World Justice Project

CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE

REDUCING VIOLENCE AND IMPROVING THE RULE OF LAW

Organized Crime, Marginalized Communities, and the Political Machine

REDUCING VIOLENCE AND IMPROVING THE RULE OF LAW

Organized Crime, Marginalized Communities, and the Political Machine

Yusuf Ahmad, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Alyssa Dougherty, World Justice Project
Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Alejandro Ponce, World Justice Project

Table of Contents

PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review seeks to highlight specific policy interventions against risk factors that predispose communities towards gangs, organized crime, and electoral violence; and interventions that attack each of those types of violence directly. This is by no means a comprehensive report, given the extensive scholarship that has been dedicated to these three issues. It is, however, a starting point from which we can begin to explore the success or failure of policy interventions, and the contexts in which they have been found to work or fail. We hope to add to this review before and following the workshop, with the help of workshop participants.

Reducing Violence from Political Parties and Elections

Violence around elections is not only dangerous for those trying to vote, but has broader repercussions that contribute to national instability. In fact, by depressing voter turnout and affecting electoral outcomes, it can harm democracy itself. Particularly violent elections have the potential to scare neighboring countries away from democracy: should publics view elections and violence as synonymous, they may be less inclined to push for greater civil rights. This section of the literature review seeks to highlight specific policy interventions that governments and law enforcement agencies have enacted in their attempts to foster well-conducted, non-violent elections.

Election management specialists have begun to see electoral violence as a cycle, and prevention as requiring cyclical and interdependent activities beginning with pre-electoral registration, electoral roles, and training; moving through election-period activities of campaigning and voting, and through the post-election period in which legal reform and future planning may be needed. In the context of this literature review, the term *electoral violence* will encompass this cycle. It may refer to intimidation tactics to keep citizens from voting or the intentional disruption of an opponent's campaign. It may reference violence intended to suppress opposition votes during balloting or could signify tactics used in the theft of votes. *Electoral violence* could also indicate violence generated by the exclusion of losers from a newly formed government. Given its myriad of definitions, the causes of electoral violence can be proximate – such as a dispute over a particular poll's balloting – or may be years in the making as a winner-take-all political culture manifests and offers benefits to supporters while excluding opponents from resources or basic rights. In some cases, a riot may be engineered to polarize the voters a few days, weeks or months before the elections on communal, caste, tribal or regional basis.

RISK FACTORS FOR ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

Electoral violence is often treated by the popular press as resulting from age-old ethnic conflicts or high emotions at election time. In fact, as the electoral community knows well, electoral violence is often a political strategy used to enhance chances of winning or to gain leverage in post-electoral negotiations for power (Wilkinson 2005).

- **Electoral violence is therefore more likely to arise when an election is seen as having the potential to bring about significant shifts in the balance of power** (Bruce 2009; Rahman 1990). Research from worldwide data suggests that **threatened incumbents who face viable opposition** will be more likely than non-threatened incumbents to use violence to win elections, particularly when their power lacks constraints (Hafner-Burton,

Hyde and Jablonski 2014; Hickman 2011; Rahman 1990; Chatuverdi 2005). In fact, stronger, non-threatened incumbents may prefer to resort to bribery rather than violence, based on political game models and studies of four African countries (Collier and Vicente 2012). These incumbents, however, will likely distance themselves either by directing or influencing local party supporters to act on their behalf (Bruce 2014).

- **Identity-linked parties may provoke identity-based violence in order to increase their chances of winning an election**, as has been the case in Pakistan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malaysia, and India (Africa Watch 1993; Klopp 2001; Wilkinson 2005; Jaffrelot 1998). Studies in Pakistan suggest that identity-based parties may also provoke violence to de-facto influence voting demographics within districts by forcing out undesired ethnicities (Huma 2012). Conversely, in India, creating competitive multi-ethnic districts in ethnically charged elections was also found to generate violence (Naidu 1990). More positively, ruling parties that rely on minority support or cooperation use less violence against minority groups and have greater incentives to reduce and prevent such violence. For example, state governments in India intervened to protect minorities from ethnic riots when their coalition depended on direct or indirect minority support, a finding supported by research in South Africa (Wilkinson 2005; Horowitz 1991).

- **Political manipulation to give rights, land, and resources to winning voters and exclude other groups from these goods can also cause electoral violence**, demonstrated by crises in the Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC (Boone 2009; International Crisis Group 2012; Lemarchand 2008). Finally, capable parties are often encouraged to threaten post-election violence given that it successfully influences voter behavior (Elmman and Wantchekon 2000) by manipulating with coercion, intimidation, or even threats regarding pensions (Bruce 2014).

- **Weak institutional constraints on violence, such as corrupt or politicized law enforcement, can allow violence** to become a legitimate form of political expression – a finding that fits with the "crime triangle" requiring a likely offender and a suitable target to come together without an effective guardian to deter them (Datta 2005; Moniruzzaman 2009). Strong parties may use the threat of violence in weak institutional contexts to influence voters who fear post-election violence, as occurred in Liberia and El Salvador (Elmman and Wantchekon 2000). Conflict and violence can also arise when natural conflict dampeners – institutions that provide a means to resolve conflict peacefully – are unable to counteract volatile societal competition in a post-conflict setting (Paris 2000; Autesserre 2010). Finally, politicians frequently employ unemployed youth and gangs to undertake electoral violence when they can rely on corrupt or politicized law enforcement to protect such actors as in Nigeria (Paden 2011).

- **New democracies and semi-democracies are particularly at risk for violence**, as authoritarian states do not have real elections and repress violence, while established democracies tend to favor peaceful negotiation (Hedre et al 2001). Post-conflict environments may be particularly fraught, as previously warring factions turn into powerful political groups (Brancati and Snyder 2013). In the absence of strong, moderating political institutions, elections can also instigate violence through nationalist politics carried out by powerful elites (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2005).

- Much ink has been spilled on determining electoral systems to increase fairness and reduce violence, particularly following conflict or transition. **Winner-take-all electoral systems may encourage violence**, by concentrating power in the hands of the executive and making the post worth fighting violently to take, as in Keyna (Klopp 2001). However, competing evidence from Ghana suggests that this may be a weak factor.

- **State capacity does not appear to be a risk factor**, despite popular assumptions otherwise. Wilkinson (2005) has found that, for instance, even the weakest states in India were able to manage electoral violence when it was prioritized by political leaders. Similarly, Bangladesh carried out a peaceful election under a caretaker government in 2008, despite electoral violence previously and following that election when parties were in control (ICG 2012).

POLICY INTERVENTIONS

Many policy interventions appear to be quite successful in tackling electoral violence, particularly if a strong and neutral Electoral Commission can be created. However, interventions become more difficult when parties have incentives to engage in electoral violence. Interventions to create apolitical and effective Electoral Commissions where they are not present require further research.

Party Agreements to Abstain from Violence During Elections: Success depends on the electoral incentives of the parties, according to scant research

In Karachi, a Supreme Court intervention to gain party compliance worked temporarily but ultimately failed (USIP 2012). In Ireland, where violence was caused by party supporters but was not in the interest of either party, Scharff (2010) describes a successful case of party agreement limiting election day violence.

Electoral Dispute Committees: Can be successful at deterring violence when it is not integral to party electoral strategy, based on a number of African studies

Multiple African countries have instituted electoral dispute committees to mediate disagreements between parties and serve as an early warning system to identify electoral violence. These committees may be composed of general citizens or elites, such as traditional leaders. Case studies on South Africa's 1999 elections, Sierra Leone's 2007 and 2008 elections, and Zambia's 2011 elections suggests that these committees were effective in reducing conflict caused by misunderstandings or after someone had been wronged; however, the deliberate use of violence to influence electoral outcomes was generally out of their purview (Jackson 2011, Jackson 2013). Training, the use of traditional leaders, and the inclusion of political party stakeholders assisted efficacy.

Electoral Commissions can be strong deterrents to violence if they are apolitical and have adequate funding, de jure and de facto authority, and leadership to be effective

When electoral commissions are apolitical and neutral, they can use a number of techniques to reduce violence, according to case studies from locations as diverse as Guyana, Lesotho, India, Liberia, South Africa, Nepal, Somaliland, Mozambique, Albania, Ghana and Bangladesh. These include garnering party agreement on procedures beforehand to lessen disputes (Kuris and Mawson 2011; Majeed 2010; Scharff 2011); working with the media to prevent inflammatory coverage and broaden voter education to reduce attempts to spark identity-based political violence (Chaubey 2011; Majeed 2010; Scharff 2011; Quraishi 2014); ensuring that the technical aspects of elections are run effectively, so that there are fewer problems that parties and supporters can seize on to catalyze violence (Chaubey 2011, Bennet and Woldemariam 2010; Isacharoff 2010); and implementing strategies to greatly enhance voter participation across the countries, particularly in marginalized communities (Scharff 2011, Mawson 2010). Hiring able staff, identifying and staffing potential trouble spots, mediating, and building cooperation among party leaders are all crucial to electoral commission success, as described in these case studies and in Quraishi (2014).

Case studies demonstrate the many interventions electoral commissions use to dampen violence. Chaubey (2011), for example, explains that cycles of violence and international criticism of the electoral commission's handling of the 2001 election in Guyana sparked institutional and technical reforms of the commission, enabling the

commission to improve voter registration, decentralize administrative processes, improve field communications and better coordinate security plans. Kuris and Mawson (2011) elaborate on how Lesotho's Electoral Commission was critical to peaceful elections in 2002, but its poor performance in 2007 led to renewed conflict. Majeed (2010) and Quraishi (2014) argue that from 1990 to 2010, India's electoral commission used a voluntary electoral conduct code combined with media and civil society pressure to reduce violence. Scharff (2010 and 2011, respectively) explains how Albania's Electoral Commission has contributed to the prevention of major electoral violence since 1996 and how Liberia's Electoral Commission worked with political parties to develop an inclusive electoral process that built legitimacy and reduced violence in the 2005 elections. He also indicates that Nepal's Election Commission helped reduce violence by leveraging public pressure and facilitating bargaining between political parties to build a credible constituent assembly election from 2006-2008. Mawson (2010) suggests that South Africa's Electoral Commission maintained political commitment of parties and public to electoral outcome, reducing violence in the first post-apartheid elections. Bennett and Woldermariam (2010) study how Somaliland's electoral commission built consensus and prevented violence amid tense, tight elections from 2002-2005. Mawson (2010) points out how Mozambique's multiparty National Election Commission succeeded in dampening violence in the 1994 election despite post-conflict party polarization. Issacharoff (2010) indicates that Ghana's electoral commission helped promote a peaceful transition as well as elections in 2008. A natural experiment in Bangladesh, where elections moved from a partisan to an apolitical electoral commission, also showed that politics, not capacity, was what had undermined such effective technical measures in the past (ICG 2012).

In nearly all cases, including parties equally in the process of crafting electoral rules was essential to reducing violence. It takes strong leadership, as in Nepal (Scharff 2011). In particularly difficult cases it may require external intervention, as in Mozambique (Mawson 2010). When one party gained the upper hand, violence returned in Mozambiqe and Albania (Scharff 2010; Mawson 2010).

Civil Society Engagement: Mixed results, engaged civil society may help get parties to the table to agree on rules and can undertake specific anti-violence initiatives, but more generalized groups may be less useful

Civil society engagement was useful for getting parties to come to the table and work with electoral commissions in Nepal and India (Scharff 2011; Majeed 2010). Civil society engagement to undertake specific activities to reduce violence starting well ahead of elections and throughout the election cycle may prevent electoral violence according to Chaubey (2011), and Varshney (2002). Such a strategy proved useful in Ghana, according to Hoffman and Smith (2010) who argue that in Ghana in 2008, unlike Kenya in 2007, violence was prevented because civil society groups mobilized and coordinated well ahead of the elections, making specific plans to prevent both a fraudulent election and the possibility of violent fallout. In 2011, Ghana continued to rely on civil society groups to institute a series of peace-building initiatives that included high-level dialogues and grassroots forums. For instance, the media worked with UNDP and the election commission to create and abide by a new voluntary code of conduct (Chaubey 2011). However, Ghana's parties were also less active in using ethnic identity as a wedge issue in these elections than was the case in Kenya in 2008.

Inter-group civil society efforts show mixed results. Varshney (2002) argues that daily contacts in intercommunal associations had an important effect in reducing communal violence and in pressuring politicians not to foment violence, based on case studies of 6 Indian cities, including two with a history of such communal violence. Other studies, however, suggest that civil society engagement across party and identity lines does not always prevent violence, as election violence has emerged in places with strong bi-partisan communal life. Wilkinson (2005) examines Varshney (2002) and argues that while Varshney's thesis is compelling, there are plenty of counterexamples: Kano and Kaduna in Nigeria have had strong intercommunal associations, but have recently experienced bouts of electoral violence along communal lines and Yugoslavia similarly possessed strong

intercommunal organizations and civic engagement, but also devolved into political violence along communal lines. One explanation could be that in places that face significant communal tension, civil society groups intended to bridge these divides are more likely to be created – but also face steeper paths to success.

Media Education and Engagement: Can be successful, can also exacerbate tensions depending on how media is used

In multiple cases, strong Electoral Commissions have worked with the media to prevent inflammatory coverage and broaden voter education to reduce attempts to spark identity-based political violence (Chaubey 2011; Majeed 2010; Scharff 2011; Quraishi 2014). Paluck and Green (2009) suggest that media-based educational initiatives may help build credibility and respect for elections and divergent views, possibly reducing violence. The scholars found that a radio show in Rwanda which focused on promoting tolerance enhanced listener's willingness to express dissent while encouraging them to resolve community problems without deferring to officials, suggesting that positive changes in political culture can be made in the short run.

However, media have also been used to exacerbate communal violence in numerous cases, most graphically in Rwanda's genocide. The increasing use of "paid" media is decried by Quraishi (2014) as detrimental to electoral calm in India.

Policing, Situational Techniques, and Coercive Responses can work if they are apolitical and move policing to apolitical bodies; politicized policing or militarized attacks on armed political groups exacerbates violence

Apolitical electoral commissions also have the opportunity to reduce party violence by using policing methods. For instance, removing control over the police from levels of government that have a stake in harming minorities, to a level that has an incentive to protect minorities, has the ability to diminish violence, according to Wilkinson (2005) who studied protestant partisan local administration in Ireland as well as several Indian states.

Situational crime prevention techniques, ranging from election-day transportation bans to mapping polling places likely at risk for violence, helped to reduce election related violence in India (Verma 2007). Examples of these strategies include authorities issuing identity cards and using electronic electoral rolls along with a focused police response from 2000 to 2005 in Bihar (Verma 2009), and vulnerability mapping, which involves prioritizing the deployment of police and paramilitary forces to hot-spot polling places, which helped dampen violence in West Bengal and UP, India (Scharff 2011; Quraishi 2014). A number of similar techniques were employed in the cases studied above of effective electoral commissions. Election Day transport bans also prevented violence by stopping the movement of armed groups in Nepal, Scharff confirmed; similar techniques were used in Bangladesh in 2008 by the apolitical electoral commission to reduce violence.

However, coercive policing that may be perceived as politicized may increase violence, especially when the public view the military and illegal armed groups as colluding (Naidu and Dube 2010). For instance, militarized attacks on armed groups linked to political parties in Pakistan dampened violence in the short term, but exacerbated violence over the long run (Yusuf 2012; ICG 2014). ICG adds that not only did such militarized policing exacerbate underlying conflict between groups, but that it also increased extrajudicial killings by criminal and political actors. Datta (2005) adds that military interventions in Bangaldesh in 2002 and 2003 to disarm politically linked groups also did not reduce violence or serious criminal activity, despite arresting over 11,000 individuals and seizing significant caches of arms.

Electoral System Design: No silver bullet has been found due to tradeoffs between exclusion, which can lead to violence, and weak governing coalitions, which can also devolve into violence

Electoral practitioners have long hoped that, particularly in newly emerging democracies, electoral systems could be crafted to facilitate cooperation and moderate tensions that might lead to conflict and violence. However, no electoral system is a clear-cut success, and all involve a tradeoff between the strength of the eventual governing coalition and inclusion. Representational electoral institutions are thought to best ensure a direct translation of popular preferences and cleavages into politics through political parties representing social groups, proportional representative elections to ensure the representation of minorities, and low thresholds and few barriers on the formation of new parties. Ideally, having a representational electoral system should allow for the creation of a multi-party system where all groups are separately represented. By contrast, efficient institutions deliver clear parliamentary majorities to strong and effective political powers and are associated with majoritarian electoral laws and the presence of "catch-all" parties which command strong electoral support across cleavages (Reilly 2008). While Cohen (1997) defends proportional electoral systems as being more conducive to moderating ethnic conflict compared to majoritarian systems, Mitchel (2014) finds quantitative support for the single-transferrable vote system in moderating ethnic conflict and governing divided society in Northern Ireland. Given mixed scholarly views, the need to cooperate with minority parties for votes should also be stressed, given that majority parties are encouraged to moderate their behavior, reducing violence against minorities in cases drawn from India and South Africa (Horowitz 1991).

Power Sharing Agreements: May reduce violence in the short term but can lead to gridlock, institutionalize polarization, and further violence eventually

When violence looms due to close electoral outcomes, power sharing agreements that force parties to both govern together are often the attempted solution, as is occurring now in Afghanistan. Power sharing agreements have proved promising in some case studies in the short term (Jarstad 2009). For instance, one qualitative study of Burundi's 2010 elections suggest that a power-sharing arrangement negotiated during Burundi's peace process in 2000 reduced election related violence by helping to maintain an inclusive political system, paving the way for successive elections and less ethnic violence in both 2005 and 2010 (Vandeginste 2011). Inclusion of representatives of three political parties (one ruling and two main opposition) in the electoral commission and the election management machinery down to the provincial, district and polling station levels proved to be an effective political compromise in the national elections in Mozambique in October 2014 (Quraishi 2014).

However, the results of a quantitative academic study focusing on 37 post conflict countries, suggest that power-sharing often institutionalizes polarization and contributes to political gridlock. Jarstad further argues that power-sharing agreements also decrease the likelihood that elections would be held, while power-sharing prior to elections does not enhance election or post-election peace. In Burundi, for example, Vandegiste (2011), explains that the overwhelming election victory of the ruling party may undermine the power sharing agreement and could subsequently entrench long-term conflict.

Reducing Violence by Gangs, Youth, and the State in Marginalized Communities

Violence plagues marginalized communities all over the world. While the United States had a national murder rate of 4.7 per 100,000 in 2012, homicides skyrocketed to 63 per 100,000 in Flint, Michigan. San Pedro Sula, Honduras appears to have been the deadliest city in the world in 2012. With a homicide rate of 90.4 per every 100,000 people, it was more violent than all active war zones due largely to a deadly mix of gangs, narcotraffickers, and violent law enforcement. In 2013, South Africa's Western Cape documented 2,580 homicides, 12% of which were linked to gang activity.

In the context of this literature review, the term *marginalized communities* refers to communities which are systematically disadvantaged socioeconomically, suffering from limited access to resources such as housing, employment, education, and healthcare, and are marked by an inability to escape the cycle of poverty.

The criminology literature focuses on five main theories to explain crime and suggest policy interventions in marginalized communities. *Social disorganization theory* (Shaw and McKay) and *social control theory* (Hirschi 1969) hold that deviant behavior is more likely in neighborhoods where social institutions fail to control the population, and therefore focus on improving such social institutions. *Social learning theory* posits that vulnerable populations – especially young children – are encouraged to develop the necessary skills so that they might also participate in the culture of gang-populated areas (Burgess and Akers 1966), and therefore focus on reducing interaction with gangs and affecting culture. According to *rationale choice theory*, people act in their own self-interest, weighing the benefits of illegal activity while also assessing the risk of being apprehended by the police (Cornish and Clarke 1985; Becker 1968), suggesting that more effective and certain punishment will affect crime. *Routine Activity Theory* (Cohen and Felson 1979), or the "triangle of crime," suggests that in the absence of effective controls, a motivated perpetrator will take advantage of an attractive target. Therefore, violence mitigation revolves around affecting perpetrator motivation (such as anti-gang recruitment programs); increasing effective controls (by improving policing techniques or community oversight); and/or reducing the attractiveness of targets (for instance, through increased street lighting).

Gangs are related to organized criminal violence in multiple ways, as described in the final section of this review, and particularly in areas where they are formalized as in Central America, are better seen as on a continuum with organized crime rather than sharply demarcated. They are also related to electoral violence, as unemployed youth are at times employed by political parties to undertake electoral violence (ICG 2010; Paden 2011), and are then protected from legal sanction by those parties once they attain power. This pattern is repeated from Pakistan to Nigeria, and was used historically by the political machines of the United States as well.

RISK FACTORS PREDISPOSING SOME MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES TOWARDS CRIME

A number of studies as well as evaluations of hot-spot policing suggest that crime and violence are largely concentrated in certain geographic locations within cities and neighborhoods, specifically low income, marginalized communities (Sherman et al 1989; Pierce et al 1988; Taylor and Gottfredson 1984; Weisburd and Green 1994; Pease 1991; Hunter and Jeffrey 1992; Clarke and Harris 1992). What risk factors predispose these communities to violence?

Inequality, social exclusion, and youth unemployment are all correlated with higher crime. In a study of 165 countries, Ouimet (2012) found that greater income inequality correlated with a higher homicide rate, particularly in middle-income countries, and that greater poverty and less economic development are positively correlated

with higher homicide rates. Violence also, of course, increases poverty, making the direction of causality difficult to determine: Ajzenman, Galiani, and Siera confirm that increases in homicide rates negatively affected the price of low-income housing by three percent in their 2014 study.

A literature on social exclusion and identity, particularly masculinity, also suggests that young men may turn to violence during adolescence to offset the emasculation of joblessness and general poverty. This is particularly true when gangs are present that can offer identity and community as well as monetary and at times, sexual rewards (Baird 2012; Spergel 1990; Fontes, forthcoming). Findings from Mexico suggest that low education levels, more than poverty per se, determine predation by police and drug trafficking organizations (Diaz-Cayeros et al 2011).

The presence of gangs studied in a number of low-income communities in the United States showed the increased likelihood that individuals, particularly vulnerable populations, including children and young adults, will be involved in violent crime – both as perpetrators and victims (Lizotte et al. 1996; Sherman 1997; Thornberry, et al 1993; Kennedy et al 1996). In communities with gang presence, gangs may begin recruiting children in their early teens for violent activities. Prominent gangs take advantage of the marginalization of such communities, not only by playing on perceptions of neighborhood loyalty and identity in order to prevent other gangs from taking root, but also through seemingly good works such as handing out aid, fostering new jobs, or introducing other community goods to enhance their power and reach.

