warfare tactics much more attractive as a means of competition. As hybrid campaigns polarize Western democracies and make them suspect conspiracies behind every debate, they can be used to sow discord, weaken trust in institutions, and undermine the notion of truth. Hybrid activity has
the benefits of deniability, stealth, and the ability to achieve the objectives of war without the need to fight. It is difficult to attribute perpetrators and intentions, and much hybrid activity is legal, as when China acquires ports in the European Union (EU) or Russia manipulates Western social media companies. For aggressors, such activity potentially has a high gain for a generally acceptable level of risk.

Great-power competition plays out along the East-West axis in Ukraine, Georgia, and Central Asia; in the South, where Russia and China are increasingly active in the Middle East and Africa; and even closer to home, in the Western Balkans. Russia and China have concluded security, training, and economic agreements with a number of states. Both present themselves as more reliable than the West and less demanding when it comes to democratic standards and human rights. Dealing with the problems of the South, such as terrorism, uncontrolled migration, and weak, often corrupt security establishments, would already be a major problem for the alliance. But the increasing roles of Russia and China in this area, as well as the Eastern dimension and the hybrid home front, add an unprecedented layer of complexity.

This situation is complicated further by the unpredictable nature of U.S. foreign policy in the era of President Donald Trump. Allies are in a constant state of anxiety as to whether the United States will remain engaged or suddenly disengage. This cannot be solely about burden sharing because the United States today has very low levels of troop deployments in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa compared not only with the levels during the Cold War but also with those a decade or so ago.

**Managing Complexity**

NATO’s challenge as it embarks on its eighth decade is to manage the complexity of great-power competition as a long-term, endemic characteristic of the alliance’s strategic environment.

Russia and China have learned the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their autocracies are entrenched, and they are much more integrated into the global economy, giving them many more levers of influence. They have learned that power is not about having more resources than democracies but about being able to marshal their own lesser resources more effectively. It is also about being willing and able to move decisively to exploit openings while democracies hesitate. Russia and China are up against a much less cohesive West than during the Cold War or the first decade of the twenty-first century. Rather than find their rightful place in the traditional Western order, they are tempted to rewrite the rules and impose their own distinct order.

Moscow and Beijing cannot be defeated through a quick and relatively painless air or naval campaign or ground operation, as happened with the weak, isolated adversaries that the allies faced after the Cold War. NATO has to dig in for the long haul. The alliance must use its resources far more efficiently to contain, confront, and, where possible, cooperate with its new great-power rivals.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Prepare for New Forms of Warfare**

The first strategic implication of the new security environment is that NATO must equip itself for multidomain warfare. Exploiting the new domains of cyber, data control and manipulation, and outer space, where hostile activity can be conducted below the threshold of the alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense clause, adversaries will try to defeat NATO in the electromagnetic spectrum before tanks, armor, and aircraft come into play. The preparation for war has become the war itself.

The United States is already moving in this direction, but it needs to engage its allies fully on how NATO
can mainstream new technologies throughout its force posture. The risk is a digital divide in NATO, in which a minority of allies have acquired the new technologies and thought through how to use them effectively, while a majority have not invested in them and are prepared to fight only in limited, low-intensity engagements.

NATO needs to make its exercises more demanding and incorporate lessons learned faster into its operational procedures and organization. The alliance needs a senior group of scientific advisers who can make policymakers understand earlier and better the impact of technological change by drawing more on private sector expertise and contributions. Declaring space as a domain of operations would be a good move in this direction.

**Respond Robustly to Hybrid Warfare**

The second implication is in the area of hybrid or gray zone warfare. This activity may be difficult to attribute quickly, but it is hostile, damaging, and intolerable. So NATO needs to respond robustly and in a consistent pattern that establishes some form of deterrence over time.

This will be a culture change for the alliance, because it means making lots of small decisions all the time, rather than major ones only rarely. Generating solidarity in response to lesser affronts and devising a playbook of responses below resorting to military force will not be easy. It will need good situational awareness and the ability to handle a hybrid crisis without getting drawn into unwanted escalation or exposing cracks in alliance solidarity.

Russia and China use hybrid activity differently. Russia tends to employ deliberate probes and focused political campaigns to test NATO’s resilience and polarize its societies. China prefers penetrating economies and gaining leverage in high-tech industries, as well as in research and innovation sectors such as universities. Beijing is also more interested in accessing critical infrastructure and supply chains. So the alliance needs two distinct hybrid strategies to enhance its resilience and preserve its strategic autonomy against both types of challenges.

What is common to Russia and China is that they play more in the civilian area than in traditional military domains. Therefore, NATO will need to further develop its civilian response capacities by deepening its partnerships with the private sector, managers of critical infrastructure, and universities. The May 2019 meeting of the North Atlantic Council with national security advisers from capitals was a good start, but it needs to become the norm rather than the exception.

**Support European Strategic Autonomy**

The third consequence is the impact on the relationship between burden sharing and European defense integration. The United States is calling on Europe to do and spend more. This is justified, but it can be meaningfully achieved only if Washington wholeheartedly supports an EU security and defense union that pools and shares its members’ budgets, capabilities, and defense industries. Such a union would remove duplication and give the EU the capacity for autonomous operations at the high end of the spectrum.

The EU’s problems are in its immediate neighborhood, from Ukraine to the Western Balkans, Libya, and the Sahel. The United States is not going to stabilize these regions. On the contrary, it is reducing its footprint in the Middle East and Africa. Yet the United States has a vital interest in the EU succeeding in this venture. So instead of criticizing the EU goal of strategic autonomy or European cooperation initiatives, Washington needs to back them. After all, a strong EU is the only emerging power that will not be a threat to the United States and is truly in its long-term interest.

Russia and China’s greatest weaknesses are their lack of allies and relative isolation. But as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping...
travel constantly in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia and court traditional U.S. allies, this situation could change quickly. Moreover, the United States will succeed in urging allies to spend the equivalent of 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense only when EU countries demand this of each other in the name of EU as well as NATO solidarity—and not as the price of continuing U.S. protection.

**Plan for the Long Term**

Finally, the alliance needs to think and plan for the long term. China and Russia are good at this and do not allow themselves to be easily blown off course. NATO, meanwhile, has become good at responding to immediate crises in line with the news cycle but at the cost of shifting its priorities too quickly and losing depth and focus.

China and Russia are highly complicated entities that cannot be reduced to predictable stereotypes for good or bad. Both states require engagement and analysis at all levels, from official meetings such as the NATO-Russia Council to track-two and broader societal dialogues. The alliance urgently needs some sort of partnership forum to regularly engage with China, including at the levels of foreign ministers and defense chiefs.

NATO’s intelligence reform and creation of a new division to generate more inputs and fuse civilian and military intelligence have greatly increased the alliance’s capacity to understand Russia and China. But NATO cannot manage a policy of containment, cooperation, and occasional pushback when redlines are crossed solely by being more aware or always leaving the initiative to Russia and China and figuring out how to react. These two powers are determined to penetrate NATO’s systems, while simultaneously using firewalls, intimidation, and propaganda to make it difficult for the alliance to get inside theirs.

The allies need a long-term, patient, realistic strategy to counter this behavior. Perhaps the first step is to stop giving Russia and China free, easy victories through the alliance’s self-inflicted wounds and divisions.

NATO’s next seventy years will be a rougher ride than the first seventy. With international institutions being questioned—ironically, by the very nations that created them—the alliance is one of the last pieces in what used to be a transatlantic framework to face the world of great-power competition. NATO combines solidity and permanence with a proven capacity to change and adapt. Yet it does not run on autopilot. The alliance can still provide peace with freedom, but the time for its leaders to decide on the reforms to achieve this is now. Tomorrow is already too late.

Jamie Shea is an associate fellow in the International Security Department at Chatham House and a professor of strategy and security at the University of Exeter. He was a NATO official for nearly four decades.
RESILIENCE: RESPONDING TO NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION

NATO’s success as a collective defense organization lies in its ability to rally twenty-nine member states in defense of any one of them. Cohesion is what makes the alliance strong and unique, but it is difficult to sustain day after day, under constant pressure from adversaries.

One useful way to measure cohesion is in financial terms. Despite a pledge to contribute the equivalent of at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product to defense by 2024, some member states seem likely to miss the target. While this does not prove that the allies disagree on the nature and gravity of the threats before them, it does strongly suggest that some have not fully bought into the agreed priorities.

Many factors are undermining cohesion in NATO. In an era with no single unifying threat, different members inevitably have different interests in diverse centers of power and influence. Allies also diverge on what constitute democratic standards and appropriate responses to competition with non-Western actors.66

It is up to individual countries to safeguard their freedom to respond to a call for help from an ally, address vulnerabilities and gaps in their national systems, and take proactive measures to reduce risks. But the alliance as an organization can help. This is especially true when it comes to understanding and responding to new threats to cohesion. None is more relevant than the hybrid war for hearts and minds that NATO’s adversaries are waging through political interference and disinformation.

ISSUES AT STAKE

While not a new phenomenon, hybrid warfare has been widely mentioned in international discourse since at least 2014. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea showed that NATO and its member states lacked ready-made responses to the emergence of a threat aimed directly at solidarity and cohesion. The experience has prompted allies to rethink, act, and adapt quickly, especially with regard to instruments for protection beyond triggering Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty, which declares that an attack on one ally is an attack on all.

Hybrid warfare includes a variety of activities and covers the use of different instruments to destabilize
a society by influencing its decisionmaking. Frequent instruments include:

- **Interference in electoral processes**: An adversary can use techniques from campaigning through the media and social networks to securing financial resources for a political group to influence the outcome of an election in a direction that favors the adversary’s political interests.

- **Disinformation and false news**: An adversary can create a parallel reality and use falsehoods to fuel social fragmentation. The idea is to disorient the public and make it difficult for a government to seek public approval for a given NATO policy or operation.

- **Cyber attacks**: An adversary can pressure NATO governments into not coming to each other’s aid in times of crisis by threatening devastating cyber attacks aimed at the civilian population. Examples include attacks on networks governing hospitals or electricity and water supplies.

- **Drone attacks**: These are similar to cyber attacks but on a more limited scale. An adversary can use remotely piloted platforms to inflict misery on civilians by crippling the operations of airports, air ambulances, and police helicopters. Such attacks can also hamper military airspace operations in early phases of a conflict.

- **Financial influence**: An adversary can make investments, conclude unfavorable energy-supply deals, or offer loans that make a country vulnerable in the long run to political pressure.

Russia is the most frequently cited source of hybrid attacks, particularly disinformation, interference in elections, and cyber attacks. It and other states often act via third, nonstate entities such as nationalist, criminal, or terrorist groups. This leaves the attacking state room for deniability, confuses the attacked country, and can prevent a timely and adequate response. Most hybrid operations to date have featured a mixture of mechanisms used by state and nonstate actors, and a clear line between them is difficult to draw.

NATO’s efforts to address hybrid threats have been conducted at two levels: defining strategy at the supranational level and assisting the target countries at the national level. The latter effort will receive a boost when the new counterhybrid support teams on which members agreed in July 2018 fully come into effect. NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division is in charge of hybrid-related research and analysis, while the Public Diplomacy Division tracks disinformation through online instruments. The Emerging Security Challenges Working Group, established in 2012, has a goal to identify and prioritize nontraditional threats. Because hybrid attacks are a threat to the West as a whole, not just NATO, and because they mostly rely on nonmilitary tools, the alliance has been strengthening its cooperation with the European Union (EU). One useful tool available to both organizations is the joint European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, established in Helsinki in April 2017.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

NATO can and should do more to counter hybrid threats, following the proven strategy of prepare, deter, and defend.

**Build Resilience by Fostering Democracy**

The first, self-evident recommendation is to deny adversaries the opportunities they exploit for hybrid attacks. The more stable the political systems and economies of NATO countries are, the less suitable ground they represent for hybrid threats. A government that is credible, popular, and trusted will have an easier time winning support for its chosen course of action in NATO than other governments and will be better able to resist disinformation and other forms of interference and blackmail.
Western Balkan countries seem particularly vulnerable, as their citizens tend to have low trust in the authorities and do not believe that their judiciaries are truly independent. In opinion polls, as many as 70 percent of respondents said that the law did not equally apply to all. Democracy and trust have declined in most Western Balkan countries over the last ten years, a trend that overlaps with the crisis of democracy throughout Europe.

Steps that strengthen democracy and economies are the most effective way of building resilience against hybrid attacks. Corruption deserves particular attention. Not all authoritarian and illiberal governments are corrupt, but most abuse access to public and European funds to give themselves a competitive advantage over political rivals. Once on a corrupt path, authoritarians are, in essence, condemned to always seek to remain in power, lest they be prosecuted. It is a vicious circle, and this dynamic between authoritarianism and corruption is not always understood—including by the U.S. and EU leaderships, which does not serve the alliance well.

NATO has few tools to defend democracy and combat corruption among its member states, but allies can do more even within this limited framework. Perhaps an annual report on the rule of law in member states, modeled on the one proposed in the EU, could help. NATO could also highlight good and bad practices in member states on an annual basis and could link serious violations of the law to the suspension of certain political rights. The pressure to comply with democratic standards must exist both before and after a state joins the organization. Naturally, the alliance should continue to help foster democracy in countries that aspire to EU and NATO membership.

**Share Best Practices**

NATO provides a platform from which allies can work when coping with individual problems and vulnerabilities. The alliance can also help identify particular challenges, sometimes before the governments concerned do, and can play a role in early warning. This matters because rapid decisionmaking is sometimes the key to success in hybrid warfare.

**Think and Speak Coherently**

NATO is meeting the hybrid challenge with twenty-nine member states experiencing very different sociopolitical realities and often using different concepts. A unified vocabulary and strategy would limit the misunderstanding of threats, improve collaboration, and make the sharing of lessons learned more effective—so would an agreement on the prioritization of tasks and responsibilities and a shared understanding of NATO’s role.

This would greatly help individual countries to build compatible and comparable national strategies. Many of these strategies, including that of the youngest member Montenegro, are in early stages of preparation, but divergences are already becoming evident. Those that have been completed—such as Slovenia’s 2018 regulation on cyber and information security or Croatia’s 2017 National Security Strategy, which partly deals with hybrid challenges—have largely opted for different approaches.

NATO member states must send a unified message inside and out. As strategic communication is a mind-set, it has to be built together carefully and fundamentally. NATO’s communication strategy should be a result of joint efforts and hence a common instrument against all threats, not just hybrid ones, at all levels.

**Unite Forces**

Hybrid threats work across military and civilian domains and therefore require intersectoral, regional, and international cooperation. For NATO, cooperation with the EU is essential given the overlap in the two organizations’ memberships and their distinct and complementary responsibilities.
This is understood in theory and reflected in joint declarations, but the practice lags behind. The EU and NATO should adopt a common hybrid strategy. They should also build joint response teams, improve day-to-day coordination, and expand the geographic scope of myth-busting websites such as EUvsDisinfo.eu.

**Include Civil Society**

The capabilities of think tanks or media groups to detect and defend against hybrid threats often surpass those of governments. Specialized private websites such as Stopfake.org do a better job at recognizing disinformation than many public agencies and often relieve governments of the need to build their own capacities. However, few private initiatives exist.

It is in NATO countries’ interest to systematically build private capacity by providing grants through the alliance and other international entities dealing with security issues. Financial support should also cover analysis, not just public diplomacy. The more NATO and individual allies succeed in building a network of experts, the more they strengthen their resistance to hybrid challenges.

**Invest in Journalism to Raise Media Literacy**

Social networks, as currently managed and regulated, lend themselves too easily to the dissemination of disinformation. Regulation falls outside NATO’s competence, but the alliance should make known its preference for sensible legislation that makes social networks more impervious to abuse by improving recognition of false profiles and strengthening penalties for hate speech.

Ultimately, the best tool for fighting disinformation is professional journalism. In particular, both NATO and its member states should invest more in investigative journalism to offer high-quality alternatives to false news.

