PERCEPTION and Misperception in American and Chinese Views of the Other

Alastair Iain Johnston and Mingming Shen, editors
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# CONTENTS

CONTRIBUTORS ............................................................................................................. v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................... vii

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES .................................................................................. ix

PREFACE ......................................................................................................................... xi

SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 3

CHAPTER 1
CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICANS AND THEMSELVES:
IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP? ....................................................................................... 9
CHAPTER 2
A WORLD LEADER-TO-BE? POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S GLOBAL ROLE ................................................................. 23

CHAPTER 3
WHOM DO WE TRUST? TESTING FOR SOCIALIZATION EFFECTS IN CHINESE SURVEYS .......................................................... 41

CHAPTER 4
THE TEA PARTY AND CHINA POLICY ........................................................................................................................................ 63

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................................................ 77

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE ......................................................... 88
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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

CHAPTER 1
Table 1: The Chinese Think Highly of Themselves But Not of Americans .........................12
Table 2: The Good About the Americans Is Not Associated With the Bad .....................14
Table 3: The Good About the Chinese Is Not Associated With the Bad About Americans ....17

CHAPTER 2
Table 1: Should China Be a World Leader? ...............................................................................27
Figure 1: Chinese Attitudes Toward China’s Rise .................................................................28
Table 2: Measurement of Independent Variables ......................................................................32
Table 3: Ordered Logistic (Multiple-Imputation Estimates)  
Models of Chinese Attitudes Toward China’s Rise ...............................................................33

CHAPTER 3
Figure 1: Urban Chinese Mistrust Most Countries, But Some Much More Than Others ..........44
Figure 2: Americans Trust Some Countries and Distrust Others ...........................................45
Figure 3: Demographic Predictors of the Percent of International News Consumption From Old and New Media .................................................................47
Table 1: Regressions of Trust and Threat Variables .................................................................53
Figure 4: Interest in International Affairs and Education Negate Each Other ......................54
Figure 5: Greater Interest in Foreign Affairs Was Associated with a Greater Perception of Threat from the United States—But Only Among Those Who Consumed More International News...

Figure 6: Greater News Consumption Is Associated With Greater Trust in the United States—But Only Among Those Less Interested in Foreign Affairs.

CHAPTER 4

Figure 1: Trust in China

Figure 2: China as an Enemy

Figure 3: Assessment of Obama's China Policy

Figure 4: Using U.S. Force to Defend Taiwan

Figure 5: Hierarchy of China Policy Concerns

Table 1: Beliefs About Self and Other (tetrachoric correlations)

Table 2: Odds Ratios for Tea Party China Policy Positions
PREFACE

Michael D. Swaine and Luo Yuan

THIS REPORT PRESENTS in-depth analyses by eight U.S. and Chinese scholars of elite and public opinion survey data on a wide range of security-related perceptions. The data were gathered through surveys conducted in the United States and China in mid-2012 as part of a collaborative Sino-American project named the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project. That original undertaking, launched in 2011, constituted a unique effort between leading research institutions in Washington and Beijing. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association in Beijing coordinated the project, in collaboration with the Pew Research Center, the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

The project involved many stages, each requiring extensive Sino-American consultation and agreement, including the development of a joint set of comparable and unique elite and public survey questionnaires; the coordination of survey methodologies and elite and public sampling groups; the holding of daylong workshops in Washington and Beijing composed of representatives of the five elite groups surveyed (government, scholars, business, military, and news media) to discuss the results of the surveys and their possible policy implications; and the drafting of a report to present the project findings. That document, “U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications,” was published in 2013. Topline results of the U.S. and Chinese surveys are also contained in separate reports produced by the Pew Research Center and the Research Center for Contemporary China.1
This fourth report, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston of the Government Department at Harvard University and Mingming Shen of the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, represents a key component of the overall effort, as it situates the survey results in the context of the broader scholarly literature on public and elite opinion in the United States and China.

In so doing, it provides more nuanced and far-reaching insights into the potential effects of such attitudes on each side’s foreign policy and on the bilateral relationship. Although three years have passed between the fielding of the surveys and the more detailed analyses of the survey data presented here, these scholars’ studies focus on some of the deeper structures of attitudes that may be slower to change. Barring extraordinary changes or events in each country or in Sino-U.S. relations, many underlying images and beliefs that each nation holds toward itself and the other in the security realm are likely to persist in at least the short to medium term.

The initial findings and analyses contained in the four reports of the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project establish a baseline set of security-related views that can provide a standard for measuring changes in elite and public opinion in each country over time. In fact, we hope to build upon this initial set of data and analyses to develop a multiyear effort, involving annual or biannual surveys to chart changes in attitudes, as well as “rapid reaction” polls designed to measure the impact of specific events or incidents on elite and public views in both countries.

We are confident that this endeavor has the potential to become an indispensable source of views and analysis on the Sino-American security relationship. In turn, the more accurate understanding of both elite and public attitudes and beliefs fostered by this report will be critical to the establishment of a more stable Asia-Pacific and global environment.

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**SUMMARY**

**THE UNDERLYING BELIEFS** that people in the United States and China hold toward each other in the security realm are likely to influence, directly or indirectly, each side’s foreign policy with regard to the bilateral relationship. In-depth analyses of elite and public opinion survey data from the United States and China on a wide range of security issues provide nuanced and far-reaching insights into the potential effects of these attitudes on the U.S.-China relationship.

**KEY FINDINGS**

- There are substantial gaps in American and Chinese perceptions of the basic traits and characteristics that each side exhibits. However, at the individual level, strong in-group exceptionalism does not necessarily predict out-group denigration.

- A considerable part of the Chinese population appears to believe that China should not take on a world leadership role, or if it does, it should jointly lead the world with the United States. These attitudes are associated both with older respondents and with those in their thirties and early forties.

- In general, mistrust of the external world on the Chinese side stems from educational socialization and media messaging.
• Tea Party supporters in the United States demonstrate very low levels of trust toward China and, as a result, advocate much tougher economic and military policies. However, the Tea Party is less interested in interfering in the internal affairs of China than other elements of the population.

**ANALYZING THE RESULTS**

• Credible reassurance signals from the United States may be well received if aimed at individuals in the Chinese government, even if said individuals espouse a strong belief in Chinese exceptionalism.

• The younger cohort of Chinese citizens has yet to influence Chinese politics and policy, and there may be some basis for expecting that this group could be more accepting of a continued, dominant U.S. role in international politics.

• Efforts to affect Chinese beliefs about the United States may be limited by the powerful socializing effects of the Chinese government–controlled education and propaganda systems.

• If the U.S. Congress and the next president are beholden to the Tea Party for electoral success, then there might be more conflict in the security and economic realms but somewhat less support for the United States’ cost-imposing policies on China’s internal affairs.
INTRODUCTION

Alastair Iain Johnston and Mingming Shen

THE JOINT STUDY of U.S.-Chinese perceptions of each other coordinated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association in 2012, while not the first such undertaking, had a number of unique features in terms of its questions and purposes. It explored important questions about identity (beliefs about the collective traits of the self and the other), international status, support for current foreign policies, and threat perceptions. It included comparisons with other countries for some of these questions, along with very detailed data on the socioeconomic, demographic, and political characteristics of respondents.

Together, the answers provided a more nuanced picture of how each side viewed the other than could be gleaned from general questions about “favorable versus unfavorable” views or “positive versus negative” influence. As for the purpose, the well-connected Washington- and Beijing-based research institutions that coordinated the project, in collaboration with the Pew Research Center, the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, agreed that decisionmakers (and publics) in both countries needed accurate and timely information on what publics and elites considered the most pressing bilateral issues, and on how each side understands—or misunderstands, as the case may be—the intentions and characteristics of the other.
Often what happens with this kind of survey is that topline results are published, raw percentage distributions of responses are highlighted, and perhaps some in the media pick up on a couple of main takeaways, but the data remain largely untapped or unprocessed. When this happens, any conclusions that are more nuanced than reported in the topline results are left unexplored. More precise and targeted policy implications may even be left undeveloped. With these concerns in mind, and with the support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, we invited a group of specialists in American and Chinese public opinion studies to examine the 2012 data from the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey more deeply. We did not give them any particular marching orders. We simply asked them to develop a research question that interested them, and then use the data to answer the question. The only requirement was that they think of the policy implications of their findings.

Not surprisingly, the conclusions from these papers are complex.

Brian C. Rathbun’s chapter shows that there are some pretty large gaps in Chinese perceptions of the basic traits and characteristics that they and Americans exhibit. That is, the differences in perceptions of the self and the other are quite substantial. In the aggregate, Chinese respondents believe Chinese people demonstrate a lot of positive traits while Americans demonstrate negative ones. But Rathbun also shows—somewhat optimistically—that at the individual level, strong in-group exceptionalism does not necessarily predict out-group denigration. Chinese exceptionalists are not predisposed to denigrating Americans. In other words, Chinese patriots are not predisposed to being Chinese nationalists as well. The good news is that Chinese patriots are less likely than Chinese nationalists to discount reassurance signals. So credible reassurance signals from the United States may not be falling on infertile ground if aimed at these types.

In this regard, Rathbun provides a service by distinguishing between patriotism and nationalism in the Chinese context. Much of the policy, pundit, and even academic accounts of Chinese views of the outside world focus on nationalism and on the constraints this imposes on Chinese leaders’ foreign policy options. The distinction between patriotism and nationalism is one that the American policy discourse on China can probably intuitively understand, since it is a distinction Americans often make about U.S. opinion. In this regard, Rathbun’s findings introduce a subtlety about Chinese opinion that is lacking in much of the public discourse in the United States about “rising Chinese nationalism.”

Many Americans bridle at the proposition or possibility that U.S. hegemony is waning and that at some point China may surpass the United States as the sole superpower, or at least in setting the agenda in various world orders (trade, security, humanitarian intervention, to name just a few). Yet, according to the chapter by Zheng Su, Tianguang Meng, Mingming Shen, and Jie Yan, a substantial part of the Chinese population appears to believe that China should not take on a world leadership role (25 percent) or that if it does,
it should lead the world jointly with the United States (42 percent). Of course, those who resist the idea of a G2—not just Americans, but also other actors in the Asia-Pacific—may be less than enthusiastic over these findings.

At the same time, these attitudes constitute a somewhat more moderate view of how global orders should be constructed and are not necessarily associated with revisionist challenges to the norms, values, and institutions that the United States prefers to promote. Chinese support for no leading role or a joint leading role is associated with higher levels of education. The authors suspect that this is because education is related to more nuanced understandings of world politics. Such views are also associated with older respondents and with those in their thirties and early forties. The older generation and its preference for Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to “lie low” in international relations will pass from the scene. The younger cohort, however, has yet to have its direct influence through leadership of Chinese politics and policy. So perhaps there is some basis for optimism (for Americans at least) that this future cohort may be more accepting of a continued dominant U.S. role in international politics.

Peter Gries and Matthew Sanders are perhaps less optimistic about the ability to affect popular views of the United States in China. They suggest in their chapter that whatever efforts the United States may employ to try to influence Chinese beliefs about the United States—the essence of public diplomacy—may well run into the powerful socializing effects of the Chinese government–controlled education and propaganda systems. The fact that mutual trust in U.S.-Chinese relations is low is not news, of course. But this chapter shows mistrust to be deeply rooted.

On the Chinese side this is due to its basis in educational socialization and media messaging. On the U.S. side it is due to perceived ideological differences (trust toward other liberal democracies is higher). The chapter’s complex findings do not lead to facile policy recommendations. For instance, higher education among the Chinese population is related to more trust in the United States, but only for those people who are less well informed about the outside world. But the chapter does strongly suggest that, in general, a trusting view of the external world is not something that comes out of China’s education system. Many Chinese do not appear to be generalized trusters in the sense that they appear not to hold strong beliefs in the inherent trustworthiness of others. Is it the content of education—a vision of China struggling against foreign imperialism, a Marxist-Leninist environment of political conflict, a realpolitik worldview? All of the above? And which element is more pervasive? The answer may have a bearing on what has to change in China’s education systems for there to be an improvement in perceptions of the United States.

In contrast with the other authors, Alastair Iain Johnston looks at only the U.S. data, in particular at supporters of the Tea Party movement, in his chapter. There is little systematic research on Tea Party supporters’ views of foreign policy, and none on their views of
China and U.S. policy toward China. Not surprisingly, given the worldview of Tea Party supporters (namely, a strong belief that the world is a dangerous, threatening place; a racialist-tinged anger; and a deep commitment to the notion of U.S. exceptionalism), they demonstrate very low levels of trust toward the People’s Republic of China. They express strong criticism of the Obama administration’s China policy. And they advocate much tougher economic and military policies toward China.

In some instances these views are shared with other factions of the Republican Party, but in many instances the Tea Party supporters’ views are more extreme than those of other GOP respondents. Whether any of this matters for China policy will depend, of course, on whether Congress and the next president are beholden to the Tea Party for electoral success. One area of policy restraint in Tea Party supporters’ preferences concerns China’s domestic repression. Consistent perhaps with both a view of the persuasive power of U.S. exceptionalism and with libertarian strains of thought, Tea Party supporters are less interested than other elements of the population in interfering in the internal affairs of China as a central element of U.S. policy toward China. There are some limits to Tea Party support for more militant cost-imposing policies toward China.

This selection of studies, of course, cannot answer a more fundamental question: how much does public opinion matter for explaining foreign policy? Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the literature. Even when it comes to systems with direct elections of state leaders and legislators, there is no consensus. Some argue that public opinion, with rare exceptions, only broadly constrains decisionmakers’ options. Others suggest that the constraints depend in large measure on whether leaders believe that public opinion should matter. Others argue that on particular issues, particular interest groups—those able to overcome collective action problems typical of the broader public—can exert considerable influence on foreign policy. Still others contend that in fact even in multiparty democracies, elite opinion matters more than mass opinion.4

When it comes to single-party states, the study of public opinion and foreign policy is in its infancy. There is some evidence that for certain single-party regimes, particularly ones with political leaders who do not fully control the security services, the opinion of the “selectorate” (other elites whose support is essential for regime survival) may constrain foreign policy choices.5 Some suggest that in authoritarian systems even mass opinion—when it is relatively cohesive and mobilized—limits some foreign policy options.6 But thus far the mechanisms by which public opinion might matter for these kinds of systems are under-theorized. When leaders don’t face electoral consequences, after all, where do the costs for ignoring opinion come from in the foreign policy realm?

