MR. PEI: Today we are very pleased to have Professor Suisheng Zhao from the University of Denver to give us a seminar on Chinese nationalism.

Professor Zhao is a good friend of mine and also one of the leading scholars on contemporary China. He is the author of three books, and the most recent one is called "A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism." It is probably the most comprehensive treatment of the subject of Chinese nationalism. It discusses its historical origins, various subtypes and implications for China's foreign policy.

Professor Zhao is also the founding editor of this wonderful journal called "Journal of Contemporary China." It was launched in the mid-90s and now is one of the three or four top journals in the China studies field. Professor Zhao is also an academic entrepreneur. He is the executive director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at the University of Denver, and he hosts all kinds of interesting activities and programs at his center.

After Professor Zhao's presentation of the major arguments of his book, Professor "Mike" Lampton of SAIS will comment on Professor Zhao's presentation. Mike, of course, needs no introduction. He's a good friend of Carnegie, and that says it all.

Before I yield the floor to Professor Zhao, I just want to say how important the issue of Chinese nationalism is today. I think if you read news stories about China, if you read analysis about Chinese foreign policy or domestic policy, one of the major themes that appear constantly is Chinese nationalism. The common perception out there is that
in the '90s, Chinese nationalism appears to have emerged as a major force driving domestic politics and influencing Chinese foreign policy.

And this phenomenon, of course, did not escape an astute observer such as Samuel Huntington. In his latest and very controversial book -- controversial for other reasons -- "Who Are We?" there is this paragraph that caught my attention when I was reading it. I think all of you will be equally interested in what he said about Chinese nationalism. "The real and potential enemies of the United States now are religiously driven militant Islam and entirely non-ideological Chinese nationalism." Professor Huntington has elevated Chinese nationalism to the status of a potential threat to the United States.

Although Professor Huntington is a good friend of mine, I think we probably need to take some issues with his view, and today we are taking the first step toward understanding what Chinese nationalism is, whether it is rising uncontrolled in China or whether the Chinese Communist Party is manipulating that, and whether, as Professor Huntington warned, that Chinese nationalism will become an enemy of the United States.

I think Professor Zhao will give us a lot of clues on those issues. So let's welcome Professor Zhao.

MR. ZHAO: (Applause.) Thank you, Dr. Pei, a very dear friend indeed.

MR. ZHAO: Indeed it is a great pleasure to come to Washington -- and from the sunshine West to the rainy town of D.C., it's a very big change -- and to have this opportunity to talk about my book, "A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism." I have some propaganda, and if you have not got it, we still have some left. And also, talking about my journal, I also want to take this opportunity to promote that journal. (Laughs.) As Minxin mentioned, it's one of the top journals. If you want to subscribe to that journal, you could go to our website, www.du.edu\gsis\China. So you can find that journal. If you subscribe, you can get free online versions of the journal.

In any case, this book, I started doing research in 1994. In fact, I went to China, tried to interview some members of new conservative movement, but I discovered reemergence of nationalism in China. So since then, I spent about eight years to do research and write the book. I tried to understand Chinese nationalism not in its current presence but also historically comprehensive, tried to understand what are the origins, what are contents and what are consequences of Chinese nationalism; to look at China, an ancient empire, how it has struggled to build a modern nation-state; and how has China tried to search, to seek its right place in the modern world. That's what the book tries to accomplish.

Because of the time limit, I will very briefly address a few issues I wrote in this book. I will start by looking briefly at the resurgence of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s at three levels -- the state, international discourse, and popular society.
At the state level, the Communist leadership launched a propaganda campaign of patriotic education to hold the country together after the Tiananmen, which China was in big trouble. The call of the patriotic education, they called it "guoqing jiaoyu," national situation education, or national essence education, depending how you translate that. It told the Chinese people that China's "guoqing" -- national situation -- is different, is not ready for West-style democracy, and the Communist Party has been instrumental for China's national unity and modernization.

The sanction of China by the Western powers at that time provided a good opportunity for the Communist state to position itself as the defender of China's national pride and national interests. Its national credentials were boosted in the fighting for China's entry into the WTO; the maintenance of the MFN or PNTR status in the U.S.; the Olympic Games in Beijing, which at that time it was the year 2000 games, they've got year 2008 games now; and stopping Taiwan independence movement.

At the intellectual level, the mainstream Chinese intellectual discourse experienced a drastic shift from enthusiastic worship of the West in the 1980s at that time to deep suspicion of the West. China's intellectuals became suspicious of the West in response to Western criticism of China after the end of Cold War.

This nationalist intellectual discourse made a strong response, in particular to three Western intellectual works on the post-Cold War world. One was Fukuyama's "The End of History"; the second was Huntington's first book, not this book, "The Clash of Civilizations"; and a third was "The Coming Conflict With China" by Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro.

While some Chinese liberal intellectuals welcomed Fukuyama's argument in terms of the victory of liberal democracy, they worried that the Western countries would come to confront a rising China based on geopolitical conflict as they took note of Huntington's argument that international politics in the post-Cold War world were not ideologically motivated but defined by different civilizations. In response, these intellectuals argued that nationalism would be indispensable and a rational choice to advance China's national interest.

At the popular level, nationalist sentiments were expressed by a series of "Say No" books by the members of the "Say No" club in the middle 1990s. These books include "The China That Can Say No", "Still Can Say No", "How Can China Say No?" The simple message in these "Say No" books was that some Western countries, particularly the United States, were plotting against China in a new cold war; China must stand up to those hostile foreign countries. At the popular level, it is interesting to note and to see that.