Research shows that 70 percent of uses of the term “hybrid threats” by the media are inaccurate. NATO would benefit from helping strengthen journalists’ capacity to properly cover and monitor this issue. Well-educated media are an indispensable partner in building social awareness and educating citizens on how to cope with various forms of hybrid pressures. NATO can help by providing training and leading campaigns that improve awareness of hybrid challenges and thus boost local media capabilities in this area.

**Jovana Marović** is the executive director of Politikon Network, a think tank based in Podgorica; a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group; and a member of the Working Group for Chapter 23, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, within Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations.
INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, cyberspace has transformed societies around the world, reshaping economies, politics, social affairs, and, increasingly, militaries. The first cyber attacks launched as part of a military conflict are now twenty years old. In the last decade, cyberspace has become a central aspect of military operations.

The acceleration of the military use of cyber capabilities and the simultaneous militarization of cyberspace create new threats and opportunities for NATO. The alliance must respond in a number of ways, including by increasing investment, strengthening technical cooperation with the European Union (EU), and seeking political consensus on the attribution of, and responses to, cyber attacks.

ISSUES AT STAKE

Armed forces and vital civilian organizations, such as operators of energy networks, rely more and more on computer systems for their operations. This increases both their efficacy and their vulnerability. NATO saw the significance of this trend some time ago, and since 2016, the allies have recognized cyberspace as a domain in itself. The alliance integrates cyber capabilities into its thinking and planning for operations, even if mainly in defensive terms. The alliance’s 2016 Cyber Defense Pledge helped member states strengthen their national cyber defense capabilities by working together.

Twenty-four of NATO’s twenty-nine member states have issued public cyber doctrines that deal with military issues. Dedicated units are being created across NATO countries, either with a unified cyber command, as in France and the United States, or with a devoted cyber force, like in Germany. This is the right step overall, although allies’ differing approaches to cyber strategy and organization could cause challenges when it comes to joint and combined operations.

NATO is responsible for protecting its networks and infrastructure, as well as promoting cooperation among allies and with partner nations. For the moment, the alliance’s most important prerogatives and capabilities lie in the defensive use of cyber capabilities, although individual countries can volunteer various cyber services—not only defensive ones—to NATO commanders. In 2018, the alliance set up the Cyberspace Operations Center in
its command structure to help nations and commanders better understand these possible national contributions and their uses. NATO also strengthened its cooperation on cyber matters with the EU through a joint declaration at the alliance’s 2016 summit in Warsaw.62

There is often little difference in offensive cyber capabilities between criminal groups and some military forces. Hacking tools are becoming more accessible. In 2017, the U.S. National Security Agency’s sophisticated offensive suite was stolen or leaked and subsequently used in attacks.63 In parallel, critical civilian infrastructure, such as the networks that govern energy or water distribution, is becoming more dependent on the internet, making it a target in potential conflicts. This infrastructure could even be used as a tool for a large attack: if corrupted by hackers, it could be turned into a botnet—a network of computers linked by malware. It has become possible, in theory, to achieve a strategic effect with cyber attacks on civilian facilities and infrastructure, which tend to be less protected than military equipment. As a result, the line between the defense of military and nonmilitary assets in cyberspace is becoming increasingly blurred.

One consequence of this trend is closer military cooperation with civilian authorities, including law enforcement. However, military organizations and armed forces tend to invest more than civilian ministries or agencies in cyber defense and cybersecurity. In the United States, for example, the Department of Defense accounted for more than 50 percent of the 2018 federal cybersecurity budget, representing $8.5 billion out of $15 billion.64 Unchecked, this trend creates a growing gap between military and civilian spending.

Several international organizations and, more recently, companies have decided to address stability in cyberspace and the regulation of cyber conflicts. Some states and nonstate actors are even suggesting the adoption of a treaty on the use of information technology and international security. After meetings of the United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts failed in 2017 to reach a consensus on what constitutes states’ responsible behavior in cyberspace, the UN initiated two new negotiation processes. One is a resolution, sponsored by the United States and European countries, to create a new group of governmental experts.65 The other is a Russia- and China-sponsored resolution to set up an open-ended working group.66 The two tracks have different calendars and mandates, including on consultative meetings. The outcomes of their work, and the potential codes of conduct for cyber conflict they could generate, will provide guidance for how all countries, including NATO allies, should behave in the future regarding cyber operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Research and development policies and investment strategies in cyber and military technologies are key elements to ensure that armed forces are equipped with up-to-date capabilities. The fast pace of technological evolution requires NATO member states to make significant, continuous investments to avoid falling behind in terms of capabilities.

Alongside investments in technology, allies need to strengthen education in cyber matters, not only in engineering, but also in strategic thinking and social use. All military personnel have to be involved to ensure greater cybersecurity awareness and a better integration of cyber capabilities into military operations. The most important challenge for NATO as an alliance is to bridge the gap between those states with first-rate cyber capabilities and awareness and those that lag behind. Currently, a handful of member states are pulling away from the others in terms of the mass integration of connected devices, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence–based systems. This gap could have a major impact on burden sharing in NATO, because a low level of spending by one or more countries would need to be compensated by the others to maintain a satisfactory global level for the alliance.
Allies should draw up national cyber rules of engagement for offensive operations in accordance with principles of international law. Certain policies espoused by some member states, such as hack-back, which allows private firms to pursue attackers into other companies’ networks, or cyber deterrence, could lead to uncontrolled escalation. International law tends to limit this escalation to mainly economic responses, such as sanctions and countermeasures. All NATO allies also need to ensure that their rules of engagement are compatible with the alliance’s agreed approach to cyber defense. At present, different countries have different views on offensive cyber policies, in particular.

The alliance should give technical assistance to member states that are willing to share information and national best practices. NATO should expand its rapid-response system to cover attacks that blur the line between the military and nonmilitary realms, such as an attack on critical nonmilitary networks in the context of a NATO military mission.

Unity is important when it comes to external communications by the allies, or by NATO’s secretary general, on attribution. While the decision to attribute an attack to a particular entity remains a sovereign and political one, allies should discuss any such communication from individual capitals before it is made. This would not only prevent uncontrolled escalation but also preserve the strength and unity of the alliance.

NATO should develop standards on the security of emerging cyber technologies in close partnership with the EU. Allies could address the interoperability and security of connected devices in the defense sector by devising a common policy in the alliance. NATO should also impose a minimum standard of cybersecurity in products, such as connected devices and systems; computer-based technologies; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems during the acquisition process.

Quantum computers deserve particular attention from NATO, because they can be game changers in the military domain. The alliance should act as a gateway between member states’ militaries and defense companies to promote further industrial cooperation, notably on technical standards. Such cooperation should be based on the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, which provides platforms for the exchange of information, threat trends, and best practices. The alliance must foster the maximum possible level of cooperation to ensure that NATO countries are the first to implement this technology.

NATO should strengthen cyber cooperation with the EU more generally, in accordance with the 2016 joint declaration. The EU has broad experience in cybersecurity regulation, in particular. The alliance should lend its political weight to the adoption of recent EU cyber laws, such as the directive on the security of network and information systems. This directive improves cybersecurity in two ways: first, by imposing tighter obligations on the operators of critical equipment to report incidents and, second, by requiring Europe-wide cooperation between cybersecurity agencies and computer emergency response teams.

NATO should continue to work with the EU in educating and training military staff and officials on cybersecurity—for example, as the two organizations do via the Cyber Defense Smart Defense Project. Common exercises such as the annual Locked Shields form an important framework in which to develop common views and capabilities. The alliance could use facilities such as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, or the NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Latina, Italy, to train officials and operators on cybersecurity.

The alliance should support the public political goal of building a predictable, secure, and stable cyberspace. There is a risk that cyber conflicts could escalate to open military confrontations and that the uncontrolled spread of offensive cyber technologies could create an
era of permanent low-level conflict. The international community has an interest in strengthening peace and stability in cyberspace, and NATO has an important role to play here.

The alliance should also make its views heard in international negotiations on stability in cyberspace, especially at the UN. Some important issues remain open in these talks, such as the possible application of the right to self-defense in cyberspace, and military alliances such as NATO should promote their views on such topics. In particular, NATO has to be proactive in opposing the militarization of private cyber actors and offensive operations by nonstate entities, which are major possible sources of instability in cyberspace. NATO’s contribution could consist of advising member states on the issues involved, as well as feeding into international negotiations on stability and regulation in cyberspace.

NATO could participate in new forums created to promote a secure and stable cyberspace, such as the Paris Call, a declaration launched by French President Emmanuel Macron in November 2018 to encourage the development of common principles for securing cyberspace. The alliance’s position should be to encourage respect for international law in cyber conflicts. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) has contributed to this goal by supporting the development and publication of two editions of the Tallinn Manual. This expert work is not an official document of NATO, the CCDCOE, or the member states, but it offers a comprehensive analysis of how existing international law applies to cyber operations. With other publications on this topic, it offers a valuable resource for policymakers and experts on the legal framework of cyber defense.

More broadly, NATO should take into account existing initiatives aimed at promoting peace and stability in cyberspace, such as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, as well as the ways in which the alliance’s policies and actions may influence such initiatives. International law is a key element to avoid uncontrolled escalation, because many cyber attacks remain under the threshold of an act of war.

Nicolas Mazzucchi is a research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research.

Alix Desforges is a postdoctoral fellow at Geopolitics of the Datasphere (GEODE).

The authors are grateful for the contributions of François Delerue, research fellow at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM); Frédérick Douzet, director of GEODE; Aude Géry, doctoral candidate at the University of Rouen and researcher at GEODE; and Olivier Kempf, associate fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research.
INTRODUCTION

It is hard to predict the exact impact and trajectory of technologies enabled by artificial intelligence (AI). Yet these technologies might stimulate a civilizational transformation comparable with the invention of electricity. AI applications will change many aspects of the global economy, security, communications, and transportation by altering how humans work, communicate, think, and decide. Intelligent machines will either team up with or replace humans in a broad range of activities. Such a drastic shift will boost the social, economic, and political influence of those with game-changing capabilities, while the losing sides could face significant challenges.

The AI revolution and accompanying technologies are also transforming geopolitical competition. Because the development of AI, machine learning, and autonomous systems relies on factors such as data, workforces, computing power, and semiconductors, disparities in how well different countries harness these technologies may widen in the future. This matters because states’ mastery of AI will determine their future strategic effectiveness in military matters, as well as their performance, competitiveness, and ability to deter adversaries.

From the use of autonomous systems to the transformation of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, and from intelligence processing to cognitive security, AI will change how wars are planned and fought. AI systems will be crucial for tackling more integrated conventional, hybrid, and peacetime challenges. As disruptive technologies provide new tools for totalitarian regimes and extremist groups, the transatlantic community needs to develop solutions to mitigate the malicious use of intelligent machines.

NATO is coping reasonably well with the challenge. Recent military capability-building efforts, collaborative research projects, and internal consultations in the alliance suggest an awareness of opportunities and challenges emanating from the rapid development of AI. Allied exercises include cross-domain autonomous systems, cyber-enabled tactics, and adversarial scenarios, as well as new C4ISR capabilities. Various organizations, such as NATO’s Science and Technology Organization...
and centers of excellence, help spread knowledge, create awareness, stimulate research and development support, and attract national expertise.

However, the alliance still needs to develop a holistic vision for developing and adapting to AI. NATO should address internal and external disparities in AI capabilities. Internally, the alliance needs new mechanisms so that smaller member states do not lose the ability to support the organization. Externally, the alliance as a whole must maintain its adaptability and agility in a highly competitive international environment. All member states need to be involved in preparing for the transition to an AI-powered, highly interconnected world, because such a world will not tolerate weak links in defenses.

ISSUES AT STAKE

AI and Integrated Battle Spaces

Modern warfare is based on unprecedented connectivity between and within three categories of the battlefield, which together build complex battle spaces. The first category is the physical domain, in which ballistic missiles, main battle tanks, aircraft, the weaponry of ground infantries, and other military hardware are used to degrade or destroy an adversary’s physical resources.

The second battlefield is the information technology space. Here, each side tries to gain superiority by improving the way information is shared, connecting space-based intelligence to weapons systems, or calculating the trajectory of an incoming ballistic missile. For example, a combatant may use electronic warfare to try to blind an adversary’s acquisition radars before an airstrike.

The third battlefield is the cognitive space, where information operations and political warfare take place. Cyberspace straddles the informational and cognitive battlefields. Fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35 and Russia’s influence operations use cyberspace to produce, disseminate, control, and monitor information.

In the future, victories will increasingly depend on the systematic synchronization of the physical, informational, and cognitive battlefields, all augmented by algorithmic warfare. This triad will redefine essential military concepts such as the center of gravity, the fog of war, and the concentration of forces. In the age of AI, big data, and robotics, concept development will be more important than ever. This will be an unending task because new concepts will need to constantly change to keep up with countermoves such as adversarial algorithms and data-poisoning attempts, which involve feeding adversarial data to AI systems. Such attacks try to alter what AI learns from training data or how it solves classification or prediction problems.

In the near future, more breakthroughs seem imminent. Advances in neuroscience, behavioral biology, and other fields will enable new technological leaps such as human-machine teaming and increased autonomy in military systems.73 Robotic swarms—the “collective, cooperative dynamics of a large number of decentralized distributed robots,” in the words of AI researcher Andrew Ilachinski—form another field in which computer science and robotics follow in biology’s wake.74

Human-machine collaboration is likely to bring about faster and better decisionmaking by enabling enhanced management of massive data streams. Humans and AI systems have very different decisionmaking mechanisms, which result in completely different kinds of errors when they fail. By combining the strengths of humans and machines, it may be possible to eliminate those weaknesses. Such teaming trials have already been carried out in the military realm.75

New technologies encourage people, groups, and states to conduct influence operations and manipulation at scale. Intelligent machines can identify susceptible groups of people and “measure the response of individuals as well as crowds to influence efforts,”
according to Rand Waltzman, deputy chief technology officer at RAND Corporation. Cognitive hacking, a form of attack that seeks to manipulate people’s perceptions and behavior, takes place on a diverse set of platforms, including social media and new forms of traditional news channels. The means are increasingly diversified, as distorted and false text, images, video, and audio are weaponized to achieve the desired effects. Cognitive security is a new multisectoral field in which actors engage in what Waltzman called “a continual arms race to influence—and protect from influence—large groups of people online.”

AI could cause drastic changes in hybrid warfare, which is a major concern for NATO. States and nonstate actors can use cyberspace to influence large groups of civilians and opposing forces. From reconnaissance activities and the profiling of target audiences to the weaponization of distorted or fake information and psychological operations, AI broadens the potential of information operations.

In addition, human-machine interactions will likely become a part of military engagements, with ethical and legal implications that remain unclear and unexplored. The introduction of this technology needs oversight to prevent potential abuses and unintended consequences.

**Geopolitics in the Era of AI**

Computing power, data availability, and infrastructure are the core pillars of AI geopolitics. One area of great-power competition lies in finding, recruiting, training, and retaining a highly qualified expert workforce. Humans have become a central component of the ongoing international race for data-driven advantage.

Among the main technological enablers of AI industries, semiconductors will potentially be decisive in tipping the balance of power between major actors. The Chinese government and Chinese companies have invested significantly in expanding their computing power and semiconductor capabilities to narrow the gap with actors in the West and develop an independent industrial base.

At present, the United States is the leading AI power, while China is emerging as an aspirant challenger. Russia, as yet, has not managed to be a part of the top tier in AI, autonomy, and robotics. However, the administration of Russian President Vladimir Putin has attached high importance to the subject, and the Kremlin sees AI as the focus of the next great-power competition.

In the meantime, ambitious small and midsize states that can punch above their weight thanks to their technical and scientific know-how, such as Israel, Singapore, and South Korea, have promising potential that should not be underestimated. This diversity will lead to dynamic technological development and diffusion, with social, economic, geopolitical, and security implications on a global scale.

**Defending Core Values and Defeating Malign Machines**

Another focus for NATO should be the values that the alliance has been defending for decades. As the use of AI in everyday life grows, biases and discrimination inherent in AI, the management of sensitive personal data, and malicious online behavior will change societies in ways that are only beginning to be understood.

