The Security Sector in Tunisia after the Uprising and in 2013

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Three years after the uprising of 14 January 2011, security remains one of the most outstanding and complicated issues in Tunisia, due to mounting terrorism and the increase in organized crime, as well as the sharp political crisis that has followed the faltering transition process and crumbling state institutions.

Fragile and volatile as this political, institutional, and security situation is, it undermines the State’s capacity to address security issues and reform its security sector. The challenges are immense, the stakes are high and the political will is yet to crystallize. Attempts, if any, to initiate reform or even effect change have fallen short of establishing a security system that breaks with the past and commits to public service in a democratic system. Future prospects thus remain uncertain.

Observers of the security and political situation, both inside and outside Tunisia, now seriously question the chances and feasibility of reform. Instability and threats have worn security services out, while mounting political wrangling has repeatedly hindered democratic transition, amid ongoing attempts to politicize and enmesh the security establishment in the cycle of conflicts. The government and state institutions involved in security, defense, and justice have also failed to handle the most important pending security issues, such as terrorism; organized crime, particularly smuggling; political violence (with the assassination of senior political leaders in Tunisia); as well as attempts to infiltrate security and military services in order to weaken them and throw the republican regime, state institutions, and the Tunisian society into disarray.

Security sector reform has faltered since the launch of the transition process and also during the constituent phase, amid lack of vision and strategy. As a result, no solid bases have been laid for democratic security institutions and good security governance.

This paper will review the most important phases of security sector reform in Tunisia. First, it will place reform in a security and political context, while highlighting the challenges and dilemmas it poses. Second, it will delve into the institutional framework in order to explain why reform has stumbled despite intensive efforts. Third, it will look into legal and constitutional aspects as a key prelude and prerequisite framework to promoting democratic practices within the security establishment, which necessitates real prioritization prior to the overhaul of the security system.
1. Political and security instability

There are various and intertwined reasons behind the plethora of challenges currently facing the security sector. Some are common; others are structural.

First: Shaky legitimacy of security and civil institutions and lack of political consensus among different stakeholders and key State institutions. The political situation clearly hangs over the security establishment, most notably the internal security services (police, National Guard, prisons and rehabilitation, and customs) and the Ministry of Interior. The latter too is unstable given the repeated reshuffle in its political and security leadership since January 2011.

For the security establishment to change gears and shift from its old role of protecting the regime to one that serves the citizen, it should address its current crisis of legitimacy, wisely and responsibly, (as should other statutory security providers, such as the Ministries of Defense and Justice). Security personnel are now gripped by a crisis of trust and legitimacy. The security apparatus is believed (whether rightly or wrongly) to exercise oppression, abuse power, and protect the interests of narrow segments of society. It is also reeling from the chasm that has affected state services, in the wake of the popular uprising against the political and constitutional regime in place. This has unsettled security services (including as an employer), and the security establishment now confronts the same challenges as the state and the ruling authority during the transition period.

The political climate should be purified, and harmony should be established among different key political stakeholders. This will create an environment conducive for the implementation of necessary reforms. Tunisia continues to lag behind on this front, despite the intensive efforts exerted through the ongoing National Dialogue and others. Meanwhile, pressing security issues and challenges should be addressed, particularly given the fact that they weigh the military and security establishment down, deepen the political crisis between the government, the opposition, and civil society, and embroil the military establishment in conflicts that weaken it.

Second: Limited state capabilities to address the multi-faceted security problem. The lack of security widens the chasm between citizens and security personnel, and jeopardizes democratization in Tunisia. It thus negatively impacts socioeconomic growth, and endangers democracy building. The ensuing tug-of-war, if unchecked, could lead to a cycle of violence, instability, and deterioration. The incidents of 2013 serve as a stark proof of this: political leaders were assassinated; multiple and massive terrorist operations were perpetrated; the internal security and armed forces came under attack; smuggling, including of weapons, mounted; and attempts were underway to plunge the Tunisian society into a cycle of violence.

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1 By the end of 2013, three ministers would have assumed the mantle of the Ministry of Interior during the course of the year, apart from the changing senior leadership of other security administrations, such as the Director-General of National Security, the Director-General of Specialized Services (Intelligence), the Director-General of Public Security, and the Commander of the National Guards.
Obviously, the state’s capacity to grapple with the social, economic, judicial, political, and military facets of the security problem, as part of a comprehensive vision that will place the security sector at the service of development, is still limited. Far from being stable, the security situation has deteriorated over the past two years. The process of reform has also stumbled for no reason. With respect to necessary legislative reforms, few draft laws have been enacted (such as the White Paper, the reform of the police law, the reform of the law on public meetings and assembly, among others.)