Some scholarly analysis on the geopolitical conflict between China and the U.S. also became popular. For example, Yan Xuetong, a scholar at Qinghua University, who was trained at Berkeley, wrote a book at that time called "The Analysis of China's National Interest," which was a scholarly book. They say that it was the first book in
China to analyze geopolitical conflicts from national interest perspective. That book gained what I think was really unbelievable popularity because it argued that China is facing a competitive international environment and must defend its economic, political and security interests. They say “Oh, wow, that’s very interesting.” That's very interesting. They're looking at, talking about China's threat or containment of China. A lot of copies of that book were sold.

Another book very interesting I noticed was a friend of mine, Professor Jia Qingguo. He had a PhD from Cornell. His PhD dissertation was on U.S.-China relations in the early years of the Cold War. He went back to Beijing in the 1980s when he got his Ph.D. He translated his dissertation into Chinese and tried to find a publisher. He talked to all kinds of publishers. Nobody wanted to publish that.

Now, suddenly in 1995 the publisher of the "China Can Say No" approached him, said "We'll publish this book," and then gave the book a very sensational title "China Does Not Only Say No." So join the "Say No" club. (Laughter.) And that book was published in November 1996. It couldn't -- when -- at that time, I went to Beijing. I went to his home. He handed me a copy of his book. He said, "This is one of the very last copies." All hundred thousand copies were sold within one month. However, all footnotes were deleted. He's a scholar, so he's not happy and seen that kind of sentiment among Chinese people.

The massive demonstration in the front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in May 1999 was a powerful expression of populist nationalism. Many outsiders were really astonished by the quick and automatic conviction of the Chinese people that the U.S. bombing was deliberate. So that shows.

The discussion of Chinese nationalism raises a question about its causes and contents. While some scholars insist that Chinese nationalism has come as a spontaneous response to the external humiliation and has a coherent content rooted deeply in a constant national identity, others attribute it to the promotion of the Chinese government.

My book argues that while national consciousness has a deep root in a shared history, the contents of nationalism are subject to the manipulation of self-interested political elites, kind of the rational choice approach.

I define nationalism as a set of ideas that centers people's loyalty upon the nation-state, either existing or desired. Nation-state is a unique form of modern political organization, different from traditional empires. Traditional empires were based upon a mixture of universal principles, such as Christianity in the Roman Empire, Islam in the Ottoman Empire and Confucianism in the Chinese Empire, and particularistic features, such as ethnic and language compositions. The rise of nationalism, modern nationalism, meant ascendancy of sentiments associated with particularistic feature of the universal principles. China was an empire, not a nation-state, before the 19th century. Chinese culture was seen as a universal set of values and the focus of people's loyalty. All those who accepted its teachings and principles, including alien empires and dynasties like the
Mongols and Manchus, could be incorporated into the Chinese culture. In this case, nationalism did not exist in China before the 19th century.

Nationalism was borrowed by seasoned Chinese political elites as an instrument for national regeneration only after China was defeated in the Opium War, which led to the collapse of the Chinese empire and brought China into the modern nation-state system in the late 19th century. Since then, these Chinese political elites have competed to offer nationalist doctrines and programs to save China.

These doctrines and programs have very different contents. My book discusses three types -- in terms of contents -- three types of nationalism that have competed in modern Chinese history. One is ethnic nationalism, which sees nation as a politicized ethnic group and often produces a state-seeking movement to create an ethnic nation-state. The second is liberal nationalism, which defines nation as composed of citizens with individual rights of political participation in national politics, but also the duty of defending national rights, individual rights versus national rights, in the world of nation-states. The third is a state nationalism which defines the nation as a territorial political unit. The state speaks in the name of the nation and demands citizens to subordinate their individual interests to those of the state.

Chinese nationalism started with -- started as an ethnic and state-seeking movement led by the Han majority to overthrow the minority Manchu Dynasty. Revolutionaries used ethnic slogans such as “driving out of the Tartars, restore China to mobilize Han Chinese all over the world” to support the anti-Manchu revolution.

After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, both the KMT and the CCP regimes have defined Chinese nation as a multi-ethnic political community. Ethnic nationalism remained active, alive, only among ethnic minorities in China's frontiers, such as Tibetans and the Mongols, which were denied their rights to establish separate states. Ethnic nationalism therefore posed a serious threat to the unity of the multi-ethnic Chinese state.

Liberal nationalism was introduced to China to generate -- regenerate the nation through political and social reforms in the early 20th century. Liberal nationalists identified with the Chinese state against foreign imperialism, and in the meantime pushed for recognition of individual rights against the authoritarian state. In this case, while the incumbent political elites have attempted to make use of liberal nationalism or liberal nationalists to confront foreign powers, they often find themselves in constant tension with the liberal nationalists on the domestic front.

State nationalism was strongly advocated by incumbent political elites of both the KMT and the CCP regimes as they tried to build a centralized authoritarian state in response to external threats to its sovereignty and internal challenges to its authority. A state nationalism promoted by the current CCP, current communist regime government, however, has been characterized by pragmatism. My book uses a term of pragmatic
nationalism to distinguish it from state nationalism in the early years of the PRC and also the KMT time.

The contents of pragmatic nationalism are also different from ethnic and liberal nationalism. Pragmatic communist leaders have set economic growth as the top priority of their nationalist program and rejected the demands of voluntary political participation by liberal nationalism on the ground that it would cause social chaos and delay economic development.

In terms of relationship with ethnic nationalism, pragmatic communist leaders have been firm in suppressing any ethnic separatist attempt. In the meantime, they have adopted an inducement policy including many preferential treatments to the ethnic minorities, known as China “confirmative” actions policy, to win the minds and the hearts of ethnic minorities.