Some allied governments have begun delving into the underlying issues. The United Kingdom (UK) Parliament formed a select committee on AI, and the United States adopted a National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan. In April 2019, a group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress proposed the Algorithmic Accountability Act, which would require companies to audit their algorithms. Reportedly, additional bills are being prepared to counter risks of disinformation and label AI-enabled fake content a threat to national security.
Parliamentary groups in the UK and Australia have proposed legislative measures to prevent similar harmful use of digital platforms.

More than thirty countries and international organizations have strategies and initiatives for artificial intelligence. These have varying priorities, from taking advantage of military clout (United States) to proposing values-based AI (European Union) and from leveraging leadership in AI research (Canada, China) to driving military-civilian fusion (China). This diversity continues to evolve both inside and outside NATO.

In recent years, European lawmakers have been actively seeking regulatory action amid emerging digital threats, data-privacy issues, and hostile influence campaigns. European policymakers often emphasize protecting core values, regulating big tech, and preventing malign actors from using AI and accompanying technologies to target Western political institutions, public safety, and individuals.

NATO would benefit from a convergence of transatlantic regulatory and legislative frameworks to better steer the trajectory of the coming transformation. In 2018, a consortium of U.S. and European experts from industry, civil society, and research institutions published a report that outlined three areas of concern. The first is the digital security domain, in which the report warned of potential AI vulnerabilities that would allow adversaries to stage large-scale, diversified attacks on physical, human, and software targets.

Second, in the physical security domain, the availability and weaponization of autonomous systems cause major challenges. Cyber and physical attacks on autonomous and self-driving systems and swarm attacks—coordinated assaults by many agents on multiple targets—are other potential threats.

Third, there are significant risks to political security. AI-enabled surveillance, persuasion, deception, and social manipulation are threats that will intensify in the near future. New AI capabilities may strengthen authoritarian and discriminatory political behavior and undermine democracies’ ability to sustain truthful public debates.

NATO nations need to develop an acceptable level of consensus in the governance of the AI transformation. Although this seems extremely difficult given the current state of political affairs, NATO exists for its member nations to come together and tackle these vital security challenges. AI is likely to cause large-scale economic and workforce shifts. Crucially, it is changing how geopolitical competition plays out. It will equip authoritarian states, some of which are competitors of NATO nations, with new oppressive and discriminatory tools. Besides, AI can offer increasingly smart autonomous weapons systems to states and nonstate actors.

The transatlantic community will therefore have a full set of tasks on its plate, from observing how such dynamics develop in different regions to building international partnerships to ensure common interests and regulatory actions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO would benefit from initiatives to prepare for, govern, and regulate AI-related policy priorities. From developing capabilities to building consensus on the challenges mentioned above, NATO needs new mechanisms to tackle emerging threats and continuously adapt to the dynamism of AI-led developments.

Comprehensive collective initiatives are known to be effective in the cybersecurity field. The alliance should establish an AI task force to review policies and strategic issues. On the policy level, NATO should initiate a continuous and meaningful conversation among decisionmakers, industry, civil society, and the scientific research community. The alliance has a long way to go in developing algorithmic warfare capabilities and
adopting an AI-enabled C4ISR structure. Because most innovations in AI and robotics come from outside the military-industrial complex, some studies have encouraged the alliance to cooperate closely with big tech or develop ties with promising start-ups.

The interdisciplinary conversation needs to go beyond tech companies. AI and other modern disruptive technologies relate to a multitude of scientific fields, from computer science to behavioral biology, neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, robotics, nanotechnology, and many others. NATO nations have relied on these scientific communities to lead AI innovations. However, the level of integration of these sectors is still significantly below what is required, in part because of a populist backlash against experts among parts of the political class. The transatlantic community needs to build a culture to overcome such communication issues and ensure a continuous conversation.

NATO must test its social-cognitive and digital-security vulnerabilities systematically. Ideally, red teaming—in which a group adopts an adversarial point of view to challenge an organization to improve its effectiveness or detect a major weakness—and experimentation efforts should cover both allied exercises and more isolated, peacetime activities to test defenses in national security apparatuses. Inputs from the interdisciplinary and multisectoral conversation, as well as continuous exercises, may provide significant information for new concepts.

A new international and interdisciplinary research center, as an analytical hub and in the form of a center of excellence, would enable effective solutions for all the challenges mentioned above. The proposed institution would blend the high-level techno-scientific outputs of existing NATO bodies, such as the Science and Technology Organization, the Innovation Hub, and centers of excellence with state-of-the-art scientific contributions from member states and in-house experts.

Can Kasapoğlu is the director of the Defense and Security Studies Program at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

Barış Kırdemir is a Robert Bosch cyber policy fellow at EDAM.
CHAPTER 8

THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY SECURITY IN EUROPE

VÁCLAV BARTUŠKA, PETR LANG, ANDREJ NOSKO

INTRODUCTION

Since Russia cut off the gas flowing through Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, energy security has been high on the minds of NATO’s member states. These crises briefly halted major industrial production in the affected states and caused measurable economic harm. They also highlighted a clear vulnerability on the part of NATO countries, which could be exploited in future crises on the Eastern flank. That is why, although major decisions about individual nations’ energy mixes and infrastructure investments are for those states and the European Union (EU) to make, NATO also has a distinct interest and a role to play.

The alliance has established three main priorities regarding energy security. The first is to enhance allies’ strategic awareness of the security implications of energy developments. The allies created an energy security section in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at NATO’s Brussels headquarters in 2010 and a center of excellence in Lithuania in 2012 to help member states maintain a thorough understanding of how energy and security interact. To this end, the allies consult with one another and partner states, share intelligence, and take counsel from relevant international organizations in the field.

The second goal is to support the protection of critical energy infrastructure, including tankers and offshore energy installations. Such infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to attacks from hostile states. Although this is arguably a national responsibility, NATO has sought to increase its capacity to protect critical energy infrastructure through training and exercises.

Third, NATO has prioritized enhancing energy efficiency in the military. By reducing the energy consumption of military vehicles and camps and minimizing the environmental footprint of their activities, allies hope to make the energy sector not only resilient but also sustainable. To achieve these goals, NATO should fulfill the pledge it made at its September 2014 summit in Wales to establish common military standards on energy-efficient technologies. The alliance should also elaborate on the concept of green defense introduced in the same year.
ISSUES AT STAKE

Two scenarios could prompt the alliance to strengthen its situational awareness. The first is that Russia bolsters its position as a major energy supplier, which would pose risks to allied cohesion and the energy security of member states. The second is that the EU transforms itself into a low-carbon economy, which could have a destabilizing effect on the states, economies, and societies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Europe’s Energy Dependence on Russia

Russia continues to be the main supplier of gas to Europe, even if it lost the claim to be the world’s top producer of gas and oil to the United States in 2018. Russia is the dominant gas supplier for a number of European NATO members. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia each receive between 75 and 100 percent of their natural gas imports from Russia. Six of these countries also get more than 50 percent of their oil imports from Russia.

Moreover, Russia’s importance as a strategic supplier for Germany is increasing as a consequence of the German government’s 2011 decision to remove nuclear energy from its energy mix. The electricity baseload previously generated by nuclear power plants, currently provided by lignite-fired plants, is expected to be replaced by natural gas imported from Russia using the Nord Stream pipeline, which bypasses Eastern NATO allies. Overall, Russia’s dominant position is a significant constraint on the alliance at times of confrontation and poses a risk to allied cohesion.

Current economic sanctions may be successful in deterring Russia’s adventurism in the Baltic. But the measures have a questionable ability to prevent Russia from further expanding its production, including of nonconventional oil and gas. In 2018, Russian oil exports grew by 2 percent and accounted for 13 percent of the global total, while gas exports rose by 5.4 percent, representing 26 percent of the world total.

Ideally, Russia would act as a standard market player in a liquid and competitive energy market. That may prove an impossible goal, however. Russia has a 40.6 percent share of natural gas imports to the EU and is the cheapest supplier, so there are few incentives for buyers to replace it with another source. NATO members with large buying power, such as Germany, Italy, or France, can exercise their market power and obtain discounts and guarantees from Russia directly. They therefore have structurally different incentives from those NATO members with less purchasing power, which may prefer the EU’s internal market framework. This is starkly illustrated in the division of views over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is under construction from Russia to Germany but is opposed by the United States and a number of Baltic and Central European allies.

Being so dominant, Russia has few structural reasons to do anything other than use this power to expand its position further. This is especially true given domestic pressures in Russia to maximize sales of energy resources abroad and use this revenue to subsidize domestic consumption. Therefore, it is unrealistic for NATO to expect to be able to change Russia’s approach. Effectively, the alliance’s goals should be, first, to have access to affordable energy supplies without being highly dependent on Russia and, second, to have a backup option.

The allies’ most powerful tools for countering the monopolistic abuse of power by a supplier are transparency in the energy trade and the EU’s market rules. Smaller European allies, in particular, can use these market rules to compensate for a relative lack of buying power vis-à-vis Germany or Italy. In the past, Russian suppliers would use this asymmetry to offer Germany better conditions than the Czech Republic or Bulgaria.
The European Commission, the EU’s executive, has the duty to investigate such cases, fine abusers of market power, and seek remedies. This independent regulatory function of the commission provides protection from the corrupting effects of Russia’s divide-and-rule policy. The EU does not always apply its market rules uniformly, however. In 2018, the commission accepted the binding commitments of Gazprom, rather than impose a fine on the Russian energy giant, for behavior that clearly discriminated against Central Europe in favor of Germany.

The growing divergence of interests vis-à-vis Russia between Germany and the United States—and, sometimes, within these countries—could have a negative impact on NATO cohesion. If the alliance does not speak with one voice, Russia may succeed in negotiating separately with individual allies and offering them different deals to reward or punish their positions. Russia, which also deploys corruption and the financing of extremist political parties as offensive tools to undermine the West’s cohesion and spread its alternative governance model, would greatly weaken security in Europe.

The Future of Fossil Fuels

In 2007, the EU embarked on an ambitious path toward energy transformation. The union wants to drastically reduce its CO2 emissions, primarily by replacing fossil fuels with clean energy. The pressure on the economies of oil and gas exporters should not be underestimated. For NATO, the push for cleaner energy carries not only many obvious advantages but also a few poorly understood risks.

Aside from climate change, the main reason for Europe’s drive toward new energy sources is a simple economic argument: the EU spends roughly $445 billion each year on energy imports. Replacing oil and gas with either solar, wind, or some new, not yet fully tested renewables makes economic and social sense. The trend toward diversification away from fossil fuels is therefore unlikely to change. Rather than sending $445 billion a year to Riyadh and Moscow, NATO countries could spend that amount on domestic producers and employment at home.

This would have a knock-on effect on the economies and politics of countries that depend heavily on oil and gas exports. These include Algeria, which receives 98 percent of its income from energy, Russia (75 percent), and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries (more than 80 percent). The first reaction of many practitioners is to disregard the whole issue. One common argument is that even if Europe abandons oil and gas, other countries will continue to need those resources. But if the EU finds an economically and environmentally viable way to replace fossil fuels, China, India, and other major importers of oil and gas will follow suit. There will still be some demand for oil and gas for chemical, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical production, but it will be far below present levels, and therefore prices will fall.

The consequences for fossil fuel producers will differ from one country to another. Some will see social unrest, political crises, or even state failure. The latter could result in migration waves toward Europe or the United States. Failed states, particularly if they become a haven for terrorists, could draw allies into a military intervention.

Because not all producing countries will be affected in the same way, NATO will need nuanced, country-specific policies and analyses for each state to stay ahead of possible risks. Yet it can be safely assumed that no exporter will be happy to lose income. In 2018, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Kuwait each recorded over $50 billion in revenues from oil exports.

Russia stands apart from the rest in terms of risks. As a nuclear power, it is a country whose possible economic collapse all allies should fear. Two decades ago, worries
that internal instability in Russia would cause nuclear weapons, material, and know-how to fall into the wrong hands prompted the United States to financially support the continuous work of nuclear laboratories and scientists in the country. It is hard to imagine Russia ever agreeing to a similar arrangement now or in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Allies, especially smaller ones, should avoid the misperception that they can get special benefits by dealing with Russia on a bilateral basis. This is a flawed view that makes states vulnerable. The EU’s market-based approach and transparency serve as a line of credible defense, especially for smaller and more susceptible member states. If the market rules are followed and the exceptionalism of Germany and France is curtailed, the elites of smaller European allies will be more resistant to the lure of corruption.

Internally, allies should refrain from employing aggressive economic measures, such as punitive tariffs, against each other, because doing so undermines political cohesion. Such measures stifle economic growth, weaken mutual trust in the alliance, and make allies less willing to buy U.S. liquefied natural gas, which would diversify their sources and strengthen their energy security.

Energy trade should become an opportunity to build trust in NATO’s neighborhood, overcome differences, and foster interdependence. Allies should avoid undermining the security of their neighborhood by supporting pipelines that bypass Ukraine or Belarus and therefore make them more vulnerable to energy blackmail. NATO should use the energy trade market as a chance to stabilize energy-transit countries and bring them into cooperation agreements. Potential risks could be managed through shared oversight or by European countries taking responsibility for energy supplies at the Russian-Ukrainian border and supporting Ukraine in dealing with its domestic governance problems.

Understanding the economies and political systems of oil and gas exporters is essential, because it could help avoid strategic surprises in the future. For example, allies underestimated the importance of former Libyan strongman leader Muammar Qaddafi’s handouts to the population in keeping the country together. A state breakup similar to that seen in Libya could happen in other oil- and gas-producing countries in North Africa and the Middle East if incomes from energy exports diminish substantially.

Finally, NATO (and the EU) should support the transfer of new energy technologies to oil-importing countries. Dependence on oil imports is especially high in Africa, where only a few countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria, are exporters. Most will benefit if a domestic replacement for oil is found and their resources are spent on improving the well-being of local populations.

Václav Bartuška is the Czech Republic’s ambassador at large for energy security.

Petr Lang is a program director at the Prague Security Studies Institute.

Andrej Nosko is a visiting assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia.
CHAPTER 9

MILITARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN THE ARCTIC

HENRIK BREITENBAUCH, KRISTIAN SØBY KRISTENSEN, JONAS GROESMEYER

INTRODUCTION

NATO has long had a clear remit in the North Atlantic, even in the far North Atlantic. This is, after all, implicit in the alliance’s name. But what role, if any, should NATO play in the Arctic?

These two regions are not identical, but they do have interlinked political geographies. The North Atlantic includes the mostly ice-free areas as far as the waters north of Iceland, while the Arctic Ocean is generally covered with ice in winter. As a matter of convention, “the Arctic” either refers to the five Arctic coastal states, including Canada, Denmark (with Greenland and the Faeroe Islands), Norway, Russia, and the United States or the eight full member states of the Arctic Council (the five just listed, plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden).

The North Atlantic is already an area of heightened tensions. The challenge for all involved is to prevent those tensions from spilling over into the relatively calm Arctic. For NATO, the issue is particularly complex. It is not evident that getting more involved in the Arctic will promote the interests of the alliance or its members, even though credible collective deterrence and defense apply to the region as much as to the North Atlantic.

ISSUES AT STAKE

Climate Change

Three related changes are afoot in the Arctic. The first is environmental. Until recently, it made physical sense to distinguish between the ice-free areas of the North Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian coastline, on the one hand, and the more or less permanently frozen areas within the Arctic Circle, on the other. So far, these two geographic areas have also corresponded to two different kinds of politics: regular security politics, including through NATO, in the Atlantic; and tentatively more cooperative international politics among the coastal Arctic states. Yet as polar ice melts and contracts, the Arctic, too, risks becoming a zone of increased great-power competition.