Finally, police absence, violence or distrust between the police and community are risk factors. The absence of law enforcement, as well as police violence and misconduct, contribute to the further deterioration of marginalized communities, inhibiting citizen compliance with the law and amplifying the likelihood of violent crime (Kane 2005; Sherman 1997; Tyler 1990). Victims often do not report crime because they see police as ineffective or untrustworthy. Police abuse is also often higher in these areas, contributing to overall violence levels. Citizen distrust for law enforcement encourages gangs and criminal groups to exercise de-facto control over neighborhoods, sometimes inspiring citizen collusion simply due to their distrust in the state, usually a result of disengagement or isolation (Shaw and Reitano 2014). In fact, a study conducted by Faull (2011) – which surveyed perspectives on the South African Police Service (SAPS) – confirmed that a trustworthy police force that dealt with the victim's needs was more important to the victim than if their case was actually solved. Promoting positive police culture therefore combats perceptions of corruption and lessens citizen distrust (Newham and Faull 2011).

POLICY INTERVENTIONS

Numerous policy interventions have been implemented to address violent crime in marginalized communities. Many of these interventions can be assessed in greater detail online, with the help of databases such as Mapping Citizen Security, which tracks public safety projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. In what follows, we summarize a subset of policies involving policing and gangs, while suggesting that further research is needed into programs to curb police abuse. It should be noted, however, that reforms addressing violence in marginalized communities have been much wider in scope, targeting the criminal justice system, social institutions and community resilience, governmental regimes, urban planning, and labor markets. We hope to expand the literature review to address the more pertinent interventions, with the help of this workshop.

POLICING INTERVENTIONS

Mano Dura and Zero Tolerance: A poor policy option, but often politically popular
Mano Dura, or the "Iron Fist" policy used in Los Angeles, Honduras, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent Guatemala, emphasizes mass arrests for actual or apparent gang affiliation, and is sometimes combined with more militarized

policing techniques. Evidence from Central America, Washington, D.C. and Brazil suggests that Mano Dura and militarized policing policies have strengthened gangs and failed to reduce crime, while less rigorous evidence from South Asia suggests that militarized policing has similarly proven counterproductive.

Mano Dura tends to increase gang identification and organization in prisons, causing gangs to metastasize into more violent actors, according to studies conducted in El Salvador by Dudley (2010) and Honduras by Rivera (2010). Other studies discuss how Mano Dura encourages gangs to develop into sophisticated criminal entities, becoming more organized and interconnected (Cruz 2010; Jutersonke, Muggah, and Rogers 2009). In fact, violent crackdowns associated with the Iron Fist have done little to actually reduce violence, and have in some cases perpetuated illicit activities (Seelke 2014; Meyer and Seelke 2012; Gledhill 2013; Osorio 2010).

Pereira and Ungar (2006) explore how popular support incentivizes Mano Dura type authoritarian policing, especially in regions more affected by gang and trafficking violence. Holland (2013) and Wolf (2012) also suggesting that politicians tend to win elections when they espouse tough-on-crime policies in places that are most victimized by gangs and violence. While majorities of citizens in Latin America indicate that they do not support *mano dura* policies, their electoral strength suggests that the majority of voters (often educated and of higher socio-economic status) support tougher measures that largely affect the poor and marginalized, according to the Americas Barometer (2010).

Support for Mano Dura increases when governments are perceived as being ineffective or corrupt, according to examination of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay in the context of their current democratic politics as well as their histories of police brutality and militarization. Pereira and Ungar (2006) and the Americas Barometer (2010) also suggest that such support for Mano Dura may stem from a desire to move policing away from the police and over to militaries, which are generally viewed as being more trustworthy.

Broken Windows and Zero Tolerance Policing: Unlikely to reduce violence, may reduce trust in police and increase fear of crime

Broken windows policing stems from broken windows theory, which recommends that police target disorderly behaviors and minor offenses in order to prevent and reduce more serious offenses. This type of policing vigorously prosecutes those guilty of low-level offenses on the theory that those committing small crimes also commit larger ones, and that allowing minor property crimes can invite more serious crime into a neighborhood. All studies have been undertaken in the U.S., and undermining the core of the theory, a Chicago study found that the correlation between crime and disorder disappeared when neighborhood characteristics, trust, and poverty were taken into account (Simpson and Raudenbusch 2000).

Studies on the effectiveness of zero-tolerance policies also produced mixed results. While Bratton (1998) argues that broken windows theory was critical in curbing homicides and crime in New York, Pollard (1998) and Wacquant (2006) disagree, suggesting that New York's crime improvements started before the reforms, and likely come from other organizational changes in the police such as introducing problem-oriented policing, as well as contextual changes such as consolidation of drug markets, economic growth, and the decreased youth population. While Worrall (2002) suggests that broken windows policing reduced property crime in California, Jang (2008) found an inconsistent relationship between broken windows enforcement and rates at which serious cases were solved in Texas. Hinkle and Wiesburd (2008) further argue that broken windows policing strategies in New Jersey increased fear of crime and insecurity, or according to Sherman (1997), decreased police legitimacy and led to more sustained crime. Rosenbaum (2006) finds that broken windows and zero tolerance policing may reduce citizens' trust of the police.

Community Policing: Shows mixed results in reducing violence but may increase trust of police
Community policing generally refers to strategies grounded in community involvement in both defining crime problems and in monitoring police activities that prevent or control crime. It may encompass policing techniques ranging from neighborhood newsletters providing information on crime to the public, to foot patrols, neighborhood watch programs, or community meetings.

The breadth and heterogeneity of what is defined as community policing means that empirical studies of effectiveness are somewhat contradictory. A series of studies as well as an upcoming systemic review suggest that community policing has limited effects on reducing violence, but may increase citizen trust in and satisfaction with the police (Sherman and Eck 2002; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004; Gill et al forthcoming, 2014). Schnebly (2008) found that community policing enhanced citizen reporting of crime in the U.S., and studies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile suggest that community policing may reduce citizen perceptions of police corruption and abuse (Dammert and Malone 2006; Kahn 2004; and Skogan 2013). Weisburd and Eck (2004) found that community policing practices reduced fear of crime in U.S. cities and Rio de Janeiro, however, their study did not demonstrate consistent effects on crime and disorder. A systematic review of Neighborhood Watch, the oldest and most popular community policing program in the U.S., suggests the program actually increased fear of crime in Chicago (Sherman 1997; Sherman and Eck 2002; Rosenbaum 1987). While these studies suggest that Neighborhood Watch has no effect on crime, Bennet et al (2008) found crime reduction from Neighborhood Watch.

Community policing can have implementation problems due to culture clashes with police departments, and may fail in cases where police push back, are corrupt, or have weak accountability, according to studies in Argentina (Prado et al 2012; Ungar 2009); Mexico (Sabet 2010); Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic (Fruhling 2012); Australia (Chan 1997); South Africa (Faull 2011); and the U.S. (Zhao 1996).

Hot-Spot Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing: May be the most effective methods when paired, though all studies are U.S.-based to date
Hot-spot policing focuses law enforcement on the times and places of most crimes, generally using data analysis to determine "hot spots." According to Braga (2007), hot spot policing has been demonstrated to reduce crime in medium and large U.S. cities in the short term, a view supported by five randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and three systemic reviews published between 2004 and 2012, as well as studies by Pierce et al (2008), Sherman et al (1987) and (1989), and Sherman and Weisburd (1995). Weisburd and Eck (2004) find that hot-spot policing reduces crime regardless of policing strategy, but that coercive strategies such as zero-tolerance eroded police legitimacy and increased fear (Rosenbaum 2006).

Problem-oriented policing focuses on specific issues and tailors strategies to those problems, using a diverse range of approaches. Braga and Bond (2008) claim that problem-oriented policing is the most effective method at reducing crime in hot spots. Multiple empirical papers, examples being Weisburd and Eck (2004) and Braga et al (1999), demonstrate that problem-oriented policing reduces crime, disorder, and fear in U.S. cities, likely because it provides a framework for addressing crime in a context specific way. Nevertheless, problem-oriented policing is often difficult for police to implement, according to Weisburd and Braga (2006), especially if the departments limit their analysis to shallow examination of crime data and responses to traditional law enforcement Telep (2011), Stone (1993).

Focused Deterrence: Appears to be effective in reducing violence, has only been tested in the U.S.
Focused deterrence also merits consideration and has developed as a part of a problem-oriented policing intervention against gang violence. Focused deterrence emphasizes community policing and problem oriented

policing approaches that mandate a range of tactics that actively involve community stakeholders and other government agencies. Braga and Weisburd (2012) elaborate on how, in its simplest form, focused deterrence consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement, social-service, and community-based practitioners; conducting research to identify key offenders, groups and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special attention (Kennedy 1997, 2006). Braga and Weisburd (2012) also suggest that focused deterrence strategies, when developed and applied using a problem-oriented policing approach, reduce gang and gun-related violence when implemented in U.S. cities.

Gun Control: May work if well-resourced and enforced; gun buy-backs less clear, evidence all from U.S.

It is possible that well-resourced and enforced gun control measures can work; however, in the U.S., most gun control efforts do not achieve any measurable impacts on gun use, partially because of under-resourcing (Zimring 2004). Fagan et al (1998) defend gun control programs in New York City, suggesting that a well-resourced and tightly enforced weapons ban may have helped reduce violence in the 1990s. Gun buyback programs do not appear to cause a reduction in homicides or gun assaults, according to Sherman (1997), who analyzed select cities such as St. Louis and Seattle, and studied both the potential for individuals to sell the guns back and the likelihood that the newly acquired cash would be used to buy more lethal weapons.

GANG POLICY INTERVENTIONS

Gangs are the crucible in which many youth are moved to commit more serious crimes. Gang members both commit more crimes, and are victims of more crimes – making it important to study gang prevention, gang leaving programs, and community resilience programs that may prevent gangs from taking root.

Gang Truces: Effects likely to be temporary, data limited to El Salvador and Belize

Whitfield (2013) suggests that the 2012 gang truce in El Salvador reduced homicide rates and created space for the reintegration and rehabilitation of violent actors. However, the truce coincided with a rise in other serious crimes, augmented by a lack of government commitment. Fox's research (2012) on a 2011-gang truce in Belize also found that homicide rates only decreased in the short term before rising again, largely because several gangs de-committed from the agreement.

Gang Mediation and Intervention: Positive trends based on U.S. studies, data limited

Policy interventions that focus on community-based programs that actively involve former gang members in mediation, crisis prevention, and intervention offer promising results, according to Sherman (1997); Spergel and Grossman (1995); Goldstein, Glick, and Carthan (1994); and Skogan et al (2008). These studies, covering a range of different conflict mediation and crisis intervention approaches, have decreased arrests of gang members in New York and decreased serious violence by former gang offenders in Chicago.

Gang Prevention Programs: May be promising, require further evaluation, especially in global South

Several studies also conclude that programs to prevent young people from joining gangs in marginalized communities have promising results. Those that target at-risk youth under the age of ten have often successfully addressed anti-social and disruptive behaviors in ways that reduce later gang involvement, according to Howell (2010), citing Tremblay et al (1996) and Gatti et al (2005) when measuring the effect of programs that focus on vulnerable youth in the U.S. and Canada. Although mentoring programs are promising and have reduced some risk

factors (like drug use and hitting amongst children), warns Howell, they have no demonstrated impact on crime reduction or gang prevention. Sherman and Howell both suggest that studies to date have not been rigorous and further evaluation is needed.

Gang Leaving Programs: Requires more research
More research is needed to determine which programs effectively empower youth and gang members to avoid or leave gangs. According to Meyer and Seelke (2012), the link between lack of employment, crime, and gang involvement suggests that governments should offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. Sampson and Laub (1993) also point to the preventative value of employment in longitudinal analysis of criminal careers. Religious programs are prevalent in Central America, and Brenneman (2012) suggests that conversion programs have helped gang members to leave gangs, as they are one of the few culturally acceptable means that gangs allow for leaving. An increasing number of Central American gangs may be ending this outlet, however, requiring further research.

Community Resilience Programs: Requires More Research
Community resilience programs are premised on the idea that communities that are more organized with greater links between community organizations are better able to prevent gangs from rooting in their localities, more effective in advocating for and receiving state services such as police protection, and may play a preventative role in gang recruitment. These programs tend to be targeted at neighborhoods facing higher homicide rates.

POLICE VIOLENCE

Reducing Police Violence: Requires More Research
Police abuse is its own cause of violence in marginalized communities, as well as leading to distrust, decreased police legitimacy, and reduction of citizen compliance with police and the law. Police misconduct was correlated with increased violent crime in New York City from 1975-1996, though whether police became violent in response to fear of violence, or were causing violence, is unclear (Kane 1995). Sherman (1997) found that overly aggressive policing can increase the likelihood of youth becoming future offenders. However, a systemic review of research on programs intended to curb police violence in Israel, the U.S., and Ireland suggests that these programs are ineffective (Litmanovitz et al 2011). An ongoing systemic review for the Campbell Collaboration also suggests that current programs to reduce police violence lack an empirical basis; therefore, further research is needed to design programs that can effectively reduce such abuses in power.

Reducing Violence from Organized Crime

Organized crime entails violence, whether the criminal group takes the form of Sicily's Cosa Nostra, the thieves-in-law of the former Soviet Union, Yakuza of Japan, Triads of China, narcotraffickers in Latin America and West Africa, or the mafia of the United States. Paradoxically, established organized criminal groups often prefer to avoid direct violence, which can undermine or distract from their main profit-seeking motive. If the threat of violence can suffice, it may be preferable – leading some governments to seek accommodation rather than direct confrontation with such groups so long as they keep violence "within themselves." Yet even in markets where turf is determined and violence between criminal groups or between the state and organized criminals is low, organized crime causes violent side-effects by corrupting the institutions of the state, undermining the ability of law enforcement to pursue other criminal actors, and dampening and skewing economic development.

The term *organized crime* is contested; in the context of this literature review, it refers to any group having a formalized structure, the main goal of which is to obtain profits and money through illegal activities. Such groups can perpetuate their viability either by threatening or using violence, by tapping into corrupt governmental channels, and by forging relationships with law enforcement officials for protection and mutual enrichment. Organized crime does not wish to avoid the state, as a criminal gangs generally do; or to destroy the state, as insurgents do; but rather seeks to use the state to its advantage. Thus, another way of defining organized crime is an alliance between criminal entities and corrupt state actors to exploit markets for mutual economic gain.

Organized crime is intimately related to marginalized communities and gang violence. By depressing equitable economic growth, education, and other state services, organized crime can create the risk factors that lead to marginalized communities. It may corrupt law enforcement institutions to the point that they become criminalized, brutal, or ineffective at fighting youth and gang violence. Or, more directly, it may use youth gang structures to market goods or undertake violent acts, as narco-traffickers use gangs in Central America. Particularly in the latter case, the line between gangs and organized crime is better portrayed as a continuum rather than a clear demarcation.

This section of the literature review seeks to highlight specific policy interventions that governments and law enforcement agencies have enacted in their attempts to inhibit the growth of organized criminals and the illicit markets they exploit. It addresses certain organized criminal activities that are linked to violence – such as drug trafficking – and presents several mechanisms by which law enforcement agencies have attempted to dismantle criminal enterprises. New tools, such as The Homicide Globe, provided by the Global Study on Drugs and Crime, can aid in visualizing the violence caused by such crime.

RISK FACTORS

There are two risk factors that must be described for organized crime: the risk that it will be present in a country, and the risk that it will act violently.

In the former case, **strong societal distrust of the state may place societies at risk for organized crime,** according to historical case studies. Organized crime then appropriates government functions and plays on local loyalties and popular support to deepen its control over communities (Slade 2013; Shelley 2007; Paoli 2007; Kilcullen 2013; Felbab-Brown 2012). Therefore, states that brutalize, exploit, or fail to provide services for their citizens or for subsets of their citizens may be more at risk for organized crime to take hold. **Discrimination may be enough**

for illicit groups to form: Daniel Bell's thesis (1960) that organized crime served as a path to social mobility for various ethnic groups in America was supported by O'Kane (2002) and others who saw a succession of ethnic mafias forming in America because legitimate paths to business were reduced due to discrimination.

Politicians may further bolster organized crime to control other forms of activity, as occurred with the Soviet exploitation of the thieves-in-law to control prisons (Slade 2013), and Japanese postwar industrialists and politicians using Yakuza to control labor rights (Hill 2004; Hill 2006; Milhaupt and West 2000).

Once organized criminal groups have formed, additional factors increase the risk that violence might emerge from conflicts between groups, within groups, and between groups and the state. Illicit markets are, of course, inherently more violent than legal markets given that, by operation, they work outside of the law. Illegal markets, however, are not necessarily violent; in fact, illicit markets are often peaceful, largely because of informal social controls such as negotiation, nonviolent theft, and retaliation (Jacques and Wright 2008, studying drug markets in the U.S.; Friman 2009, looking at drug markets in the U.S., Japan, Colombia, and Mexico). In illicit markets, however, the underlying threat of violence is the social mechanism through which to obtain security, internal order, and market shares, given that the illicit market actors do not have the ability to enforce contracts or punish disagreeable conduct by participants and outsiders. Violence ultimately becomes the predominant method utilized to redress violations of order and settle disputes within illicit economies (Goldstein 1985; Andreas and Wallman 2009; Williams 2009).

Within groups, violence results from a need for internal discipline or as a response to succession issues (Hill 2004; Reuter 2009). For this reason, targeting kingpins in an organization can trigger succession conflicts that lead to more violence, or can lessen an organization's internal discipline and increase violence (Calderon et al 2013).

Between groups, violence arises when organizations seek to expand market share by eliminating competition, strengthening their reputation, or gaining control of strategic rents that are needed to run a business (Reuter 2009; Hill 2004; Andreas and Wallman 2009; Goldstein 1985; Williams 2009; ICG 2010). Violence may particularly occur to control access to strategic logistical points, such as highways, ports, or territories critical for trafficking activities (Calderon et al 2013). Violence, however, is costly. It deploys resources and increases the risks of retaliation and government enforcement. This delicate balance incentivizes cartels to maintain their current market share despite the desire for expansion and increased profit. In this context, cartels can use violence in efforts to weaken other competing groups while simultaneously creating opportunities to gain market share. Therefore, **systemic drug-related violence is more often found in unstable markets** that promote exploitation for profit (Diallo 2013). As markets become increasingly consolidated in the hands of certain organized networks and long-term relationships and market shares develop and solidify between various networks, large-scale violence tends to decrease (Brownstein, Crimmins, and Spunt 2000; Reuter 2009; Friman 2009). State-based violence against one group may, paradoxically, increase turf violence between groups as other organizations prey on the weakened group's turf (Calderon et al 2013).

Violence between groups and the state often follows increased efforts by law enforcement to curb corruption and criminal activity (Friman 2009; Reuter 2009; International Crisis Groups 2010). The relationship between curbing organized crime and corruption and increased violence means that states may choose to allow organized criminal groups to exist in exchange for greater social peace. The government may collude with a cartel, allowing a select group to pursue their illicit activities, so long as they promise to eliminate violence (Hill 2004; Paden 2011; Hope 2013; Francesco 2007). This relationship often entails the criminal group sharing profits with government agents, thereby corrupting the state. **The breakdown of such collusive rackets between public officials and organized crime groups – usually as a result of a change in government to one in competition with organized**

criminals for criminal markets, or one that supports strong law enforcement – can lead to violence as criminal groups no longer have an incentive to maintain peace if they know they will soon be prosecuted (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009, Friman 2009).

Decentralized government systems or nearby borders may encourage violence from organized criminal groups by inhibiting law enforcement efforts. Organized criminals may exploit governmental failures to act as a single decision-making entity by coordinating their use of violence with other networks, as is the case in Cape Town (Goga 2014). Sometimes, this takes the form of different laws in different sub-national states or local entities that enable criminals to commit crimes in one jurisdiction and flee to another. Corruption within one national, state, or local government can also increase violence in another, as when organized criminal groups use one corrupted municipality as a safe haven from which to conduct criminal operations and violence in another (Rios 2014). Transitional governments also provide opportunities for criminal networks to develop (Shaw and Reitano 2013).

The balloon effect can contribute to violence when cartels shift power between countries due to increasingly effective law enforcement. For instance, the success of authorities in a drug-producing nation therefore makes drug trafficking less profitable in that country, but rather than completely ending operations, traffickers shift operations to other countries. This leads to a "progressive contamination" of more countries in the region by the drug trade and its accompanying violence (Arnson et al 2011; Bagley 2012; Castillo, Mejia and Restrepo 2013; Rasmussen et al 1993; Friman 2009).

POLICY INTERVENTIONS

Creating national level law enforcement bodies: Can be effective if empowered and politically supported
Because organized crime thrives on corrupting the state, moving law enforcement from more easily corrupted local officials to a national level is a common strategy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the first national law enforcement entity in the U.S., enabled mafia prosecution by overcoming the corrupted law enforcement maintained by local municipal machines. However, the creation of the FBI was not sufficient, effectiveness had to wait until the FBI was under leadership that supported long, slow case-building needed to prosecute organized criminal cases (Reuter 1995). Georgia's mass firing of its law enforcement bodies and consolidation into an effective and non-corrupt force enabled it to corral its mafia by eliminating the protective layer of police, prison officials, and politicians who had protected them: however, this was done through increasingly authoritarian and brutal methods that moved violence from the purview of criminals to that of the state, but with minimal additional legal protections for citizens (Slade 2013; Kupatadze 2013). On the other hand, mass firings of corrupt law enforcement officials in Mexico is seen by Reuter (2009) as exacerbating violence by removing the connective tissue between organized criminals and the state, forcing the former to respond with violence.

Inter-jurisdictional Cooperation among Local Law Enforcement: Can be an Important Element of Intervention Strategy
When police forces are fragmented, inter-jurisdictional cooperation can improve crime deterrence and result in lower crime rates, with a particular emphasis on homicides according to Durante and Gutierrez (2013). Both scholars elaborate on how inter-jurisdictional cooperation also reduces crime in the case of same-party neighbors, given its independent political alignment with the state and federal authorities.

Legal and Regulatory Approaches Targeting Criminal Organizations: Can be essential to breaking mafia control, but can also enable political exploitation
The U.S. fight against organized crime was greatly assisted by plea-bargaining laws which allowed law enforcement to infiltrate and break collusive groups by enabling members to turn on one another in exchange for immunity, and by so-called Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise

(CCE) statutes that defined racketeering and criminal organizations broadly to enable more significant penalties (Raab 2006; Reuter 1995). Conspiracy laws in Britain and laws on harassment and criminal association in New Zealand serve a similar purpose. These techniques were appropriated to positive effect in Sicily and in Georgia in successfully combatting organized criminal syndicates. However, in Georgia these methods were distorted to abet an authoritarian state which used plea-bargaining language to erect its own extortion racket against businesses that had been engaged in corrupt practices (Slade 2013). According to Hill (2004, 2006), the 1992 countermeasures law (botaiho) successfully pressured organized crime groups to use significantly less violence by closing gang offices during periods of open violent conflict. The threat of closure led mafia groups to resolve disputes to avoid parent organizations' facing headquarters closure. This peculiarly Japanese solution, given its particularly open organized crime, suggests various localized means of applying pressure.

