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TWO TRIADS: INDIA-PAKISTAN-CHINA & CHINA-U.S.-RUSSIA

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DALTON: If everyone can find a seat, we'd like to go on here. So welcome to this panel, which we've titled "Two Triads: India, Pakistan, China and China, U.S., Russia." You'll find the program description on page 33 in your program. And we've done a graphic for it and so I encourage you to check it out because, you know, this was a technological marvel to be able to print graphics in this program, I assure you.

[00:04:00]

So we've tried to frame this panel as an alternative to the traditional way of thinking about nuclear dynamics in terms of dyads to open this up and to look at the system as a whole in terms of these two triads, and obviously the most recognizable triad is the U.S.-Russia-China triad, and we'll have some discussion about that.

We also wanted to capture this effect that, you know, any activity or change in the dynamic in any one of these legs may have cascading effects that come all the way down and, you know, have some impact at the bottom of these two triangles. China is obviously the common element in both of these. And in the discussion, hopefully we'll get into some of these dynamics. We've suggested some causality in our graphic with some pointy arrows.

I would challenge the panelists to take that up and see whether we've gotten it right. But I think there's also a lot of implications that we'll hopefully get into as well for stability between the various legs and the system as a whole, for the nonproliferation regime and so forth.

We have a late addition to the panel with Professor Rifaat Hussain, who did due to some nifty flying from Qatar Air, did not make it yesterday but we're happy to have him here today. So he'll at the end join our experts in offering some commentary. We'll start with Sergey Rogov, follow with Professor Hua Han and have Ashley and then Rifaat. So thank you.

[00:05:45]

ROGOV: Thank you. It's a pleasure for me to be here this morning, although I had to come first. I hate to speak in the morning. But at least it's not 8:00 a.m., as some other panels are doing. I am supposed to speak about the big triangle – Russia, the United States and China. And I think there is a fundamental difference in the Russian-American nuclear relationship and the American-Chinese and Russian-Chinese relationship.

And the essence of this difference is that Russia and the United States have been for almost half a century locked into mutually assured destruction model. And while the Cold War is over, Russia is no more superpower. But in the nuclear field, we still – we still operate within this model.

Nothing of the kind exists between Russia and China or the United States and China, although Larry Summers once said that there is mutually assured destruction between America and China but that's in the economic field and we are not supposed to discuss it today.

[00:07:04]

So let me briefly remind you of what are the main features of the mutually assured destruction between Russia and the United States. First of all, let me start with the preoccupation with numerical parity and to look at China, China is not concerned about that. Secondly, Russia and the United States possess counterforce capability.

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All our nuclear weapons are capable of attacking hardened targets and thus we can practice the counterforce targeting.

China doesn't possess counterforce capabilities so it has to speak to the countervalue question. The counterforce capability allows Russia and the United States to technically plan disarming and decapitating strikes. China cannot do those against Russia or the United States. Because of this capability, Russia and the United States have been preoccupied with the notion of the surprise nuclear attack, a bolt from the blue.

And that's why we stick – we rely on tactical early warning, watching each other, expecting as if, well, America or Russia at any given moment can launch their missiles. China is not doing that. Tactical early warning means that we develop very elaborate space-based and ground-based systems of early warning. The stable relationship between Russia and the United States very much depends on the existence of those radars and satellites. China doesn't possess such capabilities.

And finally, Russia and the United States – or the Soviet Union and the United States – 40 years ago came to the conclusion that there is interdependence between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons and in 1972 concluded the ABM treaty which limited strategic defenses.

And the Russian-American nuclear relationship – the mutually assured destruction model – has been codified through a number of elaborate arms control treaties, the most recent one, the New START treaty. While there were some interesting innovations in this treaty, it basically maintains still the same mutually assured destruction model.

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Within this model, Russia and the United States can move to further additional reductions and we can talk more about how far Russia and the United States through bilateral agreements can go to lower numbers. But I would argue that most probably Russia and the United States can reduce from the present level of 1,550 deployed warheads to something like 1,000.

Why 1,000 is the bottom line? Because if we look at the combined nuclear forces of China, United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, India, Israel plus possible developments in North Korea and Iran, they possess today about 800 nuclear weapons. And I think that neither Russia nor the United States will agree to move below this threshold unless other nuclear weapon states are engaged in some kind of an arms control regime.

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Meanwhile, well, we can build the multilateral arms control regime. It's a different story and again that's something which invites very serious discussions how engage other countries into some kind of limitations, restrictions, transparency. Whether such a regime could be legally binding or function in the form of political commitments, is not the topic of our discussion – at least of my presentation – this morning.

Now, about China – China until recently behaved with great caution in the nuclear field and the regular predictions the Chinese will build up, the Chinese will try to catch up like the Soviet Union did in the 1960s and 1970s, they usually don't materialize. Although the present stage of the Chinese modernization raises some question. Definitely it's not simply a new generation of nuclear delivery vehicles which China is building up.

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It is the question to my mind of how China made its own through two challenges. One challenge is related to the developments in American ballistic missile defense and while the United States decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and abrogated the ABM Treaty nine years ago, if we look at the numbers after the Obama administration decided to freeze additional deployment of the strategic GBI interceptors.

The United States possesses only 30 strategic interceptors in Alaska and California, which is less than was permitted by the ABM Treaty, which I remind you originally allowed 200 strategic interceptors and then 100 interceptors.

So while it's the historical irony that the ABM Treaty is dead but the United States only marginally violates the limitations – (inaudible) – radar and sensors beyond what was permitted by the ABM Treaty. But that is not a threat to Russian strategic nuclear deterrence. And the New START treaty formally admits that the present American strategic ballistic missile defenses don't threaten strategic stability.

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The emphasis of the Obama administration is on regional or theater ballistic missile defenses. And since Russia and the United States more than 20 years signed the INF Treaty and we eliminated all the missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, American theater ballistic missile defenses cannot threaten Russian missiles since Russia does not possess this class of missiles.

But for China, it's a different story because the bulk of the Chinese missiles are not of intercontinental range but missiles which fit the definition of the INF treaty. And that raises the prospect of the United States deploying ballistic missile defenses, both strategic and substrategic regional ballistic missile defenses which can deny the Chinese nuclear deterrents.

And I think the Chinese are concerned about it and apparently – apparently they might be willing to build up their forces sufficiently enough to overcome American defenses and maintain – still guarantee a deterrent capability. But that's a speculation but nevertheless a speculation which cannot be neglected.

