Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality

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A fghanistan after the Taliban may easily turn into a quagmire for the international community, and the wrong kind of international strategies may easily worsen both its problems and ours. In particular, to begin with a grossly overambitious program of reconstruction risks acute disillusionment, international withdrawal, and a plunge into a new cycle of civil war and religious fanaticism.

Ambitious plans to turn this war-hardened, economically ravaged, deeply divided country into a modern democratic state are indeed being proposed and are even incorporated into the Bonn agreement among Afghan leaders of December 5, 2001. But nobody is proposing the full-fledged, long-term military occupation that would be required even to attempt such a transformation—one reason being that past occupations, whether British or Soviet, have ended in utter disaster. At most, the international community is speaking of a relatively light armed presence in Kabul and certain other centers.

The chances of successfully imposing effective modern democratic state structures on Afghanistan thus are negligible. Even with a massive Western military presence on the ground, the West has already run into serious problems in transforming tiny Bosnia. Afghanistan is a country twelve times the size of Bosnia with 26 million people; an extremely difficult terrain; an ethnically, tribally, and religiously segmented society; and a fearsome array of battle-hardened warlords who have no good reason to give up their power.

But the world cannot afford to turn its back on Afghanistan in frustration, as it has done in the past, lest the country again become a haven for terrorists and an international threat. Afghanistan needs a modest reconstruction program that does not require full-fledged military occupation and is tailored to the reality of the country.

A Century of Troubled State Building

The Afghan state is a recent, partly colonial creation that has never commanded the full loyalty of its own citizens. Even today, many—perhaps most—Afghans give their primary allegiance to local leaders, ethnic groups, and tribes.

Afghanistan was only created at the end of the nineteenth century. All of its borders were in effect determined by the British
Empire, and reflected not an internal historical or ethnic logic, but an imperial one. Its northern border marked the furthest extent to which Britain was prepared to see the Russian Empire advance. Its southern and eastern borders were the furthest limit to which the British Indian Empire felt it necessary and safe to extend itself. Within these borders an Afghan state with modern trappings was created by a confluence of British geopolitical interest and the ruthless government of King Abdur Rahman, the so-called Iron Amir, who reigned from 1880 to 1901. The king was a highly competent ruler, who, by quite fiendish methods and with massive subsidies of money and weapons from the British, created the basis—albeit limited—for a centralized Afghan state.

Abdur Rahman's reign marked the start of the Afghan state-building process. In Europe, this process began in the early Middle Ages, stretched over several centuries with numerous catastrophic setbacks, and was attended by immense cruelty, resistance, and devastation. It therefore is hardly surprising that the very short Afghan state-building process met fierce resistance, had limited success, and ultimately collapsed—especially given the intensely warlike, independent, and anarchic traditions of many Afghan peoples, including the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns.

For Abdur Rahman laid the foundations not only for the centralizing and modernizing Afghan state, but also for the alienation from that state of the religious, tribal, and ethnic groups that dominate Afghan society. This alienation helped bring about the failure of the Afghan constitutional monarchy in the 1960s and early 1970s and tore the country apart in the following decades.

Had the modern Afghan state succeeded in developing the country and bringing visible benefits to the mass of the population, hostility to the state would gradually have faded. But as with state building in so much of the world, it failed to do so, and its one area of partial success helped seal its own fate. The modern education system, though limited to a small fraction of the population (and of course an even smaller proportion of women), created a mass of educated graduates and junior bureaucrats and military officers for whom no well-paying jobs could be found either in the impoverished private sector or the state service. Their bitter frustration produced the communist revolution of 1978, which essentially was an attempt to relaunch the state's modernizing program in an ultraradical guise by returning to Abdur Rahman's savage methods.

The communists' program, like that of Abdur Rahman, depended critically on subsidies and weapons from an outside protector, in this case the Soviet Union. And as in the Iron Amir's time, this foreign support helped spark fierce resistance from a variety of religious, ethnic, and tribal groups. The resistance eventually triumphed, and between 1978 and 1992 it overthrew the communist regime and eventually the Afghan state itself, first in the mountains, then across most of the country, and finally in Kabul and the other main cities. Tragically, but not surprisingly, the resistance proved completely incapable of replacing this state with any unified authority of its own, except—after a period of violent chaos—in the pathological and temporary form of the Taliban.

The difficulty of creating an Afghan state based on anything but sheer coercion has been immensely complicated by the region's ethnic makeup (see map). The original "state-forming" ethnic group, the Pashtuns, make up less than half of the total population, with the rest divided among a wide range of different nationalities. Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras (Shias of Mongolian descent) are the largest groups and are mentioned most often, but several smaller ones play key roles in their own areas.

Equally important, the Pashtuns' own role in the history of the modern Afghan state has been profoundly ambiguous. Afghanistan is a Pashtun creation, achieved through a Pashtun dynasty, and to this day the Pashtuns constitute the core of the country. But Pashtun tribal society is highly segmented and thus radically
unfit to serve as the basis for the formation of a unitary state. Pashtun and other tribal revolts against the state’s modernizing policies, often led by local religious figures, plagued all Afghan rulers. They played a central part in the rebellion against communist rule, and in the general reaction against Western modernity and modern state institutions that followed.