In contrast to how climate change plays out in the global South, where state capacity is lower and states are more susceptible to the negative effects of climate change, the Arctic contains strong states that have the institutional and problem-solving capacities to prevent new conflicts from arising. As a result, in the Arctic, climate change may actually enhance trade, research, and travel opportunities due to increased potential access.
Nevertheless, such increased access will eventually lead to greater state presence in the region. In this way, climate change risks putting further pressure on bilateral and multilateral relations in the Arctic. Smaller states can become targets of geopolitically motivated foreign investment, such as China’s interest in buying a swath of land in northeast Iceland.99

**Russian Remilitarization**

The second change comes in the form of Russian remilitarization. While NATO member states and Russia have significantly reduced the size of their navies, Russian development of new missiles in effect makes distances smaller and regions closer to each other. The range, speed, and precision of these weapons make it more difficult to separate the North Atlantic and the Arctic as distinct theaters of operations, as both the Baltics and the Norwegian Sea can be the targets of attacks from the Barents Sea as well as from land. Land, submarine, and air-launched cruise missiles challenge NATO’s ability to reinforce both mainland Europe and the North Atlantic.100

From the Russian point of view, increased militarization of the Arctic makes sense and is legitimate. With
several straits and passages becoming more accessible, Moscow is gaining access to both onshore and offshore resources, such as fish and possibly mineral wealth.

The trouble for NATO is that militarization in the Arctic can become militarization of the Arctic, with ramifications beyond the region. The new strength and breadth of Russia’s access-denial strategy increasingly enables Moscow to threaten distant targets without deploying traditional power projection. The Arctic may still be relatively free of Russian maritime or air forces, but it has the potential to become a base from which Moscow can threaten targets of strategic value in the Arctic and as far away as the North Atlantic and Europe. In that sense, Russia’s military buildup cannot be isolated from the bigger picture of strategic competition with NATO and allies’ obligation to fully carry out their deterrence and defense obligations.

Increased Chinese Presence

The third change is China’s increased presence in the Arctic and rising U.S.-Chinese tensions. Beijing is showing greater interest in the region, and states in the Arctic are targets of intensifying Chinese economic statecraft. As elsewhere in the world, China’s economic activity carries an undertone of geopolitical influence. This poses a dilemma for countries in the region that need foreign investment.

Beijing’s multidomain polar strategy, which involves the planned development of a nuclear-powered icebreaker, targeted investment in Arctic real estate and infrastructure, and a reinforced research presence, reflects classic grand strategic objectives of resources, reach, and power. The Arctic has even been included in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious development campaign to boost trade across Asia and beyond. Traditional nonsecurity issues, such as sea trade and research, which function as a platform for cooperation in the region, therefore begin to look more like security issues in an age of strategic competition, casting further doubt on the maintenance of the Arctic as a low-tension area.

This problem is exacerbated by the visible tensions flowing from the rising strategic competition between the United States and China. At a meeting of the Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum, in early 2019, Washington warned of China’s growing interest in the Arctic. This increased attention is undoubtedly real—but the tone and content of the U.S. statement marked a shift toward the inclusion of China-related geopolitical issues in the Arctic Council. Politically at least, the Arctic is becoming another global theater for long-term strategic competition.

Regardless of whether the Arctic will be engulfed by Sino-American competition, this puts pressure on U.S. allies and partners in the Arctic and challenges the already-strained stability in the area. The geopolitics of U.S.-Chinese competition in the Pacific Ocean may increasingly seep into the Arctic. Furthermore, greater Western military presence in the Arctic to counter China might strengthen Russia’s demand for a security presence in the region. So while China’s strategy definitely has underlying security implications, countering it with a traditional NATO presence instead of diplomatic work in Arctic forums might be counterproductive.

Managing Arctic Security Challenges

Since the end of the Cold War, the eight Arctic states have handled most regional political matters through multilateral settings such as the International Maritime Organization and the Arctic Council. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration, which established the council, explicitly excluded military security from its mandate.

In 2008, the five Arctic coastal states signed the Ilulissat Declaration, which emphasized that “existing international law provided a firm basis for handling Arctic Ocean issues, that the coastal states would settle disagreements peacefully and in accordance with international law…, and that they would cooperate on a host of other issues through existing regional institutions, such as the Arctic Council.” In furthering the idea that the Arctic would be a particular zone of
low tension, the declaration also kept security issues out of central, formalized intergovernmental forums. Accordingly, since the Cold War, there has been no formal structure or venue to address security issues in the Arctic.

Since Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, old-fashioned geopolitics have begun to creep into discussions of the Arctic. The great powers increasingly see themselves as locked in a competition, not only in the security realm, but also in the areas of economics, politics, and trade. As a result, the cooperative logic that has so far dominated in the Arctic risks being undermined. Combined with the general Russian military buildup, this has prompted the question of whether NATO could be required to play a role in the Arctic for alliance deterrence and defense.

NATO has long regarded the Arctic as an area that has no direct military threats to deter and no significant security issues to manage—and is thus very different from the North Atlantic. There, NATO has returned to patrolling the choke point between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (known as the GIUK gap), deterring the Russian Northern Fleet, and preparing for antisubmarine warfare, especially due to Moscow’s naval modernization efforts. The area may once again become a geopolitical hot spot marked by strategic competition between Western and global powers, though analogies with the Cold War are partly misleading.

Now that some of the differences between the Arctic and the North Atlantic are being erased, the temptation is to treat both regions the same. This approach, however, could prove counterproductive, because all of the Arctic states would stand to lose from such a shift. Moscow would likely see this as an escalating move, which would ultimately signal a Western failure of confidence in the region’s low-tension status. A negatively reinforcing cycle would begin.

Diplomatic progress on nonsecurity issues already achieved in the Arctic Council would be put at risk. Such work is an essential component in maintaining a calm security environment in the region. So far, Russia abides by the rules laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as shown in the Norway-Russia agreement on the delimitation of the maritime border between the two countries in the Barents Sea. Disputes are still lawfully settled, and it is in the interests of the other Arctic states for it to remain that way, as Russia holds a significant military and infrastructural advantage in the Arctic—and always will, given its geography. Paradoxically, working on nonsecurity issues can have a security effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Even though a security dilemma may be unfolding in the Arctic, NATO and the Arctic countries should avoid making this a self-fulfilling prophecy. Drawing NATO too rashly into the Arctic risks throwing away the progress of diplomacy and cooperation that has been achieved since the end of the Cold War.

At the same time, Russian militarization risks transforming Arctic relations, and NATO will not want to be left unprepared. Thus, a wicked question arises for NATO: Does the alliance risk prematurely undoing the diplomatic progress made in the Arctic, or does it risk being caught napping by Moscow, Beijing, or both? As long as the situation remains in flux, NATO should carefully study whether and how to get engaged in the Arctic.

Finding the right balance between deterrence and defense, on the one hand, and pragmatic cooperation with Russia in the Arctic and the North Atlantic, on the other, needs to take into account that different logics are at play in the two regions. While NATO faces a growing need to consider the Arctic a regular space for deterrence and defense, it may be best served
by acknowledging and indirectly supporting the pragmatic, political cooperation in the Arctic between allied nations and Russia, unless the alliance is called on by its Arctic member states. This cooperation makes the Arctic more secure for all allies concerned. For this reason, NATO should proceed with care if and when it chooses to include the Arctic in its North Atlantic policies, capabilities, and operational patterns of deterrence and defense.

As an intermediate option between doing nothing and going all out, NATO could consider how it can engage in political measures—by taking an interest in the evolving situation in the Arctic, explicitly acknowledging the particular circumstances, and taking steps to prepare the alliance to support the diplomatic efforts of its Arctic members.

Although traditional political cooperation in the Arctic is under increasing stress, it is still functioning. Managing Russia within these structures should be a priority as long as Moscow does not use its presence in the area for more coercive purposes. If it does, NATO should start by prudently deploying military resources in parts of the North Atlantic that have a precedent for such actions, like Iceland, and then only gradually move northward. In this way, the alliance can make an initial bid to manage security concerns in the Arctic while doing its best to refrain from direct involvement in the region.

China poses a more complex problem that goes well beyond traditional military security challenges and requires long-term economic engagement. In this sense, the Arctic is like any other theater, as China’s entry into the region requires all actors to grasp and adjust to the long-term geopolitical game under way. If NATO wishes to consider China’s actions in the Arctic, the alliance should take care not to escalate the situation, especially in policy areas that, so far, have been untouched by strategic competition. NATO should carefully consider the possibility that an increased Chinese maritime presence in the region is not necessarily a zero-sum challenge to maintaining sea lines of communication.

Henrik Breitenbauch is the director of the Centre for Military Studies at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Kristian Søby Kristensen is the deputy director of the center.

Jonas Groesmeyer is a research assistant at the center.

The authors wish to thank the participants at the Arctic/High North workshop—part of the New Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO’s Next 70 Years event series—in Copenhagen on June 11, 2019, for their comments and ideas.
INTRODUCTION

Europe is facing a crisis in its Southern neighborhood; several fragile, dysfunctional, or failed states are struggling with rapid urbanization and severe economic inequality, which are expected to increasingly contribute to sizable migratory flows. Such ungoverned territories are also expected to become frequent safe havens for a range of criminal activities, including terrorism and human trafficking.

While crime, terrorism, and trafficking are not traditional NATO threats, the nexus between them has become a cause for significant concern for most European countries and the United States. The trend started with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and has deepened further with the attacks in Europe over the past two decades. The return of foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq to Western countries has contributed to increased alarm in Europe in particular. There have also been fears that refugee flows served as a back door for terrorists—although the link has been greatly exaggerated, as most attacks have been perpetrated by homegrown terrorists radicalized in Europe.

To remain credible in the eyes of national capitals and electorates, the alliance needs to demonstrate that it takes this concern seriously. NATO must show that it is doing all in its power to minimize the risks while recognizing that migration itself is not primarily a security, let alone a military, issue.

ISSUES AT STAKE

The Criminal Triad

From the viewpoint of NATO countries, the new challenge is the rise of multicriminality, in which organized crime, terrorism, and drug and human trafficking have become more interconnected. The nexus between organized crime and transnational terrorist groups gives criminals increased access to funding and weapons, allowing them to expand their geographic reach and bolster their capabilities. The factors that permit these interconnections are unhindered access to ungoverned spaces, unsupervised maritime routes, and unguarded borders.
The self-proclaimed Islamic State may have been defeated on the ground in Syria and Iraq, but the threat of terrorism to European security will remain at least as long as the jihadist narrative is undefeated and its root causes are unaddressed. The Islamic State continues to be present and active—often through affiliates—in various countries in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The combination of ungoverned territories, weak states, and persistent trafficking networks may create an environment in which organized crime and terrorism—with their underground linkages—will flourish.

Transnational organized crime, and the associated problem of corruption, is a serious security concern for NATO member states and partner countries in the Western Balkans, around the Black Sea, and in the MENA region. Categories of organized crime of special concern include trafficking of human beings, cyber crime, and the production and smuggling of illegal drugs, which is a business worth $320 billion a year. Human trafficking has flourished with increased migratory flows. To defeat it, NATO will need a multi-pronged approach that involves disrupting the business model of trafficking and enhancing transnational law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

Cyber criminals can help terrorists with their activities, while the drugs trade can be an important source of funding for terrorist organizations. Modern organized crime, which is expected to remain both a highly profitable business for criminals and a growing threat to Europe’s security, requires a multidisciplinary approach to effectively prevent and counter it.

There is also increasing concern about the migratory movements from Europe’s broader Southern neighborhood to European countries—movements that have considerable economic, security, and environmental consequences. Demographic pressures and uneven economic development in the global South are causing rapid urbanization, social and economic strains, and a steady stream of migrants seeking to escape poverty and conflict. The numbers of migrants and refugees are expected to rise further because of conflicts, climate change, and the fact that Europe remains—mainly, but not uniquely, for reasons of geography—an attractive destination for migrants and refugees.

Furthermore, migratory flows present significant opportunities for illegal activities such as human trafficking and other forms of organized crime. In cases of unsuccessful integration, these flows can become a factor for violent radicalization. On limited occasions, migratory flows have served as cover for smuggling terrorists into Europe. In response, officials and experts agree on the need to develop a comprehensive, long-term migration policy that encompasses aspects beyond security.

**NATO’s Response So Far**

In the past, NATO has not dealt with organized crime or human trafficking to any significant extent (with the exception of its Aegean maritime mission), because these were considered predominantly law enforcement issues. In the case of organized crime, states are primarily responsible for their security and resilience through national law enforcement and intelligence agencies and judiciaries. There also are several specialized non-NATO agencies in this field, such as Interpol and Europol, which focus on police cooperation; Eurojust, which deals with judicial cooperation; and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, which trains European Union (EU) law enforcement officials.

Since 2016, NATO’s naval assets have been participating in efforts to control irregular migration, mainly through the alliance’s Aegean deployment. Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 is tasked with conducting reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance of illegal sea crossings between Turkey and Greece. The group provides real-time information to the Greek and Turkish coast guards and to Frontex, the EU’s border and coast
guard agency, on the locations of refugee and migrant boats. However, because of the Aegean’s geography, the sensitive nature of the mission, institutional obstacles in sharing classified information between NATO and the EU, and, possibly, institutional rivalry between the two organizations, the alliance’s contribution to halting human trafficking has been rather limited.

NATO mentioned terrorism as a threat in its 1999 and 2010 strategic concepts. Since 2001, the alliance has devoted considerable resources to counterterrorism activities, including in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavor, replaced by Sea Guardian in 2016); in Afghanistan and Iraq; and, more broadly, within the international coalition to defeat the Islamic State, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub (NSD-S), and a counterterrorism intelligence cell in NATO’s headquarters.

Finally, on transnational organized crime, NATO’s contribution has consisted mainly of efforts to combat piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO should remain a military alliance that plays a supporting, not leading, role in managing law enforcement and nonmilitary security challenges. But in doing so, the alliance should increase its contribution to the security of member states and improve its public image, but without losing its identity.

In dealing with terrorism, transnational organized crime, trafficking, and irregular migration, NATO should focus on increasing the control of maritime routes across the Mediterranean, collecting intelligence, monitoring the activities of nonstate actors in ungoverned territories, and providing early warning of criminal operations. When required, and in cooperation with national authorities, the allies should seek to intercept smuggled cargo and use military force against terrorists. In general, the mere presence of NATO in areas of terrorist operations imposes constraints on the terrorists’ ability to do business.

NATO could upgrade its contribution to combating human trafficking by participating in interagency groups and combined efforts such as the joint task force, set up in November 2017, of the African Union, the EU, and the United Nations. The likelihood that migration flows will increase in the future means that management efforts will require the use of all available resources. While the nature of migration means that a military recourse should be an exception rather than the rule, NATO could nevertheless play a complementary role to Frontex. The alliance could permanently offer its considerable expertise in risk assessment and analysis, as well as some of its naval capabilities, where necessary.

Regarding counterterrorism, the alliance has demonstrated its ability to contribute by providing actionable intelligence and conducting maritime interdiction and military operations outside NATO territory. To give a concrete example of how the alliance could do more in this field, it could use its capacity in biometrics to identify foreign fighters.

NATO’s role and experience as a security provider suggest two other contributions to defeating the nexus of organized crime, terrorism, and trafficking. First, peacemaking operations could make an important contribution by stabilizing conflict regions. Second, NATO could then help build up local capacity to deal with security problems through security sector reform missions, with a focus on training and expertise sharing.

NATO has extensive experience in peacemaking operations and humanitarian interventions—although experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have made member states reluctant to become substantially
involved in such missions in the Mediterranean or sub-Saharan Africa unless the crisis is dire and there is sufficient legitimacy and international support. NATO countries might even decide that regional countries should carry the main burden in any such mission and that the alliance’s role should be limited to providing support.

As for assisting local security sector reform efforts, a good example is the cooperation program between UNODC and NATO. This initiative provides tailor-made training for law enforcement officers and connects target countries of the drugs trade in Europe and North America with the source and transit states. The aim of the program is to use NATO expertise for capacity building to empower countries to deal with drug trafficking.

The need for security sector reform will be particularly high in southern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan countries in transition, former failed states under reconstruction, or countries facing serious internal challenges, such as Libya and Tunisia. With its extensive experience in security sector reform in in Central, Eastern, and South-East Europe, NATO could offer valuable assistance to those countries that wish to reform their security agencies. NATO and the EU should continue and expand the considerable investment they have made in security sector reform for more than twenty-five years.

Two related NATO initiatives can also make a useful difference. One is the Building Integrity Initiative, which aims to increase transparency and accountability in the defense and security sector and thus reduce corruption. The other is the Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, which builds on NATO’s extensive track record and expertise in advising, assisting, training, and mentoring countries that need help to boost their defense and security capabilities.