Weighted down by a plethora of security, military, and structural challenges, the state repeatedly extended the state of emergency between January 2011 and 30 June 2014\(^2\), declaring a border buffer zone\(^3\) and a military operation area\(^4\). It also responded to some of the social and professional demands brandished by the internal security and armed forces, as part of emergency measures that went beyond the mainstream overhaul of the security sector (the internal security forces had their right to unionize recognized and were provided with insurance for work-related accidents. Risk allowance was also increased.) The counterterrorism system was also reviewed. A new anti-terror law is being drafted, but is yet to be debated and voted by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).

Although these measures were meant to safeguard security and stability and provide more guarantees to those units operating in the security and defense sector, they saddled armed forces with a permanent presence on the ground and weakened their preparedness, particularly with the declaration of a state of emergency. Lifting the state of emergency has thus become a pressing and crucial demand today. Pressed by unions representing security and military personnel, the government also introduced some changes to the legal system and agreed to basic guarantees. The government will have to reconsider these guarantees when it embarks on a comprehensive security sector reform encompassing laws, institutions, and responsibilities, as part of revisiting the civilian-military relationship and the democratization of security and defense sector.

Therefore, the previous security policy that was grounded in maintaining the State and the regime’s stability and security should be reviewed based on the recognition of the close correlation between development and security. In so doing, the security establishment will become a partner in creating a stable social, economic, and political climate favorable for development.

**Third: Citizens’ distrust of security services because of previous abuses and ongoing impunity.** The security establishment should definitively break with its modus operandi that had turned it into a tool to perpetuate the old regime and shore up its interests through oppression, corruption, and bribery.

\(^2\) Republican Decision No. 300 for 2013, dated 2 November 2013, on the extension of the state of emergency across the Republic.
\(^3\) Republican Decision No. 230 for 2013, dated 29 August 2013, on the declaration of a border buffer zone.
\(^4\) Republican Decision No. 298 for 2013, dated 25 October 2013, on the declaration of a military operation area.
The role of the security establishment should be radically reviewed, not only at the level of concepts and perceptions, but also basically at the level of its responsibilities in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails. As a first priority, security needs should be identified in such a way that reflects the citizens’ exigencies and aspirations for freedom, social justice, development, and stability. Mechanisms should be also devised to meet these requirements and safeguard achievements. Elaborating a clear security policy is not meant for outbidding, but is a popular demand, with the right to security consecrated as a basic human right.

To break with the past, a clear distinction should be made between those who have been honorably committed to public service and interest, and those who have abused power for the subjective interest of a minority, to the detriment of the citizens’ interest. In truth, this challenge is not only peculiar to Tunisia, but is common to all Arab regimes that continue to manipulate security services as instruments of oppression, instead of accountable law enforcement bodies at the service of the citizen. The issue is definitely not about purging the security establishment of symbols of corruption or oppression through impromptu and haphazard measures. It is rather about establishing the truth and guaranteeing the non-return to practices of the past. This is achieved through transitional justice, as part of exposing abuses and proceeding with accountability then reconciliation.

After much hesitation and delay, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) ratified the Transitional Justice Law in December 2013. But apart from the law, all parties, most notably the security establishment, should realize that impunity has drawn the security personnel and citizens apart, and that the recent rapprochement and rallying behind the security establishment is mainly linked to the people’s need for security under prevailing circumstances. However, true reconciliation will only be achieved when mindsets and practices change and when impunity ends.

**Fourth: Resistance to reform by the security or military establishment or other parties.**

Since the outbreak of the uprising, and particularly since the rise of terrorism and violence in 2013, the military establishment has grappled with the daunting challenge of renewing its leadership, structures, organization, and capacity to counter risks. Perceived as one of the exigencies of democratic transition, this challenge usually entails a series of emergency structural reforms (including review of responsibilities; establishment of oversight, supervision, and accountability mechanisms; promotion of democratic behavior within the security establishment; and reinforcement of field and professional capacities.)