The Choices Today
In the past several decades, the international community has relied on three approaches to deal with countries that descend into chaos. It has supported strong men capable of reestablishing order by force; it has given up in despair, leaving the country to sort out its problems as best it can; and, most recently, it has embarked on ambitious projects to reconstruct the country in the image of a modern secular, multiethnic and democratic state. None of these approaches should be used in Afghanistan, but something can be learned from each of them.

A compromise approach needs to be based on an awareness both of Afghanistan’s past and its present conditions, not on an image of the modern state the West would like it to become. The international community must recognize that in the northern half of the country, the coherence of the Northern Alliance is unlikely to last for long without its raison d’être of resistance to the Taliban, whereas in the Pashtun areas confusion reigns. In short, it will be extremely difficult to create any unifying political structures.

Heavily armed tribal groups will not surrender their arms or their local power unless they are forced to do so by a national government with a powerful army of its own or by an overwhelming outside force. Because the international community is not prepared to produce an occupying force on the same scale as that deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo—thus, many times larger in absolute terms—the democratic-reconstruction model cannot be implemented.

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The Endowment’s Russian and Eurasian Program is a premier policy research center on the former Soviet Union. The program’s Carnegie Moscow Center is the first such facility in the region.
Indeed, it would almost certainly fail even if such a force were deployed. The strategy therefore needs to be less invasive.

The now discredited strong-man model is historically the favored method to stabilize a country in crisis; it was freely employed, for instance, by the United States during the Cold War and by France as part of its neocolonial strategy in Africa. It is not ethically appealing, but it is cheap, can be effective for a time, and requires little effort on the part of international actors, who delegate the job of imposing order to local leaders. There is no conceivable strong-man or strong-organization solution for Afghanistan as a whole. There are, however, strong men controlling different regions. They will remain part of the political scene, and the international community has no choice but to work with them as it has worked with other such leaders in the past.

Today’s orthodox approach to restoring states is much more democratic, but also much more invasive and costly, yet not particularly successful. For the past ten years, the stated goal of the international community has been to transform countries in crisis into democratic states with a free market economy, on the ground that only such states benefit their citizens and safeguard the international need for stability in the long run. This Western dominated, sociopolitical engineering approach is becoming ever more complex and costly as experience reveals new areas where intervention is needed.

The components of the democratic-reconstruction model can be summarized as follows:

- The parties involved in the conflict must reach agreement on a new permanent political system. Elections must be held as soon as possible. The new state must be multiethnic, secular, and democratic—whether or not this has any basis in local tradition, and whether or not it is what the inhabitants of the country want. While the accord is being implemented, peace and order are guaranteed by an international force, as well as by the presence of a large number of U.N. administrators. The international financial institutions take in hand the restructuring of the country’s economy. International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are funded to work in their specialized areas, ranging from humanitarian aid to election organizing.

The approach to Afghanistan needs to be based on its past and present conditions, not on an image of the modern state the West would like it to become.

Elements of the democratic-reconstruction model are already beginning to show up in the discussions of what to do in Afghanistan. The agreement reached by the Afghan factions in Bonn provides for the formation in six months of a broadly based interim government giving representation to all ethnic groups and to women, followed by elections two years later. Virtually all international organizations and NGOs demand strong action to promote women’s rights. The World Bank’s Afghanistan “Approach Paper” calls for helping the country to build a strong central bank and ministry of finance and for capacity building in all economic institutions. Other organizations target the strengthening of civil society. And this is only the beginning.

Not only is most of this quite impossible in Afghanistan today, but much of it fits only the
The international community’s immediate aim for the Afghan government should not be the impossible fantasy of a democratic government but rather a loose national mediation committee.

This conflict would most likely lead sooner or later to a swing in exactly the opposite direction, toward withdrawal and neglect, as happened in Somalia and in Afghanistan a decade ago. The reason was the same in both cases: The countries concerned did not appear sufficiently important to justify the effort to create order. The consequences of neglect were serious. Afghanistan became a haven for the al Qaeda movement. Somalia spawned not only harmless homegrown and clan-based Islamist groups but also al Itihaad al Islamiya, an organization aligned with al Qaeda whose operatives were involved in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

In Somalia, however, neglect also had some positive consequences, and this lesson must be heeded in designing a strategy for Afghanistan. With no center to be held, and no pot of foreign aid to be fought over, fighting in Somalia was greatly reduced and mechanisms were developed to compensate for the absence of the state. This did not necessarily mean reverting to a completely primitive life within villages and clans. A new class of international traders emerged, for example, who are capable of financing complex transactions, making international payments, and developing markets.

The Somali experience has historical precedents. The “ordered anarchy” of medieval France, Germany, or Italy—characterized by multiple overlapping armed authorities—did not preclude the establishment of great and stable long-range trade routes and commercial and financial networks, major economic...
whole apparatus of a modern state, but rather
the minimal conditions for medieval civiliza-
tion: the avoidance of major armed conflict,
the security of main trade routes, and the safety
and neutrality of the capital. These conditions
should be secured not by an Afghan national
army—another empty fantasy, given the pres-
ent situation—but by an international force
created by the United Nations and backed by
the ultimate sanction of U.S. airpower. An
agreement on how to create such minimal
conditions would be a greater accomplishment
for the loya jirga called for by the Bonn agree-
ment than would approval of a Western-style
democratic constitution that could never be
implemented.