While the scholarship is unclear, then, as to the direct relevance of public opinion in determining foreign policy choices, we believe that the complexities of public opinion in both the United States and China are nonetheless worth understanding. First, public
opinion may constrain policy under certain conditions, particularly on high-profile issues where media coverage mobilizes public attention and the public eventually gathers enough information to be critical of leaders.\textsuperscript{7} Second, it may also reflect the more basic assumptions and perceptions shared by some elites. This might be especially true, in the United States, of local officials and members of the House of Representatives, who stand for reelection every two years. According to the China elite sample data from this project, China government cadres may be even more hard-line and conservative on some questions of U.S.-Chinese relations than the mass public, and certainly not necessarily less. Compared with the general public, government cadres surveyed were about half as likely to view the United States as a partner and about twice as likely to perceive the United States as an enemy. Third, public opinion may affect the quantity and quality of social interaction across societies. Exceptionalism and xenophobia tend to reinforce each other. Thus to the extent that the former comes to influence thinking about relations with the other side, the latter may also reduce public support for cultural and political exchanges, while increasing support for policies rooted in relative gains (for example, restricting free trade and supporting the use of military tools to counter the military power of the other). For these three reasons alone, we believe an understanding of the nuance and detail of American and Chinese public opinion is relevant to the work of managing U.S.-Chinese relations.

NOTES

1 See, for instance, the 2007 and 2012 surveys conducted by the Committee of 100, www.survey.committee100.org.


7 Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy.”
CHAPTER 1

CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICANS AND THEMSELVES: IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP?

Brian C. Rathbun

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARS are preoccupied with whether the United States can peacefully manage China’s rise to great-power status, pointing to such factors as the distribution of power, the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, and the incorporation of China into multilateral institutions to reach different conclusions about the future of relations between the two countries. All of these factors are no doubt important. Generally neglected, however, is a more tangible factor: the opinions of the Chinese themselves and the image the Chinese public holds about the United States. Even autocratic regimes have to keep a steady eye on the views of their citizenry, demonstrated in their efforts to shape those views through control of the media and Internet communications. And a simple distinction between inconsequential and uneducated masses and better-informed and crafty elites is generally overdrawn.

Foreign policy specialists have long pointed out that the attributions that one makes of others’ behavior are of great importance for explaining relations between countries. Individuals generally explain the actions of others with reference not so much to the external environment, such as the distribution of power, but more to characteristics they ascribe to the other as a whole. Indeed, individuals generally point to external factors that force others to make decisions in order to preserve their particular image of the adversary. Cooperative moves of an adversary, for instance, are said to arise not out of a genuine desire for peaceful relations but out of short-term expediency, such as a financial crisis. In this way, gestures of assurance can be explained away as temporary and aberrational.
Of particular concern for the future of China-U.S. relations would be a situation in which Chinese patriotism fuels anti-American sentiment. Chinese pride in their country’s accomplishments seems an unavoidable feature of modern China. One of the fiercest skeptics of the peaceful rise of China, John Mearsheimer, grounds his pessimism by arguing that Chinese identification with the nation-state will inevitably lead to fear, distrust, and even hatred of the United States. He writes,

The members of each nation have a strong sense of group loyalty, so powerful, in fact, that allegiance to the nation usually overrides all other forms of identity. Most members typically believe they belong to an exclusive community that has a rich history dominated by remarkable individuals and salient events, which can be triumphs as well as failures. But people do not simply take pride in their own nation; they also compare it with other nations, especially those they frequently interact with and know well. Chauvinism usually emerges as most people come to believe that their nation is superior to others and deserves special recognition.3

China, he argues, is ripe for such chauvinism and “hypernationalism,” which “can be a potent source of war.”4 A combination of in-group love and out-group hate (or strong dislike) is a potent cocktail likely to bring about a psychological relationship of rivalry, which is associated with a much stronger likelihood of material conflict.5 Even those with a more benign reading of the situation view Chinese nationalism as a potential problem.6

In social psychology, the desire to be part of a large social group, and to bask in its reflected glory, is a well-known phenomenon. Individuals gain self-esteem through bonds with others like them, with potential implications for international relations. The open question is whether this in-group identity inevitably brings about out-group derogation. Applying social identity theory, Jonathan Mercer argues that the tendency toward in-group identification has the potential for generating significant competition in world politics.7

Peter Hays Gries, however, disagrees, noting that most studies of social identity theory find that in-group identity leads to in-group favoritism but not out-group derogation.8 Early studies in social identity theory noted that experimental participants who were assigned trivial identities favored their in-group. The thought was that if groups were so easily formed, then strongly held identities not simply manipulated in a lab would somewhat inevitably lead to hostility between groups. The overwhelming consensus in the subsequent literature, however, is that in-group identification might be associated with favoritism toward others like oneself, but not necessarily with hostility toward outsiders.9 Gries argues that international relations scholars have misread social identity theory, with consequences for future U.S.-China relations.
Nevertheless, Gries does not directly test his argument at the level at which it is specified, that of the individual. The *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey*, coordinated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, is a wonderful tool for assessing whether in-group and out-group attitudes are strongly associated in an inverse direction. The survey asks the mass public in the two countries to characterize both Americans and Chinese. Respondents are asked if they associate a series of characteristics—whether, for instance, they are greedy, honest, selfish, competitive—with those in their own country and in the other.

I find support in their responses for Gries’s claim, which reinforces previous findings in social psychology. First, Chinese attitudes toward the United States, even at the mass level, are complicated. It is not the case that those who believe that Americans are dishonest and intolerant are also more likely to believe that they are violent and aggressive. Americans are not judged in simple good or bad terms. Second, positive attitudes toward Chinese by the Chinese themselves are barely related at all to negative feelings toward Americans. Feeling that the Chinese are generous, for instance, is associated with a feeling that Americans are generous as well, not the opposite (although the association is very low). This reinforces the distinction made in other studies of public opinion between patriotism and nationalism, in which only the latter is constituted by negative feelings toward a salient “other.”

One can feel good about oneself without feeling bad about others. Most of the literature on China does not make such a distinction, however.

There are clear implications for policy. First, as there is no discernible group of obvious American supporters, given the more complicated structure of attitudes, U.S. efforts to improve the American image must be broad-based. Second, the fact that in-group favoritism is not a barrier to move positive views of the United States means that even the most prideful Chinese might be receptive to signals of American reassurance. And there is little reason for Americans to view Chinese patriotism per se as dangerous or inimical to American interests.

**The Whole: Chinese Opinion in the Aggregate**

A look at the simple distribution of responses does reinforce a pessimism about current U.S.-China relations (see table 1). The urban Chinese surveyed generally hold negative attitudes about the United States. More than three-quarters of respondents believe that...
Americans are generally greedy, aggressive, arrogant, and violent. At least a plurality of Chinese respondents associate every attribute that has an obvious negative valence—that is, has a bad connotation that implies something about inherent moral character—with the American people. For those characteristics that have a positive valence, the situation is flipped. Less than 40 percent believe that Americans are honest or tolerant, for instance.

**TABLE 1: THE CHINESE THINK HIGHLY OF THEMSELVES BUT NOT OF AMERICANS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valence</th>
<th>Americans Are . . .</th>
<th>Chinese Are . . .</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Greedy</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rude</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Hardworking</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sophisticated</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inventive</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalistic</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are a percentage of the total sample who agree that Americans or Chinese generally exhibit these characteristics. Traits are categorized by whether they are obviously positive, obviously negative, or ambiguous in character.

In short, Americans simply do not have a good reputation among those surveyed, except that they are seen as hardworking, inventive, and modern. These sets of attributes, however, are likely not the key to inducing trust as they do not feature in perceptions of American intentions. And, indeed, attributes such as sophistication and competitiveness might even have a negative valence for the Chinese as they could feed into perceptions of threat. Perhaps something as innocuous as “sophisticated” in fact captures a belief among respondents that Americans are tricky, cagey, and duplicitous.

In contrast, the Chinese citizens surveyed generally have a very high opinion of their fellow countrymen, who are generally thought to possess obviously positive attributes—honest (77 percent), generous (80 percent), and tolerant (84 percent)—but not obviously
negative ones, such as aggressive (13 percent) or violent (22 percent). A notable exception is greed and selfishness, which roughly half of respondents believe are correct ways of describing those in their own country, although this is perhaps less surprising when we consider the profound economic changes and increase in wealth and acquisitiveness in Chinese urban areas in recent decades. The Chinese surveyed also believe that, like Americans, the Chinese are hardworking, inventive, modern, competitive, and sophisticated.

The combination of these two results—that the Chinese respondents to the perceptions survey have a high regard of themselves and a low regard of the United States—should give policymakers pause. The United States has a severe image problem among Chinese citizens. The Chinese might respect American ingenuity and modernity, but they do not trust Americans. For those who believe that the United States should be courting average Chinese citizens in an effort to define the American image in a positive direction, these results are striking.

THE PARTS: CHINESE OPINION AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

This is not the whole story, however. A simple look at the distribution of aggregate responses, as much as it is a concern, obscures as well. At first glance, one might imagine that these two tendencies go hand in hand, that Chinese patriotism, revealed in the ascription of obviously positive characteristics to fellow Chinese (and the lack of ascription of obviously negative characteristics), is a cause of or is at least associated with negative views toward the United States at the individual level, that is, in the minds of the average Chinese citizen surveyed. This would be an even greater problem for bilateral relations.

Redressing this combination of in-group superiority and out-group derogation would require loosening national bonds among the Chinese. If, at the individual level, the only way to improve the image of the United States is for individuals to become less proud and positive about being Chinese, the United States has very few tools and is unlikely to succeed. It seems impossible for the United States to affect the degree of Chinese patriotism in any meaningful way.

Nevertheless, it is false to conclude from these results that Chinese in-group favoritism drives negative attitudes toward the United States. Even while the Chinese as a whole might believe that their fellow Chinese have largely positive traits and that the Americans have largely negative ones, it does not necessarily mean that individuals who believe that the United States has negative traits simultaneously believe that the Chinese have more positive ones.
This distinction is important because it might not be the case that feeling positively about the Chinese has anything to do with feeling negatively about Americans. As mentioned above, social psychologists have consistently found that in-group favoritism does not lead to out-group hate. The question is whether this is also true in the context of the Chinese-American relationship. In social science language, what is the structure of attitudes among the Chinese about themselves and Americans?

To answer this question, an examination is in order of the level of sophistication of Chinese respondents’ perceptions of American characteristics. An unsophisticated structure of attitudes can be thought of as one that ascribes all negative characteristics to Americans and none of the positives, or, conversely, one that ascribes all positive characteristics to Americans and none of the negatives. If this were the case, Chinese public opinion would be structured in a one-dimensional manner. One is simply anti-American or pro-American. It is all black or all white.

Correlation coefficients that capture the level of association between characteristics ascribed to Americans help answer the question whether generally, for instance, those who think Americans are aggressive also believe that Americans lack tolerance (see table 2). If

### TABLE 2: THE GOOD ABOUT THE AMERICANS IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE BAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honest</th>
<th>Generous</th>
<th>Tolerant</th>
<th>Greedy</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
<th>Selfish</th>
<th>Arrogant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greedy</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Selfish</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.67</td>
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<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<td>.51</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.15</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Sophisticated</td>
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<td>.25</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventive</td>
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<td>.25</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are polychoric correlation coefficients indicating an association between perceived characteristics of Americans.
every respondent who identified Americans as aggressive also identified them as lacking tolerance and if every respondent who identified Americans as not aggressive identified them as tolerant, the entry in that cell would be -1, a perfect negative correlation. If, however, those two attitudes were not correlated at all, the entry would be 0.12

Individuals who ascribe any single characteristic with a positive valence to the United States also tend to ascribe the others (as demonstrated in table 2). In other words, perceptions of American honesty, generosity, and tolerance tend to go together.

Conversely, the same correlations indicate that those who believe that Americans lack any one of these positive traits also tend to believe that they lack the others.

What the data do not indicate, however, is that individuals who believe Americans have obviously positive traits simultaneously believe that they lack obviously negative traits (greedy, aggressive, arrogant, rude, selfish, or violent). Conversely, those who believe Americans have negative traits generally do not believe that they lack positive traits. Indeed, the correlations among obviously positive and obviously negative traits tend to be neither low nor high but rather nonexistent, around 0. Instead we see a clustering of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rude</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Hardworking</th>
<th>Sophisticated</th>
<th>Inventive</th>
<th>Nationalistic</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
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<td>.48</td>
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<td>.48</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>.17</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<td>.28</td>
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<td>.41</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<td>.22</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
correlations among negative traits. For instance, a belief that Americans are selfish is very strongly associated with a belief that they are greedy and arrogant.

This indicates that Chinese attitudes about Americans are relatively sophisticated. We generally see three clusters of attitudes—positive, negative, and a third set concerning American work habits and skills, such as hardworking, sophisticated, inventive, modern, and competitive. Correlations are shaded such that they grow darker as they move away from 0 in either a negative or positive direction. Note that the tendency to ascribe negative traits to Americans and the tendency to ascribe positive traits to them are both positively associated with the third cluster. Beliefs about American industriousness and modernity buttress both admiration and fear of the United States.

A more sophisticated way of evaluating the structure of Chinese opinion is through what is called factor analysis. Factor analysis is a form of data reduction, in which the correlations among variables, in this case attitudes, are used to evaluate whether there is an underlying construct from which individual attitudes emerge, such as a general anti-Americanism.

While this might sound complicated, we use such a way of thinking in our everyday discussions of politics, the notion of a liberal-conservative continuum. We often do not or cannot measure such a concept directly. Instead, we infer it through a particular constellation of attitudes. A conservative, for instance, is someone who believes in tough law-and-order, opposes gay rights, and is more patriotic.

The fact that those three attitudes generally go together gives an indication that they emerge from some deeper principle or ideology that we cannot directly observe or measure. Factor analysis produces a set of “loadings,” in essence the correlation between the measured attitudes and the underlying dimension that cannot be directly observed but is inferred from the correlations among the attitudes themselves.

A factor analysis of Chinese data indicates that the structure of Chinese attitudes about American traits is not one-dimensional. In other words, individuals in China are not divided between those on the one hand who believe Americans have all the positive attributes and lack all the negative attributes and on the other hand those who believe Americans have all the negative attributes and lack all the positive attitudes. In general we see a loading of positive attributes along one dimension and a loading of negative attributes along a second dimension. The virtues of American productivity and its work ethic tend to load more highly on the dimension marking high regard for Americans, although not exclusively.
If this is confusing, think again of the American context. This is akin to a finding in the American public that there is no underlying one-dimensional liberal-conservative dimension but rather a number of different dimensions that do not line up together. Economic conservatism and social conservatism are not correlated but rather distinct dimensions of political ideology.

To evaluate whether in-group love is associated with out-group hate (or at least dislike), we can examine, through another set of correlations, how and whether Chinese attitudes about their own characteristics are associated with their feelings about whether Americans have those same traits (see table 3). These correlations capture whether ascribing a certain characteristic to one's own group tends to lead individuals to deny that characteristic to the other. For instance, is believing that the Chinese are honest associated with a belief that Americans are not honest? A simplistic, black-and-white understanding of Americans would be indicated by high negative correlations among the variables with obvious negative and positive valences.

