

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT  
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**“200 YEARS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC  
RELATIONS”**

**WELCOME:**  
MARK MEDISH,  
VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES,  
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**MODERATOR:**  
JILL DOUGHERTY, U.S. AFFAIRS EDITOR,  
CNN INTERNATIONAL

**TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2007**

*Transcript by:  
Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.*

**PANEL MEMBERS:**

ALEXANDER ALEKSANDROVICH BESSMERTNYKH,  
PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, MOSCOW

JAMES FRANKLIN COLLINS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR,  
RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM,  
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

YURY VLADIMIROVICH DUBININ, PROFESSOR, MOSCOW STATE INSTITUTE  
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (MGIMO)

ARTHUR HARTMAN, SENIOR COUNSELOR, APCO WORLDWIDE

VICTOR GEORGIEVICH KOMPLEKTOV,  
PROFESSOR, MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN UNIVERSITY

VLADIMIR PETROVICH LUKIN,  
OMBUDSMAN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

JACK F. MATLOCK, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR, SOVIET UNION

THOMAS R. PICKERING, VICE CHAIRMAN, HILLS & COMPANY

SERGEY MIKHAILOVICH ROGOV,  
DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA  
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW,  
AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

YULII MIKHAILOVICH VORONTSOV,  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, AIG FINANCIAL SERVICES, MOSCOW

[Note: Remarks made in Russian delivered through simultaneous translator.]

MARK MEDISH: May I have your attention, ladies and gentlemen? Let's get started. At the outset, let me say they'll be simultaneous translation and there are headsets available for anyone who needs them. Welcome to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. My name is Mark Medish. I'm vice president for studies here. This luncheon is part of a series of discussions we've been hosting at the Carnegie Endowment to commemorate the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary since the start of official diplomatic relations between America and Russia.

If you do the math, this means that something happened in 1807. (Laughter.) It all started with an exchange of diplomatic notes that year. The date, in fact, is a bit fluid though because there were emissaries moving back and forth between the two countries before that. In addition, it took John Quincy Adams and Andre Dashkov, the first full ambassadors, more than a year after 1807, to make it over to the respective capitals. So this date is a bit of a moving feast. We can keep doing this for awhile.

One should also note that the shape of the two countries has changed over the 200 years. The Russian Federation today is not exactly the same shape as the Russian empire in 1807. And as for the United States, in 1807 we had only 17 states in the Union, nothing farther west than Ohio. So things have changed a bit. In addition, careful historians will not that we have not actually had 200 years of continuous diplomatic relations. They were almost interrupted during the U.S. Civil War and they were in fact interrupted after the Russian Revolution for about 15 years.

Anyway, the 200 years have seen many ups and downs in the bilateral relationship. We happen to be living through a period of heightened tension in this important relationship, so we're particularly glad and honored to have with us an almost full faculty of the past and serving ambassadors of the United States and Russia with us today participating in these discussions over a two-day period here in Washington. They've been meeting together in private, now in public, reflecting on the past, but also brainstorming about a way forward.

I'd like to thank our sponsors who've made these discussions possible: Boris Jordan, of the Sputnik Group in Moscow, British Petroleum, the Washington Group International. Our panel today, and you see them behind me, or most of them anyway, have comprised 13 past and serving ambassadors. I think we have nine up on the dais. Rather than go through all of their biographies, I draw your attention to the brochure, which contains detailed summaries.

There are four designated hitters today, two from each side. I'm not sure where you're all sitting behind me, and I apologize for having my back to you, but they are Ambassador Yuri Dubinin, who served in Washington from 1986 to 1990. He is now a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Vladimir Lukin, who was ambassador in Washington 1992 to 1994, he currently serves as the ombudsman for Human Rights of the Russian Federation.

From the American side, the designated hitters are Tom Pickering –

AMBASSADOR TOM PICKERING: No, no, no. It's Art.

MR. MEDISH: Oh, Art. (Laughter.) I apologize. The designated hitters are Arthur Hartman, who served in Moscow as ambassador in the 1980s and Jim Collins, who served in Moscow 1997 to 2001 and I'm proud to say is the director of the Russia-Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment here in Washington. I'd also like to recognize all the work of Sergei Rogov, who has been a co-organizer of these discussions, and of Tom Graham, who has been a special advisor to our group

Our moderator today, I'm delighted to introduce, Jill Dougherty, whom all of you know. She is the U.S. affairs editor for CNN International. She previously served as CNN Moscow correspondent in the late 1990s. She's been a White House correspondent. She's been at CNN since 1983 and she received her B.A. in Russian Studies from the University of Michigan. We're delighted to have you here. Without further ado, Jill? Thank you.

JILL DOUGHERTY: Thank you very much, Mark. This is a wonderful event and I'm very, very grateful that I was asked to participate. For me, this is like having dessert before dinner because we have so many minds here, great minds, who have dealt with relations between the two countries for so many years, and minds out there, some people I'm sure who have years of experience and we want to get a lot of questions in. So perhaps, I can just layout a little bit about how we hope to do this. As was mentioned, there will be simultaneous translation, and you have headphones, if you don't have them, in the rear.

We will open up with our four designated hitters here for maybe 20, 25 minutes, and then open it up to the floor. And I would just ask each individual, including the ambassadors, if they would, just to identify themselves so that on tape we have who was asking questions. I'd like to start out – one other thing is, as has been noted, the ambassadors told me that they are not representing the official positions of their governments. This is their opinion and maybe that will be even more interesting. We'll have to see how this goes. But if we could begin, diplomats of course think long-term, think history. Journalists have a much more limited attention span, and so we tend to ask more immediate questions.

And I'd like to start with an immediate question. And that would be, both countries are facing elections that are coming up next year. And the predictions among many are that things are already rocky and they could get even more rocky as we get down that road with potential leaders of both countries trying to prove that they are strong, potentially strong leaders of their countries, perhaps a macho effect, if you will.

Do we believe – do you believe, and perhaps let's start with Ambassador Collins, since you are so involved now in all of this with Carnegie. If you would, do you believe

that this is inevitable? Are we doomed to face some rocky months as we get into that election period? Could anything possibly be done to avoid this? Ambassador Collins?

AMBASSADOR JAMES FRANKLIN COLLINS: Well, Jill, I first of all want to say welcome to many friends and many faces I have worked with and to thank everyone for coming. I think we've had two days of discussions and we had had a chance to meet with some members of the Senate. We had a chance to meet at the White House with the National Security Advisor, and we have talked among ourselves. And I think maybe the way to sort of approach this question would be just to give one or two thoughts about what was on our minds as we talked.

