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## **POST-WAR U.S.-JAPAN RECONCILIATION: STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF HEALING**

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PAAL: Give me a glass. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning. My name is Doug Paal. I'm -- I direct the Asia program here. And it's my pleasure to welcome you all to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and to this gathering.

We've set aside, today, some time and really assembled a fine group of panelists and scholars, including former officials, to consider a topic that is rarely considered in detail, and yet in many ways comprises the foundation for national strategy and modern diplomacy.

I am talking, of course, about reconciliation between nations and states that share histories of conflict, or that have persistent disagreements over who victimized whom in the past and who owns what land and resources.

Excuse me. The roots of these conflicts sometimes go back just a few decades. Sometimes they go back for centuries. I'm just reading David Kahn's (ph) new book about Northeast Asia, and he really makes a clear case about centuries, and not decades.

For some countries, the historical tension is so pervasive that it's -- it becomes something of an organizing principle for a nation's politics and foreign policy. And, even in milder cases, they end up constraining policy choices and they complicate or frustrate the pursuit of diplomatic objectives.

The U.S.-Japan situation is unique, as U.S. and Japan shared an incredibly intense, but relatively brief period of conflict around World War II, and yet managed steadily to overcome the animosities related to that legacy, and creating a strong security alliance and economic relationship.

This is a strategically valuable asset for both countries, and it did not simply happen by chance. It was not a government-led effort or a one-time initiative. This was the result of countless public, political, private efforts accumulated over many decades, and much work remains if the U.S.-Japan historical reconciliation is to be sustained.

The Carnegie Endowment is pleased to thank and support the Japan Institute of International Affairs in its effort to examine this topic over five years, not so much to debate our various interpretations of history, but to better understand our two countries, how they succeeded in building a close alliance despite these hurdles, as well as to consider the challenges we still face.

We are not here to pat ourselves on the back, or -- but instead to think about the -- and acknowledge the -- what it takes for countries to improve over time their underlying relationships with nations with which they have had -- experienced conflicts in the past.

We can -- we are honored to have many distinguished presenters and panelists today to help us explore these issues. And I would like to thank all of them contributing their time and expertise, especially those who traveled so far.

I would like to offer a special welcome to our luncheon keynote speaker, Ambassador Michael Armacost, who has come in from the west coast. And he is always a welcome sight around here. And he was -- who has personally witnessed the phenomenon of reconciliation up close for decades.

We are fortunate to be also -- pair with him Professor Gerry Curtis from Columbia University, a longtime expert on U.S.-Japanese relations and deeply involved in the -- in all aspects of the relationship.

And, together with our other two panels and some opening remarks from Congresswoman Niki Tsongas, we have a great opportunity to explore a wide range of related issues today.

It is now my pleasure to introduce the real leader behind the event today and a good friend, Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami. He is the president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and a career diplomat with truly global experience. He has been posted here in the U.S., Hong Kong, Paris, London, served as deputy and vice minister of foreign affairs.

And we want to thank you, Ambassador Nogami, for choosing Carnegie -- to work with us. And I want to welcome you to the podium. Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

NOGAMI: Thank you, Doug. Thank you very much for coming for this seminar.

The Japan Institute of International Affairs, JIIA, has recently launched a five-year program on history. Today's event is a part of this project. History is something that one cannot undo, but history is something that -- history is one of the crucial determinants of where you are today. We are -- from this perspective, we intend to revisit Japanese history for the past 150 years.

Actually, this year marks the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration. So Japan, as a modern state and postmodern state -- I think that this is an extremely important juncture. And revisiting the history -- and we wish to draw some policy implications from our review process.

We are -- we are undertaking a series of research, and -- as well as public seminars, like the one we have this morning, and the -- with the help from Japanese experts, as well as from experts, scholars from various countries.

Our previous seminar, which was held in Tokyo earlier this year, was assisted by the experts from China, Republic of Korea, India, Philippines, Vietnam, as well as from the United States, United Kingdom and France. Some of the salient points of the past seminars -- you can visit our website, [jia-jic.jp](http://jia-jic.jp). Yeah.

I would like to conclude my very, very brief remarks by thanking Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, particularly Doug Paal, Jim Schoff, and Alex Taylor, for their very valuable support.

Thank you very much.

(APPLAUSE)

SCHOFF: Thank you very much, Ambassador Nogami. It's a real pleasure to work with you and your team.

Good morning, everyone. My name is Jim Schoff. I'm a senior fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment and in charge of our Japan program. And I am here to actually introduce our morning keynote speaker. But I have to extend an apology that our congresswoman, Niki Tsongas, was -- is not able to make it here this morning. So, I have a little bit of an introduction for her, but let me -- let me -- let me begin and explain.

First of all, I want to thank the Congressional study group's team, which we worked with to help consider and recruit an opening speaker from Congress, because we thought that would be kind of a good way to open the event and consider the legislative role and a view from that perspective.

And it was actually quite fascinating to learn how many current and former members of Congress have a long history in connection and collaboration with Japan, including Jim Sensenbrenner from Wisconsin and Jim -- Tom Petri from Wisconsin and Jim McDermott from Washington, who are all former co-chairs of the U.S.-Japan legislative exchange program.

And we were fortunate that Congresswoman Niki Tsongas from Massachusetts was willing and able to join us today. But we were less fortunate that, late yesterday, the Natural Resources Committee, on which she serves, confirmed a bill markup for 10:00 a.m. this morning, and she is now not able to attend.

So I'm sorry about this, and I know she is sorry about this. I appreciate the fact that she is attending to her legislative duties and that she also did take the time, late yesterday afternoon, to tape some opening remarks, because she wanted to still kind of follow through with her commitment to us. So we will show the video message for you in just a minute.

It's interesting; Congresswoman Tsongas -- she's served in Congress since 2007, and she sits on the House Armed Services Committee, among other assignments. She grew up in a military family. And her father, who served in the Air Force, was a survivor of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.

As fate would have it, her father was later assigned to work in Japan. And Niki Tsongas spent part of her high school years growing up in Japan, attending American school in Japan.

And I think her most recent trip back there was just last year, when she had the chance to meet Prime Minister Abe and a variety of other political and business leaders. And I am going to turn it over to Congresswoman Tsongas now, who had a few words of opening for us today.

So, Alex (ph), get us going. Thank you.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

TSONGAS: Good morning to you all. It is an honor to have been asked to present this opening address at this prestigious event, and I regret that I am unable to join you in person due to legislative business here in the House today.

Japan is one of the United States's greatest friends and most critical allies, and a partner in so many different areas. My own personal experience with Japan and its people dates back to the early '60s, when my father, an Air Force officer, was stationed in Tokyo.

Living in Tokyo in those early post-World War II years and being fortunate to travel extensively throughout the country as a high school student gave me a unique opportunity to experience the country's rich and fascinating culture, its traditions and its history.

Early last year, I had the opportunity to visit Japan for the first time in 50 years. It was a long-overdue return, and I was heartened that, in our many meetings, it was abundantly clear how the relationship between the United States and Japan has grown and matured, rooted in our shared values and our common purpose.

The economic ties between our countries are abundant and important. It is necessary to keep open the lines of communications, so leaders of both our countries can explore ways to maintain and grow these mutually beneficial partnerships.

Japan is Massachusetts's fifth largest trading partner. And, in my district, there are companies in a diverse array of fields, such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, manufacturing and electronics, that are Japanese-owned, supporting jobs and innovative new products in a wide range of areas.

This point was driven home to me during one of our discussions in Japan, when I asked a Japanese business leader how his company innovates. He simply stated, quote, "We buy American companies," unquote.

America's innovation economy is cultivated and nurtured by government investment. We found that, when the government partners with the private sector to encourage research, development, and innovation, what we produce and have to offer is more internationally appealing.

Beyond the important area of economic cooperation, United States and Japan face many common security challenges in the region, a fact which has been underscored by the provocative actions of North Korea as of late, and of China in the South China Sea.

Challenges in the region include cyber threats and illicit trafficking, as well, and this is an area where natural disasters have a tendency to persist.

As a senior member on the Armed Services Committee, I have seen the ways in which our countries have partnered to strengthen the security of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Our continued pursuit of cooperative efforts help to realize the immense potential for growth and prosperity in the region.

And I believe that dialogue and communication at every level are crucial to our long-term relationship. In speaking with officials and business executives, I was disappointed to learn that the number of exchange students from Japan to the United States has fallen significantly since the 1990s: some 50 percent, according to one study.

My experience living in Japan taught me how important these types of personal investments are to mutual understanding and cooperation. I encourage all of those interested in continuing the progress of the U.S.-Japanese partnership to think about how this trend can be reversed.

These are but a few of the issues that demonstrate the breadth and depth of U.S.-Japanese cooperation. I remain encouraged by the political will in both of our countries to maintain this strong and enduring partnership.

Thank you all again for the opportunity to share this morning with you. And I hope you all enjoy a rich and fruitful discussion throughout the course of the day.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

SCHOFF: So thank you, Congresswoman Tsongas, for those remarks. It is very nice -- her and her team pulled this together very late in the day. The confirmation of the markup only came up relatively late yesterday, so we're grateful for that.

But we're going to just take a short break now to fix the stage and get ready for the first panel. Inevitably, with conferences like this, there's always something that doesn't go quite according to plan, so I think we've had our one thing that doesn't go quite according to plan. Luckily, everyone else is here, and we have a terrific group of people.

We'll be having our first panel, looking at the -- kind of the history of U.S.-Japan historical reconciliation. We'll have lunch served here, and you'll be able to bring it back to your table, and we'll have kind of a networking luncheon before our keynote luncheon speech and dialogue with Ambassador Armacost and Gerry Curtis. And then we'll have a whole second session, looking at the U.S.-Japan case in a broader global context.

So we have a lot of content ahead of us. And we'll give everyone a chance to have a break now and get a little bit of coffee, if you like, and we'll reconvene, I think, in about -- let's say 15 minutes. So we will start at around 10:35 or 10:40, and we'll get started at that time.

So thank you very much.

(BREAK)

SCHOFF: OK. I'd like to invite the panelists up to the front of the stage, please.

OK. Good morning again. Thank you for joining us today, and thank you for your patience as we now really begin to kick off the substance of our discussion today.

In our first panel, we're going to survey the history of U.S.-Japan historical reconciliation, as Doug Paal mentioned, not so much to debate the validity of one historical interpretation versus another, but to understand a little bit more about how far we've come, how we got here and how much further we have to go in this endeavor.

It is tempting to -- it is tempting to look at this kind of purely in a post-World War II context. And I'm sure we'll focus quite heavily on this era. But I think it's also important to remember that the U.S.-Japan relationship has a much broader context than just the war and the post-war, beginning, of course, with Commodore Perry and his Black Ships in 1853, and kind of the further opening of Japan at that time, leading to the Meiji Restoration that Ambassador Nogami referenced.

But it's even more complex than that. As I was doing a little bit of preparation for today's event, you know, early coverage of Japan in American papers and media, like Horace Greeley's New York Tribune, for example, was quite positive in the early days of the relationship -- impressed with Japan and the Japanese, if still somewhat patronizing.

We had a budding friendship in the late 1800s. Japan's ban on Christianity was lifted in 1873. Both countries embraced the game of baseball around -- almost, roughly at the same time. And in -- this era featured an influx of missionaries into Japan, including -- Edwin Reischauer's parents traveled there at that time -- and writers like Lafcadio Hearn were of this era.

But, not too long thereafter, into the 20th century, global conflict, competing interests and outright racism opened up a gulf in the relationship at the start of the 20th century, and we plunged into the depths of brutal and total war.

Afterwards, and in my opinion relevant to today's discussion, is looking at the famous NSC-68, or the U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security, that was written in 1950, thinking about American strategy, dealing with the Soviet Union in the postwar era.

And that NSC-68 prioritized, quote, "the rapid and sustained buildup of the political, economic and military strength of the free world," unquote, which included Japan and made U.S.-Japan reconciliation a long-term imperative for U.S. foreign policy in East Asia.

That doesn't mean that the president and the Secretary of Defense sat down and said, "My goodness, the number one thing we have got to do is reconcile with Japan so that we can carry out all the rest of our objectives." But it's an -- it is the underlying, enabling context, I think, in that regard.

So this dynamic, making a strategic decision to have a better relationship with a former adversary and then seeing it through -- that is a key focus of today's discussion and of this panel.

So, as we get started, I will turn to our panelists to open with some opening comments, and we'll have a bit of a dialogue among ourselves here, and then open it up to the broader audience, because we have a lot of experienced, quality people in the audience today.

You have brief bios in the handout, but, for the sake of our video later, I would like to make some brief introductions. Of course, I am Jim Schoff, senior fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

To my far right, at the end of the table, we have Michael Auslin, who is the Williams-Griffis research fellow in contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution, affiliated with Stanford University. His most recent book is *The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation and the Risks to the World's Most Dynamic Region*. It's a very good book. Pleased to have you here with us today.

Jennifer Lind, in the middle here, comes to us from Dartmouth College via London, where she is finishing up a special teaching program there for this semester. She teaches on a -- and writes on a wide variety of foreign policy and political issues in East Asia.

Perhaps her best known book is entitled *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, which has been published in English and Korean, as I understand, and won an award in Japan. So you can publish in Korea and win an award in Japan on this topic. That's a pretty good accomplishment.

And, of course, to my right here, Toshihiro Nakayama, Professor of American politics and foreign policy at the faculty of policy management at Keio University in Japan -- he is also an adjunct fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. And I know of a lot of Americans who read Nakayama-sensei's work to enhance their own understanding of what's going on in America. So it's great to have him here with us today.

So I'm going to begin with Jennifer and let her start, and then go to Professor Nakayama and Michael. And, Jennifer, will you get us started with your thoughts?

LIND: Good morning, everyone. Thank you for the introduction, Jim. And it's really a pleasure to be here, talking about this very important topic with such an amazing group of people. It feels like a reunion, in many ways, so it's a pleasure to be part of it.

President Obama's visit to Hiroshima and Shinzo Abe's visit to Pearl Harbor were remarkable milestones in U.S.-Japan reconciliation. I think I speak for all of us when I talk about how moved I was to see the two leaders lay wreaths and give the remarkable speeches that they gave.

And those remarks that they made showed so much empathy for the suffering on the other side and such a strong commitment to friendship. And these visits justifiably got a lot of attention. Many commentators said they were a model for reconciliation in East Asia. And people urged Shinzo Abe to go to Nanjing, just like he had gone to Pearl Harbor.

Now, of course, no one could object to the idea of encouraging greater empathy from Japan to its neighbors, and vice versa. But I want to argue today that such commentary -- this notion of these visits as a model that East Asia can pursue -- such commentary mixes up cause and effect. Such visits don't cause reconciliation. They are the result of it.

Reconciliation comes first from a strategic need that pushes countries together. And only at such times, under those conditions, will leaders have incentives to accept what are often massive domestic political costs of pursuing conciliation toward a formerly hated adversary.

So let me start by putting on my international relations hat and talking about the broader context that these countries are in at such moments.

So, after these terrible wars, after young men die in the millions, after women are raped and cities are razed to rubble, people are hurting and angry. There's a vast gulf in remembrance on both sides. Each side sees the other as the aggressor who is at fault, toward whom no sympathy, no concessions are owed. Each side sees itself as acting in self-defense.

This gives rise to opposing narratives in which each side frames itself as a victim. People pass down memories of past suffering to their children. Entrepreneurial politicians use such fears in order to seize or consolidate power. And tales of the rival's wickedness are transmitted through education, commemoration and the arts.

When we look across history, we see that, sometimes, countries do decide to reconcile. And in the process of this, we see them harmonize their narratives of the past. Such cases are countries with great shared strategic need, a common security threat that they must join together in order to contain or defeat.

Now, a great example which the afternoon panel may well talk about is the French and the West Germans after World War II. And they were pushed together, of course, in the late 1950s by the growing Soviet threat. The French and Western Europeans initially saw Germany, after the terrible war they'd just fought, not to mention the previous war they'd just fought -- they initially saw Germany as a predator whose aggression had caused these wars.

But European leaders knew that, to bring West Germany into NATO, it had to make Bonn a full, viable partner, and this negative identity would undermine that. So the Western Europeans created a postwar narrative that emphasized the dangers not of a German predator, but of European anarchy, the need to tame this dangerous anarchy by creating institutions.

The U.S.-Japan alliance similarly grew out of shared strategic need during the Cold War, aimed at Soviet containment. Today, in a dangerous East Asia, our alliance continues to rest on a foundation of shared interests -- not perfectly aligned interests, but shared interests all the same. And, today, we enjoy over 60 years of cooperation; knowledgeable and dedicated alliance managers, many of whom are in this room; deep societal connections and great warmth that promotes trust and empathy.

Let me talk about this in the context, first, of the Hiroshima visit. President Obama showed tremendous empathy that day toward Japan. He understood that the Japanese people wanted and would greatly appreciate a visit. And his speech acknowledged Japanese suffering in the bombings. He said, quote, "We come to mourn the dead. We stand here in the middle of this city and force ourselves to imagine the moment the bomb fell."

Now, of course, there's still a lot of distance between our two countries' narratives of World War II. Americans generally view the bombings as justified by the need to end the war. And, of course, this diverges sharply from the Japanese perspective.

But, despite this, Obama was still able to offer empathy to the Japanese people. And Abe and Obama found themes that both countries could support: a call for nuclear abolition, the suffering of innocents in war and the profound achievement of our two countries' reconciliation.

A much-overlooked issue is that this remembrance at Hiroshima would also have not been possible without extraordinary compromise on Tokyo's part. From the start, the White House said that Obama was not going to offer an apology.

Think about how remarkable that is. Obama was essentially telling a close ally that, despite the fact that America had leveled its cities with conventional bombs and attacked it with two atomic weapons, killing and maiming and wounding hundreds of thousands of people in the process, Japan would receive no apology.

Tokyo's decision to accept the visit on these terms represents extraordinary compromise. In fact, this decision was as consequential as Obama's decision to go. Both decisions made this visit possible. Japanese leaders did not seek an apology, because they recognized that even just visiting was politically fraught for Obama and could trigger acrimony that would be bad for alliance unity.

The countries also demonstrated this kind of compromise when Abe visited Pearl Harbor. The Americans did not seek an apology, and Abe demonstrated extraordinary empathy in his remarks that day. He talked about the terrible loss of the young people who were, quote, "serving to uphold their noble duty of protecting the homeland that they loved." He said, "Rest in peace, precious souls of the fallen."

So visits like this are only possible between countries that share strategic need, are committed to bilateral cooperation, and thus are capable of empathy, compromise, and accepting and forging together a shared narrative, rather than clinging to divisive ones. Visits like this don't cause reconciliation. They result from it.

Now, one can imagine Shinzo Abe having ceremonies like this in several different countries -- Australia, India, the Philippines come to mind. A visit like this to China -- again, the idea that Abe can go to Nanjing -- is unthinkable. There's a lack of shared strategic need and, quite the opposite, strategic competition between these two countries.

The lack -- the resulting lack of a need or desire to compromise and find a shared narrative would make such a visit impossible. With an eye to their domestic political propaganda, the Chinese would see visits like this as opportunities to humiliate and punish Japan.

For South Korea, I'm what I would call cautiously pessimistic. While such historical reconciliation, I think, is a non-starter with China at this moment, it's possible with South Korea, but not while Seoul is hedging between the U.S. and China, as it's currently doing.

If Seoul decides it's sufficiently alarmed by the rise of China and it would be more amenable to trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, this would in turn make it more likely to pursue historical rapprochement.

One hopeful sign, of course, was the 2015 comfort women agreement. That agreement was only possible, as we know, because of tremendous compromise on both sides. While it doesn't seem to be going very well, it astonished me, and I think it was a good sign that it was even signed in the first place.

So, in short, the shared narrative that the U.S. and Japan embraced at Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor is indeed a model for how countries can talk about the past. But the only countries that can follow this model are those that are committed to cooperation. Only they will have the necessary empathy and compromise that such gestures require.

Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

SCHOFF: Thank you very much, Jennifer. That's a great start.

And, inevitably, there will be some overlap between the first panel and the second panel. I think that's perfectly natural. But thanks for getting us started.

Nakayama-sensei, let me ask you to go next.

NAKAYAMA: Well, thank you. I'm not a historian, but I do talk about, you know, U.S. and U.S.-Japan relations daily in Japanese universities and on media. So I think do I have a sense of how Japanese people see the United States. And I guess that's why I am here.

And about this term, "reconciliation" -- I guess there is lots of definition to it. But I don't think there will be any sort of full, 100 percent reconciliation. And I guess we are not talking about that.

But, in a very pragmatic way, I think, you know, many or the majority -- a strong majority would agree -- forgive, accept, understand what happened in the past. I guess we can talk about reconciliation. And, in that context, I think U.S. and Japan have successfully sort of reconciled. And that will be the premise of my talk.

And the assignment that I was given is that -- what efforts U.S. and Japan, including their governments and societies, have made toward reconciliation, and what had been keys for relative success and what work remains unaccomplished. So that was the assignment that I was given. So let me jump into my thoughts (ph).

I guess, you know, despite these strange times here and...

(LAUGHTER)

... in our region, I guess, you know, the condition of U.S.-Japan relations is quite good. And I think I -- we can all agree on that. Initially, at the start of the Obama administration, there were some bumpy periods, I guess, probably or maybe due to sort of, you know, our side. But, since we entered this century, I think U.S.-Japan relations have been quite good.

In the past couple of years, this institutionalization of the alliance and this -- Japan's, you know, security posture, directing toward a more proactive direction -- I think that common perception is that the condition of the alliance and the bilateral relation is quite good, but -- although, you know, we haven't really faced a crisis situation yet, and we hope that we won't.

And, when we talk about these, you know, special bilateral relations, this U.K.-U.S. special relationship always comes up. But this common cultural heritage -- you know, both English-speaking countries -- and it's quite natural for, you know, the two countries on both sides of the Atlantic -- would become -- would be able to establish a special kind of relationship.

In that context, I don't think U.S. and Japan is a natural sort of ally, in that sense. You know, we're quite different, I think. But, you know, the fact that these two different countries were able to establish this close relationship is, I think, an anomaly. It may be the only case in history of such a kind of alliance.

And, you know, I wanted this -- you know, a sophisticated word for this closeness. And I looked up a dictionary -- a Japanese dictionary. And the example sentence that dictionary gave is that there is close connection between Japan and the United States, right, literally.