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On the other hand, the development of the nuclear forces of India create a second challenge to China, and while it's not my job to talk about the second triangle, basically it's a fact the Chinese have to take into account the development of the Indian nuclear forces and possibility for development of an Indian nuclear triad.

So the nuclear arms race has become multilateral. And thus one can speculate that if the Chinese will see this double threat growing, they may decide to change their policy and to build a much bigger strategic nuclear forces. In this sense, China already is a very major factor in Russian-American nuclear relationship. Neither Russia nor the United States want China to catch up.

Russia is also concerned, like China, with ballistic missile defenses but not the present ballistic missile defenses which the United States have but with what will happen at phase four of the adaptive approach when the new generation of SM-3 interceptors – Block IIB – will be deployed, deployed ashore in Europe.

And a big question is will it be deployed on American ships since just two weeks ago the chief of the Naval operations said at the hearings in the Senate that the U.S. Navy is planning to deploy SM-3 Block IIB on all

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destroyers which the U.S. Navy possesses and there are 87 of them right now. That might grow into a formidable strategic capability.

I said that Russia admits that the present American defenses is not a threat. But by the end of this decade, the numbers might be quite different. And don't forget that Russia under the New START Treaty will have a smaller number of delivery vehicles than it is permitted. Remember that the New START Treaty permits 700 deployed launchers and 800 deployed and undeployed launchers.

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So when SALT I was signed and ABM Treaty was signed, Russia, like the United States, had more than 2,000 of strategic missiles. By the end of this decade, Russia will have only 400, maybe more if we succeed in deploying the new generation of our ICBMs and SLBMs. But my point is that the threshold when the ballistic missile defenses might be perceived by Russia as a threat, by the end of this decade will go down. So there is also the problem of prompt conventional global strike which Russia is concerned about, but China is, I guess, even more concerned because, well, the number of strategic targets in China is much smaller than in Russia.

And thus, within a decade, this special Russian-American nuclear relationship would become truly a bilateral relationship and the big question is whether we can envisage in the middle of this century a mutually assured destruction model between China and the United States.

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Will China want to build the same relationship as the Soviet Union did with the United States, this mutually hostage relationship? Will the United States permit China to graduate to the status of a nuclear superpower? And finally, another question, will a mutually assured destruction model develop between China and India? Again, I'm trespassing and touching the topics which other members of the panel is supposed to discuss.

But we will see growing uncertainty and we might have a situation when no more bilateral legally binding treaties between Russia and the United States will be signed. So the New START will become the last START. Or we really will be able to create a multilateral system to manage multiple nuclear powers which reflects the realities of the 21st century international system. Thank you. I tried to keep the time limit.

DALTON: Thank you, Sergey. Hua Han?

[00:22:25]

HAN: Thank you. It's my great pleasure to be here. Dr. Rogov just gave us a very clear picture about the first bigger – or bigger triangle between China, U.S. and Russia. But as the two triangles show, China enjoys the connecting point between these two triangles. So let me talk from a Chinese perspective how these two nuclear triads look like and what role China can play in these two triangles.

Firstly, let me talk about how Chinese look at these two nuclear triads. Firstly, many Chinese, they really think there is a significant asymmetry in the upper triangle that suggests that China holds a low stake in defining a nuclear direction or nuclear future. Secondly, India and Pakistan, in standing outside the NPT, really make some Chinese analysts – as well as practitioners – hesitant to build nuclear relationships between itself and the two South Asian countries from a triangular lens.

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Lastly, some Chinese are very cautious about whether or not China can play a bigger role in these two nuclear triangles. Having said so, many Chinese do agree that the nuclear capability, doctrines and policy in the five nuclear states – NPT states and de facto nuclear states – and their interactions hold the key – hold the key to nuclear stability or anarchy in the foreseeable future.

In specific, two triangles present NPT nuclear states in one group and de facto nuclear states in the other group. Their interaction really determines where the nonproliferation regime goes. Again, two triangles present established nuclear states and rising nuclear states.

Their view on the role of nuclear weapons are essential to understanding how this disarmament process evolved, what the role of nuclear weapons is in their respective national security strategies. And a nuclear dynamic among five countries is very different from that in 20th century and thus pose new challenges which we have to learn to cope with.

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Then, I would like to look at the upper triangle that is U.S., Russia and China triad. As I said, there is a big asymmetry, especially in terms of size of nuclear arsenals, and as Dr. Rogov just stated, U.S. and Russia, each after the New START Treaty, still holds more than 1,000 nuclear warheads in each state. And they are – but at the same time, China, according to estimations, has 150 – or around this figure – deployed nuclear warheads.

And in terms of doctrine, U.S. and Russia enjoys still – I mean, their relationship still can be characterized as – (inaudible) – while China's force structure and posture reply (?) a long pursued goal of assured retaliation. U.S. and Russia deal with first use of nuclear weapons while China still insists on no first use. There is something, I mean, new in discussion about nuclear no first use policy in China. But from the official line, no first use still holds up quite strongly in China.

In this triangle, some concerns – again, like Dr. Rogov just asserted – some concern about Chinese in fact inspecting nuclear arsenals. But as I said before, I mean, China – that is political decision to keep small arsenal. And the so-called nuclear modernization has focused much in survivability, mobility in short, second strike capability which are key elements for assured retaliation capability for China.

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So what we can really forecast this trilateral interaction between these three nuclear powers? I think three steps have taken place and these steps can really show their determination or their view about what the nuclear order or what order look like in next several decades.

Firstly, let me talk about disarmament. People talk about what's going to happen after the New START Treaty. I think as the former speaker just said, maybe it's hard to go lower than 1,000 nuclear warheads. But I think that's a very, very critical number or the moment to really push China to join the process or be more transparent in terms of their nuclear capability.

Second, CTBT. The U.S. and China are the key to really push the CTBT into force – both signed but not yet ratified, as you well know. China – I think it is common knowledge that China will follow what U.S. do. I mean, if U.S. ratifies, then China will follow suit. And China's stance on CTBT is basically that the treaty is good. And China supports the CTBTO's – I mean, working and on-site inspection.

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And also recently there was CTBTO meeting in Beijing rather than here. Let me talk about FMCT. China once took a linkage policy. I mean, if you talk about FMCT, you should talk also about the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). But later on, China dropped that policy and in late 1990s China already began to have no objection to the negotiation.