I think one basic point was a consensus that the relationship is not what it should be or can be. And that is disturbing and something about which all of us should be thinking and trying to develop an approach to improve things into the future. The second is that we are at something of a turning point. We are going to have a change of leadership in both countries over the next 18 months or so. That will mean a transition. I think there was concern – certainly, I would find it to be of concern – if the differences in U.S.-Russia relations become a major subject of the political debate, it probably would not be helpful. But what we focused on more was what could be done in the next 18 months or so to lay a base for a better relationship in a new administration in both countries.

And I think we may want to address a number of those questions. We don't think it is inevitable that relations have to be bad, I would say. But we do think in the statement we've put out, and in our discussions, which we can develop here, that there are certain steps that would make sense in the short-term and then there are some things that we should about in the longer term to improve the dialogue. And let me leave it at that and maybe you could –

MS. DOUGHERTY: Okay, thank you very much. Ambassador Lukin, could you comment on this – on a turning point and some disturbing facts of the relationship right now. What – let's try to be as specific as possible – what would be the primary thing that should be done right now by both countries to avoid that clash, which could come at the beginning of the election campaigns?

AMBASSADOR VLADIMIR PETROVICH LUKIN: I think that between the two large countries like Russia and the U.S., there always were in the past and are in the present and will be in the future the elements that keep them closer and the elements that pull them apart. You cannot avoid it, but I don't expect that there will be general confrontation either, in my opinion. Concerning the issues that bring us together – the fight against international terrorism. And there are also other issues such as arms reduction and arms control, non-proliferation, which is – (inaudible) – weapon-related issue – (inaudible) – of both nuclear weapons and of other types of OMD, of weapons of mass destruction, and out of those, I would like to specifically highlight the most dangerous, perhaps as far as short-term issue that are biological weapons, issues that bring us together, and we hope will continue to be together as far as those.

There are also dividing issues. However, as we discussed them among our ambassadorial group, so to speak, these dividing issues are actually less important. They tend to be regional or local, and here is an example. Kosovo would be one example, and even the Middle East host of issues, as important as they are, they are regional issues, although even in the Middle East, to a certain extent, and in certain aspects, we're working together.

There're also some major irritants, of course, and needless to say, an election campaign just happens to be a period of time and provides a set of circumstances where, of course, the temperature will rise, and the passions will fly, both politically and generally domestically; and in the next 18 months, as my friend and colleague Ambassador Collins said here, our goal for the next 18 months is to make sure that – (inaudible) – to not reach too high, and not become too pervasive.

To an election campaign in Russia, for instance, it's quite possible to say something like, what we're trying to do is make sure – is to make Russia a strong, influential power that is friendly with its neighbors but also assumes to a deserving position, or alternatively one can say there are some countries, major countries, that are preventing Russia from becoming a great power, hence we should really have a better relationship. They don't like us, so why should we like them? So both scenarios are completely feasible and possible, and the second scenario, the latter scenario, is something that should be avoided. Both it should avoided in the Russian territory during the elections in Russia, and something along those lines should also be avoided on the U.S. as well.

That would be the minimal set of objectives. As far as the maximal set of objectives is that perhaps on the European elections, we can achieve some practical agreements and create something for the future. You may say it is unlikely because people's minds will be busy thinking about something else

It very well may be unlikely, but there have been such precedents. You will remember, of course, that none other than President Bush, Senior, was actually able to reach a very important agreement with us a few days before he left the White House, which was a major disarmament agreement. So I support the maximal set of objectives, but even if we realize and implement the minimal set of objectives, we will still open up great prospects and vistas for work.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you very much. Ambassador Lukin just mentioned Kosovo. And that's certainly one of the greatest challenges that we have right now – the U.S. ready to recognize it if it declares independence, Russia adamantly opposed to that. Is resolution of this very thorny problem possible, or are the sides too far apart, and perhaps Ambassador Dubinin would be a good person to answer that, please. Yury Vladimirovich.

AMBASSADOR YURY VLADIMIROVICH DUBININ: Dear Ms. Moderator, with your permission I would first like to make a few comments of a general sort of nature, which is what we agreed upon, before this event.

I would like to revisit how and when I ended up in the United States. I came here in the spring of 1986, and we all know very well that not only it was a period of time when the confrontation was peaking and going really high up, and the peak of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA, but it was of course the highest point of tension bilaterally. At that point in time, there was no commercial air traffic, either by an American airlines or a Russian airlines. And I arrive in the United States on an El Italia flight, and the only question that I was asked as I got out of the plane was Mr. Dubinin, are you bringing in spaghetti in your bags. That was what they greeted me with.

I was leaving the United States in four years, in 1990, and just as a reminder, at that time, both our leaders in Malta – had a summit in Malta, and there's actually a monument there – had declared the Cold War over, and there is a monument in Malta to that effect. And I left by a nonstop Washington, D.C.-to-Moscow flight. So within those four years I was a witness, and to a certain extent a participant, in the U-turn in the global politics that had been affected primarily by two driving forces, the United States and the then Soviet Union.

And out of that, I derive a very important conclusion for myself: I think that the cooperation between our two countries is of great, vast, crucial importance when it comes to dealing with issues of global, not just bilateral, but global security, and with issues of a global peace.

Look at the world we're living in now. We're living in a world where the conflict potential is actually on the rise, and both the number of – (inaudible) – and the number of issues that threaten peace are increasing. So to answer your first question, distinguished Ms. Moderator, in terms of what I think about the possibility and prospects of resolution of that issue, I would like to say that the role of the United States and of Russia and the factor of their cooperation in solving the single most important problem, the problem that everything else, including the Kosovo issue, depends on – and I am referring to solving the problem of decreasing the conflict potential and reversing the conflict potential trend.

The United States and Russia can, and should, have a very important role, and the most recent meeting between our presidents shows that the development of the moods among the leadership of our countries, in this respect, is going precisely in that direction. That is why, despite all of the difficulties that both countries are going to face in the course of negotiations, I hope that this trend in our relations is going to develop, and for the benefit not just of our two countries, but also for the entire international community. And this, incidentally, is the most important and the most effective lever for the image of our two countries in the world. Every success of our countries in this direction is going to increase and strengthen the image of our countries.