Adopting a pragmatic attitude toward nationalism has a very important foreign policy implication. To a great extent, all Chinese nationalist leaders in the 20th century pursued a similar goal of national greatness, or, in the Chinese words, qiangguomeng, and a dream of a strong China. However, they were divided on how to build a strong China and developed three different nationalist perspectives: nativism, antitraditionalism and pragmatism. Each perspective is rooted in a different assessment of the sources of national weakness and advocates a distinctive approach to revitalize China.

Nativism sees foreign imperialist invasion and the subversion of indigenous Chinese virtues as the root of China's weakness and calls for return to Chinese tradition and self-reliance. Antitraditionalism sees China's tradition as the source of its weakness, calling for the adoption of foreign culture and models. Pragmatic nationalism sees the lack of modernization as the source of China's weakness, and would adopt whatever approach that can make China strong. Just like Deng Xiaoping said, "It doesn't matter if it is a black or white cat, as long as it can catch rats" -- that approach.

The three perspectives of Chinese nationalism are often related to different international orientations. Nativism often related to confrontational anti-foreignism. The most extreme examples are the strong xenophobia of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Antitraditionalism is to accommodate to a progressive or modern world. One example is China's early efforts to adopt the Soviet model and accommodate to the Soviet-led communist world. Another example is liberal antitraditionalists' call in the 1980s to adopt Western models, accommodate to the Western world. Pragmatic nationalism is adapt, not accommodate; it's adapt to the changing world, but has nothing or very little to do with any ideology, either Marxism or liberalism. It's a national interest-driven program.

This discussion now will help us to address the last question I'm going to talk about, and that is -- in fact Huntington addressed the question -- whether or not an aggressive nationalism would emerge from China's century of humiliation after its rise to the status of a modernized power.
Some scholars have been cautious in exploring the limits of Chinese nationalism. In fact, the first issue of my journal next year is a special issue on the limits of Chinese nationalism. We have about eight articles on that issue.

Some others, including Huntington, believe that Chinese nationalism has or will become a source of international aggression. Indeed, Chinese foreign policy swung between the two extremes of confrontation and accommodation, driven by either nativist nationalism or anti-traditionalist nationalism in the early years of the PRC. After Deng Xiaoping launched market-oriented economic reform, however, pragmatic nationalism, or pragmatism, has been established as the dominant thinking of the Chinese leaders and Chinese people.

Pragmatic nationalism is assertive in defending China's national security and uncompromising with foreign demands involving China's vital interests, such as the preservation of national sovereignty and the reunification of China, but it's not linked to anti-foreignism. It is largely reactive to specific issues and perceived threats that have little to do with abstract ideas, religious doctrines or ideologies targeted at certain foreign countries.

Instrumentality is the most important feature of pragmatic nationalism. From instrumental perspective, it is not hard for the Chinese leaders -- for pragmatic leaders--to realize that nationalism is a double-edged sword. While the communist government may use nationalism to compensate the declining communist ideology, it may also cause serious backlash and place the government on a hot spot, facing challenges from both domestic and international sources.

Domestically, nationalism is both a means for legitimizing the communist role and a means for the Chinese people to judge the performance of the communist state. If Chinese leaders cannot deliver on their nationalist promise, they would become vulnerable to nationalist criticism. As a matter of fact, the rising nationalism has run into a criticism of China's foreign policy: its seemingly too soft stance toward the U.S. and Japan, which, in the views of pragmatic nationalists, hold the key to the future of China's modernization.

Another domestic challenge is the possibility that ethnic nationalists or ethnic separatists take over nationalist appeals to challenge the very basis of the multinational state. That Chinese nationalism has appealed largely to the Han history and nation could be offensive to ethnic nationalism. In my book, in fact, I discuss a case, talking about how the Chinese intellectuals, Chinese official -- I mean publications to a debate on how to treat so-called national heroes -- Yue Fei, Wen Tianxiang. These are Han national heroes, not all-nationalities hero. A lot have tried to reshuffle on those issues.

Internationally, the rise of Chinese nationalism has coincided with the negative view of nationalism in the modern world. In this context, the new tide of Chinese nationalism has caused anxiety in Asia and the rest of the world in the 1990s. Balancing the positive and negative sides, pragmatic leaders have been very ambivalent toward the
promotion of nationalism and cautious to prevent the nationalist sentiments of Chinese people from getting out of hand. As a result, Chinese nationalism is more defensive than offensive or aggressive.

The Chinese leaders have been cautiously cultivating nationalism against so-called “Westernization of China by Western countries.” However, strong nationalist rhetoric has often followed by prudential policy actions in foreign affairs. My book has quite a few case studies on this kind of national rhetoric versus prudential foreign policy.

So I will stop here, and thank you. (Applause.)

MR. LAMPTON: I'd like to thank Minxin and Carnegie for putting together the opportunity to speak about such a splendid book and to have this opportunity to talk about a major issue with practical implications—nationalism.

I liked Suisheng's book very much, and enjoyed reading it in terms of the writing quality and the history and conceptualization embodied in it. Also, Professor Zhao provides a clear framework. Nationalism is an important subject for a number of reasons and Zhao’s treatment has a number of merits.

First of all, he provides us a basis to think about Chinese nationalism that isn't simplistic. He’s saying that there are several types of nationalism with several manifestations. I'll come back to that. Which one of these forms of nationalism China adopts is an important issue for the world; it raises the further question of how the rest of the world can move China in one direction or another if, indeed, we have much influence at all. So Professor Zhao is dealing with an important subject and he gives us a typology that's useful in thinking about the variations in Chinese history and variations in thinking in China.

The second thing I like about the book is that it leads us to ask important questions. I always like something that leads you to ask, “Okay, well, if this is true, what are the questions that derive from it?” Suisheng leads us to some very good and important questions.