(LAUGHTER)

So, you know, I chose to stick with this word -- simple closeness -- are there. And the fact that it was in a -- in a dictionary shows that, you know, in the minds of the Japanese people, I think, you know, it's -- this closeness is really rooted, I would say. I think that's the perception on our side.

When we're talking about sort of reconciliation, of course we are talking about that war. And the Pacific War was one of the most brutal wars in human history, I would say. You know, brutality was on both sides.

But, you know, these two countries successfully reconciled and became partners. And there has to be, you know, some lessons that we can learn. This process of reconciliation was a very gradual and slow process. It did take a long time.

But, in the context of U.S.-Japan relations, what happened before the war, I think, you know, played a very positive role as well. When we talk about U.S.-Japan relations, we think about this postwar 70 years. But, before that -- I mean, Meiji Restoration in the 1860s, the Civil War ended in the 1860s, and both countries, U.S. and Japan, sort of, you know, rose together on world stage, I would say.

And, you know, this U.S. occupation after the war was quite benign. And also -- but here was an acceptance, on the Japanese side, of, you know, this -- that reality, I think.

Of course, you know, immediate period before the war, you know, there was talk about "kichiku beiei" -- is like the Anglo-Saxons, you know -- "The Brits and the U.S. are like the devils." And there was some difficult period in the early part of the 20th century about this immigration policy on the U.S. side.

But, you know, there was a clear line of, you know, pro-American group of people in modern Japan. They did -- and they did play a very important role in establishing Japan as a modern state. And, by the way, I personally sort of was raised -- and attended these institutions.

I graduated a university called Aoyama Gakuin which is sort of founded by an American missionary -- United Methodist Church, in fact -- it was in 1874. And the university that I've sort of taught at is Tsuda Juku -- is -- was, of course, founded by Ms. Umeko Tsuda. And she was one of the members of the Iwakura mission. She was only seven or eight years old when she was -- she was there, and she stayed, and she was one of the -- well, she was the first to found the -- sort of the women's sort of educational institution in Japan. And I taught there.

And now, I teach at Keio University, and the founder is, of course, Yukichi Fukuzawa. He visited the United States two times, in 1859 and 1867. And he felt the need to study the United States, and especially the English language and all that. And he -- and, after he returned to Japan, he sort of translated the Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitution into Japanese.

So, you know, there was this -- at the very founding of modern Japan, you know, U.S. did play a very important role. And there's this -- a sentence in -- Shiba Ryotaro, a popular historian in Japan, talking about Iwakura mission. And the people of Iwakura mission sort of -- they were in the United States, and -- very different from what they experienced in Europe, and sensed this justiceness (ph) that you can see in youthhood (ph), right? And the people of Iwakura mission felt very sort of comfortable with that.

And there were many other sort of influential people, like Nitobe Inazo, who was the undersecretary general of League of Nations. And in the early 20th century, he felt the need for Japanese to study the United States and to learn from the United States. And he was a Quaker, as well, and he's known for writing the book Bushido.

And, right after that, there was a lecture in Tokyo University sort of specifically focusing on American history and American institutions. And that's one of the first outside of Japan to focus specifically on the United States.

So, you can see that there is a sort of a stream of, you know, thought in modern Japan that, you know -- that America is a very important country. Now, there was, you know, unfortunate times. But what was lucky for us -- that, you know, the leaders who sort of led the postwar Japan was this -- you know, was coming from this school of thought.

And the most typical example is Shigeru Yoshida. When Prime Minister Abe visited Pearl Harbor last year, for the first time, we learned that Prime Minister Yoshida actually has visited -- not the Arizona Memorial, because it wasn't there, but Pearl Harbor, even before, you know, Prime Minister Abe did, and it was not in our memory. And we did not know about it.

And he did visit, you know, the Punchbowl, the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, and he did pay respect to the people who died in Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific. Why did we not know that? What was on Yoshida's mind? We're not quite sure.

After Prime Minister Yoshida, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Prime Minister Kishi has also visited the Punchbowl. And I don't think this is by accident. I think this shows -- the fact that we did not know this shows that this is a process of reconciliation -- you know, took a long time. That's what I think it is showing.

I think there were no sort of effort to publicize the visit on both sides, I would say. And that is because, in Japan, you know, there is, like I said, a sort of stream of, you know, pro-American thought. But, at the same time, there's uneasiness about the United States. And that's another constant in Japan, as well.

This, you know, uneasiness exists on both the left and the left (sic) sort of wing on the political axis. For the sort of the -- you know, on the left, the U.S. alliance, relations in -- with the United States, is something that sort of stains pacifism. And, for the sort of -- the right people, it's something that would avoid (ph) from Japan becoming a fully sovereign nation.

And, in the '60s, you know, whether we should sort of stick with the U.S., whether we should we keep the alliance was a major issue for the students' sort of movement and students' revolt. In the '80s, when we were a bit, you know, sort of overconfident, you know, Mr. Ishihara -- Shintaro Ishihara wrote this book that we all remember, Japan That Can Say No. And that's this expression of uneasiness on the right-wing side.

You know, young people these days do not know these two incidents. But, you know, there has been this uneasiness about the U.S. on the Japanese side. And I call them anti-Americanism lite, because they don't have the real, true conviction to sort of really steer away from the U.S. But the uneasiness was nonetheless there and real.

But, you know, during -- even in those difficult times, you know, this basic position of Japan that, you know, Japan sort of would be a partner with the U.S. didn't waver, because if you -- if you are realistic, you know, you would know that there are no other options. And, at a sort of a subconscious level, the Japanese public understood that, as well. And I think that basic condition hasn't changed at all.

But then, at the time, there were some dangers in talking about that publicly, because, you know, Japan is a very secular society, as you know. But the closest thing you have to a religion in Japanese society is the Article 9, the pacifism and, you know, non-nuclear. And, if you fully endorse the alliance, it seems like it would sort of stain those -- civic religion.

So, like in 1981, you know, there was a joint communique, and they used the word "alliance." And one of the foreign ministers had to resign because, you know, they used the word "alliance" to describe U.S.-Japan relations, because "alliance" sounded too militaristic. It sounds silly today, but that was, I guess, the reality.

So, you know, for a long time we could talk about U.S.-Japan relations, but we could not talk about -- there were no language to talk about U.S.-Japan military alliance.

But, I guess, today, you know, things have changed, and we're -- and we're talking about the alliance. We talk about sharing of values between two countries who successfully reconciled. But, you know, it's not that long ago that these kinds of rhetoric sort of, you know, took hold in Japan. I think it's been, like, only 10, 15 years or so since these kind of narratives really took a hold, took root in Japan.

Now, here at this podium, I can sort of -- without hesitation can say that, you know, we have successfully reconciled. But it's not just because of a result of any single incident. I think it was a series of incidents: you know, the emperor's visit to the U.S.; to Ron-Yasu; Bush-Koizumi; 311 and the Tomodachi effort; Prime Minister Abe's speech at the joint session of Congress; you know, Hiroshima and Arizona Memorial -- you know, those sort of distilled into this sense of reconciliation, and that penetrated into the Japanese people's minds.

When, you know, emperor visited U.S., I was in elementary school in New York, and, you know, it was a very strong impact on me. And Ron-Yasu -- I was an exchange student in South Dakota. It was the Williamsburg Summit in 1982 or '83, I would imagine, and also very proud of Prime Minister Nakasone standing by President Reagan.

And I'm sure -- my son is 10 years old now, and the visit by President Obama to Hiroshima, I'm sure, would leave a strong impression on him. So -- you know, and this had a strong impact especially on the Japanese side, because, you know, talking about sort of sharing in values and all that -- it only becomes real after this process of reconciliation.

And there's this sense in Japan that, you know, the Japanese side is relying on the alliance more. And there's this sense that there's no other choice, there's no exit to the alliance, so the cynical feeling in Japan about the alliance -- and it does exist.

But, if we sort of frame the alliance in terms of, you know, not just dealing with threats -- of course, you know, the core mission of the alliance is dealing with threats, but, at the same time, it's more than that. That -- this is about two sort of countries with shared values, sort of aspiring for a desirable regional order.

If we talk alliance in that context, I think, you know, the sense of "We're in this together" and that we're partners becomes real. So, in that sense, I think it is as important as physical infrastructures and institutions. So I don't think it's just a decoration (ph) or just a narrative; I think it's very important, especially in the context of Japan.

So, when the election was going on last year, here in your country, you know, many colorful language about Japan was, you know -- was floating around. And we were sort of -- definitely quite worried. But, at the same time, there was this sort of realism that, whoever becomes the president, U.S. would remain our best choice -- only choice, and fortunately, the best choice.

And the reason why we could sort of maintain this realistic, pragmatic posture was that, you know, we had the sense that we're in this together and this is good for both of us. So, through this process of reconciliation, I think this uneasiness was minimized, and that played a very important role in the alliance management process.

So, lastly, sort of where do we go from here? We rely on the fact that -- you know, that America is a resident power in our region, Asia-Pacific, and -- without which I think Japanese foreign policy and security policy would have to sort of go on -- you know, have to sort fundamentally change.

And, like I said, there's this sense that, you know, we rely on the alliance more and the fact that -- you know, the changes in geopolitics in our region -- you know, there could be an occasion where sort of the distrust and uneasiness would be coming back.

And also, you see this constant trend -- not just this administration, but you see -- you saw that in Bush Two and the Obama administration -- this sense of not isolationism, but the sense that America is sort of retrenching. We clearly see that. So there is nothing we can do about that directly.

But for Japan to keep on showing that, you know, in terms of our security posture, we would be more assertive, and we have to sort of, you know, convince the younger generation that this reconciliation is an important process, because reconciliation doesn't end like a movie ends. I guess it is a -- it's a constant process. So we have to sort of keep on sort of reproducing this process. And I think -- as I said in my remarks, I think it is as important as the institutions and the infrastructure.

So I will end here. Thank you.

SCHOFF: Great. Thank you very much, Nakayama-sensei.

(LAUGHTER)

Thank you for very sweeping and thoughtful comments.

There's two things I can't help but comment on a little bit, because, you know, you mentioned Emperor Hirohito's visit to the United States, which was in the '70s, I think -- the late '70s or -- and -- mid-'70s. And you talked about kind of the not promoting -- or the not -- you know, the sensitivity of some of these things.

I remember having a conversation with one of my father's good friends -- banker -- successful banker, well-educated in New York and very interested in Japan, had done a lot of work with Japan. And in our conversations, somehow -- I was probably college-age, I was studying about Japan, et cetera, and I mentioned about Hirohito's visit to the United States.

He's like, "Jim, Emperor Hirohito would never visit the United States." You know, "You're clearly mistaken." So he -- it had never registered for him. It was almost -- on the U.S. side, in some ways, my impression was that was not necessarily as broadly disseminated as perhaps it was in Japan.

And then the dictionary example you put out there -- in our age of conspiracy theories, I can imagine now that some people would say, "Well, this is clearly, you know, the government trying to sell an agenda of U.S.-Japan relations by putting in the dictionary definitions, you know, that closeness is a part of -- part of our DNA."

So -- wait a minute, I have a little note here -- and I want to now turn it over to Michael to bring us home on the opening remarks, and then we'll launch into our discussion.

AUSLIN: Jim, thank you very much.

Ambassador Nogami, it's always a pleasure to work with JIIA again.

As I was coming up here, I was looking at the demographics of the panel, and I was thinking, this is either the best group to talk about reconciliation, or the very worst, because none of us here, age-wise, ever had to think professionally about reconciliation.

I'm looking out at the audience, at friends like Robin Barrington and Bill Grier and Rust Deming, and these are folks who had to deal with reconciliation, or were a lot closer to dealing with reconciliation than any of us were.

So, you know, take -- certainly take my comments, at best, with a grain of salt. Either I have no idea what I'm talking about or the distance of young age allows me to think about this in a slightly different way. And also I am a historian, so from my co-panelists, I may have a slightly different take.

But I don't think there's much I can really add to their eloquence and what they've -- what they've covered. So, instead, let me try to maybe put into a framework that may guide, a little bit, the discussion going forward. I do have -- I do have one problem with what we're talking about. And I am wondering -- it may just be me -- whether we're talking more about cooperation than we are reconciliation.

And I assume, though I haven't, you know, gone back and looked at it as a historian would, that you can have cases of cooperation where you don't have reconciliation -- probably Israel, with some of its Arab neighbors that it does work with, you know, Jordan and even Egypt. You know, you -- just because you sign a peace treaty or some type of treaty doesn't mean you've reconciled yourselves. And I'd love to get better historical examples; I don't -- I don't really have any right now.

But it seems to me a lot of what we're talking about -- and it's part of the way we framed it so far -- is really cooperation, and I'm not sure what reconciliation is, which raises the question -- not to be too tendentious about it, but what is reconciliation?

You know, from an Occam's Razor point of view, from just the simplest explanation, we could probably get away with saying that all of this is pretty easily explainable. From the U.S. perspective, it's really easy to reconcile when you've won. We won the war. This was pretty easy to reconcile. We got to determine the postwar structure. You know, we successfully enforced it. So we had no problem with reconciling with our former enemy.

For the Japanese, a more complicated question, but, again, to be as simplistic as possible, if the emperor's words, "Endure the unendurable," really guided the way that the Japanese approached the occupation in the years afterwards, then it's fairly an unexceptionable that we were able to reconcile and work with each other. But, again, that to me smacks more, maybe, of cooperation than it does reconciliation.

So, reconciliation -- what is it? And I certainly don't think that I have an answer, but there are three possible definitions or possible explanations I would give to what reconciliation is. The first is temporal, the second is geographic and the third is societal. And I think each of them are imperfect in their own way.

Temporal, to me as a historian, certainly is the one that makes the most sense. We've spent a lot of time this morning, and maybe more time as the day goes on, talking about the visit -- President Obama to Hiroshima and president -- and Prime Minister Abe to Pearl Harbor. It took 70 years.

I mean, I remember -- I'm sure a lot of us did it -- I was giving media interviews, because I couldn't find anyone else to talk to. I was doing a media interview, saying, "Well, yeah, of course, they should have done it by now. It's 70 years."

So, temporally, the question of reconciliation to me seems, again, not all that exceptional. Many of those -- many, not all, but most, probably, of those who had direct influence or -- I'm sorry -- direct experience in the war had -- were no longer active, had passed from the scene -- certainly, none of the policymakers. Certainly, none of those who had responsibilities are left.

And, after two generations -- two full generations, two and a half generations had passed, the idea that we wouldn't have moved down to some level of reconciliation, to me, seems -- seemed quite odd. But, then again, you can look at other disputes around the world that have gone on for centuries, if not millennia, and they have not been reconciled.

So, moving from the temporal question of "Isn't reconciliation sort of natural," we move to the question of geographic reconciliation. And here, again, the U.S.-Japan case, to me, is somewhat exceptional, as is the U.S. role in the 20th century.

Proximity increases tensions. We know this. We have abundant historical evidence, which is why we still talk about borders and fighting over borders, and why we look at Europe post-World War II as such an abnormal period, where there has been no fighting -- at least until recently -- over borders. And we're back to that, when you look at Ukraine.

So maybe you have to have such an apocalyptic, cataclysmic clash between neighbors, as occurred twice between Germany and France in the space of one generation, that you can move beyond that type of geographic tension, that proximity tension, to actually get to a lasting reconciliation, an "enforced from the top down" reconciliation.

It may be -- and we've already referenced it here -- why, because of proximity, it has been harder for Japan and South Korea to reconcile, Japan and China to reconcile, China and Vietnam to reconcile, and I could go on and on and on. But, for the United States and Japan, even in an age of intercontinental air travel and an ocean that we always talk about linking us, the truth is it divides us. Just physically, it divides us.

And so we're very far away, and maybe reconciliation from a geographic perspective, in this particular case, is actually easier. We are not cheek by jowl as societies, as countries, as these other groups are. And so -- and so it is much easier to put aside an episode in the past, because it does not directly affect where you go forward from that point.

If you want to look at one of the causes for World War II, the Pacific War in the U.S. and Japan, it was, of course, the United States's colonial occupation, colonial control of the Philippines, which Japan coveted and invaded. And, after 1946, we were no longer a colonial power. So you remove that impediment. And, again, with an ocean to separate us, maybe the geographic element makes reconciliation more natural in our case, as opposed to other cases.

But, again, at the end of the day, it seems to me it comes down to society, societal reconciliation. And so let me finish up my remarks by talking a little bit more about that and, again, subdivide it into three different -- three different groups, or three different elements.

Most of what I -- without trying to put words in the mouths of my co-panelists, I felt that they were mostly talking about state-level reconciliation, though they were certainly talking at different levels as well, but largely about state-level reconciliation. But reconciliation is a very personal issue.

And so there are at least three different levels of societal reconciliation. The first is the state; it's a legitimate one to look at. The second are groups -- or the second is groups within the state. And then the third is the individual.

Now, at the state level, I think that sort of pushes us back to that question of "Are we really cooperating versus reconciling," and that's, to me, completely legitimate. As a policymaker, I would assume what -- we don't -- at one level, we don't care if we've reconciled, as long as we are cooperating; for state interests, that's fine. And if we -- if we frame it or drape it in the garb, the words of reconciliation, that's perfectly acceptable. But I think Jenny's point is a very trenchant one, about state interests that can drive a sense of reconciliation -- certainly, deeper cooperation.

So, at the state level, the question of interest -- for example, the question of the rise of China or North Korea -- drives us together and can lay bare, even in ways beyond what we already understood or thought we understood, the shared principles or the shared values that we have. So that, to me, seems completely legitimate.

But what about -- what about groups and individuals? Their cooperation doesn't have to happen. Or, if it does happen, it doesn't really affect the broader canvas, I would say, on which state-to-state relations occur. So, then, we are really talking much more about reconciliation.

And here, I would say the historical record seems a little bit more mixed to me. It's interesting -- Jim talked about the prewar history. I think it's a really important point, the prewar history of U.S.-Japan cultural relations. I wrote a book on it, so it's something that I've tried to think about, and try to keep in the forefront of my mind.

Do you know when the highest number -- I guess that's the right way to put it -- the biggest number of members of the America-Japan Society in Tokyo was, what year? I can frame it differently. What year did the America-Japan Society of Tokyo have the most members?

(UNKNOWN): 1941.

AUSLIN: 1941. Exactly. 1941, the eve of Pearl Harbor. As relations had been deteriorating for years, there was a group committed to promoting binational, bicultural relations. And it had its greatest success, from that metric, as we were about to head into the most catastrophic war either of us had faced.

But there was decades -- at least 40 full years, and even -- you can go beyond that, but 40 full years of organized cultural exchange between Japan and the U.S. before Pearl Harbor -- all sorts of different groups. And did that, then, help the postwar reconciliation? Because, even if those plants had been uprooted during the wartime, at least maybe some deep roots remained, and they could -- they could crop up in different conditions.

But certainly not all groups were reconciled to each other. We remember, in 1995, the controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian, in which a group of U.S. veterans were against, from their perspective, the way that the Smithsonian had begun to trim the way it was going to show the exhibition, and then, from the Japanese side, also a feeling

that you shouldn't show a machine of mass destruction. And it took years -- I don't know when, but they finally put the Enola Gay together. You can go -- now go see it at Udvar-Hazy. But you couldn't do that for years. So we had that.

The POWs -- American POWs, who still search for what they believe is the appropriate and proper apology -- these are American POWs; I'm not talking about other countries. So there are lots of groups that have not reconciled, or found it more difficult to reconcile, or accepted cooperation between our countries but not the reconciliation that we're talking about.

And then, the individual level, the hardest to even try to get at -- and I'll just give an anecdote. Probably 20 years ago, I don't know remember exactly when, I read the memoir of Eugene Sledge, called *With the Old Breed*. If you haven't read it, I cannot commend it highly enough. It is not only undoubtedly the best memoir of the Pacific War from an American serviceman's perspective; it's the most harrowing. It will keep you up at night.

And so I wrote him. He was living down in Alabama. He was the -- it was his book that became the basis for the HBO series "*The Pacific*" -- Pacific War -- you know, the *Band of Brothers* counterpart in the Pacific. So I wrote Eugene Sledge from a very personal perspective, to tell him how much his book had meant to me as someone whose professional and personal life is wrapped up with Japan. And he wrote me back, which I didn't expect. And he -- and he's passed now, so I think I can say this, you know, publicly.

But, anyway, he wrote me back, and I expected a letter that was going to be, you know -- "Those days are gone," and so on and so forth, and "It's a new era, and I'm glad my book maybe helped you to get to where you are in your life." And, instead, there was a bitter letter. It was full of bitterness over what he had experienced and seen, 50-plus years on. And so, he hadn't reconciled himself.

And then there's other, different types of reconciliation that also don't take place. And I'm thinking here -- I forget the year, 1983, 1985 -- where a Chinese-American was beaten to death outside a bar in Detroit by two Americans who thought he was Japanese, because of trade tensions between our countries.

And so issues that did not affect either the individuals involved, meaning the war, and decades later, were resurrected in a different way, leading to the question of are we really reconciled as individuals and how do you even try to put your finger on that.

So that's all I really have. I mean, there's -- you know, it -- I think this question is one that operates at so many different levels. And I would -- I would simply say that the state level, which we think about a lot in D.C., is not the only one to look at it from, not that any of us would claim that.

But, if we're talking about something as personal and as intimate as the idea inside people's heads, which then becomes groups, which then becomes society, which then somehow manifests itself in the state, reconciliation is a far more fraught process, and one that, probably just as a constitutional skeptic, I'm -- I feel is probably much more fragile than what we -- than what we think we might have.

Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

SCHOFF: Thank you very much, Michael, for taking us, you know, farther down the road into some of these issues, because this is part of what I want to touch on in our quick discussion, before we open it up to the audience.

I'd like to ask a very kind of broad multi-part question, and then let our panelists respond to whatever piece of that they feel inspired to respond to, because I think Michael is right. Obviously, it's clearly a very complex, vague issue and notion. He came up with the three categories of actors, in a sense: the state, groups, and the individual.

I did it slightly differently. I came up with government, civil society or non-governmental organizations, grassroots organizations as the second, and private sector, private companies kind of as a third. So you can slice this in a variety of different ways.

And then Nakayama-sensei talked a -- introduced this issue of institutions, which I think is also very critical to think of -- foundations, universities. I've studied for a year at International Christian University in Mitaka in Japan, established after the war -- philanthropy and other types of institutions, and scholarships and other types of things like that.

