



# 2011 CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLICY CONFERENCE

## WHAT'S NEXT AFTER "NEW START"?

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**CHAIR:**

**Ambassador Linton Brooks**

**SPEAKERS:**

**Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller**

U.S. Department of State

**Ambassador Sergey Kislyak**

Embassy of the Russian Federation

Transcript by Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.

[00:00:06]

LINTON BROOKS: Good afternoon. I'm Linton Brooks, and I have the extremely easy task of moderating a discussion between two people who have known each other for a long time and don't need me here. (Laughter.)

What we're going to do is they're each going to make – they're each going to make some brief opening remarks, then we'll have a little dialogue up here, and then we'll go to questions. One thing I need to remind you now – there will be no break after this panel. We will be moving directly to the national security adviser. So when I ask you to thank them, that doesn't mean get up and run out and look for the coffee.

On my immediate left is Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Verification Rose Gottemoeller. On her immediate left is the ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States. They both have long and distinguished careers. Their bios are in the book, but as my personal view, if you don't know who they are you actually wandered into the wrong conference by mistake. (Laughter.)

And so with – I'm going to ask Rose to start and make a couple of observations, and then the Ambassador, and then we'll go to a more free-form discussion.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Great.

[00:01:25]

GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Ambassador Brooks. It's wonderful to be on the same stage with you. And it's wonderful to be with this audience. Again, I see so many faces I know in the audience, so many respected colleagues and friends. So thank you to Carnegie for the opportunity to speak here today.

I wanted to begin my short introduction by recalling that the Carnegie conference – the 2009 Carnegie conference was, my first official act. Right after I was confirmed by the Senate I came here to speak to this group the last time the conference was held, and my partner in crime on that occasion was none other than Ambassador Kislyak, so it's a great pleasure to be on this stage again with Ambassador Kislyak.

[00:02:05]

What a two years it has been. It has been a really amazing rollercoaster ride, first with our negotiation of the New START treaty in Geneva, which succeeded, and the presidents signed – President Medvedev, President Obama – on April 8th of last year, and then with the ratification debate in the Senate that culminated on the 22nd of December with the New START treaty gaining the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate and afterwards being ratified by the president.

I was honored and pleased to be in Munich on the 5th of February when my boss, Secretary Clinton, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov exchanged the documents to bring the treaty into force. And the story doesn't end there. Away we went. Immediately on that day we began exchanging notifications through our Nuclear

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Risk Reduction Centers to begin the implementation process for the treaty. Forty-five days after that, last week, we exchanged the comprehensive databases under the treaty.

We began our first exhibitions— the Russians came to look at our B-1 bomber; we went to look at the RS-24, the new Russian ICBM. And this week we are beginning the first meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the implementing body under the new treaty. Sixty days after the treaty enters into force – that’s the 6th of April – after that point both of our countries have the right to conduct onsite inspections.

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So it’s been – it’s been really a continuing story, and I can’t tell you the degree to which it has been exciting for all of us involved; also it’s positive to be supported so, so clearly by this community, both in and out of government. The expertise that has stepped forward to help us in our efforts both at negotiating in Geneva and also negotiating here in Washington up on Capitol Hill – it has really been an astounding effort by this entire community.

So I will just end my brief introductory remarks by expressing a word of appreciation to you all and thanking you for the continuing work that you do, because it is so important to the accomplishments of our goals inside the government. So, thank you, from me.

Sergey?

[00:04:24]

AMBASSADOR SERGEY KISLYAK: Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you, Carnegie Foundation, for inviting me. It’s the second time that I have a chance to talk, and I am extremely glad that my partner – I hope it’s not in crime –

GOTTEMOELLER: (Chuckles.)

KISLYAK: – is Rose.

I remember two years ago, I had the chance to welcome her in her new role in the State Department. And congratulating ourselves that in that moment, we had had already an interlocutor, because prior to that we were still trying to get an answer as to how and when we were going to start talking with the Americans regarding arms control. Two years have elapsed and there are a lot of things that have been done, and they have been proved successful.

It wasn’t the easiest, we thought, in the very beginning. The negotiations proved to be a little bit lengthier than we had expected. The document is a little bit thicker than we were promising.