And finally, as Suisheng just said, the book has some interesting case studies. There are important case studies of the 1995-96 Taiwan missile imbroglio, the EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident, and the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade.

On many levels, therefore, this is an important and interesting book. If a lot of the people who speak simplistically about nationalism read this book they would be a lot more careful in their discourse.

Nationalism is important – it has practical importance. First of all, it bears on the whole question of the legitimacy of the Chinese government and regime. And as Suisheng said, both here and in his book, there is a double-edged quality to nationalism’s
conferral of legitimacy. On the one hand, if you're seen as the agent of achieving nationalistic objectives, whichever type of nationalism we're talking about, this confers legitimacy. On the other hand, it also provides a standard by which one can judge the government, and frequently the Chinese government has been found wanting by the Chinese people, by the standard of nationalism that's prevailing at any particular moment. So, nationalism is intimately related to the right to rule of the Chinese elite at any given moment.

I think the other thing -- of more concern, I suppose, to Americans or Westerners -- is that nationalism shapes China's posture to the world. I just finished an interesting book by a psychologist named Thigpen. It is called *The Three Faces of Eve*, and it was popular about four decades ago. Like Thigpen’s clinical subject, Eve White, China's nationalism really has three very distinct faces, and each of those faces has an implication for China's foreign policy. To put it bluntly, we would prefer some faces much more than others.

This brings us to Professor Zhao’s typology. I'll simplify Suisheng's complex and sophisticated argument. It seems to me that he has a three-fold by three-fold table, a matrix. On the horizontal axis are goals; what goals are served by various forms of Chinese nationalism?

One category of goal is liberal/participatory values. Maybe we think of Zhao Ziyang as a nationalism that embodied this set of goals. Then there's the second set of goals concerning ethnic identity. State-building and nation-building is a third set.

Then another axis by which to differentiate forms of nationalism concerns its expressions. Each of these goals of nationalism has different expressions. Those expressions are anti-traditional, often associated with the liberal participatory goal, perhaps. Ethnic identity can assume a nativist/xenophobic expression. And, state building has a more pragmatic expression, at least recently. Put another way, each of these nationalisms has a face that it presents to the world. I would say the participatory/liberal one has an accommodative face to the rest of the world. The ethnic identity/nativist/xenophobic one is more in a confrontational mode. And state building is pragmatic and adaptive in terms of its face to the contemporary world.

Zhao’s central argument is that different elites at different times have found one or another form of nationalism, with different expressions, to serve their interests. This framework provides a very nice way to go through reams of Chinese history, putting different periods into different conceptual cells.

To perhaps oversimplify, over time there have been different kinds of nationalism that have been very important both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. If I were to put recent history into the vocabulary of this book, the Cultural Revolution was about participation and ethnic identity/xenophobia. It was anti-traditional, it was nativist, and above all, it was confrontational to the world and in domestic class terms. If you contrast that form of nationalism with what I would call the current nationalism, the emphasis
now is on state building, pragmatism, adaptation, and accommodation. I don't think it takes a genius to understand which form we would prefer.

This typology then leads to the second thing I liked about the book; it leads you to ask important questions. What are the questions that seem to derive from this?

The first set of questions is, “What are the internal and external factors or conditions in China that foster a more benign expression or form of nationalism than others?” And one of the things implicit in Zhao’s theory is that political leadership is important. I very much subscribe to that view. Leadership doesn’t explain everything, but leadership accounts for a lot, and which kind of nationalism it promotes is important.

A second big set of questions is, if we prefer the current expression of Chinese nationalism, is this mix going to persist? I wish I could say, “Yes,” and that I was certain. I'm certainly hopeful it's going to persist. But will it persist? I don't think anybody can be sure.

I'd like to conclude roughly where Professor Zhao did on page 289 of his book. You say, Suisheng, that the century of shame and humiliation is at the heart of the CCP's legitimacy.

I would ask the following: “Is the self-pitying victim drive in Chinese nationalism changing?” I'm beginning to think maybe it is. After all, the hundred years of shame and humiliation for China was only 100-plus years, out of China's long history. There is much in Chinese history that has nothing to do with shame and humiliation. What I see is the glimpse of maybe a more ennobling kind of self-image emerging, one in which China is talking more about future benefits and future visions of a more cooperative world rather than making up for historical wrongs. In other words, are we moving more toward thinking about the future, and less past wrongs, as a referent for future Chinese national goals and foreign policy?

In this respect, I would end by observing Premier Wen Jiabao's recent visit to Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Plus Three agreement on a free-trade area. This was really a startling vision of a different Asia. This wasn't the China whining about unequal treaties; this is the one talking about reforming the economic system of Asia and raising the question of America’s future role in the region.

So my question, just to kick off the discussion –“Is the century of shame and humiliation today as important as we all learned from Mary Wright, John Fairbank, and other historians?”

MR. PEI: Let Suisheng deal with this central issue first; then we open up.

MR. ZHAO: I think that's a very interesting question and a very important question. In fact, in my book also I discuss the so-called contents -- that's the contents of
nationalism -- the victim symposium mentality was a very important part of content of the Chinese nationalism.

But the contents of Chinese nationalism have been very situational or contextual. It's never eternal. That's the whole argument of my book. It's changing. It's evolving.

So those kinds of victim types of contents were the most important part of the nativist nationalism. They see the foreign invasion and foreign humiliation -- humiliation at the hands of foreign powers as the starting part of Chinese nationalism.

But in the current years -- I mean current Chinese government propaganda and also even in the actual discourse, those types of contents have become a smaller and smaller part of the contents, when pragmatic nationalism is rising. The -- China's right place in the world -- how to make China an equal power with other nations, how to pursue China's national interests in the equal -- as an equal power in relationship with other nations, has become a very important part of the contents of nationalism.