Now on the subject of Kosovo: Indeed, I am dealing right now, involved in state activities. I work as a professor at the Institute of International Relations; I teach diplomacy. In other words, I'm trying to figure out what is it that I've been doing for 45 years, and then when I understand this I'm trying to teach it to my students. And my main subject is negotiations because when it comes to Russian diplomacy, the solving of problems by means of negotiations is a priority.

And we teach our future diplomats the craft of negotiating. And this, incidentally, also has to do with the second question you had raised, namely Kosovo needs to be resolved only through negotiations. This corresponds not only to the best traditions of the world diplomacy, but also to the democratic approach. Now both countries of ours are democratic, therefore we need to know the opinion of our peoples, what is it that they want, and to solve the objectives, the problems the way the people want and not the way this or that country wants us to do. Thank you.

MS. DOUGHERTY: More specifically, on Kosovo, is it impossible now; are the two countries off on completely different paths on this issue?

AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN: You know, one of the interesting things to me as an observer is the way issues that are not issues directly between our two countries get dragged through because we take different positions on the basic dialogue that's going on. From my point of view, the United States and Russia are the world's leading nuclear powers. The nuclear threat, through diversion or just sloppiness, is with us; we ought to be doing more about it. We have some good basic agreements, things like counting rules that nobody wants to reinvent, that would give us the basis for looking at a longer-term way of controlling nuclear weapons and indeed, give us some idea of how we ought to proceed with chemical weapons and biological weapons. It seems to me we have that kind of responsibility.

I would hope on an issue like Kosovo – and I don't know much about it, luckily – we would feel that it's not central to our relationship. Other things are much more important. The world community is taking a hand on the Kosovo problem, and it should not be made into a bilateral issue, as if we have total control over what might happen or indeed if Russia has control over what might happen. We ought to keep our eye on the ball.

Now, this is difficult to do in an election period. I would hope that the relationship with Russia does not figure in our election campaign; or if it does, hopefully it can figure in a more positive manner. But there is something else that I would love to do, and that is abolish paranoia. (Laughter.) It seems to me paranoia comes out in these electoral campaigns. If you look at Russia today, the number of nationalists who are saying, you know, that America is against us, and every action that we take is somehow aimed at the heart of Russia. And if you look around at some of the debates that go on in our country, as they lift up the rug and see, you know, who's behind what, there's much too much emphasis on the direct threat.

Luckily, we're living in a period when the direct threat has been very much diminished, and those of us – I've been out of government now for 20 years, and doing much more profitable things – (laughter) – when you go back to Russia, it's a different place. And you talk to the children and the grandchildren of some of our colleagues, and they're a different bunch. And that's the first thing they say to us, that it is going to be a different country as the new generation comes along. And we Americans, who are so impatient with progress, and making the world over in our image, it seems to me you have to be a bit relaxed and a bit forgetful, or I think we ought to think more about how long it took us to get certain matters straightened out in our country.

This is going to happen in Russia, and the sooner we wake up to that and stop making every little thing that happens there central to an issue that, to me, is not central to our relationships, and keep our eye on the main thing that we ought to be doing in the Russian relationship, which is getting control of these very, very dangerous weapons, and working together where we can, which I think we're doing in places like North Korea, Iran, and other areas, in order to help find solutions. But it's not dependent on us alone; it's something where you have to build coalitions and work together.

And one last point. It seems to me our Russian colleagues ought, in some ways, to be rather grateful to us. At this moment, we have two of our leading Russian experts, one as Defense secretary and one as our secretary of State. And certainly, those are people they ought to be able to talk to, have some understanding of the history of this relationship, and who I think have the capacity to lower their tone.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you.

You know, there's an issue that probably is on everybody's mind right now, and that is the issue of energy. And the question I'd like to pose, and I think it would be to Ambassador Lukin, is that what does Russia want to do with its energy supplies? Does it want to, in a capitalist sense, sell oil, sell gas, and that is as far as it goes? Or is it, as many suspect and especially in Europe, that it is part of, let's say, a weapon in the foreign policy of Russia, to be used in a political sense as well as an economic sense. How would you answer that?

AMB. LUKIN: Russia is a very original country, therefore it wants to use the resources it has, and the ones that are in excess, with regard to its demand. Russia wants to sell it, and to sell it as expensively as possible. I think it's a very original approach to the issue. And nothing like this ever happened in America, of course.

That's the entire strategy. I don't know of any other strategy. At first, there was a strategy of the following kind: Since our neighbors are good, they come to Moscow and come up with pretty speeches, took pictures together with our leaders, including the president, therefore, we have to cut our prices for gas and oil. All of this was very nice; they liked it, but this was not very much to the liking of the Russians, of the Russian citizens, of the taxpayers. And as a result, the position has changed somewhat lately.

Very mildly, very gently, the prices started rising; and our neighbors, of course, didn't like it. But they have to choose who likes it less.

Again, we are very original as a country. When in America, when the question raises, do they like it or do they not when it comes to our steps, the Americans make a priority of their own citizens and their opinions. But what's interesting is that previously, Russia was accused of wanting to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries because, by lowering prices in a number of countries, it allegedly carries out its influence. Now, we started raising our prices. I'm talking about the oil companies such as Gazprom. And now, we're being accused that we're interfering into the other countries' internal affairs because we are raising our prices.

If they show us some third way, we'll be very careful in studying it, and we'll take it into account. But so far, we have only one of those two ways at our disposal. I think, in reality, the best is the market approach. If the price is such-and-such, you need to pay it, and at the same time, this is precisely fair approach because more or less everybody in the world proceeds on this kind of a premise. Of course, our Gazprom is not impeccable as a corporation. I personally believe that it needs to be reformed gradually, but this is an internal question, question of time, of various relations between our anti-monopoly committee and a number of other governmental bodies. But gradually I think it's going to improve, but there is nothing perfect in this world.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Just, perhaps, this could be our last question and then throw it out.

But do you, how do you react to what you just heard from Ambassador Lukin? Is it, well, low prices, high prices; is it politics; is it a weapon; is it economics? What is Russia trying to do with its energy?

AMB. COLLINS: Well, I think at base one should acknowledge that Russia, like about 70 percent of the rest of the world, wants to have the bulk of its oil reserves and gas reserves under some kind of national control. Russia's not unique; but what it is, I think, and this is an important factor, is in some sense new to the global marketplace in a rather traditional way. And most of the entities that are working from the Russian side in this global marketplace are, if not new entities, at least they are new structures and changing structures that basically have a history of 10 to 15 years, and are quite young, if you take Standard Oil by comparison, or some of the other oil companies that are big in the world.