**TABLE 3: THE GOOD ABOUT THE CHINESE IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE BAD ABOUT AMERICANS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Awareness</th>
<th>Communist Party Members Only</th>
<th>U.S. Is Main Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greedy</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rude</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardworking</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventive</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are polychoric correlation coefficients showing an association between perceived characteristics of Americans and the same characteristic in the Chinese.
Almost none of the attitudes, however, have negative correlations (as indicated in table 3). Aggressiveness and competitiveness are the lone exceptions. Aggressiveness has a very low correlation (only -0.15), and competitiveness is neither an inherently positive nor a negative attribution. This indicates that the belief that the Americans are aggressive is very slightly correlated with the belief that the Chinese are not. Otherwise, however, we see a striking lack of moral superiority in the structure of Chinese attitudes. Believing that the Chinese are honest, generous, or tolerant does not deny Americans these same positive attributes. Believing that Americans are greedy, selfish, arrogant, rude, or violent does not lead individuals to believe that the Chinese lack these same characteristics.

A factor analysis combining Chinese attitudes toward both themselves and Americans again reveals a multidimensional solution in which attitudes toward Americans and the Chinese are largely independent of one another. The analysis produces a four-factor “solution.” Not only are clusters of positive views about Americans not highly (and negatively) associated with negative views about Americans, but positive views about the Chinese themselves are not highly (and negatively) associated with negative views about themselves.

The findings are true even as we separate respondents by their self-reported interest and awareness in international affairs. We might expect that more sophisticated respondents who follow international news might demonstrate a different structure of attitudes than “low information” respondents. But this is not the case. Even Communist Party members do not have a simplistic, one-dimensional, and black-and-white view of American and Chinese traits. Their responses are very similar to that of the sample as a whole, even though they make up a small portion of the overall pool of respondents. The exception seems to be on traits capturing industriousness, such as modern, competitive, and inventive. This deserves some more exploration.

In the aggregate, the Chinese public indicates a sense of moral superiority in that Americans are generally seen to have negative traits and lack positive ones, while the Chinese have positive ones and lack negative ones. However, this is not produced by an association at the individual level in which in-group favoritism leads to out-group hate (or perhaps more mildly, dislike). In another indication of this, the number of obviously positive traits that all respondents ascribed to their in-group yet denied to the out-group were calculated and summed with the number of obviously negative traits that they ascribed to the out-group yet denied to their in-group. This is a crude measure of a sense of moral superiority. Only 4 percent of the total sample had the highest score of 7 on this scale;
6 percent scored a 6. More than a quarter of the sample had a score of 0, which was the most frequent response. Almost 40 percent of the sample had a score of 1 or below. The median was only 2.

Could it be that distinctions between attitudes toward the in-group and the out-group are enhanced by a sense of threat, or a sense of a status discrepancy in international relations? Scores on moral superiority are indeed higher for those who perceive the United States as the greatest danger facing China. For the latter, the mean score is 2.8; for those who disagree, the mean is 1.9. However, this seems to be because of greater negative feelings about Americans, as we would expect. A simple count of positive American attributes subtracted by negative ones indicates a mean of -3.4 for those who feel most threatened by the United States and -3.0 for those who do not identify this as the most pressing danger. People typically are threatened by those they think to be dishonest and aggressive.

At the same time, those who believe the United States is the biggest danger to China do not have better opinions of the Chinese in any meaningful sense. A simple count of positive Chinese attributes subtracted by negative ones yields a mean of 0.58 for those who feel most endangered by the United States and 0.39 for those who do not. Being threatened by the United States makes people only trivially more proud to be Chinese. However, those who feel that the United States does not take into account the interests of other countries—a marker of status concerns—do have both more negative views of Americans and more positive views about the Chinese.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

It is indeed worrying, for advocates of American rapprochement and good relations with China, that the Chinese surveyed are so negative toward the United States. Unfavorable attributions about Americans are prevalent, both in the frequency of negative attributions and the paucity of positive ones. A more complicated picture emerges when we go behind simple aggregate statistics and probe more deeply into the structure of the data, particularly the patterns of opinions about the Chinese and Americans held by the Chinese at the individual level. The findings that emerge have implications for how the United States might go about shaping public opinion in China in a more favorable direction.

First, it does not appear wise to simply focus on strengthening the position of pro-American Chinese at home, simply because there appears to be no solid group of
consistently pro-American respondents, at least in this survey (although we should be mindful of the difficulty in assessing the accuracy of survey responses in a nondemocratic society). Those who feel positively toward the United States—who believe, for instance, that Americans are generous, honest, and tolerant—do not simultaneously believe that Americans are nonviolent and pacific in character. It is not simply a case of increasing the voice of friends of the United States in China. The United States, it appears, does not have many such consistent fans.

Second, and the flip side of the first conclusion, is that the pro-Chinese feeling, what we might call patriotism, is not the cause (or a symptom) of anti-American feelings. This indicates that the potential audience for a revised opinion of the United States is potentially broad, as an improvement in America’s image need not come at the expense of a decrease in Chinese pride at the individual level. In-group favoritism does not lead to out-group hate. In short, there is no easy solution, but even as the view of Americans in the aggregate is quite poor, the structure of beliefs at the individual level indicates something less than an entrenched hostility to Americans on the part of the Chinese.

NOTES


4 Ibid., 400.


The correlations are based on a polychoric correlation matrix because the responses are dichotomous. In other words, respondents answered only “yes” or “no” to whether Americans had these particular characteristics. Those who refused to answer or did not know were excluded from the analysis.

Results vary slightly depending on statistical assumptions. However, all types of factor analysis, whether principal factors or principal components, reveal a multidimensional structure in which attitudes about good attributes do not correlate with attitudes about bad attitudes. Results available from the author.

Results available from the author.
CHAPTER 2

A WORLD LEADER-TO-BE?
POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S GLOBAL ROLE

Zheng Su, Tianguang Meng, Mingming Shen, and Jie Yan

INTRODUCTION

IN RECENT YEARS, the world has witnessed the rapid rise of China, from its continuous high-speed economic growth before and after the financial crisis to its impressive state capacities as shown in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake relief operations and its manned space program. Scholars hold different opinions on the dynamics of China’s economic development. What is indisputable, though, is that since the 1978 reform and opening up, China has grown from less than 1 percent of the world’s economy thirty years ago to being the second-largest economy today. Hence, heated debates, both inside and outside China, regarding its phenomenal economic success focus less on China’s previous achievements and more on its future global influence and status.

What are the implications of China’s economic and military power? Is China’s political influence changing the international order? Debates over China’s power status began to emerge among scholars and policy practitioners in 1992, only one year after the Soviet Union collapsed. In various assessments, China’s rank in comprehensive national power ranges from second to sixth in the world, depending on the standard employed.

Behind the discrepancy there also lie different attitudes toward China’s expanding influence. Some analysts believe that China is undertaking more international responsibilities for world peace, security, and development, while at the same time is gradually changing the
unreasonable rules of certain international economic and political institutions. Others stress that as an emerging great power that is still a developing country, China has limited abilities to change the global order in ways that do not cause problems that could damage economic growth and political stability. Moreover, China does not show much interest in contributing its resources to provide global public goods. To sum up, China’s global role is some distance away from a responsible stakeholder, and it sometimes acts like a “free rider,” which in return might limit its worldwide influence.

If China succeeds in maintaining current trends in its growth of economic power and military muscle, will it overtake America’s status as the lone global superpower? In an article in *Foreign Affairs* at the peak of China’s state image in 2008, John Ikenberry asks about the rise of China vis-à-vis the future of the West: “Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises?” He concludes that although there may be conflict and friction during the power transition, the United States must ensure that China’s rising power operates within the rules and institutions set up by the United States and the Allied forces after the Second World War. This way the United States can remain the dominant power in leading the international system.

Other observers are skeptical about China’s motivations for participating in world affairs, especially in Asia and Africa. The products of this skepticism are variations on the familiar “China threat” arguments, whereby an increasingly powerful China is likely to destabilize regional security or become a longtime danger, and therefore some measures must be taken to prevent this from happening.

The two important questions posed above have no definitive answers at this time. The one regarding the implication of China’s power is an evaluation in which every scholar applies his or her own standards, while the one regarding the future of China’s political influence is a prediction; only history can provide the answer to that. Absent from these debates among scholars and practitioners is knowledge about how the Chinese public understands the rise of China. Thus we concentrate on public ideas about what leadership role a rising China should play in the world, and we investigate how key sociodemographic variables, such as age, gender, education, and income, among others, affect the Chinese people’s perceptions of China’s rise and its global leadership.

Needless to say, useful studies abound on whether and how public opinion has an influence on foreign policymaking in liberal democracies. Nationwide public opinion surveys
toward foreign policy in an authoritarian context like China, however, have not received the attention they deserve, and they do not tend to ask citizens any questions about the state’s self-positioning in the world.

Some may argue that official propaganda control may force people to hide their actual ideas and beliefs, but our experience suggests that, compared with domestic politics, respondents enjoy more freedom of speech on international affairs issues and tend to express their true feelings. Others may argue that only the ideas of political elites matter. As members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government who claim to “serve the people” (为人民服务), these elites contend that they listen to the voices of the people and avoid “hurting their feelings” when it comes to issues related to national pride and interests. They will adjust foreign policies accordingly. Thus, how China’s ordinary people view its global role is a topic of political significance and academic interest.

**CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S RISE: A FUTURE WORLD LEADER OR NOT?**

For a major power like China, a clear and proper recognition of its international identity or global role is among the top priorities of the country’s leadership. Perhaps the most influential and quoted orientation is the aphorism of Deng Xiaoping that China should “stay humble, never take the lead, keep a low profile, but do some things” (善于守拙, 决不当头, 韬光养晦, 有所作为). In one of his speeches during the famous “Southern Tour” (南巡) in 1992, Deng said again that “we will only become a big political power if we keep a low profile and work hard for some years, and then we will have more weight in international affairs.” Obviously, with an international context full of dramatic changes and challenges, Deng suggested that China should be cautious, not seek leadership, and wait for its time. Due to Deng’s authority, long-lasting influence, and pragmatic wisdom, his instructions on China’s foreign policymaking were considered to be primary principles and basic strategy.

Now that China’s domestic and international situation is quite different and China has become the second-largest economy in the world, is it time for China to change its strategy from staying humble and never taking the lead to, at long last, making a difference? In other words, the question facing China’s leadership today is whether China should become more involved on the international stage and play a leadership role worldwide. In 2013 the CPC General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping put forth a slogan, the “Chinese Dream,” which means “to build a moderately prosperous society and realize national rejuvenation.” This slogan was rephrased and interpreted by Western observers as combining domestic concepts of “national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and military strengthening” and a
global idea of benefiting “not only the Chinese people, but also people of all countries.” Regardless of the difference between the interpretations, if national rejuvenation is essentially China’s rise, will global leadership necessarily become part of the “Chinese Dream”? Will the Chinese public approve and support this goal?

The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China finds that 58 percent of the respondents agree that China will replace the United States as the world’s dominant superpower or that it already has. The finding is similar to that of a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey that shows that two-thirds of American respondents believe that “another nation” (presumably China) will become as powerful as or will surpass the United States. A more recently released survey report by the UK’s largest advertising and public relations group, WWP Group, says an overwhelming 80 percent of Chinese regard the United States as the most powerful country today, while they expect China and the United States to be equally powerful in just ten years.

However, when carefully investigated, there is a great perception gap between different subgroups. For example, when answering the question “Which nation or political region do you think will be the world’s leading superpower twenty years from now?” 58.4 percent of the Chinese general public chose China, while only 23.1 percent of opinion leaders and 37 percent of business leaders did so. Moreover, even the general public is not a monolithic whole. Based on interviews and document analysis, David Shambaugh finds seven categories of schools or tendencies of analysis within China concerning the country’s global identities. But these reflect the views of elites, and the categories are not mutually exclusive and thus do not constitute a formal classification of views.

In our study, we analyze perceptions of China’s global role using the 2012 U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey, designed and implemented by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, and coordinated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association. This is a representative national sample of ordinary Chinese. And we employ a single standard to measure respondents’ attitudes and classify them in a way that avoids overlapping and confusion.

In particular we use two questions (see table 1). Question B1: “What kind of leadership role should China play in the world? Should it be the SINGLE world leader, or should it play a SHARED leadership role, or should it not play any leadership role?” If the respondent chooses “a SHARED leadership role,” we move to ask Question B2: “Should China be the most assertive of the leading nations, or should it be no more or less assertive than other leading nations?”
TABLE 1: SHOULD CHINA BE A WORLD LEADER?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question B1</th>
<th>What kind of leadership role should China play in the world?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Be the single world leader</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Play a shared leadership role</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Not play any leadership role</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Don’t know / Refused</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question B2</th>
<th>Should China be the most assertive of the leading nations, or should it be no more or less assertive than other leading nations?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The most assertive of the leading nations</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No more or less assertive than other leading nations</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Don’t know / Refused</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n=2,597.

To report the results in a more straightforward way, we engaged in some recoding of the questions. Since Question B2 is secondary to Question B1, it can be easily merged into the latter without sacrificing useful information. In addition, the two options of Question B2 are covered in the second option of Question B1, which makes them replaceable.

Thus our new question still asks “What kind of leadership role should China play in the world?” but we now have a four-option answer: “1=Be the single world leader,” “2=Be a shared world leader but more assertive than other leading nations,” “3=Be a shared world leader but no more or less assertive than other leading nations,” and “4=Not play any leadership role.” Those who originally supported a shared leadership but have no idea about or refuse to answer Question B2 are regarded as “9=Don’t know / Refused” (missing ones).

Of the valid responses, 18 percent, that is, 352 respondents, say China should be the single world leader, overtaking America’s hegemony (see figure 1). Fifteen percent, or 300 of the total respondents, agree that China should pursue a shared world leadership as the most assertive of the leading nations. Meanwhile, 42 percent (849 people), constituting the largest share, hold a relatively moderate attitude that China should be a shared
world leader but no more or less assertive than any other leading nations. There may be two reasons for this. On the one hand, peace and harmony are a key element so deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture that any actions and policies are preferred to avoid conflicts or arguments. On the other hand, the standard expression that the global structure is *yi chao duo qiang* (one superpower and many great powers, or simultaneously unipolar and multipolar—一超多强) appears in all textbooks of Zhengzhike (civics curriculum—政治课), from primary school to college. People become very familiar with that approach and even take it for granted. Hence, the idea of a shared world leadership where China is no more or less assertive sounds both correct and satisfactory to them. The remaining quarter of the respondents (500 people) think China should not seek to play any leadership role, which is remarkable. It may suggest that a large number of people still believe in Deng’s strategy to keep a low profile. The divergence between people’s attitudes and the reason for it needs to be further explored.