Civil Litigation and Asset Seizure Targeting Individual Crime Bosses: *Appear to be effective methods for reducing the power of organized criminal groups*

In Japan, civil litigation against organized crime bosses to hold them responsible for killings by subordinates has led syndicate leaders to place stricter controls on the use of violence by sub-groups (Hill 2004, 2006). Asset seizure was similarly used by authorities in Georgia to break the power and attraction of organized criminals to future recruits (Slade 2013, Shelley 2007).

Harsher drug use law: *May simply crowd the court system and marginalize communities*

Harsh anti-drug laws, such as the Rockefeller Drug Laws of the early 1970s in New York State, may be politically popular as part of get-tough-on-crime policies. Kohler-Hausmann (2010) concludes that the Rockefeller drug laws were not only ineffective in reducing drug use and crime, but that they also paralyzed the court system with low priority offenders, despite their political success. Similar zero-tolerance laws in Georgia led to a 300% increase in prisoners, creating overcrowding and abuse (Slade 2013). California faced similar prison overcrowding as a result of its "three-strikes" and other punitive laws. In the United States, disproportionate enforcement of laws prohibiting drug use and low-level dealership in low-income and minority areas have increased the jailing of this population and the marginalization of these communities, arguably leading to increased violence.

Legalization of criminal activities: *Can be effective but may lead to broadening of criminal action*

In the United States, alcohol prohibition laws at state and national levels notoriously abetted the mafia by turning a significant legal market into an illicit one. The repeal of Prohibition weakened the U.S.-based mafia, but did not destroy it, as it spread into other illicit and licit markets (Raab 2006). However, Prohibition's repeal did appear to make the mafia less violent by removing a particularly unstable market (Reuter 1995). Similar discussions are now underway with regards to some drug markets.

Drug Prohibition and Crackdowns: *Tends to be counterproductive and exacerbates violence*

Policy interventions that involve militarized and harsh enforcement approaches to drug related violence are counter-productive and actually exacerbate violence, in line with research taken from case studies in Japan, the U.S., Mexico, Central and Latin America, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. As demonstrated by Andreas and Wallman (2009), as police crackdowns remove illicit actors, new members rise up to fill the vacuum and claim market share through violent competition. For example, Friman (2009) argues that Mexican cartels filled the vacuum left by Colombian cartels in methamphetamine markets in the U.S. and Japan and the cocaine market in the U.S., Mexico, and Colombia. Similarly, Castillo, Mejia and Restrepo (2014) found that Mexican violence increased during months when drug supplies from Colombia decreased. They reason that cocaine seizures in Colombia drove up prices and therefore inter-group violence in Mexico, a finding supported by Castillo et al (2014). Additionally, Mexican

government crackdowns on drug trafficking organizations significantly increased police-criminal violence, violence between drug tracking groups, and violence in adjacent municipalities when drug trafficking routes were diverted because of crackdowns (Dell 2013).

Thus, Reuter (2009) calls for policies that target drug prohibition to be tailored to underlying factors causing violence in order to limit conflict. Ultimately, despite significant resources devoted to fighting organized crime and related violence, Levi and Maguire (2004) confirm the absence of rigorous research evaluating the efficacy of programs in reducing crime or violence.

Removing leadership: May be effective for hierarchically organized groups in locales with less inter-group contestation, may increase violence for semi-autonomous networks and locales with more inter-group contestation

A common tactic in the fight against violent organized criminals is to remove the top levels of leadership. Jones (2013), Guerrero (2011), and Calderon et al (2013) suggest that the decapitation strategy of capturing or killing narco-trafficking kingpins has increased violence in Mexico. On the other hand, in counter-insurgent literature, more recent and robust studies suggest the "decapitation" strategy may be an effective tool (Johnston 2012 and Price 2013); while older studies suggest the strategy does not lead to success (Jordan 2009; David 2002). Research is still needed to see if this finding can be generalized outside of the narco-trafficking field to other forms of organized crime, and if it holds outside of Mexico. Calderon, Robles, Magaloni, and Diaz-Cayeros suggest that the decapitation strategy may function more effectively for hierarchically organized groups, but be less useful for networks of autonomous or semi-autonomous cells such as Mexican drug trafficking organizations, and in areas where more groups are competing. In these latter cases, decapitation can cause rival groups to fight over turf and can lead to intra-group succession violence.

Militarization of law enforcement: Tends to increase both criminal and law-enforcement fueled violence

A common strategy to combat violent organized crime is to increase the militarization of law enforcement, which is believed to provide police forces with the capacity and resources to overcome the force of criminal groups, and also to remove law enforcement purview from often corrupted local bodies. However, Shirk (2011) explores how militarized strategies against drug cartels in Mexico – which involved replacing law enforcement personnel with career military officers, deploying thousands of troops to man checkpoints, and running street patrols to oversee other domestic law enforcement operations – increased violence and homicides in Mexico by the military as well as criminals. Quantitative and qualitative evidence from Australia and the U.S. also strongly suggests that increasing drug law enforcement and arrests will increase drug related violence, according to Web et al (2011). In one comparative study of Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil, Lessing (2012) argues that state crackdown is more likely to succeed when repression is conditional on the use of violence rather than unconditional.

Focused Deterrence and Selective Targeting of Most-Violent Groups: May Create Vacuums of Power; Impact on violence unclear

Several studies defend focused deterrence and selective targeting against the most violent groups as a strategy for reducing violence, which allows law enforcement to overcome low capacity and under-resourcing issues (Felbab-Brown 2012). By moving away from random non-strategic strikes against all organized criminal groups, the police can strategically select which groups to dismantle. Kleiman (2011) adds that because most drug dealers are not violent, law enforcement officials should focus on arresting the most aggressive drug-dealing individuals and groups, which would lead to the double benefit of curtailing the capacity of the most violent actors and deterring the rest from violence.

Focused deterrence, however, has produced mixed effects. While Reuter (2009) argues that selective incarceration of the most violent participants, coupled with the maturity of the market and its participants, helped

decrease violence in U.S. crack markets in the late 1980s, cases targeting gang leaders actually increased inter-gang violence by removing important points of contact between groups, from which multiple new leaders emerged. In a qualitative study of Sydney, Australia's heroin market, Maher and Dixon (1999) also suggest that the removal of key players from the illegal drug market created new financial opportunities for other individuals ready to fill the vacuum by entering the market.

Cartel fragmentation: May make violence more unpredictable and chaotic

A different method for dismantling organized crime and violence is the fragmentation of cartels. This involves breaking cartels into smaller, manageable pieces, and downsizing drug traffickers from a nation-wide security threat to a public, local security problem. In the context of Mexico, Shirk (2011) and Guerrero-Gutierrez (2011) argue that there are several reasons why splintering groups into smaller fragments may not be beneficial in reducing violence. First, making the problem smaller does not necessarily mean it is more manageable; in fact, cartel fragmentation has led to a much more chaotic and unpredictable pattern of violence across Mexico. Additionally, splintering groups into smaller organizations has led to a diversification of violent crimes including kidnapping, bank robbery, human smuggling, trafficking, and oil siphoning. Secondly, the cartel fragmentation strategy has not been applied evenly across all cartels. Officials have focused primarily on major organized groups that present the greatest danger to society, which actually abandons original objectives of the fragmentation approach. By focusing on some but not other organized criminal enterprises, well-positioned groups that have averted officials' attention have been able to go about their business undisturbed; the choice of which groups to fragment may also lead to further corruption of law enforcement via pay offs from groups that are strengthened by the elimination of their rivals.

Crop eradication: Tends to increase violence

An alternative policy for dismantling criminal enterprises focuses on crop eradication efforts to reduce drug supply and the subsequent violence that stems from drug trafficking. The U.S. government allocated $1.962 billion in 2013 for international drug control activities, with $653.3 million for counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan and Central Asia and $114 million for Colombian-led interdiction, eradication, and security (ONDCP, 2012). Despite these large resource commitments, systemic review of numerous empirical studies suggests that crop eradication has largely been found to be ineffective in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru (Higginson et al; Dion and Russler 2008; World Bank 2004). Scholars claim that it not only fails to reduce illicit crop cultivation, but also intensifies violent conflict that is associated with significant human costs such as displacement and health issues related to fumigation. In 2004, the World Bank reported that crop eradication intensified political grievances and violent conflict in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, asserting that crop eradication can be counterproductive. It can also result in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs and displace production to more remote areas, making the transition to growing marijuana or opium poppy easier when farmers suffer from price decreases in legitimate crops like maize (Dube, Garcia-Ponce and Thom 2013).

Interdiction: Can reduce drug flows while increasing violence

The U.S. frequently supports drug interdiction initiatives to reduce drug flow across its borders. Interdiction in Colombia has proven to be more cost-effective than crop eradication efforts. However, both have had questionable effectiveness, particularly in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, according to Mejia and Restrepo (2011). Both authors argue that there is a difference between the effectiveness of interdiction and eradication efforts, in part because supply reduction policies become less effective as they raise prices. Castillo, Mejia, and Restrepo (2014) provide additional evidence on the supply shortages caused by cocaine seizures in Colombia that drove up prices and increased homicide rates in Mexico.

Civil Society Empowerment: Successful strategy that may be difficult for government to launch

In Sicily, popular turning against organized crime was essential to its demise (Orlando 2003, Johnson and Soeters 2008). Scholars Vanda Felbab-Brown and David Kilcullen similarly argue that breaking community support for organized crime is important in its demise, in cases from Central America to Afghanistan. However, such criminal forces are often able to lodge in countries in which weak, venal, or corrupted states have lost legitimacy with their citizens (Felbab-Brown 2012; Kilcullen 2013). This makes state efforts to regain legitimacy an important prerequisite to citizen movements: as occurred in Sicily when the mafia killed some infamous "clean hands" judges and prosecutors who were attempting to fight mafia influence in politics. While it is possible for citizens to rise up against both the state and criminal organizations, this can result in insurgency that is even more violent.

Sources

Africa Watch, (1993 November). Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf

Ajzenman, N., Glaiani, S., & Seira, E. (2014). On the Distributed Costs of Drug-Related Homicides. Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/publication/distributed-costs-drug-related-homicides-working-paper-364

Andreas, P., & Wallman, J. (2009). Illicit markets and violence: what is the relationship? *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 52, 225-229.

Arias, E.D. (2006). *Drugs and democracy in Rio de Janeiro: trafficking, social networks, and public security*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Arnson, C., Olson, E., Dudley, S., Bosworth, J., Farah, D., & Lopez, J. (2011). Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle. *Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Report on the Americas*, 29.

Autesserre, S. (2010). *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Avakame, F., & McCoy. (1999). "Did you call the police? What did they do?" An empirical assessment of black's theory of mobilization of law. *Justice Quarterly*, 16(4), 765-792.

Bagley, B. (2012). Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major trends in the Twenty-First Century. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Update on the Americas August 2012.

Baird, A. (2012). The violent gang and the construction of masculinity amongst socially excluded young men. *Safer Communities*, 11(4), 179-190.

Bakrania, S. (2013). Policy responses to criminal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. GSDRC, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HDQ934.pdf

Baumer, E.P. (2002). Neighborhood disadvantage and police notification by victims of violence. *Criminology*, 40, 579-616.

Becker, H. S. (1963). *Outsiders: Studies in Sociology of Deviance*. New York: The Free Press.

Beckett, K. & Western, B. (2001). Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy. *Punishment and Society*, 3(1), 43-59.

Beckett, K., & Sasson, T. (2000). *The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Beittel, J. S. (2011). *Mexico's drug trafficking organizations: source and scope of the rising violence*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Bekoe, D.A., (2012). *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa*, U.S. Institutes of Peace.

Bell, D. (1962). *The End of Ideology*. New York: Free Press.

Bennet, R. (2010). *Nurturing Democracy in the Horn of Africa: Somaliland's First Elections, 2002-2005. Innovations for Successful Societies.*

Bennett, T., Holloway, K., & Farrington, D. (2008). The Effectiveness of Neighborhood Watch. *Cambell Systematic Review.* 2008(8).

Bennett, R. R. & Wiegand, R. B. (1994), Observations on Crime Reporting in a Developing Nation. *Criminology,* 32, 135–148.

Benson B.L., Leburn I.S., & Rasmussen D.W. (2001). The impact of drug enforcement on crime: an investigation of the opportunity cost of police resources. *Journal of Drug Issues,* 31(989).

Benson B.L., & Rasmussen D.W. (1998). Deterrence and public policy: trade-offs in the allocation of police resources. *International Review of Law and Economics,* 18(24).

Boone, C. (2009). Electoral Populism Where Property Rights are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. *Comparative Politics,* 41(2), 183-201.

Braga, A., Papachristos & A., Hureau, D. (2012). Hot Spots Policing Effects on Crime. *Campbell Systematic Reviews.*

Braga, A.A. & Weisburd, D. (2012). "The Effects of Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,* 49(3), 323-358.

Braga, A.A., & Weisburd, D. (2012). Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime. *Crime Prevention Research Review,* 6. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Braga, A.A. & Weisburd, D. (2010). *Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Braga, A., Kennedy, D.M., Piehl, A.M, Waring, & E.J. (2001). Problem Oriented Policing, Deterrence and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,* 38(3), 195-225.

Braga, A. (2007). The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime. *Campbell Systemic Reviews.*

Braga, A., Weisburd, D., Waring, E., Mazerolle, L., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized controlled experiment. *Criminology,* 37, 541-580.

Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. (2013). Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-Conflict Stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 57, 822-853.

Bratton, W. (1998). *Crime Is Down in New York City: Blame the Police.* The IEA Health and Welfare Unit. London: Revised Second Edition.

Brenneman, R. (2012). *Homies and Hermanos: Gods and Gangs in Central America,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brownstein, H., Crimmins, S., & Spunt, B., (2000). A conceptual framework for operationalizing the relationship between violence and drug market stability. *Contemporary Drug Problems,* 27, 867-890.

Bruce, D. (2009). Dictating the local balance of power: Election-related violence in South Africa. *SA Crime Quarterly*, 28, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CQ28BRUCE.PDF

(2014). *Just Singing and Dancing? Intimidation and the Manipulation of Voters and the Electoral Process in the Build-up to the 2014 Elections*. Community Agency for Social Enquiry.

Brumm, H.J., Cloninger D.O., (1995). The drug war and the homicide rate: a direct correlation? *The Cato Journal*, 14(8).

Buchanan, C., DeAngelo, L., Ma, R., & Taylor, C. (2012). Americas Barometer Insights. *Americas Barometer*, 80, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO880en.pdf

Bushway, S. & Reuter, P. (1997). Labor Markets and Crime Risk Factors, in Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., Bushway, S. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress*. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.

Calderon, G., Robles, G., Magaloni, B., & Diaz-Cayeros, A. (2013). The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico's Drug War. *White Paper*.

Callahan, C., Rivera, F., & Koepsell, T. (1995). Money For Guns: Evaluation of the Seattle Gun Buy-Back Program. In Plotkin, M., ed., *Under Fire: Gun Buy-backs, Exchanges, and Amnesty Programs*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Castillo, J.C., Mejia, D. & Restrepo, P. (2013). Illegal drug markets and violence in Mexico: The causes beyond Calderon. Working Paper, Universidad de los Andes.

Centre for Policy Studies. (1993). Crying Peace Where There is None? The Functioning and Future of Local Peace Committees of the National Peace Accord. *Johannesburg Research Report*, 31.

Chan, J. (1997). *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society. Cambridge & Melbourne*: Cambridge University Press.

Chaturvedi, A. (2005). Rigging elections with violence. *Public Choice*, 125(1-2), 189-202.

Chaubey, V. (2011). Cooling Ethnic Conflict over a Heated Election: Guyana, 2001-2006. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Clarke, R.V., & Harris, P. (1992). Auto theft and its prevention. In Tonry. M., (ed.), *Crime and justice: A review of research*, 16, 1-54. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cohen, F. (1997). Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(607).

Cohen, L.E., and Felson, M.K. (2013). *Routine Activity Theory*. Encyclopedia of Criminology. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Collier, P. & Vincente, P.C. (2012). Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Public Choice*, 153 (1-2), 117-147.

Cornish, D.B. & Clarke, R.V. (1985). Situational prevention, displacement of crime and rational choice theory. *Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory Intro Practice*. London: HMSO.

Crime. (2010). Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence. Paper presented at the Global Gangs Workshop, Centre on Conflict Development, and Peacebuilding, Geneva.

Cruz, J.M. (2007). Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational Protection Rackets. *Global Crime.*

(2009). *Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence*. Paper presented at the Global Gangs Workshop, Centre on Conflict Development, and Peacebuilding, Geneva.

Dammert, L. & Malone, M. (2006). Does It Take a Village? Policing Strategies and Fear of Crime in Latin America. *Latin American Politics & Society*, 48(4), 27-51.

Datta, S. (2005). Political Violence in Bangladesh: Trends and Causes. *Strategic Analysis*, 29(3), 427-447.

David, S. R. (2003). Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing. In Efraim Inbar, (ed.) *Democracies and Small Wars*. London: Frank Cass.

Decker, S. & Curry, G.D. (2002). Gangs, gang homicides, and gang loyalty: Organized crimes or disorganized criminals.

Dell, M. (2013). *Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War*. Working Paper.

Diallo, I. (2014). *A Profile of Crime Markets in Dakar*. Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/a-profile-of-crime-markets-in-dakar

Dion, M. & Russler, C. (2008). Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia. *Journal for Latin American Studies*, 40, 399-421.

Diaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., Matanock, A., & Romero, V. (2011). Living in Fear: Social Penetration of Criminal Organizations in Mexico. *White Paper*.

Dube, O. & Vargas, J. (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80 (4), 1384-1421.

(2012). *Cross-border Spillover: US Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico*. APSA Annual Meeting Paper.

Dube, O., Garcia-Ponce, O., & Thom, K. (2014). From Maize to Haze: Agricultural Shocks and the Growth of the Mexican Drug Sector. http://omargarciaponce.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/maize_to_haze.pdf

Dudley-Jenkins, L. (2005). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 64(2), 508-510.

Dudley, S. (2010). How Mano Dura is strengthening Gangs. *Insight Crime*. http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs

Durante, R., & Gutierrez, E. (2013). Fighting Crime with a little help from my friends: party affiliation, inter-jurisdictional cooperation and crime in Mexico. LIEEP: Science Po.

Ellman, M., & Wantchekon, L. (2000). Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(2), 499–531.

Fagan, J., Zimring, F.E., & Kim, J. (1998). Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 88, 127-1323.

Faull, A. (2011). *Corruption in the South African Police Service: Civilian Perceptions and Experiences*. Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/corruption-in-the-south-african-police-service-civilian-perceptions-and-experiences

(2011). *Oversight Agencies in South Africa and the Challenge of Police Corruption*. Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/oversight-agencies-in-south-africa-and-the-challenge-of-police-corruption

Felbab-Brown, V. (2013). Focused deterrence, selective targeting, drug trafficking and organized crime: concepts and practicalities. *Modernizing Drug Law Enforcement Report 2*. International Drug Policy Consortium.

(2012). *Aspiration and Ambivalence*. Washington DC: Brookings Institute.

Finklea, K. M., Krouse, W. J., & Rosenblum, M. R. (2011). *Southwest border violence: Issues in identifying and measuring spillover violence*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41075_20110125.pdf

Fox, E. (2012). Is Belize's Gang Truce Breaking Down? *InSight Crime*. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/is-belizes-gang-truce-breaking-down

Frencesco, S. (2007). The Decade Horribilis: Organized Violence and Organized Crime along the Balkan Peripheries, 1991-2001. University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Frazer, J. E. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2011). *Preventing Electoral Violence in Africa*. New York: Carnegie Mellon University Press.

Friman, H. R., (2009). Drug markets and the selective use of violence. *Crime Law and Social Change*, 52(3), 285–295.

Frühling, H. (2012). A realistic look at Latin American community policing programs. *Policing and Society*, 22(1), 76-88.

Gatti, V., Tremblay, R.E., Vitaro, F., & McDuff, P. (2005). Youth gang, delinquency, and drug use: A test of the selection, facilitation, and enhancement hypotheses. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 46(11), 1178-1190.

Gill, C., Weisburd, D., Telep. C., Vitter, Z., & Bennett, T. (2014). Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder, and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: A systematic review. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*.

Gledhill, J., (2013). La Mala Administración De La Seguridad pública1/The Maladministration of Public Security. *Revista de Antropologia Social*, 22, 25-57.

Global Homicide Rates. *iGarape, Global Study on Drugs and Crime*. http://hglobe.igarape.org.br/

Goga, K. (2014). The Drug Trade and Governance in Cape Town. Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/the-drug-trade-and-governance-in-cape-town

Goldstein, A., Glick, B., & Carthon, W. (1994). *The Prosocial gang*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Goldstein, P. (1985). The Drug/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework. *Journal of Drug Issues*, 39, 143-174.

Goudriaan, H., Wittebrood, K., & Nieuwbeerta, P. (2006). Neighborhood characteristics and reporting crime: Effects of social cohesion, confidence in police effectiveness and socio-economic disadvantage. *British Journal of Criminology*, 46.

Guerrero-Gutierrez, E. (2011). "La raíz de la violencia." Nexos. http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14318

Hafner-Burton, E., Hyde, S. & Jablonski, R., (2014). When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? *British Journal of Political Science*, 44, 149-179.

Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1816-1992. *American Political Science Review*, 95(1), 33-48.

Hickman, J. (2011). Explaining Post-Election Violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 28(1), 29-46. http://search.proquest.com/docview/884214924?accountid=40995

Higazi, A. (2011). The Jos Crisis: A Recurrent Nigerian Tragedy. Friedrich Evert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07812.pdf

Higginson et al, (2014). The Effectiveness of Crop Targeting Interventions for Drug Control: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. The University of Queensland, Institute for Social Science Research.

Hill, P., (2006). *The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State, New Ed*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

(2004). The Changing Face of the Yakuza. *Global Crime*, 6(1), 97–116.

Hinkle, J.C. & Weisburd, D. (2008). Irony of Broken Windows Policing: A Micro-Place Study of the Relationship Between Disorder, Focused Police Crackdowns and Fear of Crime. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 36(6), 503-512.

Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hoffman, B., & Smith, E. (2010). Preventing Post Election Violence in Africa. United States Agency for International Development by Democracy International, Inc.

Höglund, K. & Jarstad, A. (2010). Strategies to prevent and manage electoral violence: Considerations for policy. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4737~v~Strategies_to_prevent_and_manage_electoral_violence__Considerations_for_policy.pdf

Holland, A. (2013). Right on Crime? Conservative Party Politics and Mano Dura Policies in El Salvador. *Latin American Research Review*, 48(1), 44-67.

Hope, A. (2013). In Mexico, obfuscating crime numbers. *Dallas Morning News*. http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/sunday-commentary/20130517-alejandro-hope-in-mexico-obfuscating-crime-numbers.ece

Horowitz, D. (1991). *A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society Berkeley*: University of California Press.

Howell, J.C. (2010). Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs. *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*.

(1998). Promising Programs for Youth Gang Violence Prevention and Intervention. In Loeber, R., & Farrington, D.P., (Eds.) *Report of the Study Group on Serious, Violent, Chronic Juvenile Offenders*. Washington, DC: OJJDP

(1995). Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders. Washington, DC: OJJDP.

Hunter, R., & Jeffrey, C.R. (1992). Preventing convenience store robbery through environmental design. In Clarke, R. (ed.), *Situational crime prevention: Successful case studies*, 194-204. Albany, New York: Harrow and Heston.

Hurst, G. (2013). Belize Registers Record Murders in 2012. *IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis*.

Hyunseok, J., Hoover, L.T., & Lawton, B.A. (2008). Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates. J*ournal of Criminal Justice*, 36:6, 529-538.

ICG.   (2012, June). Bangaldesh: Back to the Future. *International Crisis Group*.

(2012, December). Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis. *International Crisis Group.*

(2006, September). Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan. *International Crisis Group.*

(2014, January). Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan. *International Crisis Group.*

IFES Q&A with Former Chief Election Commissioner of India Dr. SY Quaraishi. (2014). International Foundation for Electoral Systems. http://ifes.org/Content/Publications/Interviews/2014/IFES-QA-with-Former-Chief-Election-Commissioner-of-India-Dr-SY-Quraishi.aspx

Indermaur, D. (1999). Situational prevention of violent crime: Theory and practice in Australia. *Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention*, 8:1, 71-87.

International Centre for Science in Drug Policy. (2010). *Effect of drug law enforcement on drug-related violence: Evidence from a scientific review*. Vancouver, Canada.

Issacharoff, L. (2010). Keeping the Peace in a Tense Election, Ghana, 2008. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Jackson, R. (2013, April). Creating Avenues to Resolve Election Disputes: Conflict Management Committees in Zambia, 2001-2011. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

(2013, July). Mediating Election Conflict in a Bruised Society: Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees in Post-War Sierra Leone, 2006-2012. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

(2013, July) Using Conflict Management Panels to Resolve Tension in the Second Post-Apartheid Election: South Africa, 1999 – 2000. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Jacques, S. & Wright, R. (2008). The relevance of peace to studies of drug market violence. *Criminology*, 46(1), 221–254.

Jaffrelot, C. & Maheshwari, M. (1998). Hindu Nationalism and Violence, Revolution to Terrorism. http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri

Jang, H., Hoover L.T., & Lawton, B.A. (2008). Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 36(6), 529-538.

Jarstad, A.K. (2009). The Prevalence of Power Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace. *Africa Spectrum* 3, 41-62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/40607823.pdf

Johnson, H.N., Soeters, J.L., et al (2008). Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and the Chances of a Reversible Destiny. *Political Studies*, 56(1), 166-191.

Jones, N. (2013). The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies kidnap rates and the Arellano-Felix Organization. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 16 (2), 156-176.

Jordan, J. (2009). When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation. *Security Studies*, 18(4), 719-755.

Jütersonke, O. Muggah, R., & Rodgers, D. (2009). Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America. *Security Dialogue*, 40(4-5), 373-397.

Kahn, T., (2004). Policıa comunitaria: evaluando la experiencia de Sao Paulo, in: H. Frühling and A. Candina, Eds. *En participacion ciudadana y reformas a la policıa en America del Sur*, Santiago: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo, 188-225.

Kane, R. J. (2005). Compromised police legitimacy as a predictor of violent crime in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods. *Criminology*, 43(2), 469–498.

Kelling, G. & Wilson, J., (1982). Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety. *The Atlantic*. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/

Kennedy, D. M. (2009). *Deterrence and crime prevention: Reconsidering the prospect of sanction*. New York: Routledge.

Kennedy, D. M., Piehl, A.M. & Braga, A.A. (1996). Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use Reduction Strategy. *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 59:1.

Kleiman, M. (2011). Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars: Smarter Policies for Both sides of the Border. *Foreign Affairs*, 90(5), 89-101.

Kilcullen, D. (2013). *Out of the Mountains*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Klopp, J. (2001). Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 35(3), 473-517

Kohler-Hausmann, J. (2010). The Attila the Hun Law: New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Making of a Punitive State. *Journal of Social History*, 44(1), 71-95.

Koper, C. S., & Mayo-Wilson, E. (2006). Police crackdowns on illegal gun carrying: a systematic review of their impact on gun crime. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 2, 227-261.

Kupatadze, A. (2014). *Organized Crime, political transitions and state formation in post-soviet Eurasia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kuris, G. & Mawson, A. (2011). Managing a New Model for Elections: Lesotho, 1998-2011. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Latin American Public Opinion Project. (2011). Americas Barometer 2010. Vanderbilt University.

Laub, J. H. & Sampson, R.J. (1993). Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change Matters to the Study of Crime. *Criminology*, 31, 301-325.

Laub, J.K. (1981). Ecological considerations in victim reporting to the police. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 9(6), 419-430.

Laycock, G. (1991). Operation identification, or the power of publicity? *Security Journal*, 2, 67-72.

Lemarchand, R. (2008). *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lessing, B. (2012). *The Logic of Violence in Criminal War*. Dissertation in Political Science. University of California: Berkeley.

Levi, M., & Maguire, M. (2004). Reducing and preventing organized crime: An evidence-based critique. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 41(5), 397-469. http://search.proquest.com/docview/216177280?accountid=40995

Levitt S.D. & Venkatesh S.A. (2000). An economic analysis of a drug-selling gang's finances. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 35.

Litmanovitz, Y., & Montgomery, P. (2011). Training programs to improve attitudes, skills, and behaviors of police officers regarding democratic norms. Centre for Evidence Based Interventions, University of Oxford. The Campbell Collaboration.

MacKenzie, Eck, J., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (2009). Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report to the United States Congress, University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.

Maher, L. & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health: law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. *British Journal of Criminology* 39, 488.

Majeed, R. (2010). Implementing Standards without the Force of Law: India's Electoral Conduct Code, 1990-2001. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Manning, P. K., (2010). *Democratic policing in a changing world*. Boulder: Paradigm.

Mansfield, E., & Snyder, J. (2007). *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Mapping Citizen Security. *iGarape*, Inter-American Development Bank. 2014. http://igarape.data4.mx/

Mawson, A. (2010, October). Compromise and Trust-Building After Civil War: Elections Administration in Mozambique, 1994. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

(2010, February). Organizing the First Post-Apartheid Election, South Africa, 1994. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Mejia, D., & Restrepo, P. (2013). *The Economics of the War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking*. Working Paper.

Mejia, D., & Restrepo, P. (2011). *The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia*. Working Paper.

Meyer & Seelke. (2012). Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf

Milhaupt, C.J., West, M.D. (2002). The Dark Side of Private ordering: an institutional and empirical analysis of organized crime. *University of Chicago Law Review*, 67(1), 41-98.

Miron, J.A. (2001). Violence, guns, and drugs: a cross-country analysis. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 44, 615.

Mitchell, P. (2014). The Single Transferable Vote and Ethnic Conflict: The Evidence from Northern Ireland. *Electoral Studies*, 33(1), 246-257.

Moniruzzaman, M. (2009). Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh: Issues, Manifestation and Consequences. *South Asian Survey*, 16(1), 81-99.

Naidu, R. (1990). Old Cities, New Predicaments: A Study of Hyderabad. New Delhi: Sage.

Naidu, R., & Dube, O. (2010). Bases, Bullets and Ballots : The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia. Center for Global Development. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542699##

Naylor, R.T. (2009). Violence and illegal economic activity: a deconstruction. *Crime, Law, and Social Change*, 52, 231-242.

Newham, G. & Faull, A. (2011). Protector Predator? Tackling Police Corruption in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/monographs/protector-or-predator-tackling-police-corruption-in-south-africa

Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP]. (2012). The National Drug Control Budget: FY 2013 Funding Highlights. http://www.whitehouse.go/ondcp/the-national-drug-control-budget-fy-2013-fundinghighlights

O'Kane, J.M. (2002). *The Crooked Ladder: Gangsters, Ethnicity, and the American Dream*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Orlando, L. (2003). *Fighting the Mafia and Renewing Sicilian Culture*. New York: Encounter Books.

Osorio, J. (2013). Hobbes on Drugs: Understanding Drug Violence in Mexico. http://media.wix.com/ugd/76b255_675f00d2a50ceebfd89750ae3b6969ae.pdf

Ouimet, M. (2012). A world of homicides: The effect of economic development, excess poverty and income inequality on the homicide rate for 167 countries in 2008. *Homicide Studies*,16(3), 238-258.

Paden, J. (2013). Midterm Challenges in Nigeria: Elections, Parties, and Regional Conflict. *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*. www.usip.org

Paluck, E.L. & Green, D.P. (2009). Deference, Dissent, and Dispute Resolution: An Experimental Intervention Using Mass Media to Change Norms and Behavior in Rwanda. *American Political Science Review*. 103(4), 622–644.

Paoili, L. (2007). Mafia and organized crime: the unacknowledged successes of law enforcement West European Politics. *Frank Cass and Company Ltd*, 30, 854-880.

Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Papachristos, A. V., Meares, T. L, & Fagan, J. (2007). Attention felons: Evaluation Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 4, 223-272.

Pease, K. (1991). The Kirkholt project: Preventing burglary on a British public housing estate. *Security Journal*, 2, 73-77.

Pereira, A. & Ungar, M. (2004). The Persistence of the "Mano Aura": Authoritarian Legacies and Policing in Brazil and the Southern Cone. In *Authoritarian Legacies Democracy Latin America Southern Europe*, Eds. Cesarini, P. & Hite, K. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Pierce, G., Spaar, S., & Briggs, L. (1988). *The character of police work: strategic and tactical implications*. Boston, MA: Center for Applied Social Research, Northeastern University.

Pollard, C. (1998). Zero Tolerance: Short-term Fix, Long-term Liability? In *Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society*. IEA Health and Welfare Unit (London), Revised Second Edition.

Prado, M.M., Trebilcock, M., & Hartford, P. (2012). Police Reform in Violent Democracies in Latin America. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 4(2), 252-285.

Raab, S. (2006). *Five Families: The Rise, Decline, and Resurgence of America's Most Powerful Mafia Empires*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.

Rahman, H. Z. (1990) Landscape of Violence: Local Elections and Political Culture in Bangladesh. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25(47), 2622-2624

Ramsey, G. (2012). Tracking El Salvador's Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC. *Insight Crime*.

Rasmussen, D.W., Benson, B.L., & Sollars, D.L. (1993). Spatial competition in illicit drug markets: the consequences of increased drug war enforcement. *Review of Regional Studies* 123(219).

Ratcliffe, J. H., Taniguchi, T., Groff, E.R. & Wood, J.D. (2011). The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots. *Criminology*, 49, 795–831.

Reilly, B. (2008). *Post-War elections: uncertain turning points of transition*. Cambridge Books Online http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755859

Resignato, A.J. (2000). Violent crime: a function of drug use or drug enforcement? *Applied Economics*, 32, 681.

Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. In Special Issue: Illicit Markets and Violence, Edited by Andreas, P. & Wallman, *J. Crime, Law and Social Change*, 52(3), 275-284.

(1995). The Decline of the American Mafia. *The Public Interest*, 120, 89-99.

Riccioa, V., Ruedigerb, M.A, Rossc, S.D., & Skogan, W. (2013). Community policing in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro. *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, 14(4).

Riley, D. & O'Hare, P.A. (1998). Reducing the harms of drugs and HIV: policies & practices around the world. *XII International AIDS Conference*, 12, 667.

Rios, V. (2014). The Role of Government Coordination in Crime Deterrence and Citizen Security Mexico. Forthcoming in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Rivera, L.G. (2010). Discipline and Punish? Youth Gangs' Response to 'Zero-tolerance' Policies in Honduras. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 29(4), 492–504.

Roberts, B. & Chen, Y. (2013). Drugs, Violence, and the State. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 39, 105-125.

Robles, G., Calderon, G., & Beatriz Magaloni. (2012). *The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico*. Working Paper, Program on Poverty and Governance, Stanford University.

Rosenbaum, D. P. (2006). The limits of hot spots policing. In Weisburd, D., & Braga, A.A., (Eds.), Police innovation: Contrasting perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press, 245-   263.

Rosenbaum, D. (1987). The Theory and Research behind Neighborhood Watch: Is it a Sound Fear and Crime Reduction Strategy? *Crime & Delinquency*, 33(1), 103-134.

Rosenfeld, R. (1995). Gun Buybacks: Crime Control or Community Mobilization. In Plotkin, M., (Eds.), *Under Fire: Gun Buy-backs, Exchanges, and Amnesty Programs*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Ruback, B.R. & Ménard, K.S. (2001). Rural-urban differences in sexual victimization and reporting: Analyses using UCR and crisis center data. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 28(2), 131-155.

Sabet, D. (2010). Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dms76/policefiles/Sabet_police_reform.pdf

Sampson, R.J., & Raudenbush, S.W., (2000). Systematic Social Observation of Public Places: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighbourhoods. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105, 637-638.

Scharff, M. (2011). A Path to Peace: Liberia's First Post-War Elections, 2004-2005. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

(2010). Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Elections in Northern Ireland, 2005. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

(2011). Policing Election Day: Vulnerability Mapping in India, 2006-2009. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

(2010). Restoring Voters' Trust and Confidence: Albania's Central Election Commission, 2001-2006. *Innovations for Successful Societies*.

Schnebly, S.M. (2008). Influence of Community-Oriented Policing on Crime-Reporting Behavior. *Justice Quarterly*, 25(4), 223-251.

Schneider, S. (2013). Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian Case study. *Sociologia: Problemas e practicas*, 71, 125 - 143.

Seelke, C.R. (2014). Gangs in Central America. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf

Shaw, M., & Reitano, T. (2013). The Evolution of Organized Crime in Africa: Towards a New Response. Institute of Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/the-evolution-of-organised-crime-in-africa-towards-a-new-response

(2014). People's Perspectives of Organized Crime in West Africa and the Sahel. Institute for Security Studies. http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/peoples-perspectives-of-organised-crime-in-west-africa-and-the-sahel

Shelley, L., Scott, E, & Latta, A.(2007). *Organized Crime and Corruption in Georgia*. New York: Routledge.

Shepard, E.M., & Blackley, P.R. (2005). Drug enforcement and crime: recent evidence from New York State. *Social Science Quarterly*, 86, 323.

Sherman, L. W., & Eck, J. E. (2002). Policing for crime prevention. In (Ed.) Sherman, Farrington, Welsh, & MacKenzie. *Evidence-based crime prevention*. New York: Routledge.

Sherman, L. W., & Weisburd, D. (1995). General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime "hot spots": A randomized, controlled trial. *Justice Quarterly,* 12(4), 625–648.

Sherman, L.W., Gartin, P.R., & Buerger, M.E. (1989). Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place. *Criminology,* 27, 27-55.

Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress*. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.

Shirk, D. (2011). *Drug Violence and State Responses in Mexico*. University of San Diego. Working Paper.

Skogan, W.G. (2013). Use of force and police reform in Brazil: a national survey of police officers. *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, 14,4.

(2004) *Fairness and effectiveness in policing: the evidence committee to review research on police policy and practices*. Washington, DC: The National Academy Press.

(1994) The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents: A Cross-Site Analysis. In Dennis Rosenbaum, (Ed.), *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

(1990) *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*. New York: Free Press.

Skogan, W., Tuch, S., & Weitzer, R. (2008). Police-Community Relations in a Majority-Black City. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 45, 4.

Slade, G. (2013). *Reorganizing Crime: Mafia and Anti-Mafia in Post-Soviet Georgia*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Snyder, R., & Duran-Martinez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. *Crime, Law and Social Change* 52(3), 253-273.

Snyder, J. (2000). *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: WW Norton.

Spergel, Irving A. (1986). The Violent Gang in Chicago: A Local Community Approach. *Social Service Review*, 60.

(1995). *The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Spergel, I. & Grossman, S.F. (1995). *Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program*. Paper Presented at the National Evaluation Conference, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC.

Stone, S. (1993). *Problem-Oriented Policing Approach to Drug Enforcement: Atlanta as a Case Study. Unpublished doctoral dissertation*. Emory University.

Taylor, R. B., Gottfredson, S. D., & Brower, S. (1984). Understanding block crime and fear. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 21, 303-331.

Taylor, B., Koper, C. S., & Woods, D. J. (2011). A randomized controlled trial of different policing strategies at hot spots of violent crime. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 7, 149–181.

Telep, C. (2011). What is Known about the Effectiveness of Police Practices? George Mason University.

Thornberry, T.P. Forthcoming Gangs and Serious, Chronic and Violent Offenders. Draft. In Rolf, L. & Farrington, D.P., (Eds.), *Report of the Study Group on Serious, Violent, Chronic Juvenile Offenders*. Washington, DC: OJJDP

Thornberry, T. P., Krohn, M.D., Lizotte, A.J., & Chard-Wierschem, D. (1993). The Role of Juvenile Gangs in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 30, 55-87.

Tremblay, R. Masse, L., Pagani, L., & Vitaro, F. (1996). From childhood physical aggression to adolescent maladjustment: The Montreal prevention experiment. In Peters, R.D., &McMahon, R.J. (Eds.), *Preventing childhood disorders, substance abuse and delinquency*, 3, 268-298. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Tyler, T. (1990). *Why People Obey the Law*. London: Yale University Press.

Tzifakis, N. (2007). The Bosnian Peace Process: The Power-Sharing Approach Revisited. *Perspectives*, 15(1), 85-101,124. http://search.proquest.com/docview/215138978?accountid=40995

UNDP. (2011). Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia, United Nations Development Programme. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/UNDP_elections_violence_AP.pdf

Ungar, M. (2009). Police Reform in Argentina: Public Security versus Human Rights, in *Policing Insecurity*, (ed.) Uildriks, N. Lanham: Lexington Books, 180.

Vandeginste, S. (2011). Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49(2), 315-335.

Varshney, A. (2002), *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Verma, A. (2009). Situational Prevention and Elections in India. *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences*, 4(2), 83-97.

    (2007). Anatomy of Riots: A Situational Crime Prevention Approach. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, 9(3), 201-221. http://search.proquest.com/docview/232160590?accountid=40995

Vilalta, C. (2014). How Did Things Get So Bad So Quickly? An Assessment of the Initial Conditions of the War Against Organized Crime in Mexico. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 20(1), 137-161.

Wacquant, L., (2006). The 'Scholarly Myths' of the New Law and Order Doxa. *Socialist Register*, 93-115.

    (2003). Toward a Dictatorship over the Poor. *Punishment and Society*, 5(2), 197–205.

Ward, T.W. (2012). *Gangsters Without Borders: An Ethnography of A Salvadoran Street* Gang, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weisburd, D. & Braga, A.A. (2006). Introduction: understanding police innovation. In D. Weisburd, D. & Braga, A.A. (Eds.), *Police innovation. Contrasting perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-23.

Weisburd, D. & Eck, J. (2004). What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 593, 42-65.

Weisburd, D., & Green, L. (1994). Defining the street level drug market. In MackKenzie, D., and Uchida, C. (Eds.), *Drugs and crime: Evaluating public policy initiatives*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 61.

Weisburd, D. & Telep, C. (2014). Hot Spots Policing: What We Know and What We Need to Know. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 30, 200-220.

Werb, D., Rowell, G., Guyatt, G., Kerr, T., Montaner, J., & Wood, E. (2011). Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 22, 87 - 94.

Whitfield, T. (2013). Mediating Criminal Violence: Lessons from El Salvador. *Oslo Forum Papers*. http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Mediating-Criminal-Violence_01.pdf

Wilkinson, S. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, P. (2009). Illicit markets, weak states and violence: Iraq and Mexico. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 52, 323-336.

Wolf, S. (2012). Policing Crime in El Salvador, *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 45(1). http://search.proquest.com/docview/1172800613?accountid=40995

World Bank. (2004). *Afghanistan. State building, sustaining growth, and reducing poverty*. Washington, DC.

Worrall, J.L. (2002). Does "Broken Windows" Law Enforcement Reduce Serious ROLCrime? California Institute for County Government.

Wycoff, M.,& Skogan, W. (1993). *Community Policing in Madison: Quality from the Inside Out. An Evaluation of Implementation and Impact*. Research Report. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

Wycoff, M., Pate, A., Skogan, W., & Sherman, L. (1985). Citizen Contact Patrol in Houston: Executive Summary. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Yusuf, H. (2012). Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW82Conflict%20Dynamics%20in%20Karachi.pdf

Zhao, J. (1996). *Why Police Organizations Change: A Study of Community - Oriented Policing* (Police Executive Res Forum).

Zimring, F. E. (2004). Firearms, Violence, and the Potential Impact of Firearms Control. *The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, 32, 34–37.

Reducing Violence from Political Parties and Elections

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Africa Watch, (1993 November). Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf	How do minority and identity-based politics affect violence?	Africa Watch conducted qualitative research based largely on interviews with victims of violence in affected districts and a range of Kenyans in Nairobi, including lawyers, human rights activists, journalists, doctors, clergy, local government authorities, and Members of Parliament from all political parties.	Politicians may forment identity-based violence in order to increase an identity-linked party's chances of winning an election. For example, Daniel Arap Moi formented intertribal violence to increase his KANU party's chances of winning the 1992 election.	
Autesserre, S. (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	How do institutional weaknesses affect violence?	Autesserre conducted an in-depth case study on the Democratic Republic of Congo and International peacebuilding in the country, drawing from more than 330 interviews and a year and a half of field research.	Prioritizing elections as a means to build democracy and peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (instead of focusing on institution-building) actually hurt democratic consolidation and jeopardized peace and stability in the country.	
Bennet, R. (2010). Nurturing Democracy in the Horn of Africa: Somaliland's First Elections, 2002-2005. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do effective electoral commissions affect violence?	Bennet conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Somaliland in October 2010.	Somaliland's electoral commission built consensus and prevented violence amid tense, tight elections from 2002-2005.	
Boone, C. (2009). Electoral Populism Where Property Rights are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. Comparative Politics, 41(2), 183-201.	How does gerrymandering affect violence?	Boone conducted a qualitative study of property rights, electoral competition, and violence in the Cote d'Ivoire.	Incumbents manipulated property and citizenship rights to maintain winning coalitions and excluded ethnic groups that support the opposition, accelerating electoral violence in the Cote d'Ivoire.	
Brancati, D., & Snyder, J. (2013). Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-Conflict Stability. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57, 822-853.	What are some of the structural causes of electoral violence?	Brancati and Snyder conducted a quantitative analysis of all civil wars ending between 1945-2008. To address issues of causal inference, they employed matching methods in the analysis. They measured post conflict stability by coding civil war recurrence. They measured post-conflict election timing and sequencing on a 12-point coding criteria.	Elections in a post-conflict environment can reignite violence because weak institutions are unable to counteract the rise of formerly warring factions that have turned into powerful political groups, and are unable to support smaller political actors in balancing out the previously warring factions.	
Bruce, D. (2009). Dictating the local balance of power: Election-related violence in South Africa. SA Crime Quarterly, 28, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CQ28BRUCE.PDF	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Bruce conducted a qualitative case study of election violence in South Africa from 1994 to 2009, focusing on the 2009 elections.	Election violence spiked in 1994 when groups competed over the post-Apartheid political order, leading to 3,794 election-related deaths. Violence subsidied in subsequent elections, as political power centered on the ANC, with violence breaking out in areas where power was being contested (e.g. KwaZulu-Natal). However, election violence spiked in 2009 with the emergence of the opposition party COPE.	Rahman (1990).

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Chaturvedi, A. (2005). Rigging elections with violence. Public Choice, 125(1-2), 189-202.	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Chatuverdi developed a political model that examines incentives for party activists to coerce voters to vote for their party or to prevent them from voting. He also used shallow historic and journalistic evidence to corroborate the model's assumptions and findings. When designing the model, Chatuverdi assumed that using violence has constant returns, regardless of incumbent advantage, while other forms of campaining have diminishing returns.	A party with lower initial political support will resort to more political violence in cases where most voters have strong ties to certain parties in order to (a) compel opposition voters to vote for the party instigating violence or (b) prevent the opposition from voting. As the fraction of undecided voters goes up, political parties tend to campaign on more ideological grounds and use less violence. Incumbency advantages increase the resources devoted to creating political unrest, leading to more violence and political corruption.	
Chaubey, V. (2011). Cooling Ethnic Conflict over a Heated Election: Guyana, 2001-2006. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do effective electoral commissions affect violence?	Chaubey conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Georgetown, Guyana in May 2009.	Apolitical Electoral Commissions can prevent and mitigate violence through effectively executed measures to work with parties and the media, while ensuring technically flawless elections. Guyana's electoral commision helped reduce violence in the 2006 elections by addressing concerns about voter registration and security and working with the media and civil society groups to prevent violence.	
Chaubey, V. (2011). Cooling Ethnic Conflict over a Heated Election: Guyana, 2001-2006. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How does civil society engagement affect violence?	Chaubey conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Georgetown, Guyana in May 2009.	Civil society groups instituted a series of peace-building initiatives that included high-level dialogues and grassroots forums. This was part of a series of efforts by the election commission: for instance, the media worked with UNDP and the election commission to create and abide by a new voluntary code of conduct. Despite renewed violence in 2008, these initiatives contributed to reductions of violence before the 2011 elections.	
Cohen, F. (1997). Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 30(607).	How does the electoral system design affect violence?	Cohen conducted a quantitative analysis that analyzed the incidence of conflict over nine 5-year periods, utilizing Gurr's Minorities at Risk data set. Three incidences were used to detect intensity of ethnic conflict for each observation and create a non-violent protest index. He also measured and scored institutional proportionalism for minorites subject to democratic management.	Proportional electoral systems are more conducive to moderating ethnic conflict compared to majoritarian systems. Institutions built on principles of proportionalism outperform those built on majoritarian principles on managing ethnic conflict. This is because majoritarian systems attempt to cut across ethnic cleavages, and this can be construed as implicit ethnic repression. Such perceived repression can encourage ethnic groups to express discontent. He finds that federalism generates increases in the incidence of low-level intensity ethnic conflict, but stifles the creation of high-intensity ethnic conflict.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Collier, P. & Vincente, P.C. (2012). Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. Public Choice, 153 (1-2), 117-147.	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Collier and Vicente developed their argument based on a political game model. They then used Afrobarometer data on elections from 1999-2008 to test their model, leading them to examine four cases: Zimbabwe 2008, Nigeria 2007, Angola 2008, and Kenya 2007.	Threatened incumbent governments that have a weaker grip on political power tend to resort to repression. In contrast, strong incumbents with a firm grip on political power may use bribery or fraud in lieu of violence.	
Datta, S. (2005). Political Violence in Bangladesh: Trends and Causes. Strategic Analysis, 29(3), 427-447.	How do institutional weaknesses affect violence?	Datta conducted a qualitative case study to examine the evolution of political violence in Bangladesh since independence in 1971.	Cultures of political intolerance in contexts with weak institutional constraints can engender violence. The criminalization of politics, the lack of political tolerance and weak democratic institutions contribute to political violence in Bangladesh.	
Datta, S. (2005). Political Violence in Bangladesh: Trends and Causes. Strategic Analysis, 29(3), 427-447.	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	Datta conducted a qualitative case study to examine the evolution of political violence in Bangladesh since independence in 1971.	Military interventions in Bangladesh in 2002 and 2003 to disarm politically linked groups did not reduce violence or serious criminal activity.	
Ellman, M., & Wantchekon, L. (2000). Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), 499–531.	How does the manipulation of voter behavior affect violence?	Ellman and Wantchekon used political game theory applied to five brief qualitative case studies.	Strong parties are incentivized to threaten post-election violence and unrest because it influences voter behavior. For example, in El Salvador in 1994 and Liberia in 1999, voters in both cases voted for a party because they feared that party's capacity to destabilize the country following the election.	
Hafner-Burton, E., Hyde, S. & Jablonski, R., (2014). When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? British Journal of Political Science, 44, 149-179.	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014 examined brief case studies (e.g. Zimbabwe and Iran) and data from all worldwide elections from 1981 to 2004, using qualitative methods (case studies, literature review) and quantiative analysis (polling data, data on electoral violence pre and post elections).	Governments and leaders used violence when they anticipated that elections would unseat them (or their party) and when they faced a few constraints on their power in elections across the world from 1981 to 2004. In addition to examining when and why governments use electoral violence as a political strategy, the authors also found that pre-election violence increased the likelihood of post-election protest. They also found that in cases where institutional constraints on the executive were weak, the likelihood of post-election violence also increased.	
Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1816-1992. American Political Science Review, 95(1), 33-48.	How does regime change affect violence?	Hegre et al linked the level of democracy and regime change in an empirical analysis that uses data from 152 countries in the period 1816 to 1992.	Countries that have undergone a recent regime change (semi-democracies) are more likely to experience conflict as a result of democratization efforts (which can include elections) than countries with more stable political systems (democracies and autocracies).	
Hickman, J. (2011). Explaining Post-Election Violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Journal of Third World Studies, 28(1), 29-46. http://search.proquest.com/docview/884214924?accountid=40995	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Hickman conducted a comparative case study of Zimbabwe and Kenya, examining data on post-election violence in Kenya from the Final Report of the Commission on Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence and from NGOs in Zimbabwe, electoral data from the respective electoral commissions, and polling data.	Incumbents increased their use of violence as their percentage of vote eroded in Kenya's 2007 and Zimbabwe's 2008 election. Mugabe's ZANU-PF resorted to electoral violence as one-party rule eroded in the 2000s.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Hoffman, B., & Smith, E. (2010). Preventing Post Election Violence in Africa. United States Agency for International Development by Democracy International, Inc.	How does civil society engagement affect violence?	Hoffman and Smith conducted case studies of the 2008 election in Ghana and the 2007 Kenyan election, particularly focusing on civil society mobilization in both countries around the elections.	Ghana in 2008, unlike Kenya in 2007, did not experience electoral violence because in Ghana, a range of civil society groups mobilized and coordinated well ahead of the elections, making specific plans to prevent both a fraudulent election and the possibility of electoral violence in 2007 because civil society failed to mobilize around preventing fraud and/or violence.	
Horowitz, D. (1991). A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society Berkeley: University of California Press.	How do electoral systems affect violence?	Horowitz conducted a qualitative case study of South Africa and a review of literature on constitutional engineering of electoral systems.	The need to cooperate with minority parties for votes encouraged majority parties to moderate their behavior, reducing violence against minorities in cases drawn from India and South Africa.	
ICG. (2012, June). Bangaldesh: Back to the Future. International Crisis Group.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	ICG conducted a case study of electoral violence in Bangladesh in the run-up to the 2013 elections.	December 2008 elections in Bangladesh featured a caretaker government that administered the fairest and most peaceful elections in the country's history; showing that political party incentives, not capacity, was an issue previously.	
ICG. (2012, December). Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis. International Crisis Group.	How does gerrymandering affect violence?	The ICG study combined interviews with civil society activists, conflict experts, government officials in Nigeria.	Political groups manipulate indigene status in Nigera's middle belt in order to benefit political patrons, contributing to electoral and broader political violence between competing groups through 2012.	
ICG. (2006, September). Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan. International Crisis Group.	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	The ICG conducted interviews with politicians, government officials, analysts, civil society members, and security officials.	Heavy-handed, repressive military policies in Balochistan transformed a protest movement into a widespread insurgency.	
ICG. (2006, September). Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan. International Crisis Group.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	The ICG study combined interviews with officials, security officers, analysts, civil society activists, and government officials.	Heavy-handed paramilitary policies in Karachi initially reduced crime in 1992, but early results from 2013 efforts suggest that military responses have exacerbated violence and instability. Militarized security policies have contributed to increases in political and urban violence in Pakistan.	
ICG. (2006, September). Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan. International Crisis Group.	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	The ICG study combined interviews with officials, security officers, analysts, civil society activists, and government officials.	Across diverse urban contexts in Pakistan, militarized security policies have undermined civilian policing capabilities, exacerbated underlying conflict risk factors, and arguably worsened cycles of extrajudicial killings by a range of political, criminal, and militant actors by increasing the stakes of conflict.	
Issacharoff, L. (2010). Keeping the Peace in a Tense Election, Ghana, 2008. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Issacharoff conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Accra, Ghana in January 2010 and Beirut, Lebanon in August 2008.	Ghana's electoral commission helped promote a peaceful transition and elections in 2008.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Jackson, R. (2013, April). Creating Avenues to Resolve Election Disputes: Conflict Management Committees in Zambia, 2001-2011. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral dispute committees affect violence?	Jackson conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews, but the evidence for reduced violence is based on anecdotes.	Code of conduct monitoring committees may have reduced non-party sponsored electoral violence in Sierra Leone's 2007 and 2008 elections. Conflict Management Panels helped reduce violence in South Africa's Second Post-Apartheid Elections. Conflict management committees in Zambia arguably reduced tensions between political parties and reduced electoral violence.	
Jarstad, A.K. (2009). The Prevalence of Power Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace. Africa Spectrum 3, 41-62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/40607823.pdf	How do candidate and party truces and election-structure agreements affect violence?	Jarstad conducted a quantitative academic study based on the Post-Accord Election data collection on all 37 post-accord countries in the post-Cold War period. For each five-year period following a peace accord, the PAE data collection reports whether or not power-sharing was stipulated in the agreement, whether or not it was implemented, the holding or absence of a legislative election, and any subsequent armed conflict during the following year.	In 37 post conflict countries, power sharing agreements involving national legislative bodies signed between 1989 and 2004 often did not prevent political and electoral conflict in cases where an agreement had been signed. Power-sharing often institutionalized polarization and contributed to political gridlock. Although power sharing may reduce violence in the short term, it may entrench longer-term conflict. After subsiding with the signing of an agreement, conflict would often re-emerge, even if the agreement included provisions for power sharing. Meanwhile, power-sharing agreements decreased the likelihood that elections would be held, while power-sharing prior to elections did not enhance election or post-election peace.	
Klopp, J. (2001). Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 35(3), 473-517	How do minority and identity-based politics affect violence?	Klopp conducted a qualitative case study of ethnic clashes and elections during Kenya's transition to multiparty rule.	Kenya's ruling KANU party used ethnic violence to resist the transition to multiparty elections and as a tactic to suppress the opposition and mobilize support for KANU.	
Klopp, J. (2001). Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 35(3), 473-517	How do electoral systems affect violence?	Klopp conducted a qualitative case study of ethnic clashes and elections during Kenya's transition to multiparty rule.	Strong presidential winner-take-all systems may play a role in increased violence; however, similar systems exist in other countires, such as Ghana, which experience far less violence. The concentration of power in the Kenyan presidency accelerated intra and interparty competition over the presidency, leading candidates to resort to violence in the 1992 and 1997 elections.	
Kuris, G. & Mawson, A. (2011). Managing a New Model for Elections: Lesotho, 1998-2011. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Kuris and Mawson conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Maseru, Lesotho, in February 2010.	Lesotho's Electoral Commission was critical to peaceful elections in 2002, but its poor performance in 2007 led to renewed conflict.	Majeed (2010); Scharff (2010).
Lemarchand, R. (2008). The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.	How does gerrymandering affect violence?	Lemarchand used a collection of qualitative and historical case studies on conflict and violence in Rwanda, Burundi, and the D.R.C.	Political violence and suppression of voting and political rights targeted at Hutsi migrants in Burundi in the 1970s led to reciprocal crackdown on Tutsi's in Rwanda.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Lemarchand, R. (2008). The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.	How do candidate and party truces and election-structure agreements affect violence?	Lemarchand used a collection of qualitative and historical case studies on conflict and violence in Rwanda, Burundi, and the D.R.C.	Power sharing and inclusion, achieved in Burundi's 2000 power-sharing arrangement, have been crucial to promoting peace and reconciliation and reducing election violence and political violence more generally.	
Majeed, R. (2010). Implementing Standards without the Force of Law: India's Electoral Conduct Code, 1990-2001. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Majeed conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in New Delhi, India in November 2010.	India's Electoral Commission used a voluntary electoral conduct code combined with media and civil society pressure to reduce violence.	
Mansfield, E., & Snyder, J. (2007). Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. Cambridge: MIT Press.	How do institutional weaknesses affect violence?	Snyder and Mansfield used in-depth qualitative case studies of Germany, Britain, France, Serbia, Yugoslavia, post-Communist Russia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, Rwanda and Burundi.	Elections, in the absence of strong political institutions to act as a moderating force, can instigate violence through nationalist politics carried out by powerful elites. Promoting and holding elections can produce serious conflict and violence, particularly if the election-holding region in question has weak institutions and lacks critical preconditions (such as adaptable ruling elite, the rule of law, a competent bureaucracy, and a free press). In the absence of these moderating institutions, elections and the use of the popular ballot often can lead to the rise of nationalism and nationalist dialogue. Powerful elites within a nation can utilize popular energies and electoral politics to spread nationalist and sectarian appeals. This forms an illiberal and extermely polarized style of politics that seeps into political institutions and can send a country's political development away from democratic consolidation and more towards conflict and violence.	
Mawson, A. (2010, October). Compromise and Trust-Building After Civil War: Elections Administration in Mozambique, 1994. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Mawson conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Pretoria and Johannesburg in February 2010.	South Africa's Electoral Commission maintained political commitment of parties and public to electoral outcome, reducing violence in the first post-apartheid elections. Mozambique's multiparty National Election Commission (CNE) succeeded in dampening violence in 1994 elections despite post-conflict party polarization.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Mitchell, P. (2014). The Single Transferable Vote and Ethnic Conflict: The Evidence from Northern Ireland. Electoral Studies, 33(1), 246-257.	How do electoral systems affect violence?	As Northern Ireland is the only divided society that uses STV elections, Mitchell observed Northern Ireland and used quantitative analysis of empirical evidence before and after the Belfast Agreement. Mitchell examined the operation of the electoral system at the Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 1982, 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2011.	The single-transferrable vote system moderates ethnic conflict and governing in a divided society such as Northern Ireland. The problem with electoral systems that advocate proportional representation and post-election power sharing is that voluntary ethnic power sharing is difficult to arrange and sustain; it is usually premised on pre-electoral cooperation but on post-election bargains to be gained. The problem with vote pooling systems is that inter-ethnic vote pooling is only achievable with high thresholds.	
Moniruzzaman, M. (2009). Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh: Issues, Manifestation and Consequences. South Asian Survey, 16(1), 81-99.	How do institutional weaknesses affect violence?	Moniruzzaman conducted a qualitative, non-rigorous study.	Political intolerance, distrust, and continued competition exacerbated party antagonism in Bangladesh, allowing violence to become a legitimate form of political expression.	
Naidu, R. (1990). Old Cities, New Predicaments: A Study of Hyderabad. New Delhi: Sage.	How does gerrymandering affect violence?	Naidu conducted a qualitative case study of Hyderabad examining urban decay and communal violence.	Gerrymandering can create competitive situations that spark electoral violence, according to studies in India. For example, changes in voting districts that created competitive districts from uncompetitive ones led to election violence in Hyderabad from 1983-85.	
Naidu, R., & Dube, O. (2010). Bases, Bullets and Ballots : The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia. Center for Global Development. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542699##	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	Naidu and Dube conducted a study analyzing the impact of increased military aid to Colombia on paramilitary and guerilla violence.	Increased military aid to Colombia increases paramiltiary violence but has no effect on guerilla violence. The potential benefits of military aid are hampered by military and illegal armed groups that collude.	
Paluck, E.L. & Green, D.P. (2009). Deference, Dissent, and Dispute Resolution: An Experimental Intervention Using Mass Media to Change Norms and Behavior in Rwanda. American Political Science Review. 103(4), 622–644.	How does civil society engagement affect violence?	Paluck and Green conducted a quantitative and qualitative study in Rwanda. Over the course of one year, a radio program promoting tolerance was presented to pairs of communities, including communities of genocide survivors, Twa people, and imprisoned individuals linked to the genocide. The authors measured changes in individual attitudes, perceived community norms, and deliberative behaviors using closed-ended interviews, focus group discussions, role-play exercises, and observations of collective decision making.	Education initiatives may help build credibility and respect for elections and divergent views, possibly reducing violence. A radio show in Rwanda that focused on promoting tolerance enhanced listener's willingness to express dissent while encouraging them to resolve community problems without deferring to officials, suggesting that positive changes in political culture can be made in the short run.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Paris, R. (2004). At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	How do institutional weaknesses affect violence?	Paris conducted an in-depth qualitative case study of 14 peacebuilding missions from the 1990s.	Conflict and violence can arise from elections due to a lack of natural conflict dampeners to counteract volatile societal competition in a post-conflict setting. Conflict dampeners include institutions that provide a means to resolve conflict peacefully.	
Rahman, H. Z. (1990) Landscape of Violence: Local Elections and Political Culture in Bangladesh. Economic and Political Weekly, 25(47), 2622-2624.	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Rahman used the archives of major national newspapers to document incidents of violence for five local level elections from 1977-1990.	Intense, zero-sum political competition and efforts to exclude supporters of rival groups from voting fueled electoral violence in five post independence elections in Bangladesh. Incumbents in Bangladesh who faced a credible electoral threat used government resources to target opposition supporters.	
Scharff, M. (2011). A Path to Peace: Liberia's First Post-War Elections, 2004-2005. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Scharff conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Monrovia, Liberia in July 2011 and August 2008.	Liberia's Electoral Commission worked with political parties to develop an inclusive electoral process that built legitimacy and reduced violence in the 2005 elections.	
Scharff, M. (2010). Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Elections in Northern Ireland, 2005. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do candidate and party truces and election-structure agreements affect violence?	Scharff conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Londonderry and Belfast.	A political agreement prior to Ireland's 2005 elections produced an agreement that ended decades of electoral violence; however, parties also did not face electoral incentives to continue the violence. However, violence in this case was not desired by the political party whose supporters were violent. Nationalist parties had incentives to reduce violence, as violence deterred participation in ways that cut into their vote totals. Irish nationalist anger targeted at British-controlled Protestant police would spark fighting, which would then spill over into broader violence. Getting police off the streets by transferring security to the parties ended election-day violence and rioting from 2005-2010.	
Scharff, M. (2011). Policing Election Day: Vulnerability Mapping in India, 2006-2009. Innovations for Successful Society.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Scharff conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in New Delhi and Kolkota, India in November 2010.	Vulnerabiltiy mapping designed by the electoral commision helped dampen violence in West Bengal, India, according to government officials. Nepal's Election Commission helped reduce violence by leveraging public pressure and facilitating bargaining between political parties to build a credible constituent assembly election from 2006-2008.	
Scharff, M. (2010). Restoring Voters' Trust and Confidence: Albania's Central Election Commission, 2001-2006. Innovations for Successful Societies.	How do electoral commissions affect violence?	Scharff conducted a qualitative case study based on interviews in Tirana, Albania in June 2010.	Albania's Electoral Commission has contributed to the prevention of major electoral violence since 1996.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Vandeginste, S. (2011). Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections. Journal of Modern African Studies 49(2), 315-335.	How do candidate and party truces and election-structure agreements affect violence?	Vandeginste conducted a qualitative case study of Burundi's 2010 elections.	A power-sharing arrangement negotiated during Burundi's peace process in 2000 reduced election related violence by helping maintain an inclusive political system. However, the overwhelming election victory of the ruling party may undermine the power sharing agreement and subsequently spark violence.	
Vandeginste, S. (2011). Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections. Journal of Modern African Studies 49(2), 315-335.	How does civil society engagement affect violence?	Varshney conducted a qualitative case study based on historical research and interviews.	Civic engagement and inter-communal associations reduced violence in three Indian cities where democratic politics are relatively institutionalized.	Wilkinson 2005 examines Varshney 2002, arguing that while Varshney's thesis is compelling, there are plenty of counterexamples: Kano and Kaduna in Nigeria have had strong intercommunal associations, but have recently experienced bouts of electoral violence along communal lines; Yugoslavia similarly possessed strong intercommunal organizations and civic engagement, but also devolved into political violence along communal lines.
Verma, A. (2007). Anatomy of Riots: A Situational Crime Prevention Approach. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 9(3), 201-221. http://search.proquest.com/docview/232160590?accountid=40995	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	Verma conducted a qualitative overview of situational crime prevention techniques applied to demonstrations and processions throughout India. The author highlighted cases where these work, suggesting the need for further systemic research on these approaches.	Situational crime prevention techniques effectively mitigated election related riot violence in India. Strategies including errecting barricades, closing streets, banning demonstrations in dense neighborhoods, and provindg entry and exit points to potential places of conflict. Moreover, police embedded themselves in plain clothes among citizens to ensure processions avoid conflict zones while requiring demonstrations and processions to obtain a license stipulating where the groups will march/assemble.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Verma, A. (2009). Situational Prevention and Elections in India. International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences, 4(2), 83-97.	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	Verma conducted a qualitative overview of situational crime prevention techniques applied to demonstrations and processions throughout India. The author highlighted cases where these work, suggesting the need for further systemic research on these approaches.	Situational crime prevention strategies led authorities to issue identity cards and use electronic electoral rolls along with a focused police response likely contributed to reduced electoral violence in Bihar from 2000 to 2005.	
Wilkinson, S. (2004). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. New York: Cambridge University Press.	What are the proximate causes of electoral violence?	Wilkinson used town and state level data on 2,000 Hindu-Muslim riots in India from 1950-2005. Wilkinson and Ashutosh Varshney assembled the data from India's newspaper of record, hundreds of reports in other papers, government reports, and archives in India England, and the U.S.	Even the weakest, most corrupt state governments in India (e.g. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) are able to manage electoral and ethnic violence when managing violence is prioritized by political leaders. Political incentives explained when politicians and governments prevented or promoted violence in India, with state capacity bearing no discernible influence on a government's role in preventing election violence. His examination of data on elections and violence in India from 1950-2002 demonstrates that election violence is generally driven by political incentives, and not a lack of state capacity.	
Wilkinson, S. (2004). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. New York: Cambridge University Press.	How do minority and identity-based politics affect violence?	Wilkinson used town and state level data on 2,000 Hindu-Muslim riots in India from 1950-2005. Wilkinson and Ashutosh Varshney assembled the data from India's newspaper of record, hundreds of reports in other papers, government reports, and archives in India, England, and the U.S.	State governments in India intervened to protect minorities from ethnic riots when their coalition depended on direct or indirect minority support. Conversely, states where the majority party does not rely on support or cooperation of minority groups are significantly more prone to both electoral and identity based violence, in many cases instigated by the ruling party. There is similar evidence in 19th century Ireland, post-independence Malaysia, and post-communist Romania. Political violence and riots are manipulated and planned by politicians, especially in situations where a party corresponds to a specific religious ethnic identity, in order to increase the salience of that identity as a voting issue. For instance, Malay anti-Chinese riots have been repeatedly initiated by regimes hoping to build electoral support, dating back to the 1960s.	Jaffrelot 1998 explains how Hindu party leaders strategically used processions through Muslim neighborhoods, religious performances, flag raisings, and other symbolic events to generate crowds mobilized around Hindu identity, and then would use symbols and language to provoke the crowd to violence against a perceived other (e.g. Muslims).
Wilkinson, S. (2004). Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. New York: Cambridge University Press.	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	Wilkinson also conducted a case study of 19th century Ireland's challenges with election violence.	Moving control of policing in Belfast, Ireland from a Protestant partisan local administration to the national government significantly increased the state's degree of riot prevention, arguably because the national government, unlike the local Belfast government, relied on Catholic electoral support.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Yusuf, H. (2012). Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW82Conflict%20Dynamics%20in%20Karachi.pdf	How does gerrymandering affect violence?	Yusuf conducted a qualitative USIP case study of urban violence in Karachi written by a Pakistani journalist and based on interviews with analysts, security forces, officials and activists.	Politicians in Pakistan used political violence to gerrymander districts along identity and party lines to bolster their political support and improve electoral success. For example, the MQM Party used violence to influence the demographics of voting districts in order to enhance its election prospects.	
Yusuf, H. (2012). Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW82Conflict%20Dynamics%20in%20Karachi.pdf	How do candidate and party truces and election-structure agreements affect violence?	Yusuf conducted a qualitative USIP case study of urban violence in Karachi written by a Pakistani journalist and based on interviews with analysts, security forces, officials and activists.	The Supreme Court led investigations and hearings and pressured parties to reduce ethnopolitical violence in Karachi. Violence dipped following the agreement but rose again within six months.	
Yusuf, H. (2012). Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW82Conflict%20Dynamics%20in%20Karachi.pdf	How do policing, situational techniques and coercive responses affect violence?	Yusuf conducted a qualitative USIP case study of urban violence in Karachi written by a Pakistani journalist and based on interviews with analysts, security forces, officials and activists.	Military operations targeting political party affiliated militias and militant groups successfully weakened groups and led to decreases in ethnopolitical and sectarian violence in the 1990s in Karachi, Pakistan.	

Reducing Violence by Gangs, Youth, and the State in Marginalized Communities

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Ajzenman, N., Glaiani, S., & Seira, E. (2014). On the Distributed Costs of Drug-Related Homicides. Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/publication/distributed-costs-drug-related-homicides-working-paper-364	What risk factors contribute to violence in marginalized communities?	Ajzenman, Glaiani, and Seira estimated the impact of violence in Mexican municipalities on housing prices between 2008 and 2011.	A one standard deviation increase in homicides leads to a three percent decrease in the price of low-income housing.	
Arias, E.D. (2006). Drugs and democracy in Rio de Janeiro: trafficking, social networks, and public security. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.	How does community policing affect crime?	Arias used ethnography, participant observation, and interview research in three favelas in Rio de Janeiro over a nine-year period.	Blended police strategies in Rio de Janeiro, involving some community policing elements, may be sucessful in the short-term, but are limited by a political economy that encourages violence.	
Avakame, F., & McCoy. (1999). "Did you call the police? What did they do?" An empirical assessment of black's theory of mobilization of law. Justice Quarterly, 16(4), 765-792.	How does marginalization affect violent crime reporting?	Avakame employed a logistic regression model to analyze data from the 1992-1994 files of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) (U.S. Department of Justice 1996). From a set of 48,114 respondents in this data set, the authors examined those who reported that they had been victims of rape, attempted rape, other sexual assault, or aggravated assault (n=2,203) at the hands of people whom they knew and with whom they shared at least a casual acquaintance within the reference period. These cases also include information about whether the victim called the police and, if so, whether the police arrested the alleged offender.	In the U.S. minority victims are more likely to call the police than whites, but victiminization of whites is more likely to result in arrest. Similarly, poorer victims are more likely to call the police than wealthier victims, but their calls are less likely to result in arrest.	
Baird, A. (2012). The violent gang and the construction of masculinity amongst socially excluded young men. Safer Communities, 11(4), 179-190.	What risk factors contribute to violence in marginalized communities?	Baird analyzes empirical data from 2008 of life-history interviews with male youths, including gang members and non-gang members.	A literature on social exclusion and identity, particularly masculinity suggests that young men may turn to violence during adolescence, and offset the emasculation of joblessness and general poverty. This is particularly true when gangs are present that can offer identity and community as well as monetary and at times, sexual rewards.	Spergel (1990); Fontes, forthcoming.

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Baumer, E.P. (2002). Neighborhood disadvantage and police notification by victims of violence. Criminology, 40, 579-616.	How does marginalization affect violent crime reporting?	Baumer conducted a quantitative study to analyze the Area-Identified National Crime Victimization Survey's data on aggravated assaults, simple assults, and robberies from 1995-97 and socioeconomic disadvantage using the 1990 US decennial census data. After excluding cases with missing data, the sample analyzed included 6193 victims, including 698 robbery victims, 1177 aggravated assault victims, and 4318 simple assault victims.	Socioeconomic disadvantage reduces the likelihood of police notification for less serious crimes (e.g. minor assault). Socioeconomic disadvantage has no influence on reporting for robbery and aggravated assault victims.	
Bennett, T., Holloway, K., & Farrington, D. (2008). The Effectiveness of Neighborhood Watch. Cambell Systematic Review. 2008(8).	How does marginalization affect violent crime reporting?	Bennett and Wiegand analyzed data collected from a household victimization survey in Belize of approximately five percent of households in Belize.	Environmental factors (class, social background) did not play a significant role in crime reporting in Belize. Incident-related and individual-specific factors played a role in shaping whether a person would report a crime.	
Bennett, R. R. & Wiegand, R. B. (1994), Observations on Crime Reporting in a Developing Nation. Criminology, 32, 135–148.	How does community policing affect crime?	Bennett et al conducted a systemic review of studies examining neighborhood watch. The authors were careful to note that studies included in the study were significantly more positive regarding neighborhood watch than studies excluded from the review.	Neighborhood Watch programs in the U.S. were associated with significant declines in crime, but could not establish a causal link between the programs and crime reduction.	
Braga, A. (2007). The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime. Campbell Systemic Reviews.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Braga examined 9 quantitative studies that used randomized controlled trials to examine focused police enforcement at crime hot-spots. The studies examined five large US cities and one Australian suburb and three types of hot-spot policing strategies: problem-oriented policing, directed and aggressive patrol programs and police crackdowns and raids. Braga identified these 9 studies after evaluating 697 abstracts and 57 full studies according to rigor and content.	Focusing police efforts in high crime places has been found to decrease crime and disorder in 5 large U.S. cities and one Australian city. The problem-oriented approach significantly reduced crime and disorder calls for service. Additionally, crime was not displaced to areas that were not targeted by the police through systematic observations of social and physical disorder at the target hot spots relative to control locations.	The evaluation of the Houston Targeted Beat Program examined the effects of three types of treatments applied in different target areas; these interventions included high visibility patrol, "zero tolerance" disorder policing, and enforcement problem-oriented policing (Caeti 1999).
Braga, A., Weisburd, D., Waring, E., Mazerolle, L., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37, 541-580.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Braga and Weisburd conducted a book-length review of policing strategies in hot spots in the U.S., which included analysis of three preview systemic reviews on hot spot policing strategies.	Intensive enforcement (i.e. broken windows policing) reduces police legitimacy. Problem-oriented policing in hot spots is most effective in the U.S.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Braga, A., Weisburd, D., Waring, E., Mazerolle, L., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37, 541-580.	How does focused deterrence affect crime?	Braga and Weisburd conducted a systemic review of quasi-experimental studies of focused deterrence strategies in small, medium, and large US cities.	Focused deterrence strategies reduced gun and gang violence in small, medium, and large US cities.	
Braga, A., Kennedy, D.M., Piehl, A.M, Waring, & E.J. (2001). Problem Oriented Policing, Deterrence and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(3), 195-225.	How does problem-oriented policing affect crime?	Braga et al conducted a qualitative case study of the Boston Gun Project and Operation Ceasefire and a non-randomized quasi-experiment to compare youth homicide trends in Boston relative to youth homicide trends in other major U.S. and New England cities that also found a unique program effect associated with the Ceasefire intervention.	The Boston Gun Project focused on homicide victimization among young people in Boston. After convening an interagency practionery group, the project assessed the nature and causes of youth violence in Boston. The conveners designed an iterative intervention to reduce youth homicides based on the assessment and grounded in two focal points: confronting illicit firearm providers and creating a strong deterrent to gang violence. After averaging 44 youth homicides per year from 1991 to 1995, the number dropped to 26 in 1996 and 15 in 1997.	
Braga, A., Weisburd, D., Waring, E., Mazerolle, L., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37, 541-580.	How does problem-oriented policing affect crime?	Braga et al conducted a randomized controlled experiment that used generalized linear models to analyze the main effects of the intervention on reported crime incidents and citizen emergency calls. The authors attempted to measure displacement by tracking data that was constructed around areas where police intervened.	Problem-oriented policing focused on violent hot spots reduced emergency calls and crime incidents in a pilot study in Jersey City, NJ.	
Bratton, W. (1998). Crime Is Down in New York City: Blame the Police. The IEA Health and Welfare Unit. London: Revised Second Edition.	How do broken windows and zero tolerance policing affect crime?	Bratton conducted a qualitative case study of police reforms that contributed to the drop in crime, written by the police chief who led the reforms.	Policing reforms in New York City involving significant decentralization, measures to empower and increase the morale of officers, a 7,000 person spike in total officers, and zero tolerance policing strategies contributed to a sharp reduction in homicides and crime from 1994 to 1996. Bratton argues that zero tolerance policing strategies, drawing on broken windows theory, were critical in curbing homicides and crime in New York.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Brenneman, R. (2012). Homies and Hermanos: Gods and Gangs in Central America, Oxford: Oxford University Press.	How do gang leaving programs affect crime?	Brenneman interviewed 63 former gang members in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, examining, among other issues, why youth join gangs. He explains that although macrosocial factors influence the emergence of gangs, they don't explain why only small percentages of disadvantaged youth join gangs. He explains that separation from parents, migration, and physical abuse are risk factors that enhance the probability of gang entrance.	Joining a born-again Protestant church is a culturally recognized way of beating MS-13s "hasta la morgue" rule (only exit from the gang is death). Moreover, churches operate on a similar family metaphor and demand absolute commitment.	
Chan, J. (1997). Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society. Cambridge & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.	How does community policing affect crime?	Chan examined a study, completed from 1991-92, which combined questionnaires, material from a stratified random sample of police (oversampled in areas with large ethnic populations), semi-structured interviews, and content analysis of documents and news clippings.	Community police reforms in New South Wales, Australia, failed to reduce police violence and corruption and were resisted by police.	
Cruz, J.M. (2007). Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational Protection Rackets. Global Crime.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Cruz reviewed the literature on Central American street gangs, the American scholarship on gangs, and his own research on Central American gangs from the mid-1990s.	Largely in response to Mano Dura law enforcement tactics, gangs have developed into more sophisticated criminal entitites, some of which are now running extortion rackets throughout the region.	
Cruz, J.M. (2009). Global Gangs in El Salvador: Maras and the Politics of Violence. Paper presented at the Global Gangs Workshop, Centre on Conflict Development, and Peacebuilding, Geneva.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Cruz examined academic literature on marginalization, gang institutionalization, and the dynamics of gang violence and used this research as a lens for analyzing the work done by research programs on gangs at the University of Central America in El Salvador.	Mano Dura exacerbated gang violence in El Salvador: It institutionalized the state's use of violence against the youth, and provided the maras with the opportunity to organize, unite their cliques, and develop regional and national leaderships.	Ethnography based on eight and a half years (1993-200) experience with MS-13 cliques in Los Angeles and another decade of follow-up reveal that prisons serve as "finishing schools" - rather than being rehabilitated, first-time offenders often deepen their involvement in illicit gang activities while in prison. Additionally, gang leaders use prisons to increase discipline and cohesion within the gangs.

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Dammert, L. & Malone, M. (2006). Does It Take a Village? Policing Strategies and Fear of Crime in Latin America. Latin American Politics & Society, 48(4), 27-51.	How does community policing affect crime?	Dammert and Malone conducted a brief qualitative case study examining Argentina, Brazil, and Chile and the relationship between fear of crime and policing strategies within each country. The authors aggregated data on policing strategies and crime in major cities in the three countries and then normalized the data using dummy variables so that comparisons could be made across contexts.	Community policing proved more effective at reducing police violence than more coercive methods in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.	
Dudley, S. (2010). How Mano Dura is strengthening Gangs. Insight Crime. http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Dudley conducted a qualitative study, based on February 2010 interviews with Salvadorian security officials, diplomats, foreign intelligenge officers, and analysts.	Although Mano Dura policies successfully jailed mara leaders and soldiers, the doubling of the gang population in prison from 4000 to 8000 between 2004 and 2008 overwhelmed prisons, highlighted by fighting between MS13 and diesiocho that resulted in hundreds of inmate deaths and the separation of the gangs into different prisons. The separation of the gangs in prisons provided leaders with time, security, and infrastructure to strategize and plan. This has enhanced command structures and empowered gangs to expand kidnapping and extortion activities, which are predominantly run from prisons. Moreover, arbitrary arrest of thousands of youth based on appearance, associations, or address likely accelerated gang recruitment.	
Fagan, J., Zimring, F.E., & Kim, J. (1998). Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 88, 127-1323.	How do gun control programs affect crime?	Fagan et al examined a gun control program in New York City.	Evidence from New York City in the 1990s suggests that a well resourced and tightly enforced weapons ban may have helped reduce violence.	
Fox, E. (2012). Is Belize's Gang Truce Breaking Down? InSight Crime. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/is-belizes-gang-truce-breaking-down	How do gang truces affect crime?	Fox conducted brief investigative journalism pieces on the gang truce in Belize.	Homicide rates initially declined as a result of a gang truce in Belize. However rates have since increased again causing the government to withdraw support.	
Frühling, H. (2012). A realistic look at Latin American community policing programs. Policing and Society, 22(1), 76-88.	How does community policing affect crime?	Fruhling 2012 reviewed the emergence and main characteristics of community policing in the US and community-policing models employed in Latin America, drawing on extensive academic literature and journal articles.	Community policing programs in Latin America were often not implemented according to community policing principles and lacked meaningful evidence for their effects on crime and violence.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Gledhill, J., (2013). La Mala Administración De La Seguridad pública1/The Maladministration of Public Security. Revista de Antropologia Social, 22, 25-57.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Gledhill conducted qualitative case studies of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Salvador based on research, literature and interviews with residents in the three cities affected by the policing policies.	Repressive policies, exacerbated by urban development projects that disrupt and displace marginalized communities, have increased stability and violence in these three Brazilian cities. Militarized police interventions killed many civilians and strengthened the Primerio Comando de Capital (PCC), Brazil's largest organized crime organization, by difusing the leadership across Brazilian prisons.	
Goudriaan, H., Wittebrood, K., & Nieuwbeerta, P. (2006). Neighborhood characteristics and reporting crime: Effects of social cohesion, confidence in police effectiveness and socio-economic disadvantage. British Journal of Criminology, 46.	How does marginalization affect violent crime reporting?	Goudriaan et al used hierarhchical linear modeling and a survey-based measure of neighborhood-level social cohesion in the Netherlands. They examined victimization and crime reporting data from the biannual Dutch Police Population Monitor (Politiemonitor Bevolking) from 1995 to 2001, which included survey data from 110, 950 victims along with detailed respondent location information. The authors used neighborhood and socio-economic disadvantage data from the Residential Environment Data Base (Woonmilieudatabase) and the 2002 Residential Needs Survey (Woningbehoefteonderzoek).	The likelihood of victim police notification for serious and minor crime is significantly lower in neighborhoods characterized by socioeconomic disadvantage and less social cohesion.	Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers (2009) explain that muscular state-led responses don't address the underlying factors shaping urban violence and actually have exacerbated violence. They find that attempted changes have done little to actually reform approaches to reducing gang violence, explaining the continued rates of violence in Central America.
Hinkle, J.C. & Weisburd, D. (2008). Irony of Broken Windows Policing: A Micro-Place Study of the Relationship Between Disorder, Focused Police Crackdowns and Fear of Crime. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(6), 503-512.	How do broken windows and zero tolerance policing affect crime?	Hinkle and Weisburd examined police interventions in two hot spots in Jersey City, New Jersey, 2004-2006. Data on fear of crime before the police intervention was based on residential survey, which also provided information on social and demographic control variables. 733 interviews were conducted during the post-intervention period to gauge the impact of police intervention of fear of crime, social and physical disorder, etc. Additional data was collected through field observation on social and physical disorder. Police emergency data was provided by the Planning and Research Bureau of the Jersey City Police Department.	Although reducing social and physical disorder should reduce fear of crime (which is the driving logic of broken windows policing), broken windows police interventions actually increased the probability of feeling unsafe. Accordingly, any fear reduction benefits gained by reducing disorder may be offset by the fact that the policing strategies employed simultaneously increase fear of crime.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Hinkle, J.C. & Weisburd, D. (2008). Irony of Broken Windows Policing: A Micro-Place Study of the Relationship Between Disorder, Focused Police Crackdowns and Fear of Crime. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(6), 503-512.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Hinkle and Weisburd conducted 733 interviews during the post-intervention period to gauge the impact of police intervention of fear of crime, social and physical disorder, etc.	Broken windows interventions applied to hot-spots increased fear of crime and insecurity.	
Holland, A. (2013). Right on Crime? Conservative Party Politics and Mano Dura Policies in El Salvador. Latin American Research Review, 48(1), 44-67.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Holland examined social science literature on Mano Dura and focused her primary research in El Salvador on political party documents, newspaper reports, and interviews with party members and policymakers.	The Nationalist Republic Alliance (ARENA) party in El Salvador maintained power for two decades by using Mano Dura policies to maintain electoral support from traditional elites and their rural bases without reversals to its economic program (thereby allowing ARENA to maintain support of the business elites). For example, President Tony Saca was reelected in 2004 on the basis of his Mano Dura policies and promises to expand them.	
Howell, J.C. (2010). Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs. Juvenile Justice Bulletin.	How do gang prevention programs affect crime?	Howell conducted a literature review of programs and research on gang prevention and categorized studies according to rigor. The Tremblay et al 1996 study and Gatti et al. 2005 study were the only studies ranked L-1 by Howell, meaning they were the most rigorous studies examined in the review and involved a high quality research design.	Preventive Treatment Programs in Montreal reduced gang involvement by working to prevent antisocial behavior among boys ages 7 to 9 with a low socioeconomic status who had previously displayed disruptive behavior in kindergarten. The program improved school performance, reduced delinquency and substance use, and showed that a combination of parent training and childhood skill development can steer some children away from gangs before they reach mid-adolescence. Moreover, while mentoring programs are promising and have reduced some risk factors (like drug use and hitting among children), they have no demonstrated impact on crime reduction or gang prevention.	
ICG. (2014, January). Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan. International Crisis Group.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	The ICG study is based on interviews with officials, security officers, analysts, civil society activists, and government officials.	Heavy-handed paramilitary policies in Karachi initially reduced crime in 1992, but early results from 2013 efforts suggest that miltiary responses have exacerbated violence and instability.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Jang, H., Hoover L.T., & Lawton, B.A. (2008). Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(6), 529-538.	How do broken windows and zero tolerance policing affect crime?	Jang based his research on official crime data for the thirty-five largest municipal police agencies (each with a population greater than 75,000) in Texas from 1990-2004. His research used hierarhical multivariate linear modeling to examine the relationship between broken windows enforcement and rates at which cases for Uniform Crime Reporting Part 1 offenses were solved.	There is an inconsistent relationship between broken windows enforcement and rates at which serious cases were solved. In cases of burglaries and auto-theft, there was a positive relationship between broken windows enforcement and solved cases; and in larceny cases, the study found a negative correlation.	
Kahn, T., (2004). Policia comunitaria: evaluando la experiencia de Sao Paulo, in: H. Frühling and A. Candina, Eds. En participacion ciudadana y reformas a la policia en America del Sur, Santiago: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo, 188-225.	How does community policing affect crime?	Kahn compared community perspectives on community police to traditional policing.	A 1997 San Paulo program that reformed parts of the military police according to community policing principles improved perceptions of the police: the newly trained force was found to be less corrupt and more acceptable to the community than the traditional military police forces.	
Kane, R. J. (2005). Compromised police legitimacy as a predictor of violent crime in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods. Criminology, 43(2), 469–498.	How does police violence affect police legitimacy?	Kane measured socioeconomic disadvantage by using U.S. census data from 1970, 1980 and 1990. Police misconduct was measured through a records analysis of personnel orders from 1975 to 1996 at New York City Police Headquarters while police responsiveness was measured by examining the number of violent crime arrests per officer at the precinct level. Kane then used multivariate analysis to control for other factors.	In communities characterized by high socioeconomic disadvantage, incidents of police misconduct predicted increases in violent crime; in communities characterized by extreme disadvantage, police misconduct and overpolicing both corresponded to increases in violent crime.	Brazilian police officers self-reported in a web-based, non-rigorous study that they were less likely to use force in environments they perceived as less-risky, suggesting that community-policing methods might reduce violence (Skogan 2013). Women, older officers, and those with more education reported less frequent use of force.
Kennedy, D. M., Piehl, A.M. & Braga, A.A. (1996). Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use Reduction Strategy. Law and Contemporary Problems, 59:1.	How do gangs affect violent crime?	Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga reviewed recent literature on gang violence, worked closely with and interviewed police officers, and examined 155 victims under 21 who had been killed by guns or knives from 1990-1994 and 125 youth 21 or under who had killed another person 21 or under with a gun or knife in the same time span.	Most of the youth (21 or under) victims and perpetrators of gun and knife homicides were involved with gangs, and were high-rate criminal offenders.	Decker and Curry (2002) found that gang members were especially violent with members of their own faction and that they were more violent than non gang members.

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Kennedy, D. M., Piehl, A.M. & Braga, A.A. (1996). Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use Reduction Strategy. Law and Contemporary Problems, 59:1.	How does focused deterrence affect crime?	Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga reviewed recent literature on gang violence, worked closely with and interviewed police officers, and examined 155 victims under 21 who had been killed by guns or knives from 1990-1994 and 125 youth 21 or under who had killed another person 21 or under with a gun or knife in the same time span.	Publicizing that the police will respond in force and arrest anyone tangentially involved in a shooting reduced gang related gun violence in Boston.	
Koper, C. S., & Mayo-Wilson, E. (2006). Police crackdowns on illegal gun carrying: a systematic review of their impact on gun crime. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2, 227-261.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Koper and Mayo-Wilson conducted a systemic review of evidence based on policing literature.	Directed patrol strategies reduced gun-related crime from 29 to 71 percent in six comparisons from four quasi-experiemental studies. However, significant variation in declines and across outcome measures suggests that while promising, more research is needed.	
Laub, J.K. (1981). Ecological considerations in victim reporting to the police. Journal of Criminal Justice, 9(6), 419-430.	How does marginalization affect violent crime reporting?	Laub examined national crime survey victimization data from 1973-1977.	Urbanization did not affect crime reporting, the nature of the crime, but the relationship of the victim to the offender did affect reporting.	
Litmanovitz, Y., & Montgomery, P. (2011). Training programs to improve attitudes, skills, and behaviors of police officers regarding democratic norms. Centre for Evidence Based Interventions, University of Oxford. The Campbell Collaboration.	How does police violence affect police legitimacy?	Litmanovitz et al examined research on police trainings in the US, Ireland, and Isreal.	An ongoing systemic review of police training and anti-police violence programs suggests that current programs are not successful and that further research is needed.	
Manning, P. K., (2010). Democratic policing in a changing world. Boulder: Paradigm.	How does community policing affect crime?	Manning used Rawls's difference principle as a lens for analyzing scholarship on policing (from broken windows to community policing) and actual policing policies through qualitative, comparative case studies focused on the U.S.	Democratic police reforms have generally failed to significantly alter policing strategies in marginalized communities of Anglo-American countries.	Brooks (2008) found that crime fell by 6-8 percent in business improvement distrits in Los Angeles, compared to neighboring areas and areas that had considered implementing the districts but chose not to. Prado et al (2012) found that a business improvement district in Colombia has increased oversight and accountability of police.

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Meyer & Seelke. (2012). Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Meyer and Seelke reviewed literature and conducted interviews for a background on security in Central America for CRS.	Mano Dura has been ineffective in reducing organized crime in the northern triangle. Thousands of youths arrested as part of government crackdowns were wrongly arrested and later released. Furthermore, aggressive roundups have overcrowded prisons and the criminal justice system in Central America.	Sampson and Laub (1993) also point to the preventative value of employment in longitudinal analysis of criminal careers.
Meyer & Seelke. (2012). Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf	How do gang leaving programs affect crime?	Meyer and Seelke reviewed literature and conducted interviews for a background on security in Central America for CRS.	It is important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations in Central America.	
Ouimet, M. (2012). A world of homicides: The effect of economic development, excess poverty and income inequality on the homicide rate for 167 countries in 2008. Homicide Studies, 16(3), 238-258.	What risk factors contribute to violence in marginalized communities?	Ouimet used a regression analysis to study socioeconomic factors (GNI, Gini, excess infant mortality) and homicide rates for 165 countries in 2010.	Economic development, inequality, and poverty correlate with the homicide rate for all countries; greater income inequality, not economic development or poverty, corresponds with greater homicide rates for countries with a medium level of human development.	
Papachristos, A. V., Meares, T. L, & Fagan, J. (2007). Attention felons: Evaluation Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4, 223-272.	How does focused deterrence affect crime?	Papachristos, Mears, and Fagan conducted a quasi-experimental designed evaluation of Project Safe Neighborhoods.	Project Safe Neighborhoods used a four pronged approach to reduce homicides in Chicago, particularly relying on focused deterrence through meetings with offenders.	
Pereira, A. & Ungar, M. (2004). The Persistence of the "Mano Aura": Authoritarian Legacies and Policing in Brazil and the Southern Cone. In Authoritarian Legacies Democracy Latin America Southern Europe, Eds. Cesarini, P. & Hite, K. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Pereira and Ungar examined Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay in the context of current democratic politics and compared this to histories of police brutality and miltiarization that are rooted in the fabric of these states.	Policing policies are shaped by popular acceptance of police excesses if crime drops, leading to a democratic impetus for authoritarian policing. Popular support for militarized policing is also grounded in longstanding histories of state formation in Latin America, where militarized policing is deeply ingrained in state institutions and social norms.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Pollard, C. (1998). Zero Tolerance: Short-term Fix, Long-term Liability? In Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society. IEA Health and Welfare Unit (London), Revised Second Edition.	How do broken windows and zero tolerance policing affect crime?	Pollard conducted a qualitative case study of New York's zero tolerance reforms and brief study of San Diego's reforms. The author was a police commissioner in the UK.	Organization reforms (empowerment of police officers, decentralization, modernization of the force, problem solving approaches), not zero-tolerance strategies, likely explain the drop in crime in New York City between 1994 and 1996. Other factors (e.g. transformations in drug markets) may also explain the drop in crime. New York's drop in crime is similar to San Diego from 1989-1996, and community based policing strategies, including neighborhood watch committees and important police re-organization, contributed to reductions in violence and crime in San Diego.	
Prado, M.M., Trebilcock, M., & Hartford, P. (2012). Police Reform in Violent Democracies in Latin America. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 4(2), 252-285.	How does community policing affect crime?	Prado et al conducted a qualitative study examining cases in Latin America based on review of research literature.	Community policing reforms failed to reform the police in some Latin American countries due to pervasive corruption and weak accountability mechanisms. Conversely, reforms that deliberately involved groups with different interests and that worked to build multiple oversight mechanisms have proved promising.	
Ramsey, G. (2012). Tracking El Salvador's Mara Salvatrucha in Washington, DC. Insight Crime.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Ramsey used brief InsightCrime (journalistic) investigation involving interviews with law enforcement officers and scholars in and around Washington D.C.	Ties between gang leaders in El Salvador and Washington D.C. have been enhanced, likely by Mano Dura and U.S. deportation policies.	
Ratcliffe, J. H., Taniguchi, T., Groff, E.R. & Wood, J.D. (2011). The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots. Criminology, 49, 795–831.	How does community policing affect crime?	Ratcliffe et al used linear regression models to examine the effect of foot patrols on violent crime in Philadelphia.	Hot spot focused foot patrols reduced violent crime significantly in Philadelphia.	
Riccioa, V., Ruedigerb, M.A, Rossc, S.D., & Skogan, W. (2013). Community policing in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 14(4).	How does community policing affect crime?	Riccioa evaluated a study which surveyed six hundred residents of the target communities regarding the program and their concerns about crime and police misconduct.	A basic version of community policing grounded in honest, professional, and respectful policing increased quality of life and reduced concerns about crime in two Rio de Janeiro communities dominated by armed gangs.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Rivera, L.G. (2010). Discipline and Punish? Youth Gangs' Response to 'Zero-tolerance' Policies in Honduras. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 29(4), 492–504.	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Rivera conducted qualitative analysis drawn from three research periods spent in San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 2006 and 2007, including five informal conversations with gang members, participant-observation in gang-controlled areas in jails, and analysis of newspaper articles from national papers from 2002 to 2004.	In Honduras, Mano Dura strengthened emotional ties within gangs, enhanced their ability to control social and physical space, consolidated gang identity in prisons, and shifted the locus of gang identity from a physical neighborhood to a symbolic barrio, facilitating transnational affiliation and movement.	
Rosenbaum, D. P. (2006). The limits of hot spots policing. In Weisburd, D., & Braga, A.A., (Eds.), Police innovation: Contrasting perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press, 245- 263.	How does community policing affect crime?	Rosenbaum conducted a quasi-experimental evaluation of community crime prevention programs in Chicago in the 1980s that were based on the neighborhood block watch model. The study included three carefully selected control areas for each of the four target areas, as well as a comparison to city-wide data.	Neighborhood watch increased fear of crime and worsened perceptions of crime in Chicago.	
Rosenbaum, D. P. (2006). The limits of hot spots policing. In Weisburd, D., & Braga, A.A., (Eds.), Police innovation: Contrasting perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press, 245- 263.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Rosenbaum reviewed research on hot spots and policing.	The police generally use broken windows and zero tolerance strategies in hot spots because they are easier for the forces to implement, which in turn functions to concentrate the effects of those strategies in hot spots, including their negative effects on police-citizen relations, trust in the police, and police legitimacy.	
Sabet, D. (2010). Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dms76/policefiles/Sabet_police_reform.pdf	How does community policing affect crime?	Sabet conducted a qualitative case study on community policing.	Police reforms have failed in Mexico because of a failure to address political and police corruption.	
Sampson, R.J., & Raudenbush, S.W., (2000). Systematic Social Observation of Public Places: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighbourhoods. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 637-638.	Are crime and disorder related?	Sampson and Raudenbush conducted a quantitative study analyzing crime and disorder on 15,141 streets in Chicago.	While predatory crime and disorder are moderately related when other factors are unaccounted for, the connection disappears when factors such as neighborhood characteristics, trust, and poverty are accounted for.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Schnebly, S.M. (2008). Influence of Community-Oriented Policing on Crime-Reporting Behavior. Justice Quarterly, 25(4), 223-251.	How does community policing affect crime?	Schnebly conducted a rigorous, multi-US city quantitative study based on multinomial logistic regression analysis using victimization and crime reporting data from the 1997-1999 Area-Identified National Crime Victimization Survey of 43,000 housing units (approx. 80,000 individuals) and community policing data from the 1997 and 1999 Law Enforcement Management and Adminsitrative Statistics (LEMAS): Sample Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies (SSLEA).	Extensive training for police in community policing methods enhanced citizen reporting of crime to police in U.S. cities.	
Seelke, C.R. (2014). Gangs in Central America. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf	How do Mano Dura and militarized policing policies affect crime?	Seelke analyzed a Congressional Research report based on secondary research, USG documents, and interviews.	Violent crackdowns often involving the military in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have done little to supress crime, gangs and vigilante violence against gangs.	
Seelke, C.R. (2014). Gangs in Central America. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf	How do gang truces affect crime?	Seelke examined a Congressional Research report based on secondary research, USG documents, and interviews.	Although homicide rates have dropped in El Salvador since the introduction of a gang truce, researchers continue to question its impact on other crime indicators.	
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How does police violence affect police legitimacy?	Sherman reviewed literature on community policing programs.	Police presence can backfire if it is provided in a disrespectful manner. Rude or hostile treatment of citizens, especially juveniles, can provoke angry reactions that increase the risk of future offending (see also Tyler, 1991).	Citizen perceptions of police legitimacy encourage law-abiding behavior not only during an actual or potential police-citizen encounter but also outside of encounters, during everyday life (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Huo 2002).

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How does community policing affect crime?	Sherman reviewed literature on community policing programs.	Neighborhood Watch, a popular community policing program, has no discernible effects on crime rates and has been found to increase fear of crime in the U.S. middle class areas, in which trust and participation in neighborhood watch is higher, generally have little crime to begin with, making measurable effects on crime almost impossible to achieve. Even for middle class groups, neighborhood watch did not decrease a desire to leave the neighborhood due to fear of crime. Neighborhood Watch in poor areas generally experiences low levels of participation.	
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How does community policing affect crime?	Sherman reviewed literature on community policing strategies.	In Chicago, meetings focused on specific problems and held in public spaces have shown mixed results, but some findings show that they may help reduce crime in some of the city's highest crime neighborhoods.	
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How do broken windows and zero tolerance policing affect crime?	Sherman reviewed literature on zero-tolerance policing.	Zero tolerance policies have strong long-term effects on people arrested for minor offences that may increase the risk of violent crime in the long run. First, it pushes individuals with criminal records out of the labor market, increasing the risk to repeat violence and crime. Aggressive broken windows policing also lowers police legitimacy, both for the arrested person and their social network of family and friends while making these groups more defiant to police and more prone to anger in domestic violence and child abuse.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How do gun control programs affect crime?	Sherman reviewed two gun buy back studies: one on St. Louis's program in 1991 and 1994 (Rosenfeld 1995) and one of Seattle's 1992 program (Callahan et al 1995).	Given the high cost (and therefore opportunity cost of implementing the program), weak theoretical rational, and possibilities that the individuals selling the guns back may use the cash to buy more lethal weapons.	
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How do gang mediation and intervention programs affect crime?	Sherman examined three main case studies: Spergel 1980, Spergel and Grossman 1995, and Golstein, Glick and Carthan, 1994.	Conflict Mediation and crisis intervention programs have decreased arrests of gang members in NY and decreased serious violence by former gang offenders in Chicago. Other findings are mixed, suggesting the need for further research.	
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How do gang prevention programs affect crime?	Sherman reviewed literature on gang prevention as part of a broader report for the US Congress on what works in preventing crime.	Literature on gang violence prevention in the US is not rigorous, but there are some promising case studies, which still need to be subjected to controlled testing.	
Sherman, L. (1997). Communities and Crime Prevention. In Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. & Bushway, S. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report To the United States Congress. University of Maryland, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.	How do gang leaving programs affect crime?	Sherman reviewed literature on gang leaving programs.	Despite research demonstrating links between unemployment and crime, no program has been proven to reduce unemployment rates in high crime areas.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Sherman, L. W., & Weisburd, D. (1995). General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime "hot spots": A randomized, controlled trial. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 625–648.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Sherman and Weisburd examined the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment. This Randomized Controlled Trial used computerized mapping of crime calls to identify 110 hot spots of roughly street-block length and doubled police patrols for the experimental sites.	Doubling of police patrols in targeted hot spots reduced crime and disorder relative to sites experiencing normal police patrols in Minneapolis over a ten month period.	
Sherman, L.W., Gartin, P.R., & Buerger, M.E. (1989). Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place. Criminology, 27, 27-55.	How does place affect violent crime?	Sherman et al examined spatial data on 323,979 calls to police over all 115,000 addresses and intersections in Minneapolis over 1 year.	Crime is strongly associated with place, and even within the most crime-ridden neighborhoods, crime clusters at a few discrete locations.	Several studies revealed that over half of all crimes in a city are committed at a few places within communities (Pierce et al. 1988; Sherman et al. 1987). Furthermore, research by Taylor and Gottfredson (1984) suggests that conclusive evidence links this variation to physical and social characteristics of particular blocks and multiple dwellings within a neighborhood. This uneven distribution of crime within specific neighborhoods has been reported in studies of a variety of crime types including drug selling (Weisburd and Green 1994), burglary (Pease 1991), robbery (Hunter and Jeffrey 1992), and auto theft (Clarke and Harris 1992). Analyses tend to show that 50 percent of calls or incidents are concentrated in less than five percent of places (e.g. addresses or street segments) in a city (Pierce et al., 1986; Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd et al., 2004).
Taylor, B., Koper, C. S., & Woods, D. J. (2011). A randomized controlled trial of different policing strategies at hot spots of violent crime. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 7, 149–181.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Taylor et al used an RCT on Jacksonville, Florida to compare different hot spot treatments in the same study, with one treatment group receiving increased foot patrols and the second receiving a problem-oriented response that focused on officers analyzing problems in the hot spot and responding with a more tailored solution.	Problem oriented policing in hot spots reduced street violence in Jacksonville by 33 percent 90 days after the experiment.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Telep, C. (2011). What is Known about the Effectiveness of Police Practices? George Mason University.	How does problem-oriented policing affect crime?	Telep conducted a systemic review of evidence based policing literature.	Multiple quasi-experimental studies suggest that intensive patrol in high gun crime areas can lead to reductions in gun carrying and gun-related violence. Police interventions that more closely approximated "text-book" problem-oriented policing achieved greater impact on crime than programs that only superficially implemented it.	In cases where police departments are not on board with this approach, programs will not work as well (Stone 1993).
Telep, C. (2011). What is Known about the Effectiveness of Police Practices? George Mason University.	How does hot-spot policing affect crime?	Telep conducted a systemic review of evidence based policing literature.	Multiple quasi-experimental studies suggest that intensive patrol in high gun crime areas can lead to reductions in gun carrying and gun-related violence. Police interventions that more closely approximated "text-book" problem-oriented policing achieved greater impact on crime than programs that only superficially implemented it.	