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Let me quickly – sorry – to look at the smaller or the new nuclear triangle. Now, people talk about some uncertainties in this new triangle. I mean, there are some factors really determined if the triangle – new triangle – is stable or not. One is threat of nuclear state-held in these three countries. and people say maybe on the increase in the state-held is quite possible, especially when people talk about Pakistan nuclear warheads, over 100 warheads now.

And we still think minimum deterrence – critical minimum deterrence. The minimum figure of how big is enough in terms of nuclear arsenal is not a fixed figure. It is determined by what other countries will do. And India and Pakistan are still continuing to produce fissile materials and especially some of these reactors are not under the IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear doctrines in the three counties are incompatible. There's another concern about the triangle's stability. China, no first use – India for me is a conditional first use because in 2003 Indians stated that nuclear weapon could be used to attack back – I mean, in the face of biological or chemical attack. And Pakistan, no official policy or doctrine. But we know Pakistan has been insistent not to give up first use.

A nuclear escalation is another very dangerous scenario in this theater, especially – I mean, and Pakistan heavily relies on nuclear weapons in a possible Indian commission of an attack, which is another dangerous scenario. And also people talk about nuclear security, especially of nuclear facilities in Pakistan.

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Okay, what is China's role in this South Asian nuclear competition? I think China's nuclear development is basically responsive to the U.S., not to South Asia. China has never threatened to use a nuclear weapon against India and Pakistan.

And drivers for India's nuclear program for me is more on political prestige rather than the security threat from China. China and India have engaged in nuclear cooperation in 1980s or 1990s and also after Hu Jintao, the president of China, met in New Delhi in 2006. There is a joint statement talking about the cooperation of the civilian part of nuclear development. A Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation has been under IAEA safeguards since late 1990s.

And India and Pakistan are resistant to joining the nuclear arms control regime, which really limits China's nuclear diplomacy and hegemony in this region. And so far, the nuclear weapon issue has not really appeared clearly on the table in Sino-Indian strategic dialogue or other bilateral or trilateral discussions on track one level. Track two levels are heavily involved in this process but it's hard to put this level to the high track one level.

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U.S. engagement with India in civilian nuclear program implies that such a nuclear interaction goes beyond trilateral triangle – triangular interaction. How to reduce nuclear uncertainties in this theater? I think firstly they

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should avoid a nuclear arms race. Deep cuts in U.S. and Russia and then China's participation is crucial to decrease the legitimacy and utility of nuclear weapons in their own national security calculation.

And China's engagement in nuclear arms race with India or Pakistan is all but against Chinese interests. Minimum culture – should establish a minimum culture in this scenario because they think Cold War deterrence based on that is not applicable to this triangle. And CTBT, signing CTBT – I don't want to talk about NPT – is also a way to prevent a nuclear race, I mean, in India and Pakistan.

India has declined to make a formal commitment on testing ban. U.S. ratification of CTBT can send signal to China, India and Pakistan to push them to really take a – follow in efforts to do that. And next step is FMCT. India thinks it's not time for FMCT while Pakistan is in a way to have FMCT negotiations at Geneva.

So ending of fissile materials production in India and Pakistan, even through a unilateral or undeclared approach, is very important. China's leverage in Pakistan's FMCT decision making is limited. as you know, China's – I mean, is all-weather friend – partnership with Pakistan. But I mean, China still stays with the no interfering nuclear – internal affairs. And also nuclear weapons – I mean, very treasured by Pakistan.

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Nuclear CBMs, I think it's very possible for the two countries to resume the dialogue in this year. So it's very encouraging sign for this scenario. But in conclusion I want to talk a little bit about China as a pivot state between these two triangles.

As a nuclear state situated somewhere in between nuclear superpowers and the new nuclear states, China enjoys a connecting point between the two nuclear levels but it's not necessarily a pivot state in two triangles of romantic model or scale. Rather, it finds itself in the center sometimes in a security dilemma net.

On the one hand, it must cope with strategic nuclear pressure from the two nuclear superpowers. But on the other hand, it has to try very hard to avoid provoking a chain reaction from India and then Pakistan. Outcome of China's pursuing of assured retaliation could cause concerns in India and other countries and hence provoke a nuclear arms race.

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So for China, balancing the two nuclear objectives – strategic objectives – is hard but crucial. And it needs statecraft and diplomacy. Thank you very much.

DALTON: Thank you. Ashley?

TELLIS: Thank you, Toby, for inviting me here this morning. I was asked to comment on both the triads and then speak in particular to the issues of the Asian triad involving China, India and Pakistan. I think it's interesting to think of these two triads because they are a fascinating case study of the kind of diversity that exists in the nuclear realm today.

And when this diversity, which I will try and illuminate in my remarks following, are looked at closely, I think one can leave the discussion with a sort of qualified optimism that the long-term future of the nuclear regime offers the hope for smaller, but not particularly modest arsenals, but not yet disarmament.

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I think there are enough political pressures that are operating both within the two triads and across them that make at least the Obama dream of a world without nuclear weapons somewhat impractical in the foreseeable future.

Let me start by offering a couple of remarks about the nature of the triads themselves. The organizers obviously configured the idea of the triad around three pairs – around two pairs of three countries. I think there are two other ways to think about the triad which are worth reflecting on. The first triad would be to try and think about the relationships of these countries to nuclear weapons themselves. And I think you get three types of relationships that are worth thinking about.

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The first might be to think of the United States really as a post-nuclear power – that is, a country whose core security interests today are really not furthered by the possession of nuclear weapons except for deterrence of threats that might be mounted by other nuclear states. The U.S. has such comprehensive conventional superiority that most of the traditional security tasks that the United States had to discharge could well be discharged by conventional weapons. And the fact that the U.S. has to retain its nuclear weapons is really owed to a persistent reality in the global system as well as legacy issues.

There's a second type of state and that is established states which are nuclear-dependent, for good old-fashioned reasons of security. And in the triads in question, I would put both Russia and China in this category.

They need nuclear weapons at least for a while longer to discharge certain critical security obligations to themselves and both states possess arsenals of considerable size, diversity and sophistication, though of course there are variations between the U.S. and Russia and China.

And the third would be the emerging nuclear powers and I would put India and Pakistan in this category. One, Pakistan being a nuclear-dependent power, that is it needs nuclear weapons for its security. The other, India, really being a contingent nuclear power, in many ways like the United States, does not need nuclear weapons to discharge its core security tasks except to prevent, deterrence of use by others. So that's one way of thinking of breaking up the triad

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There's another way of breaking up the triad and that is simply to look at how the countries that have been – that are before us – that relate to the issue of arsenal size. And here again I think you get three broad subdivisions.