So I'd like to ask our panelists a little bit about ranking the role or importance, I mean, I guess you can answer and say well they're all equally important, but I'd press you to think about the balance of the role that these different factors play -- government, kind of NGOs or civil society. Thinking of the recent case, you had the Obon Society that has sprung up in the United States to return artifacts to soldiers' families in Japan and they have a relationship with the Nippon Izokukai, the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, to try to foster this. It's completely separate from any kind of government institution.

So that's kind of like proactive action to try to help reconcile or foster friendship, but then there's also acts of suppression which are trying to avoid controversial topics, almost, and it can be in legal sense, as we've had some of the POW cases that were brought in courts in California and elsewhere that were dismissed based on legal grounds. In a way, that's kind of pushing aside certain issues. We're not going to talk about that. That's not necessarily the reason why; there's a foundation in law in some of these decisions.

But then you see, years later -- so it was 1999 or so -- that the first court cases came in California. By 2015, you have Mitsubishi apologizing to James Murphy, making donations to the Bataan and Corregidor museum. Kajima and Nishimatsu and others have made some apologies and compensation to Chinese forced laborers.

There are examples of private companies and individual responses to some of these things, although for some, it is not enough, and for others, it is. So there is proactive action and suppression, institutions, and then this kind of three-part role of government, civil society and private sector.

So, within that broad range, I would like to seek your thoughts on in the U.S.-Japan experience, what strikes you as kind of the most relevant or some of the critical factors in this regard. My second question will be much more specific and clear-cut.

LIND: I really appreciated hearing my co-panelists' remarks and thinking about them a lot. I thought I was the wonky academic in the room and then Mischa says, "Well, we got to define our dependent variable here, people." No, you didn't use those words, but it's reconciliation, and the importance of defining that, I think, really is key in any conversation. So I'm really glad you brought it up.

You could define it very narrowly and, again, putting on my international relations hat, you could say just not being in a situation of rivalry where you're mobilizing military forces and conducting diplomacy and ways that anticipate conflict with the other side.

So if you're able to get to a situation where you don't see the other as an enemy and you're not preparing to fight them, that can be a tremendous achievement for countries -- just that, right? And that's a very narrow reconciliation.

But you could imagine a continuum where, at the other end, it would be a picture very much like the U.S.-Japan alliance, where you have a far deeper connection and see each other -- and Nakayama-san put it so nicely -- in terms of this is not just a narrow military alliance, this is a much broader conception of shared interests and shared purpose. So I think really defining reconciliation is important.

In terms of the different actors who go into it, I think, again, if you're shooting for a narrow reconciliation, you just need the state to be on board, right? If you're content with that and if that's all you really need, then you just need the state to make that decision. It's very top-down, right?

You can think of some alliances or partnerships that the U.S. has where it's barely even cooperation, and certainly not any sort of warmth, right? So America and Pakistan, America and Saudi Arabia -- we can't use very glowy sentences to talk about these relationships with our shared values and shared purpose, right? So these are very narrow partnerships created for a very specific, narrow reason.

So that's one area where, again, we see that the U.S. and Japan actually started as that. We were America and Pakistan, at the beginning. I don't know, Mischa reminded us, I think, really helpfully of the existence of societal connections before the war.

But we had this very narrow alliance -- societies really didn't like each other much after the war; racism was endemic, right? So it started off as very much just the states deciding, and the people not being very happy about -- we're going to cooperate.

And I think that it was the recognition that this probably wasn't going to be durable -- right back to the security treaty crisis, that it wouldn't be very durable unless you widened the people who had an interest in reconciliation.

So, again, that, over time, you see the evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance, starting with, OK, it's just two governments deciding we're going to pursue these narrow interests, and then realizing that wasn't going very well. And so, starting in the 1960s, you think of the visit by Robert Kennedy to Japan; you can think of the Kennedy administration's reaching out through summits; you could think of bringing Japan into international institutions and so on -- that it was a time when they started working much more closely together.

And then, over time, it just deepened. Lots of people in this room started and participated in programs toward this goal. So I think it really is important -- and Mischa gave us this framework for thinking about -- you could have very narrow cooperation, in which the state generally dictates, and then, maybe in some cases, that works.

In the U.S.-Japan case, the leaders thought this wasn't going to work real well, so they moved further down the line, to bringing in the groups that Jim mentioned, bringing in the individuals, reaching out with language programs, and teaching exchanges, and exchanges between artists and sculptors and musicians -- CULCOM comes to mind as a big advocate of this.

So I think all these dimensions are really important part of this conversation. And I'll let my panelists comment, also.

AUSLIN: Let me just add something. I think that's a great point. I wouldn't undervalue the importance of big-impact moments, though. And I think Jenny is right -- I mean, I would describe it more as organic and holistic, the great chain of being.

All of these things have to work together, and they do it at different points, even as they don't at different points -- as I mentioned, some of those individuals. But there's also high yield from certain gestures or certain initiatives that probably do more to continue what's going on than just sort of a steady push.

And so I'm thinking, just to throw a few out there -- actually I think the most important one, and actually, we can end the conference right now -- I think reconciliation happened because Emperor Hirohito went to Disneyland in 1975. The Americans were just like, "We understand now. This is great."

That really was important. I mean, that was the picture that got splashed all over U.S. newspapers -- was Emperor Hirohito with Mickey Mouse, believe it or not, and some of us are old enough to remember that. But that normalizes this country that is still very far away, and very few Americans had encountered.

But there were other really high-yield moments. Some of them were institutional -- the restarting of the Japan Society in New York, right after the occupation ended. I think the first meeting was 1953, and if I remember, the first annual banquet that it did after the war, the current emperor, as crown prince, went. And this was with John D. Rockefeller III, and Dulles -- not Allen -- John Foster Dulles who was one of the heads of the Japan Society.

I mean, this was big stuff. This was the elite imprimatur that it's OK to once again have interactions at this level, and that sort of sent signals throughout society. One that was reminded to me by the Carnegie folks is that -- amazingly, I did not know this -- in 1964, the Japanese government awarded the highest award, whichever it was, the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, whichever one it is, to Curtis LeMay, Curtis LeMay.

So, from your perspective, he's either a war criminal, or he's the perfect person you want to embrace for a reconciliation moment, to say, "If the Japanese government can get over this, then the rest of you can get over it."

And also, in a little-known -- and this will be my last comment on this -- a little-known fact, as well, is that -- I don't remember the exact specifics unfortunately, but Chester Nimitz, our fleet admiral who led the American war effort in the Pacific, donated the royalties from one of his books or his memoirs to a fund for reconstruction in Japan -- I think it was Japanese orphans or something like that -- and then built in his hometown in Texas -- I think it's Fredericksburg -- a peace garden that's still there today.

So there are very high-yield moments, when those who shaped what those relations were for good or bad commit to this idea of cooperation/reconciliation. I think that's very powerful and sends signals to those who, down at the lowest levels, would say, "Well, I want to study Japanese," or "I want to go visit there." Maybe, without those, it might be a slightly harder sell.

NAKAYAMA: About this thing -- it wasn't about the bombing, right? It was about him sort of laying the foundation of the Self Defense Force. So yes. I mean, it's not really about reconciliation. It was still symbolic. It was a debate back then, I guess, but it wasn't about that specific.

AUSLIN: I didn't imply that he got the award for the bombing. That's not what I meant to say.

NAKAYAMA: Yes. So it does makes sense to a certain degree, because he laid the foundation for an important Japanese institution.

And about this question that you raised about the state, group, individual or government, civil society or private, I think U.S. and Japan has dealt at the level of a state group or government, civil society, pretty well.

But, as Mischa mentioned, at this individual level, I think difficulty would remain. And people who actually was in the forefront at the war -- I mean, it's so personal. There's so little that we as a state or a group can do.

But at the same time, there's maybe a subdivision within individual or private, as well, because ordinary people like us are part of the collective memory, as well, right -- not at the forefront. And at that level, even on the individual side, I think we have achieved a lot.

And I think we should -- yes, like I said at my remarks' outset, there would never be 100 percent, and it's even silly to talk about that. But, including myself personally, and others like you, everybody here, maybe, we have achieved a lot, even at a personal and individual level. And I think we should be sort of highlighting that aspect, as well.

So I know I'm not directly answering to your question, but I think we have more or less dealt with these three sort of layers of issues successfully -- I think.

SCHOFF: Thank you. Well, let me ask quickly, how fragile are the gains that we've made, in your mind? Because, on the one hand, I'm encouraged, when I look at some of the rhetoric that came out there in the Trump campaign, for example, kind of re-raising some of the trade issues and unfairness and some of the things we saw in the 1980s and 1990s, yet it didn't really take hold in my mind.

And we also have a huge presence of Japanese foreign direct investment in the United States, and Japanese companies and the culture cross-fertilization that has happened provides, in some ways, a great reservoir of just strengthening this personal side, going forward. So I'm encouraged on that front.

But then, sometimes I look at situations and I get dismayed, especially when the generations early on that helped rebuild after the great tragedy -- when the generations that have no connection to what had happened in the past -- how groups can use history, distort it. We're in the era of fake news, and everybody can get in their own little track of information that they choose to have funneled to them.

How fragile are the gains that we've made, in your mind? And what are the key things we need to kind of be looking for, going forward, or if we want to keep this momentum going, this -- keep the shark swimming, as it were?

LIND: I would say that, because of the insights of the two governments 50 or so years ago -- this insight that it was fragile, that the cooperation was fragile, the alliance was fragile and they had to make it more robust, and they actually put energy, diplomacy, and other resources toward that -- I think they did make it significantly stronger. And we're benefiting from that today. We're the results of that today.

And now, I mean, I just find it just remarkable, the period of the U.S. election where I would go to Japan, I would talk to them about, "How are you feeling about this? What are you thinking when you're hearing the kinds of things we're hearing?" And just -- they were grownups. They were absolutely just saying, "OK, how can we deal with this?" And they're talking to their American friends and colleagues, and listening and learning and thinking.

And they took such a mature -- much more than I did, I think -- line on what was happening. I was so upset. But they're mature, pragmatic. They had great lines of communication with the U.S. And so that really showed me a really impressive moment in our relationship, and into this administration, which, again, we were very concerned about how Trump would either continue to work with Japan, or whether he would start attacking it.

We continue to see Tokyo being very calm and pragmatic and making the best of the situation. So I see it as a very strong relationship. I guess I would ask, OK, so what causes fragility in an alliance? And we could think about that and then apply it to different relationships, like the U.S. and NATO, for example, and others.

And I guess I would emphasize, what's your purpose? Do you have a foundation of shared interests? Or have your interests actually drifted apart, and you're just relying on rhetoric, now, to claim you have shared interests?

So do we have a foundation of shared interests? Absolutely. It was a harder sell in the early 1990s, I think, but today, absolutely. I mean, Asia is -- like I said, it's a dangerous place, and particularly the rise of China is only pushing the U.S. and Japan closer together.

So do we have a foundation of shared interests? Certainly the military one, and then we've also expanded our sense of shared interests far beyond that to, again, thinking about global governance and the spread of liberalism. And Japan is fully committed and a partner in that. So yes, we have a continued foundation of shared interests. That is really important.

And then, do we have buy-in from the groups and the individuals, right? So do we have buy-in from business groups and societal groups? And do we have buy-in from average people? Or do they just not get this at all, like, "Japan? Who cares?" Well, I think we do have buy-in. We have significant buy-in, and people have warmth, and poll data show that the American people really do favor a good relationship with Japan and a continued alliance with Japan.

So this all points to me that it's pretty strong. And this is not inconsequential. We have shared interests, we have buy-in from the groups that we would need buy-in from, and from the people more broadly.

I would also emphasize, though, I don't think we can rest on that forever, because it changes with generations. And, unless we are able to transmit this kind of sense of community and get this buy-in from future generations, then that will be in jeopardy there.

As I think one of the speakers earlier mentioned the fewer and fewer -- maybe it was Congressman Tsongas? Yes -- the fewer and fewer Japanese students coming to the U.S., for example. We need to make sure that these relationships between individuals in both of our countries is continuing. And so we can't rest on this forever. We can't take it for granted, and we need activities like this to continue to provide that foundation.

AUSLIN: I'd also add that it's probably easier -- I don't know where this fits in all the schema we've been throwing out here but it's easier for this cooperation, or even this sense of reconciliation, whether real or imagined, when your sense of competition is also decreased, right?

So there's a lot of people in this room old enough to remember and lived through the bad days of the 1980s, right? And there was great fear in the United States. I mentioned about the trade tensions, but it was more than that. It was a feeling what we have today vis-a-vis China -- that we were going to be supplanted, potentially, by Japan.

So I don't think we have to review that whole history, but books with the title *The Coming War with Japan*, *Black Sun* -- these were extremely negative views of Japan. And they were -- not only had a racial element to it; they had a pure power element to it. Japan was rising, America was sort of doddering along, and this was very cultural.

And, interestingly, a lot was happening a lot at the moment when you had the Ron-Yasu relationship, and strategically, the two countries were cooperating more, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the like. But I don't know how much reconciliation there really was back then, because people felt here that this was a power we were going to have to deal with, and that wasn't positive -- Japan after the bubble.

Let's be honest, it's a lot easier to reconcile, have warmer feelings for, be open to cooperation when you don't feel threatened, and conversely, maybe, from Japan's perspective, as well. If Japan really believed in the 1980s that it was going to overtake the United States, that's a dynamic on that side -- I can't speak to it. But maybe from Japan's perspective, as well, it's easier when the bubble burst and you realized you're not going to overtake the United States, you are not going to be number one, with all of the responsibilities and problems that come with it. You're also more open to cooperation.

So the buy-in that Jenny's talking about, which I agree is very, very important -- there's also a temporal, comparative aspect to it, where these are countries that view each other differently, and therefore -- in terms of the hard power element, and therefore are able to sort of flow that down through all these other, softer elements of the relationship that we're talking about. So yes, I think it's more fragile.

SCHOFF: And we have a chance for Japanese perspective on it.

NAKAYAMA: Whether the reconciliation is fragile or not, I'm a bit mixed. To a certain degree, I think it is fragile because, like I said, this is always a process, and it never ends. So, if situations get out of control, of course, in Northeast Asia, and if something happens between the U.S. and Japan, it could sort of break up, to a certain degree. And there are still these feelings of uneasiness about Japan relying on the U.S., although, like I said, it's anti-Americanism without political conviction, therefore, anti-Americanism lite.

This is an interesting story. I mean, when the election was going on last year, I talked around Japan about the election. And people were saying -- especially this middle-aged men type -- would say that Japan has to become a full-blown military power, because we can't trump the U.S. anymore. And when I sort of said that, "No, that's not a realistic option," I would get criticized as a member of "anpo-mura" -- that's sort of like the community of alliance managers, where they're not interested in talking with the public, that -- they use jargon, and all that.

But, since -- after Mr. Trump's victory, sort of, I stopped hearing that. Or, whenever I explain what's going on in the U.S., nobody would say, "We have to become a full-blown military power," because they would know that it's totally unrealistic. And I don't know we're mature or not, but I think we have chosen to adapt, rather than to complain, because, if you think about all the other options that is left to Japan -- I mean, regional organization, global organization, going it alone, other alliance partners, et cetera -- I mean, like I said in my remarks, it may be the only option that we have.

But still, it's the best option that we have, and there's this sense that I think many people in Japan understand, and the results of the recent election in Japan, although it may not be the issue, but it helped LDP and Prime Minister Abe. So I think the sense of realism is there.

But, like I said, this underlying uneasiness could surface if something happened. So it is fragile, but I think it's a manageable fragility -- I think.

SCHOFF: Thanks. All right. My final question I want to speak in, and then I'd like to reach out to the audience. But quickly, I wanted to touch on this issue of kind of third-party dynamics in the United States. So we'll save some of the global context for the second panel.

But, when a group wants to put up a comfort women statue in San Francisco or elsewhere, or wants to write a textbook that describes what happened in World War II a certain way, whether it's a textbook in Japan or -- about something going on in Asia, or a textbook here about that time, how active do you think the government or our community should be to try to manage that, or intervene, or try to keep that kind of battle off of our shores?

We had the ECC of Japan battle and Virginia State textbooks, not too long ago. Or should it just be hands-off, and just let it play out the way it is -- if San Francisco and Osaka have to lose their friendship -- sister city relationship, then so be it?

(UNKNOWN): I get to ask that question. I don't have to answer it.

(LAUGHTER)

NAKAYAMA: Was that addressed to me? Well, I think the government and scholars like us should intervene, to a certain degree. And in my case, as an individual scholar, in the case of governments, according to their position, they should explain the position.

So I don't think we should totally sort of step out. That's not the solution. But I think the difficult part is how the media sort of plays up the issue. Of course, the issue is there, but how it plays up -- where it has a very negative effect.

And Japan is a democracy. We have all sorts of people, like you do, as well. And we're learning more and more about difficult type of groups that you have in this country. We have that, as well. And those people sort of play up issues -- this is a tainted work on both sides, right?

(LAUGHTER)

It's not funny. But we somehow have to learn to sort of engage in a reasonable conversation. And media so often - Japanese media and the U.S. media, both sides -- flares up the issue. And that's very unfortunate, and it makes an atmosphere where a decent conversation can't take place. So -- trying to avoid answering your questions, but...

SCHOFF: It's fair. Good response. Any other reactions?

LIND: I don't think Washington should tell people in San Francisco what monuments they can build and not build. So I don't think the federal government should be stepping in. But our community, right -- this community of people who are very close to Japan and working to create a stronger relationship between the two countries -- I think it's on us, right? We should be involved.

Now that I think about it, actually, this is an issue -- the issue of, like, the local monuments in the U.S., and that sort of thing -- this is an issue. I don't think I've ever been to a conference on that. I don't know if it's because other people go to it and I don't, but this strikes me as a very important conversation, an increasingly important one.

So I hope there are lots of conversations going on about this, and people writing in op-eds and people writing articles on this. It might be kind of a half-step away from the "anpo-mura," what we're usually talking about, but I think it's a really important conversation for us, absolutely.

SCHOFF: Now, I'll open it up to the floor, comments OK, questions good as well. A microphone is coming to you, and we're taping this for posterity. We have a question up front. I need a microphone.

Let us know who you are and where you're from. Whether it's a comment or a question, try to keep it concise, if possible. Manage to keep it concise.

QUESTION: Thanks so much. Chris Nelson -- I'm a fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, which I think illustrates exactly what we're talking about here. But most of you know me as the Nelson Report, and I've written a lot about this stuff for years, so thank you.

And the comfort women statue thing goes to the heart of, I think, almost every question we're talking about, because, as I have argued and talked with my friends in the Gaimusho about for years, guys, these statues, these monuments don't become news until you protest them. Then the story is, "Oh my God, Japan's consul general in New York just went and threatened the mayor of Bergen" -- of wherever the hell it was in New Jersey, right? That became the news.

And the actual discussion of what the monument is for, what it was about and who is on it either didn't take place, or degenerated into ridiculous demands for proof of coercion. This is -- in a military dictatorship, you have to show proof of coercion. Really? Is that a serious argument? And yet the government of Japan keeps making that argument. So the debate doesn't really ever get joined.

So I think Jenny is absolutely right that we have to think about what's the appropriate level of reaction to things like this, but also to ask ourselves what business is it of any government to object to monuments in another country, put up by other cultures and races? It's none of your damn business, and yet it's become a real problem.

And I think it underscores the point that you've all made that, yes, it's top-down in terms of cooperation and, eventually, reconciliation. But it's bottom-up, individual hearts and minds and experiences, that either solidifies the alliance or imperils it.

And I'm making a speech, rather than asking a question, and I apologize for that, but it goes to the heart, I think, of this continued problem with our Korean friends. Any of us who's been in Korea and managed to get outside of Seoul -- every little town you go to has a museum to the martyrs of the Japanese occupation, and horrendous stories of terrible things done.

My daughter taught in South Korea twice now, in the last five years, and said she was stunned to have five-year-olds and six years old and seven-year-old kids write to her, write little essays for her, obviously retelling stories from their grandparents and their parents about the terrible things that the Japanese had done. So it's being kept alive, and you can see how it's blocking rational cooperation between -- you know, at the state level between, you know -- so all this stuff really is intimately entwined.

And I'm really asking a question, but I would say the question is, at some point, the U.S. government does have a role, doesn't it? It can't just sit there and let a fight be carried out that isn't engaging in the real thing. Or do you disagree with it? Do you think this has to be more an individual thing and not a government? So sorry for this.

SCHOFF: No, no, that's all right. I don't know. I think we've kind of addressed that question a little bit. If the panel wants to react to that, they can.

Let me take another question here, first. All right, let's go in quick succession here, and -- working our way down. Let me go to Ben?

QUESTION: Thanks, Jim.

SCHOFF: Then we'll keep it relatively short.

QUESTION: Thanks, Jim. Ben Self from The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. It's a wonderful panel, and I've learned a lot, and I don't mean to criticize by pointing out some of the holes, but you couldn't be comprehensive.

What struck me as one of the big holes was the discussion of the benign nature of the occupation itself. My great-uncle fought in the Battle of Okinawa, but his memories of Japan are very, very warm and positive because he was immediately in the occupation afterwards. And he formed friendships. There was no discussion of John Dower's book, *War Without Mercy*. But one of the key insights there was how U.S. propaganda shifted from demonizing Japan, to infantilizing Japan.

But, right away, we have a step towards reconciliation on the U.S. side with the occupation itself. And I was surprised not to hear -- even before NSC-68, even before the Cold War, we had a strategy for an occupation that would learn the lessons of Versailles, that would be benevolent.

And I think that was something American troops experienced directly, and something the Japanese population experienced, when they first encountered, you know, American soldiers on Japanese soil -- it wasn't as cruel oppressors, but as benevolent sort of liberators, if you will, from Japan's own regime.

So I'd be curious to hear a little bit more from the panel about the legacies of the occupation and the strategy that America went into, with those lessons of Versailles in mind. Thank you.

SCHOFF: Thank you.

QUESTION: OK.

SCHOFF: Hold on to this. I'm going to collect a few more questions, and pick your spots that you want to respond to. But that's a good point, Ben. My parents had the same experience in '56, when they were over there. Ellen?

QUESTION: Thanks. Ellen Frost, East-West Center, National Defense University. I want to underscore Jim's mention of the corporate sector as a real catalyst.