Reducing Violence from Organized Crime

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Arnson, C., Olson, E., Dudley, S., Bosworth, J., Farah, D., & Lopez, J. (2011). Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle. Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Report on the Americas, 29.	How does the balloon effect affect violence?	Arnson et al analyzed a series of case studies on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.	The balloon effect can contribute to violence when cartels shift power between countries due to increasingly effective law enforcement. For instance, the success of authorities in a drug-producing nation therefore makes drug trafficking less profitable in that country, but rather than completely ending operations, traffickers shift operations to other countries. This leads to a "progressive contamination" of more countries in the region by the drug trade and its accompanying violence.	Bagley (2012); Castillo, Mejia and Restrepo (2013); Rasmussen et al (1993); Friman (2009).
Benson B.L., Leburn I.S., & Rasmussen D.W. (2001). The impact of drug enforcement on crime: an investigation of the opportunity cost of police resources. Journal of Drug Issues, 31(989).	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Benson conducted a longitudinal observational study from 1994 to 1997.	The increased rate of drug arrests corresponded to a twofold increase in the risk of violent and property crime across 67 Florida counties.	
Bell, D. (1962). The End of Ideology. New York: Free Press	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Daniel Bell's thesis that organized crime served as a path to social mobility for various ethnic groups in America and was supported by O'Kane (2002) and others who saw a succession of ethnic mafias forming in America because legitimate paths to business were reduced due to discrimination.	Discrimination may be enough for illicit groups to form.	
Benson B.L., & Rasmussen D.W. (1998). Deterrence and public policy: trade-offs in the allocation of police resources. International Review of Law and Economics, 18(24).	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Benson conducted a longitudinal observational study of data from 1983 to 1987.	Drug law enforcement in 67 Florida counties significantly increased violent and serious property crimes and drug arrests correlated with a five fold increase in violent and property crimes.	
Brumm, H.J., Cloninger D.O., (1995). The drug war and the homicide rate: a direct correlation? The Cato Journal, 14(8).	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Brumm conducted a longitudinal observation study of 1985 data.	There is no significant association between law enforcement intensity and drug-related violence in 57 U.S. cities.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Calderon, G., Robles, G., Magaloni, B., & Diaz-Cayeros, A. (2013). The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico's Drug War. White Paper.	How does violence within and between groups affect crime?	Calderon et al used an empirical strategy that combined a difference-in-difference methodology with the use of credible interventions by using synthetic control methods. They measured the treatment effects of arrests or killings on violence in three types of municipalities: treated municipalities where arrests take place, neighboring municipalities where violence might spill over, and strategic neighboring municipalities.	Targeting kingpins in an organization can trigger succession conflicts that lead to more violence; or can lessen an organization's internal discipline and increase violence. State-based violence against one group may, paradoxically, increase turf violence between groups as other organizations prey on the weakened group's turf. Violence may particularly occur to control access to strategic logistical points, such as highways, ports, or territories critical for trafficking activities.	
Castillo, J.C., Mejia, D. & Restrepo, P. (2013). Illegal drug markets and violence in Mexico: The causes beyond Calderon. Working Paper, Universidad de los Andes.	How do interdiction and plan colombia affect violence?	Castillo, Mejia and Restrepo examined monthly data from 2,438 Mexican municipalities from December 2006 to 2010, homicide data from Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (data from 1990 to 2010), and drug-related homicide data from the Mexican Presidency from December 2006 to December 2010. Cocaine supply data is from UNODC and seizure data is from Colombia's ministry of defense.	Cocaine seizures in Colombia contributed to a 21.2 percent increase in homicides and a 46 percent increase in drug related homicides in Mexican municipalities near the U.S. from 2006 to 2010.	
Dell, M. (2013). Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War. Working Paper.	How do drug prohibition and crackdowns affect violence?	Dell used regression discontinuity design, comparing municipalities where the PAN, Calderon's party, won the local elections by a small margin to municipalities in which the PAN lost by a small margin, based on evidence that PAN mayors more strongly implemented Calderon's policies and allowing Dell to test the effects of a more thoroughly implemented war on drugs and violence. Drug trade-related homicide data between December of 2006 and 2009 was based on the findings of a committee involving representatives from all ministries that are members of the National Council of Public Security. General homicide data was from National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) from 1990 to 2008.	Mexican government crackdowns on drug trafficking organizations significantly increased police-criminal violence, violence between drug trafficking groups, and violence in adjacent municipalities when drug trafficking routes were diverted because of crackdowns.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Diaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., Matanock, A., & Romero, V. (2011). Living in Fear: Social Penetration of Criminal Organizations in Mexico. White Paper.	How does the removal of leadership affect organized crime?	Diaz-Cayeros et al conducted a randomized survey across rural and urban regions and across municipalities of different levels of violence. They used a test of two stochastic dominance relationships based on expectations about the joint probability and compared these relationships within each number of list items given.	Decapitation strategies may function more effectively for hierarchically organized groups, but be less useful for networks of autonomous or semi-autonomous cells such as Mexican drug trafficking organizations, and in areas where more groups are competing. In these latter cases, decapitation can cause rival groups to fight over turf and can lead to intra-group succession violence.	In counter-insurgent literature, more recent and robust studies suggest the "decapitation" strategy may be an effective tool (Johnston 2012 and Price 2013); while older studies suggest the strategy does not lead to success (Jordan 2009; David 2002). Research is still needed to see if this finding can be generalized outside of the narco-trafficking field to other forms of organized crime, and if it holds outside of Mexico.
Dion, M. & Russler, C. (2008). Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia. Journal for Latin American Studies, 40, 399-421.	How does crop eradication affect violence?	Dion and Russler examined published times-series cross-section data from 32 sub-national departments from 2001 and 2005 to examine the impact of Plan Colombia crop eradication strategies on cocoa cultivation.	Crop eradication did not significantly reduce cocao cultivation in Colombia from 2001 to 2005; in the cases where it did have an impact, the impact was temporary and largely due to population displacement caused by fumigation efforts. Dion and Rusler explain that crop eradication only succeeded in reducing cocoa cultivation when it created significant displacement. Moreover, they find that cocoa cultivation is more common in poorer, less developed agricultural regions and in regions with less developed public infrastructure.	
Dube, O., Garcia-Ponce, O., & Thom, K. (2014). From Maize to Haze: Agricultural Shocks and the Growth of the Mexican Drug Sector. http://omargarciaponce.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/maize_to_haze.pdf	How does crop eradication affect violence?	Dube, Garcia-Ponce, and Thom analyzed whether access to arms contributed to violent crime following the 2004 expiration of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban.	In 2004, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban expired, increasing the supply of arms in Mexican municipalities near Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Municipalities near California, which kept in place its own state-level ban, did not have the same increase in supply. Homicides and gun-related crimes were higher in municipalities near non-California border states. These effects were greatest in areas which had recently become more politically competitive and in areas where the drug trade was more prevalent.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Durante, R., & Gutierrez, E. (2013). Fighting Crime with a little help from my friends: party affiliation, inter-jurisdictional cooperation and crime in Mexico. LIEEP: Science Po.	How does inter-jurisdictional cooperation among local law enforcement affect violence?	Utilizing Regression Discontinuity Design, Durante and Gutierrez proxied neighboring municipality cooperation with the degree of political alignment between mayors.	In Mexico, inter-jurisdictional cooperation between and across neighboring municipalities/local police forces is more effective at reducing drug-related violent crime compared to local-federal level cooperation.	
Friman, H. R., (2009). Drug markets and the selective use of violence. Crime Law and Social Change, 52(3), 285–295.	What are some proximate causes of crime in marginalized communities?	Friman conducted brief case studies (based on review of literature) of the methamphetamine market in the United States and Japan and the cocaine market in the United States, Colombia, and Mexico. He examined cycles of law enforcement, violent contestation over markets, and consolidation from the early 1980s through the 2000s.	Violence is not inherent to the drug trade itself. It only emerges under certain conditions. Drug-related violence derives from competition among drug trafficking groups and/or between drug traffickers and the state over access to distribution networks in the US, Japan, Colombia, and Mexico. Because of the absence of state backed dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms (mechanisms that are typically present in illicit markets), violence often serves as a selection tool of market regulation in illicit economies. Violence between trafficking organizations derives from competition over market share and/or distribution networks (market consolidation and stability reduces violence). Mexican cartels filled the vacuum left by Colombian cartels following law enforcement crackdowns, exacerbating violence between groups competing to fill the space left by former cartels.	
Goldstein, P. (1985). The Drug/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 39, 143-174.	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Goldstein discussed systemic violence.	Violence is used in drug trafficking markets as a business tool to accrue market power by eliminating competition, build a strong reputation, and/or gain control of strategic rents that are needed to run a business.	
Higginson et al, (2014). The Effectiveness of Crop Targeting Interventions for Drug Control: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. The University of Queensland, Institute for Social Science Research.	How does crop eradication affect violence?	Higginson et al examined 15 empirical studies of crop targeting interventions in Afghanistan and Colombia. They examined ten studies that reported on crop eradication efforts.	Crop eradication efforts to reduce drug supply (and therefore the violence that stems from drug trafficking) has been shown to be ineffective in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Hill, P., (2004). The Changing Face of the Yakuza. Global Crime, 6(1), 97–116. Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Hill conducted a historical case study of organized crime in Japan based on extensive fieldwork and interviews, with a specific focus on the evolution of the Yakuza.	Economic expansion in Japan's post war period provided a lucrative new source of protection money for Yakuza groups. Competition over these revenue streams and other market opportunities (e.g. control over day laborers) sparked widespread organized crime related conflict in Japan). A succession crisis in Japan's largest crime (yakuza) syndicate sparked a five year violent conflict between two factions of the group in the 1980s.	Williams 2012 explains that over 85 percent of drug related violence in Mexico in the late 2000s involved drug traffickers killing each other.
Hill, P., (2004). The Changing Face of the Yakuza. Global Crime, 6(1), 97–116. Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.	How do focused deterrence and selective targeting of most-violent groups affect violence?	Hill conducted a historical case study of organized crime in Japan based on extensive fieldwork and interviews.	A summit strategy involving mass arrests of organized crime group members, particularly top personnel, decreased violence in Japan in the 1960s.	Milhaupt and West (2002).
Hill, P., (2004). The Changing Face of the Yakuza. Global Crime, 6(1), 97–116. Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.	How do legal and regulatory approaches affect violence?	Hill conducted a historical case study of organized crime in Japan based on extensive fieldwork and interviews.	The 1992 countermeasures law (botaiho) in Japan successfully pressured organized crime groups to use significantly less violence by closing gang offices during periods of open violent conflict. Civil litigation against organized crime bosses has held them responsible for killings by subordinates, leading syndicate leaders to place stricter controls on the use of violence by sub-groups. Despite successful legal and regulatory efforts to reduce violence related to organized crime in Japan, risk for violence remains significant because the threat to deploy violence is the central prop empowering these groups and many of their activists.	Despite 2008 judicial reforms, the Mexican criminal justice system remains weak as trafficking operations are run out of prisons, according to Shirk 2011.
Hill, P., (2004). The Changing Face of the Yakuza. Global Crime, 6(1), 97–116. Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.	How does informal group mediation affect violence?	Hill conducted a historical case study of organized crime in Japan based on extensive fieldwork and interviews.	A pan-syndicate organization in Tokyo provided a mechansim for settling disputes between groups peacefully, contributing to less organized crime related violence in Japan.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Hope, A. (2013). In Mexico, obfuscating crime numbers. Dallas Morning News. http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/sunday-commentary/20130517-alejandro-hope-in-mexico-obfuscating-crime-numbers.ece	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Hope wrote an op-ed analyzing the dissonance between government drug-related homicide figures and more established homicide figures.	The mexican government under Pena Nieto has made efforts to (a) decrease attention given to violence, particularly in the media (the use of the words homicide, narcotrafficking and cartel declined by half from the year before in the Mexico City press, possibly because of pressure from gangs, but also because of silence from government sources on drug violence) (b) controlled drug conflict related information but not sharing information (e.g. the names of arrested cartel members) and (c) manipulate homicide statistics through the arbitrary creation of drug-related homicide statistics that portray a decline in drug-related homicides when violence has actually likely remained at high levels.	Frencesco (2007) explains that economic liberalization empowered organized crime syndicates with economic clout to direct political violence.
ICG. (2014, January). Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan. International Crisis Group.	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	ICG interviews with political leaders, police officials, judges, economists, journalists, and civil society activists in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, and Peshawar.	Increased competition among organized crime groups and among political groups lead to increased violence in Karachi, Pakistan. Since 2000, competition between groups has led to increased violence in Karachi, Pakistan (considered the most dangerous megacity in 2013). Competition between extortion rackets has contributed to violence. Employment rooted in political patronage often means that losing party youth are unemployed, leading them to join gangs, which in turn become instrumental in political competition between groups. Increased political competition in Karachi has therefore led to more political and gang violence, both in contested neighborhoods and in ethnic/political party strongholds.	
Jacques, S. & Wright, R. (2008). The relevance of peace to studies of drug market violence. Criminology, 46(1), 221–254.	What are some proximate causes of crime in marginalized communities?	Jacques and Wright conduct 50 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with drug dealers from low-income communities St. Louis, Missouri and middle-class families in Georgia. All interviewees had sold drugs within two years of the interview.	Even the most violent markets are peaceful most of the time, largely because of informal social controls (e.g. negotiation, nonviolent theft and retaliation).	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Johnson, H.N., Soeters, J.L., et al (2008). Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and the Chances of a Reversible Destiny. Political Studies, 56(1), 166-191.	How does civil society engagement affect crime?	Johnson et al conducted a literature review on Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and civic intervention.	In Sicily, popular turning against organized crime was essential to its demise.	Vanda Felbab-Brown (2012) and David Kilcullen (2013) similarly argue that breaking community support for organized crime is important in its demise, in cases from Central America to Afghanistan. However, such criminal forces are often able to lodge in countries in which weak, venal, or corrupted states have lost legitimacy with their citizens.
Jones, N. (2013). The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies kidnap rates and the Arellano-Felix Organization. Trends in Organized Crime, 16 (2), 156-176.	How does violence within and between groups affect crime?	Jones conducted a literature review on the removal of leadership as well as flat and hierarchical organized crime networks.	The decapitation strategy of capturing or killing narco-trafficking kingpins has increased violence in Mexico.	
Kleiman, M. (2011). Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars: Smarter Policies for Both sides of the Border. Foreign Affairs, 90(5), 89-101.	How do focused deterrence and selective targeting of most-violent groups affect violence?	Kleiman studies how to move away from random non-strategic strikes against all organized criminal groups (a zero-tolerance policy) towards strategically selecting groups to dismantle.	Because most drug dealers are not violent, law enforcement officials should focus on arresting drug-dealing individuals and groups that are the most violent. This would lead to a double benefit of both curtailing the capacity of the most violent actors and deterring the rest from violence. To measure which groups use the most violence, law enforcement officials can create violence-related metrics to be applied over a period of weeks or months. A scoring system could measure a group's number of killings and distribution of targets, and nonfatal shootings and killings. This would not necessarily involve physically arresting the leaders of the organizations, but an increased focus of dismantling of most-violent organizations, less violent organizations can replace or substitute the most violent organization trafficking activities.	Targeted deterrence does not happen in one-step; it usually involves not just targeting the most violent group, but continuing after that group has been successfully dismantled. This should be done to make sure the deterrent effect is sustained. Ultimately, focused deterrence and selective targeting allow law enforcement to overcome low capacity and under-resourcing issues, according to Felbab-Brown 2013.

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Kohler-Hausmann, J. (2010). The Attila the Hun Law: New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Making of a Punitive State. Journal of Social History, 44(1), 71-95.	How do harsher drug laws affect violence?	Kohler-Hausmann reviewed the social and cultural history of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, examining the context in which Rockefeller pivoted from rehabilitative policies to retributive policies and why these policies were politically successful despite empirical failure to reduce crime and drug use.	Harsher drug laws, despite popular public support, have been shown to be ineffective in reducing drug use and crime in the United States (New York). The Rockefeller Drug Laws of the early 1970s were motivated by political considerations (tough on crime policy would mobilize popular support) and by citizen groups that felt a loss of stature and privileges as economic opportunities narrowed and traditionally marginalized groups (e.g. African Americans) gained new rights.	
Lessing, B. (2012). The Logic of Violence in Criminal War. Dissertation in Political Science. University of California: Berkeley.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Lessing conducts a comparative study of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil to assess criminal war.	A state crackdown is more likely to succeed when repression is conditional on use of violence rather than unconditional.	
Levi, M., & Maguire, M. (2004). Reducing and preventing organized crime: An evidence-based critique. Crime, Law and Social Change, 41(5), 397-469. http://search.proquest.com/docview/216177280?accountid=40995	What are some resources devoted to fighting organized crime and related violence?	Levi and Maguire examined literature on organized crime reduction initiatives and questionnaires designed and disseminated by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention in early 2000 to 460 relevant agencies in EU member states and other selected countries.	Despite significant resources devoted to fighting organized crime and related violence, there is a dearth of rigorous research evaluating the efficacy of programs in reducing crime or violence.	
Levitt S.D. & Venkatesh S.A. (2000). An economic analysis of a drug-selling gang's finances. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 35.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Levitt conducted a longitudinal observational study, four years in the 1990s (years not identified for anonymity reasons).	The dearth of formal dispute resolution mechanisms in illicit drug markets coupled with intense law enforcement measures caused a high level of violence among drug gangs studied; as a result, violent conflict made up approximately 25% of gang activities during the study period.	
Maher, L. & Dixon, D. (1999). Policing and public health: law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level drug market. British Journal of Criminology 39, 488.	Does the militarization of law enforcement reduce violence?	Maher conducted a qualitative case study from February 1995 to February 1997.	Enhanced enforcement led drug dealers to leave the market, which attracted in their place individuals who were more risk prone, leading street dealing to become more volatile and violent in Sydney, Austalia.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Mejia, D., & Restrepo, P. (2011). The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia. Working Paper.	How do interdiction and plan colombia affect violence?	Mejia and Restrepo modeled illegal drug markets to capture the main strategic responses of the actors. They then calibrated the model using data from the war on drugs in Colombia, as well as the observed outcomes from wholesale cocaine markets. Using the calibrated results, they estimated different measures of the costs and efficiency of the anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2008. Then they carried out simulation exercises, where they assessed the effects of exogenous changes in the U.S. budget allocated to Plan Colombia.	In Colombia's national strategy to combat drug trafficking, Plan Colombia, inderdiction efforts (which involve taking control and destroying drug trafficking routes) has proven to be more cost effective than crop eradication efforts to reduce drug supply.	
Mejia, D., & Restrepo, P. (2013). The Economics of the War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking. Working Paper.	How do drug prohibition and crackdowns affect violence?	Mejia and Restrepo created a coca suitability index that predicted the presence of coca crops cross-sectionally and its expansion from 1994 to 2000. This showed that an increase in cocaine in Colombia was associated with an increase of coca cultivation in municipalities with a high suitability index. They used this data to then uncover the causal effect of illegal cocaine markets on violence.	In Colombia, illegal markets played a crucial role in bringing the violence of cartels to the country. A 10% increase in the value of coca cultivation in the municipality increases homicides by about 1.25%, forced displacement by about 3%, attacks by insurgent groups by about 2%, and incidents involving the explosion of land mines by about 1%.	According to Andreas and Wallman (2009), often, strategies to combat the use and sale of drugs can provoke organized criminal groups to utilize violence. As police crackdowns remove some illicit actors, new ones arise to fill the vacuum and claim market shares through violent competition.
Miron, J.A. (2001). Violence, guns, and drugs: a cross-country analysis. Journal of Law and Economics, 44, 615.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Miron conducted a longitudinal observational study from 1993 to 1996.	Increased drug seizures correlated with increased violence.	
Naylor, R.T. (2009). Violence and illegal economic activity: a deconstruction. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 52, 231-242.	What are some structural causes of organized crime?	Naylor detailed the changes in regulatory markets and how they affect levels of violence.	The illegalization of certain markets into "illicit markets" can encourage riskier behavior and with it an increase in violence, as demonstrated by the 1910 Mann Act's ban of prostitution in the United States.	
Paden, J. (2013). Midterm Challenges in Nigeria: Elections, Parties, and Regional Conflict. United States Institute of Peace Special Report. www. usip.org	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Paden conducted a case study on election violence in Nigeria based on interviews and literature review.	Political parties in Nigeria regularly collaborate with oragnized crime and youth gang groups to intimidate political opposition and achieve political aims.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Raab, S. (2006). Five Families: The Rise, Decline, and Resurgence of America's Most Powerful Mafia Empires. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.	How do legal and regulatory approaches affect violence?	Raab tracked the history of the rise, decline and resurgence of America's most powerful mafia empires.	The U.S. fight against organized crime was greatly assisted by plea-bargaining laws which allowed law enforcement to infiltrate and break collusive groups by enabling members to turn on one another in exchange for immunity, and by so-called Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statutes that defined racketeering and criminal organizations broadly to enable more significant penalties.	Reuter (1995).
Rasmussen, D.W., Benson, B.L., & Sollars, D.L. (1993). Spatial competition in illicit drug markets: the consequences of increased drug war enforcement. Review of Regional Studies 123(219).	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Rasmussen et al conducted a longitudinal study and model of spatial competition of Florida jurisdictions.	There is quantitative empirical support for the balloon effect in Florida. Higher drug enforcement in one jurisdiction increases the size of the drug market in an adjoining jurisdiction, thus resulting in a higher crime rate.	Castillo, Mejia and Restrepo (2013) find quantitative empirical evidence for the ballooning effect taking place between Mexico and Colombia; they find a strong correlation between high-freqency time series data on Colombian cocaine seizures and homicide rates in Mexico. They find that not only do aggregate supply shocks in cocaine in Colombia have an impact on drug trafficking in Mexico, but that drug related violence has surged after President Calderon took office in 2006.
Rasmussen, D.W., Benson, B.L., & Sollars, D.L. (1993). Spatial competition in illicit drug markets: the consequences of increased drug war enforcement. Review of Regional Studies 123(219).	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Rasmussen et al conducted a longitudinal study and model of spatial competition of Florida jurisdictions.	Increased drug enforcement increased the size of a drug market in an adjoining jurisdiction, resulting in a higher violent crime rate in 67 Florida counties.	
Resignato, A.J. (2000). Violent crime: a function of drug use or drug enforcement? Applied Economics, 32, 681.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Resignato used 4 regression analyses anlayzing data from 24 US cities from October 1992 to September 1993.	Increasing the ratio of drug arrests to total arrests increased violence.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. In Special Issue: Illicit Markets and Violence, Edited by Andreas, P. & Wallman, J. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 275-284.	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Based on existing literature, Reuter qualitatively compared violence in Mexican drug markets in 2007-08 and violence in the US crack market in the late 1980s.	There are three primary causes of violence in illicit drug markets: violence within drug-dealing groups (relating to internal discipline and/or succession issues), violence between groups (over territory and/or transactions), and violence between these groups and the government/law enforcement. Interventions in Mexico that were not tailored to underlying factors causing violence exacerbated conflict. Similar enforcement measures against gang leadership worked in the US because they addressed causes of violence.	
Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. In Special Issue: Illicit Markets and Violence, Edited by Andreas, P. & Wallman, J. Crime, Law and Social Change, 52(3), 275-284.	How do focused deterrence and selective targeting of most-violent groups affect violence?	Based on existing literature, Reuter qualitatively compared violence in Mexican drug markets in 2007-08 and violence in the US crack market in the late 1980s.	Selective incarceration of the most violent participants, coupled with the maturity of the market and its participants, contributed to decreases in violence in US crack markets in the late 1980s. The targeting of gang leaders in Mexico increased inter-gang violence. Removing key players and kingpins from the illegal drug market can create new financial opportunities for other individuals to fill the vacuum by entering the market.	In a qualitative study of Sydney, Australia's heroin market, Maher and Dixon (1999) found that as dealers left the market (either because of being arrested or displaced), those more willing to work in the increasingly high-risk environment moved in. Street dealing thus became more volatile and violent and increased the power of certain groups. Intrusions were also dealt with violently.
Riley, D. & O'Hare, P.A. (1998). Reducing the harms of drugs and HIV: policies & practices around the world. XII International AIDS Conference, 12, 667.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Riley conducted a longitudinal observational study of data from 1995.	Enhanced enforcement in crack markets increased homicide rates in four cities and decreased rates in two U.S. cities.	
Rios, V. (2014). The Role of Government Coordination in Crime Deterrence and Citizen Security Mexico. Forthcoming in Journal of Conflict Resolution.	What are some structural causes of organized crime?	Rios used a time-variant data-set of Mexico's cocaine markets at the sub-national level and Cox proportional hazards regressions to test the argument.	Violence can result from a lack of local government coordination, which is a byproduct of a decentralized and weak nation-wide governance system.	
Robles, G., Calderon, G., & Beatriz Magaloni. (2012). The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico. Working Paper, Program on Poverty and Governance, Stanford University.	How does organized crime affect marginalized communities?	Robles, Calderon and Magaloni used a variable regression while focusing on Mexican border towns.	Organized crime and drug trafficking has negative economic consequences in Mexico by driving out business owners who move to safer territories and forcing migration of civilians to safer countries.	

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Schneider, S. (2013). Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian Case study. Sociologia: Problemas e practicas, 71, 125 - 143.	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Schneider empirically tested Brownstein, Crimmins and Spunt's theory using a case study of Montreal, Canada by examining Quebec's biker war.	Violence stemmed from conflict over competition in the distribution of cocaine in the province and Montreal in particular. Violence also stemmed from competition over who would maintain a monopoly in the illegal market and freelance wholesalers and retailers. Instability in Montreal's wholesale cocaine market stemmed from the oligopoly that the most powerful group (Hell's Angels) maintained, and its aggressive goal to establish an outright monopoly. As Hell's Angels attempted to impose more strict lines of authority, re-draw territorial boundaries to favor their group, and create new roles and relationships between the group and free lancers, the market became more unstable and experienced an uptick in violence. The efforts of the organized criminal group to remove competition and become a monopoly resulted in market instability and consequent increases in violence.	Brownstein, Crimmins and Spunt (2000) aruge that less stable markets involve actors operating outside the law, which is reflected in the social controls that moderate interactions. They argue that systemic drug related violence is more often found in unstable markets characterized by participants who are focused on competition and gaining market share. This competition over market share contributes to instability, introducing the greater risk of violence as a means to regulate conflict between competing groups.
Shepard, E.M., & Blackley, P.R. (2005). Drug enforcement and crime: recent evidence from New York State. Social Science Quarterly, 86, 323.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Shepard conducted a longitudinal observational study from 1996 to 2000.	Increases in total per capita drug arrests are accompanied by higher rates of crime. Additionally, arrests for manufacture and sale of hard drugs is associated with higher levels of all crimes, including assault.	
Shirk, D. (2011). Drug Violence and State Responses in Mexico. University of San Diego. Working Paper.	How does cartel fragmentation affect violence?	Shirk studied approaches to dismantling organized crime and the violence that stems from the fragmentation of cartels.	Cartel fragmentation, which involves dismantling organized criminal groups into smaller manageable pieces, is questionably effective. In Mexico, cartel fragmentation has led to a much more chaotic and unpredictable pattern of violence.	Shirk (2011) and Guerrero-Gutierrez (2011) argue that there are several reasons why splintering groups into smaller fragments may not be beneficial in reducing violence. First, making the problem smaller does not necessarily mean it is more manageable; cartel fragmentation has led to a much more chaotic and unpredictable pattern of violence across Mexico.

AUTHOR / DATE : TITLE	RESEARCH QUESTION	METHODOLOGY AND DATA	MAIN FINDINGS	RELATED STUDIES
Slade, G. (2013). Reorganizing Crime: Mafia and Anti-Mafia in Post-Soviet Georgia. Oxford: Oxford UP.	What are some proximate causes of organized crime?	Slade analyzed police files, court cases, archives and conducted interviews over a two year period.	Strong societal distrust of the state may place societies at risk for organized crime, according to historical case studies. Organized crime then appropriates government functions and plays on local loyalties and popular support to deepen its control over communities.	Shelley (2007); Paoli (2007); Kilcullen (2013); Brown (2012).
Snyder, R., & Duran-Martinez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets. Crime, Law and Social Change 52(3), 253-273.	What are some structural causes of organized crime?	Synder and Duran-Martinez used comparative case studies of Mexico and Burma.	The breakdown of state sponsored protection rackets (as in Mexico) and the preservation of similar rackets (in Burma) affect levels of violence. In Mexico, state-sponsored protection rackets formed in the 1940s and lasted until the late 1980s, resulting in relatively lower levels of violence in this time period. The breakdown of such rackets in the 1990s (which was a result of administrative reforms aimed at reducing corruption among public officials) was associated with sharp increases in violence. In Burma, however, there was no state-sponsored protection racket in the 1990s, a time period associated with a protracted civil war. After 1990, the military government in Burma created institutions of protection for the illicit drug market. This was associated with a noticeable reduction in violence.	
Werb, D., Rowell, G., Guyatt, G., Kerr, T., Montaner, J., & Wood, E. (2011). Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review. International Journal of Drug Policy 22, 87 - 94.	How does the militarization of law enforcement affect violence?	Werb et al conducted a systematic review of English language scientific literature on drug law enforcement and violence, and examined 15 studies in the U.S. and Austrialia.	Quantitative and qualitative evidence from Australia and the U.S. strongly suggests that increasing drug law enforcement and arrests increases drug related violence.	Militarized strategies against drug cartels increased violence and homicides in Mexico, according to Shirk (2011) and Guerrero-Gutierrez (2011).
World Bank. (2004). Afghanistan. State building, sustaining growth, and reducing poverty. Washington, DC.	How does crop eradication affect violence?	The World Bank report on crop eradication in Afghanistan reviewed literature on crop eradication strategies in contexts of political instability, including Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.	Crop eradication intensified political grievances and violent conflict in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. World Bank 2004 found that eradication often proves counterproducvie, resulting in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs, displacement of production to more remote areas, and fueling of violence and insecurity, which in several cases forced the eradication policy to be reversed and led to adverse political outcomes.	