First, the United States, which really for all the reasons that I laid out does not undertake any serious nuclear modernization today. It's focused on maintaining existing capabilities because the demands of deterrence continue to persist. But it's not expanding those capabilities and in fact is actively pursuing a process of drawing down arsenal size.

The second category would be Russia which pursues selective nuclear modernization, again for understandable reasons because of conventional weakness, but is also drawing down strategic force sizes in part because of economic reasons because the size of the forces that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union are simply too expensive to maintain and go far beyond the needs of deterrence in the current circumstances of the day.

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And then the third category would be China, India and Pakistan, all three of which are involved in actually a quite comprehensive nuclear buildup but at very different rates and for very different dovuses. Having said that, I'm going to offer a few remarks on what I think offers the great power triad, which is Russia, the United States and China.

I'm not going to talk about the U.S.-Russia relationship because Sergey did a superb job of laying out what the characteristics of that relationship are. So I'm going to say a few words about the U.S. and China. There's clearly a prospect of emerging strategic competition between these two countries.

But from the perspective of the United States, at least for the foreseeable future, China is going to remain a lesser included case within the larger panoply of deterrence which is still metered against the capabilities of Russia.

U.S. nuclear superiority vis-à-vis China is still sufficiently considerable that the United States does not require to develop a new set of capabilities to deal with evolving Chinese nuclear forces unless the strategic competition between the United States and China were to degenerate into truly malignant rivalry. Mercifully, that does not appear to be imminent and ought to be pushed back to the degree that that is possible.

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China, however, because it finds itself in this grade A symmetry with the United States, is focused on building up its nuclear forces but at least at the moment orients its buildup primarily towards increasing the second strike survivability. So it has made investments in increasing the numbers of the force, diversifying the type of the force but really making most of its investments in the direction of survivability, mobility, reinforcing command and control, et cetera, et cetera.

As Sergey pointed out, I think quite astutely, although it is likely that China will end its nuclear modernization at numbers that are far less than were witnessed during the heyday of U.S.-Soviet competition, there is no assurance that that will be so.

China has a sufficient stockpile of fissile materials and an ongoing production program for building actually a quite bewildering diversity of delivery systems that in principle the Chinese buildup and modernization could continue quite open-ended and could, depending on what happens in the case of the United States and Russia, actually in some circumstances even come close to the kinds of numbers that the United States and Russia finally end up with.

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This is not fore ordained but it is a possibility that we ought to pay attention to. For the moment, however, what I think is most distinctive about the U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship is that the United States still remains focused on deterrence paradigm and that is essentially deterrence strategies that involve the prospects of counterforce attacks.

The whole U.S. nuclear arsenal is essentially designed for counterforce takeout in a way that the Chinese arsenal is not. And China would have to change the characteristics of its nuclear force quite considerably if it were to move in that direction.

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Unless China becomes a true peer competitor of the United States – and again, that prospect is not anywhere on the horizon – I think U.S. nuclear forces could possibly draw down further, though the fears and uncertainty about China's growth will leave the United States with a relatively high floor beyond which nuclear drawdowns will likely be impossible.

Let me say a few words now about the Asian triad, the triad involving China, India and Pakistan. As Toby pointed out in the introduction, China remains really the lynchpin which connects the two worlds between the great power triad and the Asian triad.

And this Asian triad, as I mentioned earlier, is characterized at the moment by steadily enlarging nuclear arsenals, though it must be remembered that these enlargements are taking place in each case for different reasons, they are proceeding at different rates and they have different effects.

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But let me start with China. China clearly, as I said, is modernizing its nuclear forces with an eye to protecting its deterrent against the prospect of competition with the United States. But the fact that this enlargement is occurring, driven primarily by contingencies involving the United States and the presence of U.S. conventional forces on China's periphery has unintended consequences. Well, they may not be entirely unintended but they certainly have consequences.

And part of those consequences bear on what it does to China's ability to target India. China has always treated India as a serious nuclear adversary. In fact, long before India acquired a nuclear arsenal. And as China's nuclear modernization, though driven by its concerns about the United States, end up giving India a far greater capabilities with respect to targeting India than it has ever has to start.

In fact, the kind of expansion that one sees at the two principle Chinese missile bases that historically were known to have responsibilities for targeting India suggests that the Chinese attention to India, although subtle and understated, will continue to persist far into the foreseeable future. Irrespective of what China's rhetoric about the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship may be, the fact I believe will be continued targeting of India as part of China's general preparations for deterrence.

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Let me say a few words about Pakistan. Pakistan has obviously been in the news in recent months because of the public revelations now that it is undertaking a fairly energetic nuclear modernization. In fact, in the comprehensiveness and the diversity of Pakistan's nuclear modernization, Islamabad comes closer to Beijing than it comes to New Delhi. Pakistan's nuclear modernization is in fact quite extensive and end-to-end.

It involves everything from building up a fissile material stockpile to rapidly increasing the numbers and diversity of its delivery systems, modernizing its command and control and potentially most problematically involving a shift in its doctrine which traditionally was focused on minimal deterrence oriented towards counterforce targeting.

Now possibly – not certainly but possibly moving in the direction of counter-military targeting which raises the specter as the United States experienced during the Cold War – the prospect of getting involved in an endless weapons sink where the need for the numbers of weapons increases exponentially because for anyone who has looked at what targeting military targets involves, they are weapons sinks. They basically require large numbers.

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India, in contrast, remains the slowest of the three modernizers in the Asian triad, partly because the Indian state is not terribly efficient at anything, including the production of nuclear weapons.

But also partly because I suspect it is a matter of state decision that India has a low dependence on nuclear use because it is relatively protected in terms of both its geopolitics and its conventional capabilities and therefore does not appear compelled to build up its nuclear forces certainly to the levels and with the alacrity that one sees in Pakistan and to a lesser degree China.

The bottom line about the Asian triad actually leaves one somewhat optimistic because there are relatively weak interaction effects. The strongest interaction effect is between India and Pakistan but there the causality of the interaction really runs only in one direction. It's Pakistan racing against its own fears more than its racing against India.

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Broadly, the kind of stability that I think we'll obtain in the Asian triad for at least the next decade or so derives ultimately from the fact that all three key Asian nuclear powers have nuclear forces which are incapable of counterforce and as long as the nuclear forces stay this way.