So the contents of nationalism are evolving, is not eternal, from that -- I just answer from that perspective.

MR. PEI: Excellent.

Q I'm Tom Palley (sp) with the U.S.-China Commission. Thank you. Very interesting talk and I am looking forward to reading the books.

It struck me that there's a sort of another taxonomy or divide that might be made, introduced here, which is a sort of notion -- and I have two questions. The first -- this divide is in terms of nationalism as means and as end. I mean, I think that seems to be something that I hear back and forth in the sort of discussion that you're talking about, which then in turn links a little bit to -- perhaps there's sort of two types of conversation about nationalism. One is an elite conversation, and another is the popular conversation. And here you can very much sort of have the elite, the government here, talking of nationalism as this end, hoping to guide the polity in a particular direction, but the conversation then feeds into the popular discourse when nationalism becomes a means to the people, as sort of something fulfilling to them. And I wonder if that's sort of -- if that has any sort of relevance or -- I was thinking about sort of the evolution and developments of Chinese nationalism.

The second point I wanted to raise is the sort -- David talked about how sort of your ideas spark questions. And I couldn't help sort of think here that nationalism is in part a reflective sort of idea. It's not just what's going on here but what's going on outside your country as well. That's very forming if you're -- so it doesn't take place in isolation. And that, then, got me thinking, well, we have two very distinguished Chinese-Americans on the panel in front here. Could you talk about what you might think -- how does this taxonomy apply to American nationalism? Are we today pragmatic? Are we
Are we xenophobic? It seems this is a very important -- this is going to be very important in terms of sort of framing Chinese nationalism down the road.

And I think that sort of leads to the notion that maybe there are -- we need to distinguish nationalisms here of superpowers and other countries. It strikes me that the role of nationalism in Britain or France or smaller countries yet is different from the nationalism that might be in play sort of in American nationalism or an evolving Chinese nationalism.

MR. PEI: Thanks.

Q I'd like to follow up on that. Banning Garrett from the Atlantic Council. And I thought it was really, really useful presentations by both sides, and they sparked questions, as Mike said.

And one of the questions is about the global context. And I mean more the strategic context, not just the question of whether you're a victim or not, but an evolving globalized world seems to be a very different context than the context in which, over the last two centuries of the evolution of Chinese nationalism or, shall we say, the buffeting around among the three different types of nationalism -- so how is that world going to shape what this looks like? Because neither of you really -- Mike was hopeful; you kind of left off as to what this will be like in 20, 30, 40 years with -- again, more hopeful in terms of the direction. I would suggest that the nature of the kind of strategically interdependent world we're entering into would put a high premium on a more pragmatic and liberal kind of nationalism and encourage it in that direction just simply to further the interests of the kind of elite that is developing in China.

But the second question, and this relates to what Tom was saying, talking about superpowers or larger powers versus small powers. China is a country that's had a couple bad centuries and sort of coming back and still is evolving in this mentality, but now finds itself in a position where it's a huge influence on the world -- I would argue China's probably the second-most important country in the world -- and now is starting to see it has a great stake in and a responsibility for the international system, and we'll just leave that as a general statement of what the international system is. But what I'm wondering is, can -- will we see another step towards what I would call internationalism?

And I think one of the trends, going back to Tom's question about the United States, which I think has been rather suppressed in the last several years, but going back to John Kennedy, was a notion of internationalism; Americans as world citizens, responsible for the whole world, not just themselves; of values that apply to everybody and should be applied to themselves; pursuing not just national interest, but international interest. I don't see that mentality at all so far in China, and that probably worries some people; as China becomes more of an actor on the international stage, there won't be a kind of mentality that is maybe from -- we have it partially from a universalistic ideology, perhaps, but a sense of being global citizens and a global responsibility beyond just making China strong and prosperous nation, but worrying about the whole world. And
part of that's an individual level of perception, too, and we have a Peace Corps and these kinds of institutions that help foster that through people's experience. But is there another stage beyond? Maybe that's too idealistic, but I'd like to let you think it out a little further.

MR. PEI: Okay. Suisheng, it's yours.

MR. ZHAO: Very good questions.

In terms of the means and the end, I think that's a very interesting question. Also the book's argument argues that -- approach argues that the whole approach Chinese so-called nationalists or Chinese elites' nationalism is instrumental approach. That means they use -- they borrowed the Western concept of nationalism. We're talking American nationalism. In fact, that was from Europe. Chinese elites borrowed from Europe. Why? Because they thought this was an instrument for China to defend itself, is sovereignty. The sovereignty concept was not in China before the 19th century at all. They saw, well, you do worse, so-called culturalism in the Chinese world.

So it was not about the concept of sovereignty. Now this thought, wow, sovereignty; you can make decisions for ourselves. We are the sovereign. So they borrowed this term just for the -- as a means to use the means to defend China's so-called national interests.

When these kinds of instruments were borrowed, when they borrowed the concept of nationalism, national sovereignty and all those kind of concepts, that tend to penetrate itself into thinking of -- becomes some kind of end, especially in the modern world. Even though the world -- I mean, China becomes more interdependent, becoming more globalized. We still hold that kind of concept we borrowed in the 19th century, those kind of sovereignty issue, and those kinds of nationalism as an end. So it is a mean that evolves; to a certain extent it becomes an end.

And in terms of the relationship between elites and popular society, I will say for many, many years, nationalism was an elite phenomenon in China for sure. It started from the early 20th century. It was very elitist. Even the communist movement, when they tried to borrow nationalism and also nationalist movement, were also an urban and elite movement. Only when the Japanese invasion into China, that created a condition to turn the so-called elite nationalism into a popular nationalism. That's what also one chapter in my book discussed. And also, I mean, there are some very classical studies studying kind of popular, peasant nationalism.