And I think, what I would say is that first of all, the world energy markets have a way of taming anybody's exceeding ambitions over time. It is a global market; the opportunities for any supplier to dominate it and to manipulate it in an overly effective way, I think, has pretty much been disproven by the history of OPEC and other efforts.

The unique relationship that Russia had in the Soviet period, and the immediate post-Soviet period, as an energy supplier to its immediate neighbors and those who were formerly in the network was inevitably going to change. I don't think it was a credible

system in which Russia provided its energy resources at subsidized prices to neighbors, that that was going to last. Whether political or economic reasons, I just don't think it had a future.

And similarly, for the neighbors, to expect or build their futures on the idea that a major supplier of energy was going to continue to do it at sub-market prices was probably not a very wise set of policies. Now, that is not to say that in my view, there haven't been many, to put it mildly, not very effective diplomatic approaches to resolving arguments over gas prices and supplies and so forth; there have been. But I think everyone in that part of the world is going to live with Russia as a major gas and oil supplier, and energy supplier. They're going to have to figure out how to develop and organize those markets, and that sometimes that's going to have serious bumps in the road, and sometimes it will go smoothly.

But we're at the early stages of it, and in the long run I think my colleague, Art Hartman, today made the point that these markets have a tendency, basically, to structure themselves and to organize themselves on the basis of what costs are and what the market will bear. And that is the world in which all of these neighbors of Russia, and Russia, are going to have to learn to live. And that's what I would expect to emerge.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. Well, maybe we could open it up to some questions. I believe we have some microphones that are moving around the floor. And if there are some questions, we could start. One thing, if people could please identify themselves before they give the question. Bill, I think you were the first person. The microphone is on its way to you.

Q: Thank you. Bill Courtney (sp), with Computer Sciences Corporation.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and other similar programs operated by the Department of Energy and Department of State have been among the most successful U.S.-Russian programs for many years. Now that many of those programs are winding up their work in Russia, what do you think of the potential, for the United States and Russia, to cooperate in enhancing the security and safety of potentially destructive weapons of mass destruction, or materials that could lead to those weapons, in other areas of the world, for example, in supporting new regional security frameworks around the world that would focus on combating weapons of mass destruction?

MS. DOUGHERTY: Is there any particular person that you would like to answer that, and we do have other ambassadors up here?

Q: Well, let's start with Ambassador Vorontsov.

AMBASSADOR YULI MIKHAILOVICH VORONTSOV: You are absolutely right. What Senator Lugar was initiating in Russia was very, very important, and very, very successful. So I don't think anyone in Russia is looking forward for the quick

winding-up of that program. But if that happens, it's okay, and we have learned a lot, by the way, from that program. We can continue, ourselves, to control the nuclear weapons and nuclear material. There is no possibility, absolutely, that they will fall into some kind of unfriendly hands, which I wouldn't say about the situation in Pakistan, as a matter of fact. But that's my personal opinion.

So you're right, the program was good and we would wish it will continue.  
Thank you.

AMB. PICKERING: Could I make a point?

MS. DOUGHERTY: Please, Ambassador Pickering.

AMB. PICKERING: Thank you. I was not privileged to join the discussion until now, and so I really do speak for myself and without any opportunity to have heard from the others.

But it seems to me we have a unique opportunity, Russia and the United States, to cooperate now in a program that not only revitalizes the non-proliferation regime, but also can move ahead on the question of disarmament, and that Nunn-Lugar could play a role.

And I think there are four things, very quickly, that we should look at. One is I think we should try for a 50 percent reduction in delivery vehicles and weapons in five years, and I think that should be verified, unlike past efforts. I also think that in order to verify the material coming out of weapons, we ought to both put, as we did with the 500 tons of Russian uranium, that material ought to be blended down and used in civilian reactors.

I think the United States ought to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. I think both of us should put together a verifiable fissionable materials cutoff treaty, to take the present moratorium we have on making fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, and put it on a permanent basis, and then, to enhance proliferation. All those, I think, are things that we should have done long ago, to play our role in the non-proliferation activities.

But I think the other thing we ought to do is put together, with maybe the other nuclear powers, a nuclear fuel regime that can provide fresh fuel. Maybe the fuel coming out of these weapons, maybe with the help of the Nunn-Lugar program, to all those countries that burn it in reactors and take back the spin fuel, which as you all know has dangerous plutonium in it. But this has been proposed by a lot of people; this is not a new idea. But it's something that the U.S. and Russia could certainly take a lead in moving ahead on, and both sides would make a major contribution in this particular effort.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Ambassador Collins?

AMB. COLLINS: I just want to add two footnotes to that. First of all, I think it's not only that we can cooperate; I believe such systems will not exist unless we do cooperate. And I think it's there where U.S. and Russian responsibility is particularly acute simply because we remain the two nuclear superpowers, and that's not going to go away.

The second thing that I think we did talk about, and when we discussing what might be done in the near term, was for us to conclude, finally, and get off the table and into operation, what's called the 123 agreement. This is basically the framework agreement that permits broad-based nuclear – civilian nuclear cooperation. This is going to be essential if we are to fashion a reasonable, I would say, global system, working together for the expansion of nuclear power, which is coming, and where our scientists and, as far as I know almost all of our nuclear industries really believe this would be a terrific benefit for both countries, and would advance our capacity to talk more openly and broadly than is the case today.

MS. DOUGHERTY: All right, I think this lady in the front, right down here, if we could get a microphone there.

Q: Thank you. Hope Harrison, from George Washington University.

I know at least two of you have been teaching in universities; others of you have had a lot of time to reflect back on the forces that you think have driven and are driving U.S.-Russian relations. And I would be very curious what do you teach your students or what do you think in retrospect about the importance of individual leaders in U.S.-Russian relations versus domestic politics, other events in the world. When you look back over the long period of U.S.-Russian relations, what stand out as some of the guiding factors, and as we talk about new presidential elections coming up, sort of puts that in a context, how important will the change of the leader be to overall U.S.-Russian relations. Thank you.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Okay, thank you. Is there any particular person who would like to answer that? I would say, probably yes. Ambassador Dubinin.