That is, they are technically incapable of counterforce – then the strongest incentives for nuclear arms racing, for seeking nuclear parity, for going in the direction of thinking of preemptive nuclear use by way of damage limiting strikes, all the incentives that essentially drove the U.S.-Soviet competition to stratospheric heights could with a bit of luck be avoided in South Asia as well.

The biggest challenges for security in the Asian triad will be the risks of nuclear coercion and this involve particularly Pakistan and the prospects of state fragility, and this involves Pakistan as well though in the interest of accuracy it must be noted that the investments that Pakistan has made in securing its nuclear arsenal over the last decade have been quite remarkable and exemplary. So I will end on the note that there is reason to be qualifiedly optimistic about the prospects for stability in the Asian triad in the decade to come.

DALTON: Thanks, Ashley. Rifaat, you want to offer a few comments from your perspective as well?

[00:56:43]

HUSSAIN: Yes. Good morning. Thank you so much, Toby. And I apologize for not being here yesterday because of the problem that we had with our flight which didn't actually brought us here to Washington until about 6:00 p.m. But I'm thankful to the Carnegie for the opportunity to say a few words on this very interesting discussion that we are having on the Asian triangle and its relationship with the larger global triangle consisting of the United States, China and Russia.

One thing that I think we can find as an interesting way of linking the two triangles is the role of geography. With the exception of the United States, all of the other three triangles are operating in a shared geography. India, Pakistan have borders. And of course China has a very long border not only with India but also with Pakistan and also with Russia.

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So the United States is the only actor which actually does not have a contiguous geography with these triangles. And this I think is something which is of immense significance when you look at the whole interaction between these two triangles from Pakistan's perspective.

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Actually in his comments, he mentioned that whatever happens between United States and China has a direct effect on India. I think you could make the same argument that whatever happens between China and India in terms of their strategic modernization, whether it is of the conventional capabilities or the nuclear capabilities, has a direct bearing on Pakistan's national security.

So in that sense, the point that I'm trying to make is that there is a strategic dependence, though one can talk about its degree or its quality and its dynamics and its diversity. But you know, the two triangles are organically linked.

The second comment that I wanted to make was about this whole issue of capability versus strategic intent. I think most of the discussion that we had is actually focused on what is happening to the nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities of all these six actors that we are talking about.

But I think the question of strategic intent is very critical from Pakistan's security perspective, that you could have a range of capabilities but as long as those capabilities are not seen to be directed against you, both in terms of employment and doctrinal principles, Pakistan can live with that.

So that's why Pakistanis do not feel threatened by the fact if China actually is engaging in strategic modernization because the relationship is not marked by distrust. Rather, it is a very solid and a strategic relationship.

[01:00:10]

And one example of that that I will give you is that when China became a member of the United Nations, the first veto that the Chinese ever cast was in favor of Pakistan's request to block the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations because the Bangladeshis were insisting on putting 133 Pakistani military officers on trial for allegedly having committed war crimes.

And then the Pakistanis requested the Chinese, and the Chinese after having just joined the United Nations did not allow Bangladesh to enter the United Nations. Still this demand was blocked.

Similarly, if you run through the whole history of this relationship, this balancing act that Pakistan has performed historically is very interesting.

That even though Pakistan had become a member of the Cold War regional nuclear alliances, which were directed primarily against the expansion of Communist influence in Asia, Pakistan managed to maintain a very stable and a very – I would say a very good relationship with China even though Pakistan was part and parcel of the American regional containment strategy of China.

And then of course in the early '70s we know that Pakistan acted as a bridge to bring the United States and China together. And when that historical development took place, the Chinese leadership, when it received Kissinger and Nixon in Beijing, told them that do not forget the bridges that have actually brought you to this country.

[01:01:57]

So this is, you know, the kind of relationship that we have with China. So Pakistan does not have any strategic intent issues vis-à-vis China. But Pakistan does have – and I will be very blunt and very candid with you – reservations about the United States’ strategic intent towards Pakistan because there are many people who argue in the emerging security discourse in Pakistan that say that the United States actually is after Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability.

Whether that is true or not, but that’s the very widely held perception. So that causes a certain degree of unease in Pakistan. And that partly also explains that why Pakistan has tried to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal because if you are – if you have a smaller nuclear weapons capability, if it is located in a particular geographic region and you know – or you think that you know most of the coordinates about that – then Pakistan is vulnerable to some kind of a – either nuclear or maybe a conventional preemption.

To preempt that possibility, Pakistan is now thinking of increasing the arsenal. The next point that I wanted to make and which is actually the last point – that Pakistan looks at its nuclear weapons capability in very specific terms.

Even though we do not have a declared nuclear doctrine but it is essentially an India-specific nuclear weapons program, which I’m not sure is true of the motivations of the other members of these two triangles that we are talking about.

But Pakistan’s nuclear program is essentially security driven and as long as the security dilemma that we have vis-à-vis a larger neighbor which is now conventionally stronger, is economically growing and is now projected to acquire, you know, the 9 percent of the future arms acquisitions globally poses a huge threat.

[01:04:20]

So therefore I think the security dilemma that Pakistan faces is not – is very unique in this triangle because India can be a strategic competitor of China and China can be a peer competitor of United States. There can be competition between United States and Russia and Russia and China.

But in case of India-Pakistan competition, I think, you know, there is an existential dimension to this because Pakistan feels that India is a strategic imperative and the only way you can deal with this challenge is by maintaining a very solid relationship with China. So in the interest of time let me just stop there. But these were just a few of the observations I wanted to make. Thank you very much.

DALTON: Thank you. So we’ve got about half an hour for some questions and I’d invite you to line up behind the mic there and we’ll take several at a time and pose them to the panel here. I think there’s a lot of rich material to really address.

If I might just start with one brief question for Professor Han and also for Ashley – you both discussed some of the uncertainties that both the Chinese perceive, and then, Ashley, in the largest sort of systemic dynamics, what do you see as potentially some of the stabilizing elements and, you know, what might, you know, some of the countries represented here do in terms of their government policy to promote stability, assuming that it’s a good thing?

[01:06:00]

TELLIS: Sure. Well, just off the top of my head, I think the two factors that are conducive to stability are, one, the absence of a clear geopolitical rivalry, which otherwise would have the effect of bringing nuclear weapons to the center stage and making them the pivot of competition as it was during the Cold War.