**FIGURE 1: CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S RISE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Be the single world leader</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be a shared world leader, most assertive</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not play a leadership role</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be a shared world leader, no more or less assertive</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE: VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESIS**

People in China have different attitudes toward China’s global role, from a strongly supportive standpoint to a relatively mild one, to a somewhat negative one. What has caused this variation? Human thoughts and behaviors, as we know, are greatly influenced by sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, or
whether people reside in an urban or rural area. The list can be quite long, but in China’s context, only a couple of variables may matter, according to previous studies. In this section of the chapter, we will introduce relevant variables, and based on these, test some simple hypotheses.

Sociodemographic Variables as Independent Variables

GENDER

Researchers in the United States have found that compared with men, women are more peace-oriented toward international affairs, though, very unfortunately, this open, liberal, and tolerant attitude is sometimes misunderstood as weakness. Thus gender may predict lower support for China’s being the single leader in the world and higher levels of amity toward other countries.

H1: Female respondents are less likely to support a single world leader role for China.

AGE AND POLITICAL GENERATION

In recent years a remarkable consensus has grown around the observation that in most Western societies, political attitudes and behaviors of young people differ significantly from those of earlier cohorts. This phenomenon is another example of what Edgar Friedenberg called the “generation gap” due to different environments of socialization. Various studies of Chinese people’s attitudes toward Japan and the United States also report that respondents of different age groups show significant differences: seniors are more likely to view America as hegemonic, while younger respondents are less likely to do so; but in attitudes toward Japan, seniors tend to be more forgiving than the youth.

Two sets of variables dealing with ages will be added to our model. The first divides respondents by life period, namely youth I (18–29), youth II (30–44), middle age (45–59), and seniors (60 and older). It is expected that the youth groups have a more expansive vision of the nation and are more eager to see a strong China showing up on the global stage. The second is a political generation variable. We test whether people born after the end of the Cultural Revolution (and growing up in the reform and opening up period) have, in particular, been influenced by the idea of keeping a low profile, compared with the generations born in the first twenty-seven years of the People’s Republic of China or earlier.

H2a: Senior respondents are less likely to support a single world leader role for China.

H2b (competing with H2a): The respondents born after the reform and opening up began are more likely to be influenced by the idea of China’s keeping a low profile and not pursuing a leadership role.
EDUCATION

School is a very important, if not the most important, institution for an individual’s political socialization. “School-level and classroom-level attributes are related to four political socialization outcomes: political knowledge, political attitudes and values toward society and politics, attitudes toward political participation, and participation in political or quasi-political affairs.”27 And much of a school’s function is fulfilled through its curriculum.28 Under China’s current education system, children above a certain age, usually seven years old, are sent to primary school for a nine-year compulsory education where all the courses are standardized and arranged by the government. Not until senior high do they have the choice to study arts or sciences, and avoid some courses they dislike. Of course, during college they will enjoy much more freedom of course selection, and be exposed to more liberal theories, and know more about international relations. Some research shows that Chinese with higher education levels hold a more positive attitude toward American hegemony.29 Similarly, one should expect that higher levels of education are related to a more rational position on China’s global role, as “exposure to more information about the outside and to more sophisticated modes of analysis and thought, contribute to a more critical or nuanced view of one’s own group.”30

H3: Respondents with higher education levels are more likely to support a shared leadership role for China.

HIGH INCOME

Using longitudinal data from the Beijing Area Study, Alastair Iain Johnston finds that the Chinese middle class generally exhibits a greater level of nascent liberalism than the poorer respondents.31 But it is difficult to predict the high-income group’s orientation about China’s global role. They may be satisfied with the status quo since they benefit from the current international system.

H4: Respondents with higher incomes are less likely to support a single world leader role for China.

Other Sociodemographic Variables as Control Variables

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Party membership measures political identity, for example, whether the respondent is a member of the Communist Party of China. It is a proxy for political ideology and political participation, and it contributes a very important part of one’s socioeconomic status, which usually brings higher income in urban areas,32 privileges in rural areas, and better opportunities in one’s career path.33
The hukou system is “an institution with the power to restrict population mobility and access to state-sponsored benefits for the majority of China’s rural population.” The Chinese state does not provide rural people with services and welfare entitlements equal to those provided to urban residents. This leads to a distinction in the socioeconomic status between these two groups, making the rural population second-class citizens. This difference in status may also affect people’s feelings toward the state and attitudes about international affairs.

Danwei used to be a system governing urban labor under socialism. As the reform of state-owned enterprises evolved, the role of danwei has been greatly reduced. However, danwei may still be a proxy for profitability and earning levels in urban China because those who work in government, state-owned enterprises and other government-funded institutions such as universities and hospitals usually have a higher income.

Besides the sociodemographic variables listed above, we test some other variables that might also influence attitudes about China’s rise and role.

This variable taps into whether the respondent is in favor of China’s using military power or has a tendency to support the use of force in international affairs.

The ideal kind of global role that China should play may be bounded by respondents’ self-perception of the degree to which China is a selfless or selfish actor in international politics.

This variable should tap into both levels of awareness or knowledge of the outside world, and interest in international affairs.

All the measures for the main sociodemographic independent variables as well as for the various control variables that are used to explain the divergence of people’s attitudes toward China’s rise can be seen in table 2.
TABLE 2: MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables’ names</th>
<th>(Re)coding Rule (and question wording, if any)</th>
<th>Range of Values</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0 Female; 1 Male</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>18–92</td>
<td>43.261</td>
<td>16.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group *</td>
<td>1 18–29; 2 30–44; 3 45–59; 4 60 and older</td>
<td>1–4</td>
<td>2.368</td>
<td>1.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol-generation **</td>
<td>1 Born before 1949; 2 Born in 1949–1976; 3 Born after 1976</td>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>1.763</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education ***</td>
<td>1 Primary school and under; 2 Junior high school; 3 High school; 4 College and above</td>
<td>1–4</td>
<td>2.667</td>
<td>1.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>0 The lower 80%; 1 The top 20%</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>0 No; 1 Yes</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>1.853</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hukou</td>
<td>0 Rural; 1 Urban</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danwei</td>
<td>0 Public; 1 Private</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View about dependence on military power (VDMP) ****</td>
<td>In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals? 1 Too much; 2 Too little; 3 About the right amount</td>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>2.237</td>
<td>0.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China's self-image (CSI)</td>
<td>In general, to what extent do you think China takes into account the interests of other countries around the world in making international policy decisions? 1 Great deal; 2 Fair amount; 3 Not too much; 4 Not at all Recoded as: 0 No (if 3 or 4); 1 Yes (if 1 or 2)</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention on international affairs (AIA)</td>
<td>To what extent do you pay attention to what is happening in the world or in other nations? 1 Great deal; 2 Fair amount; 3 Not too much; 4 Not at all Recoded as: 0 No (if 3 or 4); 1 Yes (if 1 or 2)</td>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Variables with * are categorical ones. The percentages of each value are as follows.
Age group *: 1 (23.33%); 2 (35.62%); 3 (21.95%); 4 (19.10%)
Political-generation **: 1 (37.12%); 2 (49.52%); 3 (13.36%)
Education ***: 1 (17.99%); 2 (26.52%); 3 (26.21%); 4 (29.28%)
VDMP ****: 1 (21.13%); 2 (34.01%); 3 (44.86%)
MODEL SETUP AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Basic Model
Given that the dependent variable—Chinese people's attitudes toward China's global role—is an ordinal one, and the independent variables are either ordinal or dummy, an appropriate model is ordered logistic regression, or ordered logit. Missing data have been treated using multiple-imputation estimates. We developed four models (see table 3).

### TABLE 3: ORDERED LOGISTIC (MULTIPLE-IMPUTATION ESTIMATES)
MODELS OF CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S RISE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Odds Ratio (s.e.)</th>
<th>Model 2 Odds Ratio (s.e.)</th>
<th>Model 3 Odds Ratio (s.e.)</th>
<th>Model 4 Odds Ratio (s.e.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.074(0.095)</td>
<td>1.075(0.095)</td>
<td>1.070(0.095)</td>
<td>1.073(0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group 2</td>
<td>1.227(0.135)</td>
<td>1.385(0.189)</td>
<td>1.415(0.195)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group 3</td>
<td>1.045(0.258)</td>
<td>1.268(0.239)</td>
<td>1.320(0.251)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group 4</td>
<td>1.466(0.258)</td>
<td>1.787(0.455)</td>
<td>1.893(0.485)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 2</td>
<td>0.977(0.096)</td>
<td>0.817(0.116)</td>
<td>0.804(0.115)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 3</td>
<td>1.229(0.218)</td>
<td>0.806(0.202)</td>
<td>0.764(0.191)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu. level 2</td>
<td>1.283(0.226)</td>
<td>1.253(0.216)</td>
<td>1.278(0.225)</td>
<td>1.263(0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu. level 3</td>
<td>1.730(0.293) **</td>
<td>1.655(0.275) **</td>
<td>1.716(0.292) **</td>
<td>1.748(0.292) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu. level 4</td>
<td>2.024(0.365) ***</td>
<td>1.898(0.326) **</td>
<td>1.983(0.360) **</td>
<td>1.932(0.344) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>1.015(0.124)</td>
<td>1.075(0.095)</td>
<td>1.016(0.124)</td>
<td>1.002(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>1.089(0.136)</td>
<td>1.098(0.136)</td>
<td>1.090(0.137)</td>
<td>1.089(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hukou</td>
<td>1.092(0.116)</td>
<td>1.130(0.119)</td>
<td>1.099(0.117)</td>
<td>1.098(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danwei</td>
<td>1.009(0.117)</td>
<td>1.010(0.124)</td>
<td>1.019(0.120)</td>
<td>1.035(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDMP Group 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.500(0.057) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDMP Group 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.922(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.747(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.034(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>-0.816(0.180) ***</td>
<td>-0.948(0.169) ***</td>
<td>-0.825(0.180) **</td>
<td>-1.277(0.243) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>0.093(0.177)</td>
<td>-0.040(0.166)</td>
<td>0.085(0.177)</td>
<td>-0.349(0.239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 3</td>
<td>1.763(0.176) ***</td>
<td>1.625(0.165) ***</td>
<td>1.755(0.176) ***</td>
<td>1.349(0.236) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
<td>0.0297</td>
<td>0.0338</td>
<td>0.0573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R²</td>
<td>0.0287</td>
<td>0.0259</td>
<td>0.0290</td>
<td>0.0511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. n=2,597.
In Model 1, $H_1$, $H_{2a}$, $H_3$, and $H_4$ are tested with other sociodemographic variables controlled. Similarly, in Model 2, the $H_{2b}$ is separately tested, while Model 3 contains both competing hypotheses, $H_{2a}$ and $H_{2b}$, as controls for each other. Based on Model 3, Model 4 is a more complete one where another set of control variables is added.

Empirical Results
Contrary to expectations, as Model 1 indicates, $H_1$ lacks empirical support: gender does not make a significant difference in people's attitudes toward China's global role as expected. At the same time, age group has a weak nonlinear effect on people's attitudes. Compared with the baseline group youth I (ages 18–29), the youth II group is more likely to support a shared leadership or no leadership role for China, perhaps because members of this group grow more mature and less radical as their experiences increase. This effect does not continue to be significant when it comes to the middle-aged respondents. Seniors, however, are more likely to support either a shared leadership role for China or none at all. Overall, the findings support $H_{2a}$, that senior respondents are less likely to support a single world leader role for China. The effect of education ($H_3$) on people's attitudes toward China's global role is as predicted. Those who go to high school or have a college education are more likely to support a shared leadership for China. The hypothesis about the effects of high income ($H_4$) is not supported by the evidence. Other control variables, such as party membership, household registration, and work unit, have no significant effects.

In the final Model 4, views about dependence on military power (VDMP), China's self-image (CSI), and attention on international affairs (AIA) are included as controls. The results are similar to Model 1. First of all, age group has a positive effect on people's attitudes toward a shared leadership in general. The effect of generation is not statistically significant compared to the effect of age group, which means $H_{2a}$ is stronger than $H_{2b}$. In other words, when age groups (a proxy of life period) and generations (a proxy of political socialization) are both included, people's attitudes seem to be more influenced by their life period than by the political socialization. Second, $H_3$ also has strong empirical support; higher levels of education are positively related to respondents' attitudes toward a shared leadership role for China. It seems those exposed to more information about the outside world are more likely to be liberal or moderate, and they tend to have more sophisticated modes of analysis and thought.

Third, people who think China relies on military strength too much—and thus might lean in a more pacifist direction—seem to support a strong leadership role for China more than others. At the same time, those who think China does not rely on military strength enough appear to have the same goal. This phenomenon is very interesting and needs further explanation. The somewhat contradictory phenomenon here may be due to respondents’ different understandings of relying on military strength, which has at least has two dimensions: the possession of military strength and the use of it. On the one hand, although
people might lean in a more pacifist direction, they do not necessarily deny the important fact contributing a lot to China’s international status that China is among the few countries that possess nuclear weapons. On the other hand, these respondents hope China can expand its influence through other channels, economically or culturally, to achieve a strong leadership. In short, in these people’s eyes, the possession of military strength is the cornerstone, but economic and cultural power would be the pathway to China’s future leadership. However, people who think China does not rely enough on military strength put more emphasis on the fact that compared with other major powers, China seldom uses its military strength or gets involved in conflicts or wars. They regard the use of military power as a pathway to strong leadership.

Fourth, people who think China takes the interests of other countries into account too much are less likely to support a weak, shared global role, because they think China’s consideration and sacrifices deserve a stronger leader position. And they believe greater Chinese influence in the world would be good for the international community. Lastly, $H_1$ and $H_4$ are not supported—gender, high income, party membership, household registration, work unit, and attention to international affairs do not have significant effects.

CONCLUSION

As China’s rise becomes an undeniable fact, “What does China want?” and the Chinese people’s attitudes about global leadership are of great significance. Thus, this chapter investigates Chinese people’s attitudes toward the nation’s rise using national survey data: A plurality of respondents (42 percent) say China should share world leadership in a way that is no more or less assertive than other leading nations, while 15 percent think China should be the most assertive of world leaders. Only a minority of respondents held the most extreme positions: 18 percent believe that China should be the only world leader, and 25 percent desire no leadership role at all.

The variation in the general public’s opinions is highly related to sociodemographic characteristics. Older and more educated people are more likely to think China should play a shared leadership role, while those who think China relies too much on military power but also cares a lot about other nations’ interests believe China deserves a stronger role in international politics.

Our study has paid considerable attention to the effects of age differences. We divided respondents into groups according to life period and political generation. We find that
only the former variable matters when both are included in the regression model. But by including both age group and generation, we still could not exclude the effects of the life cycle (aging), which may have its specific explanatory power. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the current cohort of youth really differs from earlier youth cohorts, in the 1970s and 1960s, or even earlier, due to the lack of time series or panel data. However, our efforts can be regarded as the first step toward that goal.