From the 19th century, right through the mid-30s, the U.S.-Japan business relationships were really quite good. And companies in Japan held on to the licensing fees during the war, and repaid Americans after the war. Business cooperation picked up, and I would argue that that was one of the factors that promoted reconciliation.

Conversely, in the 1980s, the bashing period, which I lived through vividly, the worsening of relations came from the corporates, the automotive sector and the I.T. sector. And the whole notion that Japan Inc. was unfair, which was reflected in the books that Professor Auslin mentioned, was a factor.

And then, lo and behold, China opened up, Japan's investment shifted, their exports to China went up and exports to the United States went down, and lo and behold, now the issue was the trade imbalance with China, and not with Japan.

So I think you just need a little bit more attention paid to the corporate sector.

SCHOFF: Thank you.

Let me go to Rust, and then we'll go to Mindy.

QUESTION: Thank you. Rust Deming at SAIS. Mischa, I appreciate very much your reference to me and Bill Grier and Robin as old enough to understand what reconciliation is all about.

Indeed, I hate to admit, but I was a child in Japan, about a year old, in the occupation, and I was in Disneyland with him. It gives me a little more wisdom.

My question to the panel is, how important is it to try to come to a common understanding of the origins of the conflict that created the need for reconciliation (OFF-MIKE) by the French and Germans and (OFF-MIKE) better, just not to dig too deep (OFF-MINE) to build the reconciliation (OFF-MIKE).

SCHOFF: Good question. Thanks.

Mindy, and then I'm going to wrap up with Jim and then we're going to get the panels ready.

QUESTION: My name is Mindy Kotler with Asia Policy Point. Professor Nakayama is correct: Reconciliation is a process. An apology needs to be offered, apology needs to be accepted. And it's an educational, long-term, forever -- it's not a one-off.

And in regard to that -- and it was mentioned, you know, the prisoners of war -- the Japanese state and the American state did eventually -- even though there are people in this room who willfully interfered, willfully neglected and willfully delayed apology and reconciliation for the American POWs, there was, in 2009, a Cabinet-approved apology to the American POWs of Japan.

It's one of only four Cabinet-approved war apologies by the Japanese government. I take a bit of a legalistic view of this. This apology then opened the door for what was not done in 1995, when the Japanese government gave trips and reconciliation programs to other prisoners of war.

So, in 2010, there started a process of trips for seven or eight former POWs, which is now including families and widows and orphans. This was delayed many years because of a lack of State Department involvement. But the Obama Administration went in and talked to the Japanese government, and this program was created.

So you have this Cabinet-approved -- as far as the apology that the POWs still want -- and that's from the companies, the companies who used them as slave labor. The companies were -- Mitsubishi Zaibatsu was at the Cabinet table, was a member of the Cabinet, with Tojo and with Abe's grandfather, where they devised a program where -- there's a document that says, "We want the white slaves."

So they want these apologies from the companies, and they had wanted compensation, but that is long gone, because the apology is more important. And the only company that has apologized, even though there's two Cabinet members that -- from families that had prisoners of war, slave laborers, and that is Mitsubishi Materials, because they had four mines. And they gave \$50,000 to a library in West Virginia. Is \$50,000 worth the slave labor in four mines? I don't know.

So it's a process. And what the POWs would really like is, at the Port of Moji Memorial to all the POWs who died, of which -- on the port, of which one was the Smothers Brothers' -- brothers' father -- interesting.

But my question, I actually have a question. I want to know what a "goi" is, and I don't mean the Yiddish "goy." I mean in terms of where does it fit on the spectrum of Japanese treaties, agreements -- it means "agreement," and is what the comfort women agreement is called. It's called a goi.

And I'm surprised -- Professor Lind said that it's a signed agreement. It is two records of conversation; there is no signed agreement. The two records of conversation are different.

Also, when Abe was asked on the floor of the Diet what did he say to Park in terms of apology, he refused to say, so we don't know. And so this goi was never Cabinet approved, it was never Diet approved. What is a goi? Where does it fit?

SCHOFF: OK. And if we don't have...

QUESTION: I don't pronounce even English very well.

SCHOFF: And if we don't have time to address that on this particular panel that actually might be a good topic in the second panel with the global context, because I think we'll get more into the Japan-Korea peace at that point.

Jim Zumwalt, you have the final...

QUESTION: Again, thank you so much to the organizers. This has been a really wonderful discussion. I actually just had a comment on getting back to I think what Mischa Auslin was saying about looking at the framework of sort of government, and then groups, and then individuals.

And one really important group in the reconciliation process, in my experience, has been the two militaries on both sides. And I think -- you know, I've thought a lot about this -- as to how can these institutions that fought each other and paid the biggest price be the biggest supporters of our relationship.

And I think there are several reasons. There's probably others, as well, but one is they understand best the benefits of the alliance. You know, the U.S. military gets it, why being allied with Japan is so important to their mission.

But I think a second reason, and I think this is a little hard for civilians to understand, is the professional respect that the militaries have for each other. And, just one brief anecdote -- I was in Iwakuni at a professional development class for Marine pilots, and they brought in a former Japanese kamikaze pilot to talk about his experiences in training and getting ready for a mission where he was going to die.

And they were -- you know, this was someone who was an enemy, who was dedicated to killing their predecessors, and yet their interest was, as a military, they admired what he was doing and his sense of mission. So it was just interesting, as a civilian, to see that professional respect that the two militaries have for each other that goes beyond the fighting in the past.

And I then I think the third reason is that, often, the personal ties -- everyone talks about how important personal ties are. And I think our two militaries have some of the best developed relationships between each other. There's so many ceremonies where one side goes to the other and shares in their ceremony. The Marine Corps birthday in Japan -- you'll have so many Japanese military coming and sharing in that.

So I think these three -- there may be other reasons, but I think it's important for us to acknowledge that one accelerant for the reconciliation process has been our two militaries.

SCHOFF: That's a great point, Jim. Thanks. And certainly the ceremonies that have taken place in Saipan and Iwo Jima between soldiers who fought against each other is a great model of that, as well, but there's modern-day interactions among today's soldiers, as well.

Panel, I would give you a shot at any and all of these questions, comments -- some final words or thoughts from you, and then we'll close our panel.

LIND: Thanks for these great questions, everyone. This is really a neat discussion.

I brought up the comfort women agreement, and I want to -- I want to address Mindy's question. Mindy brought up the various reasons why it could be considered a weak agreement or, you know, not Cabinet approved, or, you know, it didn't have this or this, or it wasn't signed, or, you know, however you want to put it.

OK, thanks a lot. So this was flawed in many ways. This is me actually agreeing with you, by the way, so maybe you'll let me -- so there are all these sort of -- I don't know what you would call them -- like, legalistic reasons why this specific product that was produced, you could say, made this weaker than it could have been if it had been delivered in a different way.

I would also point to a couple of other things that I found troubling about it, and that I think has been one of the reasons why it hasn't gone as far as it certainly could have.

So one were just the sheer optics of it, the two men in suits shaking hands. Come on, this is an agreement about the abuse of women, who men did things to without their consent. And having two governments, represented by two males in this photo op, doing an agreement without the consent of the survivors is just a level of tone-deafness that astounds me. If any women might have been in these meetings when such a thing would have been discussed, it might have been useful to have them, and this might have been brought up.

A second thing -- and I was talking about this with Thomas last night -- is this rhetoric about, "OK, now we're done, right? It's all done; we can move on now."

The German leader Helmut Kohl similarly said, very famously and controversially, that Germany was going to draw a line under the past. And people found this quite scary, coming from a German conservative at the time. And, again, there's this notion of, "We're done, we've come to this agreement and now we're moving on."

This is not the spirit of reconciliation, right, the notion that it is a process and the notion that it requires continually learning and continually committing to recognizing what happened. And so this notion of "We can be done with this" was really unfortunate rhetoric on that part.

I also wanted to just mention, from Chris' comment earlier, I don't think we should be remotely surprised if the Japanese government is concerned about monuments going up in the U.S. and is intervening. The rest of the world -- and the U.S. is part of that -- is very fond of commenting on Japan's own commemoration. The two words "Yasukuni Shrine" come to mind.

So you said it's none of a foreign government's business what monuments you put up. We've very much made it our business. The Koreans have made it their business. The Chinese have made it their business. So I'm not surprised. I'm not saying it's a good thing or whatever, but I just wouldn't be surprised that Japan thinks that they might have a voice of this, as well.

SCHOFF: Thank you. Any other thoughts from our panel on...

AUSLIN: A lot of good questions. I will just mention a couple of things.

For Jim's point on the military, I mean, I completely agree, but I wonder the degree to which that held because of a structure that was put in place -- the alliance, right? And you can say the same thing about the U.S. and Germany or, even better, Germany and France, right, working within NATO.

So to have the political -- I won't get too Marxist here, but the superstructure first, or whatever -- the base, whatever one, right -- and then you're able to build those types of relations, is absolutely right. But interesting, though, so -- I think, would be the temporal question.

When did these things start? How long did it take? You know, it probably wasn't 1952 or '53 when -- how many generations, or years, or decades had passed? So that would be one interesting one.

Rust's point is a really, really interesting one. I guess my answer would be, you know, probably from the policy perspective, you know, if you're saying, you know, how far do we want to go into this, it's probably just the "If it's not broke, don't fix it" rule, right? I mean, the more you try to pull at a loose thread or worry something, you can -- you know, you can cause more problems.

But, yes, I think you're hitting a real nerve, which is just how far have we gone to, you know, really be serious about trying to understand, you know, where these things went?

And then you have different schools. You know, there's the Ienaga Saburo school, which is, you know, going to fit in in one historiographical tradition, and then there's going to be others. And so whether you can even come to an understanding on one side, let alone between the two sides, is an open question.

And then -- and then finally, Ellen, I agree with you, so I'm not going to address, you know, the interpretation -- you know, the corporate interpretation. I think it's right. And they were also the ones that sponsored most of the cultural exchange organizations. You know, it was -- really, that money is what allowed these things to happen. Otherwise, they wouldn't -- I mean, who was going to give money to these things?

But Ben's point about the occupation is really an interesting one to me. It's a "chicken or egg" question. I think I would probably say that the onus of -- it's sort of a Big Bang point, right? If things had gone different right at the beginning, the entire occupation could have been different, so I think the onus was probably more on the Japanese to not try to, you know, fight the Americans on the beachheads, even after surrender, you know, in an official way, that allowed the intended benign policy to be carried through, meaning, if you had had sabotage -- there's a great book, Gerry, you may remember -- there's a book, I can't remember it. It's newspaper columns from a Chicago Sun Times columnist during the occupation. Do you know this book? I forget his name. Anyway, it's great stuff if you want to read it.

OK, that doesn't ring a bell. But it's great -- it was a Tuttle edition. And I was surprised that, at -- for how long into the occupation -- he's writing about the Americans going around and digging up caches of arms that had been hidden in schoolyards and under playgrounds, because there were expecting -- they were waiting for the Thermidor to come. They were waiting for -- it's not the right term, but you know, they were waiting for the counter to come and that they would be attacked.

So there was a lot of suspicion for a long time of the people on the ground. They did not think it was easy as it would be, but because it was, then the occupation could be benign. But you could see easily how it could have turned on a

dime, if there had been resistance and guerilla sniping and taking the lives of American soldiers at night, or whatever it was. And then you'd have a completely different occupation experience.

So Dower's book -- I think the one you really wanted to reference was not *War Without Mercy*, but *Embracing Defeat* -- yes, that's got the whole feminization of Japan, and the like. But this power question, I think, is really interesting as to how -- you know, how this was going to play out.

And you do have -- was it in *Embracing Defeat*? No, no, I think it was a documentary I saw, where this Japanese man, when he was a boy, talked about how they were -- his brother and his mother killed themselves after the surrender, before the occupation, because of what they thought was going to happen. So it wasn't, you know, a sure thing by any stretch of the imagination.

SCHOFF: Thanks.

Nakayama-sensei.

NAKAYAMA: Just briefly -- I guess we're running out of time. I guess I'm supposed to be who is explaining about the status of gois and so on from Japan. But I'm sorry, because I'm Americanist, I can't explain to you the legal instead of, you know, the position of goi. So you can ask someone else. I apologize for that.

And Ben's sort of comments about this benign occupation -- you know, I do agree that we have to be talking about that more. But I guess, initially, it was about making Japan weaker and taming Japan. All right, so I guess the whole sort of occupation -- sort of theory or just narrative of partnership came after the Rockefeller mission, right?

So yes, it was a benign occupation. Japan as a whole has accepted that that was a good start. But I think that was a sort of understanding on both sides, that -- you know, I mean, this was to weaken Japan. And maybe on the Japanese side, you know, because we lost, there's no other choice. So, you know, I mean, I guess you can have a more cynical view.

And this rhetoric of partners just came after this Cold War. We were on the U.S. side, and maybe that's the NSC-68 that played a big role. But it only came after that, as partnership rhetoric.

About the government role in this statues in sort of American -- parts of U.S.. I wasn't saying that government should intervene and, you know, do something. But I was just saying that, you know, at least they should explain and try to sort of, you know, disseminate the views, because it is about history. But then again, we all know it -- it's not just about history. It's history being created at the present moment. And it involves, you know, many other issues, as well.

So I can understand your point that the government should not intervene. But at the same time, you know, we have our sort of, you know, own set of domestic complaints, and of course, government has to react to a certain degree. And it's rational, but I think you can't really avoid that. How you intervene -- maybe there's many ways to intervene.

SCHOFF: Thank you very much. Big topic. We still have a long way to go. I mean, these challenges are universal. They're not unique to the United States and Japan, or to Japan and other countries.

I keep thinking about, just domestically, in the United States, a lot of the things that we're revisiting and reconsidering in the context of history and reconciliation. So I really appreciate our panel for helping us dive into this issue. I think we're off to a great start, and I appreciate the contributions from the audience as well.

We are going to break for lunch. My understanding is lunch is set up outside, and you can bring your plate and silverware back in here. There will be water and soda, I think, and coffee back there, as well.

We will begin our keynote address at about 1 o'clock or thereabouts, but we'll try to let people get their lunch and eat it, and then we'll start our next program. So please join me in thanking our panel.

(APPLAUSE)

(BREAK)

SCHOFF: OK. Good afternoon, everyone. I hope everyone had a chance to enjoy a nice lunch. Is it not on?  
OK.

All right, good afternoon, everyone. I hope everyone -- two minutes for coffee. This is the -- well, one minute for coffee. I hope everyone had a chance to enjoy the lunch and continue on with various conversations. I mean, a fun part of today is bringing a lot of people together who have a lot of experience in this area, and have a chance to have their own conversations on the side.

My job here -- in addition to just absorbing the transition from lunch into our keynote session, I'm the buffer between lunch and the main event. Sorry, I'm an amuse-bouche.

So thank you, everyone. For some of you who may be who have just joined us I am Jim Schoff, a senior fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And it's our pleasure to welcome you to our conference today.

We have a very special keynote guest, Ambassador Michael Armacost, who will be introduced to you in just a minute. I am going to introduce the introducer, who is a dear friend, Gerald Curtis, who comes to us from New York and Tokyo.

Gerald is Burgess professor emeritus of political science at Columbia University, and he is also concurrently a distinguished research fellow at the Tokyo Foundation in Japan. But, more importantly, he's a great mentor and friend to many of us here.

I had the pleasure of working with Gerry when he was a trustee at the U.S.-Japan Foundation and I was a program officer there. And I really admire and respect his work.

Gerry, I will turn the podium over to you and let you introduce our keynote speaker. Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

CURTIS: Hi, good afternoon, everybody. I am delighted to be here and to be able to introduce our speaker. What we'll do is I will call Mike up to the podium in a minute, and he'll make some remarks, and then I will make some comments on his remarks, and then we'll open it up for the rest of you to ask questions and make your own comments on our comments and remarks. So that's how we'll proceed for the next hour or so.

This is really an easy job, to introduce Mike Armacost in this audience, because there is nobody in this room who doesn't know Mike Armacost and know what a distinguished career he has. Some of you may not know one thing that's particularly important about Mike Armacost: He has his PhD from Columbia University, and he got it in '60 -- I just asked him -- he got it in 1965. I went to Columbia in '62.

It was '65, right, was the year? But we never met, because he actually left Columbia in 1962 and went out to teach, and I was working on the dissertation and finished it up in 1965. But we're very proud to be able to claim Mike as one of our -- one of our graduates.

And then he went on to have a very distinguished career, as you know -- ambassador to the Philippines, ambassador to Japan, undersecretary of state, president of the Brookings Foundation, and, for the last several years -- many as, I guess, he's been out at Stanford -- at the Asiatic Research Center, and made this trip in last night from California to join us today.

So we're delighted to have him with us. I am delighted to be able to chat with him again, and I'm really delighted to invite him up here to the podium to make some comments. Thank you.

ARMACOST: Thank you very much, Gerry.

It's nice to come back to Washington. When I first came here to work in 1969, practically the first person I ran into told me that Harry Truman had always said, "You want a friend in Washington, buy yourself a dog." And I found how untrue that is, because I made many friends, kept them, cultivated them over the years, and see many friendly faces here today. So I am delighted to be back in Washington.

Political reconciliation is an issue I've been involved with professionally, but I don't remember thinking about it in a systematic way, as this conference is intending to inspire. But let me start with a personal recollection. I didn't really have any need for personal reconciliation with the Japanese. I am one of the few people in the room who was alive before World War II and was quite conscious as it unfolded.

But I lived during that time in Williamsburg, Virginia, and while I was conscious of the war, the war I was conscious of was the war in Europe against the Germans. I remember very well having a 17-year-old cousin who spent the weekend with us on his way to join the Normandy invasion.

There were bases down there, Camp Perry, Fort Eustis and we saw a lot of soldiers. We always had a couple of military people living in our home, but, again, all the activity was preparing people to fight in Europe.

Then my family moved to California. And it happened that we commenced our move on V-J Day. But in those days it took a month to drive across the country, so by the time I arrived in California it was in September of 1945, the war with Japan was over. And my first memories about Japan was associated the postwar dispatch of food and medicines to Japanese who were suffering from shortages of those vital commodities.

My early encounters with Japanese people were also highly positive. In the late 1940s a Japanese woman -- Nobuko Igarashi (ph) was her name -- came from Sendai and lived for a year with my family. And she was taking graduate courses at the University of Redlands at that time, but she could not have been nicer. And my siblings and I thought of her as a relative, a cousin or an aunt, rather than a foreigner and -- let alone an enemy.

I first visited Japan in 1968 while on sabbatical leave from Pomona College. Our family thoroughly enjoyed the year we spent at International Christian University. Someone, I guess Jim, mentioned it earlier. The students were bright. The faculty was welcoming and best of all, students went on strike in February and if it had not been for many time-consuming faculty meetings which rarely reached a conclusion, I could have used more of that free time to get a start on Japanese.

My mother taught a Sunday School class in California and two of the people she most admired were Nisei, who had spent the war-time years incarcerated, I believe, in Indio, but at one of the camps. And they were without any bitterness, surprisingly, after being treated so poorly. And, again, it gave me a very favorable impression of the Japanese.

And my family has benefited from this too. My oldest son married a Japanese. They have a lovely family. And I can say of their two beautiful daughters they look so Japanese, the Japanese say they look so American. We think they just look great.

When I came back the next year, I came to the State Department on a fellowship. I found something out about the State Department, they never asked the basic questions. They knew I was trained as an academic, they knew I'd just come back from Japan, they assumed I was a big Japan specialist.

So they put me to work, and Rusty and Tom and others helped my education along, and after four or five years I figured I had the equivalent of a graduate degree. I didn't feel quite so embarrassed to work on the subject. And I've continued to work on it through the balance of my career.

I'd realized of course that Japan and the United States needed to be reconciled after a lengthy war. I had a kind of general idea I guess from having spent a year in Germany at the time when the European Community was taking shape that reconciliation was a pretty demanding process but was not impossible. It was a voluntary act. It can't be imposed. It was a goal as well as a process. It must be voluntary and reciprocal. It requires the consent of both parties.

So I had a kind of general notion of what reconciliation was, though I don't think I talked about it in those terms. But I knew when I commenced my work on Japan that each of our nations needed to acknowledge the past and yet seek to overcome it, transform our status from arch-enemies into strategic partners.

And I think, when I went to Japan, to (inaudible), for the first time in the 1960s, I felt that that process was well underway. And we treated each other like friends. I was fortunate in my early days in the department. I used to go to planning talks and ran into people like Tatsup Arima, Yukio Sato (ph) and Chako Okazaki, Hisashi Owada and others. They remain close personal friends. It was a huge advantage for me, in working in Japan on two occasions, to know and to have met people when we were roughly the same age, and be working through our careers, retaining close friendships.

And when I think back on why we had at least commenced the process, by the time I got to Japan in 1968, I thought that there were some reasons that were fairly obvious. One was mentioned this morning. It was easier for us because we won the war, and it's easier to be magnanimous in victory than gracious in defeat.

Second, I think nobody mentioned General MacArthur. I think he certainly played a major role in getting the process underway. It was widely admired by Americans and he adopted a conciliatory towards the Japanese. He sought a reputation in Japan not as a conqueror but as a protector.

And he wrote, I had forgotten whether it was during his service there later, "If the historian of the future should deem my service worthy of some slight reference, it would be my hope that he mentions me not as a commander engaged in campaigns and battle, even though victorious through American arms, but rather as one whose sacred duty it became once the guns were silenced to carry to the land of our vanquished foes the solace and hope and faith of Christian morals."

I think he earned the respect of the Japanese by treating them with grace, and without a spirit of vengeance. He didn't press the Japanese very hard to come to terms with their own history. To be sure, there were the Tokyo trials, there were some purges, but I think by and large General MacArthur, not only because he needed to govern and required the

former Japanese bureaucrats at a high level to carry out that task and he had supported the retention of the emperor, not just the institution but the individual who inhabited the office, or the institution during the war,

So his colleagues in the governance task were not inclined to spend a lot of time running through the history of the 1930s and '40s. And President, I mean, General MacArthur I think was inclined to let bygones be bygones and concentrate on practical things we could do together.

I agree that the early occupation years were devoted to the de-industrialization, de-militarization, weakening Japan. But once the Cold War commenced, the objectives of the United States and Japan became far more benign. And we focused on reconstruction and development, the promotion of self-government, the democratic form of government, the integration of Japan back into the Asian and the international system.