And during the Civil War, then, this kind of popularization of nationalism continued. During the PRC years, to a certain extent that kind of nationalist sentiment again is limited to the small elites, because mostly these kinds of ideas came into the liberal side of nationalism. The state, the communism overshadowed nationalism. Communism became a popular movement, and nationalism to a certain extent in that way was overshadowed and only among small elites. And only after the end of Cold War it's
promoted by the elites again into a popular movement, but it was very limited. After September 11, now the nationalism sentiment has been not that kind of popular movement.

Another issue is in terms of globalization. I think that's a very, very interesting issue. In fact, in one section in one of my chapters, I discuss intellectual debate on the globalization issue. I collected a lot of these kinds of writings in China from Chinese publications, how they see the relationship between nationalism and globalization, which was very interesting. Some scholars and also government publications, they said Western countries use globalization to promote their self national interest, so China should not join those kind of globalization process, China should defend its national interests against the national interests in the name of globalization by Western powers.

But some other scholars, especially liberal intellectuals, they argued just the opposite. I quoted Li Shenzhi. He died some years ago. He at that point made a lot of arguments about the positive side of globalization for China's national interest, how China should join the trend of globalization. He also -- and not only him, some other intellectuals also -- talked about even Huntington's argument was misread by those nativists and nationalists in terms of the conflicts of civilizations and also in terms of China's threat to the Western powers. They argued that the conflict of civilizations argument in fact was not to see China -- I mean, not China as enemy, but to try to look at the world in terms of different civilizations and how to live with this kind of diversity of civilizations and try to understand from that perspective. So the globalization has been read differently by Chinese nationalist discourses.

MR. LAMPTON: Just the one. How does the U.S. fit into the typology, I thought was interesting. I haven't got a satisfactory answer, but it seems to me that if we look at his categories being liberal participatories, ethnic and state-building -- that's sort of the three -- it seems to me the ethnic is the least applicable in terms of xenophobia, but maybe we substitute sort of the values-driven, manifest destiny kind of notion there.

And then, I think in a sense you maybe can come to the conclusion that the United States sort of has hypernationalism of a sort. That is, we have dimensions of all. Some are emphasized more at other times. But I see strains of all three of these co-existing at the current time. You can argue about what the balance is and so forth.

But to get to the basic point, you know, I think we are very nationalistic.

Q My point is I think that every nationalism probably has all of the three strains. It's the question of which dominates at any moment in time that gives the flavor of the period, and that's what I was sort of wondering, if one could discern that at all.

MR. PEI: I have written an article precisely on this subject, the paradoxes of American nationalism. It was published in Foreign Affairs. Basically, American nationalism is very unique. It is politically driven. It is forward-looking. And it is based on a history of triumphalism, not a history of humiliation. Very different from -- as a
result, American nationalism is very insensitive to other types of nationalism. And there you have a situation of conflict. That's why when you place American nationalism or American nationalists alongside Chinese nationalists, or, today, Arab nationalists, you can have a very vicious joke.

Okay, Burt.

Q Yeah, Bert Keidel, Carnegie Endowment. I was going to posit that China has all three, as does the U.S., and we see it now in the U.S. in terms of the fact that terrorists don't like our values. We have to say that they're against us. But China's xenophobia certainly is alive. I wouldn't call it xenophobia, it's a reaction to humiliation, with the Taiwan issue.

And my question is related to all of this. To what degree does the posture of the United States toward China influence the evolution of China's nationalism as it's composed of this mix? And this has to do, of course, not only with Taiwan, but, for example, China's access to energy in the Middle East, which is now really dominated and controlled by the West--that oil; those regimes are essentially friendly to us, perhaps with the exception of Iran and Syria. But there are other issues, too. Will China be allowed to play according to global rules, is one issue. And what is our sense about China's capabilities if it wants a blue water navy, for example? How are we going to react to that?

So I would just question, what are our choices in influencing the evolution of Chinese nationalism?

MR. PEI: We'll take one more.

Q Julie Walton, the U.S.-China Business Council. I was wondering if you could comment on the role of this emerging, rather small, but still growing new elite class that isn't connected with the CCP but is fundamentally the rising business class in China, the emerging rich Chinese who generally do not really have a stake in the CCP, the political aspect of the Chinese system, although certainly they want stability for business purposes.

One thing that seems to be of interest here is that at some level, perhaps at some point in time there's going to be a conflict of interest between the rising, emerging middle class and how they want to maintain open trade and investment, with this pragmatic decision-makers within the government at the highest levels, that sure they, on some level, subscribe to open trade and investment, but when it comes down to specific areas, whether it's agriculture production or protection and strategic oil reserves, or protection of the telecommunications sector, what have you, the government is not willing to allow foreigners in because of very nationalist, very well-stated nationalist interests in protecting their industries for historical reasons.
And so I'm just curious your perspective on perhaps an area of conflict within China as new elites who are not connected with the system come into power and perhaps have different interests.

MR. PEI: One more.

Q Okay. This is on slightly a different topic. But thank you very much for your presentation. My name is Carl Minzner. I'm with the Congressional Executive Commission on China.

One of the interesting questions about Chinese nationalism is that -- or one of the interesting questions is it forces you to answer the question of exactly who are we, or who are we as Chinese. And certainly if you -- like -- as Professor Zhao mentioned, if you went back 300 years and you asked this question, it would have been much more of a cultural identification that was much broader than the boundaries of current China itself.

Now, in everything I read, I mean, the assumption seems to be that at the end of the 19th century, all of that was discarded in favor of the European nationalisms that were imported. The model short of shifted to be what you find elsewhere in the world.