And the second is, with the exception of Russia and the United States, which in most ways is a benign competition today, none of the other players in the triads are capable of counterforce nuclear operations. And that to my mind is a profound technical difference that makes for stability because that frees you from the burdens of arms racing.

All these powers, to a greater or lesser degree, also have nuclear postures that are relatively opaque and which benefit from the stabilizing effects of a lack of transparency. So it makes targeting harder. It makes the confidence that people would need to execute splendid first strikes harder to achieve, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

So as long as that technical condition holds, I think off the top of my head those would be two stabilizing factors.

[01:07:20]

HAN: I'm Chinese so I'll say some good words from the Chinese point of view. (Chuckles.) I think one factor – a stabilizing factor – is that China has really tried very hard to really play the nuclear card very low priority in their relationship with the two Asian nuclear states. During the Cold War era, and after that both – in both scenarios – you can see that really what characterized Chinese nuclear relationship.

And the other thing is for me I think the three countries – I mean, they still think it's irrational to have big nuclear arsenals. I remember well when I was in Bangkok there was a trilateral dialogue between China, India and Pakistan. They talked about what does small arsenal race is supposed to have. So people in these panels, they said maybe 60 to 100.

But very unfortunately after I came back to Beijing I heard the news about Pakistani nuclear data and the updated data. But still, the people at least in the analysis, they still keep very low numbers in their thinking.

[01:09:05]

Q Thank you. I am Zia Kazmi. I am from the Strategic and Nuclear Studies Department of National Defense University in Pakistan. My question will be for Dr. Rogov because the other two speakers have already answered the question.

And before I do that, a small comment that what – okay, what would feed a nuclear dwarf like Pakistan will not satiate its next-door neighbor because if I correctly remember, the figures in IPFM report of 2006, there was one ton of weapon-grade plutonium and 15.8 tons of reactor-grade plutonium. So you can do the mathematics to find out who has the fastest growing program.

Now, about the triad, I think the triad between Russia, U.S. and China can become a rectangle because of the fact that I just said. And my question is that instead of 1,000 weapons, sir, that you proposed to come down to, why not 300 weapons, all the weapons that China possesses.

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It will stop vertical proliferation and it will reassure the other nuclear weapon states. And I suggest we should instead of talking about triangles, we should talk about a circle because it is a more robust structure. So it will be more reassuring. I request your response. Thank you.

DALTON: Should we take a couple and then –

[01:10:35]

Q: I'm James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment. I wanted to pick up on an issue that Ashley raised and ask Dr. Rogov and Dr. Hussain how your countries view tactical nuclear weapons. And in particular, what I mean by that is there's two different conceptions for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. One is as a tool for war fighting – you know, for literally blowing up the enemy divisions as they come across your borders. And the other is using them as a tool for escalation, for creating shared risk.

And if you view them as a tool for war fighting, you need lots of them. And if you view them as a tool for manipulation of risk, then you don't need so many of them. So how do your countries view tactical nuclear weapons? And if you say that they're political rather than military weapons, then could you tell me, Dr. Rogov, why Russia needs thousands of them, and Dr. Hussain, why Pakistan needs four plutonium production reactors?

[01:11:30]

Q: I'm Sadia Tasleem from department of defense and strategic studies, Quaid-i-Azam University. My question is addressed to Professor Han. Professor, one of the external variables that does affect India, Pakistan and China triad is the role of the United States in this region.

The evolving U.S. strategic partnership which according to many is triggered partially by the U.S. intent to contain China is gradually but certainly I think strategic positioning and shifting balance of power in the southern Asian region. So I would like to hear your views on how – what is China's conception of its role in context of these developments. Thank you.

DALTON: Sergey, would you like to start?

ROGOV: Okay. Why not 300, why not 500, why not 100? First of all, we can debate the numbers. But in my view, both the United States and Russia still maintain this nuclear superpower mentality and for us to recognize, well, what used to be parity between Russia and the United States but to recognize parity with somebody else is going to be enormously difficult.

Besides, well, this – when we go into very deep reductions, we will face a completely different military balance. I mean, well, not just nuclear balance but overall new military balance. And that explains to some extent I think Russian overemphasis on tactical nuclear weapons.

Since today's Russian Federation for the first time in many centuries is facing unfavorable conventional balance both in the east and in the west. The conventional balance between Russia and NATO is 1:3 or 1:4 and with China the numbers – the gap is even bigger.

[01:13:57]

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So Russian preoccupation with tactical nuclear weapons is a reflection of huge Russian conventional weaknesses. If you look at the numbers of latest military balance published by IISS, you will see that the four military commands which Russia created really possess only token conventional forces. And I think that in this situation, it's very unlikely that Russia will agree to deep reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.

As far as my personal position is concerned, I think that during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union for a number of reasons decided on an official distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Although Russia – the Soviet Union always tried to count American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as strategic at each negotiation because they could reach our attainment. But the United States always refused.

Now, if we look at the comprehensive nuclear picture, going from Korea, China, Pakistan, India, Iran, Israel, we could see that Russia faces quite a number of countries which possess or might possess nuclear capabilities and while those countries, except China, don't have intercontinental ballistic missiles, then nuclear weapons can reach Russian territory.

[01:15:45]

And because, well, Russia in the conventional field cannot counterbalance it, that's while we are not enthusiastic about reduction in tactical nuclear weapons. But if we talk about Russian-American bilateral nuclear balance, I think it's quite possible that later this decade, Russia and the United States may reach a new arrangement to replace the New START which will deal with all nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to establish ceilings for deployed warheads and undeployed warheads with freedom to mix.

So each side – Russia and the United States – might themselves decide how many weapons of strategic range, how many weapons of tactical range. This is the situation which I think will allow Russia and the United States make another bilateral arms control treaty.

But any further steps would require for sure very serious involvements and commitments from China, from other nuclear countries and just let me give you another example concerning tactical nuclear weapons.

If we count all nuclear weapons deployed by NATO countries in Europe, we should count not only American tactical nuclear weapons but also British and French nuclear warheads which are not covered by the START Treaty. So as a result, the United States, U.K. and France have in Europe about 700 nuclear warheads which are not covered by START. And of course, well, there are no official numbers on the Russian side.

But the number of the Russian tactical nuclear warheads on the European theater is not much higher if you don't count such nonstrategic nuclear warheads which are rather peculiar. Like, for instance, nuclear warheads for Russian ballistic missile defense around Moscow. We somehow stick to the notion that we're willing to blow up 68 nuclear bombs around Moscow to protect Moscow from the enemy's warheads.

