Naxal Insurgency in India
Maoist insurgency is an **ongoing conflict between Maoist groups**, known as Naxalites and **the Indian government**.

- Has a **long history of 42 years**.
- "**The single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by India**" - Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh called the Naxalites (2006)
Naxal insurgency unique

- Defying Indian state for longest period except J&K
- Not emotively driven or motivated like J&K or even Naga & Sikh movements
- Yet managed to outlive “neutralizing strategy” of many state police/s & giving “real” fight to central forces under IAP
- Strain of insurgency represents “revolutionary stream” of Indian Maoist/Marxist who do not believe in “parliamentary democracy”
- Profess & practice path of armed struggle as the only way of meeting aspirations of “teaming millions” and towards requisite systemic change
Maoist Philosophy

- “Power flows through the barrel of the gun”
- No belief in parliamentary democracy.
- Want to usher the New Democratic Revolution (NDR).
- To capture political power by overthrowing the democratically established Govt. through protracted mass armed struggle.
- To build up bases in rural and remote areas which will eventually be transformed into guerilla zones and later into liberated areas.
- To expand the liberated areas in order to encircle urban areas to facilitate seizing of power.
The term Naxalites comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, where a section of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) led by Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Ram Prabhav Singh and Jangal Santhal, J P Inspector initiated a violent uprising in 1967. On May 18, 1967, the Siliguri Kishan Sabha, of which Jangal was the president, declared their readiness to adopt armed struggle to redistribute land to the landless
In 1969, the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries gave birth to the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI(ML)).
During the 1970s, the movement was fragmented into disputing factions. By 1980, it was estimated that around 30 Naxalite groups were active, with a combined membership of 30,000. On April 22, 1980, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War, commonly called as People's War Group (PWG) founded by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah.
Orissa State
Chhattisgarh State (formerly in Madhya Pradesh)
Andhra Pradesh (Srikakulam Dist.)

West Bengal State

1980 - 1995
ORGANIZATION and MILITARIZATION

- Like any communist party politburo and central committee, various state committees or special zonal committees state/zonal committees straddle existing state boundaries. Eg: the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee has seven divisions under it, which include Bastar in Chhattisgarh and Gadchiroli in Maharashtra.

- Below this: regional, divisional, or district committees, area committees, and so on down to local cells in villages or factories.

- Mass organizations that have units in villages sanghams or collectives—like the women’s organization, the seed-sowing cooperatives, the village defense committee are supervised by a visiting squad or dalam comprising some 10 to 15 people, which carries arms but is not primarily involved in military action.

- A separate military wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, which is assisted by people’s militias (made up of village defense committees) for specific actions.

- Estimates suggest 7,300 weapons for 10,500 armed cadres nationwide, a 25,000-strong people’s militia, and 50,000 members in village-level units.

- They also have ‘AK-series assault rifles, 9mm carbines, 7.62mm SLRs, grenade launchers, mines, improvised explosive devices and mortars’, and are manufacturing their own weapons.

- Occasional weapons from China or Sri Lanka, most of this weaponry is looted from the police themselves or from raids on government armories.
Formation of the CPI (Maoist)

CPI (ML) PWG (1980)

CPI (ML) PU (1976)
Bihar

MCC (1969)
Bihar, Jharkand, WB, Orissa

RCCI (M) Punjab

CPI (ML) PW (1998)
AP, Orissa, Chattisgarh, MP, Maharashtra

MCCI (Jan 2003)
Bihar, Jharkand

RCCI (MLM) (Jan 2003) Punjab

CPI (ML) 2nd CC (1972)
Bihar

CPI (Maoist)
(Sept. 21st 2004)
Phases of Revolution

Positional War

Mobile War

Guerilla War

Preparatory Stage (Social investigation)

Recruitment

Sympathizers

Perspective Stage

Liberated Stage

Base Stage

Guerilla Stage
City Town

Infiltration into Army and security forces

LIBERATED
• No Chinese Wall demarcating three warfare/s in the period of transition.