And my question -- and I judge from what you mentioned that maybe your book has somewhat of a similar conclusion. And I just want to ask the question, to what extent is that necessarily true? Is there anything in modern nationalism that you find today in China that perhaps replicates some of the trends that you found 300 or 400 years ago of a broader cultural identification? In particular, one sort of more specific question would be, do you find anything in the modern nationalist movement that makes reference to Vietnam or Korea or Japan as having some sort of special relationship with China?

MR. ZHAO: In terms of American influence on the rise of Chinese nationalism, that is a very, very important factor for the rise of Chinese nationalism. In fact, that's what some argument -- in fact, in my book, argument that Chinese nationalism to an extent is reactive nationalism in terms of reaction to the external stimulation, the -- especially in the last decade of the end of the Cold War, the so-called containment of China, all those type of external stimulant factors have become very important for the Chinese response to the -- I mean, as a response -- nationalism as one response to those kind of external pressure.

And also, reading the discourse, when I did my research, I connected a lot of Chinese writings of nationalism. I found a lot of them they learned from American nationalism. They found American -- as we discussed earlier, American -- the U.S. is the most nationalistic country, to a great extent. So they gave examples. A lot of returned Chinese students, when they went back from the United States, they wrote a lot of things about -- they learned in the U.S.: the 4th of July, how nationalistic Americans are; the Pledge of Allegiance -- how nationalistic Americans are. Even read Chinese law. They have the national anthem law, the rising flag law -- all those they learned from the United
States. They did not have that. I mean, even the national flag rising ceremony in Tiananmen Square -- I did not remember that when I was young. (Chuckles.)

MR. LAMPTON: Well, I was thinking -- you asked the question, how can the U.S. influence which face is expressed in this? And I was thinking on several fronts.

One is, I would think, a United States that's more consultative and starts its discussion with China admitting that there are legitimate interests that we have to reconcile, as in our own domestic discourse. In other words, China has legitimate national interests we need to respect, as we expect them to -- and have it on an interest-based consultation. That will be, I think, the first thing.

Secondly, I think we have to avoid activities that are construed -- and may correctly or incorrectly be construed this way -- as attempts to keep China weak. I mean, I think we have to sort of presume that the Chinese have a right to become richer, stronger. And the issue isn't strength; it's how strength is used. And that's where we have our interest and our concern.

So for instance, if the U.S., for instance, were to be arguing to the Russians, "Gee, we'd really rather have you put the pipeline towards Japan than China," I think that's not a real terrific policy if you're trying to have a more benign face to nationalism. Now we'll adopt our policies for lots of reasons, but I think that kind of thing.

And then to try to develop a multilateral regulatory -- start from the idea that we're all in an interdependent world and we have to divide regulatory mechanisms that operate in all of our interests, and involve China, as Japan and others in that. I think that's the kind of mind set and orientation that I think will -- and I don't think, incidentally, we control what face of Chinese nationalism is going to come around. But where we operate at the margins I think -- if we operate that way, we'll be better off than some other way.

Does that?

Q I am a visiting scholar in U.S. My question is what kind of role can religion play in the nation-building, especially during such a transition period -- what kind of role religion can play, especially in the social restructuring, social rebuilding?

Q My name is Larry Ferguson from Project Asia at the Center for Naval Analyses. I want to thank you, Professor Zhao, for your presentation.

My question was about specific events. And you mentioned a few case studies -- specifically, let's start with the incident in May of '99. It seems to me that it would be logical to assume that each event as it occurs informs what we call the current flavor of nationalism. I remember very vividly how the flavor of nationalism changed in May of '99 as it was very, very effectively managed. I mean, there were -- you know, imposing hindsight back on it, you could look at specific time periods, how statements were made, logistical transport was provided. It was very carefully managed; very effectively.
Looking back recently on what happened at the Asia Cup this year, I'd like to ask you to comment specifically on what I think we can all agree was a very unfortunate incident. Where does it fit in your rubric, and does that change as it's managed as an incident?

MR. ZHAO: Okay. In terms of the role of religion in Chinese nationalism, in my study I did not find strong evidence that religion has played a very important role in the formation of Chinese nationalism, which is very different from European case -- civil society and a certain kind of -- to a certain extent religion played a role. In China the concept of nationalism was borrowed from Europe for the -- as a response to domestic reform -- to the demand of domestic reform and regeneration of China in the new nation-state system. So religion, I don't see that important role there.

In terms of the kind of flavor of nationalism, there are different levels we can see at the state level and at the popular level. At the state level, I think the state has been -- had learned it nationalism from the 1999 embassy bombing event. In fact, that's what's discussed in the book. The state at first was as angry as the popular society. In fact, to a certain extent, the state responded stronger; in the state they have the coverage of news media, everything. Then the students went to the U.S. embassy to protest, they quickly found that would damage China's national interests in terms of foreign investment withdrawal from China, the Shanghai Stock Market fell down right away 10 points -- I mean, how many points? -- 10 percent in a week. So the Chinese government warned that they cannot congregate. So Hu Jintao at that time, who was the vice president, came out that enough is enough, go back to campus; don't continue the demonstration. So the government, from that perspective, was very cautious, ambivalent to the popular sentiment of nationalism. They cultivated that, then they found they cannot let it go out of hand.

Then in the -- not spy -- I mean reconnaissance flight event, they learned from that, from very beginning to try to control the expression of nationalism. And they played the game of the apology diplomacy; I mean at elite level. The popular society did not have a lot of influence. It wanted to make sure that Chinese foreign policy is not made on the street, it's made in Zhong Nan Hai for sure. So that was very, very clear since then.