A change in focus of these initiatives might be necessary, however. The rule of law, democratic control, transparency, and accountability should remain important priorities. But parallel efforts should focus on making the security sector substantially more efficient in dealing with new security threats, especially transnational ones. What agencies in the security sector urgently need are innovative training methods that would provide them with not only new skills but also cutting-edge technologies and fresh organizational structures. This would bring about a change in mentality and modus operandi that is essential in dealing with complex security problems.

Although law enforcement agencies seem better positioned to offer such training, NATO could make an important contribution because of its existing institutional links with several countries in the MENA region through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The allies should make increased use of these tools.

NATO also has a comparative advantage when it comes to training the paramilitary and special forces that are necessary for various types of law enforcement operations. Walking the fine line between accountability and efficiency in the security sector will not be easy, but NATO has considerable experience from the past three decades. The alliance should capitalize on the recent creation of the NSD-S, which could provide extremely valuable strategic analysis and enhance situational awareness in the MENA region.

Farther afield, the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa are becoming regions of increasing interest for NATO, because instability is being exported from there to adjoining areas and NATO territory. But while the impacts of ethnic conflicts and terrorist activities are widely felt, the root causes of these problems are economic, demographic, and environmental—and NATO
is ill-equipped to deal with them. The alliance’s role in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa should therefore focus on building capacity in the security sector and providing counterterrorism training. The allies would also benefit from an improved understanding of regional security dynamics, which the NSD-S could provide.

NATO can certainly do more but cannot do everything, as it has finite means and resources and must pick its battles to remain effective. The allies should make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis of the resources invested versus the results produced. The alliance is right to search for ways to better connect the internal and external dimensions of security, but it should not lose its focus on defending against military threats.

Thanos Dokos is the director general of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
INNOVATION: ADAPTING THE TOOLKIT
CHAPTER 11

THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIMES

DICK ZANDEE

INTRODUCTION

The 1967 Harmel Report introduced NATO’s dual-track policy of maintaining deterrence while promoting détente: the policy of easing hostilities, including through arms control. The report argued for balanced force reductions in Europe, which defined NATO’s approach to disarmament and arms control for the next several decades. That approach resulted in a structure of nuclear and conventional arms control regimes that stood the test of time.

Unfortunately, in recent years, this has no longer been the case. Russia’s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and other regimes have cast a shadow over the future of arms control. Technological developments, such as unmanned systems, robotics, and cyber capabilities, also raise questions about the applicability of the traditional approach to arms control treaties—that is, a focus on reducing the numbers of weapons systems. The rise of China as a world power has introduced a new challenge, in particular to nuclear arms control.

NATO is adapting its deterrence posture in response to these changes. The four NATO battle groups in the Baltic states and Poland are an answer to the increased threat from Russia. The allies are also boosting high-end fighting capabilities and reinforcing their defenses against cyber challenges.

The alliance’s arms control and disarmament policy needs to undergo a similar update. The allies should consider how they can overhaul their general approach in this area.

ISSUES AT STAKE

Challenges of Arms Control

For the alliance, the immediate challenge in arms control lies in the breakdown of existing treaties and agreements. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited the number of strategic missile interceptors that the United States and Russia could possess. In 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moscow is also hampering information exchange and only partly implements other confidence-building measures contained in the
Vienna Document of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Treaty on Open Skies, which establishes a program of unarmed surveillance flights over the territory of participating states. This has increased uncertainty and the risk of an escalation in times of crisis.¹¹⁰

Noncompliance is one issue; the relevance of the present regimes is another. They were created in a different time, amid a different political and military threat: the bloc-to-bloc confrontation of the Cold War.¹¹¹ The United States rightly pointed to changed circumstances when it withdrew from the ABM Treaty. However, new tensions and open war have since returned to the European mainland. The numbers of Russian provocations and violations of allied airspace, in particular in the Baltic, are increasing.¹¹² The need for renewed arms control and other stability measures is back and more pressing than ever. The question is: What sort of arms control will work in this new security environment and against twenty-first-century military technology?

With regard to nuclear arms, the only existing treaty that bans a complete category of nuclear weapons—the INF Treaty—is dead, having expired on August 2, 2019. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) could be next. In force since 2011, it needs to be extended before February 2021, and the two signatories—the United States and Russia—have not said whether it will be extended, amended, or suspended.

Whatever New START’s future may be, the whole nuclear arms control regime between Washington and Moscow is currently under pressure and could collapse. A breakdown would remove any limits on the two sides’ nuclear weapons, in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. Moreover, the existing transparency about the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals would also disappear, because information exchange and verification measures would no longer apply. In a worst-case scenario, a new nuclear arms race might follow, while the risk of misjudgment and escalation could rise in a crisis.

Technological developments are increasingly endangering the nuclear arms stability that has characterized the Moscow-Washington relationship for a long time. The introduction of hypervelocity reentry vehicles, low-yield nuclear warheads, faster cruise missiles, more accurate targeting technology, and other innovations may increase the temptation to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. States that possess nuclear weapons might conclude that new technologies allow them to deploy these weapons in such a precise and limited manner as to avoid the risk of escalation into an all-out nuclear exchange.

The same effect may arise from the narrowing gap between heavy conventional blasts and low-yield nuclear detonation. A massive conventional bomb may be considered a nuclear weapon, triggering a nuclear response. Nonmilitary means—cyber attacks against command-and-control centers in particular—can endanger nuclear stability as well, leading to unintended escalation. Naturally, countermeasures will be taken to prevent the compromising of nuclear command-and-control systems, but cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) are developing so fast that the question can be posed whether the usual action-reaction cycle applies.

The rise of China as a new world power creates additional problems for arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements. One of the reasons for the breakdown of the INF Treaty is that it does not cover China’s intermediate-range nuclear weapons, creating imbalances with both the United States and Russia. Other rising powers, such as India, are also expanding their nuclear arsenals. New arms control initiatives should be broader than the traditional bilateral U.S.-Russia context. Yet the more states are involved, the more difficulties will be brought to the negotiating table.

Opportunities and New Approaches to Arms Control

On the one hand, the trends point toward increasing difficulties for old-style arms control. While the United
States and Russia might still have a bilateral interest in reducing and controlling numbers of nuclear weapons, China and other nuclear weapons states are reluctant to join any arms-reduction regimes. Beijing points at the imbalance of nuclear arsenals: the United States possesses 6,500 nuclear warheads, Russia 6,185, but China only 290. From the Chinese perspective, the United States and Russia have to start disarming toward a number of warheads that is closer to China’s before Beijing will join any negotiations.

On the other hand, China and India might be interested in risk-reduction measures, as these would serve their interests as well. Negotiations on nuclear risk-reduction measures could focus on limiting unauthorized use (someone using a nuclear weapon without official authorization), unintended use (for example, by accident or due to a technical error), and intended use based on incorrect assumptions (authorized use that later appears to be based on incorrect information, misunderstandings, or misperceptions). These measures could deploy any combination of new approaches, including:

- improving training for nuclear emergencies;
- increasing transparency regarding nuclear capabilities, doctrines, postures, and other related policies;
- improving communications between nuclear weapons states;
- de-targeting nuclear weapons;
- increasing the security of launching systems;
- de-alerting nuclear weapons;
- increasing the decision time for nuclear weapon use;
- raising the threshold for use;
- eliminating certain types of nuclear weapons; and
- limiting the numbers and locations of nuclear weapons.

In the realm of conventional forces in Europe, too, the likelihood of negotiating new quantitative arms control agreements with Russia is rather low. Given that some existing nuclear and conventional arms control regimes are probably on their way out, and are less and less relevant, it might be worth exploring the scope for new negotiations focused on risk-prevention and risk-reduction measures.

One idea, launched by the OSCE network, is the new approach to risk-reduction measures for the NATO-Russia contact zone in the Baltic. The proposed restrictions on troop deployment would probably favor Russia because of its short supply lines and should therefore be rejected in their current form, but there is ample scope to explore new measures for limiting the size of military activities, restricting snap exercises, and increasing notification and observation provisions. New measures could also focus on preventing and reducing the risk of airspace violations, for example by prohibiting the deactivation of transponders, which makes it impossible to communicate with pilots flying aircraft in contested airspace.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

NATO’s arms control policy should continue to be based on the combination of deterrence and détente. Verification also remains an essential element for arms control and disarmament regimes. Yet the alliance must adapt its approach to reflect changed geopolitical realities.

In the past, allies’ arms control policies have been largely based on setting limits on numbers of weapons, either in support of the United States or in the context of conventional forces. That made sense during the Cold War and in the first two decades after it, when the two capabilities that mattered most to military balance were nuclear and conventional weapons.
Today and in the future, new forms of warfare come into play. The weaponization of AI increases the risk of loss of human control over the use of force. A new agreement is needed to address the dangers of conventional weapons systems deployed with humans out of the loop. A new regime that limits the most destabilizing kinds of cyber attacks is also overdue. It should limit or ban those that target nuclear command-and-control and critical civilian nodes or automated cyber attacks controlled by AI.

There is little political will on any side to negotiate new quantitative limits, in particular for conventional weapons. But there is an urgent requirement for new talks on measures to reduce risks and prevent escalation in a crisis. These measures should aim to prevent the misuse of nuclear weapons and ensure that the nuclear threshold is raised, not lowered. To this end, the alliance should give priority to considering the prohibition of low-yield nuclear weapons. In the conventional area, the same approach should prevail, based on both the need for risk-reduction measures and realism about what hopefully can be negotiated in the foreseeable future.

In the nuclear arena, these negotiations can no longer be limited to the United States and Russia. China will have to be involved and perhaps other nuclear weapons countries as well—if not at the start, then later. Beijing continues to oppose nuclear-arms reductions, but it has an interest in preventing accidental nuclear war or a limited nuclear attack that escalates into an all-out exchange.

The new approach could use a new label to mark the changed NATO policy. The title could be Risk Prevention and Reduction (RPR) to underline the nature of the approach. To further explore concepts, measures, and a negotiating strategy, NATO could create an RPR advisory group, consisting of civilian and military experts from several allied countries. Within one year, this group could produce a report with concrete recommendations on issues like concepts and proposals. In the meantime, NATO arms control expert groups should sketch out new approaches, including by using the expertise of academia and think tanks.

Dick Zandee is head of the Security Unit and a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, the Netherlands.
CHAPTER 12

THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE: EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR POSTURES

ŁUKASZ KULESA

INTRODUCTION

Deterring state adversaries from threatening the core interests, territories, and populations of NATO members lies at the heart of the alliance. If NATO gets this essential mission wrong, the consequences could be catastrophic. To forestall such a possibility, NATO has developed a deterrence posture that includes nuclear and conventional capabilities alongside missile defense and other tools, such as cyber or counterhybrid instruments. Together with exercises and strategic communications, they signal to any potential adversary the alliance’s determination to protect and defend its members.

Two recent events have forced the alliance to tailor deterrence to specific actors. The first was Moscow’s aggression toward Ukraine from 2014 onward, along with its military exercises that rehearsed a war with NATO. The second was the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa: civil wars in Syria and Libya and the emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which helped spawn the 2015 migration crisis. Since then, Russia has remained the focus of NATO’s deterrence, but a reflection is under way on how to best deter nonstate and state threats from the Middle East and North Africa.

Going forward, NATO will need to consider three dimensions of deterrence: who, what, and how. First, the alliance knows that it may be called on to deter other actors in addition to Russia, but it needs to spell out which ones, because each requires a different mix of means and strategies. Second, NATO needs to consider what types of action, beyond armed attacks, it needs to deter. This applies to the full spectrum of threats, including those from Russia. And third, the allies have to constantly review the effectiveness of their current deterrence approaches in all areas of focus, as modern conflict has come to be dominated by unconventional and hybrid tactics used by state and nonstate actors.

ISSUES AT STAKE

The Who

On NATO’s Eastern flank, the focus is on Russia. Moscow seeks to achieve its strategic aims—a sphere of influence in the neighborhood and the prevention
of NATO’s expansion—without a war but seems ready to engage in brinkmanship and is working on creating favorable conditions to prevail in a conflict. This makes it necessary for the allies to develop a credible deterrence strategy.

However, NATO also has to deter the threats from states and nonstate entities in the Middle East and North Africa. The effects of conflicts in the region are already being felt on NATO territory, and governments in the most affected member states are asking how they can prevent further spillover of existing and potential crises. The discussions have been light on specifics, though not for lack of options. The allies are already fielding missile defenses in Turkey to defend against missile attacks from Syria; deterring conventional attacks on NATO territory could be the next step, depending on developments in Syria itself. Other actors of concern include Iran, with its growing missile arsenal, and nonstate groups operating in Lebanon, Libya, and Syria.

Farther afield, given the U.S. and other allies’ engagement in the Asia Pacific and NATO’s close links with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, the alliance may have to consider the feasibility of deterring China and North Korea from threatening or harming member states. This would be a new task with significant resource implications and should not be undertaken lightly.

The What

Internally, NATO members need to be clear about specific actions they can reasonably expect the alliance to deter. Clearly, an armed attack—from whatever direction—is one course of action to be deterred, but other actions are not so simple.\(^\text{116}\)

In the case of Russia (and other state actors), the focus is also on deterring coercion: the act of adversaries imposing their will on NATO allies through a combination of military threats and nonmilitary means. For now, the thinking at NATO has emphasized deterrence of a territorial grab or blockade in the Baltic region. However, the characteristics of the Russian approach to warfare mean that the alliance has to look beyond the Baltic Sea and beyond the physical domain, mainly to the cyber realm.\(^\text{117}\) More and more of the critical systems running hospitals, carrying electricity, or patrolling the skies are now connected to the internet and therefore vulnerable. NATO’s adversaries can, in theory, block allied governments from coming to each other’s aid by threatening devastating cyber attacks that will cause populations to panic and cripple economies.

NATO has already declared that a cyber attack could lead the alliance to invoke its Article 5 collective defense clause, a statement that aims to have a deterrent effect—though there is little evidence that it has stopped adversaries from trying.\(^\text{118}\) This is mainly because most cyber attacks are designed to stay below the level that would trigger a response of the whole alliance. The allies need a clearer policy on what to do if the line is crossed one day. That policy must also address the thorny issue of credible attribution and should be rehearsed rigorously.

The How

NATO does not need to mirror the activities of its adversaries to deter effectively. The idea is to signal that the alliance will not be intimidated or coerced, but that can be done in multiple ways.

With regard to Russia and the threat of a land incursion, NATO has decided to rely on limited forward deployments along its Eastern flank and on the ability to reinforce quickly those small contingents in times of crisis. The shortcoming of this posture is that if Russia overwhelms the first line of defense, it may be able to use the strength of its conventional forces, as well as the threat of nuclear weapon use, to thwart allied reinforcement.

NATO, as a whole, is adapting its posture to respond, and the United States is strengthening its military
presence in Europe to address these potential weak points. The mix of U.S. troops and stored equipment and supplies in Europe is being expanded, including in Poland. And NATO has taken steps to improve its ability to deploy units from North America and move them around Europe by creating a Joint Force Command for the Atlantic and a Joint Support and Enabling Command. Other means of strengthening deterrence include implicit or explicit threats of political or economic sanctions or threats of countermeasures in cyberspace.

Regarding the South, the exact form of deterrence has to match the threat that NATO chooses to deter. With regard to potential state adversaries, NATO’s existing deterrence tools and military capabilities can be utilized against threats from that direction. The creation of the Strategic Direction South Hub—a consultation and coordination body for allies and partners—at the NATO command in Naples, Italy, also contributes to the deterrence mission. However, these measures alone will not deter the main challenge in the South: terrorist groups, with the potential to strike in Europe, operate in lawless spaces.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

NATO may be back to its traditional mission of deterrence, but deterrence itself has evolved. A new approach must be adapted to today’s environment, in which a number of deterrence challenges need to be tackled simultaneously and sophisticated nonconventional means can be used jointly with traditional military tools to test the alliance.