Nonetheless, it is normal for the security establishment, or at least some of its leaders, to express reservations about these exigencies and looming changes. As a matter of fact, these reforms will raise the problem of cleansing the security establishment of those members, who neither uphold the rules of the democratic game nor enjoy the professional and intellectual capacity to cope with the new exigencies (including respect of the law, commitment to transparency at work,
With its as-yet unchanged institutional structure, the security sector continues to lag behind despite attempts at reviewing and upgrading training curricula, on the basis of disseminating the culture of human rights and improving the delivery of services to the citizen. Notwithstanding their importance, structural reforms have not been initiated so far. This unjustified procrastination undermines, in my opinion, the chances of reform, particularly because of the security establishment’s years-long intransigence, resistance to change and isolation, as well as the reconfiguration of the poles of influence.

The urgency of restructuring the security establishment and rehabilitating its members and units through tailor-made training programs that would gradually establish sound mindsets and practices and rejuvenate the security establishment is no secret. It is also only natural for rehabilitation to be restricted to those members who have not been involved in acts of violence, oppression, and corruption. But, however essential, training and rehabilitating security personnel and units do not suffice to reform the security sector. Even if the security establishment changes its workings and practices, the greatest challenge would be to change mindsets. Security personnel should relinquish force, while developing their psychological and professional capacity to overcome strain and cope with security and social situations, with the use of force being their last resort.

In a nutshell, these challenges deepen dialogue on security sector reform and push towards a radical change of mindsets, responsibilities, practices, and structures. Nonetheless, the State’s capacity to undertake these reforms remains questionable, which explains ongoing procrastination. In truth, delay is not attributed to lack of financial resources to equip security and defense forces, upgrade their operational capabilities and professional competencies, and develop their workings to face up to challenges, but is rather linked to the capacity to take and implement decisions, i.e. to the as-yet unforged political will to reform the security sector, within a comprehensive and clear vision. This is not to mention the international, regional, and even domestic security agendas that are most often governed by foreign exigencies and interests, beyond the control of the Tunisian people, such as counterterrorism, illegal migration, and religious extremism. With these exigencies influencing our political and security milieu, we cannot but guard against those who do not want the reform process to come to fruition.

Paradoxically, the scope to which security problems could allow for a political, structural, legal, and operational review remains to be seen. Every crisis brings about a new challenge, but reflects at the same time needs or requirements that necessitate diagnosis and clear answers. This is how security sector reform is practically undertaken: by meeting needs and finding solutions. Also unfeasible is the widespread belief, particularly among leaders and decision-makers, that reform

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5 The draft State budget of 2014 accounts for an 85% increase in the budgets of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, which is in addition to an earlier increase incorporated in the budget of the year before.
can be only undertaken in times of crisis, starting with a settlement of pending problems to contain tension, and proceeding with institutional reform following stabilization and return to normalcy. As a matter of fact, periods of democratic transition are, by nature, challenging times. Crisis management also necessitates competencies that security institutions often lack, hence the need for relevant expertise and support to ensure the continuity and clarity of the reform process. Tunisia is no exception.

2. **Absence of a strategy and lack of a clear vision:**

Security governance requires a vision and strategy that clearly set the objectives of the security sector reform. It is actually normal for reform efforts to struggle to change entrenched visions and modus operandi. Comparative experience has shown that countries in democratic transition are more inclined to introduce uncostly and quick-to-achieve minor changes to their security apparatuses, beyond the mainstream reform of the security establishment and upgrading of its performance. In light of this troubling truth, it is worth looking into the mainstream approach to security sector reform in Tunisia and some of its dimensions.

“Republican security” is a permanent fixture of security sector reform. But when we ask the champions of this concept about their perception and understanding of the security they want to be republican, we realize that concepts vary and are abstract. What does it mean for security to be republican, as advocated by political leaders, activists, intellectuals, journalists and security structures? What model should the police emulate? What values and principles should be applied? What rules and behavior should be complied with? What role should security services play? What missions should they shoulder in a democracy? To whom should they report? These questions remain unanswered, notwithstanding their importance in laying down the institutional, legal, and operational foundations for a security sector that serves the citizen, within the confines of democracy and its institutions.

Three years into democratic transition, debate over security reform is far from demonstrating required maturity in Tunisia. The country and its security institutions are still reeling from the past. Current security sector reform visions, if they can be described as such, are still in their very primitive stages and do not serve as the basis for a workable, coherent, and consistent reform plan. Therefore, slogans alone are not enough. The concept of security should be also entrenched within the framework of democracy and its precepts.