AMB. DUBININ: This is really a very wide, broad subject. This is a very vast subject because it relates to the future of our two countries. At my school, the Institute of Foreign Relations, there is a course called "Diplomacy of the United States of America," quote, unquote. I'm in charge of this particular course, and what we try to do is to educate our students and foster an interest in them, in the U.S. diplomacy, which of course does not limit what we teach them about the United States. But diplomacy to the United States is part of the curriculum, and as part of this course I do call the attention of my students to the role of the individual because what is it that a large-scale diplomatic action made up of when we're talking about turning events? Who's more important here, an expert or a statesman? What's more important here, the broad, general idea, or a specific scientific product?

I base my deliberations regarding this on the conclusion of a treaty to eliminate medium-range missiles concluded between the USA and USSR because it was a landmark event. When the IMF treaty was signed, it was the first-ever agreement on disarmament, on elimination of a certain type of weapons. It was not something that was curbing something down; it was an agreement intended to destroy something. Were experts more important than others? It could not have been possible without experts; however, to make that step, the two countries had to have two individual leaders whose attitude, whose mindset, was ready for that.

Reagan had come to that point as a dreamer of a president, if you will, a president who had been dreaming of making a breakthrough, one that would go down in history, and that is why he was ready for that. And Gorbachev was ready as well. What did it take for Reagan to make that possible on the part of the United States? Reagan had to remove individuals whom you know about, to remove Weinberger, to replace his national security advisor. So basically, it's not important who left; what's important is that there was certainly a role to be played by an individual, which was played, and a decision that was made by him.

Experts were – actually dug their heels until Schultz said it's time to pull out those teeth. And a parallel trend was unfolding in the Soviet Union to what was happening in the U.S. So the role of the individual in history, and in diplomacy is something that cannot be underestimated. There's a vast, gigantic role to be played in both history and diplomacy by an individual. It's very nice to be tackling a problem after a problem after a problem, one after another, but by doing that it's important to not miss the opportunity, and not be unable to see the forest for the trees.

The Cold War is over, and it would seem that the world is in a kind of happy period of time. And yet, there are more problems now that threaten international security than there used to when the Cold War was not gone, which means that at this point in time, there is a need for more principled agreements between high-level leaders who would then devolve that authority throughout the government hierarchy. So my answer, and it is my conviction, is that the individual has a vast role, an exceptionally vast role, to play; and it is through that role that the creative attitude of the individual must be displayed, in the absence of which is the most valuable component of human interaction, and in the absence of which there can be no progress either, bilaterally or worldwide.

MS. DOUGHERTY: I think Ambassador Matlock.

AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK: I actually teach a course. I've done it now at four institutions, which I call "Leadership and International Affairs." And I lead the students through a series of case studies, the first of which is precisely Reagan, Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War, and the decisions that both made that made that possible.

And I agree with Ambassador Dubinin in that role of personality is extraordinarily important. Obviously, personalities cannot recreate facts; they cannot act actually contrary to, I would say to the political, economic, and other possibilities before them. But they can exercise a leadership in making choices. My own course, I look at other choices also, such as Prime Minister Thatcher's decision to defend the Falkland Islands, or the Malvinas; Helmut Kohl's strategy and decisions to unify Germany, including a rather difficult decision, for example, to convert the austmark (sp) at par with the deutsche mark; and so on. I have others. I attribute to Boris Yeltsin, by the way, the principal cause of the breakup of the Soviet Union; I'm not sure all Russians would agree with that.

But the point is that, yes, individuals make a difference, and decisions make a difference. Are their lessons from this, though, aside from that? I think one, yes, one of the biggest lessons I take from the end of the Cold War – and remember when Reagan came in our relations about as bad as they were at any time from the beginning of the Cold War. It was Reagan's decision, basically – well, one thing, he was utterly opposed to nuclear weapons. He wanted to find a way to get the world on a road not only to controlling them, but to eliminating them, if he could. This was his dream. But, second, he did want to end the confrontations of the Cold War, which were so dangerous to us all.

So he came into office thinking that he was a little too weak to negotiate; he had to build up our military, but to build up in order to negotiate. Now, a lot of people misunderstood that. But the fact is that, against the advice of many in his administration, probably the majority, he insisted always in engaging the Soviet leaders. And that every time something would happen, like the Korean airliner gets shut down, or an American major gets killed in Germany, you have many in the administration, oh, we can't talk to those people. And Reagan said, we're not going that route. We're on the same planet; we've got to find a way to get along; and by the way, you know, I really think that we need, you know, a policy that will bring us to that. I was brought into the White House and instructed, develop a policy that is negotiable.

And Reagan knew very well, you can't ask them to do things against their national interest. But actually, many of their national policies were not in their national interest. So you had to sort of make a distinction, make a distinction what you ask for. Also, some of the more delicate things, he understood that you need to handle them privately. He didn't say nearly as much publicly, for example, about human rights than, say, Carter had before. But this was at the center of much of our private negotiations.

So, you know, none of this worked until we got Gorbachev. And I can't go through in the time we have here the various step there, but the fact was that we had two leaders, thank goodness, in office at the same time in their respective countries who understood that the need of both countries to end this crazy arms race, which was hard on us and ruining them, and dangerous for the whole world. That we had to find a different way, and by doing so we had to both define our interests in a way that we would not be seen as, you know, victors, one over the other.

One of the most damaging myths that has developed both in Russia and in the United States is we, the United States, won the Cold War; Russia lost it. First of all, Russia wasn't even a party; we were negotiating with the Soviet Union, and Russia was only a part of the Soviet Union and not an independent country then. Second, everything that we settled was in the interest of the Soviet Union. It allowed them, without the pressures of the Cold War, to try really basic reform, which, of course, Gorbachev continued to do. So to think that the Soviet Union was defeated in the Cold War is absolutely absurd.

Another myth, and pardon me for going on, but these I think have damaged so much in our relationship and even our overall foreign policy. The other myth was, somehow we brought down communism by force. This it – just not happened. I mean, Gorbachev, through his reforms, undermined the Communist Party. And when he did so, various forces within the Soviet Union, including the Russian political leadership, broke it up. We didn't want it to be broken up.

I mean, President Bush, the 41<sup>st</sup>, made a strong speech and GF, August 1<sup>st</sup>, 1991 Bill Safire called it his "Chicken Kiev" speech. But what he said to the non-Russian republics is, go with Gorbachev's union treaty. And he also said, I think with great insight, go for liberty, for freedom. Freedom and independence are not synonymous.