Our findings have the following policy implications. First, since higher levels of education are becoming more attainable for ordinary Chinese, the popular attitudes toward China’s global role and U.S.-China relations should become more rational and positive over time. More educational and academic communication and exchange between China and the United States may be beneficial for mutual understanding. Second, as members of youth group II (those aged 30–44 today) move into their careers and have greater political and economic influence, their attitudes toward a healthier U.S.-China relationship may help stabilize the cooperation between these two giants. Third, should both leaderships take public opinion into account when making decisions on foreign policy, a peaceful and bright future for the world would be close at hand: If China is doing its best to achieve a peaceful rise and a shared leadership role, the United States should also feel more comfortable dealing with China.

NOTES

1 The corresponding author is Jie Yan. To mail: Room 340, The Leo KoGuan Building, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China. To e-mail: yanjie_pku@pku.edu.cn.


Ibid.


The most recent and similar public opinion surveys are those conducted by the China Academy of Social Sciences, published in December 2009 and in March and November 2012. See Li Shenming and Zhou Hong, eds., *Zhongguo minzhong de guojiguan* [The Chinese Public’s View of the World], vol. 1 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009); Li Shenming and Jiang Lifeng, eds., *Zhongguo minzhong de guojiguan* [The Chinese Public’s View of the World], vol. 2 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012); Li Shenming and Huang Ping, eds., *Zhongguo minzhong de guojiguan* [The Chinese Public’s View of the World], vol. 3 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2012).

The original source of these words cannot be exactly found in any published materials. It is said that these principles are a brief summary of Deng’s talks by Jiang Zemin. See “Zhongguo Gongchandang Dashiji (1921 nian 7 yue—2011 nian 6 yue)” [Historical Memorabilia of Communist Party of China (July 1921 to June 2011)], Xinhua, July 22, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-07/22/c_121706389_10.htm.

See Leng Rong and Wang Zuoling, eds., *Deng Xiaoping Nianpu* [Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe 2004), 1346.


22 Using a “GPS/GIS Assistant Area Sampling” stratified and multi-stages sampling method, this survey covered 22 provinces (municipalities or autonomous regions) and 40 counties (cities or districts), and it collected data on 2,597 respondents with a response rate of 64 percent. See U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/us_china_security_perceptions_report.pdf for more information, including a description of the project, the data collection procedures, and some initial findings. For more details of the “GPS/GIS Assistant Area Sampling,” please refer to Pierre F. Landry and Mingming Shen, “Reaching Migrants in Survey Research,” Political Analysis 13, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 1–22.


24 Actually it seems that Chinese women are more friendly toward the United States. In a survey where respondents are asked “whether America will be the biggest threat to China’s long-term development,” only 10.2 percent of women agree, versus 21.3 percent of men. Xunda Yu, Chen Xuedong, and Zhu Jiping, “Zhongmei guanxi: Laizi min zhong de kanfa” [Sino-U.S. Relations: Views of the People], Shi jie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics], vol. 6 (2001): 33–38.


29 Han, *Xiangxiang de Shijie: Zhongguo Gongzhong de Guojiguan*.


34 Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?,” *China Quarterly* 195 (September 2008): 582–606.


38 Please note that in Model 2 or Model 3, whether H2b is tested separately or jointly with H2a, political generation does not a have a significant effect, which means that H2b is trumped by H2a.

39 See Hooghe, “Political Socialization and the Future of Politics.”
CHAPTER 3

WHOM DO WE TRUST?
TESTING FOR SOCIALIZATION EFFECTS IN CHINESE SURVEYS

Peter Hays Gries and Matthew A. Sanders

APOLOGISTS FOR THE Chinese Communist Party (CCP) often point to surveys suggesting that the Chinese people trust their government more than the citizens of many democracies trust their governments. In a 2013 *Foreign Affairs* article, Eric Li pointed to a 2011 Pew Research Center poll of Chinese attitudes to argue that the Chinese people are satisfied with their government.1 The *People’s Daily*, the official mouthpiece of the CCP, similarly cited a survey conducted by the global public relations firm Edelman to boast that “China ranked first in the world . . . with 88 percent trust” in government.2 By contrast, they went on to exult, “trust in government fell in the United States from 46 percent to 40 percent.”

Critics question the reliability of such surveys conducted in China. Yasheng Huang was blunt: “In a country without free speech,” he wrote in a *Foreign Affairs* response to Li’s article, “asking people to directly evaluate their leaders’ performance is a bit like giving a single choice exam.”3 He nonetheless went on to cite other surveys conducted in China to argue that the Chinese people desire democracy now.

Can the results of Chinese surveys be trusted? Or will they simply be fodder for both sides of the debate over one-party rule in China?

In a recent review, Yun-han Chu points to “credible international collaborative survey projects,” such as the Asian Barometer and the World Values Survey, as well as a long line of Western scholarship,4 to claim that “the large majority of Chinese consider the current political system to be the appropriate system for their country.”5
But Chu does not address the micro-foundations of critiques by Huang and others of surveys conducted in China. People will not always say publicly what they actually believe or what they will say privately. In social psychology, this phenomenon is known as compliance. Compliance may occur because situational pressures strongly motivate people to conform or because they are socially motivated to manage their impressions before others. In other words, in public settings people often distort their responses because they want to fit in with others or avoid being ridiculed.

Most survey research in China today is conducted face-to-face with a stranger. In such a context, owing to compliance, many Chinese respondents may not be willing to openly express their actual opinions due to fear of political retribution or because of strong normative pressure not to do so.

Wenfang Tang and Yang Zhang recently conducted a list experiment to test these hypotheses. They concluded that there is a strong social desirability bias in Chinese surveys, but little political bias. Like many pioneering experiments, however, theirs suffers from issues of question design. List experiments seek to shield participants from public scrutiny by asking them not to name specific items, but to simply give a total number of items. This is intended to keep the interviewer from knowing the participant’s actual beliefs. However, it is likely that the government items in each of Tang and Zhang’s questions stood out from the other items, thus failing to hide the respondent’s views from the interviewer. This may cloud the interpretation of Tang and Zhang’s experimental results, which are thus suggestive but not conclusive on the existence of social and political desirability biases in Chinese surveys.

Building on Tang and Zhang’s pioneering work, we explored two competing hypotheses about the macro-drivers of public attitudes in China. The “top-down” socialization hypothesis holds that political variables (for example, party propaganda or fear of retribution) or social variables (such as peer pressure or social conformity) drive the attitudes of the Chinese people. The “bottom-up” psychological hypothesis, by contrast, holds that individual differences shape Chinese attitudes. We find support for each hypothesis in different contexts and show how both situational and personal factors interact in shaping the attitudes revealed in Chinese public opinion surveys. Specifically, the bottom-up individual differences variable of interest in international affairs interacts with top-down variables such as education and media exposure. This leads some Chinese to toe the party, or “socially correct,” line, while others do not.

Chinese appear to be educated into greater awareness of the socially or politically acceptable position on sensitive evaluative questions in Chinese surveys. On evaluative issues like trust in foreign countries, Chinese seek the consensus group view, asking themselves, “Which countries do we trust?” Scholars and policymakers interested in reducing the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict, therefore, would be wise to pay attention to the role of the
Chinese educational and propaganda systems in constructing a view of both America and the world in general as untrustworthy and threatening. This recommendation, of course, is consistent with the work of totalitarianism theorists starting in the 1950s.10

**THE U.S.-CHINA SECURITY PERCEPTIONS SURVEY**

To explore bottom-up and top-down effects on Chinese survey takers, we explored data from the *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey*. Our focus was on a May 2–July 5, 2012, face-to-face survey of 2,597 adults in urban China conducted by Peking University’s Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC). For comparison, we explored data from a parallel Pew telephone survey of 1,004 American adults conducted April 30–May 13, 2012.

For our dependent measures, we decided to focus on two sets of questions. The first asked how much respondents thought that their country could trust a list of different foreign countries. The second, in the Chinese data set only, asked how serious a list of different U.S. threats were to China.

We chose these dependent measures for both methodological and substantive policy reasons. Methodologically, the battery of questions pertaining to trust in foreign countries was valuable because participants were allowed to choose from four continuous response categories, from “completely trust” to “don’t trust at all.” Having four options reduces the measurement error common to questions with fewer or categorical response categories.11 The list of five U.S. threats (the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, the United States containing China’s rise, U.S. hegemony, the U.S. position on Tibet, and U.S. spying along China’s coast) also presented four response categories, from “extremely serious” to “not at all serious,” again allowing for the creation of a continuous variable for each. Averaged together the resulting five-item “U.S. threat” scale had good internal reliability.12

Substantively, international cooperation and conflict in the twenty-first century hinge in large part upon whether Chinese and Americans view each other, and foreign countries more generally, as trustworthy or not. One reason that most structural and offensive realist international relations theorists are so pessimistic about the prospects for international peace is that they believe that the very structure of the international system dictates that there is “little room for trust among states.”13 Liberal international relations theorists, by contrast, have suggested that the “democratic peace” rests in part on the citizens of liberal democracies sharing common norms and thus being more trusting of each other.14 Alex
Wendt and other constructivist international relations theorists argue that trust between states can be created through repeated social interactions and reciprocity, facilitating cooperation.\textsuperscript{15} While there has been some research on how much Americans trust other countries,\textsuperscript{16} more empirical work is needed to better understand how trusting both Americans and Chinese are toward foreign countries.

**EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF TRUST AND MISTRUST IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES**

On average, the urban Chinese participants in the 2012 RCCC survey mistrusted foreign countries, but the extent of their mistrust varied both meaningfully and substantially (see figure 1). The sequence of countries, with Japan the least trusted, followed by the Philippines, the United States, and Vietnam, makes intuitive sense, as does urban Chinese participants viewing Russia and Pakistan as the most trustworthy, though even they were not to be trusted either (2.5 is the scale midpoint). This pattern of differences was very large.\textsuperscript{17} For instance, Russia was trusted massively more than Japan (2.6 for Russia on a 1-to-4 scale versus 1.6 for Japan).\textsuperscript{18}

**FIGURE 1: URBAN CHINESE MISTRUST MOST COUNTRIES, BUT SOME MUCH MORE THAN OTHERS**

![Bar chart showing mistrust levels of various countries among urban Chinese participants, with Russia at 2.6 and Japan at 1.6 on a 1-to-4 scale. The dashed line at 2.5 represents the neutral midpoint.](chart.png)

Note: Bars represent means for the full urban Chinese sample, in ascending order. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of 2.5 on the 1-to-4 scale.
We also created a composite scale for trust in all ten foreign countries and found that its mean ($M = 2.06$) was well below the scale midpoint of 2.5. That the Chinese participants in the survey were extremely mistrustful of the ten countries listed is consistent with national narratives of Chinese victimization at the hands of foreigners. Of course, a list of ten different countries may have produced a different result. But given the massive size of the differences revealed here, it seems likely that any ten foreign countries would be substantially mistrusted.

Americans, meanwhile, trust some countries but mistrust others. The sequence in the corresponding pattern in the U.S. general population survey conducted by Pew in 2012 also makes intuitive sense, with Pakistan the least trusted, followed by China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia (see figure 2). Britain was the most trusted, followed by fellow democracies Japan, Israel, France, and India. Overall variation was again massive, with Britain vastly more trusted than Pakistan (3.3 for Britain on a scale of 4.0 versus 1.6 for Pakistan). Compared with the scale midpoint of 2.5, Americans were only very slightly mistrusting of the nine countries included in the battery. Americans trust some countries but mistrust others.

**FIGURE 2: AMERICANS TRUST SOME COUNTRIES AND DISTRUST OTHERS**

Note: Bars represent means for the full U.S. sample, in ascending order. The dashed line represents the midpoint of 2.5 on the 1-to-4 scale.
At the aggregate level, therefore, both the Chinese and U.S. data vary both substantially and meaningfully. But what about the individual level? What are the individual-level predictors of trust in foreign countries?

In the U.S. data, demographic variables significantly predict trust in our nine foreign countries, on average accounting for a substantial 6.5 percent of the variance in trust for the average foreign country. For instance, gender significantly predicts three country ratings, age predicts seven, being black predicts two, being Hispanic predicts four, income predicts two, and education predicts four. This sizable impact of demographic variables is consistent with other surveys of American feelings toward other countries.24

Similar individual differences variables fail, however, to predict any variation at all in trust in foreign countries in the Chinese data. On average, in China demographics predict less than 1 percent of the variation in trust in any of the ten foreign countries in the RCCC survey. Gender, age, and education predict just two country ratings each, while being a member of a minority group, a member of the CCP, and income predict just one country each.

This is puzzling. For instance, one might think that older Chinese, having personally experienced the Cold War, might be less trusting of “American imperialists” (美帝) and “Soviet revisionists” (苏修) than younger generations with no direct experience of those conflicts and plenty of exposure to American popular culture. But age had no effect on trust in either the United States or Russia.25

Other individual difference variables exhibit the same pattern, accounting for variation in trust toward foreign countries in the U.S. sample but not Chinese sample. For instance, in the U.S. sample, self-reported ideology (conservative to liberal) significantly predicts six of the nine foreign country ratings over and beyond the effects of the demographic variables that could predict the outcome, accounting on average for 1.5 percent of unique variance in the country trust-dependent measures. By contrast, in the Chinese sample, a similar self-reported ideology question (“conservative” [保守] to “open” [开放]) does not significantly predict any country ratings.

That raises the question of whether the failure of such individual difference variables to predict trust in foreign countries is due to poor measurement or because they simply matter less in the Chinese context.

Further analyses revealed that the demographic variables all appear to have been well measured because they do predict other variables in the Chinese data set, both substantially and in the expected directions. For example, the 2012 RCCC survey included the question, “Over the past month, how frequently did you obtain international news from the following sources?” The five sources, rated on a five-point scale from “very frequently” to “not at all,” were newspapers and magazines, books, TV, the Internet, and mobile phone texting and mobile Internet. To control for individual differences in either over- or
underreporting news consumption, we added all five responses together to create a measure of total self-reported international news consumption, and then divided each of the five sources into it and multiplied by 100, creating a “percent of international news” from each media source variable for each.

Age was a powerful predictor of the percentage of international news consumption respondents reported from old media (newspapers and magazines) and new media (the Internet and mobile devices) and in the expected directions: greater age was strongly associated with greater consumption of old media and much less consumption of new media (see figure 3). Education, furthermore, was strongly associated with getting a greater share of one’s international news from new media. Together, all the demographic variables accounted for 11 percent of the variance in the percentage of news from old media versus a remarkable 32 percent of the variance in the percentage of international news from new media.

**FIGURE 3: DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTORS OF THE PERCENT OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS CONSUMPTION FROM OLD AND NEW MEDIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>% International News from Old Media</th>
<th>% International News from New Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>-.01**</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>.03**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, n.s. = not significant; all other $p$’s < .001. Line thickness reflects the size of the standardized $\beta$. Old media are newspapers and magazines; new media are mobile phone texting and the Internet.