Unsurprisingly, the first attempts at reforming security - and I mean by this the White Paper drafted by the former Minister Delegate to the Minister of Interior in Charge of Reforms and subsequent actions taken - did not pay off, since they lacked legitimacy and were not stabilized in the context of democratic reform. In addition, these reform efforts were adamant on developing the security establishment’s operational capabilities, within a capacity-building framework, to counter major security challenges (such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, smuggling, money laundering, and cybercrimes.) Put differently, the main focus was
building an efficient and high-performing security establishment by developing its capabilities, resources and equipment, and funneling all donor assistance to this end, amid almost inexistent good governance mechanisms that entail oversight, accountability, transparency, and respect of the law and of human rights. All countries attempting security sector reform, from Serbia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, passing by Morocco and Georgia, suffered setbacks in balancing efficiency and responsibility.

As the main party responsible for reform, the ruling authority is still unable to set and arrange its priorities, which in turn requires effective oversight mechanisms to ensure gradual implementation based on a specific timetable and measured budget. Without these basic components, there is no point talking about a security reform policy or strategy. Incidental solutions to pending problems will only compound the reform process further.

Counterterrorism, which requires a radical review of the intelligence sector, is an example of shortsightedness and failure to structurally reform such a sensitive sector. Reforming this sector should be an incontestable priority, mainly in light of its role and departure from its crucial functions. In addition, structural, legal, and operational problems have aggravated after some apparatuses were disbanded, transformed, or even temporarily suspended, which had a negative impact on their performance and operational capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary to overhaul this sector, while taking its particularities into account and enforcing oversight and supervision mechanisms.

Security incidents in Mount Chaambi, as well as others that followed in 2013 and counterterrorism all attest to this. I do not think that the “axes of the Government’s anti-terror plan,” including the intelligence sector, and the enclosed “counterterrorism reform mechanisms,” as announced by the Government on 5 October 2013, represent a true strategy in the complete sense of the word or even a “holistic” counterterrorism vision, because of their lack of key components. As a matter of fact, the Government had barely announced a series of intertwined measures dictated by security circumstances and strains to address the imminent risk of terrorism. This plan did not enjoy required legitimacy and fell short of meeting the establishment’s real counterterrorism needs, based on a general and comprehensive assessment of the system in place. How short-lived are the reforms initiated under the pressure of circumstances and crises!

Therefore, the Government, particularly the Ministry of Interior, should elaborate a new blueprint for security, one that meets the expectations of the Tunisian people and engages the security establishment. It is also crucial for this new vision to win the support of the local and international community. Perhaps the starting point would be to shy away from clichés and platitudes and grasp the citizens’ need for security that offers protection based on the precepts and values of democracy. This is where successive Governments have failed, despite the calls of many stakeholders - including political parties, security unions and civil society - as well as international organizations that support democratic transition.
When providing their services, security forces should address the concerns of all citizens without exception and should also carry out their functions, in compliance with the law and in total respect for the establishment’s neutrality and integrity. In addition to being accountable to the Government, the Parliament, and society, they should uphold transparency by making their activities public and by facilitating access to information. Finally, the security establishment, particularly the police, should be efficient and professional, on the basis that it is not only bound to achieve security and stability, but also to step up its efforts through efficient and effective use of available resources. Herein lies the true meaning of citizen security and good governance of the security sector.

But in Tunisia, we have not developed yet a common understanding of what our security should be like in the future. Instead of reassuring the people, the ongoing debate on security reform, under the banner of so-called “republican” security, has deepened feelings of insecurity because of the fragile security situation, the political crisis gripping the country, the shaky security establishment, and the media coverage of different crises and their manifestations. This confirms that security governance is in limbo in Tunisia.

Developing a new security vision is such a delicate and sensitive choice. If this new vision is presented as running against the mainstream old one, the security establishment will reject it, based on its perception of being the target. Therefore, the key challenge is to assuage suspicions and the propensity to resist change. The security establishment at large should also accommodate the idea that these radical changes are in its best interests and that its members are active drivers of change, not only in their security and military capacity, but basically as citizens too.

In this context, reconsidering the civilian-military relationship, which entails constitutional political and institutional reforms, represent the main stake of security sector reform and democratic governance.