And indeed even during the occupation, some of those early actions such as retaining the emperor's institution even while adjusting it or changing it, the decision to allow the Japanese to disarm themselves, the refusal to ban fraternization, the threat to punish G.I.s who struck a Japanese, those were all gestures I think that helped even during a pretty rough occupation. And then of course most importantly, geopolitical realities intruded and fostered a cooperative and friendly relationship. The U.S. and Japan confronted the same strategic rivals.

The emergence of the Cold War prompted the transformation of our occupation of Japan into an alliance. And the alliance proved not only durable but it always provided incentive on the American side to cultivate a cooperative relationship with the Japanese. One would like to think that the strategic alignment between our countries was a by-product of converging aims, but in fact I think the official Japanese preferences had been consulted and honored in the late 1940s or early 1950s, Tokyo might very well have chosen neutrality in the Cold War. George Kennan would probably have accepted that. Harry Truman and Dean Acheson would not and did not.

And Japan's readiness to accept alliance with the U.S. was doubtless reflective of the fact that we still had more than 200,000 soldiers in the country. In a way, it was the price, the alliance was the price Japan paid for recovering their sovereignty.

And from a Japanese point of view, the American forces and bases did provide a deterrent of sorts, thus permitting Japan to devote its attention single-mindedly to economic reconstruction and development. But I think it's important for Americans to acknowledge that many Japanese saw the alliance not as a welcome partnership, but as a remnant of America's occupation and a reminder of Japan's subservience. Some regarded it as a continuing expression of American hegemony over important aspects of Japanese life.

In light of these realities, I think it's hardly surprising that political reconciliation was probably easier for Americans and was taken on with greater comfort level and more readily than it was for the Japanese. It is certainly unusual, I think perhaps a historical anomaly for former enemies to develop the kind of alliance which we have enjoyed with Japan for more than six decades. And if you reflect on why the alliance proves so durable, it seems to me among those factors, the communist threat was palpable in the region. We encouraged our allies to pursue economic interdependence between themselves and with the United States and with that growing prosperity, we acquired a greater stake in regional stability.

Our alliance with Japan was certainly not an alliance of equals in the early days. It was a Cold War bargain, but we bolstered it by extending to Japan and to some other subsequent allies in Asia unreciprocated access to our market, which spurred certainly more rapid economic growth.

While we picked up a disproportionate of the defense costs, we also harvested huge benefits, which included a credible regional deterrent, burgeoning trade in the Pacific, and relative stability in a region that became of growing strategic importance to our country.

As for Japan, it seemed to me, political reconciliation, it did offer -- the prospect of it offered some practical benefits. The accommodation with the U.S. had an evident geopolitical logic, alignment with Washington, as I said, was the price paid for the recovery of sovereignty. And the -- it also had economic benefits associated with it.

The United States happily did not covet Japanese territory. And even in Okinawa which represented to our military a tremendous military facility, strategically located and pretty free for a huge number of American bases, sovereignty was considered in abeyance. It wasn't something we wished to transform into additional American territory.

So the terms of the alliance moreover accompanied by the Yoshida Doctrine enabled Japan to assure its security at a modest cost while avoiding direct involvement in the armed struggles of the Cold War in Asia and elsewhere.

And it seemed to me the Japanese were also very resourceful in devising self-imposed limits -- the so-called "seven nos," I guess, no security obligation overseas, no foreign deployments, no military uses at outer space, no offensive systems, non-nuclear principles and no more than 1 percent of GDP, which were a reflection not only of the pacifist sentiment which had been generated by the war, but also were used to inhibit U.S. efforts to persuade Japan to either raise its defense budget or take on wider security responsibilities.

And I think U.S. officials did not particularly hound the Japanese consistent with the kind of precedent that MacArthur had established to come to terms with their own history of the 1930s and '40s.

As Japan began to broaden its relationships in Asia, did pay reparation. And it was asked repeatedly to make apologies. Those apologies were not -- they were welcome, but they never seemed quite adequate. And so they were repeated and eventually Japan, not surprisingly, tired of having to repeat the apologies and finding different words to express them.

I thought that Prime Minister Abe on the 70th anniversary came pretty close, however, to hitting the right notes in his various speeches in Canberra and Washington, elsewhere in Asia that should have mollified the people in the countries closer at hand. They weren't needed for the reconciliation with the United States, but they were certainly welcome.

We didn't make a big deal of the apology business ourselves, as was mentioned in the discussion about POW. And I always felt when I was asked about this that it's hard to convey a sense of sincerity in an apology which is negotiated with foreign countries. It always seemed to me therefore, the test was not the language in an apology, but what Japan taught its own children about the war.

That was always a greater concern of mine and happily during my time in Japan -- the early '90s I think was a period in which there seemed consistent progress each year in the textbooks that were put out. A little more time was devoted to the war time years. The terminology became a little more factual and this was appreciated.

Unfortunately, the comfort women issue emerged also and over that issue the consternation of the Koreans seemed to be at a level where it's difficult to get at it. In any event, I was -- I wasn't a great promoter of apologies, but I was very actively engaged in trying to understand how Japanese were teaching about the war and the prewar days to their own children.

So I go back to Japan as ambassador in the late 1980s, served for four years. And I thought despite some of the language in the panel discussion, I thought we had a friendly relationship with Japan. And partly that was because I had a lot of friends in the foreign ministry, made a lot of friends in MITI and the finance ministry. Met a lot of Americans who were coming to cultivate friendships and commercial relationships with the Japanese. That didn't mean we didn't have problems. We had huge problems on the Gulf War and on trade, but we worked at mitigating and attenuating those problems.

We had some success. We had some huge difficulties. I didn't come home feeling the problems had gone away, but we worked at them at the governmental level as colleagues devoted to serving some common purposes. Japanese are tough negotiators and so the progress was slow on trade in particular, but as I say, I didn't think of this as a contentious relationship. It was just a friendly relationship facing difficult problems that required give on both sides.

Nonetheless, this alliance has survived. And that alliance was sufficiently robust that when the Cold War ended, it did shortly after I arrived in Tokyo, and when the Soviet Union disintegrated, I don't remember a single serious effort by a serious person to terminate the alliance or even amend it.

It had acquired a durability, it was recognized on both sides that it served very valuable purposes. And in the post-Cold War period, it has remained valuable as a means of countering terrorism, providing a balance of forces to check China's rise and bolstering our deterrence in the face of North Korea's nuclear program.

So while the purposes served by the alliance have shifted over time in response to changing circumstances, it has remained durable and the terms of the alliance have become more balanced, they have become more global, and they have become more operational.

I was intrigued by Jim Zumwalt's comment, and I believe it's true, but for much -- I would say throughout the Cold War, our alliance in military terms was a very arm's length affair. We didn't have a joint command, we didn't have integration of forces. In the '70s and the early '80s, you couldn't even mention joint planning. It was so taboo that it could've brought down the government. Someone mentioned Mr. Suzuki's troubles, being forced down when the word "domei" was included in the communique. But it has only been in the post Cold War period that we've made the alliance operational.

Now we're in a new chapter in the evolution of our relationship. President Trump's foreign policy has been, as the Economist recently observed, less awful than promised by his campaign. At least we haven't had a crisis yet with China over Taiwan. And that his political vulnerabilities have prevented him from pursuing a grand bargain with Vladimir Putin is a good thing.

But he did abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, he did withdraw from the Paris Climate Change Agreement. He continues to issue tweets which express reservations variously about the value of free trade, about the value of multilateralism, about the value even of alliances from time to time.

But fortuitously, Prime Minister Abe has pursued a more active and assertive Japanese policy. He has raised the trajectory of Japanese defense spending, he has reinterpreted the former constitutional planks that were claimed but not exercised. He has cultivated security cooperation with a variety of other East Asian countries, terminated the ban on military exports or exports of military equipment.

And though doubts persist about the continuity of American policy in Asia, I think Japan has stepped up, and has made larger contributions to help stabilize a changing and perhaps somewhat fragile balance. Happily, Mr. Abe also

recognized the need to cultivate a personal relationship with the president. And he commenced that task even before President Trump was inaugurated.

I think the things he has done are helpful to us. He's trying to keep TPP alive, I suspect in the hopes that we will eventually decide to rejoin it. He has certainly bolstered the capabilities of Japan's military in an important moment when U.S. policy is unclear. He has pumped new life into Japan's economy which provides a basis for the kind of assertive diplomacy that Japan has embarked upon. It's scarcely surprising to me that public support in America for the alliance is perhaps at an all-time high. And if you ignore what Washington says, in the rest of the country, the relationship seems in excellent shape and it has genuinely wide support. The larger uncertainties about the relationship as we all know are on our side of the ledger.

Mr. Trump may have alleviated some of those concerns in the course of his recent Asian trip, I hope he did. He seems to be getting some valuable help from those in the administration who are considered the adult supervisor. Our economy is reasonably vibrant. The defense budget is poised to grow.

We're, I hope, embarking on a program to expand our naval shipbuilding activities in the way that would mean a real pivot back to Asia. And I would remind us all that despite talk of America's decline and despite the realities of American retrenchment, we go through these cycles all the time. Soaring ambition followed by sober retrenchment.

We remain, however, the world's largest economy. The dollar is still the strongest reserve currency. We've had a bonanza in energy production, become one of the world's largest, if not the largest, exporter of energy today. We still account for roughly 40 percent of global military spending and our universities are still the gold standard in higher education.

So we remain a huge player. And Japan has a strong incentive and recognizes that I believe and actively engages in the Indo-Pacific area. It has assumed meanwhile the role of a real and active great power. We have ample motivation to sustain very strong partnership with it. The political reconciliation has taken place surely. I don't suppose it ever is complete, but the recent visits by President Obama to Hiroshima and by Prime Minister Abe to the U.S.S Arizona and the other symbolic gestures that have been mentioned this morning, it seem to me demonstrate the progress -- genuine progress that we've made.

The challenges we face are those that we confront. Security allies who have become diplomatic partners on a global scale. And I think we've got plenty of business on our agenda, but I think we have come far enough in this reconciliation process that we can be quite confident of our ability to make further headway and to deal with these issues in a friendly and cooperative way. I thank you for your attentiveness.

(APPLAUSE)

CURTIS: Thank you, Mike. The only problem I found with his speech is that there wasn't anything I disagree with. And I think the story -- so the story here about the strength of this alliance and strength that actually -- as you were making the point, even in the 1980s which people think, you know, the era of -- which it was the era of Japan bashing and so on, never did any U.S. president consider that this alliance was in jeopardy or wanted it to be in jeopardy.

There's a strength here that has its roots not only in the Cold War but in something that happened at a much more human level between Americans and Japanese after the war. And that's what I just wanted to spend a few minutes talking about. Some of it builds on what was said this morning. But we can explain an alliance without talking about historical reconciliation.

There are countries -- I think it was Jenny that made the point, you know, we have relationships with Pakistan, with Saudi Arabia, with other countries where there is -- it's not a question of reconciliation. It's pure realpolitik. But I -- so historical reconciliation is something else and that's what I just want to spend a couple minutes talking about.

It's not about forgiveness, but it's about how you overcome hatred and enmity and replace it with feelings of trust and friendship. That's what happened in the U.S.-Japan relationship after the war. So the question is why. A lot of the points have already been made, but let me just add a few that strike me as important. And it goes back to the early years after the war.

I think the fact that the U.S. decided to retain the emperor on the throne was very important. It was very important because it invoked the legitimacy of the Imperial House behind the occupation. The issue about retaining the emperor was -- is complicated. I think the problem was that it was built on the idea -- on the narrative that the emperor and the people were the victims of Japanese militarism as were foreign countries.

So Japan never really came to grips with trying to explain to itself what happened that led up to the Second World War. And I think you made the point, Mike. The issue about the war was not what -- not Japanese apologies to foreigners, but how Japanese explain to their own children.

We have some responsibility for that not happening and the Tokyo war crimes trial built this narrative about, you know, it was the bad militarists and everybody else was victimized. Another -- but another reason is that there was a -- you know, we think about the occupation bringing American values to Japan.

Well, we tried to do that, but the ones that stuck were the ones that had roots in prewar Japanese history because there was a prewar democratic tradition in Japan that was suppressed. And I think one of, you know, one of the arguments about what the occupation really succeeded in doing was to release these latent forces in Japanese -- in Japanese society.

There was a curious kind of cultural matching here. The U.S. was magnanimous in victory and the Japanese were humble in defeat. The combination was a winning -- a winning combination. We had won the war, we could afford to be magnanimous and we were.

Another point which has not been mentioned but as -- but I think it is an important one. You know, during the war, the Japanese banned English from the school curriculum and the U.S. Navy and Army created Japanese language schools. After the war, the graduates of these Army and Navy language schools that were the Japan hands, all my professors at Columbia about Japan and you were -- you will remember this.

They all, you know, were graduates, Donald Keane and Herb Passom (ph) and Jim, all graduates of Navy or Army language school. So -- and a lot of these men went into business in Japan and so on. And the point that was made earlier and I think Jim Zumwalt made it particularly -- but it's very important.

The military presence in Japan -- American military presence in Japan over decades, so many soldiers and their families living in Japan and then coming back to the States with stories about what a nice place it is and how -- and how hospitable people are. These things are very important. That's all what contributes to the historical reconciliation that I think has occurred.

And then things that we tend to -- not think much about, but all the efforts that went into intellectual exchange programs between U.S. and Japan, the role of Fulbright Commission, the role of I-House in Tokyo particularly in the 1960s and '70s when I was living -- first there in the 1960s. This was a place where Japanese and Americans interacted a lot. These are all very important.

So I think that you can -- that this historic reconciliation is not simply about allying in the context of, you know, our strategic interest facing common dangers, but there's something underlining it in terms of building up -- in building these kinds of personal and societal connections that gives us special strength and a special quality to this relationship.

And it makes me very optimistic about the future. Every administration until the current one was committed to this alliance, and then during the campaign, we heard Donald Trump talking about no more free ride for Japan, we're going to switch the bilateral trade agreements and so on. And got a lot of people concerned, but we've seen in fact that this administration, too, given the issues about trade policy that are there, that this administration, too, is committed to this alliance. So I think the -- that's the story. That's the story you told and now I want to open it up for you to ask questions that you have or make comments. So let me open the floor.

ARMACOST: Let me make one comment because it came up earlier. My oldest son is married to a Japanese girl, and she's been very active in the Osaka-San Francisco sister city relationship. And she called me the other day to lament the fact that the mayor's decision had prompted the Japanese to decide to abandon the sister city relationship or she feared that would be the result.

And she said basically it doesn't really matter whether this has official sanction or not, we're engaged in all kinds of activities which we both enjoy and we recognize as valuable. And we'll continue to do that whether the mayor is involved or approves or whether the governor of Osaka approves is really kind of marginal. Which I thought was an encouraging statement of strength of the societal connection.

CURTIS: Please. So we have a very broad agenda for this luncheon discussion. It goes from issues of historical memory and reconciliation to the state of our alliance and the challenges that we face in the future. So the floor is -- so it's -- it's open for your questions on any of those issues. OK. We'll start -- Mindy and then Chris.

QUESTION: I didn't plan to ask a question but while you were speaking and talking about really the sense of good reconciliation between the United States and Japan, one of the hallmarks of the Abe administration is to redo the constitution, which he has in innumerable times and his base has innumerable times said this is the mind control constitution imposed by the occupation, imposed by the Americans, and I could go on and on, and on.

CURTIS: Don't, please.

QUESTION: I don't want to. But extremely negative and hostile and nothing to do with American values. Will his efforts to redo the constitution undermine reconciliation? I'm not quite sure what the proper question is.

ARMACOST: OK. I don't believe that it's Americans to try and offer official judgments about the matter. We amend our constitution from time to time because new problems arise and we need to address the way we deal with them.

The incentive to adjust the Japanese constitution is greater I suppose because it was drafted in part by (inaudible). But the constitutional amendment doesn't revolve exclusively around Article IX. There are other aspects of Japanese governance that perhaps need updating in the light of experience, but it's for the Japanese to decide what they need to do with their constitution.

I don't think Americans should express official views on the subject. I think it's going to be very difficult, by the way, perhaps easier in the Diet than in the public referendum, but I personally would be surprised if it is amended within the foreseeable future.

CURTIS: I'll just add, what the Japanese do about their constitution is something for the Japanese to decide, so I agree with Mike. That's not our -- in the sense, it's not our business but where I think you may not be getting the story quite right, Mindy, is that what Abe has said in the past about constitutional revision and what he's advocating as prime minister about constitutional revision are very different.

Because what he's advocating is -- right now, what he's advocating as constitutional revision is to add a clause to Article IX that would in effect codify the status quo. Add a clause saying that the Self Defense Forces are legitimate. That is it. That is what he's after. That is not a big deal from my point of view.

It surely isn't re-writing the constitution. So here you have a man who has a history of being ideologically sort of on the more right end of the LDP, but who is a very pragmatic prime minister, who sees what the public is willing to do and what it's not and he's not -- he pushes the envelope as far and as fast as he can, but he backs off.

So right now, the possibility if there is going to be constitutional revision anytime soon, it's for just adding an additional clause to Article IX. My personal view is that this probably will not get through the Diet and there'll be no constitutional revision while Abe is prime minister, at least there's a good chance that's the case but if -- whether there is or there isn't, I don't think it upsets in any way the alliance or what we were saying earlier about the process of historical reconciliation moving forward. I think, Chris, you are next.

QUESTION: Thanks so much. Chris Nelson, Nelson Report. Wonderful conversation. Thanks, Michael, I appreciate it, Gerry. In a sense this is anticipating what Thomas is going to talk about at the next panel, but you have reemphasized the incredible importance of the personal experience of American businessmen and the soldiers and the sailors and all that coming back with Japanese people, you know, how critical that is to really in a sense create the alliance in the sense that we've been talking about it.

That imposed top down for pragmatic reasons, then it became a genuine alliance for people and ideas and attitudes. In the broader sense and, again, with this tragic comfort women debate, somehow that just isn't happening with Korea. And yet that I think we see it as a critical part of the North Asia alliance in the three of us.

From your experience, what are we not seeing between Japan and Korea that we have seen and you've described in the U.S.-Japan relations? And is there a constructive U.S. role there? We've seen some efforts. And really the -- in a sense the heart of my complaint earlier about protesting the comfort women monuments is -- the key question is, what is the government of Japan trying to accomplish by protesting the monuments?

Is it interested in improving the global relationship with other friends and allies? Is it interested in improving relations with Korea, the Philippines, China? You know, how do you win an argument about comfort women in the way it's being approached now? So that's one of my entry points into what I see is the problem between Korea-Japan, but I'd be interested in your sense of what else can they do and do you agree with my concern that Japan is fighting the wrong fight about comfort women in a way that is just guaranteed to continue the problems. Thank you.

ARMACOST: I don't know that I have much to add. I think in terms of U.S.-South Korean reconciliation, we've done reasonably well. Of course, there's -- even more palpable, immediate tangible threat that animates the alliance. With respect to the Korean-Japanese issues, it's a delicate one for the U.S., but I think we did play a role in 2015 in a quiet way. Others perhaps know more about this than I do. I live 3,000 miles away from Washington and don't hear all the gossip. But I think there was a serious, quiet, prudent effort to encourage both sides to figure out a way to resolve the problem. And the resolution in December 2015 seemed to me a reasonable one.

Somehow unfortunately it doesn't get implemented quite as one expected it would or hoped that it would. I don't -- I -- as I said, I was there in the early '90s when a scholar in the archives found the evidence of Japanese official involvement with the comfort women. And I remember that initially the spokesman for the government denied that. But it was impossible to sustain the denial in the face of additional evidence in the archive.

And the result was, they came to grips with it and eventually Kono Yohei made his statement, arrangements were made which seemed to deal with the problem. I think the Korean criticism of it was it wasn't a legal -- sufficiently legal agreement and the money that was supplied to the surviving comfort women was private money rather than public money. The 2015 agreement seemed to me to address those issues but I don't claim to know enough about the psychology of that relationship to offer useful advice.

I certainly hope it's resolved. The U.S. government has a stake in its resolution. We've been moving on a security -- in the security field toward a more trilateral arrangement for security not only through missile defense, but a lot of exercises -- but the Chinese have now asserted themselves on this high altitude ballistic missile defense issue and the Korean government has essentially, as far as I'm aware, concluded that they can only -- or they will only deploy one battery.

So there's an illustration of the fact that China having supplanted the U.S. as the biggest trade partner of all the other Asian countries has a degree of leverage on some of these security issues between the U.S. and our allies that they didn't have before. And they're quite eager and willing to exercise that leverage. And we've got to figure out a way how to deal with it. So I think it presents us with some novel challenges that I think are appropriate for Americans to deal with, but I don't have any bright ideas about how to accelerate the reconciliation between Japan and Korea. Gerry?

CURTIS: I do not have any bright ideas either, but I do -- because, well, I do think that on the issue of the comfort women, the best thing for the Japanese government to do is not to say anything when a statue is built in the United States or when the Korean president invites a former comfort woman to a dinner with President Trump and serves Dokdo ebi, I thought that was just playing to a domestic Korean audience, a kind of a cheap shot and totally inappropriate, there's no reason for the Japanese government then to file a formal complaint. So this will just have to play its way out over time. I do not have a bright answer either.

SCHOFF: Jim Schoff from Carnegie. Gerry, I just wanted to pick up on something you mentioned because a little light bulb went off in my head when you talked about the language schools and language. And how much does understanding each other's language feed into and enable reconciliation? And it actually strikes me as something fairly important.

Certainly, there is a lot of incentive for Japan to continue learning English and the JET Program is another great example of some of those initiatives that you were listing that contribute to all this. But I do wonder on the U.S. side, will we sustain the level of Japanese language study and understanding, and since you both spend a lot of time on university campuses, I was not sure what some of your observations are in terms of where things are now and the interest level and the investment of time in Japanese language pursued in the United States compared to a little while ago.

ARMACOST: I don't see the kind of emphasis on Japanese language around high schools that I saw before I was deployed in Japan. In the '80s, Walt Whitman High School used to have Japanese courses, my kids were exposed to them. I do not see that around California so much. There is a huge interest in Chinese, of course, and that has kind of somewhat supplanted the interest in the Japan.

The intriguing to me being around the university is on one hand, you have the dramatic decline in Japanese students. I think it was about 45,000 when I went out to Stanford. It is about 20,000 now. There has been a huge drop off. And you see that in campus, not only see it in the number of Chinese. You see it in the number of Koreans. There

are huge numbers of Koreans and it is a reflection I think of the government's interest in Seoul in emphasizing English language training and the requirements students face in the schools.

On the other hand, there is a lot of interest in Silicon Valley. Ten or 15 years ago, you hardly ever saw much interaction between Japan and Silicon Valley. Now, there are conferences all the time, bringing Japanese business people together with their counterparts in the Valley in order to not only view and observe and learn about the ways of American approach to innovation, but to work with Japanese companies who have demonstrated a capacity for it.

So I think there is a lot more enthusiasm in our community or region and that business cooperation in the high tech companies. But I see a drastic drop off in the number of students, as I say not just the Koreans for whom I think there are now nearly 300,000 visas for students every year. But Koreans I think are second or third in numbers. Perhaps, Indians are the second. But there are huge numbers of Koreans in a population smaller than Japan.

CURTIS: So, as far as Japanese students in the United States as just as Mike was suggesting is probably half of what it was 15, 20 years ago. But there is something very interesting happening here about Japanese language education in the U.S. or interest in Japan among college students that is not understood in Japan at all.

At Columbia University, and it is true for other universities that I have checked with, at Columbia University, we have more students taking courses dealing with Japan now than ever in the 47 years I taught at Columbia. More students took my class on Japanese politics in the last five years than ever took it before. Over 200 students take David Weinstein's class on the Japanese economy each year. What is going on here is that they are almost all undergraduates.

Very few American students do graduate work for, towards a PhD on Japan anymore. You will have -- they will do masters course in international affairs, whatever, but undergraduates get hooked on Japan in high school. They are hooked on anime. They are hooked on kinds of aspects of Japanese pop culture. And when they come to a school like Columbia where we offer a wide menu of courses dealing with Japan, these bright young kids say, well, I'll take a course on the Japanese economy, on Japanese history, on Japanese politics because the country is interesting.

So there is a large group of undergraduates in American universities who are interested in Japan and I have argued this -- not argued, I have stressed this with Japanese businessmen and government officials who are friends of mine, there is an opportunity here. A lot of American kids go to China during the summer on internships. There are lots of opportunities. There are very few opportunities to go to Japan.

So it is not that the interest isn't there. The interest is there. We are not training the specialists which is a real problem. But there is this undergraduate thing. And as far as -- I think language is important and the ability to communicate. At one point, I did mention in my comments, but I will say it here and not just because there are friends of mine in this room who deserve the applause, but the role of the so-called Japan hands, foreign service officers after the war who had the language, who had the friendships and still have those friendships played a very critical and important role.

So language is important. But for that Army Navy language school cohort that then taught in American universities and went into business, not all of them had really good language, but a lot of them did, but they all had a passion about, let's never let it happen again, right, we should never let this what happened to the U.S. and Japan happen again. So that kind of passion is not true for younger generations because they do not have that experience.

But there is something -- so, there are other things that are happening as I just indicated. The fact that there is a kind of interest in Japan among young Americans provides an opportunity that could be utilized. It is underutilized. I think that is the point.

Maybe I have time for one more question or so.

Yes. Rusty?

QUESTION: On this whole issue of renewing human exchanges between U.S. and Japan, I have been struck that no one has mentioned the JET Program. It really is a vehicle. There are tens of thousands of American college grads being exposed (OFF-MIKE). They may not be very good at teaching English, (OFF-MIKE).

ARMACOST: I think it is kind of like the Peace Corps. It brought a lot of people into public service with some background in international affairs. I think the JET Program has done that in a more specific way with the relationship to Japan and the more the better. We've got several of them working in the Asia Pacific Research Center and they speak Japanese all the time.

CURTIS: And there are many, many more applicants, Americans who want to join the JET Program than there are places for them. It is crucially important.

I think there was one question in the back of the room, that lady all the way in the back.

QUESTION: Thank you. I am Rachel and I am here on my own, but I also have been serving on the board of United Nations Association of Boulder County. It is a program of the U.N. Foundation.

I wonder what your thoughts are, kind of twofold on digital diplomacy and how that may aid in continued reconciliation, and also, how you foresee the gaps currently in foreign service posts and how that may play in a digital diplomacy or on the ground diplomacy field.

ARMACOST: I am 80 years old. I am not a guy that does digital very much. And I am happy to leave that one for the next generation.

CURTIS: And I am almost as old as he is.

QUESTION: How about the current gaps in posts and applicants to foreign service and how do you foresee filling those gaps current day? Thank you.

CURTIS: OK. That one you can handle, right?

ARMACOST: I would rather you take a shot at that first.

CURTIS: Well, I think the question that we have seen this decline in the number of applicants to the Foreign Service and do you see that being a temporary phenomenon or something that is very troubling to you.

ARMACOST: Well, it is extremely troubling that the department has been gutted and does not seem to exercise the influence it once did and is driving many people out. It is not only not enlisting as many people as potential members of the service, I think the recruitment level is down about half, at least the number taking the test.

But I do not believe there is a single confirmed assistant secretary. I don't know how you run the department without those people. But the secretary does not seem to speak to his staff. He travels a lot, but when you are gone, who runs things? So it seems to me there has been an atrophy in the diplomatic instrument of statecraft even as the Pentagon is getting a big budget increase. But I think the budget going up \$54 billion, State Department is being reduced by \$30 billion

or more and it seems to me at a time when you needed to supplement the capabilities we have in the military sphere with greater diplomatic capabilities, we are going precisely the wrong direction.

So I think it is catastrophic and not that it can't be overcome, there was poor morale at the time Colin Powell came in and he rejuvenated the department, got recruitment levels back and was very popular with the staff. So the morale increase and the involvement increased, but it will take something fairly dramatic I think to reverse the current downturn. I don't see it on the horizon yet.

CURTIS: We have time for one more question.

Yes, ma'am.

QUESTION: My name is Julia Quincy (ph) and my passion is retaining Article IX. (OFF-MIKE) my childhood in Japan after the war, and then later studies at (OFF-MIKE) my thesis on Article IX. Since we are talking about emerging scientific interest (OFF-MIKE), I would like to -- I think I am, but (OFF-MIKE) I'd like to continue that thought you have about the emerging interest in technology and scientific technology, and hope that (OFF-MIKE) expanding the definition of security (OFF-MIKE) and maybe expanding and then (OFF-MIKE).

ARMACOST: Yes. I don't know as I say whether the Japanese will amend the constitution or not, but it seems to me there are other fields in which there is great potential. Food security has always been a preeminent concern of the Japanese because they raise relatively little of their own food. They also have tremendous energy needs.

We've got the most efficient farm system in the world and supply a lot of the food for not only Japan, but the rest of the world. We are now an energy exporter and I think Japan is the largest user of natural gas, if not the largest, certainly very close to the largest, and we now in the last several years have for the first time been able legally to export natural gas to Japan. The way our laws worked, you could only export LNG to countries with whom we had free trade agreement.

So we could export LNG to the Koreans before the Japanese, but we have overcome that with the necessary waiver and it seems to that is a huge field or expand the U.S.-Japan cooperation. Food security has been with us for a long time, been a key point, and during my earlier service in Japan, the early '70s, when we cut off the export of soybeans, that was one of the biggest crises we had with Japan related to this dependence upon food export or food imports to take care of local needs (ph).

So I think these are all fields that are extremely important as is climate change. I don't think either of us were huge players in the climate change business until we had this bonanza of tight oil and natural gas. But, and the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement I think is a great tragedy and because we were not only doing well, Paris Agreement did not make very many new legal obligations. It left that pretty much to each country and we were reducing emissions by a lot more than any of these legal commitments that were made at Kyoto would have required, just because we were moving to not only renewables but natural gas which is a lot cleaner than oil and coal.

So I think we have made a lot of headway on that issue and it is terrible to take it off the agenda because we don't seem interested in it anymore. But these are all fields which ought to flesh out in relation to Japan and they all encourage what we were talking about this morning, the multiplication of these societal connections, because so many more people buy in to the relationship but also find the benefits of cooperation with the Japanese were very good.

By the way, when I was in Japan as ambassador, I do not think Japan has yet -- had a Nobel Prize winner. But they are now churning out Nobel Prizes very regularly. So the scientific emphasis in Japan I think has moved a bit from applied

science which they were always very good to basic science. So we have, as a result, got more to work with and we ought to take advantage of that.

CURTIS: Well, on that note, we have just about run out of time and I would like to ask all of you to join me in thanking Mike for a very stimulating and important presentation.

Mike, thank you.

ARMACOST: Thank you.

SCHOFF: Thank you, both. We really appreciate it. Thank you.

OK. So thank you everyone for your participation in this discussion. We are going to take just a 10-minute break while we reset the stage, and we will reconvene in 10 minutes and have our concluding panel where we begin to even broaden the scope just a little further, geographically.

Thank you.

(BREAK)

SCHOFF: OK, everyone. Welcome back. This is the final panel of today's conference. I will, again be the buffer here as we transition back to tables. I think Alex is feverishly beating away at the gong outside.

I almost feel like I'm in a department store, right? Maybe if you change up the order of the notes, it will get people to notice -- right, right, right. All kinds of side bar discussions today.

Well, let me begin, just briefly I am going to introduce the moderator for today's panel and then turn it over to him. Koichi Ai is the acting director general at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. It has been a real pleasure getting to know Ai-san over this last year or so, and being able to work with him specifically and his team on this project has been a real pleasure and I hope we have a chance to do more of this in the future.

He previously served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been a counsel for treaties negotiation, director of the Ocean Affairs, director of policy planning. He has still I think a long career ahead of him.

And, Ai-san, let me turn it over to you and I will let you take the panel from here.

AI: Thank you. Thank you, Jim.

Now, we are at panel two, the title of which is "U.S.-Japan Historical Reconciliation in a Global Context." This session will focus on how U.S.-Japan reconciliation has affected regional and global geopolitics as well as on how that experience informs other aspects of Japan's external relations. But obviously, in doing so, we will be, as Jim said earlier, expanding geographical scope of our discussion from strictly U.S.-Japan bilateral to more regional and engaging other parts of the world.

So this theme in conjunction with the topic discussed in the morning session approaches our bilateral alliance and our external relations in general through a less trodden path, so to speak. I believe it to be in the interest of both United States and Japan as we work to strengthen this alliance in the face of ever-developing security challenges in East Asia. Also,

as we expand the horizon of our discussion beyond strictly bilateral context and consider strategic implications of this remarkable reconciliation, international comparison might also be helpful in putting some of the real issues in perspective.

What can be learned from our past and what can usefully be applied to the contemporary situations for the benefit of the alliance, that is what we will try to explore in this session. For this session, we have three panelists and I will briefly introduce them in order of their presentations.

Dr. Thomas Berger of Boston University, he has been with the Boston University since 2001 and before that, he was with the John Hopkins University. Second speaker will be Dr. Rohan Mukherjee of Yale-NUS College. He is based in Singapore and he also has a joint appointment at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. And the last speaker would be Ms. Keiko Iizuka of Yomiuri Shimbun. She was previously the paper's Washington Bureau Chief and was also a visiting fellow at the Brookings.

So, with that, I'd like to ask Dr. Berger to begin his presentations, please.

BERGER: I am going to stand up. I am a professor and I feel somehow safer and more at home standing behind the lectern. I hope this is working. I will try to use my classroom voice.

I guess as a -- I am a trained Asianist and one of the people who trained me is actually Gerry Curtis who taught me whatever I know about Japanese politics. And I guess as an Asianist, one, I have been trained to begin by saying I apologize. I have to apologize because I had a different talk in mind. I had some separate notes, but as on hand of the very good excellent conversations that we have already had, I have had to sort of modify things considerably and I am going to try to control myself in terms of time.

But I want to begin with an apology and I am going to follow it up with a simple observation, perhaps a banal observation, going off on some of the things we talked about this morning, something about the nature of the history problem and history issues in general. And I guess the simple and banal observation I would make is that human beings operate on the basis of mixed motives. There is always a combination of both principle and passion, of ideals and interests.

And while that might breed on a certain level or degree of cynicism, I actually think it is a good thing. I think it is always good that the sort of white hot passions and gendered by historical memories, by the memory of brutalities and injustices, they have to be tempered by practical economic, political and security considerations because if they weren't, we couldn't live together.

And, again, Chihoko Goto (ph) was nice. She says I always tend to be a little bit provocative and I can't help it -- I have been married for about 30 years, close, and I would say if we did not remember common interests, we'd be in of problems. Likewise, on the other hand, this is also important to understand, to those white-hot passions, memory always has to be -- excuse me, those cold, cool calculations of interest which Jenny was invoking earlier this morning, they also have to be tempered by a sense of justice, by a sense of meaning.

And, again, I would say thank goodness, because if we didn't do that, we couldn't live with ourselves. Without emotion -- neurologists tell me that if you have people who have been injured, brain damaged and their calculating functions are intact but the part of the brain which generates emotions is damaged, they become incapable of operating. Life becomes meaningless.

And likewise, it is very important to understand it's also those emotions, those memories which give legitimacy to those calculations. That is a point which I want to mention very importantly because it is closely linked to some of the problems that we are dealing with here. It is part of what I think Nakayama-san was getting at as well.

Rousseau talked about legitimacy as being -- famously could define legitimacy as being based on the fact that the strong and never strong enough to rule unless might is turned into right and obedience is turned into duty, it has to become meaningful in some way. Otherwise, your calculations of interest, your actions, are always going to be fragile.

Now, going from this sort of simple set of observations, when does history become a problem? And I will begin by talking about when do we have history problems? When does it become a problem? Well, it tends to become a problem when you have a combination of two factors. You need to have a set of memories, a collective set of memories. This doesn't mean necessarily the same as reality. It is just the way people remember the past, a set of memories which are painful, which are difficult, memories of brutalities, memories of humiliation, memories which can create a sense of hostility.

And the other set, necessary, set of conditions has to do with calculations of interest. When do you want to use those kinds of memories, how do you want to use those kinds of memories? And there are many different groups. Jenny mentioned the term "political entrepreneurs" who may want to make use of it both inside of government, outside of government who then try to harness memories, create certain kinds of narratives which are possibly disruptive or not disruptive.

Now, when we take a look at when those memories become a problem, I will talk a little bit about the case which we found all very puzzling and very difficult before I talked about it a bit and that is the Japanese-Korean relationship. And I will differ here a little bit from Jenny. I don't pretend to be a Korea expert. I go there occasionally. I talk to people from Korea. I have had the good fortune of having high level -- some high level conversations and I have been struck again and again by the sense that I get from Korea, from Korean security experts, from foreign policy experts that really the current state of affairs between Korea and Japan does not make sense.

It is more than just, as Jenny suggested, some sort of notion of hedging between relations with the United States and Korea which is causing a problem. They have a sense that Japan and Korea really should be working much more closely together than they are today. And then, the question becomes why not. And I think it has a lot to do with the way in which the memory of relations with Japan has been turned -- has been politicized over the course of the last 70 years since the end of the colonial occupation.

And right from the beginning, I think we need to understand that at least from the conservative side when we had Syngman Rhee come into power, you had a powerful movement to try to define a Korean identity, to create a sense of there being one Korea based on two principles. Syngman Rhee himself talked about this in his sort of political manifesto, anti-communism and anti-Japaneseness, right? To create a nation, you had to oppose both what was going on in the north and what was going on in terms of the connection with Japan.

And what made things worse was North Korea was taking the cardinal sin, the original sin of the Korean Republic and using it against Korea, which is the simple fact that much of the Korean political elite, not Syngman Rhee himself, but most of the Korean business leaders, the military leaders, the political apparatus including the judges and police had collaborated, had worked and in fact benefitted from Japanese rule. So this made it even more important for Koreans in the 1950s to adopt a strong, tough issue, a stance on historical issues and we saw that right from the 1950s going on.

This was, now, again, interest could trump those concerns. Park Chung-hee, when he became President of Korea in the 1960s, pushed through a normalization of relations with Japan at enormous cost with a great deal of difficulty. And what has made things worse in recent years, and, again, we have had periods of equilibrium. We have had ups and downs in the relationship. Kim Dae-jung contributed in many important ways to improvement in Korean-Japanese relations.

But what was terribly important also has over the course of especially the 1980s and into the 1990s, democratization became strongly associated in the Korean context with confronting past injustices, the comfort women being simply the single most important case. And so, we have, again, strong constituencies with especially on the left nowadays in Korea who push -- who find themselves compelled to deal with these issues. These emotions are real. They exist in the Korean political sphere. They are social facts which cannot be denied.

So, when you have a combination of interests and of calculations of at least some political actors, then, you can wind up with history becoming periodically a problem. Again, I don't want to get myself into more trouble than is necessary, but it is inevitable that I get myself in some trouble, I suppose, but I mean, since I am talking to an American audience, this is not simply an East Asian problem. And right now, here in the United States, we also are having our own battles over history, focusing heavily on the Confederate monuments in the south.

And, again, there is a legacy of memories. None of us have direct -- well, there is a legacy of memories. None of us, of course, have direct memories of slavery at that period, but these memories, again, become re-valORIZED. They become, again, real because they are connected to experiences that people have today of inequality and of racial tensions that exist notably between the police forces in some of the communities that we have, and it takes on a new set of meanings. And these memories are playing off of narratives which exist in the cultural sphere in society and we cannot wish them away.

Now, there may be political actors both on the left and the right, Richard Spencer and white nationalists on the far right of the American political spectrum, Antifa and folks on the left, both of them who play on these things. But that does not mean that there is not a problem. It means that they are operating against these spaces.

Now, then, other question and I do not -- as I said, I do not want to get myself into more trouble than is necessary, but I just want to make it plastic, the intractable nature of these kinds of problems once they reach a certain particular point. Now, when does history not become a problem? And that is kind of interesting. We do not usually look at the negative case in social science, but we are doing that almost I think accidentally in the context of the U.S.-Japanese relationship.

And so, I am going to talk a little bit about why didn't history become more of a problem. I think we have lots of interesting answers, but going back to sort of the principles that I have talked about, was there a basis in terms of memories, both the immediate experiences of the wartime and prewar period and clashes between the United States and Japan.

On the American side, there were some, the memory of Pearl Harbor, the mistreatment of prisoners of war. In a diluted form, the history of Japanese atrocities in East Asia is especially strongly carried forward by Asian-Americans who were concerned about these issues in a very real way. But on the whole, we didn't have that great, that stronger sense.

On the Japanese side, I think there was a lot greater and there is still a much greater sort of set of collective memories which could be the basis of a history problem. And I think quite rightly we should go back to before the 1945 period, I mean, go right back at least to the late 19th century and the rise of anti-Asian sentiments in the United States, the anti-immigration movement began with anti-Asian sentiments taking hold.

I think Mischa could talk more about this than I, in California in particular, reinforced by a sense of a real sort of overt racist set of ideas that were taking hold in the United States leading to changes in immigration policy from 1920 on. And that created a strong sense in Japan of being discriminated against in the international system and helped create or begin to build the path which would lead to the Second World War.

The brutality of war was extreme. The United States prosecuted the war. It was a total war, unrestricted submarine warfare, bombings, the atomic bombings. And then also, I think it is quite right and Gerry pointed out and Mike Armacost pointed out that the occupation was an unusually mild affair and there was a great -- the United States was magnanimous in its victory and the Japanese were humble in defeat. I think that is terribly important.

But nonetheless, it was a humiliation for an entire country, and I think one should not overlook that there was also a particular psychic damage that was done through that particular process. Now, there's a lot of raw material. If I was an evil politician and I wanted to create problems, a lot of raw material one can work with. But what you didn't have right from the beginning was a strong political motive to turn these memories into a history problem, into the basis for strong animosity.

On the United States side, we dealt with some of the call for vengeance. I think Telford Taylor said, "To stay the hand of vengeance," I am talking about the Nuremberg trials. We had the Tokyo war crimes tribunals. We had the purges and we had Japan accept that in the 1952's treaty of San Francisco. That was enough.

On the Japanese side, I think it has been more complicated. I think Gerry Curtis actually is very correct in pointing out that we very intelligently managed to co-opt Japanese conservatives by preserving the Japanese emperor as an institution. And while Japanese conservatives have had a lot of resentment towards United States based on these humiliations, these memories, it has always been tempered by what Lynn Shaffer (ph) at the University of Virginia has called the conservative's dilemma. Now, you have got on the one hand, you want to be a strong nationalist, but on the other hand, in order to have a strong nation, you wind up relying on the United States ever more in terms of the mutual security treaty.

On the left, so, we haven't had a political manifestation of anti-Americanism, on the right, mainstream Japanese conservative circles, hardly ever. On the left, if there has been more avert anti-Japanese, anti-American sentiments, using, by the way, again, a memory, powerful memory of historical humiliation, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the atomic bombings becoming the basis of the peace movement. But there, again, just as there was a conservative dilemma, there was a liberal dilemma, and that is that the liberals supported lots of the reforms that the United States had brought in, beginning with the constitution. So, again, that weakened their hand and ultimately, they were not politically significant.

Now, so, the U.S. and Japan were able to cooperate. History was not able to interfere in their strategic relationship the way, again and again, history has interfered with the Japanese-Korean relationship. Now, over time, by the way, I do think that a reconciliation process has taken place. But I would -- and we have touched on some of these things, but I would like to make one point. For the most part, most of the really important reconciliation moments, events which have taken place which have removed potential sources of tension have not been motivated by any consideration of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

The one exception I can think of is the return of Okinawa which was a potential deep problem in terms of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. But lots of the things which have happened since, for example, just the opening up of American society, in 1959 for the first time, Asian-Americans, Hiram Fong and Daniel Inouye became the first Asian-Americans elected to the U.S. Congress. It had nothing to do with the U.S.-Japanese relationship; 1965, immigration reform, removal of anti-Asian and other sort of restrictionist policies to immigration, nothing to do with the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

The 1988 decision to apologize to the victims of interment, I don't think that that was primarily motivated by the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Even Obama going to Hiroshima, I think his main motive, while there may have been some consideration of the alliance, his main motive was putting a final flourish, powerful rhetorical flourish to his campaign for nuclear disarmament, making even further substance to the sort of his Prague speech for which he won the Nobel Prize.

So we have actually -- we have had U.S. movements towards reconciliation. And one thing which I won't dwell on too much, some of the things which happen on the Japanese side -- when I first went to Japan in 1986, Japan seemed a much more closed society than it is today. I think on average, 2 million Japanese a year travelled abroad. I often felt like a "mezarashii dobutsu" (ph) when I went -- that is, an amazing animal, like a panda who suddenly appeared on the streets, when I went to rural Japan, to areas like Akita. And Japan is a much more cosmopolitan country today. It is a much more open country today.

When people on the JET Program go to Japan, it is an attractive place to be. It always has been, but I think it is easier to live in. So, again, I think that there are some of these and likewise, while the Japanese foreign ministry has been promoting soft power and promoting manga and anime, that has very little to do with Japanese government policy. So I think -- and these things have, by the way, deepened relations between the United States and Japan on a people-to-people level.

But in some ways, we have had a successful case of reconciliation without even trying. We made it look easy. And now, does this make a difference? That is another interesting question. Does it make our relationship more or less fragile? This is the question which I think Jim asked. It is hard to tell because we haven't been tested. But my guess is it does strengthen the relationship. It becomes more than a -- and this is, again, what I would go back to some of the points that were made by Nakayama-san and others earlier this morning. The relationship is stabilized by the perception that there are common interests. It is stabilized by a network of human ties and that these things will make it likely, while we cannot ever give up on this process, it makes it more likely that this reconciliation process can be pushed forward in the future.

So, my thoughts, thank you.

AI: Thank you, Professor Berger. You began with a notion of these mixed motives and delved into a more detailed discussion about the Japan-Korea relations as well as U.S.-Japan reconciliation, including analysis of dynamics in both Japan and the United States, and how in your own words successful reconciliation was done without even trying perhaps. But it is a very comprehensive and very thoughtful presentation. Thank you very much.

I like to call on Professor Mukherjee as a second speaker.

MUKHERJEE: Sure. Thank you.

First of all, I am very, very grateful to Ambassador Nogami, Ai, Carnegie and Jim Schoff of course for inviting me. I have been asked to do two things today. The first is to compare U.S.-Japan reconciliation with the reconciliation that has taken place between the United Kingdom and India since the end of the Second World War. And the second is to assess the implications of U.S.-Japan reconciliation for Asian security more broadly.

So, on the first question, it is pretty safe to say that U.K.-India reconciliation has not taken place in the sense that we are discussing today, in that the sort of transformation from former rivals into a very warm and close strategic embrace, that has not happened between the U.K. and India. What we can say perhaps is that there is now an absence of bitterness which is what I would like to focus on as the aspect of reconciliation. We haven't gone further than that between India and the U.K.

Having said that, this reconciliation has taken place on substantially different terms to U.S.-Japan reconciliation, but there are some similarities which I will quickly run through before I get to the more substantial differences. The similarities are not necessarily in the initial circumstances in the process of reconciliation, but in the outcomes that we see today. So the most important similarity is the extent of the economic and cultural relations between the two countries and the two pairings, which itself is remarkable given where these countries were in relation to each other in 1945.

For example, Japan is the second largest investor in the U.S. and India is the third or fourth largest investor in the U.K. It is constantly shifting. But the picture -- and so, this sort of -- the investment story is pretty worth noting. In trade, it is a bit of a different story because India's level of industrialization is very different from Japan and from the U.S. and U.K. So, although the U.S. is Japan's second largest trading partner, trade between India and the U.K. is very low compared to their trade with other countries.

But the investment story is an interesting one in that both countries have private sector actors that are deeply invested in the other country. Another similarity lies in the respective sizes of the Japanese and Indian diasporas, in the U.S. and U.K. respectively. There are approximately 1.5 million Japanese-Americans in the U.S. and a similar number of British-Indians in the U.K.

Of course, this means that people of Indian decent in the U.K. are as a percentage of the population much larger than Japanese-Americans as a percentage of the U.S. population. But the absolute numbers are substantial, especially when you think about lobbies or effects on sort of Congress or the parliament in that sense and particularly, compared to the much lower numbers of Americans living in Japan or British living in India. So it is interesting to see the number of Japanese in American and the number of Indians in Britain is much higher than the other way around.

There are similarities also at the cultural and political levels. Japan and India both adopted democratic political institutions. Along the lines of the western model, they both have democratic constitutions, a free press, robust judiciary, just like the U.S. and the U.K. do. On the cultural front, there's a lot that has transferred both ways between the U.S. and Japan and between the U.K. and India, not only food, but sports, baseball and cricket. Baseball came up earlier, but cricket as well. They are major sources of commonality between the two countries and originate from the historical relationships that Japan and India have had with the U.S. and the U.K. respectively.

Finally, there is similarity in the manner in which each of these relationships periodically becomes contentious in the domestic politics of the countries involved. So, in Japan, there is of course resistance within Japan in certain quarters against the U.S. alliance, particularly against the status of forces agreements and the impact of the U.S. military presence. We haven't talked too much about the need for reconciliation within Japan.

India is prone also to sort of periodic bouts of anti-colonialist nationalism, more recently, there was a debate in the Oxford Union and a book that came out called *Inglorious Empire* which sort of demanded, by a very serious person, an academic and member of parliament in India, that demanded that Britain pay reparations to India for colonialism. Of course, he was predictably rebutted by influential members of the British press.

But U.S. and U.K. domestic politics are also given to periodic anxiety about the economic and demographic implications of deep ties with Japan and India respectively. So, as we have touched on many times, it was not that long ago that Japan was seen as the number one economic threat in U.S. domestic circles. A little bit of that came out during the Trump campaign more recently, but also his recent visit to Tokyo where he said that Japanese trade with the United States was unfair and that something had to be done about it. Of course, a lot of this is rhetorical and at the sort of level of politics and optics, but still interesting that it becomes contentious.

And Indians are often the subject of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.K. So there are sort of demographic and economic anxieties surrounding these countries that have supposedly reconciled in some way. So these are some of the similarities in the trajectory of these two pairings since 1945. The differences are greater. I think the most important thing is that there has been little state level engagement in an effort to reconcile between the U.K. and India. It is largely been driven by immigration, in the private sector investments and so on and so forth. So the different levels that were talked about earlier do not necessarily apply in the India-U.K. case.

But there are even more sort of fundamental historical differences. So, from a historical perspective, Japan was never colonized by the U.S. whereas India spent almost 200 years under British rule. Naturally, this has different implications for post-1945 reconciliation. In contrast to Japan, India has consistently sought to preserve its autonomy and secure itself a prominent role in global affairs, so at least definitely a preeminent role actually. And also the politics of victimhood relative to the western powers are far more prevalent in India than they are in Japan.

Another point of difference is the experience of the Second World War for these two pairs of countries. So the U.S. and Japan obviously fought on opposite sides, whereas 2.5 million Indian soldiers fought alongside Britain in the name of British India. Being among the victors, therefore, India's position and in perception of the postwar order were fundamentally different from Japan's.

So, for example, India joined the Commonwealth of Nations clearly with a clear sense of self interest. Japan perhaps had less room for maneuver in joining the U.S. system of alliances in Asia. As Nakayama-san brought up earlier, perhaps there was not much choice at the time.

Most Indian elites also viewed the transfer of power from Britain as amicable and cordial which cannot be said perhaps for the Japanese elite in the immediate postwar period. But perhaps the biggest and most illuminating difference between the U.S.-Japan and U.K.-India relationships is of course being the respective trajectories of these four countries since 1945 in terms of power and economic potential. After a long period of economic stagnation during the Cold War, India is now rising rapidly in terms of economic potential and military power and by contrast, after a long period of rising rapidly as a major economic powerhouse, Japan's economy has struggled since the end of the Cold War to recover its former vitality.

The military front has already been discussed many times. Japan has consciously restrained -- or constrained itself, thought of course this is open to change. With regard to the U.S. and U.K., the U.S. remains the predominant world power as Ambassador Armacost pointed out while the U.K. has steadily declined in military power and importance since 1945.

So the result of these trajectories is that Japan continues to rely on the U.S. as a source of economic and military security, whereas India has long moved on from considering the U.K. to be a viable and important partner, focusing much more instead on the U.S., China, and the E.U. and a diverse range of other partners when it comes to economic and security cooperation.

So, in important ways therefore, the continuance of a shared fate for both the U.S. and Japan makes reconciliation a live issue and allows us to -- I mean, it is why we are talking about it today whereas for India and the U.K., it is considered a settled matter except when it comes to nationalist point scoring on both sides.

There are some interesting lessons, particularly when looking at the commonwealth and why India joined it, which sort of touch on some of these issues of interests and ideas and things like that. I think there were sort of three big reasons why India would choose to even join a grouping that was actually led by the queen of England of international countries -- on the international grouping of numerous countries. Perhaps the most important thing was India sought influence in the third world and there were a number of Asian and African countries that were members of the commonwealth. And so, it actually made sense for India from a diplomatic perspective to have a forum in which to influence these countries.

The second was that the commonwealth came with a lot of different programs that provided aid to developing countries and India when it was weaker actually needed a fair amount of technical assistance and foreign aid. So that was another reason. But, the third reason that I would say is that India sought to sort of signal its peaceful intentions towards

its former colonizer, and I think that was an important motivation for NATO and other people in joining the commonwealth and staying with it and sort of remaining a member of it even today.

So that is as far as the sort of U.K.-India relationship goes. I want to shift my focus now to the implications of the U.S.-Japan reconciliation on Asian security, and the most important question being does the -- has the reconciliation between the U.S. and Japan come at the cost of reconciliation perhaps for Japan with other countries which is an interesting thing to think about.

And to do that, I want to start with India's historical impressions of Japan which are often overlooked, but really important in my view. So India and Indians have always sort of admired Japan since the Meiji period. Major religious leaders such Vivekananda and major literary and political figures such as Tagore visited Japan in the late 19th, early 20th century and were pretty stunned by the pace and the extent of modernization that they witnessed.

They also noticed social cohesion and nationalist fervor in Japan at the time and drew lessons for India's own struggle against western domination. The Russo-Japanese War was particularly a pivotal moment for many Indians who kind of celebrated the victory of an Asian power over a western one. And this lingering admiration was in part what convinced the Indian nationalist Sebastian Dabos (ph) to approach Japan in 1943 during the war to help him invade India from the east and unseat the British. The attempt failed, but it hasn't been forgotten either in India or in Japan.

Equally remembered is Radhabinod Pal, the judge on the Tokyo tribunal who argued that it was an arbitrary affair and argued against convictions for any of the accused at the trial. Nehru himself chose to boycott the San Francisco peace conference because he viewed it as unrepresentative of Japanese wishes and he made sure to invite Japan to the 1951 Asian Games when Japan had been denied entry to the 1948 Summer Olympics.

Both Pal and Nehru had an acute sense of the need for reconciliation after the traumatic events of the war and of the need to reintegrate Japan into the international community as an important Asian nation. This was largely driven by a desire for Asian solidarity. But as the Cold War progressed, India's own foreign policy interests started clashing with the process of U.S.-Japan reconciliation. Being non-aligned, India could not develop a relationship with Japan that was in a sense tied to the U.S.

For India, U.S.-Japan reconciliation looked like binding Japan to the U.S. at the cost of a deeper India-Japan relationship. And it is interesting that since say 2000 when India-Japan relations have taken off, the U.S. has basically acted as a chaperone in the sense that developments in India-Japan relations seemed to track development in the U.S. relations because Japan is quite hesitant to perhaps step outside the alliance perimeter or it is more comfortable in dealing with countries that are now strategic partners of the United States.

And India looked at this sort of phenomena and draws certain conclusions which I will come back in a second. But from the broader perspective of Asian security, I think U.S.-Japan reconciliation has been beneficial. So John Eckenberry (ph) argues that U.S. alliances in East Asia were structured as a hub and spoke system and so there was no complex multilateral form of cooperation that could effectively tie the U.S. down and create a community of interests that might eventually have evolved in a group identity in the way that the E.U. did. Even ASEAN was conceived largely in instrumental terms as a defensive grouping against China.

So, given this reality, the U.S.-Japan reconciliation was all the more important for securing the interests of both parties in the region and in turn, the interests of other U.S. allies and partners. Most importantly, the process of reconciliation and the alliance that grew out of it which we have talked a lot about actually allowed Japan to some extent to free ride on U.S. security guarantees while channeling resources into becoming a global economic power. That is exactly what Ambassador Armacost pointed out.

And combined with the Fukuda Doctrine and its intellectual successors, this has had significant affects on regional prosperity and security, allowing countries of Southeast Asia to benefit from Japanese trade investment aid, the setting up of the ADB and the large contributions that Japan makes to that institution, and these benefits are now expanding into South Asia as well through the growing India-Japan partnership.

It is also arguable that the U.S.-Japan reconciliation process was vital for rehabilitating Japan's image to some extent among Southeast Asian nations, many of whom were U.S. allies and clients during the Cold War. It does open the door to Japan developing robust economic links and institutional cooperation with many Asian countries. Of course, the memory of the Second World War has not been fully erased in countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, but things might have been a lot worse if Japan was left diplomatically isolated after the Second World War.

Of course, there is another view which would argue that Japan would have moved sooner and more firmly to heal past wounds with Southeast Asia had the security of the U.S. alliance not existed. This is a difficult counter factual to disprove but the case of West Germany suggests that being a U.S. ally may not have actually much to do with the pace and extent of reconciliation with third party countries which are largely driven as Tom pointed out by domestic politics or a threat. So that is something interesting to think about.

And finally, I just want to conclude on perhaps a slightly controversial point that suggests itself when comparing the U.K.-India reconciliation to U.S.-Japan reconciliation, and it is that the reconciliation process between U.K. and India has happened between two equals, not just nominally but also substantively. The political separation between the U.K. and India was virtually complete by 1947, barring a few remaining British officials assisting with institution building in various areas.

This was not the case with U.S.-Japan reconciliation as well all know, which arguably took place on unequal terms or at least on terms that were not initially of Japan's choosing. Now, this is important from the perspective of Asian security even today. So, although many Indian elites view Japan as a major power with great partnership potential, many also see Japan as having an almost semi-sovereign status under the U.S. alliance when it comes to matters of defense and regional security.

So there is a fundamental difference in outlook between a fiercely autonomous sort of post-colonial nation with great power ambitions such as India and a nation like Japan struggling to balance a certain environment with its own troubled history and dependence on a security patron. And given this reality, the extent to which Japan security partnerships in the Asia Pacific depend on its relationship with the U.S. is an important question, particularly at a time when the U.S. appears to be an increasingly weak and unreliable partner to many countries in the region.

Many decision making elites in India would actually like nothing more than to see Japan become a normal nation. They often argue that India and Japan are two countries or India is one country with which Japan has no historical baggage and therefore there is tremendous potential in the relationship. And perhaps this would bolster regional security, but Japan's so-called normalization in the absence of reconciliation, not just with the U.S. but also its neighboring countries in East and Southeast Asia may end up provoking a kind of international backlash that would have negative consequences for Asian security.

So this is something that needs to be thought about more clearly and I am hoping we can discuss more in the Q&A. I will stop here. Thank you.

AI: Thank you, Dr. Mukherjee.

You talked about mainly two topics. One is comparison between U.K.-India and the U.S.-Japan, and although your basic argument is that these are two sets of very asymmetrical issues, and -- but nevertheless, I think you have been able to identify some of the characteristics that we can develop our discussions on. And you also talked about implications of U.S.-Japan reconciliation of the Asian security, which has quite a few contemporary implications that we can talk about. So I appreciate that. Thank you.

So, now, we go on to the third speaker, Ms. Iizuka, who will present -- she will be the last speaker. Thank you.

IIZUKA: Yes. OK. Thank you.

I would like to thank Ambassador Nogami in JIIA and Jim Schoff, Carnegie Endowment for letting me be here. Thank you so much. And it is great to be back here in Washington, D.C. I was here up until two years ago as Washington Bureau Chief of Yomiuri Shimbun. And then, I was back in Tokyo and moved into London this summer.

And I was a member of the advisory panel for the Prime Minister Abe's 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II statement and I am not a historian. So I participated in that discussion as a journalist and this time, today, also, I will talk as a -- in that capacity of a journalist. And with regard to reconciliation, this morning, Mischa talked about the definition of reconciliation and it was a very good overview, but it is complicated.

So I would like to just briefly talk about it from two perspectives. It is just -- first one is government and formal level and the second one is individual of grassroots and emotional level, so, reconciliation by the state and on the individual level. And between -- between Japan and the United States much has been discussed so far, so I will not touch too much about it, but on the governmental level, well U.S.-Japan, the base is San Francisco Peace Treaty, that is the major base. And afterwards, Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971 and maybe later than that with regard to American POWs, it's ambassador Fujisaki's apology to the former American POWs, and most, more recently President Obama's visit to Hiroshima and of course Prime Minister Abe's visit or attendance to a memorial service at U.S.S Arizona Memorial, Pearl Harbor.

And I think that those, maybe the most two recent visits, reciprocal visits clearly affected the public sentiment on both sides of the U.S. and Japan. And I think that the state or the government or official leaders' effort to improve the sentiment or the public with regard to history would serve in some sense. While perhaps if we talk about China and South Korea, well that would serve perhaps in a negative way, but in both sense, both positive and negative, I think the leaders or government involvement were approached would affect the public sentiment I guess.

So in that sense with regard to China, I will move on to China, on a government level, well, China basically did not participate in San Francisco Peace Treaty, so perhaps that would -- as all of you know, that perhaps is affecting even now the position of China toward the San Francisco Peace Treaty or maybe toward Japan.

And afterwards in 1972, there was a joint communique of Japan and the PRC and of course treaty of peace and friendship between Japan and PRC in 1978. And afterwards there was repeated mentioning of history by Jiang Zemin during the 1990s and onward, you know, there's ups and downs, but we are in this current situation.

And with regard to South Korea, well, governmental level, of course South Korea did not attend the San Francisco Peace Treaty, so the base is not that. But we do have a bilateral official treaty which is a treaty on basic relations between Japan and ROK in 1965. And also Japan-South Korea joint declaration in 1998 under President Kim Dae-jung and President -- sorry Prime Minister Obuchi. And most recently we do have Japan-South Korea agreement on comfort women issue at the end of 2015 which has not yet implemented as of now unfortunately, but that's they're all governmental level and very formal level of -- well, that should have contributed to the reconciliation.

And I did not touch on the individual and grassroots level or emotional level of the reconciliation between Sino-Japan or South Korea and Japan, but as you may know, the current situations are not to -- are not full of good news, I mean, not enough good news. And so those are the relationships between Japan and U.S., China and South Korea, but I would like -- since I'm from London this time, I would like to touch on Japan-United Kingdom relationship and the process of reconciliation.

And perhaps many of you know that between Japan and United Kingdom, there was a huge issue of POW as well. And I -- well, according to Professor Hosoya who's a big historian on United Kingdom and Japan, his research and I will just use his research, but 260,000 British forces were dead on the European front, and then the ratio of that number among the entire British forces is five percent. And the ratio of the dead, prisoners under the control of the German and Italian military was approximately five percent whereas under the Japanese military, the death rate of the prisoners was 25 percent which was -- which caused tremendous hatred toward Japan upon -- well, during the Cold War too.

So in 1980s, up until 1980s or maybe even early '90s, there was still hatred towards Japan if they look back at the history of World War II. And then there came emperor's visit to London, that was in 1998, so it was not Emperor Hirohito, but our current emperor.

So there was a protest amongst the British public, the center is the treatment of the POW. And as I do research, there was one very, very dedicated private woman, Japanese woman who got married to a British businessman and moved into London and who started a project since -- at the end of 1980s. She was really sad about Japanese -- or British hatred toward Japanese, so she started inviting the former POWs, British POWs to Japan, and then that created certain understandings, but not very big, but certain understandings that efforts being made by private citizens.

And then came the emperor's visit to London. And there was a protest by the public and the British media and there were a lot of attacking to Japan politically. And then on the British media, especially tabloid papers, many criticisms toward Japan were headlined, almost every day in 1998.

And then what shocked me around that -- and of course the Prime Minister Hashimoto, the then Hashimoto made a contribution piece to tabloid, Sun, that Japan would apologize for that. But the protest did not cease.

And then it was -- what shocked me was that in early May, 1998, then-Prime Minister Blair, PM Blair dedicated a letter to tabloid, Sun, a letter to Britons, British people, British public and the main theme of that letter, letter to Britain was that -- is as follows, "I belong to the first generation which did not live through the horrors of the Second World War. We must not forget the past or the terrible suffering of our POWs, but I believe it would be wrong for these feelings to dominate our relations with Japan. It is wrong for us to perpetuate this bitterness down through generations. Hashimoto expressed his determination to work for reconciliation between the people of Britain and Japan. He set in place a variety of schemes to do this. This has to be the way forward for the sake of reconciliation, peace and prosperity of Britain and Japan as well as the world as a whole."

So that was the letter of Blair to the British public. And in retrospect, the emperor's visit was faced by very strong protest, but what Blair wrote to the British public had some much resonance to the statement made by Prime Minister Abe two years ago I think. Well, the key word is perhaps "generation" and perhaps "look to the future."

So I think in retrospect, this letter on the tabloid paper, Sun, a little bit indirectly helped to calm the sentiment of the British public. And it should be noted that this private woman called Keiko Holmes, her project was expanded further after the emperor's visit to Britain and then this created a certain calmness among the former POWs of Britain, and then it contributed to the calmness of historical dispute between Britain and Japan.

So what I would like to say is that both leaders' effort and the private or individual effort should be -- should contribute to make reconciliation move forward. And I would like to point out one more historical case which is not between two countries. Thomas just pointed out, touched on about the controversy, I mean, the historical legacy within the United States, but I would like to touch on about the tension, historical tension between Tokyo and Okinawa.

I think the tension or friction between or the problem of Okinawa base issue that used to threaten the -- that once threatened the existence of U.S.-Japan Security Pact in the mid '90s had some causes of historical background. Okinawa had spent 27 years under the occupation of the United States, which means that they have had a different postwar experience after the war.

So the mainland did not have enough sensitivity about that. I used to live in Okinawa for two years and I had very little idea of how the Okinawan people felt after the war. And the bottom line I think in retrospect or what I felt in bottom line is that Okinawans felt abandoned by Tokyo after the war and then they felt like a stepson of the United States for more than a quarter of a century, which is a long time. Twenty-seven years is a long time.

And I think that the current friction over the base issue between Tokyo and Naha, it still has something to do with history. Tokyo has not practically dealt with this history issue or that Tokyo has not dealt with or perhaps maybe more in a direct way to apologize for the poorly handled part of Japan history.