Similar results can be found for participant ratings of subjective interest in and attention to international affairs. The RCCC survey included the questions: “Are you interested in international news?” and “To what extent do you pay attention to international affairs?” These two items cohered well and were substantially predicted by every demographic variable as well as the ideology variable, accounting for a full 13 percent of its variance.

So why would demographics and other individual difference variables such as ideology matter substantially for some variables (for example, media consumption) but not at all for others (trust in foreign countries)? One possibility is that the type of question matters.
Social psychologists have shown that people think differently about objective questions than they do about evaluative questions. When people answer objective questions, they rely on factual data, but when they answer evaluative questions they tend to rely upon external authorities or the preferences of salient others. In other words, the type of question may affect how people respond to it.

Consider the question, “Over the past month, how frequently did you use the following media to gather international news? . . . Internet.” The question is objective/factual. To answer it, a Chinese respondent would most likely rely upon his or her actual experiences. The respondent might read a fair amount of international news on the Internet, while the respondent’s parents may read hardly any news on the Internet. In other words, individual differences in people’s experiences should predict their responses to objective questions.

By contrast, “To what extent do you believe that China can trust the following countries? . . . Russia” is a very different kind of question. It involves emotion and is ultimately an evaluation of how a Chinese respondent imagines China’s relationship to Russia. So we might expect respondents to rely more upon other people’s preferences, values, and authority in responding to such questions. Individual differences in personality may matter less, especially if strong social or political pressures are shaping an individual’s response. This effect may be stronger in China than the United States due to China’s more collectivist social context.

In short, demographics were properly measured and do matter in China. Not all Chinese are alike. When asked objective questions, Chinese seem more likely to show variation in their responses. They likely rely on their actual behaviors, as there is no reason to try to manage one’s impression about media consumption. However, when Chinese respond to evaluative questions such as the RCCC country trust question, they seem more likely to rely upon the views of others. They then respond with attitudes that are unrelated to who they are (such as their age and gender) or what they believe (such as conservative or open ideologies).

**TESTING FOR TOP-DOWN SOCIALIZATION EFFECTS**

If greater education or media exposure was associated with responses closer to the group mean, it would be strong evidence of socialization effects. It would imply that pressure from social or political institutions is exerting a top-down influence on participant responses. We therefore created a mean deviation score for each trust variable in the Chinese
data set. To do so, we subtracted the mean score for each country trust variable from each participant’s individual rating of trust in that country and took the absolute value of the resulting difference score. With this measure, higher values represent scores farther from the sample mean, and lower scores represent scores closer to the sample mean. This measure is useful because it can reveal how differences in socialization (the “Big Brother” effect) shape participant responses relative to the group mean, regardless of whether that consensus view is socially or politically constructed.

These ten difference scores were averaged together to create a reliable scale that we regressed onto our five demographic variables (age, gender, income, being a member of a minority group, or being a CCP member), education and total international news consumption (our variables of primary interest), and individual differences in interest in international affairs and openness-conservatism. This model allows for a strong test of the effects of socialization (for example, education and media) versus personality (interest and ideology). If socialization is occurring in the Chinese population, greater education and/or media exposure should predict answers closer to the sample mean.

The overall regression model for the transformed country trust ratings was significant. There was a small main effect of gender (women scored slightly closer to the group mean than men), but no other demographic variable significantly predicted an individual’s deviation from the group mean. Among the socialization variables, education as well as quantity of news from television significantly predicted the deviation scores. Additionally, there was a marginal effect of quantity of news from newsprint in the opposite direction. As expected, Chinese respondents who had more education and who got more of their news from television were more likely to give responses closer to the group mean. Surprisingly, the opposite was true of people who got more of their news from newsprint. They were marginally more likely to give responses further from the group mean. Perhaps they were reading fewer official and more commercial newspapers and magazines. Personality differences had no effect at all.

These results suggest that in China, top-down socialization through education may be overriding individual differences in personality in accounting for responses to evaluative questions like how much China should trust specific foreign countries. However, a parallel regression was conducted using the U.S. threat scale as the dependent measure, and there were no significant effects.

To resolve this inconsistency, we sought out other sources of data to test for replicability. We first analyzed a convenience Internet sample fielded in China in fall 2013. The sample of 187 Chinese was relatively well educated and was not representative of the larger population (70 percent were male and the average age was twenty-three). Participants were asked to indicate how coolly or warmly they felt toward the United States and three other countries (Canada, Brazil, and South Africa) on a 0 (cool) to 10 (warm) feeling thermometer.
We created the same deviation scale described above and regressed it onto our demographic variables of gender, age, income, and education. As expected, only education significantly predicted the deviation scores. In other words, even in a sample suffering from range restriction on education level, greater education was substantially associated with responses closer to the group mean, again suggesting a top-down socialization effect.

The Asian Barometer survey provides further support for a socialization effect. In its 2006 nationally representative face-to-face survey, Chinese participants rated, on a scale of 1 (“don’t trust at all”) to 4 (“trust a lot”) how much they trusted their central and local governments as well as the dominant political party. Age and education significantly predicted deviation from the group mean. Again, more educated participants were more likely to respond closer to the average view.

To compare these Chinese results with a U.S. sample, we also conducted a parallel analysis with Pew’s 2012 U.S. general population data. We regressed a scale of the same deviation scores for trust in the nine foreign countries listed in figure 2 onto gender, age, income, ethnicity (Hispanic), and race (black), as well as education and ideology. Education did not significantly predict the mean difference scores, though the relationship was in the same direction. However, ethnicity and race predicted greater distance from the group mean, while income predicted greater harmony with the group consensus. These U.S. findings further support the idea that individual differences such as ethnicity, race, and income shape country trust attitudes in the American context, contrasting their lack of effect in the Chinese data.

Taken together, these analyses provide evidence for a group socialization effect on evaluative questions in the Chinese context—but not the American context. Greater exposure to the Chinese educational system is repeatedly associated with greater congruence between a Chinese respondent’s individual response and the group mean. This was the case across three independent Chinese samples using three distinct dependent measures: country trust (RCCC 2012 data), warmth toward foreign countries (University of Oklahoma 2013 data), and trust in the Chinese government (Asian Barometer 2006 data).

The only exception was the U.S. threat scale in the RCCC 2012 data, where education did not predict deviation from the group mean. This anomaly may be due to question design. The question asked for assessments of the seriousness of eight “problems” (问题) that China faces. Six of the eight questions, however, referred specifically to the United States, one explicitly describing the United States as “hegemonic” or “bullying” (霸权), perhaps constructing the very U.S. threat the question sought to measure. Indeed, our five-item U.S. threat scale was substantially skewed toward the threat end of the distribution.
Given convergent evidence across three independent samples, it seems reasonable to conclude that education systematically shapes Chinese responses to evaluative questions. The more educated a participant was, the more likely the participant was to respond closer to the group mean. We did not find any direct effect of news consumption, however. Although correlational data such as these cannot test the precise reasons that educated participants are more likely to respond this way, we can conditionally say that there is likely a top-down socialization effect of the Chinese government or Chinese society on evaluations made by Chinese survey respondents—or both factors.

**A PERSON-BY-SITUATION APPROACH**

While individual differences such as age and gender did not have direct effects on evaluative questions like trust in foreign countries in the RCCC 2012 data, and there is convergent evidence that top-down socialization pressures are at work, could individual differences interact with socialization variables in shaping evaluative attitudes? In other words, might different kinds of Chinese respond to the same socialization pressures in disparate ways?

Research in social psychology shows that the content of the messages people receive from their social environment does not affect everyone the same way. For the messages to shape their attitudes, people need to interpret them. According to Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model, when people process information “peripherally,” they tend to do so in a shallow way, using simplifying heuristics. Fittingly, people processing peripherally tend to be easily influenced by humor or weak arguments or by social authorities. In contrast, when people process information “centrally,” they pay attention to the content of the message and are more persuaded by strong, factual arguments that present a solid case for an issue.

To process centrally, a person must be motivated to pay attention to the situation. This might occur because the information is self-relevant or because the person simply tends to think in a deep way about issues. In addition, people who are motivated to pay attention to arguments tend to form more positive attitudes toward persuasive arguments, while those who are less motivated tend to form more negative attitudes. In short, personal motivation affects whether people pay attention to the messages they receive, and that in turn shapes the attitudes they ultimately endorse.

Interestingly, the quantity of arguments people are exposed to can shape their attitudes as well. With “mere exposure” to a stimulus, people typically form more positive attitudes toward it. In the persuasion context, Cacioppo and Petty showed that people exposed to a few arguments tended to form positive attitudes and favorable thoughts toward them. However, as the number of arguments participants were exposed to increased, the number
of their unfavorable thoughts increased as well, leading to more negative attitudes. This supports the notion that people actively interpret the information they receive. Quantity of exposure can shape the valence of resulting attitudes, in both positive and negative directions.

Threat can also moderate the impact of mere exposure on attitudes. Richard J. Crisp and colleagues showed that repeatedly exposing British participants to French names increased liking for those names. However, if participants were threatened by first being told that French people did not like British names, the effect reversed. That is, under threat greater exposure led to more negative attitudes toward the stimulus. Thus, whether a person feels threatened will affect how exposure to information shapes the person’s attitudes and beliefs.

As for how this might connect to attitudes toward foreign affairs, Chinese education and media may paint a picture of foreign countries that makes them seem less trustworthy, and the United States specifically as threatening. However, only people who pay attention to the content of those messages should adopt these negative views. This is most likely to be the case with people who are highly interested in international affairs. Presumably, these people see news about other countries as self-relevant and potentially threatening. So they likely rely on the central route to persuasion and can be expected to assimilate the perspectives they receive from their education and the media.

That might not be the case with all Chinese people, though. Among Chinese less interested in international affairs, a different pattern could arise. Because the information they are exposed to is less self-relevant for them, they could process it peripherally. In that case, the content of the messages will matter less. Merely being exposed to information could show the opposite effect of those who process centrally: greater education and news consumption could lead to more positive attitudes toward foreign countries like the United States. Specifically, merely mentioning the United States could be associated with more positive views of the country.

In sum, we propose a person-by-situation interaction in accounting for international evaluations. Chinese attitudes will be the product of both the person (that is, the person’s interest in foreign affairs) and the sources of socialization the person is exposed to (education level, exposure to international news, or both). These variables should interact to predict participant attitudes. The content or valence of the messages that participants receive should matter more among those more interested in international affairs, while the mere exposure effect should matter more for people who are less interested.

To explore these hypotheses, we conducted a series of hierarchical linear regressions using interest in international affairs (person variable), education (situational variable), and news consumption (situational variable) as our predictors of primary interest. In these analyses, we relied on the raw (that is, non-transformed) data from the survey. In the first step of
the regressions, we entered the demographics: gender, age, income, and the dummy variables for being a CCP member or a member of a minority group. In the second step we entered education, news consumption, and interest in international affairs as main effects. In the third step we entered three interaction terms into the regression. This allowed us to test under what specific circumstances education, interest, and media consumption shape judgments of trust and threat from foreign countries in general, and the United States in particular.

It turns out that the six standard demographic variables accounted for almost no variation in our three dependent measures: a scale of trust in ten foreign countries, a scale of five items tapping the U.S. threat, and a single item tapping trust in the United States (see table 1). However, education, news consumption, and interest in foreign affairs interacted in different ways to predict all three of our dependent variables. We address each in turn.

**TABLE 1: REGRESSIONS OF TRUST AND THREAT VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust in Ten Foreign Countries (α = .87)</th>
<th>U.S. Threat (α = .83)</th>
<th>Trust U.S. N = 2,245</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 1,665)</td>
<td>(N = 1,765)</td>
<td>(N = 2,245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP membership</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(.07^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta R^2)</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in foreign affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(.08^*)</td>
<td>(-.07^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News consumption</td>
<td>(.13^{***})</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(.14^{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta R^2)</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education X interest</td>
<td>(-.10^{**})</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ. X news consumption</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News consumption X interest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(.07^*)</td>
<td>(-.07^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta R^2)</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (R^2)</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * \(p < .05\), ** \(p < .01\), *** \(p < .001\). Betas listed are standardized and from the final step of the regression. Only significant betas are reported.
Trust in Foreign Countries
In terms of overall trust toward ten foreign countries, there was a small but positive main effect of total news consumption. Participants who consumed more media tended to trust other nations slightly more.

This main effect was qualified, however, by a significant interaction between education and interest in international affairs (see figure 4). Among participants who were less interested in foreign affairs, greater education was associated with greater trust in foreign countries. The reverse was true, however, among those more interested in foreign affairs: for them, greater education was associated with less trust in foreign countries.

FIGURE 4: INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND EDUCATION NEGATE EACH OTHER

Education level thus has opposing effects on different types of Chinese people. Among those less interested in foreign affairs, greater education is associated with greater trust in foreign countries. In terms of Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion, these people likely respond peripherally. Not paying much attention, the mere exposure effect suggests that they ignore the negative content of educational messages and simply become more familiar with, and thus more trusting of, the foreign countries they hear more about.

However, the opposite is the case among those Chinese citizens who indicate high interest in foreign affairs. The more education they have, the more convinced they become that other nations are not to be trusted. In terms of Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration
Likelihood Model of persuasion, these people are engaging the central route and assimilating the messages they receive: as those more interested in international affairs are exposed to more education, they become more convinced that other nations are self-interested and cannot be trusted.

The slopes, notably, are in opposite directions. Taken together, interest in international affairs and education negate each other, so there was no direct effect of either on trust in foreign countries. These opposing effects may help explain why there is little effect of demographic or ideological variables on evaluative attitudes in the Chinese data set: people with different motivations believe opposing things—canceling each other out in the full sample level.

America: The “Beautiful Imperialist”
In terms of the threat posed by the United States, Chinese who were more interested in international affairs tended to evaluate the United States as slightly more threatening than those with less interest in international affairs. This main effect was qualified, however, by a significant interaction between news consumption and interest in international affairs, with news consumption affecting people differently based upon their subjective motivation.

When news consumption was low, there were no differences among participants (see figure 5). When news consumption was high, however, people with high interest in international affairs found the United States more threatening, while people with low

*FIGURE 5: GREATER INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRES WAS ASSOCIATED WITH A GREATER PERCEPTION OF THREAT FROM THE UNITED STATES—BUT ONLY AMONG THOSE WHO CONSUMED MORE INTERNATIONAL NEWS*
interest in international affairs found the United States less threatening.\textsuperscript{51} Once again, those who were more interested seemed to be processing centrally: the more they were exposed to international news, the more they perceived a rival nation such as the United States as threatening. However, people who were less interested in foreign affairs seemed to be processing peripherally: with more exposure to news, they tended to see the United States as less threatening. In short, different motivations led to different attitudinal outcomes.