**Maintain Alliance Cohesion**

While the allies’ initial response to deterrence challenges has been impressive, in the long run, deterrence fatigue may present problems. NATO needs to keep all allies committed to the deterrence mission and continue to secure sufficient contributions of committed forces, capabilities, and resources. The risk is that allies’ unity and cohesion—the indispensable foundations of NATO—will weaken as memories of the Islamic State’s caliphate and of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine fade. Adversaries will do their part to sow or exploit divisions or doubts about the strength of solidarity among alliance members.

To keep cohesion from fraying, NATO’s leadership should continuously engage every ally in dialogue about the rationale for the posture, the threat assessment, and members’ views on, and concerns over, the implementation of the deterrence mission. National governments have the same essential responsibility toward their parliaments and publics. NATO must also make sure that discussions do not focus only on one strategic direction but rather address both defense and crisis-management tasks.

Engagement with partners should include a dedicated dialogue on deterrence issues. In some cases, based on mutual consent, NATO should be ready to explore coordinated deterrence signaling or mutually reinforced deterrence activities, such as joint statements, deployments, or exercises.

Engagement with adversaries must be seen as an inseparable companion to deterrence. Dialogue and multiple contact channels remain crucial to convey and receive deterrence signals, avoid accidental or inadvertent escalation, and explore risk-reduction and arms control opportunities.

**Deter Russia’s Adventurism**

In the foreseeable future, specific challenges connected with deterring Russia will continue to dominate the practical agenda. As a priority, the allies should fully implement the 2018 decisions to adapt NATO’s command and force structure. The military credibility of the current deterrence posture depends, to a large extent, on the alliance’s ability to speedily augment its forward-deployed units with follow-on forces.
The allies should look for new ways of stimulating the development of necessary capabilities and interoperability. A more transparent discussion of the major gaps in allied capabilities could help exert pressure on members to make relevant investments. The NATO Military Committee should play a more active role in the alliance’s adaptation by more visibly highlighting the military requirements for credible deterrence to civilian authorities and—via individual military leaders—to NATO populations.

The alliance should continue Article 5–related exercises, especially in more vulnerable regions, as the exercises play a role in deterrence signaling. But NATO must also increase the realism of such exercises to identify the areas where the alliance is lagging behind. The alliance needs more exercises that test mobility, logistics, and the preparedness of infrastructure to transport troops.

NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and Tailored Forward Presence strengthen deterrence, but the units deployed need to become a more coherent military force. This calls for further calibrating their combat potential, particularly by adding enablers such as air and missile defense, logistical support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Flank countries should step up their regional cooperation to help advance that goal.

The process of adapting deterrence is ongoing, and developments on the Eastern flank will require the alliance to constantly reassess its posture. For example, Russia’s deployment of the dual-use SSC-8 cruise missile system and other long-range missiles requires a response. On the deterrence track, NATO will need to react to the threat of Russia striking targets away from the border such as harbors, airfields, or command centers, which are crucial for NATO’s ability to deploy its reinforcements. This response should include a mix of bolstering defensive measures and strengthening NATO’s ability to strike back. On the dialogue track, NATO can signal its openness to potential arms control talks.

An additional area that requires attention is the nuclear dimension of NATO deterrence. A more integrated approach to conventional and nuclear planning and exercises is needed. For example, conventional and nuclear exercises should be based on the same scenarios, although not necessarily conducted in the same regions or at the same time. NATO needs to walk a fine line by sending deterrence signals to Russia but without suggesting a lowered threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Fully integrating cyber, space, and information operations into a comprehensive deterrence posture is a less controversial but equally pertinent task.

Deter Unconventional and Hybrid Threats

NATO needs to be careful about defining and signaling its redlines. Making these boundaries too specific could embolden adversaries to intensify their actions below NATO’s declared threshold of response. Being deliberately ambiguous and raising the fear of retribution may be more useful for encouraging adversaries’ self-restraint.

At the same time, NATO should aim to deter specific types of particularly threatening unconventional activities. These include major and sophisticated cyber attacks against allies’ military forces and critical military and civilian infrastructure, proxy military and special forces operations, and state-sponsored terrorism. NATO could declare that such activities may lead it to invoke Article 5 and respond in various ways, including asymmetrically (for example, the response to a cyber attack may not involve only cyber capabilities).

The alliance must be able to identify early whether and when unconventional and hybrid gray-zone actions have become a more substantial and coordinated campaign. In such a case, NATO should aim to deter the adversary from escalating further. This requires increasing the alliance’s capacity to share early-warning intelligence and pool national intelligence-gathering, investigation, and attribution capabilities. NATO should not shy away from attributing ongoing operations to state adversaries,
relying on national data as needed. The alliance and its members should be prepared to use direct channels of communication and other means to deliver immediate deterrence signaling in specific cases.

On the Southern flank, NATO faces state actors that use unconventional tactics and proxy forces (for example, Iran and Syria); state collapse and the emergence of ungoverned spaces in Libya, Yemen, and parts of the Sahel; and the activities of a range of nonstate actors, from loose groups to terrorist and criminal networks to highly organized quasi-state structures like Hezbollah. Cooperation with regional partners in addressing these threats will be vital. NATO’s primary task, as elsewhere, should be to deter states in the region from using unconventional tactics against NATO and its allies, using signaling and attribution tools. When possible, the alliance should aim to affect the calculus of nonstate actors to prevent them from harming alliance interests. This may not work with jihadist groups but may be possible with actors motivated by political or economic interests.

Since many of the unconventional threats are not linked to specific regions or actors, a more general approach is called for. The alliance and its members need to continue investing in passive and active measures to neutralize unconventional threats, including in peacetime. Further developing cyber defense and offensive capabilities—NATO’s toolbox for countering hybrid tactics—and strengthening resilience can affect adversaries’ willingness to use unconventional means against NATO and thus help establish deterrence by denial. The toolbox—counterterrorism, special forces, information operations, disruption of terrorist groups’ cyberspace activities—that allies develop for dealing with nonstate and quasi-state entities posing unconventional threats can also be used to deter state adversaries that rely on such tactics.

Encourage Further Debate

For deterrence to work, the allies must clearly communicate their resolve and readiness to respond to an aggressive action. Clear communication is also needed to reassure the allies concerned. At the same time, the alliance faces a challenge in explaining to many citizens of NATO countries the necessity of deterrence. This is especially difficult in the area of nuclear deterrence, where reliance on such destructive weapons remains politically dubious and morally repulsive for many.

Some may suggest that to avoid damaging disagreements, details of the deterrence posture could be kept internal. This would be shortsighted, however. Many measures involved in deterrence, such as replacing dual-capable aircraft, require parliamentary and, therefore, public approval. A continuous open debate on the nature and gravity of the threats, the aims of NATO’s deterrence policy, and the relationship of deterrence to other missions is absolutely necessary.

One opportunity for such debate would be a new strategic concept, if and when the alliance starts work on it. The drafting process usually engages the broad political class and NATO publics. The allies have not revised the document since 2010, mainly for fear that the discussion would be too divisive. But delays carry their own costs, and the alliance is missing an opportunity to discuss why deterrence is necessary and worth the cost.

Deterrence would not cease to be an applicable framework after the start of hostilities. At the expert level, allies should further reflect on how NATO could counter an adversary’s escalation during a conflict and establish intrawar deterrence. This should include exploring concepts of horizontal and vertical escalation and escalation control. The outcomes of such discussions should ultimately inform NATO’s thinking.

Łukasz Kulesa is the deputy head of research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

He would like to acknowledge the intellectual contributions of the participants at the workshop on the future of NATO deterrence held at PISM in April 2019 and input from the researchers of PISM’s International Security Program.
INTRODUCTION

Challenges from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are different in nature from the conventional threats that NATO is used to dealing with through deterrence and defense. Terrorists do not abide by the traditional deterrence rationale, while massive illegal migration is more of a destabilizing factor than a threat for European societies.

Yet these and other challenges have a direct impact on how NATO members, particularly the Southern European ones, perceive security and stability. Their natural response is to call on the alliance, in both its military and political capacities, to help address their concerns. NATO cannot and should not have a leading role in tackling such multidimensional problems. But it can be an important participant in the concerted efforts of national governments and international organizations, including the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN).

The alliance should base its approach on crisis management and cooperative security—two core tasks enshrined in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. These tasks envisage the use of both military and nonmilitary means. However, the former will be of very limited use against the multifaceted causes of instability in the MENA region, particularly when it comes to dealing with nonstate actors.

ISSUES AT STAKE

Persistent instability has marked Africa and the Middle East over the last decade, mainly due to a combination of social, economic, and technological changes in the region’s societies—changes that fueled the Arab Spring uprisings that began in late 2010. At the same time, the MENA region has become an arena for renewed competition among great powers as well as midsize and small states. These nations intervene heavily—and often negatively—in local politics, crises, and conflicts from Syria to Libya.

The breakdown of state authority in the years after 2010 has empowered nonstate actors from militias, terrorists, and criminal networks to municipalities, tribes, and religious groups. Many states that have maintained...
authority over their territory have not adequately addressed the structural changes that frustrate citizens, making that control unstable and fragile.

Two further processes are taking place. On the one hand, nonstate actors have started acting as substitutes for weak, fragile, or failed states. These actors perform statelike functions in certain areas, from ensuring physical security to collecting taxes or providing basic services. On the other hand, a number of states in and outside MENA have been acting like nonstate actors by intervening abroad using hybrid and unconventional strategies, including through terrorist groups.

As a result, in the MENA region, nonstate actors such as municipalities or religious groups are gaining relevance, great powers and states are competing for influence, and nonstate-like behavior by states and international organizations is increasing. NATO, despite its adaptation in the post–Cold War period, remains a state-centric organization in its structure and nature. Because of this, the alliance has struggled at times to understand MENA dynamics and deal effectively with nonstate actors. It does not help that the allies lack a clear and common threat perception and sometimes prioritize divergent interests.

Since the 1990s, the bulk of NATO engagement in the region has taken place in the framework of two partnerships. The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) aims to achieve better mutual understanding through political dialogue and practical cooperation to address common challenges. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) focuses mainly on practical bilateral security cooperation with partner countries. The alliance has built defense- and security-related capacity in countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, and Tunisia, while trying to enhance its bilateral partnerships with all MD and ICI states. Additionally, NATO has carried out several missions in the region—first and foremost in Libya in 2011 on the initiative of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but also in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea.

After the migration crisis hit Europe in 2015, allies bordering the Mediterranean Sea called on NATO to do more on its Southern flank. The alliance’s 2016 summit in Warsaw set the goal of projecting stability in NATO’s neighborhood with an eye on the South. Yet this aim has not been followed up with a proper strategy, and capacity building has been one of the few tangible efforts pursued in this regard.

The other concrete outcome of recent efforts has been the creation in 2018 of the Strategic Direction South Hub in the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. The hub is an analytical body composed of civilian and military experts and is embedded in the alliance’s military planning structure. It represents an important opportunity for allies to engage with, listen to, and learn from local nonstate actors beyond the government. Such interaction is of paramount importance in a region where a number of nondemocratic governments have low legitimacy among citizens.

After twenty-five years of partnership and missions in MENA, NATO has built some confidence and working relations with the military and institutional establishments in partner countries. But the alliance has yet to form the kinds of relationships necessary to measurably improve cooperative security and regional stability.

One big reason is Operation Unified Protector. This 2011 allied air campaign contributed to the collapse of the Libyan state, and little effort from the international community to stabilize the country followed. Local stakeholders see NATO as one of the main causes of the last eight years of anarchy, civil war, smuggling, and destabilization in and around Libya. Critics often overlook the fact that the unrest in Libya and other MENA countries began before the Western intervention and several Arab autocracies were inherently fragile. It is easier to point the finger at foreign actors.

NATO’s relationship building in the region has to contend with an additional problem. As a state-based
organization, the alliance has developed pragmatic partnerships with MENA states, particularly with their military and security forces. But those same military and security services are often culpable in the deterioration of the country’s political situation. To avoid being tainted by association and to strengthen its influence in the region, the alliance needs to engage with civil society actors to play a more nuanced and positive role in favor of long-term regional stability.

The Arab Spring uprisings have proved that civil society is a driver of change and can initiate major political shifts that influence stability. It would be risky for NATO to ignore civil society. Yet publics tend to hold negative views of the alliance, so governments are not eager to showcase their cooperation with NATO and the related benefits. As a result, NATO efforts, even if held in high regard by governments, do not lead to a better public image of the alliance. In the long term, NATO needs to work on its reputation among civil society and the wider public if it is to put in place effective stabilization policies based on a broad and durable consensus on the ground.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

As the MENA region experiences the empowerment of nonstate actors and the emergence of states that have adopted hybrid tactics, NATO has to rethink its state-centric approach. The alliance should focus on six priorities.

**Analyze and Understand**

First, NATO’s hub for the South, international staff, and other bodies should offer regular, tailored analysis of local dynamics and transborder phenomena such as migration, terrorism, radicalization, and desertification. This analysis should be developed with external civilian support where NATO lacks expertise or networks. Such analysis should fuel a reflection in the alliance on options and goals in each country, as well as ways to partner with other actors, such as the EU, that have a better toolbox for a vast range of nonmilitary challenges like migration or climate change.

Given the persistent instability of MENA, populations’ negative perceptions of NATO, and the involvement of great powers and international organizations in the region, a better understanding of local and regional realities is a prerequisite for avoiding unintended negative consequences, as happened in 2011 in Libya. Such a process should guide NATO’s engagement with local actors, including governments and nonstate entities, and help member states coordinate their efforts—or, at least, avoid conflicting national policies in the region.

**Cooperate Coherently and Pragmatically**

Second, NATO should cooperate with military and security forces in pragmatic terms, from defense capacity building and security force assistance to security sector reform and institution building. Currently, there is a double disconnect to address. The first is between the technical level, where cooperation delivers results, and the politico-strategic level, where cooperation does not help stabilization. The second gap is between NATO’s institutional efforts in the region and those pursued by member states on a bilateral basis.

Addressing this double disconnect and making overall Western engagement more coherent in the long term would have two important advantages. First, it would increase local forces’ abilities to cope with security challenges on the ground. Second, it would popularize NATO’s approach to, and standards of, integrity, the rule of law, women’s rights, and civilian control over the military.

As it builds capacity in MENA, the alliance needs to be especially mindful of political and military implications. When training, equipping, and therefore empowering military or security forces in a country, NATO is altering the national and regional balance of
power. Some local military and security forces may also be involved in corruption and illegal activities and thus lack credibility in the eyes of civil society.

Allies need to place capacity building within a clear, long-term transformative agenda backed by political, economic, and military commitments to build institutions that play a positive role in society. Sometimes, allies lack the will to enter into such commitments for a variety of reasons. In these cases, nonengagement is a better alternative to a counterproductive effort.

When building defense capacity in a failed state or crisis-affected area, NATO should embed its activities in a process of national reconciliation. Allies should strive to have a positive influence on long-term strategic solutions, not seek quick fixes. More often than not, reconciliation will be the only sustainable way to end terrorism. And reconciliation is, first and foremost, a political process that should involve both governments and nonstate actors across the dividing lines of society.

Partner With International Bodies

Third, NATO should team up with international organizations that enjoy greater legitimacy and support in the MENA region. These bodies may derive their legitimacy from being made up of national governments, as is the case for the African Union and the Arab League; from including all concerned states, as in the case for the UN; or from simply not being perceived as responsible for the 2011 war in Libya, as is this case for the EU. Better coordination and cooperation should include sharing information, framing a common understanding of threats and crises, and agreeing on a division of tasks among the most capable organizations on the ground.

Providing military support and technical assistance to efforts led by those actors empowers them to intervene in crises where NATO may lack the legitimacy to act directly. This approach also improves the alliance’s perception among and beyond institutional stakeholders and political circles. Such cooperation presumes that NATO and the EU can prevent mutual competition, which would produce incoherence and undermine credibility, at a time when the two organizations are asking countries in the region to cooperate with each other.

Engage With Nonstate Actors

Fourth, NATO has to reach out in a progressive and nuanced way to nonstate actors that are active in the region, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society actors, to create partnerships and overcome the limits of a state-to-state approach. This should happen directly though the hub for the South and other NATO bodies, relying on facilitators like NGOs or academics and benefiting from cooperation with the EU.