• In the preliminary phase of mobile war, the “guerilla” nature will be somewhat more, and in the mobile war, which goes on with increased concentration of troops, the primary features of positional warfare appear.
Guerilla warfare

- Units at lower level operate *independently*.
- Supply system is totally *decentralized*.
- All units are *self-reliant*.
- Mainly depend on people and on the enemy.
- *People support* is lifeline of guerilla war.
- Do not go in for protracted battles.
- Quick operational decisions are taken.
- Take enemy by *surprise*.
- Know the terrain.
- Greater mobility and speed.
- Command on the situation/decisive.
Mobile warfare

- Regular army concentrating its forces in a vast area
- With fluid battle-fronts and deployments
- Often changing from one place to another
- Mobility of attacking the enemy at relatively vulnerable spots
- Withdrawing quickly
- Potential for changing tactics when conditions change.
- Fight when you can win. Move away when you cannot.
- Mobile warfare will not aim at retaining or capturing. Instead, it aims at wiping out enemy groups.
- Troops will be concentrated in large numbers.
- Higher political consciousness, greater discipline and military training (in guerilla war it will be relatively lower).
Positional Warfare

• Positional warfare is the final stage and is nothing but a conventional war waged face to face with the enemy, from fixed positions either to capture or to retain territory/ institutions.
## Deaths related to Maoist violence during last two phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Security forces</th>
<th>Insurgents</th>
<th>Total per period</th>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1,169</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>602</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>230</td>
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<td>2,285</td>
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</table>
Civilians | 524 | 521 | 460 | 399 | 586 | 713 | 275 | 89
Security forces | 153 | 157 | 236 | 221 | 317 | 285 | 128 | 77
Insurgents | 225 | 274 | 141 | 214 | 217 | 171 | 199 | 64
Total per period | 902 | 952 | 837 | 834 | 1120 | 1169 | 602 | 230
Three Facets of Maoists

“Three Magic Weapons” to achieve New Democratic Revolution, according to Mao:

**Party** - A strong structured underground organization with Politburo, Central Committee, Regional Bureaus, State Committees, etc.

**Military (Army)** -- PGA / PLGA – executive arm with CMC at the apex.

**United Front** -- Conglomeration of various front organizations
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Higher Committees (3)

- Standing Committee
  - 3 Members

- Politburo
  - 7 Members

- Central Military Commission
  - 6 Members

Sub Committees (5)

- SCOPE
  - 2 Members

- SUCOMO
  - 2 Members

- CMSC
  - 2 Members

- USCO
  - 4 Members

- International Dept
  - 2 members
Prevailing perspectives: Nature of conflict

1) Security: conservative
   - anti establishment, democracy, development, bereft of ideology
   - debate regarding the nature of the conflict whether a socio-eco problem
   - as a law and order issue
   - a nation-destroying process

2) Establishment: liberal
   - socio-economic problem, development paradigm

3) Revolutionary: radical
   - product of structural violence
   - the deprived & discriminated “forced” into armed struggle
   - long-term goal of state capture - party strategy
   - in practice - “immediate” concrete economic & social issues
   - land distribution, drought relief, farmers debts or caste atrocities
   - more recently posited as the bulwark against mining
Cause, context & co-relation

• Poverty rather than a direct cause, its context is important

• Unemployment & rising youth population
  Sheer demand & supply mechanism

• Industrialization without rehabilitation & placement policies

• Mal-governance rather than lack of it
Strategy & Tactics

• The strategic intent of LWE:
  – Instigate revolution to overthrow “state” through violence
    a protracted people’s war
  – expected to achieve by 1975 but raised flag post to 2016
    (internal documents)

• What is their maximum (Strategy) and minimum (Tactics) capability?
  – The former is a “failed offensive” while their minimum
    capability is Uravkonda, Jehanabad, Kolapur and Nayagarh etc.

• To keep raising the bar of minimum capacity
Political Strategy

- To join and exploit any controversial issue in order to destabilize/expose Govt.

- Opportunistic intervention in electoral politics against the ruling party

- To deter investment and development in some interior and other areas which are also rich in vital resources.

- Land to the tiller, providing employment, poverty alleviation & now mining rights etc.
Opportunistic vocal and visual support to fundamentalist Muslim front organizations.

Discouraging Police from discharging their legitimate duties by aggressive militant demonstrations, dharnas, threats, attacks, etc.

Liaison with international front organizations on issues of “human rights”
Strategy & Tactics

• The greatest protection to the party is strong mass base.

• Turn Guerrilla War - *Mobile War* - Positional war.

• Turn PLGA into PLA.

• Mobilise masses for militant struggles against fascist repression.

• Build urban movement/s which act as recruiting ground.

• All formations adopt centralized and decentralized techniques
... strategy & tactics

• Injecting party elements into police forces, CPFs and Army.