Given that U.S.-China relations are the most important state-to-state relationship of the twenty-first century, we also decided to examine the Chinese survey’s single item measure of trust in the United States.\textsuperscript{52} Looking back at table 1, there were positive main effects for education and total news consumption.\textsuperscript{53} In other words, both greater education and greater news consumption were associated with greater trust in the United States. However, there was a negative main effect of interest in foreign affairs: those more interested in foreign affairs tended to trust the United States less.\textsuperscript{54}

These main effects were qualified, however, by a significant interaction between news consumption and interest in international news.\textsuperscript{55} Among those less interested in foreign affairs, higher news consumption was associated with greater trust in the United States (see figure 6). International news consumption, however, did not affect the attitudes of participants more interested in foreign affairs. This finding again suggests a “mere exposure” effect among Chinese who are high in news consumption but low in interest: they process information peripherally, ignoring the negative content of messages. The more they hear the United States mentioned, the more trusting they become of it.

\textbf{FIGURE 6: GREATER NEWS CONSUMPTION IS ASSOCIATED WITH GREATER TRUST IN THE UNITED STATES—BUT ONLY AMONG THOSE LESS INTERESTED IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS}
CONCLUSION: “BIG BROTHER” IN CHINESE SURVEYS

Advances in the sampling methods used by the Research Center for Contemporary China, the Asian Barometer, and the World Values Survey have been substantial. Yet these surveys continue to be conducted face-to-face, introducing the problem of self-presentation effects. That approach inherently raises the possibility that respondents hide their true attitudes from strangers, due to either the fear of political repercussion or a social desire to conform.

What are the primary drivers of Chinese attitudes? Do “bottom-up” psychological variables, such as individual differences in interest in international affairs or demographic variables like age and gender, shape Chinese attitudes? Or do “top-down” political or social pressures smother individual differences in shaping the attitudes of the Chinese people?

Based on the analysis of four independent data sets, with a focus on the 2012 RCCC’s contribution to the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey, we find that the answer is highly contingent. When it comes to relatively objective questions, such as how frequently a respondent consumes different media sources, or how interested the respondent is in international affairs, bottom-up demographic characteristics matter. For instance, age was very substantially and positively associated with consumption of old media, and strongly negatively related to the use of new media. So face-to-face surveys conducted in China can produce reliable results revealing expected differences between various types of people.

Yet there was also substantial support for a top-down “Big Brother” socialization effect in all three Chinese samples. When it came to evaluative questions, such as how much a respondent trusted his own government or a list of foreign countries, the bottom-up demographic differences regularly found in U.S. surveys did not appear. For instance, while trust in a list of ten foreign countries varied both substantially and meaningfully at the aggregate level, at the individual level age, gender, and other demographic variables could not explain any variation at all in trust in foreign countries.

Among our demographic variables, education best explains this group consensus effect on evaluative questions. Across three independent Chinese samples, we found that more years of education was the only variable associated with responses closer to the group mean. This finding provides strong support for a top-down socialization effect: when it comes to sensitive evaluative questions, Chinese appear to be educated into greater awareness of the socially or politically acceptable position.

Surveys continue to be conducted face-to-face, raising the possibility that respondents hide their true attitudes.
Intriguingly, however, individual differences in the bottom-up psychological variable of interest in international affairs interacted with top-down socialization variables of education and quantity of news consumption in shaping even evaluative attitudes. Whether the dependent variable was trust in the United States, trust in all ten foreign countries, or how threatening the respondent viewed the United States, it was only those Chinese dispositionally interested in international news who processed the messages they received centrally, assimilating an attitude of mistrust toward the United States and the world.

By contrast, those Chinese less interested in international affairs appear to have processed the socialization messages they received peripherally, ignoring the negative content of the messages. Indeed, there appears to have been a passive “mere exposure” effect, in which increased exposure to news about America contributed, ironically, to greater familiarity with and trust in America. It is also possible, of course, that those with less interest in international affairs responded actively with reactance against the negative evaluations of America and the world they were exposed to, deliberately increasing their trust. Our correlational data cannot tell us why those Chinese dispositionally less interested in international affairs responded to greater news consumption with greater trust in the United States and the world—only that the pattern was consistent across a range of international attitudes. We suggest that it is because these people engage in peripheral processing, so that the mere exposure effect makes them more familiar with and thus more trusting of foreign countries.

In short, while demographic variables such as age clearly matter for objective questions like news consumption, and dispositional differences in people’s interest in international affairs do shape evaluative questions such as the extent of trust in foreign countries, we find that Chinese responses to evaluative questions are shaped by top-down socialization pressures. Education predicted less deviation from the group mean, but news consumption did not. Therefore, at least in the RCCC survey, the educational system seems to be a greater influence shaping participant attitudes than the media.

Alas, this analysis cannot identify exactly who “Big Brother” is. It could be the CCP, with its extensive educational and propaganda apparatus, powerfully shaping evaluative attitudes. But it could also be “Zhang Three and Li Four,” the imagined disciplining eyes of the typical Chinese on the street—of society as a whole. Social pressures to conform, which are so well documented in the West, are likely even stronger in China, where collectivist norms are more prevalent.

In sum, when asked sensitive evaluative questions like how much they trust their local and central governments or different foreign countries, Chinese survey respondents appear more likely than American respondents to ask themselves, “Whom do we trust?,” and search for the socially or politically desirable response, rather than answering based on their own opinion.
While not all Chinese respond to it in the same ways, the Chinese educational system appears to play a major role in socializing the Chinese people into a “correct” view of the world. Chinese and American scholars and policymakers who seek to avoid another U.S.-China conflict, therefore, should pay more attention to the role of the Chinese educational system in “securitizing” international affairs: constructing a vision of a threatening world full of untrustworthy states. Over the long run, reforming Chinese school textbooks and other propaganda materials, such as movies and newscasts, could go a long way toward easing Chinese mistrust of the world in general and the United States in particular.

NOTES


5 Yun-han Chu, “Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate Over the Chinese Model,” Asian Barometer Working Paper Series 52, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica and Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 2011.


10 See, for example, Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Berlin: Schocken Books, 1951).

11 The two intermediate categories were “somewhat trust” and “don’t really trust.” While the four response categories are technically categorical, they are presented and thus most likely understood as representing a continuum of trust that the respondent must refer to in answering the interviewer’s question. This is particularly true in the context of a lengthy rating scale where the interviewer repeatedly prompts country names without necessarily repeating the answer categories.

12 Cronbach’s $\alpha = .83$. Cronbach’s $\alpha$ is an index of the internal consistency or reliability of the items that together form a scale. Values range from 0 to 1, with those closer to 1 reflecting less random “noise” (that is, unreliability) in the measure. Alphas of .60 or higher are generally desirable. However, longer scales artificially inflate the alpha, so lower scores on shorter scales can also be acceptable.


17 $F(9, 1664) = 552.20, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .25$. Partial eta squared ($\eta^2_p$) is an effect size statistic used in reporting of analysis of variance (ANOVA) results. $\eta^2_p$ of .1 can be interpreted as small, .06 as medium, and .14 as large. So .25 is extremely large.

18 $t(2015) = 49.86, p < .001, \text{Cohen's } d = 1.48$. A Cohen’s $d$ of .8 is considered large.

19 $t(1665) = -35.35, p < .001, \text{Cohen's } d = 1.23$.


21 $F(8, 784) = 458.43, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .37$.

22 $t(905) = 48.36, p < .001, \text{Cohen's } d = 2.27$. 
23Nine countries scale $\alpha = .77; M = 2.46, SD = .49; \text{ small difference of } -0.04 \text{ from the scale midpoint, } t(784) = -2.38, p = .02, \text{ Cohen's } d = -.12.$

24See, for example, Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy.

25$p = .87$ and $p = .97$ for the United States and Russia, respectively.

26$\beta = .30$ and -.44, respectively. Both $p's < .001.$


29See, for example, Harry C. Triandis, Individualism & Collectivism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

30$R^2 = .037, F(13, 896) = 2.67, p = .001.$

31$\beta = -.09, t = -2.50, p = .01.$

32$\beta = -.11, t = -2.73, p < .01, \text{ and } \beta = -.09, t = -2.37, p < .05, \text{ respectively.}$

33$\beta = .08, t = 1.88, p = .06.$

34All $p's > .51.$

35Model $p = .34.$

36$\beta = -.21, t = -2.61, p = .01.$ Scale $\alpha = .77.$

37The modal response for all five items was a full 4 out of a possible 4, and the skewness statistic approached the conventional cutoff of absolute one at -.89, SD = .06.


45 The internal reliabilities of the two scales were very good: $\alpha = .87$ and .83, respectively.

46 $\beta = -.10, p = .01, \Delta R^2 = .007, F = 6.58$.

47 $\beta = .02, p = .05$.

48 $\beta = -.01, p = .04$.

49 Both $\beta = .01, p's > .75$; see table 1.

50 $\beta = .07, p = .04, \Delta R^2 = .004, F = 4.18$.

51 $\beta = .11, p < .01$.

52 $R^2 = .022, F(11, 1266) = 2.55, p = .003$.

53 $\beta = .07, p = .04$, and $\beta = .14, p < .001$, respectively.

54 $\beta = -.07, p = .04$.

55 $\beta = -.07, p = .03, \Delta R^2 = .004, F = 4.52$.


57 In psychology, reactance refers to psychological resistance to choices being removed, leading to choosing precisely the behavior or belief that is being removed by others. See Matthew T. Crawford, Allen R. McConnell, Amy C. Lewis, and Steven J. Sherman, “Reactance, Compliance, and Anticipated Regret,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 38, no. 1 (January 2002): 56–63.


60 Triandis, *Individualism & Collectivism*. 
INTRODUCTION

DESPITE THE RAPID growth in the size and influence of the Tea Party, its policy focus is overwhelmingly on domestic issues, such as government spending, taxation, the Second Amendment, welfare, and homosexuality. Tea Party organizations appear to say little directly about major foreign policy issues of the day. The web page for FreedomWorks, one of the main national-level Tea Party supporter organizations, has no separate listing for foreign or national security policies under its menu of issues. On many local Tea Party groups’ web pages, the closest they come to foreign policy issues are positions on immigration or opposition to certain issues associated with the “new world order” and other perceived threats to American sovereignty (for example, Agenda 21 on sustainable development or the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities). In short, domestic politics dominate the attention of Tea Party supporters.¹

National-level Tea Party leaders do take foreign policy positions, of course, but there can be considerable differences among them. For instance, Rand Paul and Ted Cruz have criticized each other’s approaches to foreign policy. Cruz has stated, “We should understand that we don’t deal with nations like Russia and China by embracing arm and arm, and singing kumbaya. The one thing Russia and China understand and respect is strength.”² Paul seems less enamored of the peace-through-strength approach. “To my mind, the key and the answer to
PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN AMERICAN AND CHINESE VIEWS OF THE OTHER

the Middle East as well as to North Korea as well as to a lot of vexing problems requires us to work with Russia, and to work with China.”

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that there is very little scholarly analysis of the foreign policy preferences of Tea Party supporters. There are a couple of exceptions. One is Walter Russell Mead’s discussion of the Tea Party’s Jacksonian roots, in which he suggests the movement combines a vigorous and militarized defense of U.S. vital interests with skepticism about being able to change the internal sources of external threats such as regime change.

In the only survey-based study of Tea Party supporters’ foreign policy preferences, Brian C. Rathbun confirms some of Mead’s observations about the Jacksonian influence, but generalizes this under the rubric of a militant internationalist orientation. That is, Tea Party supporters tend to believe more strongly in the need for the United States to demonstrate its resolve so as not to be exploited by others and to use force when faced with external threats. This is rooted in strong social conservatism and a highly pessimistic view of human nature and the ubiquity of interstate conflict.

Mead’s and Rathbun’s findings are consistent with descriptions from more popular punditry about Tea Party supporters’ foreign policy preferences. These commentaries suggest that the supporters are distinctly hardline on foreign policy issues, willing to use high levels of military force in defense of immediate U.S. interests but suspicious of entangling commitments and thus less likely to support policies aimed at regime change in other countries.

In this regard, then, there does not seem to be much debate over the observed or latent foreign policy preferences of Tea Party supporters. However, to date no one has looked at Tea Party supporters’ opinions on China policy per se. Using the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey coordinated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, a preliminary analysis is consistent with the implications in Mead’s and Rathbun’s findings that Tea Party supporters are among the toughest critics of the Obama administration, accusing the U.S. president of being soft on China. They mistrust China and favor strong responses to its military and economic power.

Also consistent with Mead and Rathbun, Tea Party supporters are not particularly interested in attempting to change China’s internal character, ranking human rights issues lower on their list of priorities on China policy than military or economic issues.
DATA ANALYSIS

Starting with some simple analyses comparing the views of Tea Party supporters and those who do not support the Tea Party, the first observation is that supporters are much less likely than non-supporters to trust China. When asked how much they could trust China, Tea Party respondents were more likely to express the strongest negative view: “not at all” (see figure 1).

FIGURE 1: TRUST IN CHINA
QUESTION: HOW MUCH CAN THE UNITED STATES TRUST CHINA?

Along with this low level of trust, supporters of the Tea Party are also more likely than non-supporters to see China as an enemy than as a partner (see figure 2).

More specifically, compared with non–Tea Party supporters, Tea Party supporters are significantly more likely to believe that various elements of Chinese behavior constitute “very serious problems” for the United States. These problems include:

- loss of jobs to China
- trade deficit with China
- China-Taiwan tensions
- Chinese holding of U.S. debt
- China’s growing military power
- cyberattacks from China
The only China issue on which Tea Party supporters do not differ significantly from non–Tea Party supporters concerns human rights. And consistent with their perception of climate change, supporters of the Tea Party are less likely than non-supporters to worry about China’s impact on climate change.

**FIGURE 3: ASSESSMENT OF OBAMA’S CHINA POLICY**

**QUESTION: IS CHINA A PARTNER, COMPETITOR, OR ENEMY?**

![Bar chart showing assessment of Obama's China policy](chart)

**FIGURE 2: CHINA AS AN ENEMY**

**QUESTION: IS CHINA A PARTNER, COMPETITOR, OR ENEMY?**

![Bar chart showing China as an enemy](chart)
As a consequence of this threat perception, it is not surprising that Tea Party supporters are much more likely than non-supporters to believe that President Barack Obama’s China policy has been too soft on China (see figure 3).\textsuperscript{18} This threat perception and criticism of current policy also lead Tea Party supporters to be more likely than non-supporters to demand toughness on a range of issues. For example, while Tea Party supporters are no more likely than non–Tea Party supporters to support building a stronger relationship with China, this is not a priority for them. Rather, the priority compared to non–Tea Party supporters is to be tough on economic and trade issues.\textsuperscript{19} On the sensitive U.S.-China issue of Taiwan, Tea Party supporters are more likely than non-supporters to consider tensions between mainland China and Taiwan as a very serious or serious problem for the United States.\textsuperscript{20} But in terms of solutions, they are also much more likely to support arms sales to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{21} They are also more likely to support the U.S. use of force to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China (see figure 4).\textsuperscript{22} \textbf{FIGURE 4: USING U.S. FORCE TO DEFEND TAIWAN} QUESTION: IF CHINA WERE TO USE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES USE MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND TAIWAN, OR NOT? In sum, in comparison with other respondents in the 2012 survey, Tea Party supporters clearly take the hardest line in their views of China. Interestingly, the motivation does not appear to be a concern about the authoritarian or “communist” nature of the regime. Indeed, Tea Party supporters are no different than
non–Tea Party supporters in terms of the importance they give to promoting human rights or supporting Tibet. Tea Party supporters, for example, rank these human rights issues below being tough on China economically (see figure 5).