In turn, local engagement should further refine NATO’s analysis of each country, feeding the alliance’s reflection in various forums up to the political and strategic levels. Such engagement is a long-term process that requires a lasting commitment and ability to listen to local demands and understand diverse nongovernmental positions and perceptions.

Use Social Media Better

Fifth, NATO should enhance its use of social media to communicate directly with civil society and offer targeted, country-specific information about alliance activities. Such digital engagement would represent a cost-effective, direct channel of communication with civil society. In the long term, it could help overcome the divide between practitioners’ and civil society’s perceptions of NATO.

The alliance should dedicate particular attention to engaging with young people, given the large youth populations in MENA countries. Youth make little use of traditional, mainstream media to gain information, reducing the usefulness of the focus in NATO’s public diplomacy on amplifiers such as officials and academics. Meanwhile, fake news campaigns use social media
effectively to spread anti-NATO messages in MENA. The hub for the South could provide tailored insights and suggestions on how to engage young people, when, and with what messages.

**Avoid Unrealistic Approaches**

Finally, NATO should refrain from a one-size-fits-all approach, which is likely to be unrealistic. The experience gained from allied stabilization operations in the Western Balkans is hard to apply to the MENA region, mainly because most Western Balkan states desire NATO and EU membership, which strongly incentivizes reforms and cooperation. That is not the case in Africa or the Middle East.

The experience in Afghanistan also is not a useful precedent for MENA—even if, at its heart, it is an attempt to build institutions in a Muslim-majority country outside the alliance’s perimeter and with no possibility of membership. Unlike in the early 2000s, there is now little political will among the allies to deploy more than 100,000 troops for over a decade in a war-torn country—as the Western decision not to intervene to stabilize Libya, Syria, or Yemen has shown. The NATO approach to stabilizing MENA should therefore build on a different conceptual basis that does not rely on large-scale, long-term, land-intensive military campaigns like the one fought in Afghanistan.

Alessandro Marrone is the head of the defense program at the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) and a professor at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze of the Italian Ministry of Defense.

Karolina Muti is a junior researcher in the defense and security programs at IAI.

The authors thank their IAI colleagues, notably Vincenzo Camporini and Filippo Cutrera, for the useful inputs and feedback received during the writing of this essay. They also thank the participants at the workshop New Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO’s Next Seventy Years/Dealing With Nonstate Actors: Which Policies, Which Tools?, held in Rome in June 2019, for their contributions to the discussion. The content of this essay is the authors’ sole responsibility.
INTRODUCTION

As NATO celebrates its seventieth anniversary, it also looks toward how it can meet the challenges posed by a security atmosphere that is radically different from when the alliance was established in 1949. Mass migration, ethnic conflicts, diseases, and human trafficking transcend national borders and challenge traditional, state-centric approaches to security. Promoting peace and stability in such a complicated global environment requires the alliance to pay closer attention to the safety of individuals—an approach known as human security.

Although the term “human security” is conceptually complex, it is essentially an approach that gives primacy to people and their intricate social and economic interactions. Human security emphasizes not only the protection of civilians, who constitute most conflict-related casualties and are often forced to flee their homes to escape violence, but also, in the case of NATO, the welfare of personnel. This essay focuses on the second of these two elements, particularly as it relates to increasing inclusion and diversity in the alliance. Numerous recent studies have noted that inclusive, diverse, and well-trained forces are better positioned to manage the complexities of the global security environment.

Accordingly, the alliance should endeavor to build on existing human security initiatives and establish new approaches in three core areas. First, NATO should increase diversity and inclusion at the organization’s headquarters, in its commands, and in the armed forces of NATO allies. Second, the alliance needs to tackle issues of misconduct. Third, NATO should support the mental resilience of personnel deployed on alliance operations.

ISSUES AT STAKE

Over the past few years, NATO allies and their partners have placed an increased emphasis on the importance of inclusive and diverse forces. Broadly speaking, such teams are more innovative, process information more carefully, allow greater access to communities, and tend to be perceived as more legitimate by local populations in places where NATO missions are deployed.
In light of these and other benefits, NATO has endeavored to increase diversity and inclusion by improving its policies, services, recruitment strategies, training, education, communication, leadership, monitoring, and reporting. This includes the establishment of initiatives designed to advance United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, such as the creation of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, the development of a mentoring program for women working at NATO headquarters, and the promotion of practical cooperation on gender issues through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program.

Notably, diversity and inclusion encompass more than just achieving a gender balance. They are also about ensuring equal opportunities and a workplace free from discrimination, “regardless of sex, race, ethnic origin, religion, beliefs, nationality, disability, age or sexual orientation,” in the words of NATO officials Patrice Billaud-Durand and Tara Nordick. Among other things, the alliance has worked to promote such a workforce by developing diversity and inclusion action plans, initiating a merit-based recruitment system that respects the diversity of alliance partners, and establishing an internship program for young graduate students.

Despite these efforts, however, progress has been slow. According to the NATO secretary general’s 2018 annual report, women represent just 27 percent of personnel across the organization and 25 percent of senior leadership positions. Although this is a slight increase from 2017, when women accounted for 26 percent of NATO’s workforce and 20 percent of leadership roles, it is apparent that the alliance has some catching up to do. In the UN, women represent 43 percent of personnel across the organization and 35 percent of the senior leadership. Moreover, there are more NATO staff between the ages of forty-six and fifty-five than in any other bracket, indicating a lack of youth employment. Ultimately, homogeneity in the alliance can impede the effectiveness of operations, hinder outreach to local populations, and undermine the credibility of the institution.

Relatedly, NATO must continue to advance its efforts to combat sexual violence, both internally and externally. Due to the destructive nature of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, as well as other harms experienced by civilians in armed conflict, the protection of civilians has been a central element of NATO missions for many years. Efforts in this regard have included integrating the protection of civilians and related measures into the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations; adopting the Military Guidelines on the Prevention of, and Response to, Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence; establishing the NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians; and identifying and implementing lessons learned on safeguarding civilians.

It is evident that the alliance has undertaken much work to protect civilians and combat sexual and gender-based violence. However, it has made little progress in eradicating misconduct perpetrated by personnel deployed on NATO operations. The alliance indicated its intention to launch a policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in June 2019, but as of October 2019, the policy had yet to be unveiled. Moreover, unlike the UN, NATO provides no publicly accessible information on allegations of SEA or reporting methods. Altogether, NATO’s approach to tackling this problem to date has not been robust.

With regard to the human security of personnel deployed to NATO operations, considerable research has recently been conducted to examine deployment stressors and related mental health issues. NATO forces are routinely engaged in military operations across the globe and are frequently exposed to situations that could lead to psychological harm. For example, personnel who encounter child soldiers can face significant moral and psychological dilemmas, in part due to the simultaneous perception of child soldiers as both threats and victims. This dichotomy
can cast doubt over how NATO forces should treat these children. In turn, encounters with child soldiers may have significant and potentially long-lasting psychological effects on personnel deployed to NATO operations. This can reduce both the effectiveness and the readiness of a mission.140

NATO’s Science and Technology Organization has produced technical reports to help alliance partners identify training and education resources to enhance the development and mental resilience of their personnel.141 Additionally, various NATO education and training providers, such as the NATO Center of Excellence for Military Medicine, have held conferences on force health protection. These conferences have contributed to the sharing of best practices in mental health training and education.

Yet comparative research on deployment-related mental health support across NATO partners has shown that many personnel continue to face similar barriers to accessing mental healthcare.142 These difficulties are linked to issues such as the insufficient availability of mental healthcare providers and an ongoing stigma associated with mental health issues that prevents personnel from seeking treatment.143

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is clear that NATO can do more to strengthen human security in the alliance, both in the organization’s headquarters and during operations. The following four recommendations are intended to help inform this process.

First, when it comes to the diversity of NATO staff, the alliance should shift its conceptualization from a problem of underrepresentation to one of overrepresentation. Conversations about increasing diversity and inclusion often focus on the underrepresentation of equity-seeking groups, particularly in the case of women. Because underrepresentation affects women in NATO and not men, focusing solely on this aspect effectively puts the burden of achieving gender equality on women.

As noted by Rainbow Murray, an expert on gender politics, “even if reducing the overrepresentation of men is a necessary corollary of increasing women’s presence, it is never presented as the primary goal with its own intrinsic benefits.” Murray continued to state that “the focus on women’s underrepresentation has the unintended consequence of framing men as the norm and women as the ‘other.’”144 Accordingly, shifting the discussion from under- to overrepresentation not only highlights the weaknesses of current approaches but also presents an alternative way to challenge the harmful effects of overrepresentation. Reframing this discussion would require an acknowledgment that the overrepresentation of a particular group can negatively affect the quality of representation in NATO, in part because it restricts the talent pool to a specific section of society.

Second, the alliance should emphasize a more holistic approach to discussions of diversity and inclusion. Both academic literature and official NATO documents tend to focus on increasing the representation of women. Although the representation of other equity-seeking groups is sometimes acknowledged, it is generally not discussed at length. Accordingly, there is an urgent need for greater intersectionality in these discussions, which can complement the work being done to support women.

Third, increasing awareness of, and transparency on, SEA is critical. This should be a central consideration as NATO moves forward with the publication and implementation of its forthcoming policy on SEA. The alliance should provide regular updates on the implementation of the policy, the ways in which the rights and dignity of victims have been prioritized, mechanisms for engaging with alliance partners, and improvements to strategic communication for training and education.
Fourth, NATO must develop and disseminate new tools to train personnel deployed to alliance operations to better recognize mental health problems in their teams. Adequate access to mental health support in a theater of war is essential to ensure a resilient and effective force. This is particularly important in missions where uniformed mental health care providers may be difficult to recruit and retain, or where they are highly dispersed due to the geography of the location.\textsuperscript{145} Such training will help break down stigma associated with mental health problems.

Ultimately, conflict has changed, and, therefore, the manner in which NATO prepares for and conducts operations must also change. To promote peace and stability in today’s global security environment, NATO must adjust its initiatives by emphasizing a more holistic approach. This includes strengthening human security in NATO as an organization.

Focusing on increasing diversity and inclusion, tackling misconduct, and supporting the mental resilience of personnel deployed to NATO operations can significantly boost the alliance’s ability to tackle contemporary security challenges. Altogether, emphasizing the human dimension of conflict in these ways can enable NATO to harness the appropriate instruments and strategies to maximize the safety and stability of all people involved in conflict.

\textit{Lindsay Coombs is a PhD student in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston, Canada, a policy officer at the Canadian Department of National Defense, and a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.}
INTRODUCTION

United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), adopted in October 2000, put women at the center of the dialogue on peace and security for the first time. The resolution recognized the undervalued and underappreciated contributions women make to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. It also stressed the importance of women’s equal and full participation in peace and security.

Since 2000, the UN has adopted eight more resolutions, each of which has widened the scope and breadth of gendered peace and security. They have changed practitioners’ understanding of the subject and challenged the international community, including NATO, to pay closer attention to it. Together, the resolutions make up the international policy framework for questions related to women, peace, and security and provide guidance to promote and protect the rights of women in conflicts and postconflict situations.

Since the adoption of the resolutions, the issue has gained remarkable traction in many international organizations, including NATO. The resolutions represented a significant political shift for the alliance: they pushed NATO to recognize that women’s experiences and roles in conflict and peacemaking are a matter of international peace and security. There is now widespread agreement that NATO must serve as a role model for the implementation of the rights of women in peace and security across the alliance’s three core tasks: collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management.

The allies have started acting on this recognition. In 2018, the alliance’s heads of state and government revised the NATO Policy on Women, Peace, and Security, developed within the fifty-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, in line with the principles enshrined in the UN Security Council resolutions. The new document outlined integration, inclusiveness, and integrity as key principles for allies and partners, drawing on the alliance’s values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Integration is about guaranteeing that gender equality is a core part of all NATO policies, programs, and
projects. It promotes gender mainstreaming as a process and seeks to integrate a gender perspective into all of the alliance’s work.

Inclusiveness is about increasing the numbers of women across NATO and in national forces, as well as promoting more women in leadership positions. Greater representation of women is vital to enhancing diversity, which, in turn, improves the effectiveness of NATO policies. This applies in allied countries and in overseas operations, where the strategic context frequently demands local cultural understanding, which flows from organizational diversity.

Finally, integrity means that those deployed on NATO missions and operations need to observe the highest standards of behavior, whatever the circumstances. This improves trust and faith in the alliance. To ensure equal treatment, dignity, and respect for women in war and peace, allies should have zero tolerance of any form of sexual exploitation or abuse, in line with international norms and standards.

While the primary responsibility for implementing these resolutions rests with individual nations, NATO—as a regional military alliance and a security organization—has significant contributions to make. The continuous commitment of NATO allies and partners to the WPS priorities is woven through NATO’s core tasks.

**ISSUES AT STAKE**

By 2016, nearly 41 percent of NATO member states had established policies and laws to integrate gender perspectives into the armed forces. Ninety-six percent of allies have opened positions in the military to women, 81 percent have provided training programs on preventing sexual harassment, and 74 percent have trained gender advisers.\textsuperscript{148}

NATO has successfully integrated gender perspectives into its mission planning and deployed a network of gender advisers to support its crisis management work. The alliance has worked closely with other international organizations that have invested in WPS and has solidified positive relationships with the European Union (EU), the UN, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe through collaboration on a number of initiatives.

The alliance has also made progress by integrating gender into core policy documents, including on topics such as counterterrorism and the use of small arms and light weapons. One of NATO’s most important developments has been the creation of the post of the secretary general’s special representative on women, peace, and security in the alliance’s civilian political structure. This move represents a symbolic commitment by NATO to the WPS agenda.\textsuperscript{149}

Civil society has a crucial role in promoting and mainstreaming the WPS agenda in member states. In 2016, NATO established a Civil Society Advisory Panel to help allies improve women’s outreach and engagement. A 2018 review of the panel identified some challenges to the integration of civil society’s voice into NATO’s work.\textsuperscript{150} In response, the allies agreed on new terms of reference for the office and established a new panel that places more focus on the voices of women from countries in conflict. The work that NATO has undertaken with members of the panel has allowed women from many countries, including conflict-affected states, to better understand the alliance’s goals.

NATO’s public diplomacy also plays an essential role in mainstreaming the WPS agenda, in civil society and beyond. Staff at the alliance’s headquarters have taken to the task well, organizing conferences and seminars at which experts and people from different backgrounds discuss and share best practices.

The allies understand that reform must be accompanied by training and awareness raising. NATO continues to develop education and training programs and tools to better integrate gender perspectives, led either by
individual nations or by NATO as an organization. A network of gender focal points across the alliance is tasked with gender mainstreaming to ensure smoother and more comprehensive integration of gender perspectives into NATO’s daily work.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Overall, NATO as an organization is moving in the right direction on the WPS agenda. The alliance’s related policy and action plans are comprehensive and clear. NATO’s focus on the three I’s of integration, inclusiveness, and integrity has encouraged more women to join military services and can serve as a model for other organizations.

However, there are still challenges and persistent obstacles to guaranteeing that WPS is securely embedded into the alliance’s work. NATO’s long-term goal should be to integrate gender perspectives into all of the alliance’s policy areas by recognizing the topic as part of everyday business. Taking this into account, NATO should consider the following solutions.

NATO’s WPS action plan should specify responsibilities for implementation at different levels. The creation of a separate committee, task force, or other supervisory body to make implementation more effective and controlled could help resolve this issue.

Each ally should adopt a national action plan on WPS, as requested by the UN to support the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325. These action plans could include a budget and a monitoring system to report on member states’ activities and achievements.

NATO should engage more civil society actors, nongovernmental organizations, and international and national bodies in the implementation of the WPS agenda. The alliance should strengthen its cooperation with civil society through regular engagement, bilaterally as well as through the Civil Society Advisory Panel. The latter is an important bridge between NATO and civil society that can help mainstream the WPS agenda. To do this more effectively, the alliance should engage with all genders.

NATO should make greater use of lessons learned and best practices in training and capacity building. Experiences shared by champions and role models are particularly useful in promoting change.