And the current Asian Cup event -- I think the incident went out of hand. And I don't think that event tells a lot about the power of nationalism at the popular level. There is a sentiment there; it's not -- mostly the classic sense of nationalism, it's just a competition between China and Japan. We think Japan -- I mean, there is a mentality in the Chinese nationalism especially that the Japanese learned from China's culture; Japan was a small country, its neighbor. Now it becomes a competitor of China for many years. Now China should not let that happen. So that kind of mentality. But the government, on the state side, I think from the very beginning, even on this event the government was very clear. I think after the so-called riots or whatever you can call that, the government
tried to make laws now to regulate those kinds of sports events. So at the state level, I think the nationalist sentiment has not guided their policy for sure. That's my --

MR. LAMPTON: I just wanted to say, because I have a somewhat different view than Suisheng on that.

First of all, all typologies don't explain everything that happens. And I see this whole thing with Japan to be in almost a league of its own, a very important league of its own, and worrisome. But I think I see more evidences of the problematic nature of what I'd call Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism just as a subset of what we're talking about because the cup wasn't the only thing, although it may have been the most shocking, but it's not the only thing.

There's also, just most recently, when Jiabao declined to accept the invitation that Koizumi extended and make it public that he, in effect, had done that, rather than just sort of saying, well, I'll check my calendar when I get back. He says, no, I'll do it when the environment's right. You know? And so this to me says there's -- to put it bluntly -- a market in China for not being too compliant to the Japanese.

So I think there's a broader phenomenon. And if you ask -- and I don't mean to say it's all China's fault. But the long and the short of it, there's not going to be a single problem solved in Asia if China, the United States and Japan don't cooperate -- I mean any major problem. And so I think almost the most problematic relationship I see in Asia, if the Americans could ever get the Taiwan thing solved, would be the Japanese-Chinese relationship. I wish I thought it was this contained.

MR. ZHAO: I agree from that feeling. The China-Japan relationship is a very unique relationship, so the nationalist sentiments from that perspective have played a role in this relationship.

And also, I go back to what I said earlier because I would say now more and more the popular level of nationalism, public opinion has influence upon the policymaking process. This is one case I think the public opinion or popular nationalism has influence on the policymaking process. They at least have to take that into consideration.

Q My question was more of looking at ethnic, you know, nationalism. And certainly, you know, I don't think anyone could disagree that prior, you know, to the modern era, ethnic nationalism was definitely an internal thing.

But in terms of looking at Korea, especially, Japan, perhaps Vietnam, I mean, I would have to -- I mean it seems to me that there is some ethnic component there; that these societies are all seen somehow -- you know, whether it's writing or culturally -- there are very specific elements that the Chinese feel, very correctly, that they are borrowed or appropriated or stolen, perhaps, you know, from China. And I was just wondering if you were thinking about -- you know, could your methodology expand to include those nations in terms of ethnic nationalism.
MR. PEI: One more question, then we close. Bert, do you have another one?

Q: Thanks. I wanted to ask a question about the Chinese ideology behind their current democracy, which has the party controlling all the levers of democracy, as a world-preferred alternative to one in which accumulated wealth manipulates the instruments of democracy. And, you know, you look at all these dead, white, male faces in the Tiananmen Square for so long, they really felt they had a scientific system, but it also was a sort of a means for keeping foreign wealth and the power of foreign wealth at bay in terms of its control over their own resources.

And so what role do you give to the current morphing of the communist ideology into the "three represents" and the really closed-rank nature of continued policy in the party about its position in society and its role in what is, you know, very nominally a democratic system because they hold elections, but it's really managed by a non-democratic power. How do you see that interface? Are they just going to lie down and roll over and eventually let domestic wealth run their democracy and lead to liberalization, or is this a longer-term confrontation?

MR. ZHAO: The last question on how this relates to nationalism. Talking about democracy, from the nationalist perspective the liberal participation view has become more and more powerful, and the state version of nationalism has tried to make a response to that. The response is that democracy or voluntary participation is the ultimate goal, but for this moment, China's immediate goal is to develop economy, to make modernization, a modernized power. So the chaos which could bring through elections all those kind of democracy would not help for this type of nationalist goal, so we should postpone democratization of liberal participating until we have achieved those kinds of economic goals. That's what their answer is, and I will say it that way.

MR. PEI: Before I close, I just want to pose two questions which you will not have time to answer, but I think they are very important theoretical and conceptual issues.

The first question is can nationalism be liberal? Because in your category there is this thing called liberal nationalism. I think it's a contradiction in terms. It's almost an oxymoron. Nationalism by definition is very ethnocentric. It's closed; it's not an open system. You've got to be joined by having certain descriptive features, identities, fixed identities. Liberalism, on the other hand, is a very open-ended system. So this is one.

The second one regard is -- the second one is regarding China's -- the possibility of China's developing liberal nationalism. Can -- even if we assume there's such a beast called liberal nationalism, can a non-democratic country have liberal nationalism?

Okay. (Laughter.) But I want to thank all of you -- (laughs) -- for all coming.

MR. ZHAO: One minute or two, quickly. It's a very interesting question, very fundamental question because in the liberal nationalism chapter, I did a very, I think, thorough literature review on the liberalism versus nationalism. In fact, liberalism stops
on a national border. Liberalism is not universal. That's the -- a lot of, I mean, scholars, I mean, just in talking eventually came up. Liberalism in the domestic arena they demand for political participation, but their own self did not allow others to have those kinds of rights. So in the international arena, nationalism in that case comes to live together with liberalism. So liberalism and nationalism could live together in that case. I mean, there's a lot of literature review on that. I will not --

MR. PEI: I think we used to do that before 2001 in this country. (Chuckles, laughter.)

Okay. Well, thank you so much for being here today. (Applause.)

[END OF EVENT.]