Well, so it was not our policy to break up the Soviet Union and we had really nothing to do with it, in a certain sense, in a direct sense. So, the idea that somehow Russia was a defeated country; we could do what we wanted; we were the only superpower, et cetera, all of these I think are quite wrong and they have affected attitudes and affected attitudes negatively on both sides and are behind at least some of the problems that we have today. Pardon the rant.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. (Chuckles.) A subject that everybody wants to talk about, but obviously. Let's see, I think we have a gentleman in the middle back there?

Q: Thank you. Wayne Merry, American Foreign Policy Council, and a former subordinate to all of the Americans on the dais – (laughter) – a few others as well. I would like to ask, probably mostly the Americans, but I would certainly invite the Russians to comment as well, on the topic that came up at dinner last night, which is the disconnect, even almost the alienation between the relations at the policy level between the two governments, which are not very good, and the relations between the two societies, which are extraordinarily good, better not just than they were in the Cold War, but than they have ever been.

In my experience, this is not the way policy is conducted by the United States with other countries, where government relations are very heavily influenced by societal relations, even when the history of those two countries has been very adversarial as, for example, with China or with Vietnam. But this is not yet the case with policy toward Russia, even though the United States currently benefits enormously from the Russian

human presence in our own society: hundreds of thousands of extraordinarily talented people in places you might not think of – this is not the old Brighton Beach stereotype at all – in areas from biochemistry to the fine arts, everything you can think of.

I like to hope that some of the American presence in Russia is at least half as much benefit to that country as the Russian presence is to ours. Many of these are people who have one foot in America and one in Russia. And yet, I see almost no impact of this excellent and rich relationship at the policy-governmental level. And in my experience, that is not true in American relations with other countries. I can't speak for the Russian case, but what I would like to ask is, how can that alienation be overcome?

MS. DOUGHERTY: Okay, so that disconnect. Who is our volunteer?  
Ambassador Hartman?

AMB. HARTMAN: Let me just volunteer one aspect of this, and that is, we have to do something about the visa system. For some reason or other, the Chinese seem to get their people through with very little trouble. Maybe that's not true today, but there was a time when there were about 400,000 Chinese students in our country. And I doubt whether every year, we've gotten over maybe 100 or 200 Russian students.

Exchanges of that kind, I think, are invaluable, and we ought to have a major program. It doesn't have to necessarily be a governmental program. The government ought to ease the way exchanges take place, but on the cultural level and on the exchange level and universities and so forth, that ought to be one of the core things we do to change things for the future, but also to better bring along both societies to get along with each other.

AMB. LUKIN: (In Russian.)

MS. DOUGHERTY: Absolutely. Yes, Ambassador Lukin.

AMB. LUKIN: I liked very much the idea that, indeed, at least to have what would bring the presence of qualified, outstanding U.S. citizens in Russia so that they could work there. I think that would be a good thing. I propose that we started with Bill Gates – Bill Gates – not the other Gates, get him involved in this; he's got the influence, he's got the money.

AMB. COLLINS: I'd like to perhaps put on a couple of thoughts about the question Wayne poses.

I think we have to start, first, with the premise that bureaucracies don't like to change very much, and they certainly don't like to do it very fast. And when you think of the bureaucracy and the entire global system that was built in this country, predicated on the Cold War and the other, the enemy, we are having a very difficult time, it seems to me, reorganizing ourselves to think in different ways because frankly, there are simply

too many institutions that are structured to think about Russia and that part of the world in a certain way.

Part of that – and this is the second point – part of that is reinforced by the fact that Russia remains the other nuclear superpower, the only country with the capacity to destroy the United States, and we, in turn, are the same vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. That has got to create certain insecurities and certain problems, even if it's psychologically, about the other. And I think until we resolve some of that reality, and find ways to build more confidence and trust through actual, tangible actions in dealing with that reality, we're always going to have the problem that, first of all, we will create a bureaucracy to watch each other. That means we will create the institutions that try to watch each other in ways that make the other side mad. (Laughter.) It is also going to create issues that then spring from this, like what are their scientists really doing here, all right, and the same for the other side.

And I must say that one of the, I think, most perhaps discouraging trends over the last few years, on both countries, and I think it has been fostered in this country by 9/11 and in Russia by simply the sort of recovery of Russia to a more stable and nationally conscious status, is that the idea that we both have to protect ourselves – I think it was, as Art said, paranoia on both sides – is an industry now, frankly. And this is partly, I think, what is at root. We have not got to the point with each other where we either have the institutional framework to look at each other normally, nor do we have the tangible steps of, if you will, removing certain of the realities from the Cold War in an effective way to make that possible. And I think both of those are going to take time, but I think they are something we need to address, and it's why it's different.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Sergey Rogov.

DR. SERGEY ROGOV: Just this morning, the Russian and Israeli governments started negotiations to abandon the visa requirement from travel from one country to another. And it happens that there may be a very major breakthrough because there may be no iron curtain anymore, but the visa curtain, for Russia to travel to America or to Europe because of certain visa requirements, and vice versa. Today, the travel may even be more difficult than during the Cold War. So maybe, what seems to be totally crazy (?) – non-visa travel exchanges between the two countries, may happen if the precedent is established.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. Yes?

Q: Suzanne Lotarski.

As ambassadors during your tenures, you saw a great advancement of commercial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia. I'd be interested in your assessment as to what these relations contributed, that is, the commercial relationship to the overall relationship, its improvement; and how do you see that perhaps working out in the future because one worries a bit about some of the

tensions that arise in terms of national interests being served or not served by investments made by national companies of the others? But how do you think, in the future, that the commercial relationship may contribute to the overall.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. Ambassador Bessmertnykh, would you be interested in making a comment on that?

AMBASSADOR ALEKSANDROVICH BESSMERTNYKH: I think it is absolutely realistic to believe that economy is always a supporter of political relationships, but the relationship between Russia and the United States actually denies this general philosophy. We have our relations strengthened, in the first place, by the mountains of weapons sitting on both sides, and we're interested to continue the relations in the normal, not dangerous way. So a strategic part of our relations is predominant, unfortunately.

It has been for decades, but now with Russia becoming, trying to become a free-market economy and a democratic society, our country became much more attractive for U.S. investments. And I believe that U.S. business is not yet ready to exploit that opportunity. Of course the Europeans, the Chinese, the Japanese, Koreans, Israelis, Turks, and other nations are far ahead of the efforts to come to the Russian market and to find their own place there, which is very profitable.