Finally, the alliance needs to regularly research women’s perceptions of defense and security to gain a better, more up-to-date understanding of the subject. The information that emerges from this research should serve as a basis for action plans, policies, and other activities. NATO’s efforts to identify women’s perceptions of peace and security are a good start. The alliance should encourage nations to participate in a broad assessment of this and similar initiatives.

*The Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association would like to acknowledge the intellectual contribution of Mariita Mattiisen to this chapter.*
The so-called Islamic State’s 2014 proclamation of a caliphate caught NATO by surprise. Allies were prepared to fight the jihadist terrorism of al-Qaeda in many ways, but they did not foresee the transformation of the terrorist threat into a well-organized military insurgency that could occupy and control territory. Although local and international forces have since retaken the territory, the terrorist threat lingers with new methods and new battlefields.

NATO needs to improve its counterterrorism toolbox accordingly. The alliance must attach a high priority to this matter and change its focus from postconflict measures—such as restoring essential services, fostering a gradual return of governance, and engaging with nonstate actors—to preconflict measures. Steps such as timely security sector reform can prevent the reappearance of a new caliphate. NATO must also assess whether its current training and capacity-building mission in Iraq is suitable for the purpose and evaluate the impacts of Russia and Iran in Syria.

By 2014, when the caliphate occupied the Levant, the allies had grown more divided about the risks at stake. Not all allies shared the same threat assessment, and some stayed out of the global coalition on terrorism established on the margins of NATO’s September 2014 summit in Wales.

Divergences among the allies help explain why in Iraq, despite the presence of all NATO countries, the organization does not lead the global coalition against the Islamic State. Instead, the alliance limits its role in the country to the deployment of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and training and capacity
building—the latter through NATO’s Mission in Iraq. Even this secondary contribution may be affected by increasing tensions in the region. The proliferation of conflicting interests is due, among other disputes, to the rivalry between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, growing divergence between the United States and Turkey, the animosity between Israel and Iran, and, last but not least, differences between the United States and its European allies over the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.

Despite NATO’s long-standing political engagement with some countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, or the assistance that NATO offers in building counterterrorism capabilities, the alliance is not yet considered a strategic actor there. The limited allied presence in MENA, the overwhelming strategic influence of the United States in Middle Eastern affairs, and the dominance of France in Africa restrict NATO’s influence to a limited number of military actors involved in counterterrorism cooperation.

As for the role of the military in crisis management, NATO’s experience shows a clear imbalance between the successes of military mandates and the poor performance of measures aimed at postconflict reconstruction. Military interventions may help once-fragile nations restore stability, but they cannot address the many problems that caused such fragility in the first place. Instability in MENA countries is due to non-military drivers such as limited economic development, demographic pressure, a lack of governance, and an accumulation of grievances, among many others.152

Regional players present further obstacles to a greater role for the alliance. In Syria, Russia and the Syrian government oppose the involvement of Western countries in negotiations to end the conflict and reject Western contributions to postconflict recovery and reconstruction. This leaves little room for a future NATO security engagement there.

The alliance has extended its traditional operations of defense and deterrence to the projection of stability in the Southern periphery with limited results.153 Algeria distrusts NATO’s presence in MENA, and it is the U.S. Africa Command, rather than NATO, that is involved in the fight against the Islamic State in Libya.154 The outcomes of NATO’s maritime missions in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas to control migration flows have also shown the limits of military means to solve security problems. NATO should learn from these experiences.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies requires NATO to deploy a fluid mixture of instruments to form a tailor-made response. On the doctrinal level, the alliance adopted a military concept in 2002, policy guidelines in 2012, and an action plan in 2014.155 In 2017, NATO created a terrorism intelligence cell in the Joint Intelligence and Security Division in Brussels.

Yet the alliance must go further. If the allies are to have a fighting chance of preventing the emergence of a new caliphate, they need to improve their situational awareness. The 2014 events in Iraq and Syria grew out of specific political, economic, and social circumstances. NATO must enhance its ability to read these early warning signs to avoid new surprises. The creation of a NATO Strategic Direction South Hub in the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy, will help. Given that the Islamic State’s military strength is diminishing, NATO faces the risk of reducing the priority it once gave to the fight against terrorism. This could be a mistake, and any change in the emphasis on counterterrorism should be based on strong intelligence assessments from the hub for the South and other relevant sources.

NATO interacts with the security personnel of countries affected by terrorism more intensively outside those countries than within. This generates a gap between
the reality on the ground and the perception of that reality in NATO’s headquarters. The alliance should realize that because of its intermittent presence on the ground, any potential intervention to combat terrorism in MENA would require extra time and coordination with local actors to acquire the necessary situational awareness.

To further increase its ability to fight terrorism, NATO must help its members enhance their military capabilities to conduct direct military actions against training camps or other infrastructure of terrorist groups. NATO planners must adapt new instruments of warfare—information, cyber, and hybrid—to the fight against terrorism. In the East, the alliance must combine its advanced presence with reinforced capabilities, while in the South, it must complement its permanent monitoring and surveillance of terrorist groups with the capability for collective direct action if necessary. That need could arise at some point if NATO members decide unanimously that populations in the South of the alliance are at risk.

Because NATO lacks the proper instruments to deal with drivers of instability, it must choose between developing its own nonmilitary instruments and cooperating with other international, regional, or subregional organizations in MENA and beyond.

The alliance also needs to learn the lessons of recent counterterrorism campaigns, in which the allies failed to bridge the gap between their low level of ambition and the high level of effort required to deliver stability. In Iraq, the U.S.-led military campaign to overthrow the regime of former president Saddam Hussein was marred by a lack of postconflict planning. In Afghanistan, NATO’s military planning included civil-military cooperation programs to provide aid and relief to the local population. But the gains of the alliance’s local reconstruction teams could not compensate for the failure of international bodies and external states to promote governance and development at the national level.

NATO should avoid becoming involved in military actions without sound planning for the day after the intervention ends. That is an error the alliance made in Libya, where the mixed outcome of the NATO-led military operation affected allies’ regional reputation and ability to carry out cooperative security missions in the MENA region.

As for NATO’s future roles in Iraq, Syria, and the global coalition, alliance planners must consider allies’ differing strategic cultures and national interests. Divergences matter, and not all allies see their vital interests threatened in Syria. Even if the civil war in that country comes to an end, NATO’s military planners should continue to monitor the situation to minimize its impact on allied security and regional stability. In its postconflict role, NATO’s secretariat should keep up political dialogue with actors to help prevent new conflicts. The alliance should support international reconstruction missions and exchange intelligence on subjects such as the return of foreign terrorist fighters, arms trafficking, or maritime security in the Mediterranean.

Given the accelerated evolution and complexity of terrorist methods and the wide range of nonmilitary actors and factors involved, NATO should not aspire to play a leading role in the fight against terrorism. Instead, the alliance should adopt a supportive function. It should focus its counterterrorist efforts on enhancing strategic intelligence, improving situational awareness, and continuing to build local capabilities to cope with terrorist threats at the national or regional level.

The intelligence gathered and the analysis conducted by the hub for the South in Naples must be comprehensive and include structural sources of terrorism and early warning to give NATO and its members as much time as possible to respond. In the context of such a supportive role, NATO must reinforce its capacity for surveillance or intervention to prevent strategic surprises and deter potential threats on the alliance’s Southern flank.
NATO should avoid placing the military in crisis management roles traditionally performed by civilians. Whatever the complexities of building and managing coalitions, the alliance should strive to harness partners’ capabilities, as it has been doing in the context of improving cooperation with the European Union. This will have the added benefit of reducing the high costs and risks of NATO-only or NATO-led operations. Even when no allies or partners can be found to join alliance crisis management operations, NATO should avoid the temptation to lead complex crisis management missions in the MENA region and look instead for ad hoc networks and responses.

The alliance’s role in MENA largely depends on the willingness of the United States to either scale back or reinforce its military presence in the region. If the United States withdraws its forces from Iraq and Syria, other allies in the global coalition will likely follow, and their ability to shape events on the ground will be limited.

Félix Arteaga is a senior analyst for international security and defense at the Elcano Royal Institute and a lecturer at the General Gutiérrez Mellado University Institute.
CONCLUSION

TOMÁŠ VALÁŠEK

The analyses and recommendations in this collection of essays are not exhaustive. For example, it could be argued that deterrence in the Black Sea deserves greater attention than it has received. This theater of tensions is geographically separate from NATO’s northeastern flank of the Baltic countries and Poland and materially different, representing a maritime threat rather than a mainly terrestrial one.156 In addition, space policy could have merited more than a passing reference in the essay on technology. Space assets have become, simultaneously, the great enablers of the vast majority of military operations today and are a prime target for NATO’s adversaries. The latter’s ability to deny NATO the use of space could be a vulnerability in allied military plans.157

Notwithstanding inevitable shortcomings, we hope that the essays have succeeded in calling attention to the main decisions facing NATO as the allies reflect on their organization’s next seventy years. The essays do not add up to a single prescription; they are more like a menu of distinct challenges and related solutions. Readers will have quickly worked out that this poses two problems.

The first is interrelation: by pursuing one of the paths of adaptation laid out in this collection, it might become more difficult for NATO to address a different challenge. This is a problem not necessarily of resources but of specialization. It may turn out, for example, that it is too much to expect NATO to signal readiness for a high-tech, high-intensity war in order to deter a peer adversary in one part of the world while also making friends elsewhere with a state that has a pacifist mindset—as desirable and important as that partnership might be. In athletics, one can be either a sprinter or a long-distance runner, but not both.

Financial and diplomatic resources may become an issue, too. That brings us to the second problem: will member states muster the collective will and patience to execute the adaptations outlined here?

The most immediate risk is a rupture in U.S.-European relations. With the passage of time, it has become too easy to forget that the U.S. commitment to the European security order in 1949 was an eminently realist, self-interested choice: it was a move that not only immensely benefited Europe but also helped the
United States as much as its allies. (The same can be said of U.S. support for the multilateral order writ large.)

All U.S. leaders pursue American greatness first, but wise ones recognize that this need not be at the expense of others. For evidence, reflect back on NATO’s first seventy years. Findings strongly suggest that the U.S. public is in favor of recommitting to the alliance. And the conditions that led the United States to agree to NATO’s creation in 1949 have, if anything, been reasserting themselves. Law and order in international relations are in slow retreat, and in the words of American historian Robert Kagan, the “jungle is growing back.”

Another, less often discussed challenge to the alliance’s ability to adapt is its gradual relegation to the margins of key capitals’ interest and attention. After all, most military alliances of the past did not go out with a bang; they fizzled.

Whether NATO follows suit depends, in great part, on how it manages the diversity of interests among its members. Since the demise of the unifying Soviet threat, allies have inevitably come to different conclusions about their primary defense worries. Geography and history are central factors once again. The essays here offer a fairly representative swath of the broad spectrum of concerns on member states’ minds.

This fragmentation has been partly obscured by the popular narrative of NATO as an institution committed to a changing yet single mission. That mission is said to have ranged from deterring, and defending against, the Soviets until 1991 to reunifying Europe and stabilizing the Western Balkans in the 1990s to fighting terrorism after 2001—and back to deterrence and defense since 2014, this time vis-à-vis Russia. This narrative is only partly true, in the sense that since the end of the Cold War, these tasks have taken turns in garnering more newspaper headlines than other activities that NATO was carrying out at the same time.

However, the most consequential change may have been not in the nature of the dominant task but in the way that each successive focus has had to compete harder with other, multiplying jobs on NATO’s to-do list. And while Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine in 2014 refocused minds somewhat on collective defense, the near simultaneous emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and the subsequent migration crisis have ensured that the Eastern and Southern flanks both occupy NATO. The alliance has truly become different things to different people.

The allies have responded by becoming more transactional in their relationships with each other. They all remain interested in having recourse to outside help, at some point in time, from the rest of the alliance. So they assist each other, still out of a sense of shared community but also—and increasingly—as part of an implied bargain, in which they help each other to increase the probability of receiving aid in return in the future.

This blend of idealism and pragmatism sounds crude, but it has worked well in practice. It may continue to serve NATO well for a long time, assuming that three conditions are met. First, NATO needs the means to deal with the full spectrum of contingencies that the allies expect it to address. The alliance’s ability to specialize in multiple areas at the same time, as discussed above, may yet prove difficult.

The second, closely related condition is that the alliance pays roughly equal attention to the different worries that occupy national capitals. All allies need to feel that the rest of NATO takes their concerns seriously.

The third condition is that allies continue to regard each other as acting responsibly, with restraint and with the interests of the entire alliance in mind. This has always held true, which is why articles 1 and 2 of NATO’s founding Washington Treaty bind the signatories to settle conflicts peacefully and help build friendly international relations. But the rule applies
even more stringently in today’s more transactional age. All governments need to seek public—and, frequently, parliamentary—approval for NATO missions. This has become a taller order now that, more often than not, the public does not necessarily consider the threat being addressed to be the nation’s top concern.

And the argument in favor of helping an ally becomes even more of a challenge if the country pressing for NATO action is not seen as having tried hard enough to help itself or solve the problem through other means. That is why growing divergence on values matters. When the case for action is ambiguous, allies are less inclined to extend the benefit of the doubt to a country not seen as a kindred spirit.

These thoughts are not meant to downplay the expectations of a successful adaptation but to provide a chart with which to navigate the obstacles ahead. Most challenges described above are manageable and, in fact, are already being managed. Resources—the prerequisite for being able to address multiple challenges at the same time—have become less of a problem as defense budgets have gone up. Although an economic crisis could slow the trend, the new money in the defense budgets of NATO countries—$41 billion in 2016–2018 alone—is already making a difference to allies’ capabilities. And while much public attention has been on transatlantic divisions, the United States has doubled down on its military commitment to Europe by stationing 4,500 troops in Poland and prepositioning heavy stocks elsewhere on the continent.

Throughout NATO’s history, leaders of allied nations have shown the foresight and resolve to adapt the alliance to each successive new challenge. As NATO turns seventy, they show every indication of doing so again.
## APPENDIX: CONTRIBUTING THINK TANKS

## NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SHARED SECURITY: NATO’S NEXT 70 YEARS

### EVENT SERIES, MARCH-JUNE, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canadian Global Affairs Institute</th>
<th>Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM)</td>
<td>German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen</td>
<td>Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham House</td>
<td>Hudson Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clingendael Institute</td>
<td>Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations</td>
<td>Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elcano Royal Institute</td>
<td>Politikon Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association (EATA)</td>
<td>Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES


3 For a list of the sixteen think tanks that contributed to the "New Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO's Next 70 Years" event series, see the appendix of this collection.


7 See, for example, "Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture," White House, October 24, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malek-memorial-lecture/.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


28 Schake, “NATO's Old/New Normal.”

29 Ibid.


49 Moscow’s intention to use hybrid methods is articulated in several documents—the most recent being the 2014 Military Doctrine, the 2015 National Security Strategy, and the 2015 Information Security Doctrine.


Burns et al., “NATO at Seventy.”


Martin Libicki, Cyber deterrence and Cyber war (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 213.


Andrew Ng, Twitter post, “’AI Is the New Electricity!’ Electricity Transformed Countless Industries; AI Will Now Do the Same,” May 26, 2016, https://twitter.com/andrewyng/status/735874952008589312?lang=en.


“BP Statistical Review—2019,” BP.


See, among others, Lucarelli et al., “Approaches to Regional Stability and the Outlook for NATO.”


Billaud-Durand and Nordick, “Driving Diversity at NATO.”


Billaud-Durand and Nordick, “Driving Diversity at NATO.”


Vermetten et al., “Deployment-Related Mental Health Support”; and “Mental Health Training,” NATO.


Vermetten et al., “Deployment-Related Mental Health Support”; “Mental Health Training,” NATO.


ABOUT CARNEGIE EUROPE

Carnegie Europe was founded in 2007 and has become the go-to source for European foreign policy analysis in Brussels on topics ranging from Turkey to the Middle East and the Eastern neighborhood to security and defense. Carnegie Europe’s strong team of scholars provides unparalleled depth of analysis and thoughtful, carefully crafted policy recommendations on the strategic issues facing the European Union and its member states.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, India, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, is to advance peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues.