BRIDGING THE GAPS IN EU FOREIGN POLICY
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SPEAKERS:
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Bruno Maçães, Portugal’s secretary of state for European affairs
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MODERATOR:
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JAN TECHAU: Welcome to all of you. Welcome to Carnegie Europe for a discussion on something that isn't Greece, which I guess these days is a welcome variety for lunch fare. I am sure Greece will somehow seep into this because you will make sure that it will. But originally we will not talk about it, and we'll try to give you something else to chew on.

All of this started here last year when, towards the end of the year, a couple of things happened at the same time. First of all, of course, a discussion started about the Strategic Review process that the EU would be undergoing in terms of its Foreign Policy, and Federica Mogherini was really embracing the idea that a mandate would come from the summit, and then a second mandate from a summit this year, and so all of a sudden everybody was talking about Strategic Review, the Neighbourhood Policy and a number of other things, all wrapped together as a big thing.

Around the same time, Bruno from the Portuguese Foreign Ministry approached us and said we need to have a discussion and we would like to do a workshop in Lisbon on this, and really ask the critical questions on how we can reengineer EU Foreign Policy. We did a great workshop in Lisbon, co-hosted by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry in Carnegie, and we had great results.

Then the third thing that happened was that around the same time it became clear that Pierre Vimont would be joining Carnegie Europe as the Senior Associate, which he is now, and so we had critical mass on the strategy thing, and we decided, okay, let's bind this together in an intelligent way and turn it into a real contribution to the debate. This is what we are here for today.

Two publications came out of this, both of which have, I think, been made available to you. The first one is Pierre's Policy Outlook that he wrote for us, which was published a few days ago, The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy. And the second one is the reengineering piece, with some of the results and recommendations coming out of the workshop in Lisbon. We will be talking about both of these and then, hopefully, have a lively discussion about this.

We will also have afterwards a small light lunch, with Portuguese food and Portuguese wine, so austerity, forget it for a couple of minutes, at least today, and indulge. Alcohol certainly helps in these difficult days, so we will actually provide you with some. What we will do is, after the discussions here are over, we will remove this to the wall, the chairs will be moved to the side, it will take two or three minutes and then you can storm the buffet and take in all the calories that you will certainly need afterwards.

I would like to hand over to Pierre, who will start us off. Pierre, of course, as you know, was present at the creation when the External Action Service started to operate. He was the Executive Secretary General. He is now with us. He has just accepted a new job. President Tusk has asked him to be the Special Envoy for the Malta Summit on Migration. That will happen in November. So Pierre is really having fun between the hot potatoes that he likes to manage, the big crises, and the more scholarly work that he also likes but has so little time to do. But I am very grateful that he did this paper for us.

Then Bruno is here with us, Secretary of State for European Affairs in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, and Sylvie Kaufmann, also known to all of you, doing foreign policy big time at Le Monde. So we have a good panel here. Pierre goes first, then Bruno comes in with some of the findings from the workshop, and then Sylvie will provide us with the common sense that all of the people involved have long lost. And then, hopefully, you come in as well and give us your critical opinions and questions.

With this, here is Pierre.
PIERRE VIMONT: Thank you, Jan. Thank you all for coming. Your reference to the food reminds me of my good old days in Washington where we were organising a conference followed by a dinner, and I invited a former foreign minister, a French foreign affairs minister who came. There was a big crowd, and I told him, that's great, and he told me, don't worry, I know they come for the food. Which was, on behalf of the Minister, some humbleness, which is worth noting.

I'll be very short because I wrote this piece, and maybe some of you were there, but I would really like only to summarise some of the ideas that I put forward. I have tried to answer two or three questions. The first point was about European foreign policy. Why are we here where we are? And, I think, my main idea was to try to look a little bit at the history of the European Union and how we have built this system, which is a very divided system in fact, at the end of the day.

On the one side we have the member states, with what we call the Common Foreign and Security Policy where, to be honest, member states have never been too proactive in pushing forward that kind of classical diplomacy, because they were somewhat thinking about retaining as much of their sovereignty as possible there. On the other side, you have what the Commission has done inside the realm of its competencies, where they have been much more proactive, and I think this entails two consequences that we have to look at.

One, if you look at the broad picture, is that you have a strong difference of momentum between the two. If you have, on one side, the actors of the CFSP giving small pieces of their competence towards Brussels with some reluctance, reservation. We had some progress with the Amsterdam Treaty, we've had other progress with the Lisbon Treaty, but, at the end of the day it's still all about unanimity. It's still very much about member states being represented at all international organisations and having great difficulty in accepting a sort of single representation by the EU.

Then if, on the other side you have, as it has happened since the beginning of the European Project, a Commission that is pushing forward to try to take as much room as possible, you have this extraordinary impression of two parts and two components of the European Foreign Policy that are not moving ahead at the same pace.

The second consequence is how our partners outside of Europe watch this. For them, the main deliverables of our foreign policy and of our external action have a lot to do with what the Commission has been doing. Trade, development assistance, and so on and so forth. With regard to the main crises we are facing today or that we have been facing in the past, they have the impression that Europe is not maybe playing exactly at the level it should play, and they rely much more on member states individually to discuss what could be done. Think about the recent Ukrainian crisis, with the non-multi formats, Germany and France, and you could think about maybe other issues where the same thing has happened.

Why haven't we been able to bridge that gap and to go further on? That's the second question. Lisbon has tried, and they have made some impressive innovations. Now a High Representative that is also a Vice President, a full-fledged administration, working beside and in support of the High Representative Vice President. The right of initiative for the High Representative. No more rotating presidency, to put it in simple terms, inside this whole realm of foreign policy.

In spite of all that, we have the impression that there hasn't been all that much change in the system and that we're still very much stuck with this strong division as it appears at the moment.
I think one of the reasons for this, first of all, is that the mind-set hasn't really changed in Brussels. If we really wanted to have major improvement, both institutions, the Council and the Commission, should have decided, at top level, that they wanted things to change. It didn't work that way. Lisbon was seen on the one side, I think the Commission side, as a major defeat. They lost part of the services. And on the Member State side, it was maybe too much perceived, Lisbon was too much perceived as a sort of revenge against the Commission and a way for the Member States to interfere with what the Commission was doing.

We've seen a lot of small battles, bureaucratic battles, going on and on.

I think, also, other reasons for that are because there are some structural flows inside the Lisbon Provision, as they have been set out. Two or three. Just to give you a quick example, nowhere have they really discussed the whole issue about what an added value is, from the EU point of view, from the EU side, with relation to Foreign Policy. There has never been a debate about what that means. We're, therefore, working with this added value in a very pragmatic way, without ever knowing really what it means and we don't understand why, on some occasions, we decide to go for a military operation, a CSDP operation and, in other cases, we think it's not necessary because Europe should not interfere with that crisis.

I think the second point is – and that may change, and we all hope it will change in the near future – we're still not really assertive enough about what kind of geopolitical role we want Europe to play. We discuss that from time to time among Member States, but we're not so sure, and some member states are not so sure, at least, that Europe should get involved in many of those crises. Syria, for instance. Yemen. Libya. We very much prefer to leave it to the UN and to others, but we don't feel that we should be part of this.

Today, on an issue like the Middle East Peace Process, it has always been a very difficult issue for the Europeans, but, it seems to me, and I'm talking here under the control of Marc, maybe, that we were more self-assertive a few years ago in trying to push and take the initiative. We have become somewhat reluctant today, and don't know exactly what is the role we should play in many of these crises. Which means, as a sort of consequence for the EEAS itself, that we don't know exactly what should be the mission of the EEAS.

Should it be a think tank? Should it be a service in charge of managing crises precisely? Should it be something else? For the time being, it has mostly replaced the rotating presidency in a sort of routine way, chairing working groups, trying to push forward, but it is lacking sometimes the energy that rotating presidencies had because they were there only for six months and, therefore, they were pushing their own interests as much as they could. And even if we thought it was lacking continuity there, at least there was a little bit of momentum every six months that was popping up.

With the EEAS in charge of it month after month, year after year, we're witnessing a little bit of routine moving in, and some member states are starting to be more and more critical about this.

I could go on and on, but I'll stop there and, I think, my third question would be, how can we improve that. In this paper I've tried to point out a few of them related either to working methods, to launching what is precisely doing at the moment the High Representative with the new Security Strategy. I think this is going in the right direction. But, I think, we need maybe to go even further and be a little bit more creative and innovative if we can by looking at two or three controversial issues on which, I think, we need to be more forthcoming.
One is flexibility, the idea that a group of Member States should be leading sometimes on some issues. I think this is a good thing, at the end of the day, if we use that flexibility in the right way and if it is being done with all the necessary safeguards. In other words, having inside the flexible format a representative from the European Union as such to be able to report back. But I think, maybe, at the end of the day, because of the numbers, 28 Member States together, taking decision by anonymity is becoming something more and more cumbersome and more and more difficult to do. Why not try to be more flexible and to allow for more of this, as we move along?

The second one, I think, is about priorities. We discussed that several times with Jan, who is somewhat sceptical about this, and I understand him very well. We have managed quite often to maintain consensus about 28 Member States precisely by avoiding to take any kind of priorities. But today, with our neighbourhood on fire on the Eastern partnership, or the Southern neighbourhood, with major crises in three or four very well focused places, I think we need to set up clear priorities for the years ahead.

I think, if we don’t do that, then we will become more and more an actor that is dragging behind and losing some of its ground. So, I think, through the new strategy that the High Representative is going to push forward, through the review of the Neighbourhood Policy, through the review of the post Cotonou situation, through the review of the post-2015 Sustainable Development, we are at a crucial juncture where we may precisely decide altogether that we need to focus more on some priorities. I think this is very important.

I've been all too long, I'll stop there.

JAN TECHAU: I have a very quick follow up for you here. The one thing that I am worried about most is that we've created all of these tools, and mightn't we be able to improve them on the technical level that they operate. But without that clear purpose that we've asked for in the beginning, what role does the EU want to play? What's the value added that the EU brings to the foreign policies of the Member States? Without having all of that answered, none of these improvements will make a great difference.

My question to you is, do you think that this Review Process that is now underway can give some answers to these very fundamental questions?

PIERRE VIMONT: I think it gives a great opportunity, and this should be the place where we start discussing these kinds of issues. Whether Member States will be ready to do that, what kind of process we should use to do that, it's not easy. Heads of State of Governments, Foreign Ministers don't know very well how to handle those strategic issues and what kind of format they should have. When there are 28 around a table it becomes very quickly a sort of bureaucratic exchange of views with no real impetus.

So, should it be precisely done in a different way, with small groups of countries discussing this? I don't know. We have to think about it because, I think, the initiative launched by Federica Mogherini to start working on a new Foreign Policy Strategy is the right one, and it's the right place to look at those issues.

JAN TECHAU: I will hand over to Bruno who, of course, in his current position, is still leading from the trenches on all of this. He's here in town not only for this event but also because he attended the Summit yesterday and he's part of the daily negotiations. It's very much our gain that he is here to give us the real position of the Member States in all of this. Bruno.
BRUNO MAÇÃES: Thank you, Jan. It's been a great pleasure working with Carnegie here this past six, seven months on this project and also discussing with you some of these problems.

A quick personal note. I started on this job two years ago in the run up to the Vilnius Summit, the preparations for the Vilnius Summit, and then I actually went to the Vilnius Summit to represent our Prime Minister, who could not go. So this had a huge impact on me, coming in to the job, very fresh, and seeing how EU foreign policy is done. My first impression was that it could be done better. Of course, by now, I've been fully socialised and I can't even remember what is wrong with the EU Foreign Policy any more. But, hopefully, this document still has some of those points.

You may remember, Jan, in our first conversation on this that I made the point that I was a bit puzzled by the difference between how the EU had dealt with the Euro crisis and how it was dealing with its foreign policy crisis, having to do with Ukraine and Russia. Then, in the case of the Euro crisis, there was a deliberate effort to re-think the system. At the same time that we were approving this bail-out and emergency measures, we were also thinking about what made the system vulnerable in the first place. And you have to do both. You have to use the system to respond to crises, but also to reform the system and make it strong. So we embarked on that very ambitious project of a banking unit for Europe, and other measures, including also emergency funds, permanent emergency funds like the ESM.

Now, in the case of foreign policy, there was an immediate response, using the available tools, and we can talk about whether it was a good or a bad response. I think there are actually good arguments to say that, everything considered, what the EU has done after Vilnius is quite positive. Before Vilnius, it's another discussion. But there was very little, and, I think, there's still very little on the other, more structural approach to a crisis – how should we reform and revise the system. And, I think, that's still the case, and this project was an attempt to put together a number of experts, insiders, and think about that question in particular.

In Lisbon, when we met last December – it's hard to believe it was six months ago – when we met in December we talked only about this. We didn't talk about strategy. We didn't talk about Russia or Ukraine directly. Only indirectly. We were focused on how to improve the EU Foreign Policy system. The paper that comes out of it, it's a bit unusual, I think, formally. The participants are not mentioned. We decided to adopt a very stringent version of the Charter House Rule. We don't even mention who is there. There were foreign prime ministers, prime ministers, think-tankers, academics, people from inside the institutions, the European External Action Service, and others. But, in order not to be forced to have a purely objective, matter-of-fact report, in order to be able to start from the suggestions that were made by everyone there and build a sort of argument, a coherent argument out of it, we don't mention who the participants were. I hope they are happy with that because it's ideas that matter. I see a couple of them here.

What are the ideas? In some respects, similar to what Pierre Vimont has talked about in the Initial Approach. The sense that the EU is not playing at the level it should play at in foreign policy. The sense that there hasn't been much change to the system since Lisbon. We already talked a little bit about that in the sense that the system is not responding to the crises. It's responding to the crises but it's not responding to the crises in a structural way. EU's geopolitical role – I think this is present also in the Lisbon Paper. The idea that we're going to face, probably, a decade or two of high geopolitics. I think this is becoming clearer and clearer to everyone.
It's becoming clearer and clearer that we have a number of global actors struggling to give a certain shape to the global system. I think, if we think back to the decade from 2000 to 2010, this was the return of a certain universalism in global politics. Really, the moment when the idea of Westphalia that you have different political orders, irreconcilable in the end, but living in peace with each other. At least, this is the initial proposition. This idea is more and more being abandoned. What you have now, in my opinion, is a number of projects for the global order as a whole.

I think the Iraq War with the United States was the moment when you saw the United States fully embrace its already existing universalism, but in a much more ambitious and open way. Then we have 2007-2009 and the Lisbon Treaty and a new foreign policy, much more ambitious. The Neighbourhood Policy. So the EU embraces its role of also shaping the global system. And then we have 2008 and the Georgia War, where Russia also declares its strategic goal of being a global player and shaping a new global order in a different global order.

That decade was the end of national politics, really; the beginning of a new, much more universalistic geopolitics, and the EU has to be ready for this with stronger EU foreign policy machinery. More creative and innovative, as Pierre has said, and more flexible.

Now, let me very, very briefly go over some of the ideas from our Lisbon meeting, which followed from the initial positions. We were concerned, first of all, with the question of forecasting and scenario outlook, the sense that this needs to be improved. A sense that came out of Vilnius that forecasting at the EU level was not good enough, and how should we deal with that. It's very difficult, and lots of voices in our Lisbon meeting pointed out that it's impossible to predict the future. But that is not the point. The point is to have a number of scenarios and think about what consequences follow from each of them. To have a tree of decisions and different outcomes, and how that can be done.

The paper points out that one thing we could do would be to formalise the process of forecasting so that it can be more self-critical. We have, of course, in the Foreign Affairs Council many ministers evaluating future developments and doing scenario outlooks, but this process is not fully formalised in the sense that it can look back and see where we were right, where we were wrong, and try to improve it. I think the US foreign policy machinery is better on this, with the National Intelligence estimates, which are permanently being evaluated and we should, perhaps, look at ways to formalise and institutionalise this forecasting exercise.

Second, how to link EU foreign policy and national foreign policy. Pierre Vimont has talked already about this. I very much like this idea of flexibility, having groups of member states work together to bridge this enormous distance between national capitals and the 28 as a whole. In the Foreign Affairs Council there should be intermediate bodies to bridge this distance, to make it more executive, since with 28 it is difficult to have an executive body. And we have something more like a senate than an executive body.

Pierre Vimont mentioned that there should be a representative from the EU there, and this is, of course, also what we think. I am also concerned that these groups should be variable. One would have different groups for different briefs and different issues. Perhaps having a country that is directly related and connected to the issue at hand, having a country that is a bit more distant, having small countries and bigger countries. But this old idea of a troika of foreign ministers is perhaps something worth going back to in a more informal way.
Then we talked a bit about what kind of tools we have and how to make them faster, how to make them better able to react to unpredictable situations, and better able to execute EU Foreign Policy Rules. The executive I mentioned is lacking. EU Foreign Policy is administrative in its nature, and regulatory. We don't have the flexibility, the discretion of an executive decision, and this lack is very clear when you compare EU Foreign Policy to American Foreign Policy, Chinese Foreign Policy or Russian Foreign Policy. How to do this without breaking with our political and institutional tradition is also talked about in this paper.

One or two final points. The European Council: we've now become much more clear that the European Council is where the big decisions are going to be made. Well, let's accept that and let's try to make the European Council a body that can also prepare the future, a more strategic body that can plan ahead. If we accept that the European Council is where the big decisions are made, let's try not to turn them all into emergency, last minute decisions. I actually think this has been happening already under President Tusk. We have a number of cases where the European Council has been deciding well ahead, planning the Riga Summit. It's not a surprise the Riga Summit. Some people think it was disappointing, but it was well prepared, expectations were well managed. We got what we wanted out of it.

TTIP: the European Council has been involved in this not because it is a crisis issue but because it is an important issue. And Russian Sanctions, which were dealt fundamentally with already in the March European Council and not the June European Council. Good examples of how they deal with difficult issues well ahead of the time when they finally have to be decided.

Finally, to conclude, there's a number of recommendations and suggestions about both the external structure and the internal structure of EU Foreign Policy. I think this is an interesting distinction. The internal structure has to do with how to organise foreign policy from within, with all the institutions and bodies that we have. How to make them stronger were particularly interesting discussions. The Political and Security Committee and how to upgrade it. But also the external structure, in the sense that we have a much more global, holistic approach to these issues now, and EU Foreign Policy has to be able to relate to international organisations like the International Monetary Fund. Like the European Investment Bank. Like the World Trade Organisation.

EU Foreign Policy should not be a closed silo. It should be open to other issues, which are not traditionally foreign policy but which are becoming more and more difficult to bluntly distinguish from foreign policy. We also discussed ways in which this could be done.

One sentence to conclude. The idea of this paper and the Lisbon discussion was to talk about how foreign policy should be conducted; not what foreign policy we should have but how we should conduct it. Whatever it is, whatever it turns out to be. I think this is an important idea to keep in mind. I'm always reminded of the old recommendation: before we start to think, it would be good to think about how we should think. Otherwise we will be thinking badly without even knowing it. So let's start by using the resources available to us to create a better system and better machinery. And then we'll use the system and the machinery.

But to jump immediately to the content without thinking about the form is not the best way of thinking. It's also not the best way to do foreign policy. This is the basic idea of our Lisbon meeting and the paper that came out of it.

**JAN TECHAU:** Bruno, can I also ask you a quick follow up? One of the points you make in the paper is that most of the foreign policy tools that the EU has are non-Machiavellian tools; meaning
that they're not coercive in nature but that they depend on the other side to have goodwill and to actually play along, and also, basically, share the idea behind it. So coercion is not really the strong side.

Now, with all that has passed since the workshop, and with some of the things, especially about the executive nature of all of this in mind, how can we work around this? We will not be a coercive power any time soon. How important is that, really? Is that a structural flaw that we can't work around, or is this something that we can compensate for in other ways?

**BRUNO MACÃES:** This was talked about a lot in Lisbon and the paper tries to give some more emphasis to the discussion we had in Lisbon. These are the different possibilities that I see to deal with that question. Of course, we could try to develop pure Machiavellian tools all the way up to a European army. We all know that is going to be difficult for the time being. We could give up the idea of having any Machiavellian tools, turn the EU into a pure soft power global actor, using its deep pockets to influence decisions and processes in the directions that it wants.

I think we should try to look for something in between these two options, because we do have tools that are not reliant on the willingness of the other side to play along, as you have pointed out many times. We do have a Trade Policy. We have a Competition Policy. Economic sanctions. The problem, I think, with these tools is that they are not flexible enough, or they were not flexible enough, scalable enough, malleable enough. I think, the story from the last two years, actually, is an attempt to turn economic sanctions into a tool that is both Machiavellian in that sense in that the other side can do nothing about it, but a lot more flexible. And there was a lot of effort to make the sanctions almost surgical, entirely scalable. Sanctions that could be easily removed or increased. This, I think, with all the constraints that we have, is the best approach, and this could be further developed.

So, what Machiavellian instruments we should have, we should use them better and give them the institution or structure to use them better in a much more flexible, quicker, faster but also scalable way. This, to me, seems the most promising way to solve this problem, which is a real problem and it's going to stay with us. The other two alternatives are not satisfying in the end.

**JAN TECHAU:** Thank you, Bruno. So, lots of material to talk about and perhaps comment on, but I'm sure you have your own points as well. Just one little side note. It was our goal to make this room warmer than the outside, which, after the last couple of days was a bit of a challenge, actually. But with your help we've succeeded in turning this room into a sauna again, which we always do at Carnegie. But now we've opened the doors. If this is too much of a draught, let us know, but I think it's getting a little better. It was a bit warm. We always apologise for this. But if somebody has a good idea for fundraising for climate control, please approach me afterwards.

**SYLVIE KAUFFMANN:** Thank you very much. Well, I have the convenience or advantage of not being a Brussels insider and not being a policymaker, so I can bring the irresponsible views and layman's view or the contrarian view. Listening and reading your excellent papers, and listening to this very sophisticated views about all the tools and the challenges of the EU Foreign Policy reminded me of the motto of the Clinton Campaign, the Bill Clinton Campaign: "It's the economy, stupid". I think, in this field it's: "It's the politics, stupid".

Whatever is being thought and built here in Brussels, the one bottom line that you cannot really avoid is that when all these leaders go back home they are facing their voters. This is something that we cannot forget; that at the end of the day, there are public opinions there. We are very much witnessing this these days on other issues, but I think one tool, when Pierre talked about the benefits of a
comprehensive political vision, there's another word, which goes along with this, which is a very fashionable word now, which is "narrative". I think we really badly need a narrative.

China has a narrative. America has a narrative. I think we haven't really found our European narrative for our foreign policy. That would be a narrative that leaders, whoever they are in those 28 countries, can go back home and build on, and also the High Representative can also spread around when she travels or when she speaks out. There is the weapon or the tool of the Bully Pulpit. I think Catherine Ashton has used it very much, Mogherini does use it more, but still, you may have a bully pulpit but you still need to say something from the bully pulpit. I think this is really something which is very political. If you have this narrative, it has to be very political to convince public opinion, and public opinion which, of course, has totally divergent interests or divergent concerns.

I think, one of the powerful cases that can be made and that you are making in a way, is that we are much stronger united than the sum of individuals, and this is something which still is not understood, I think, in national public opinion. It's that the strength, the power of the union, if it acts, if the Member States act together and have this common narrative, it hasn't come through yet, I think. And it's a case which still has to be made in political terms.

For instance, the Neighbourhood Policy. What does Neighbourhood Policy mean to public opinion? It's far too abstract, it's far too vague. It's very Brussels-like in a way. It's very well understood here, but beyond Brussels, we don't have a word for Beyond the Beltway, which applies to Brussels, but this is what I mean. It's very difficult to comprehend for voters. This one size fits all concepts just doesn't play. Why should Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova or Tunisia be applied the same concept? It's just very difficult to understand.

So, in these Neighbourhood Policies which, of course, are indispensable, we need to have policies, I think, one good way of building a narrative would also be to choose some priorities. And I think we have two priorities at the moment, which are Ukraine and Tunisia, which are, of course, very different cases. You cannot apply the same recipes to the two of them. I am very struck by the fact that if you are in Poland people are not interested in Tunisia beyond the tourism aspect. And in the south of Europe, of course, we are far less interested in Ukraine. And that sounds like a tautology, but it's a fact that you have to take into account.

At the same time, you can see by the migrant crisis the huge differences of perception that we have across Europe. Also about terrorism issues. Yet the case can really be made that this affects all of us, including even though the migrants are coming in through the Mediterranean at the moment. And we were talking about this just before coming in. Of course, the roads are being modified and they are already coming in through other routes, and land routes and so on. It's now affecting Hungary. So, I think, the Poles should be open and can be convinced that it is something that also is important to them and that they have to be involved in when the time comes to find a solution.

I think there are other issues that we can build a narrative on. China, for instance. It is quite obvious that the European Union, when you are faced with China, can be much more efficient if it's one rather than individual countries going to Beijing and playing the individual cards. Of course you cannot prevent commercial interests from coming in the middle of this, and you won't prevent countries from playing this card also. But beyond this, I think, there is really a case that can be made for Europe regarding China. Here we are dealing with a partner which has a major role in the global scene, which doesn't share our values, which is creating a lot of tensions in the East and Southeast Asia. There are enormous security and economic interests at stake, and the European Union, as such, has a role to play also.
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We were talking about tools. Solidarity. We have to find a way to build on, to translate this principle of solidarity into action, and this has been so obvious on the migration crisis. This has been so obvious where there is an issue. Talking about Machiavellian tools, of course, Bruno, you are absolutely right to say that the idea of a European army is difficult and is quite far away, but still, if we are not able to act better when we have to be militarily involved, how can you have a sensible discourse on a common foreign policy? We have had these examples of operations in Central African Republic and in Mali where one Member State in particular was ready to act, and you had these conferences where you talk about confiance de générations de force, I don't know it in English. And you ask for help and everybody is staring at their shoes and help is not coming.

I think we have to do better than that, and some Member States have to understand that solidarity is a two-way lane. I think this is something which can be understood by and explained to public opinion. I think this lack of common defence efforts – and I am not talking about an army but of capacity to come together on a particular operation which is in the interests of all of us – is an existential problem for the European Union and for our European Foreign Policy.

Last point, diversity. I think diversity, and it goes to the point you both made about flexibility, which, I think, is a very, very important point. Diversity is both a strength and a weakness, in many respects, but including in the European Union. It's a weakness if it plays against each other, and it's a strength, of course, if we come together. I was struck recently, I was part of a study trip to East Russia with the European Council and Foreign Relations, and we had a fantastic dinner with the EU Ambassadors there. Of course, there was the ambassador representing the European Commission, who was from Latvia and there were, I think, a dozen other EU Member States ambassadors. Listening to them, I was really struck by the wealth that each of them brought with his or her own identity, his or her own history. What the national perception or expertise brought to this issue, to the common issue.

I think, if we had this conversation with an American ambassador, of course, we would only have one view. And those views, of course, were absolutely not contradictory. They were all fairly getting to the same point but bringing very different points and expertise, and I thought this was really where the European diversity is at its best, when it enriches the views and the expertise.

I think, probably, the High Representative should tap into this resource in a more concrete way. The idea of small working groups, bringing together ministers or officials from countries, which have a dog in the fight of the issue concerned, but also representatives of the countries that don't have a dog in the fight and which will bring maybe contradictory views or paradoxical views. This is really something that, I think, will be a very good tool. The format of the Iranian negotiations, I think, is a format that we can also take inspiration from. Another example, I think, on the Eastern partnership; we had two brilliant people working on this Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, and they were probably the best people you could think to work on this, but maybe it would have been good to have somebody also totally external to this issue, who was not so knowledgeable and involved as they were. Maybe this is also an experience to think of and learn from.

I will stop there.

JAN TECHAU: I'd like to ask you all to get your questions ready, but before I give it to the audience, a quick question for you. You said in the very beginning a very simple thing, but which is a fundamental thing, which is that the idea that we are actually stronger together doesn't seem really to register in this field. It's a very simple thing to say, but it's an enormous problem. Something that seems to work in the single market, seems to work on something like maybe police cooperation, and
even on the currency, to a certain extent. It doesn't seem to really register in this field. Political scientists will always say, well, it's a matter of national interest that they diverge, and so naturally it's not that easy. But what's your take? Why doesn't the simple truth register better? Is it an elite problem? Is it a population problem? Where is the issue here?

SYLVIE KAUFFMANN: I think it's very much an elite problem, and in this I include the media, of course. I think the political establishment and the media have a very hard time explaining to the public that the migrant crisis, for instance, doesn't only affect the countries where the migrants arrive, or that Russia may be far from the South of France or Portugal, but the Ukrainian issue affects us all. It's a case which is difficult to make, but I think it's a lack of courage, of course. Le Monde, my paper, works with five other European newspapers in a project called Europa, and it's an irregular collaboration but we use it more and more now on short term issues. For instance, we did two or three pages together a week ago about the migrant crisis, and each of us contributes one piece to an issue that we choose. We asked the journalists from Gazeta Wyborcza, the Polish paper, to write about why the Poles, having almost no immigrants except from some Ukrainians, are still reluctant to accept quotas or refugees. And this issue, from what I hear, was not so well addressed in the Polish press. The piece he wrote and which was published in five other European newspapers, including The Guardian, of course, had a huge echo in the UK, but also in Germany in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and in Le Monde.

It reverberated back in Poland. And you see, I think, that's quite interesting because sometimes you have to go through other countries to talk back to your own country, and that shows, to me, it's a sign, it's bit complicated to do concretely every day, but I think it's a message to the media and to politicians that together we can work more on these issues.

JAN TECHAU: Thanks to all of you for the input. It was very rich and very diverse and now I'd like to open it up. The first question is here in the first row, and the fingers are going up. Giovanni, and then the gentleman behind Giovanni and then Marc. I take those four first and then I move over to this side.

CATHERINE WOOLLARD: Thank you. Catherine Woollard. Two short questions. Mr Vimont, I very much enjoyed your paper and you set out a lot of clear recommendations. My question is, who needs to be convinced in order for your vision to happen, and how will you convince them? The second question is a broader one about the future of diplomacy. Hearing again this discussion of trade and the fact that the EU's power, as we know, lies largely in its trade policy.

Generally, how can diplomats reassert themselves in this relationship with commercial and corporate interests? We certainly see at national level diplomacy and the idea of commercial diplomacy has rendered diplomats often the servants of commercial interests. At EU level, there's a different problem, which is DG Trade and its unwillingness to allow EU trade policy to be used as a foreign policy tool. So I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on how that can be instrumentalised.

GIOVANNI GREVI: Thank you very much. Thank you for a very interesting presentation and very good papers. I very much agree that, at the end of the day, it's the politics and, in fact, perhaps one element, which is common to the debate on internal policies, to the debate Catherine suggests on migration, and the debate on foreign policy is that, somehow paradoxically, the moment we have adopted treaties, reforms, rules; the moment we have, to some extent, improved the potential for governance, the moment the politics have fragmented across the European Union. And this is a paradox that, I think, is core to our reflection and our debate.
My question really goes to the question of the vision, the narrative, as it has been put in the debate and in the papers. The European Union, up to a few years ago, one could say had, at least, a narrative. Whether or not that corresponded to facts or not, we can discuss. But they had a narrative, it could be said. In fact, multilateralism, well governed states, actually the Neighbourhood Policy, but essentially transforming part of the neighbourhood in ways, in power and so on and so forth.

Now, that narrative has to be updated, we know. What would be your one element that you would suggest for this, at least in part, new narrative that makes it appealing internally and externally, distinctive? And I would add realistic; meaning, we are speaking of the European Union, which is not a global actor or an international actor like others. And the question is, how can we adjust the need for a narrative to the particular features of this particular political body that is the European Union in the world? Thank you.

**JAN TECHAU:** Thanks, Giovanni. Right behind you, I'll take two more and then Marc after this.

**MARC FRANCO:** Thank you. My name is Marc Franco. I am a former official of the European Institutions and we know each other. My first question is related to the question that was asked already by the lady, and it's about the concept of interest. Mr Vimont, you spoke about the value added of the European Foreign Policy. Aren't we totally incapable or possibly unwilling to define what our interest are? We are very good in talking about all the good that we want to do for the world. Its development, its peace, international law, democracy, human rights, and the list is very long. But then, in the end, why do we do it? I mean, foreign policy is also about interests, and we are incapable of defining what European interests are in order to balance what the values are with what the interests are.

In my experience, when I went to a ministry of foreign affairs to do with a march on one or the other human rights issues, I was listened to with more or less politeness. My successor very often was an ambassador from a Member State who said we want to come and help you with the construction of your Metro, or we want to do some more exploration on gas in your sea. So, how do you balance the two? You have the European methods and then you have the Member States' measures. You have the value and interests.

The second question is about a sentence in your text where you talk about the lack of realistic touch and you say that the appetite for action compared with these capabilities and overambitious objectives that are not matched by sufficient means. You say this also applies at this moment to Neighbourhood Policy, where we negotiate and sign with countries agreements that if you look at them, in fact, are a roadmap for what I would call a soft power regime change. But we can't offer an institutional perspective, we can't offer the necessary means to do it. We can't offer the security or the defence protection or cooperation that you would need. What would be the implication for a new Neighbourhood Policy?

**JAN TECHAU:** Thank you very much.

**MARC OTTE:** Thank you. Marc Otte, Egmont Institute. Two comments. One, that we should not indulge into chest beating. There have been successes in the EU Foreign Policy. There is no precedent for that. There is no model to follow, so as long as we are pioneers, or the European States are pioneers in that respect, I think, we learn by doing. We should not underestimate the successes, maybe, in looking at reforms or improvements that are necessary. Look at the successes. Why did we succeed? I think, for instance in the Horn of Africa, in the Red Sea or in Somalia, the EU has made a difference. The risk, in many places, if the EU was not there with some of its policies of crisis
management measures, developments, it would be worse than it is. So I think we should not indulge in too much guilty feelings.

What could be done, in looking at reform, is maybe to go away from the Brussels habit to make sure that it works in theory before it works in practice, and reverse the terms. Let's look at what works and draw the consequence of that.

The issue of flexibility, that's the second comment that Pierre raised, is very important. And there also, it's already happening. Or Sylvie made the example of Iraq. It has already happened that a group of Member States decided to do things, but they are looking always for European legitimacy. When Ms Merkel and Mr Hollande go to Minsk, they don't report to their Parliament, they report to the European Council. They need the European legitimacy for what they do. So I think that's already happening.

When it comes to tools, yes, I think, more flexibility should be the order of the day in view of the nature of what is the object of foreign policy. You don't deal with an Ebola crisis in the way you deal with a traditional border crisis between two countries. So this flexibility must come not only from inside the institution but from Member States. The EEAS and the High Representative should have at her disposal the means that are present in the Member States, and there should be more of an acceptance that for some crises you have one structure dealing with it and you recreate another structure for another crisis. Then when you don't have it in your house, you ask Member States to provide them. I think the idea of a sort of standby capability that is present in the Member States should be worked on.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you, Marc. I'd like to give all of you the chance to give answers to these questions and then we have enough time for a second round. Pierre, do you want to start and pick some of these things?

PIERRE VIMONT: I'll be very quick. The first question, who must be convinced. I personally totally agree with you. What is surprising is that every time you talk about everything, we have been talking with individuals inside the system, they all agree. How come then that the system doesn't really deliver what we're all looking at? I think because, a little bit like Sylvie was saying about politics, you have to start at the top. It needs to be a top down process, and if you don't get that, and to some extent I still think that was maybe one of the problems at the Lisbon Treaty. Once this had been negotiated, agreed, nobody knew exactly how to use this whole thing and there wasn't, from top down to the whole system, clear instructions or whatever, I don't know how we should call that. But a strong recommendation that we should move ahead and work in a proper way.

I think, apart from foreign policy, there is something that is missing quite often in our system from our political leaders a clear indication that they are all committed to Europe and to what they have just adopted, and that we should push it. I think this is one of the problems that we're facing.

You were asking about diplomats and what is their role and how do they find a role compared with the business community, TTIP, DG Trade and so on. I think diplomats, for many years, 19th century and so on, have to do with politics again, and they have lost this a little bit. They have thought that they had to compete with experts from transport, from energy and whatever, but they can't. But they have to bring a real added value, which is to understand the world we're living in and what's happening at the moment. When you try to negotiate a trade agreement with a country whose politics you don't know about, you can get lost very quickly. And this is where diplomats should be both more humbled, and, at the same time, more assertive in giving precise recommendations.
And others should listen a little bit more to them. The problem with diplomats is that, because of their tradition, their reputation, they look a little bit like a nuisance when they pop in, and I know some of my colleagues from many DGs in the Commission look at the ES in that way. Here they come with politics again. We don't need them. I think, once we all can understand that this can bring added value, I think, it will change a lot. Maybe sometimes we ourselves are not very good at this.

Very briefly, just two other points, because I am sure more will be said about this. The narrative. For me, it's still the same as in the beginning. We only have to update it. Listen, peace and prosperity. What better narrative can you have today about peace, about how we're going to push back the whole terrorism moves and initiatives that are taking place around us. As for prosperity, it's about how is Europe going to find again prosperity. What kind of growth will we be able to push for? I think, on these two things, we are much better doing it together. If we were able to convince everyone that this is really what it's about, which was really what it was all about at the beginning, it would be much more useful.

On the last two points I have not much to add to Marc Otte. I totally agree with the fact that we shouldn't be too self-deprecating, but, at the same time, we should not indulge ourselves. It is finding the right balance. There is still a very long road on which we need to make progress, and I would very much agree with what you were saying about the need to use lessons learned, and what Bruno was saying about better have a permanent review of what we have done and how to improve it. I think that would be very useful.

As for Marc Franco about the added value and the interest, to think more sometimes about interest and less about values. Here again, it's a mixture of both, and it's to find the right balance. But I think, sometimes, and we have been going through very difficult debates in the Council recently about Egypt and what should we do with Egypt. With Ukraine. What should we do with our relationship with Russia? We have been agonising about this without finding, up to now, a common mind. I think these are issues that we need to face in a much more courageous way, and not just, if we can't agree, say we'll come back to it again because we're pretty much divided. I think it's very important to be able to go to the heart of these issues and try to find a way through.

JAN TECHAU: Bruno, do you want to pick a few?

BRUNO MAÇÃES: Two or three quick comments. The EU Foreign Policy machinery, to me, a relative outsider, it looks a bit loose, and they need to tighten the screws a little bit. The world has an enormous amount of constraints, and our foreign policy is a bit loose. It is still a bit unpredictable, still a bit unfocused. So I don't think either myself or Pierre Vimont are suggesting a big revolution or big revolutionary changes, but you have to look at the machinery with focus and improve it where it needs to be improved.

I am also not, and perhaps Pierre agrees with me on this, I am not one of those who thinks that it's all about the mentality, it's all about the spirit, it's all about the ideas, and that if we can have a big collective decision to embrace Europe and to embrace European foreign policy everything will be solved. Many times it's about the institutional design, and this is what makes problems either worse or reduces them. It identifies and explores opportunities. Think back to the Federalist papers in the United States. It's the best example of that. You have human nature, it is what it is. But then you have a really concerted effort to come up with the best machinery, to do institutional design at the very high level. The European Union should be able to do this.
Of course there's rivalry between states, of course different public opinions create big problems. This is, in fact, the main paradox of European politics. You have 28 heads of government who have to come together and reach a common decision, but they also have to follow their own public opinions and they have to keep it completely separate. There's very little connected channels between them.

We know this problem is there, but then we can either create the right kind of institutional structures, institutional design to alleviate the problems and to explore opportunities that it actually offers, or we can have the wrong kind of institutional design, which just exacerbates the problem even more.

JAN TECHAU: Bruno, can I come in here? I would like to ask a quick question on this. On the Ukraine crisis and on Iran, let's take those two, and perhaps you can even make the case in Kosovo/Serbia, these were all relative successes. Really big important issues, of overriding importance. A pretty unified interest situation within the EU, and a strong mandate given by the Member States to the institutions. In those cases, the machinery can work. And in those cases we even step beyond the boundaries of the machinery and create foreign policy results. So, is this a case where we just need enough pain and then, miraculously, we can get it done? And all of the other things, you know, pain is not big enough and so it takes two months to get a reply to a diplomatic snub by North Korea.

The question is, is this a cynical kind of pain threshold argument, or can we structurally improve this? Because human nature, as you just mentioned the Federalist Papers, is as it is. We can also apply this to Europe and say, well, as long as the pain is not big enough, well, there is not going to be unity.

BRUNO MAÇÂES: I think this is what I mean by that metaphor of loose machinery. Sometimes it works. Sometimes it works very well. First of all, it needs an extraordinary amount of political attention and political work, which kind of reveals to me that the machinery is not working at its best. It only works at its best if everyone is simultaneously focused on the problem. Which we saw in the Ukraine, and I think there were some good decisions taken over the last year or two. But again, enormous pressure, enormous political concentration. The level of effort that was necessary to come up with good insights and good decisions is overbearing. And you're going to make many mistakes. I tend to think that in foreign policy you may be right 99% of the time, but if you make a really big mistake, that's enough for the consequences to be devastating.

I have to say very openly that the EU foreign policy machinery does not at present give us the confidence that it will be able to be consistent and good over all the challenges that might appear over the next ten years. In many instances, it's going to be very, very good, I think. And I think Kosovo is an obvious one – a very, very difficult problem. Do we think that the machinery worked in the case of Kosovo because it is bound to work or do we think that there were a number of contingent elements and the extraordinary work that the former High Representative did in that particular case? But we don't have the confidence that it will always work well.

JAN TECHAU: Sylvie, do you want to pick something quickly?

SYLVIE KAUFFMANN: Yes, on the narrative and the definition of our interests quickly. We are extremely bad at PR but I don't think that's a surprise to any of you. I was thinking of the beginning of the Ukrainian episode, this one, and those EU flags for days and days being flashed up on the square, and we haven't built on this. We could have done. This is really a very powerful argument that the European Union ideal is so ideal and reality is so attractive. We haven't built on this at all in terms of a narrative. I hate that word but it always comes back somehow. In terms of public relations, also, I think we made a mistake there.
Also, if you look at the Greek story, it's very interesting to see Euro-sceptic movements suddenly panicking that the Greeks may leave the Eurozone. It's totally contradictory. But that shows also the power of the European ideal. You're against it, but if a member may get out of it, it's a tragedy. So this is also, I think, something we can work on – how this idea in fact is now so ingrained in the public mind that the sheer idea of living outside of this is difficult to comprehend.

JAN TECHAU: We have about ten minutes before we have to get the wine out, so this gentleman with the green sweater in the front row, and then these two, and a third one here, and I think we start over here.

PARTICIPANT: Good afternoon to all the speakers. Thank you for your very valuable contributions. My name is [inaudible], Youth Proactive. I have two quick questions, one for Pierre and another one for Bruno.

For Pierre, I think you make very, very good points when you refer to the EU and define added value. I would like to make further points. I think something that also needs to be addressed is what is the defined added value of the individual Member States to the EU Foreign Policy. We cannot simply sleepwalk in European construction and I think not only in European foreign policy but definitely in this case it will help a lot also from a civilian perspective of the EU building mentality to, if they understand what can they bring different. In the EU you have 28 member states from different geographies, with different geopolitical realities, with different historical perspectives, with different alliances presently and historically with very, very different countries.

If the EU somehow manages to bring together and they say each and every one of you can bring to our EU foreign policy an added value and strength, of course, Brussels can be at will, no one is going to say anything against it. But if the Member States feel involved in this, maybe, it will be also a bit easier for them to move a bit more of their competencies, their sovereignty, if you want, to supranational level.

To Bruno, I only have a very simple question. It was already mentioned, I believe, by Pierre that the Neighbourhood Policy is a fire. I think we can say out loud, considering all the challenges we have in our neighbourhood in Africa, ISIS, everything, Europe is at war, I think. It has been said out loud by many people but I think we can say that, unfortunately, we are at war. In the present day, most of our attention has been driven because of a very pressing issue involving one Member State, which let's not mention. But the truth is even if by magic that problem disappears, everything was okay with that Member State and our relationship with it, we would still be surrounded...

JAN TECHAU: Can I ask you to ask that question because we are a bit under time constraint?

PARTICIPANT: Yes. Even if that disappeared, we would still be surrounded by problems. Each and every one of them sufficient to endanger the EU cohesion and its very existence, even in the short term. I would like to ask you, from your very privileged position, if you believe, and you already mentioned that the EU machinery sometimes doesn't work as well as it should, but do you feel that there is an understanding at the high level of this reality? And if so, do you feel there is a feeling of common challenge, or a feeling of entrenchment is stronger? Thank you.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you very much. Ambassador Vandemeulebrouck.
ROBERT VANDEMEULEBROUCK: Thank you. On the issue of speaking with one voice, Russia speaking with one voice, United States speaking with one voice, Europe has great difficulty because of the consensus rule. What would it take in order to amend this consensus rule to make this a priority for the EU? I heard the word by the French journalist, and I like it very much. What would it take to move it to a priority and not a side issue, as it has been for the last 20 years? It has made Europe so far a not so serious contender in comparison with the other players. Europe could enjoy greatly by making it a priority and not a side issue any longer.

JAN TECHAU: Thank you very much. Steven Blockmans for the final question.

STEVEN BLOCKMANS: One comment, one question. There was a lot of focus on institutional innovation, the framework, the mechanisms which ought to be improved. This very same narrative could apply to the type of overreaction which we have seen lately on the side of the EU in cobbling together a boat sinking operation off the coast of Libya EUBAM which came surprisingly quickly to a conclusion in the Council with a decision on launching this operation without the very same machinery that you have talked about from a negative perspective, essentially, having provided enough barriers perhaps to prevent the EU from launching mission that in phases two and three lacks a mandate.

My question relates to the philosophy of a more assertive mind-set for EU Foreign Policy. If I understand correctly, Pierre Vimont is saying that we essentially have the narrative, we ought to tweak it. We have a narrative of peace and prosperity. But in this more assertive mind-set, would you go as far as to say that the EU would have to go to war in order to safeguard its interests?

JAN TECHAU: A big one for the last one. We do it in the reverse order this time, so Sylvie I'd like to ask you to comment first and then we'll give Pierre the final word.

SYLVIE KAUFFMANN: Well, if peace is threatened I guess you have to be able to make the case that you have to go to war, yes. We're faced with very serious issues in the south of the Mediterranean, in Syria and ISIS and it's not only on the other side of the Mediterranean, as we have seen. It's many places of Europe now. So I think this is an issue which people think about. It's not only in Brussels. I think, in all our countries, it's a very serious issue. I mentioned we are at war. It's a feeling which prevails in many of our countries. Of course, it's a question which should arise here too.

I am not sure I understood very well your question about the consensus issue.

JAN TECHAU: Speaking with one voice - making that a priority.

SYLVIE KAUFFMANN: Okay, so I did understand it but I don't think I have the answer, I'm afraid. It's again a very political solution, I think, and decision, but how to achieve it, I will leave it to Pierre and Bruno.

BRUNO MAÇÃES: I'll try to answer all questions more or less together, and focus a bit more on this. I think the EU has a narrative. What it lacks is a little bit incorporating all the complexity and the mess of the world we live in into that narrative and making sense of it. I think Russia and US are better able to do this. We see how Russian foreign policy sees the pros and cons when it has an opportunity. You see how the US sees conflicts all over the world as part of a secular struggle of democracy against its enemies. And so even foreign policy crises are quickly incorporated into their narrative.
The EU is a little more focused on itself. It has to open up to the world, it has to realise that it's also part of this contemporary effort to shape a new global order. And it has to embrace foreign policy as it's always been for thousands of years, which is dealing with problems. The fact that a problem is there, it doesn't show that your foreign policy has failed. It shows that your foreign policy should get working. In some cases there's an opportunity there to pursue our interests or our vision, and I think that our main interest is a certain vision of the world, which is based on universalism, based on cosmopolitanism. But a sort of universalism and cosmopolitanism which includes institutions and rules. It's not just a universalism of values. It's a universalism of rules and institutions.

We're in the middle of that process, and, I think, it should be motivating enough for European foreign policy to be involved in that big project.

Trade – maybe over lunch we can talk a little bit about how trade can be a part of this. I'm very interested, personally, in trade policy. I think you shouldn't be as worried as you sounded because geopolitical concerns are more and more a part of the discussion on trade. I hear that more and more in the trade councils. We just have to think about how to do it. But I think the moment when trade goes up to DG Trade and has a completely technocratic discussion is long past and it's now being taken up with a very definite and better perspective.

**JAN TECHAU:** Pierre?

**PIERRE VIMONT:** Very quickly. Added value that could be brought by Member States. Yes, definitely, there is no doubt. But we're doing that already, to some extent. What I found quite fascinating, and Sylvie is certainly right in that we're very bad at public relations, but when we launched the Fourth Generation Process with our Central African operation, which was, by the way, a peacekeeping operation in the middle of Bangui, a rather difficult place, the first countries who came up and said they were ready to support were the Baltic States. To have the Baltic States sending some of their foot soldiers to Central Africa – I guess some of them didn't even know where Central Africa was – was rather interesting.

I could give you another example. When we discussed how we could move into Mali and help there and we needed expertise, we found out that Denmark had an extraordinary expertise on Mail because of its development policy there for many years. All this shows if only it was needed to remind us that we have an extraordinary treasure of expertise in our 28 Member States that we can't use enough, and that we should do more than that. I think the main problems we have with foreign policy, and it's a very good point that Bruno makes in his paper, which is that we're facing three different categories of Member States. Those that don't have much ambition any more in foreign policy; those that are looking at some specific interest; and the large ones who are rather dismissive with European Foreign Policy because they think they can do better. The whole issue of stronger united.

I think it's how do you bring these three groups together and try to make them find a common way to move ahead. It's complicated.

Speaking with one voice, it depends very much on what you are thinking about that. If it's trying to have a sort of common stance that we can express all together, or we can express with different voices but moving in the same direction, this we can manage, more or less. It takes time, sometimes, but we can do it. If you're talking about one single representation, I agree with you that we're still very far away from that because Member States relish their own single representation in the UN or in different organisations. I am not even talking about the Security Council, of course, with two permanent members. Therefore, I personally think this will be one of the last hurdles that we will overcome.
because they are very eager, and this I can understand. We have to accept this reality that Member States still want to be seen and still want to be addressed as sovereign states on some of these issues.

The third question is a very interesting one, I think, because there is something we have totally forgotten, when talking now a lot about Libya and our military operation, but do you remember that before launching the military operation in 2011 in Libya, the two leaders of that intervention, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy thought that it was important to come to the European Council and ask for its endorsement. It was a very interesting session, very badly prepared and, therefore, it went all over the place, but, at the end of the day, we had a common line. Of course, everybody forgot about it in the next 48 hours with Germany abstaining, etc., but it was we won't go into a military intervention in Libya if we don't have UN Security Council. It's not for the EU to ask for it for the countries of the region and the Arab League, and they did so. And if there is an agreement and a positive vote in the UN Security Council then we're ready to go, and those who wish to go could go.

To have the two leaders from UK and France thinking that it was necessary to have the endorsement of the European Council before moving in that direction was quite interesting, I thought, and of course everything that happened afterwards made everybody forget about this European Council, but it was a very interesting move by these two. I think, if we had more of that in the future, that could be a very interesting way of moving ahead with our foreign policy.

**JAN TECHAU:** Thank you, Pierre. That was an upbeat note. Sylvie, just one final comment.

**SYLVIE KAUFFMANN:** Yes, just one thing that came to my mind, back to the question of PR and speaking with one voice, because you mentioned how Russia and the Americans speak with one voice. This is an area where we have a role to play now is propaganda war within this hybrid war. We have this very strong propaganda war being waged on European screens and we have to fight back. I think we can fight back in a very different way from the American strategy. I really think there is a European role to play here, and I know this task is being taken at a European level but we should put a lot of effort in it, I think. It's worth it.

**JAN TECHAU:** Thank you very much. I am very thankful for this final comment, not least because it wasn't about Greece and we really managed to talk for 90 minutes without mentioning Greece once. Brilliant. Thank you very much. Thanks for your insights. Another little break in this big strategy debate that we're trying to have here in this time about how to improve EU Foreign Policy is that always questions are bigger afterwards than they were before, and so I guess is the appetite, and also the thirst. This is where we're going to rearrange the building as always, and serve you food and drinks. Thank you very much for coming and for staying with us over lunch. Please stay on, have a discussion with us and come again next time when an invitation reaches you. Thanks a lot.