But there are positive signs lately, especially in the area of mutual investments. There are Russian investments in the U.S. economy. I believe it was mentioned by one of our great experts in that area – about \$4.5 billion of Russian investments in the United States, and pretty larger than that, U.S. investments in Russia.

There are no problems, actually, for increasing those investments. I think there is political view which is needed. I think the U.S. business should feel that it is supported by the general strategy of the U.S. government, as far as Russia is concerned. And since the relations is still very much in doubt, and since there are a lot of problems – there are even talks about new cold war coming back – I think business is hesitant to use its natural possibility.

So each business is cautious – it's in the nature of it – and they're waiting for the indications that if they go, it will be supported by the governments. It would be a risk to stay that is probably the number-one problem for the U.S. business rather than for the Russian business. Russian business is much more, let's say, independent because it's new, it's Russia – it doesn't want to listen too much to the government, and sometimes the government listens to it more. So I agree with you; this could be a big boon of future stability in the relations. But that chance has not yet been exhausted by the efforts of both sides.

AMB. DOUGHERTY: Ambassador Hartman.

AMB. HARTMAN: I left the government 20 years ago and became a businessman. Business has been carried on all during this period while the governments have argued back and forth, and while some rather bad developments took place in the economy of Russia, our fund was doing beautifully. And American pension funds – some of you here I see from the academic community – TIAA-CREF was one of my first investors, and other American pension funds have followed. Today, we're offered more money than we can actually find projects to put it into. So, private equity is blooming.

Tom Pickering can tell you stories about Boeing's successes over there. And American automobile companies are beginning to get very interested, and there are Russian automobile companies – I understand one is established a plant in Mississippi. So, you know, it's happening. Sure, there are political problems. I helped a Russian mining firm buy a mine in Montana. Well, you can imagine what the people in the state legislature would say as soon as they heard a Russian was coming to buy a mine in their state. Well, we talked to them calmly; we showed the labor unions what the advantages were of this purchase. It went through; it's been very successful, and Montana now accepts a Russian owner of one of their big mines.

So a lot of this requires real political explanation and push, but I don't think it's dependent on the government policies. I think government policies help, but individuals in the business community know what's best for them, and they're following the places where they can make a profit.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Ambassador Pickering, could I just add on that question. I was in Moscow recently and talked to some businessmen, Russian businessmen, who were afraid of precisely what Ambassador Hartman was talking about. In other words, these are Russian companies that want to invest in the United States, and they were worried that the same thing that has happened to some Chinese companies, who've tried to get a piece of the action in the United States, will happen to them. Is there a danger that could happen, anything that could be done about it?

AMB. PICKERING: Yeah, I think that this is not a world in which the governments are, in fact, spending their time putting down red carpets for everybody. They all have their own rules, and you have to pay attention to the rules. In Russia a little bit you have to pay attention to what people think might be the rules – (laughter) – occasionally, because in fact they're somewhat unpredictable.

And as our Russian friend said, I think Vladimir Lukin originally said, well, the Russian government has decided it wants to maintain a commanding interest in the major national natural resources in Russia. That's Russia's right; nobody would gainsay that. But it means the number of people rushing to invest is somewhat more limited because the government has showed an inclination to, in some ways, at least from the perspective at this end, to make life difficult for people who are already there with the hopes that they will maybe discourage some of this. One wants predictability in business.

Now, other businesses, and certainly I was associated with Boeing, have done very, very well. They have been well received. They did add a lot of employment to Russia; Russia, in turn, has become a very good customer of the company. That harmonious relationship has been an extremely good one; it's required a lot of attention and a lot of care and feeding, but nevertheless it's important.

Russian firms ought to be allowed, in general, to invest in the United States. We have something called SIFIUS, which is designed to guard our strategic interests. The rules there should be clear; I'm not sure that they're any more clear than the Russian rules are about natural resources in Russia, so that in fact I'm not trying to point the finger at the Russians any more than the U.S.

We need clarity, predictability, and stability in these particular efforts as we go ahead. And to some extent, that's something else that the two governments could help to foster. We have a dialogue at high-level among CEOs. Those folks could get together. There's no reason why they couldn't help to prepare suggestions that both governments could undertake, in effect, to help clean up their acts a little bit on some of these issues.

It's hard to do that in election times because these become domestic issues rather than purely foreign policy issues. And we know some of that makes life difficult for people to move ahead. But these are serious opportunities. Both economies are moving ahead; both economies are very large; both economies present important advantages to investors. And the commercial relationship – I totally agree with what's been said here – can help to reinforce and strengthen the political relationship.

It's a little bit of an add-on to Wayne Merry's question. I think the commercial relationship is, in general, good. I think the points that have been made here: paranoia, bureaucracy, old-think, the sense that people haven't changed, emotionalism, the tendency to over-read statements made for domestic political advantage but really have a kind of international resonance, all play into the disadvantage of the relationship, which does need to be fixed up.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you.

There's a lady in the middle here, if you can get the microphone in.

Q: Thank you; Michele Steinberg, from Executive Intelligence Review Magazine.

In July, I believe it was this summer, President Putin was in Kennebunkport and he made a very bold initiative for cooperation between the United States and Russia on the question of missile defense. And President Bush said he was interested; there is a commission that Henry Kissinger is on. I believe Dr. Primakov is also it. And at the same time, there was an interesting speech by President Bill Clinton in Kiev, I believe, about Reagan's initiative, way back, on the strategic defense initiative praising that.

Could any of our Russian colleagues who wish to answer that, and also I'd like to hear from Ambassador Matlock and Pickering if possible, what is the commission doing, the Kissinger group, if you know, and is this a way to overcome the Cold War?

MS. DOUGHERTY: Any of the Russian ambassadors could answer that question? The fingers are pointing.

AMB. VORONTSOV: (Off mike)

INTERPRETER: Microphone is off. The interpreter can't hear anything.

AMB. VORONTSOV: (In progress) – defining the statutes and the work, how to proceed and so on and so forth. I happen to be the member of that commission, and we are meeting again in January.

Since the representatives of both societies have a very high status there, so I hope that the commission will play a very interesting role in advising the governments, in finding the solutions or way to the solutions of many problems, which are really serious ones, and I hope that in general the commission will be successful. Maybe later on the work will continue, but the second meeting is slated for January, so far as the commission is concerned.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Perhaps Sergey Rogov could add a little bit to that.