[01:18:26]

We also possess a huge number of nuclear warheads for our air defenses, so those weapons which cannot be used for offensive purposes. And of course, well, I think at some point when Russia will become conventionally stronger, we will be able to overcome this preoccupation, this love for tactical nuclear warheads. But that's related to many factors including conventional balance and nuclear weapons of other countries, not only the United States.

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HUSSAIN: Just two quick points. I think there is a debate in Pakistan whether tactical nuclear weapons are the best means to deal with India's conventional military superiority, particularly if India were to implement its so-called cold start doctrine against Pakistan. I am not sure the strategic decision has been made with regard to whether Pakistan should acquire the tactical nuclear weapons or not. But it is certainly a debate that has been figured in Pakistan.

[01:19:42]

But the nexus that people see between the plutonium – expansion of Pakistan's plutonium capability – I don't think it has anything to do with their tactical nuclear weapons. In my judgment, the dynamic is more related to Pakistan's efforts to develop a second generation of nuclear weapons capabilities which are lighter and which can also have a longer range.

So that has something to do with Pakistan's efforts to acquire a capability which is more sophisticated, which is more accurate and I don't think that's being seen as related to the debate about the tactical nuclear weapons. Thank you.

MS. HAN: A very quick comment – response – to the question about U.S.-Indian strategic partnership vis-à-vis China. I think China is concerned about this new partnership. It's in a way that China – how China perceives its peaceful rights in the future.

I think the U.S. have valued Japan, India and other middle powers along China more – I mean, more – so started by Bush administration. In Obama administration they experienced quite a tension last year. Fortunately the relationship has been back on track. But one reason I think China is not that concerned is that because they still think India is not Britain or still keep their various cultures in this relationship with U.S. and with China.

[01:21:46]

And also I mean China is confident and because China also holds kind of an interdependence with the United States in economically, trade or strategically. So we think it's a kind of a big power politics, but so far not that divisive in terms of Asia yet. Thank you.

Q: Thank you. I'll just follow up to what Dr. Rifaat just said and my question is to Dr. Tellis. I was wondering if you could comment upon the four destabilizing trends which are in the South Asian region. First and foremost, it's the Indian military Cold Start doctrine which was started in 2004 which argues that India would launch eight multiple assaults within Pakistani territory in the first 96 – from 72 to 96 hours and is working towards a limited war option despite the fact that India and Pakistan are nuclear, one.

Number two, the fact that India has just recently conducted an antiballistic missile defense – an antiballistic missile test on the 6th of March which was successful. Number three, the Indian nuclear doctrine talks about the right of India to use nuclear weapons once Indian forces are threatened by a chemical, biological or nuclear attack. So in that sense, you're dealing with an option in which India would actually be using first strike option.

[01:23:17]

And if you combine that with the aggressive preemptive doctrines – military offensive doctrines – it is a destabilizing trend. And the last one is the presence of the clause of strategic fuel reserve and fast breeder reactors

which they might be getting as a result of the India-U.S. nuclear deal and the clause under the India-U.S. deal which states India has the right to review its decision based on its national security interest.

So in all of these things, what role do you think these things or these trends are putting in terms of lowering Pakistan's threshold which would not necessarily lead in my opinion to merely an increased number or review in terms of tactical weapons but perhaps even go for perhaps the change in posture. That is one if you could look into that.

And the second question is what stops India considering that fact now that it has got antiballistic missile systems also as part of its new game plan to engage into an arms control arrangement between Pakistan and India and it can later on go on and have an arms control agreement between India and China, why the chain reaction is a considerable factor in this region. So I was just wondering if you could look at the impact on strategic stability.

[01:24:40]

Q: Teresita Schaffer. I have a quick question for Professor Hussain and a slightly longer one for Dr. Han. Rifaat, you spoke about the Pakistani doctrine but you didn't actually say what it was other than being India-specific. I realize that there hasn't been a press release but I wonder if you could talk a bit about what goes into that.

And Dr. Han, I was really struck by the fact that in both of your presentations on both triads you gave a lot of explanations of the pressures upon China but you didn't suggest any areas where China might contribute to a solution nor did you suggest that China had any sense that it had a responsibility to do that.

You were worried about nuclear cooperation with India and Pakistan because they're outside the NPT. But that doesn't seem to have stopped your government from being interested in going ahead with a couple more nuclear generators without any of the international preambles that took place in the case of India.

I wonder what you see as – does China have a responsibility to actually do something to keep down the nuclear tensions and dangers in either of the triads in which it is a part and if so, what is that?

[01:26:15]

Q: I'd like to congratulate you all on a terrific panel. I'm Lora Saalman from Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. And my question – actually I was struck by the dynamism I think of all of these legs that we've been talking about today.

But I was equally struck by the fact that I think with Dr. Hua Han's lecture and also Dr. Tellis' lecture that there seem to be a certain static view with how we're looking at China's relationship with Pakistan, particularly in Dr. Hua Han's lecture and I think that in Dr. Tellis' lecture there really wasn't that much drawn out about the Sino-Pakistani relationship.

So for Dr. Tellis I would like to know if you think that India's view of the China-Pakistan relationship is changing because obviously we've heard today that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is certainly changing and not static. Similarly, I have a question for Dr. Hua Han and how you view the relationship between China and Pakistan and is it changing given all of these developments and the ones that were just mentioned. Thank you.

DALTON: Ashley, do you want to start?

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[01:27:16]

TELLIS: The four points that you made about factors impinging on stability, generically to my mind come under one broad category and that is how do states behave in the presence of nuclear weapons. And I think there are two strands here. The issue to my mind is not what Pakistan does with respect to the expansion of its nuclear arsenal. I can understand the logic for that completely given Pakistan's fears about Indian conventional superiority, India's strategic capabilities both in the nuclear and the non-nuclear realm.

To my mind, the real source of instability comes not from the presence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, no matter how many they are, and if Pakistan believes that it needs 300 nuclear weapons, so be it. That's by itself not the problem. To my mind, the problem starts off in the way states think about what nuclear weapons allow them to do with respect to resolving outstanding disputes.