**FIGURE 5: HIERARCHY OF CHINA POLICY CONCERNS**

**QUESTION: WHICH IS THE MOST IMPORTANT?**

This hierarchy of concerns may reflect libertarian or isolationist strains or hyper-sovereignty elements in Tea Party ideology (as in, we do not want other countries to interfere in our internal affairs, so we should not interfere in theirs). Or, more simply, the hierarchy may be an extension of the domestic economic focus of Tea Party politics.²³

Downplaying human rights may also reflect a Jacksonian tradition of domestic exceptionalism and external Hobbesianism. Jacksonians prefer to defend the U.S. example through material power rather than through the proactive promotion of the U.S. example abroad.²⁴

It is a little unclear to what extent out-group distancing and denigration or “othering” plays a role in these policy preferences. There is some limited evidence of ethnocentric
othering of Chinese people, but it does not appear to be decisive in this survey (see table 1). The table shows tetrachoric correlation coefficients, which essentially reflect the degree to which when respondents believe that the Chinese have negative (positive) traits they also believe that Americans have positive (negative) traits. As in the Rathbun chapter, negative coefficients indicate that respondents believe the Americans and Chinese demonstrate opposite traits (for example, if Americans are associated with X trait, Chinese people are not associated with X trait). If the coefficients are positive, this means the respondent believes both Chinese and Americans are associated with that trait.

When it comes to Tea Party supporters, there is only one trait with a large and negative coefficient—generosity—indicating that they believe Americans are generous but that Chinese people are not. However, on a range of other traits, Tea Party supporters believe Americans and Chinese are similar. What is notable about these shared traits, however, is that many of them are negative ones (violent, arrogant, aggressive). This suggests that Tea Party supporters have a darker vision of people in general. This attitude may contribute to the higher perception of threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAIT</th>
<th>Not a Tea Party Supporter</th>
<th>Tea Party Supporter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greedy</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rude</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The puzzle is that research shows that out-group othering is a prominent feature of Tea Party worldviews (mainly anti-black, anti-immigrant, and anti-homosexual). This othering, however, does not appear to show up much in the answers to specific questions about Chinese traits. It is possible that the othering is mainly domestic, aimed at blacks and Muslims, which explains the anti-Obama and “Obama is a Muslim” sentiments.
The pathway from the Tea Party tendency to dramatically “other” domestic out-groups to foreign policy may be through the production of a generalized fear and a heightened perception of danger, and thus an emphasis on relative gains.28

Extended to foreign policy, this means that for Tea Party supporters the world is an especially dangerous and competitive place. Interestingly, the 2012 poll asks respondents to rank the degree of threat from a number of international developments: China’s emergence as a world power; political instability in Pakistan; the Iranian nuclear program; the North Korean nuclear program; international financial instability; Mexican drug violence; Islamic extremism; and climate change.

In six of these eight cases, Tea Party supporters are statistically more likely than non–Tea Party supporters to consider the issue as a “major threat.” Climate change is, of course, dismissed as a threat, and in the case of Pakistan’s instability, Tea Party supporters’ assessment of threat was not statistically different from that of non–Tea Party supporters.

This expansive threat perception is not explained by the fact that Tea Party supporters tend to identify with the Republican Party. In a couple of these cases, such as attitudes toward a rising China and the North Korean nuclear program, Tea Party supporters were no more likely than other Republicans to consider the issues as major threats. But in other instances—the prospect of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, international financial instability, Islamic extremism, and Mexican drug violence—they were even more worried than non–Tea Party GOP respondents.

This overall sense of danger may help account for perceptions of threat from China as well as the preferences for toughness against Chinese economic and military power. Fear of economic collapse and decline likely feeds into worries about the military and economic rise of China.29

While Tea Party supporters express significantly harder-line views of China and China policy, does identification with the Tea Party have any independent effect in predicting whether respondents support hardline policies when controlling for standard socioeconomic and demographic factors? Or is Tea Party support irrelevant? Typically the literature on policy preferences in American politics shows that ideological orientation on a conservative-liberal dimension and political party identification are powerful predictors. But Tea Party supporters are not identical to the GOP, and their worldviews do not wholly map onto conservative values. So it is possible that Tea Party support is an independent predictor of China policy preferences.

To test this hypothesis, I constructed a multivariable model using a range of attitudes about China and China policy as independent variables. The model was kept simple, including standard controls such as age, sex, race, level of education, income, party
identification, and ideology, along with support for the Tea Party as an independent variable. Tea Party identity turned out to be a relatively strong predictor of support for hardline attitudes and policies (see table 2).

For example, the odds that Tea Party supporters do not trust China are 2.3 times as great as for non–Tea Party supporters. Ideology and party identification are not significant. The odds that Tea Party supporters consider China an enemy are 2 times as great as for non–Tea Party supporters, controlling for the rest of the variables. Compared with a non–Tea Party supporter, being a Tea Party supporter increases by about 2 times the odds of believing the United States is not tough enough. In addition, the odds of Tea Party supporters supporting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are more than 2 times as great as for non–Tea Party supporters.

### TABLE 2: ODDS RATIOS FOR TEA PARTY CHINA POLICY POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Trust in China</th>
<th>China as Enemy</th>
<th>Not Tough Enough</th>
<th>Arms Sales to Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>0.651 *</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>0.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.765–1.511)</td>
<td>(0.433–0.979)</td>
<td>(0.756–1.446)</td>
<td>(0.607–1.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.545 *</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.589–1.269)</td>
<td>(0.344–0.866)</td>
<td>(0.586–1.227)</td>
<td>(0.669–1.375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.015 **</td>
<td>1.013 *</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>1.016 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.005–1.024)</td>
<td>(1.002–1.025)</td>
<td>(0.995–1.013)</td>
<td>(1.007–1.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1.658 **</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>1.536 *</td>
<td>0.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.093–2.515)</td>
<td>(0.476–1.454)</td>
<td>(1.010–2.338)</td>
<td>(0.448–1.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.097 *</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>1.134 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.012–1.190)</td>
<td>(0.886–1.075)</td>
<td>(0.954–1.110)</td>
<td>(1.049–1.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>0.732 **</td>
<td>0.717 ***</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.832–1.212)</td>
<td>(0.583–0.920)</td>
<td>(0.597–0.860)</td>
<td>(0.741–1.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>1.719 **</td>
<td>0.628 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.655–1.603)</td>
<td>(0.655–1.708)</td>
<td>(1.130–2.615)</td>
<td>(0.412–0.956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tea Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Party</td>
<td>2.324 ***</td>
<td>1.961 **</td>
<td>2.075 ***</td>
<td>2.32 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>1.330</td>
<td>0.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.211–1.191)</td>
<td>(0.138–1.094)</td>
<td>(0.571–3.095)</td>
<td>(0.299–1.608)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Odds ratios (95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses); * $p <= .05$, ** $p <= .01$, *** $p <= .001$. 

71
In many cases this effect is independent of ideology and party identification, suggesting that the characteristics of Tea Party support are distinct from these variables. For example, Republican Party identification is not a proxy for the Tea Party or vice versa; Tea Party support has an independent effect on hardline policies.32

This is clear from the statistical differences between Tea Party supporters and non–Tea Party supporters who are also GOP members. GOP Tea Party supporters are far more likely than GOP non–Tea Party supporters to see China as an enemy and not as a partner. Tea Party supporters are also more likely than other GOP supporters to believe that U.S. policy toward China has not been tough enough and are more likely than other Republicans to support arms to Taiwan. Indeed, the Tea Party may simply be a proxy for very hardline attitudes toward international relations. It is not surprising, then, that strongly held hardline beliefs are a significant predictor of tougher China policies.

CONCLUSION

The obvious question is whether Tea Party views of China and China policy are likely to be politically relevant in American foreign policy toward China. Many studies conclude that the Tea Party has helped drive the GOP further to the right, accounting for the larger number of Tea Party sympathizers in Congress after the midterm elections in 2010, 2012, and 2014. So one should expect the Tea Party to exercise considerable influence over 2016 GOP presidential and senatorial candidates.33

It is possible, of course, that neoconservatives will dominate the next GOP presidency on foreign policy issues. The Tea Party is much more focused on domestic issues than on foreign policy issues, and thus may not have strong preferences over the personnel in foreign policy and national security positions in a GOP administration.

Still, the Tea Party will provide a strong pool of support for more hardline military and economic policies toward China, though not necessarily for a more proactive focus on China’s human rights conditions (unless the anti-Christian religious discrimination element is emphasized).

Some suggest that Tea Party isolationist strands may lead to less interest in expanding U.S. capabilities and presence to offset Chinese power (the “rebalance” or “pivot”).34 The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey data suggest, however, that Tea Party supporters will, in fact, be very supportive of tougher China policy, including arms sales to Taiwan. Given
that Tea Party supporters are more likely than non–Tea Party supporters to trust Japan, they are likely to support strengthening military cooperation with Japan to counter China as well.

NOTES

1 I am grateful to Theda Skocpol for underscoring this point in an e-mail exchange with me in May 2013.


7 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Pew Research Center questionnaire asks, “From what you know, do you agree or disagree with the Tea Party movement, or don’t you have an opinion either way?” Those who said they agreed with the Tea Party movement were coded as supporters, and those who disagreed or who said they had no opinion were coded as non-supporters of the Tea Party.

8 $X^2 = 23.68, \ p = 0.000, N = 926.$

9 $X^2 = 30.97, \ p = 0.000, N = 926.$

10 $X^2 = 8.60, \ p = 0.035.$

11 $X^2 = 21.36, \ p = 0.000.$

12 $X^2 = 10.86, \ p = 0.013.$

13 $X^2 = 14.46, \ p = 0.002.$

14 $X^2 = 11.26, \ p = 0.010.$

15 $X^2 = 15.96, \ p = 0.001.$

16 $X^2 = 1.77, \ p = 0.622.$
PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN AMERICAN AND CHINESE VIEWS OF THE OTHER

17 $X^2 = 20.39, p = 0.000.$
18 $X^2 = 61.2906, p = 0.000.$
19 $X^2 = 18.6055, p = 0.001.$
20 $X^2 = 18.61, p = 0.001.$
21 $X^2 = 33.91, p = 0.000.$
22 $X^2 = 10.02, p = 0.002.$

23 Some studies argue that the Tea Party was born from libertarianism and has evolved mainly into a socially conservative, anti-Obama, and highly militaristic community. On the social conservatism at the heart of the Tea Party, see Eric D. Knowles, Brian S. Lowery, Elizabeth P. Shulman, and Elizabeth P. Schaumberg, “Race, Ideology, and the Tea Party: A Longitudinal Study,” PLoS ONE 8, no. 6 (June 2013). Others suggest that the anti-Washington and small government elements continue to dominate the Tea Party, or at least those who claim to represent it in Washington. See Juraj Medzihorsky, Levente Littvay, and Erin K. Jenne, “Has the Tea Party Era Radicalized the Republican Party? Evidence From Text Analysis of the 2008 and 2012 Republican Primary Debates,” PS: Political Science & Politics 47, no. 4 (October 2014). On these two orientations in the Tea Party, see Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservativism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 34–39. Skocpol and Williamson suggest that the religiously based conservatives—who tend not to be libertarian—dominate the local Tea Party organizations (p. 37).


25 In designing the questionnaire, Pew chose to use binary questions to measure perceptions of identity difference, such as: Are Chinese (Americans) associated with trait X or not? A more nuanced and proven protocol uses Osgood semantic differential questions, where respondents are asked to place their group and an out-group on a seven-point scale anchored by antonyms. The Pew questions, therefore, may be too blunt to capture variation in perceived identity difference.


27 Matt A. Barreto, Betsy L. Cooper, Benjamin Gonzalez, Christopher S. Parker, and Christopher Towler, “The Tea Party in the Age of Obama: Mainstream Conservativism or Out-Group
Anxiety?” Political Power and Social Theory 22 (2011), and Skocpol and Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 77–81. In the 2012 U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey data set, using the basic socioeconomic, demographic, and political identity variables as in the main models above, the odds that a Tea Party supporter disapproves of Obama’s job as a president are almost 10 times as high as for non–Tea Party supporters. These odds are almost 2 times as great as for those who identify themselves as Republicans. In short, a distinguishing feature of Tea Party supporters is hatred of Obama. Gries has shown using other data, however, that social dominance and social conservatism among conservative respondents predicts prejudiced views of Chinese people, which in turn predict support for harder-line policies. Peter H. Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives Over Foreign Affairs (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 221.


30 The dependent variables are all binary—China can be trusted or not, China is an enemy or not, U.S. policy is or is not tough enough, and the United States should sell arms to Taiwan or not. As for independent variables, the level of education is measured by a dummy variable with 1 for those with a bachelor’s degree or at least some postgraduate or professional education, and 0 for all other levels. Income is treated as a continuous variable of gross family income on a 1–9 scale representing $10,000 increments. Party identification is a dummy variable with 1 for those considering themselves to be Republicans and 0 for all others. Ideology is treated as a continuous variable on a 1–5 scale from very conservative to very liberal. A logit model was employed to estimate the odds ratios for the effect of the independent variables on change in the dependent variable. Don’t know and no answer responses are excluded.

31 Interestingly, those who self-identify as Republicans are less likely to support arms to Taiwan. This is the only issue on which Republicans and Tea Party supporters differ. It is possible the Republican reluctance reflects a fiscal conservatism or a more centrist realpolitik attitude that would eschew highly provocative policies aimed at China. On the question of defending Taiwan, being a Tea Party supporter was not a significant predictor of support for such an action. Rather, it seems that the Tea Party variable was subsumed in the powerful effect of Republican Party identification on the issue (Republicans strongly favored defending Taiwan if it were attacked by China). However, the question was asked of only those respondents who said they had heard “a lot” about the China-Taiwan issue. This reduced the number of observations dramatically, and probably selected in more informed conservative Republicans.

32 This is consistent with Gries’s finding about foreign policy differences between “Teavangelists” on the one hand and other Republicans on the other hand (Gries, *The Politics of American Foreign Policy*, 73–75, 270).


REFERENCES


The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues.

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