DR. ROGOV: Two points: First of all, the Kissinger-Primakov commission is a commission of elder statesmen, like the Ambassadors' Club. They are not negotiating between the two governments. And Tom Graham, who is sitting right in the back, he's another member of this commission, together with Ambassador Vorontsov, and this is an effort to mobilize the brainpower of the experienced political players. But this is not a substitute form of negotiations.

As far as the negotiations are concerned, there have been some first official discussions between the Russian foreign ministry and the Department of State concerning ballistic missile defense calculation. And a week ago, a delegation from ballistic missile organization visited the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan, which is another warning radar. So for the first time, we showed the Americans our top-secret technologies. And General O'Reilly (ph) said she was quite impressed.

But the gap still persists because the American position is, okay, we build ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe and take Gabala – (inaudible) – too. And Russia said, well, no-no-no-no, it's either/or. So we're just beginning what I hope a diplomatic game, which eventually will lead to compromise. It don't, we're going to have a very, very big trouble.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. Could I just check on our time? We are coming to the end. One more question? Okay, we'll take one more question, yes.

Q: Laura Kennedy from the State Department, and like Wayne Merry I had the honor of having worked, in one capacity or another, for all four of the American ambassadors.

But if you'll indulge a very parochial question, since I'm teaching a course on the Caucasus and Central Asia, you know that a lot of journalists have made a lot of money writing about a new great game in Central Asia, but I wonder if particularly our Russian guests might comment on prospects for cooperation between our two countries in that area, however you want to define Central Asia.

MS. DOUGHERTY: You know, I don't believe we've heard from Ambassador Komplektov. Ambassador Komplektov, would you like to make a comment? The microphone is not on I think.

AMBASSADOR VICTOR GEORGIEVICH KOMPLEKTOV: I came down to Washington for the first time back in 1955. Since then, I served for three times in our embassy here in Washington and worked for the foreign ministry in Moscow, so I've seen quite a few ups and downs in our relations. And I'll say that I 100-percent agree with what Ambassador Jack Matlock said about breakthrough we managed to get, back in early 1970s .

Actually I think that those were my happiest days, or years, in my professional career. I just mention that only because when we have a will on both sides – on both sides supported by feelings in the societies, then we're quite able to make a breakthrough in our relations not only for good for our two countries but also for the entire world I would say because we started at that time, the process, still continues, and this is strategic arms implementation talks, and also at that time we had an ABM treaty también (?) – also.

And now, Caucasian and Asian, the Central Asian situation – well, probably, you know, and the fact is, that when the military operations started in Afghanistan by American, and then the NATO troops, we tried to facilitate this alteration through infrastructure and at that time, the United States – well, they've got some places for their bases in some central – well at least in Kyrgyzia. This is one of the countries of Central Asia, and one of the former Soviet Republics. So right now, the major airport, their Manas in Kyrgyzia. They also have the American air force base. So this in a way, I would say, probably practical and most pragmatic way of cooperation between us, well as far as the Central Asia is concerned.

As far as the Caucasus, the situation is more complex because there are three politically or ideological, but anyway somewhat different three countries in there. And this is Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Azerbaijan, also a former Soviet Republic and now independent state, is very rich with oil, and the Americans have their interests, material interests, in there, I would say. And so they are now cooperating with the Azerbaijan government in building up a pipeline for oil supplies.

Then, there is Georgia, which has no oil resources or any other material resources in there, but which takes a sort of strategic position because Georgia is between Azerbaijan and Armenia. And then Armenia, which I will say is trying to have a sort of neutral position in this region.

I will say that the best relations Russia has there is with Armenia. We're trying to get along with Georgia, despite the fact that the young president in there is very emotional sometimes, and, well, and so on and so forth.

Well, as far as calculation is concerned, there is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in there; it's a long-standing conflict, over 15 years by now. So I would say that we both – I mean, United States and Russia, they can facilitate the negotiations between the two countries, but not to interfere directly, either in these countries or in this conflict. It's a very delicate thing, like any ethnical conflict is concerned.

Well, again, back to Central Asia. Yeah, I would say I think they can have some rivalry there, again, as far as the oil business is concerned because around the Caspian Sea there are very rich oil deposits in there. And the Americans, for instance, show preparations, are very active in there. I guess we can, again, cooperate in there in trying to facilitate the world on these oil fields, but without trying to get on our side, this or the other state against the other one.

So, I would say again, these two zones, they are rather delicate. They are rather delicate because of the conflicts in there because of, again, the rivalry about oil. But I think that if we have a sort of a non-geopolitical attitude toward these regions, but try to cooperate commercially, try to cooperate in some reconciliation work toward the existing conflicts. That would be good. Thank you.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Thank you. Well, it looks – I just want to check, I think we pretty much have to wrap it up. Do we have last thing by our resident expert, Sergey Rogov?

DR. ROGOV: As far as the chess-game concern, of course you know about the Shanghai organization for cooperation made in Central Asia. But I want to remind you about four months ago, something totally unprecedented happened, and I don't think it was broadly reported in this country: The Russian state Duma ratified the SOFA.

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, who is also a participant of this conference, except that he is not a former ambassador; he is an active ambassador in South Korea, but he was the ambassador in Russia and then before that he was the U.S. ambassador to NATO. Who could believe that Russia would ratify the status of forces agreement with NATO, which legally permits the movement of NATO personnel and cargo through the Russian territory, since in Afghanistan we have the common enemy, Taliban and al Qaeda, that's the enemy of Russia, America, NATO, China, India.

And this was a unique opportunity for us to upgrade our calculation dealing with a common threat. But remarkably, four months passed. NATO didn't respond, the United States didn't respond, as if you guys are not interested in this kind of cooperation. I'm not trying to blame you; I'm just saying that who could imagine that Russia would ratify the status of forces agreement. We did it, and then what, and then nothing happened.

(Laughter.)

MS. DOUGHERTY: Well, maybe on that interesting note, we will end and continue private discussions after this. But I wanted to thank everybody here, the former ambassadors, for a really very interesting, and to me inspiring, talk because you know, as we look at the relationship – and working in the media I hear this all the time – as we began with the idea of the Cold War, you can see the desire by these gentlemen, who have vast experience, to move forward and to forget about that and work on a better relationship in the future. So I find it very inspiring; I hope you did too. Thanks.

(Applause.)

(END)