3. The Constitution’s non-incorporation of mechanisms promoting democratic behavior within the security establishment:

Security governance is grounded on a basic political and legal fact: that the military authority is subject to the State’s civil authority; hence the bet on community institutions and societal balances of power, as well as on the monopoly over the legitimate use of means of material coercion, including armed force, to protect societal interests from internal and external threats.

The discussion about a democratic security establishment is necessitated by the nature of transition into a participatory republican regime, where the democratically elected civil authorities gain supremacy; where the rule of law and respect of human rights and freedoms prevail; where good governance forms a pillar of the State and society; and where all citizens enjoy security, freedom, justice, and dignity. Therefore, the principles of the security establishment need to be revisited since the drafting of the Constitution.
Although these principles do not only hinge on the constitutional and legal structure, the latter remains the cornerstone of democratic oversight over security and defense. Such has been the request of security and defense forces, backed by political parties, civil society organizations, and many other players (“the constitutionalization of republican security”) since the downfall of the former regime and immediately after the elections of 23 October 2011. Therefore, we have the right to question the extent to which the draft Constitution will allow for democratic security.

From this perspective, and taking a look at the proposed Constitution and its four drafts, we have tried to grasp the legislators’ intentions and the principles and provisions they could eventually formulate to consecrate and guarantee the citizens’ right to security, as well as the means to establish a democratic security system. But, to our surprise, the text was incomplete and flawed, failing to capture the principles of democratic or ‘republican’ security, as some has called it.

Drafters of the Constitution have overlooked the inclusiveness and multiple dimensions of the concept of security, first as a basic human right (the right to security), and second, as a set of institutions, systems, laws and procedures (concept of national security) that seeks to preserve public order, fend off any risk to individuals or properties or undermine public security, and ensure respect of the law through legitimate means; and third, as a strategic framework to protect the State against all internal and external risks that threaten its entity, territorial integrity, as well as the continuity of its institutions (concept of national security.)

As proof of this, it is enough to compare Article 31 of the draft Constitution to other articles, particularly Articles 15 and 17. As stipulates Article 31, “every person has the right to access information as much as this access does not cause prejudice to “national security” and to rights enshrined in the Constitution.” Similarly, by mentioning national security, Article 92 of the draft Constitution refers to all internal and external threats, in sharp contrast to the organic concept incorporated in Articles 15 and 17.

Interestingly and alarmingly, Constitution drafters seem particularly concerned with basically functional considerations pertaining to security and defense. The texts proposed in this Chapter (particularly Articles 15, 16, and 17) thus address the distribution of powers, whether related to defense or security, between the two heads of the executive or define the functions of the military establishment and the internal security forces (this is not what the Constitution should be about.)

Meanwhile, the Constitution overlooks other central issues, such as regulating the relation between the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker and different armed forces; defining the distribution of power, leadership, subordination, and oversight; and devising mechanisms of supervision and oversight, particularly by the Parliament. This raises more questions and calls for further caution, even if appointments to senior military and security positions remain an exception.
Placed at the heart of the Constitution, in the absence of the foregoing mechanisms, security and military institutions thus acquire, de facto and de jure, a self-existent constitutional standing, with autonomous powers to disengage from State institutions and act directly. This runs against the exigencies of democratic oversight over armed forces.

In addition, the Tunisian legislation has failed to comply with entrenched legal concepts (different terminologies, such as ‘armed forces’ or ‘national army,’’ were employed, instead of the ‘national armed forces,’ in reference to the military establishment.) Furthermore, the draft Constitution has fallen short of consecrating the supremacy of civilian authorities and their monopoly over means of coercion and legitimate force as an absolute principle, which would have blocked the way to any interpretation that may question the role of the State and its legitimate institutions. Although the draft Constitution has stipulated that the State establishes armed and national security forces, the terminological mix-up has implied that other groups or armed apparatuses, beyond the umbrella of the army or national security, can be formed by virtue of the law. This has sparked controversy and panic, particularly in light of what could be construed as legitimizing the establishment of parallel informal security apparatuses.