So in my opinion, that still contributes the trouble between Tokyo and Naha. And so the legal system is now different, so what happened, what took place in 1990, 1995 that the governor would not sign the necessary document which was necessary for the pact, the security treaty to be functional, that would not -- that would never happen. But in 1990s, the single act of signing by the governor, sign by governor would have or could have damaged or dysfunctionalized the security treaty, meaning that U.S. bases in Okinawa could not have been operational.

So my point is that if we handle history issue wrongly or poorly, that could damage our security situation or geopolitical situation. So yes, so my -- so back to -- so I wanted to touch two cases, but I will go on to the conclusion. Three conclusions I would like to draw and one is that my agenda given by Mr. Ai is that how U.S.-Japan reconciliation affects regional global geopolitics, that's one agenda. And second one is so with this U.S.-Japan security reconciliation -- not security, but reconciliation, historical reconciliation experience is transferable.

And so, my conclusion is that perhaps maybe let's go with is it transferable. My conclusion is that perhaps it's difficult to apply the experience of reconciliation between Japan and U.S. to Sino-Japan relationship or Japan-South Korea relationship, perhaps it would be very difficult or with very much different background, and perhaps as someone noted this morning, the first handling was not handled too well, I mean, compared to maybe Germany apologizing to Poland for what they did during World War II.

And perhaps maybe from the recent case of Obama's Hiroshima visit, it went very well, but by China or Chinese Foreign Minister, right after the visit, he noted that well, this Hiroshima is important, Japan depicted as a victim of the war, but Nanjing, how about Nanjing as Jennifer noted this morning. Nanjing is much more important. Japan is not a victim, but they are the sufferers -- no, they are the ones who did damage to us.

So this is the act, I mean, Obama's Hiroshima visit and Japan welcoming that is averting people's eyes from the responsibility of war of aggression. So I was thinking Obama's historical visit was more of a material, good material for China to get more aggressive or more proactive in attacking Japan. So I don't think that, it is not doing too good for the reconciliation.

And second, my second conclusion is that how would that affect geopolitics? And just simply thinking about the current situation over North Korea, well, the current relationship between Japan and South Korea, perhaps it would be more of a problem than an asset to cooperatively -- for both countries to cooperatively handle the North Korean situation.

I heard from some of the SDF officers, half a joke, but half seriously, that maritime Self-Defense Forces fleet cannot land at South Korean piers because politically South Korea would not welcome Self-Defense Forces directly coming over their soil. So what the SDF is now considering is that the U.S. fleet would land at the South Korean pier and then SDF fleet would go there just next to the U.S. fleet so that it's going to be U.S. soil, so it will not be a problem.

I mean, some sort of a joke. It's like a joke, but it's quite a serious political problem. It's not only political, but operationally, it would be a problem for Japan to cooperate or maybe if only for near operation, I mean, to rescue the Japanese citizens from South Korean territory, it's not just a political thing. It would become -- it would affect the operational or military activities or operation vis-a-vis North Korean threat.

And another fact that we can simply think that -- I mean, imagine that the fact that Japan and South Korea are not on good terms because of history issue means that it would provide a chance for North Korea to drive a wedge between Japan and South Korea. And it might lead to a close -- lead to damage close trilateral cooperation of U.S., Japan and South Korea.

So my conclusion is that the damage would be done if this historical tension continues in the wake of this North Korea crisis.

And my last conclusion is about this institutional or formal effort and private effort, it's about two efforts on the different levels, but those two efforts, two levels of effort should be -- should keep going on under what circumstances is. And I would not say as Professor Curtis told us that it might not be forgiveness, but forget hatred, but whatever that effort is, effort should be made on two different levels.

And one point to be noted, it's quite easy for us to talk about look forward. Forward looking is important, don't just look back, but bullied will remember what's done to them forever perhaps. It would not end. And people who bullied wouldn't forget what they did. So we have to keep remembering that and with that sensitivity, if efforts should be made on two different levels, I think -- well I might be too optimistic, but some progress would be made between China and Japan and South Korea and Japan, and we have to remember that.

I don't know when it will come, but Japan will have to make in the near future or distant future with North Korean people or people in North Korea currently, we would have to make a great amount of effort to make reconciliation with North Korean people. I don't know how it would take place, but it's obvious that they will come. I will stop here. Thank you.

AI: Thank you, Ms. Iizuka. You've covered a lot of ground. Thank you very much.

Before I open to the floor for the question-and-answer, I'd like to ask two questions for the panels. One is something that Professor Mukherjee talked about in his reference to U.K., India, Japan, U.S., the question of democracies being involved in this reconciliation package. There was also reference to, in different context though from Thomas when he talked about the impact of democratization in South Korea in the process of Japan-Korea relations in the postwar period.

My question is briefly, what is the implication of one or both parties to the reconciliation process being non-democratic, what kind of difference does it make from your own perspectives that one of the -- well at least one of the parties to the reconciliation process does not share a political system with the other? Would you like to address it first?

BERGER: That's a big question. Right, I have to press the button. Look, I think there was one very interesting episode in 1998 when back to back we had visits to Japan from Kim Dae-jung of Korea, a democratic country, and Jiang Zemin from China, from PRC which was definitely non-democratic. And in both cases, history was very much on the political agenda, and in one case I think we had much more success in dealing of these issues.

In principle before I go back to that, in principle, it is easier for a non-democratic country to create some kind of consensus, but they have -- so you are able to cooperate more easily. You are able to sort of by fiat simply cut off discussion. The problem for a non-democratic country is then you have a lack of legitimacy, and I think it becomes perhaps a sort of deeper, stronger societal level of reconciliation becomes more difficult.

Conversely in the democratic country, it may be more difficult for leaders to create a consensus and to drown out, right, in the basis of strategic, economic and other interests, the different contending voices on historical issues. But on the other hand, if you can create a consensus, it's more meaningful. It has greater legitimacy and it can lead to greater societal change.

Now, going back to Kim Dae-jung, I think in the case of Kim Dae-jung interest, again, there were no unmixed motives. Kim Dae-jung was also motivated by various questions at the moment where the Asian financial crisis where they desperately needed support from Japan. But Kim Dae-jung was able to help create a moment where we had a pretty successful episode in terms of Japanese Korean relations where Japan offered an apology and very importantly South Korea and Kim Dae-jung accepted it and Kim Dae-jung had the morale authority and legitimacy to make that meaningful.

And by the way, once you took a look at public opinion polls in Korea at that moment in time, you had a considerable improvement. There was also improvement on the Japanese side in terms of each country's view of the other. So I think there was a moment which was created and it lasted for about five years. We had a number of possible events where we actually began to see the kind of deeper form of reconciliation, something more than tactical strategic cooperation. And I wish we had been able to keep that going. We could talk about that.

On the other hand, when Jiang Zemin arrived, and, again, there were various issues and I'm sure Ambassador Nogami who is not here at the moment would say more about it, some of the other people who are perhaps in this room were involved more in Japanese foreign policy at that time could say more about this. But Jiang Zemin also wanted an apology including a written apology. There was a sense that, this was on the Japanese side, that this was not going to lead to any substantive movement forward.

And we had a very unsuccessful meeting. And I think the lack of democracy on the Chinese side was a serious impediment to having an improvement. So there are pluses and there are minuses. On the whole I think for real reconciliation, democracy is definitely a plus.

We mentioned Korea and -- excuse me Poland and Germany, Polish-German reconciliation didn't really start in the 1970s when Brandt visited Poland. It had almost no impact on Polish attitudes. In fact, when the communist government finally collapsed, there was a kind of uprising of all kinds of suspicions and resentments directed towards Germany within the Polish population.

It was only in the 1990s, really in 1990 going on that you began to have serious discussions. And, again, German and Polish leaders both at the national and at the local level took a number of steps to try to push that discussion forward.

And then nowadays if you take a look at Polish-German views of one another, there are serious problems and unfortunately right now, they are intensifying because we have authoritarian tendencies developing under the Kaczynski government in Poland.

But the public opinion has not moved backwards. So going back to one of the points I've made in my talk, when you have genuine reconciliation which takes time to process, it can have lasting effects and it can stabilize the relationship. So if you hadn't had that process in the German-Polish relationship in the 1990s and 2000s, I think we would have a much more difficult situation today. Sorry for such a long-winded answer.

MUKHERJEE: A variation of what Thomas just said. I think -- so if we assume that a reconciliation is a matter of manipulating symbols, memories and narratives, then democracy being more open, I think it's both paradoxically sort of easier to manipulate from the outside and harder to manipulate from the inside because it's a more open society. And so what you end up with is essentially even if a government doesn't want to perhaps reconcile, you can't necessarily stop that process, right, that there is a certain spreading of messages that goes on within a democracy.

Alternatively or on the contrary in a non-democracy, it's easier to manipulate from the inside and harder to manipulate from the outside. And so the clear example is China and the Yasukuni Shrine, meaning if they could just didn't say anything, perhaps this wouldn't become such a massive media issue every time a prime minister went there. But they choose to manipulate that narrative and they're able to do it because they control the means of the narrative within China, which is not the case if there were two democracies within each other which could manipulate more easily within the other party's political system.

AI: Thank you. There's another thing that was not necessarily covered in this session, but was mentioned earlier by Ambassador Armacost was the issue of education. One of the themes of the morning session was that reconciliation is a process and there's no one stroke of incident that can resolve the issues arising from conflict once and for all.

Given that, what is the role of education in all this, and in the context of your knowledge of particular cases and reconciliation between countries, what lessons should we take from the past cases of the role played by education? Because education tends to perpetuate the narrative that's already there or the people in the educator's position would want to pass on to the next generation. And sometimes it does not -- it is not conducive to passage of time helping reconciliation move forward.

So if you could comment on that education's role aspect of reconciliation, that would be my last question. Yes.

BERGER: Collective memory is carried in a number of different ways. It can be shaped through a number of different instruments, and education is one of the very important ones.

So you can -- through issuing textbooks, through organizing the curriculum, through having class visits and so forth, you can have some impact on a society's view of the world and it can either promote like any tool, it can either promote or hinder reconciliation. It depends on the type of narratives that you are perpetuating through the educational system.

Now trying to -- this isn't easy to do. I mean, I had some contact with Ministry of Education Monbusho bureaucrats when I did research in Japan, and they are very stubborn in my experience. You can't -- and likewise if you are dealing with teachers, I mean, you can tell teachers to teach something in the classroom, what they actually do on the classroom can be difficult. So it's not so easy to switch this on and off.

But if you are going to pursue reconciliation between countries, education is going to be an important tool. And when you do that -- and this goes back to one of the questions, do we have to -- I think Rust Deming asked this question, do we have to have the same notion of history.

I've spoken with Kitoka Shinichi who tried this with a great deal of courage and determination for a little while, you don't need to have an exact agreement with one another. Now, they adopted the message which was developed actually in the Franco-German context, it was picked up by the U.N., where you have, you know, parallel textbooks, but you tried to at least convey to the other side some sense of how the other side sees it, so giving mutual recognition.

I guess that can be useful, that can be helpful, but it is only one component, and if you do it the wrong way, that is if you create -- for example, we mentioned a little bit about Arab-Israeli efforts to have better relations and, you know, it's not enough to meet on the White House lawn or its functional equivalent in East Asia to shake hands and smile at each other. If you don't follow through on other levels including the educational system, you're always going to have problems.

And we see this, you know, the Israelis are very well aware that many of the kind of textbooks which are used in Palestinians schools are not exactly pro-Israeli. They are really quite anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist and in some ways anti-Semitic and that makes a problem and makes it more difficult. So that's enough for me.

IIZUKA: Yes, I fully agree that the education is really important for historical reconciliation. And perhaps in China or perhaps in South Korea, there are more or less reinforcement of the wartime atrocity or some bad legacy of war in the second, third or fourth generation.

So we talk about the new generation which should not have the real-time memory or experience of the wartime, but I think it keeps going on, reinforced by education. And there is so much talking about that in Japan, but I would like to stress on a different perspective of education, which is education in Japan.

Looking back on my education or classroom days when I was a school kid or maybe in high school, I was not taught very much about what Japan did because it was too recent and perhaps because of the teacher's union, or whatever, there was a struggle between right and left within, among the teachers or maybe in the government or the educational institutions.

So because of those, all those not, unsettling disputes, well it's still going on, but there was not much substance in textbooks about the Pacific war. And perhaps added to that, what we did to Okinawa, well, what was not done to Okinawa. So like I said -- as I said earlier, I did not know too much about Okinawa at all even though it is a part of my country, but it was the stage of the warfare and battle, and so many Okinawan people were killed.

But all we know is about perhaps Tokyo bombings, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, so the Japanese should be educated more about war and perhaps -- but I think it's got a little or perhaps much better through the years when I was a school kid. Maybe nowadays a little bit better perhaps, but still more education is necessary on the Japanese side to promote reconciliation. That's my comment.

MUKHERJEE: Very quickly, I mean, for me I think this is -- goes under the question of can you change the national narrative by changing textbooks? I think three things to be said. One is it's a slow multi-generational process. You can't just do this overnight, right? So even if you tried to subvert the narrative, it would be difficult.

The other thing is it has to be reinforced through other messaging, you know, media, social media, digital diplomacy, someone brought up earlier, national symbols. It's not enough to just have the textbooks changed, right?

And the third thing is education is not just about historical literacy. It's also about teaching empathy which Jennifer brought up in the morning. You may have different understandings of history, but if you learn empathy through your educational system, that might teach you to revise your views when you come across contradictory evidence.

AI: Thank you. So I think I have or we have time for a couple of questions. Please, Ambassador.

QUESTION: I didn't come here to talk about Korea, and in fact my interest and experience in Japan goes way back further in my more recent experience with Korea. But this fascinating discussion led me to a few thoughts about Korea and Japan and what we perhaps all ought to understand better about Korea, and that is -- Mr. Mukherjee, you kind of raised it with me, you talked about reconciliation in India's case from your former colonist, U.K., and sort of compare that to the U.S. and Japan. But I think the circumstances are quite different as it's been pointed out.

We had a very decisive war. The U.S. was I think relatively magnanimous in victory. The Japanese were relatively humble and responsive in defeat, and subsequently we discovered we had a lot of commonality. But it struck me that the India-U.K. experience perhaps is more relevant to the Korea-Japan experience whereas you had a 200-year colonization by the U.K. and Korea had a 35-year colonization by a very close neighbor, Japan. And it seems that Indians have gotten over the 200 years a lot better than the Koreans have gotten over the 35-year colonization, partly because of its nature.

But I think partly because there was a sense in India that you Indians had won your independence and shaped the future. And in Korea, I think there's still a sense of search for independence. It struck me very clearly as I was in Korea as ambassador, that Koreans didn't win their independence. You know, we won their independence and then kind of began imposing our own occupation and then it went into the Korean War. And in fact the Koreans have never -- have not won their unification yet either. That's still pending.

Another place I have a lot of experience with is the Philippines and, again, we were the colonizer of the Philippines, and while we've made a lot of progress towards reconciliation of the past, it hasn't been fully achieved, particularly under Duterte. We're finding there's still a lot of resentment. A lot of that resentment came from the U.S. bases, a lot of attitudes. But we haven't succeeded in that process yet.

So I think the success in reconciliation depends a lot on the circumstances, what you're trying to overcome. And I think in Korea there is still is this sense that they haven't found themselves as a nation, either as an independent nation vis-a-vis the world although they have a long history of independence, nor have they achieved unification. And that spills over very much into the relationship with Japan and their sense of competition with Japan, with us. And I just think that circumstance needs to be taken into consideration as all of us look at what to outsiders as a very vexing problem of two nations who seem a lot alike, have very common interest, yet can't somehow reconcile.

Thank you.

AI: Thank you. And I'll take one more question or comment and ask the panel to respond. Jennifer?

LIND: Thank you so much for these really insightful presentations. This has been super. I really wanted to commend the idea behind the panel taking this very comparative approach, because I think it's so important and often in our conversations about history issues in Asia they tend to be very narrowly framed.

And I wanted to note that, again, there's often a tendency, frequently in media coverage and in some scholarly coverage that emphasizes that Japan has a history problem, singular, in the sense of all of its foreign relations are fraught with the problem of history. And then people look for, well, why might that be and they look into Japan to try and puzzle through what might be the reason for that.

And I think this is really a problematic framing and it overlooks tremendous variation in the extent to which history is a problem in Japan's foreign relations. And Thomas framed this really well by saying it's important that we ask when is history a problem and when is it not. And we tend to assume it's always a problem for Japan and overlook this incredible heterogeneity in its foreign relations.

It also overlooks tremendous change overtime within countries where Japan actually has a history problem. So it's not just across space, but across time we see variation. One example is China took a much more conciliatory approach toward Japan in the 1950s than it does today and so people today talk about China as, well, of course, they hate Japan. Well no, they actually were more conciliatory early on which is a pretty fascinating point to Mischa's temporal arguments before because it directly reminds us it doesn't have to be the case.

And then another case that I think is really relevant for talking about Korea is Taiwan and we haven't talked about that. And I don't think we talk about enough and I didn't look into it when I was researching this and I'm only starting to now. And in addition, I mean, again, the idea of the colonial experience, right, and so reminding us of the India case might be relevant here.

So Taiwan is a fascinating case to compare with, with Korea and there we see that the memory of Japan was quite fraught and angry and bitter in the early days and we've seen a major transformation in that. And like Korea, the anti-Japan idea was kind of built into their identity with commemoration and very heavily in their textbooks and so on, but the sort of broader drama with China was what seemed to be pushing this to a great extent. And as that changed over time, we saw that the way they talked about Japan and the war has changed significantly.

So I think Taiwan is a really useful case for us to be talking about, and maybe also India and some others that we can think of. But, again, the most -- the biggest lesson for me is the essential need to do this comparative exercise and just how much we can learn from that. Thanks.

AI: Thank you. Anyone who wish to comment on this? Do you want to?

BERGER: Well, yes go ahead. No Rohan, you were--

MUKHERJEE: Well I think the Indian experience is -- so yeah, I think the Korean example is fascinating. I don't want to comment because I don't know too much about Korea and Japan relations, but what strikes me is that it's not just the mode of decolonization, but also the nature of the colonial experience.

What was really interesting was that a lot of the Indian nationalists, they've actually been termed collaborationists by many people because they essentially wanted home rule. They wanted greater autonomy within the British Empire. They were willing to continue being British subjects. (Inaudible) has done work on this in Algeria. Algerians actually first wanted to be French citizens before -- when they were rejected, they chose independence, right?

So in a sense there was a sense that the colonial experience was not this awful thing, that you could actually within it and be autonomous and have your own taxation and all of that. That my sense was not the case in the Japanese colonization of Korea and it might also be another factor that plays into this resentment or whatever you want to call it. So yes, that's all I have, thank you.

BERGER: Lots to respond to, but briefly, I don't like to use this language too often, but one of the problems is how do you identify your own identity and by doing that, in almost a Hegelian sense you're trying to identify another, who is the other that you're identifying yourself off against.

Now, in the Taiwanese case, especially Taiwan during the democratization process, the other became not Japan. It became China, the Peoples Republic, and in fact the colonial heritage, the experience of Japan became part of what many Taiwanese pro-democracy activists would use to distinguish themselves. We've always been a maritime nation. We've never been fully part of China. It wasn't until right before the Sino-Japanese War that China even turned us into a province and all of this sort of stuff. And then this becomes actually an asset. And some of my Japanese friends who've dealt a lot with Taiwan say it was almost embarrassing how sometimes pro-Japanese they were in terms of, you know, the relations with Taiwan. So, you know, that's an important element.

With India, I think one of the things which did not happen was you never had that kind of othering. In fact the trauma that -- and I go to India with some regularity because my wife is from India, the great trauma was the partition and the other that India as a secular republic defined itself off against was Pakistan with its particular sort of ethno-religious based identity. And that has been sort of the focus of Indian nationalism. So the U.K. was spared some of these problems.

The other thing in the point which Jenny was making is we shouldn't apologize. We apologize when we have to. Now, I'll just say one anecdote which kind of brought this home, long ago before I started dealing of all of this, I was applying for a post-doc at Harvard and the -- not the Olin Fellowship, it was the Cochrane (ph) Fellowship, and the chair of the committee, I had to be interviewed was Henry Rosovsky who by the way, historian of Japanese economic history. And, you know, he want -- I wanted to talk about one thing, Japanese security policy and he wanted to talk about the history issue. And he asked me directly, so why hasn't Japan ever really said sorry? This is the mid-1990s.

And I gave him my set of standard answers, you know, it had to do with the different nature. And he interrupted me and pardon me, this was -- it completely caused me to short circuit, putsun suru (ph), he said maybe the reason is because the Germans apologized because they killed Jews, while Japanese killed Koreans and Chinese. And Henry Rosovsky I should add is Jewish. And I was like oh my God, how am I supposed to respond to this? This is kind of wild Elders of Zion type of stuff.

But actually the point he was making is that you often find yourself apologizing when you have to. And actually at that time period as China and as Korea were becoming more and more important strategically and economically, Japan was under growing pressure to apologize.

So what is the point here? The point is we can't apologize for everything. There are endless numbers of potential sources of unhappiness. We apologize when there's a genuine concern and when political pressures -- this is one of the things you have worked on too -- when political pressures force us to confront that issue. And I think that keeping that in mind about why do we sometimes apologize, why don't we apologize, when does it become actually an international issue, it relates to both the issues of principle, practicality and memory that I talked about, but also having to do with strategic interest of the sort that you've worked on so much.

AI: Thank you. We are 15 minutes past our scheduled time. And I think we need to close at that time. But please join me in thanking our panels for their animated and excellent presentation.

SCHOFF: Thank you very much. Thank you, Ai-san. Just quickly I won't keep everyone, it's always tough to cut these conversations short because we have so many good people up on stage and so many good people in the audience to contribute to the conversation. We appreciate your participation today, all of you. Very grateful to Japan Institute of International Affairs, to Ambassador Nogami and Ai-san and your team and our team here and we will -- I won't summarize the discussion today. We will have short papers that come out of the discussions and the presentations today that will eventually be edited and up on our website.

So the event page will become a little bit of a repository, you can go back and look at some of these things. And we will have, separately Carnegie is planning an event in February or March or so which will look very specifically at the Japan-Korea case on historical reconciliation, so we get a chance to continue the conversation even more. But thank you, again, Nogami-san and everyone for your participation. Thank you.

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