• Conducting survey in bordering areas to build internal corridors.

• Organising inter-state military actions for mass attacks involving militia in large numbers.

• Spreading party activities to new areas by intensifying counter offensive actions.

• Strengthening party corridor between DK, AOB and BJ.
Basic military tactics

- When the enemy advances, **withdraw**
- When he camps, **harass**
- When he tires, **strike**
- When he retreats, **pursue**
- Make noise in the east & attack in the west

“State armories are our armories”

- Mao
1. Mass organisations to build and strengthen United Front.

2. All mass organisations are issue-based.

3. To prepare masses towards armed struggle.

4. SUCOMO formed to coordinate and guide the AIMOs.

5. Mass work, source for recruitment and support to the party, PLGA and the UF.

6. Without mobilising masses for war - directly or indirectly- party cannot defeat the State & enemy offensive only through PLGA.
All India Mass Organisations (AIMOs)

1. All India League for Revolutionary Culture (AILRC)
2. Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF)
3. People’s Democratic Front of India (PDFI)
4. Indian Association of People’s Lawyers (IAPL)
5. All India Revolutionary Students Federation (AIRSF)
6. All India Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (AIKMS)
7. Committee Against Violence on Women (CAVOW)
8. United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS)
9. Forum Against Imperialist Globalisation (FAIG)
CPI-Maoist - International Links

Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) was formed in 1984 to unify all the communist parties in the World.

During the year 1989-90 the CPI (ML) PWG was trained by *ex-LTTE* activists of Sri Lanka in landmine technology.

Ever since the formation of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), it has links with Indian left wing extremist groups.

In July 1995, *CPI-ML PW and CPN* (Maoist) issued a joint press release and resolved to work together.

Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) has been formed in June 2001.

CCOMPOSA consists of 10 Maoists parties of South Asia.
Types of attacks/raids

- Abductions
- Raids on Police Stations
- Ambushes using weapons/landmines
- Raids on explosive magazines
- Raids on police camps/Hqrs
- Attacks on Railways
- Attacks on CPFs
- Attacks on Banks
- Attacks on Jails
- Ambushes on escort parties
Attack on Police Stations

Location of attack
- Forest
  - Semi - Forest
  - Plain

Method of attack
- Raid
  - Directional Mines
  - Rocket Launchers

Type of attack
- Single
- Multiple
Maoist strategy on attack on PSs in future

- More attacks on police stations in plain areas
- Planning company level formations to continuously attack police establishments
- They may attack PSs during day time
- They may attack PSs on main roads and High Ways
- Use of JCBs/Proclainers to carry explosives and blow up the targeted building
- Use of pole by 4 to 5 members to jump/vault over fencing/compound wall with CQB weapons
- Use of wire cutters to cut fencing
- Use of Cordex with IEDs to destroy mesh fencing
**R & D of Maoists**

- Their R & D – is continuous
- Seen in improvements they achieved in their own rocket launcher technology
- Also visible in their manufacture field – pressure activated mines and manufacturing units in Bhopal and Rourkela
- They have improvised VHF sets into mine-triggering devices
- They are planting booby traps which go off while removing obstacles/mines
- They have plans to use mobile bunkers and JCBs during attack on PSs
VHF/UHF Sets Available with CPI (Maoist)
(For intercepting Police Communications and for their internal communications)
Rocket launchers seized
Seizures
Seizures ...
MPV blasted in Chattisgarh
CPI (Maoist) stand on Indian Army

PLGA is adopting the military formations of Indian Army

2003, the interview of CMC chief of CPI (Maoist) - indicates that PLGA forces would attack Indian Army by strengthening and involving party forces from smaller attacks to larger attacks

2005, CC document of CPI (Maoist) - plans to form one political intelligence wing at National level and People’s Security Service (PSS) to study political, economic & social situation of the State and Central Govts and counter methods and policies of Army and Police forces to suppress the Maoist movement in the country

Interrogation Reports of Maoist leaders - Maoist Guerillas are taking help from ex-Army personnel on military skills (handling of various weapons, lobbing of grenades and repairs) in Chattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal
Companies & Platoons

- Each company is formed with 70 - 90 members
- There are 3 platoons in each company
- Each Platoon is formed with 25 - 30 members
- There are three sections in each Platoon
- Each platoon has an Order Group
- Two LOSs and one LGS in each division are clubbed and formed as Platoon
Guerrilla Companies

About 9 Companies were formed by CPI (Maoist) in DK. 10 Divisions had 9 companies in DK.

Some more companies have formed in other areas, for example

- One Company with 80 members is functioning in Jharkhand from 2004.

- One Company is under formation in the border of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
Military Platoons

- About 55 Military platoons (25 – 30 members) are functioning all over the country.

  - 5 Platoons and 1 Militia PL in AOBSZC
  - 1 Platoon in NTSZC
  - 13 Platoons and 15 Militia PLs in DKSZC
  - 16 Platoons in Bihar – Jharkhand SAC
  - 2 Platoons in 3U SAC
  - 1 Platoon in West Bengal SC
Syllabus for military camps

- Physical training
- IA drill
- UAC
- Arms drill
- Obstacle crossings
- Weapons training
- Maintenance of weapons
- Arms cleaning
- Firing practice
Continued..

- First Aid and medicines
- Political classes
- Strategies and tactics
- Mine ambushes
- Pressure mines
- Booby traps
- Rocket launchers
- Grenade lobbing /throwing
- Precautions in handling walkie-talkie sets
- Roll calls
Guidelines for military training for Militia

• Not more than 30 minutes for PT.

• Teach new tactics, after practicing in the ground everyday.

• Give primary education by concentrating on military and political classes.

• Give importance to practical outlook and increase confidence among the students.

• Keep practical experience before the students in every issue by correcting lapses.

• Political subjects should be planned by the DC.
• Plan military camp for 2 to 5 days depending on enemy movements and convenient dates of “students.”

• Changes made according to previous participations /students - their feedback on subjects.

• Conduct camp by depending on students, local people and local resources.

• Training should be given on improvised explosives according to availability.

• Supervision and counter check should be made by instructors to avoid accidents by educating the students.

• Confidence should be given in counter tactics by educating students in using branded weapons.

Continued..
10 Districts, 100 Police Stations affected to different degrees.

Approx 200 cadres in the two regional committee areas of AP viz., NTSZC and AOBSZC.

Possess about 250 weapons, including LMGs, INSAS, two inch mortars, etc.
Extortion: Approx. Rs.25-30 crores per annum - sources (civil, beedi leaf, liquor contractors, industrial houses, businessmen, landlords, realtors).

Money spent for procuring weaponry, explosives, technological gadgets, dens, anti-national activities and Mass/frontal organisations etc.

Expenditure on conferences in foreign countries.
Latest Trends

Technical:

• Using highly sophisticated VHF sets which are not only transceivers, but also scanners, with scrambler facility.

• Recent interrogations reveal their plans to set up FM Radio Stations and their own communication base.

• Sophisticated communication equipments and laptops, data cards, PDA

• Extensive use of internet for transmission of encrypted data like steganography, PGP

• Use of satellite phones, mobile phones
Latest Trends . . . .

Tactical

They have studied efficacy of the Mine Protected Vehicles and enlisted its shortcomings in *JUNG*.

*Use of crude rockets, pressure activated mines, wireless activated mines, booby traps etc. is on the increase*

More importance to military than organizational aspects – induction of more “uneducated cadres”.

Indulging in mass attacks, focusing on multiple targets

Targeting Central govt. properties - vital installations.

**Recruitment of more women into the cadre**

**70% of squad members are uneducated/unemployed between 15-21 including women**
Latest Trends . . . .

Other

Less aggressive and vocal front organizations.

Infiltration into media, trade unions, NGOs etc.

Indulging in huge extortions from businessmen, industrialists, contractors of major developmental works, realtors.

Tapping protection money. Police intercepted money flow on several occasions and made recoveries.
ANDHRA PRADESH Initiative

- Police
- Mass Contacts
- Development
Basic Principles followed by AP Police

Patrol and comb remote and interior areas aggressively.

Mapping of water resources, shelters, caves, RV points, camp sites etc.

Continuous search for explosives and arms dumps.

“Never travel” on beaten tracks/forest roads.

NO HARRASSMENT OF CASUAL AND FORCED SYMPATHISERS
Basic Principles followed by AP Police
Contd...

Police keep their *promises*

Good *informant* network

Maintain touch with *surrendered cadres* and *families of UG cadres* and render help

Selectively target Maoist *leadership*

All out efforts to locate "*prominent*" killers

Always follow *NHRC guidelines*
Modernization

Firearms - AK-47, SLRs, Glock pistols, Insas Rifles, MP-5 etc.

GPS, BP jackets, latest communication equipment procured

Generators, motorcycles, binoculars, night-vision devices provided

Bullet proof vehicles provided

Mine protected vehicles procured

PS defense improved with chain link fencing/ compound wall, sentry posts etc.

New PS buildings re-designed

Advance Tactical Training Centre established on the outskirts of Hyderabad

Cellular phones, satellite telephones purchased
PS Security

Separate funds for PS defense structures

Roof-top sentries introduced

Motor cycles, BP jackets, binoculars, High band VHF sets supplied to PSs

Construction of PSs & quarters in the same premises

Augmentation & rationalization of PS strength

Redeployment of APSP by taking into consideration vulnerability of PSs

Regular review of PS security by OSD etc.
PS Security Contd...

- Sentry posts – Permanent, Bullet proof and sand bagged
- Lighting (Invertors/ Generators)
- Stand-to drill
- Weapons & weapon training
- Intelligence sharing
- Communication
- Precautions against abduction
- Defense and Contingency Plan
- Monitoring
- Keeping country/stray dogs
- Rationalization of policeman : weapon ratio in PSs
Visits by special parties to all inaccessible and remote areas in the state and bordering areas.

Established joint control room with Chattisgarh and Maharashtra for round the clock exchange of extremist intelligence.

Communication compatibility between border police stations in affected districts.

Conducted 23 operations on Orissa border which resulted in 5 exchanges of fire and death of 7 extremists.

Conducted 11 operations on Chattisgarh border resulting in 4 exchanges of fire and death of 36 extremists, recovery of 2 - AK 47 Rifles, 2 - SLRs, 4 - .303 rifles, 3 - 12 bore, 4 SBBLs, 1 DBBL, etc.
Other Initiatives

- Creation of 5190 posts of *Home Guards* to be recruited from extremist-affected areas.
- Creation of a *Special APSP Battalion (15th)* to recruit men only from tribal areas of Andhra Pradesh, by giving certain exemptions.
- Sanction of funds for *fortification* of Police Stations and for procuring of special equipment.
- Fully utilizing the GOI scheme of *SPOs* for collection of intelligence and also for operations in extremist areas, without exposing them.

- Fully utilizing MOP and SRE support MHA
- Augmenting strength of Special Protection Force
Motivation (Police)

DGP empowered to give *accelerated promotions*

Advance increments and cash rewards

*Mukhya Manthri Shourya Pathakam* and other State Pathakams/ Gallantry medals

Insurance scheme

Reward presentation by DGP

*ANS allowance @ 15% of Basic Pay* to District Special Parties

*Special Allowance @ 50-60% of Basic + DA* to Grey Hounds and SIB personnel

Strong support for police action in media by DGP and SsP
Police families - Rehabilitation

Last pay drawn by the deceased to be paid to spouse till date of superannuation of the deceased officer – latest orders entail applicability of successive PRCs also

Employment to next of kin (based on the rank of the deceased)

Free education to children up to Intermediate level

HRA on last pay drawn
Ex gratia of Rs. 9 lakhs upto SI rank and Rs 12 lakhs for Inspectors and above

Rs 3.60 lakhs for permanent incapacitation

Rs 2.40 lakhs for grievous hurt

Medical facilities on par with serving employees

Assignment of house-site

75% concession in second class train fares to widows of the deceased Policemen
**Victim Reassurance (Civilians)**

Ex gratia of Rs.15 lakhs to next of kin of MsP, MsLA and chairpersons of ZP

Ex gratia of Rs.10 lakhs to next of kin of Mandal Presidents, ZPTC members, Chairpersons of DCC Banks etc.

Ex gratia of Rs 7.50 lakhs to next of kin of Sarpanches, MPTC members, Chairpersons of PACS etc.

5 lakhs for others

Compensation of Rs.3 lakhs for permanent incapacitation
Compensation of Rs. 1 lakh for serious injury

Compensation for property damaged - actual amount of damages assessed by the District Level Committee

Free medical treatment

*Employment* to son, daughter or spouse of any person killed in extremist violence
Surrender Policy

- Comprehensive surrender policy introduced in 1993
- Surrenders is one of the most important tools to weaken extremists
- Parents, relatives and elders are counseled to get their wards to surrender
- Appeals are made through the media to surrender
- Immediate relief of Rs. 5000/- is sanctioned soon after surrender to meet immediate requirements
- Reward amount on them is given to them
- Rehabilitation package
- Since 1993, of the 7775 extremists surrendered, 2545 were rehabilitated and assets worth Rs.19 crores were distributed
Rehabilitation Policy for Extremists

Financial assistance under Rehabilitation Scheme is provided subject to the maximum of Rs.4 lakhs under self employment scheme.

Additional financial assistance is provided to those who surrender with weapon.

House site allotted to those who do not own a house.

$1\frac{1}{2}$ acre land is provided with loan facility to those who are interested in cultivation.

Allowed to pursue further studies.

Criminal cases pending against them are reviewed, some withdrawn.

No police harassment.
Mass Contact Programs by Police

- Village Adoption
- Medical Camps, Sports Camps
- Agnatham – Swetcha (Counseling for Surrenders)
- Mythri Sadassus (Friendship meetings)
- Grama Sabhas (Village meets)
- Palle Talli Pilustundi (‘Mother Village Beckons’)
- Kalisi Naduddam (‘Let us Progress Together’)
- ‘Girijana Mahasabhas’ (Tribal Conventions)
- Palle Dariki – Talli Vodiki (‘to village – to mother’s lap’)
- Melukolupu (The awakening)
Propaganda

• Counter Propaganda
• Countering the claims/boastful proclamations
  ✓ Red Corridor from *Pashupathi to Tirupathi*
  ✓ Very sophisticated rockets
• At any cost *never accept* ‘intelligence failure’
• Never give credence to Maoist acts of commission or omission, technological sophistication and other boastful propaganda.
Remote & Interior Area Development (RIAD) programmes

Youth Employment Scheme (YES)

Dovetail Central Schemes for employment generation and infrastructure development in remote areas (PMGSY)

Land distribution on mass scale.
Infrastructure Development

RSVY/BDI, Food for Work program

Minor irrigation schemes and drought schemes

Emphasis on providing roads, communication and power

Repairs to school buildings and hospitals taken up

Allocated funds to MsLA for Local Area Development

Taken up irrigation and civil works in a big way with an estimated cost of Rs. 45,000 crores
Challenges

Analyses of seized documents and computers

Locate and neutralize sources of weapon supply

Locate and neutralize accumulated extorted money/funds

Check and neutralize supply of explosives and technical equipments

Civil Liberties Groups
Challenges  Contd...

- PIL asking registration of murder cases for every encounter death
- Social problems
- Govt. machinery – PDS and rest of developmental machinery
- maintenance of SC/ST hostels
- Counter publicity and propaganda
- Right to Information Act
Anodyne vs antidote?

• Combination of military, political and social actions under single & strong control / authority.

• Aim of war to gain support and win over population versus territory

• Order enforcement be done progressively by removing armed opponents & then seducing support of population

• Eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with local populace.

• Done piece by piece (not piecemeal) using “pacified territory” as basis of operation to retrieve other trouble zones/area.
• Contrary to popular perception naxal insurgency is not just guerrilla warfare but tackling revolutionary politics, which accounts for at least 50 % of the strategy
• revolutionary politics is a combination of information warfare & political warfare more than mere armed engagement or fighting
• Its antidote is & can only be effective COIN ops
• Use of propaganda, red herring, co-option, & buy-out.. over & above combat operations & area dominance / ground clearance.
• COIN- intel ops...?
• Presently, the MO of SFs: to locate insurgents, isolate them from local population and eliminate them.
• No plan towards sustained isolation not merely from local populace but also from source of finance & communications
• Very complex & deft plan but very difficult to operate on ground. visa vis the
• Protracted People’s War?
Sendero Luminoso  Shining Path

Country: Peru
Size: 4,200 (as of 2012)
Active: 1980-Present
Goal: "To combat and resist the state through people's war"
AOP: Formerly the Upper Huallaga Valley

Zapatista Army of National Liberation

Country: Mexico
Size: 3,000 active participants and militia and tens of thousands of civilian supporters
Active: 1994-Present
Goal: "To combat and resist the state through people's war"
AOP: Chiapas, Mexico
Unresolved issues

• Technology based ops
  NTRO, UAVs, GPS
• SF armed engagement sans precision
• Synergy & co-ordination gap
• Holistic impact of “engagement” on society & communities
• Social costs – on the govt. & the human lives
• Economics of the engagement
• Address mal governance
  ???