This issue is quite sensitive and delicate. The Constituent Assembly should have regulated existing relations between security services and the executive power for effective security operations within the confines of the law. Needless to say, transforming the security establishment from one that seeks to preserve general security to one manipulated by specific groups to protect their own political and economic interests has come as a shock of late to the Tunisian people, which has turned the establishment into a tool used by the regime, particularly the executive power, to maintain its survival and shore up its interests through oppression, corruption, and bribery. This is usually compounded in regimes, where impunity is rampant, either because oversight mechanisms (parliamentary oversight) do not exist or are week (oversight exercised by the judiciary, media, and civil society.)

Speaking of parliamentary oversight, the Parliament is widely believed to exercise limited oversight and supervision over the security and defense sector. This concept of parliamentary oversight is not expressly recognized, amid a mere incidental reference (Article 77) to the competent parliamentary committee and the denial of its right to oppose senior military, diplomatic, and national security appointments. The failure of the Parliament’s bylaws to define the committee’s role and areas of oversight indicates imbalance between the role of the executive power and the Parliament, in the absence of a real understanding of parliamentary oversight over security and defense and its importance.

Parliamentary oversight is perhaps one of the most important mechanisms of exercising democratic oversight over security and promoting democratic behavior within the sector. It also averts a fiasco similar to the one suffered by the committee investigating the incidents of 9 April 2011 or even the boring hearing sessions of some defense and security officials.
In any event, the current draft does not meet the exigencies of democratic oversight. Transparency and accountability are not identified, at least expressly, as being among the principles governing security operations, while some provisions only detail the controversial functions and roles of security and military establishments. Meanwhile, crucial matters remain unresolved, such as the disobedience of commands that violate the law, including those laid out in the Constitution or international treaties, or the security personnel’s integrity in implementing the law and respecting human rights. The neutrality requirement for military and security establishments is overlooked, mentioned as it is in a loose sentence that does not reflect an accurate and comprehensive vision of the requirements of effective democratic oversight over security and defense. Some of these principles, as we have noticed, are even overlooked or obfuscated, compared to the second draft of the Constitution, particularly with respect to proposed amendments to the powers and joint relationship between the executive and legislative authorities.

While we recognize how delicate and sensitive it is to specify the functions of different security and military apparatuses, especially that the legitimacy of their interventions and use of force is decided on the basis thereof, we cannot but question the feasibility of identifying these institutions and specifying their functions in the Constitution (Articles 16 and 17 on the national army and national security forces). In addition, Article 16’s sole reference to the political neutrality of the military establishment cannot be mentioned in passing, especially that neutrality should be complete and absolute (politically, ideologically, and economically.)

It is true that Article 17 has better worded the role of national security forces. But this wording is flawed, with its omission of some functions vested in the internal security forces, most notably intelligence. Needless to say, intelligence agencies bear a share of responsibility for the security establishment’s partiality and deviation from the confines of the law, in the absence of legal and judicial guarantees, as well as oversight mechanisms that are usually in place in democratic regimes. The Constitution’s failure to mention these functions, among others, may render intelligence unconstitutional although it is a vital function of the State.

Last but not least, basic guarantees for military and security personnel, among others, should be addressed. We have noticed the Constitution’s abandon of basic rights for armed forces, which contradicts the spirit of the Constitution and international standards. One of the basic requirements for designing appropriate civilian-military relations lies in guaranteeing the rights and obligations of security personnel to ensure the legitimacy of their functions and provide favorable circumstances for their exercise. Whoever adopts the concept of “citizen or national security” should embrace the idea of “citizen in uniform.” Therefore, the Constitution should recognize a minimum of guarantees and rights for military and security personnel. The State

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6 Internal security forces carry out intelligence functions by virtue of Article 2 of Order No. 1160 for 2006, dated 13 April 2006, which serves as the bylaws of national security and national police personnel. The personnel were entrusted with “looking into all that relates to the political, economic, social, cultural, and media aspects of life” (as is the case with National Guards units.)
should, for instance, offer basic guarantees to armed forces personnel, within the framework of the Constitution, and should also completely guarantee their physical safety.

Finally, security sector reform is an integral part of the country’s constitutional and political reform. A new Constitution will confer legitimacy anew upon the security establishment that should transform into a democratic and accountable institution. This is such a daunting challenge that requires security to be part of the democratic equation. It may take the security establishment some time to learn democratic practice, just like citizens, parties, and civil society groups. Politicians should also shy away from politicizing the security establishment, which will entrench the ruling authority’s capacity to initiate and spearhead necessary reforms.