Most Western aid therefore should not be
directed through the Afghan government—
even assuming that the appearance of a broad-
ly based national government could be
sustained—but should be provided directly to
Afghanistan’s regions. Aid should, moreover,
be used in a quite clearheaded and tough way
as an instrument of peacekeeping— as a way to
give local warlords and armies an incentive not
to go to war with each other. It would be a
bribe of sorts, and might appear to perpetuate
the power of warlords. But as Somalia and
other African examples illustrate, in fact greater
risks would be involved in making the central
government the chief channel for international
aid; for this would make control of the govern-
ment and the city of Kabul a vital goal for the
country’s various armed forces. Aid itself would
become a source of future conflict.

Aid should also be provided directly at the
local level, of course, to villages and local
organizations. But the international commu-
nity should have no illusion that it is possible to
completely bypass warlords and tribal leaders
in this fashion. In the end, the experiences of
aid agencies in many countries show, armed
groups and powerful individuals always influ-
ence how aid is used in their areas.

The international strategy toward
Afghanistan should therefore be based on these
key principles:

- Discard the assessments of what help
  Afghanistan needs to become a modern demo-
  cratic state, and replace them with a sober evalua-
  tion of the minimal tasks a central administration
  needs to perform to allow a measure of normal
  life, economic activity, and above all trade.

- Work directly with regional leaders whose
  power is well established. Assign liaison offi-
cials to work with these leaders, monitor their
  behavior (especially their treatment of local
  ethnic minorities and their relations with other
  regions and ethnic groups), and make sure that
  they provide no shelter to terrorist groups.

- Instruct these liaison officials to work with
  international and domestic N G O s, to ensure
  not only that they can work unhindered, but
  also that they do not become dangerously
  entangled in local politics.

- Create a corps of international civil ser-
  vants to serve as these liaison officials and oth-
erwise assist Afghanistan. These officials should
  be paid generously in return for devoting a sub-
stantial term of service to this difficult and
dangerous task and for investing in learning
local languages, history, and customs; every-
thing possible should be done to establish their
position and prestige. A certain historical
precedent here is provided by the British
Empire’s Indian Political Service, which man-
aged— but, wisely, never tried to administer—
the Pashtun tribal areas and handled relations
with the Afghan monarchy.

- Give serious consideration to the stan-
dards that need to be met by local leaders in
exchange for aid. Resist the temptation to
impose unrealistic standards. Pick only a few
battles to fight at one time. For example, make
aid initially contingent on education for girls,
but not on a comprehensive reform of legal or
social codes governing the position of women
in the family or major participation of women
in administration. Incremental change is more
likely to be sustainable.
Accept that, even with checks and conditions, there will be corruption, and aid will help warlords consolidate their power and their client networks. Experience shows that corruption is inevitable whenever a country receives large amounts of aid, even if it is channeled through formal government institutions. Use aid quite consciously as a political tool to maintain peace.

Establish certain basic national institutions in Kabul, but leave the question of a real national administration for Afghanistan to the distant future. Instead, treat the central government as a form of national mediation committee. Avoid making Kabul and the central government prizes worth fighting over.

Create a substantial United Nations–mandated international force to ensure the security and neutrality of the city of Kabul as a place where representatives of different areas can meet and negotiate, and where basic national institutions can be created. Be prepared to maintain this force for a period of several years, at least.

Do not pursue democratic measures, such as organizing elections, that would increase competition at the center among different warlords or ethno-religious groups. For there is no possibility in present circumstances that such elections could lead to stable democratic institutions.

Conclusions
The United States and the international community do not need Afghanistan to become a modern democratic state—or even a united one—to protect their key interests. They require a cessation of serious armed conflict and sufficient access to all parts of the country to ensure that it will not again become a haven for international terrorist groups and a source of destabilization for its neighbors. Beyond this, our interests and our capabilities are both highly limited.

If Afghanistan could be turned by fiat into a Scandinavian welfare state, well run and capable of delivering services to its population, its people surely would benefit greatly. But the international community cannot deliver such a state. At best, experience shows, it can deliver institutions that conform to the appearance of the modern state, but that function inefficiently and corruptly and that generate new conflicts over control.

What the people of Afghanistan need most urgently, and the international community can help them obtain, is the cessation of war and the possibility of pursuing basic economic activities free from brutal oppression, ethnic harassment, and armed conflict. They need to be able to cultivate their fields, sell their products, go to market, send their children to school, receive basic medical care, and move freely around the country. In the long run, much more would be desirable, but the first step should simply be to reestablish a degree of normal life, even if it is not life in a modern state. Just to achieve this much will require many years of careful, concentrated effort by dedicated international workers on the ground. More ambitious state-building plans must be left for another generation, and to the Afghans themselves.

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