So it's less a question about numbers and just possession and more a question about how nuclear weapons are used in the pursuit of state interests. Now, if you end up in a situation where Pakistan, whether it has five weapons or 500 weapons, ends up believing that its nuclear weapons immunize it against Indian conventional attack and therefore give it the liberty to tweak the Indians every now and then through various means of some conventional war, then in effect what Pakistan will have done is open the door to what Michael Krepon in that volume a few years ago described as a stability/instability paradox. And so the question to my mind is less the capabilities in the region because the capabilities in the region have a certain static quality. They don't generate the instabilities that we are most concerned about. It's managing the characteristic of political competition in this environment that I think is critical.

[01:29:30]

And to the degree that both Pakistan and India can arrive at new rules of the game, that build on the recognition that both sides have nuclear weapons and that circumscribes the extent to which the status quo can be revised, I think that is going to be the biggest contributor to stability.

I mean, the bottom line for me is this. Nuclear weapons are supposed to preserve and protect the status quo. If they become opportunities for challenging the status quo, then you're entering into a very dangerous world, irrespective of what the numbers of weapons involved actually are.

So my concerns here are less the numbers of weapons than the means and the ends to which they are put. I can discuss the issues about ATBMs and stuff in greater detail. Let me just say one thing about India and ABMs. I think it's very dangerous to presume that India has a ballistic missile system that works.

[01:30:33]

It's a very dangerous assumption. It's very dangerous also to presume that the Indians have a ballistic missile system that not only works but that they have also decided to acquire in large enough numbers that would actually end up denaturing the Pakistan deterrent. I mean, those are two very big bookend assumptions that have to be examined when one looks at the question of ABMs.

But the fact that the Indian ABM program causes uncertainty in Pakistan, forces Pakistan to think about multiplying the numbers of its weapons – I understand all of that completely, which brings me back to point number one. If Pakistan feels that the only solution to protect its security is to build a large nuclear arsenal, from my point of view, by all means go out and do that.

So long as you can protect it in terms of security. So long as you believe that those numbers actually reassure the state, that's perfectly fine, at least as far as I'm concerned. It may not be the official review of the organizers of the conference. To me, the dangerous thing is not the numbers. It's really the utility to which national leaders believe their weapons give them and the uses to which they are put.

[01:31:47]

On Nora's question, the Indian view of Chinese-Pakistani relations, I think the short answer is that it's a dim view. It's a dim view because the Indian state has watched the Chinese-Pakistani relationship essentially take the form of strategic balance with India. And from that broader perspective, there are a whole series of derivative complaints. But the derivative complaints are in a sense less relevant.

The larger question is that India does not perceive China as substantially moving away from the effort to balance India and contain it within South Asia through the instrumentality of Pakistan. And the Indian state I think has grown in the conviction that as India's rise in power becomes more and more palpable, then China's incentives to balance and contain India with Pakistan will only increase and Pakistan's incentives to rely on China for a comparable balancing effect of India will also only increase.

So the net result is that there is a strategic pessimism in India really about the China-Pakistan relationship.

HUSSAIN: Toby, before I answer Tesi's question, let me just pick up on the last point that Ashley has made. I think you have a very unprecedented situation in the South Asian powers up until now where you have an aspiring regional or global power like India being actively encouraged and supported by the sole surviving superpower, which is the United States.

And this actually is an unprecedented situation if you look at the post-Cold War international system, that a major power has now acquired – has the strategic weight of the sole surviving superpower behind it in all, whether it comes to economics, it comes to corporate interests, it comes to FDI, it comes to the provision of nuclear technology and all that.

What will be the consequence of this unprecedented situation for the security of the smaller states, I think that's the question that needs to be posed. In this triangle relationship that we are discussing, I think it's a new variable and really the Pakistani security managers, you know, when they look at the situation, you know, it causes, you know, a huge nightmare for them. So I just want to leave it at that.

[01:34:30]

Tesi, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, as you all know, it's not a declared one but there have been sufficiently lacking number of official statements to give us an idea what the key elements are. Of course, Pakistan looks at its nuclear weapons essentially as weapons which are meant to deter aggression. And here in the fine print, the aggression – India is not named as the aggressor. But it is implied because it's in India's first strike doctrine.

And number two, Pakistanis are also – have repeatedly emphasized this, that they would like to maintain a posture of credible minimum deterrence and this credible minimum deterrence is actually not very static, which essentially means that if India were to engage in a strategic nuclear modernization, then the number game can actually change. There are several other elements but this is the main thrust of the nuclear doctrine.

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Now, there are many people who have said that Pakistan has actually used its nuclear weapons capability since the early '80s and when it demonstrated that in 1998 essentially as a cover to engage in subconventional or low intensity conflict war against Kashmir.

[01:35:42]

Now, again, I think in case of India-Pakistan, you have a very new, almost a unique situation in which you have a very complex relationship in which the nuclear weapons are introduced. And then the question of, you know, how that nuclear weapons capability relates to the resolution of disputes becomes an absolutely critical one.

And I think India and Pakistan did something very reassuring when in June 2004 both countries after a meeting of the foreign ministers issued a statement in which they said that both countries look at nuclear weapons capabilities as a factor for stability. Now, we have come a long way since then because of the intervening developments. But I think – and then in 1999 you had the Lahore MOU and there was a dialogue and there were a whole range of, you know, nuclear CBMs that both countries had talked about.

So I think if the India-Pakistan dialogue were to start, some of these apprehensions or these worries that we have of whether India and Pakistan are going to fight a next war and that will, you know, sort of have nuclear overtones, I think then will be addressed. Thank you.

[01:36:52]

HAN: Because of the time restraint, I just will give a very quick comment and response. Firstly, talk about Chinese responsibility in the two triangles. I think – I think China has already realized it's his responsibility to be – I mean, important factor in these two interaction – triangles interactions. As a rising power, I mean, I mean, it's a very unique country. Some concerns coming from the growth of China. China has already realized the concerns – some concerns are very reasonable. But some are exaggerated.

And talking about the nuclear transfers is a quite complicated story. I don't have time. But talking about Sino-Pakistani relations, I think Dr. Saalman just said very correctly there are some evolving and especially when we talk about new dimensions, nuclear security, the overall the stability in Pakistan, antiterrorism and the energy security all these really – I mean, emerged in the overall relations between China and Pakistan.

So I think one very different phenomena is the – I mean, balance and gain between – I mean, using China against India is a really will be declining in these overall relations. Thank you.

DALTON: Well, we've exceeded our time. Thanks very much and please join me in thanking the panelists for a great discussion. (Applause.)

(END)