But at the same time, we have a document that is, in our view, a good product, that is taking into account not only the necessities of classical arms control but also the experienced gain through previous implementation of other treaties, including – (inaudible) – verification, we were able to simplify somewhat verification to make them less expensive and at the same time efficient enough to ensure that the treaty is going to be implemented.

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The start of the implementation was good. The exchange of information occurred exactly according to the treaty. And we appreciate that kind of spirit of partnership that we have developed in previous implementations of the treaty that was transplanted into the new environment by the professionals in a cooperative way. We are looking forward to implementing the treaty in full, and I hope that's going to be a really successful agreement between us that it's been for the last 10 years.

I would add a couple of – personal views – to this, that this treaty is also politically important, not only in terms of what it limits or what it reduces, however that certainly is important. But also it brings that – the culture calls Russia and the United States to cooperate in managing these strategic weapons in a way that wouldn't be threatening to each other.

So the goal of achieving stability on a lower level of weapons – that's what this treaty is about, and it brings us into the process that I hope is going to develop into the future, the next stage of our cooperation.

[00:07:28]

Mind you, next steps are not going to be easy. This treaty will prove to be less – a little bit more difficult to negotiate than we expected, and the next generations of the treaties also will require a lot and lot of work. And we certainly will have to sit together with our American colleagues and to think how we work on next steps, consistent with the goal of moving finally in the future to the zero that both presidents of Russia and the United States supported.

But at least – and also fully understanding that there's a sensitive process, that we need to do it in a way that at each and every stage the security of both sides is equally protected and that we do it in a way that will be supporting stability rather than undermining it.

The world around us is changing and the world is completely different, so for next steps we will have to think about the factors that needs to be taken into account, and there are many. So do not expect that one can come up with the easy or simplistic formula that will make a treaty tomorrow. It needs to be well-calculated here in the United States. I know that you are working inside the administration as to how to best deal with us. We also do a lot of homework because we want to be in a process that brings stability and additional added security to Russia and the rest of the world as well.

[00:09:11]

So I think that when we are considering the next steps, and I understand that's the subject matter of the discussion that we are supposed to have here, I will have to take into account a number of things that are affecting our respective security.

For us, what is important also – that there is an interlink between ballistic missile defense development and future reductions of nuclear weapons. This interlink has always existed in our negotiations, and the lower you go – it's a simple formula – the more you need to be assured that whatever programs in ballistic missile defense are implemented do not undermine stability and do not undermine our ability to – go down.

We also need to be remembering that we've advanced the technologies with appearance of – stability of appearance of strategic weapons and non-nuclear – (inaudible) – weapons that technically can implement the same missions as nuclear weapons in many respects. One has to understand how the technological developments would affect your ability to – go down with – with nuclear weapons.

[00:10:28]

We live in Europe, unlike you, here, divided by oceans from many other countries. For us, what is happening in the field of conventional weapons is much more important than most probably for the United States, and it's part of our formula for security for Russia. And to be honest, I cannot report to you a success story in our discussions on how we can move on conventional arms control in Europe that would be reinforcing our sense of stability.

We also are mindful of the possibility of appearance of the weapons in outer space. That's why we are trying to bring to the international discussions the idea of getting an arrangement, an agreement that would preclude this from happening rather than allowing it to happen, and afterwards start thinking how we will manage it into the future. And also – that's also a factor of the Europeans' security.

We are reminded in the documents of NATO in Lisbon that NATO is a nuclear alliance. I don't remember, by the way, that kind of statement coming from my NATO colleagues, and I used to be an ambassador to NATO. That would be reinforcing that kind of position, that NATO is nuclear allies. That also makes us think how the NATO nuclear weapons can affect security in Europe.

[00:12:07]

So having said all of this, you might ask me, am I interested in pursuing arms control? The answer is yes. We need it, and we are interested in it. But what we would like to do is to sit together with our American colleagues and other colleagues, because we think that the next steps in this field have to be taken together with other nuclear-weapon countries. We are going lower and lower, but the – factor of others – is growing in importance.

We need to be sure that's also part of the overall formula, that while we will be moving down – and the lower we go, the more important it is – the other countries do not increase the holdings of nuclear weapons and that there is no nuclear proliferation occurring that will be undermining our respective situations.

On this part of the formula I will say we have been enjoying pretty good cooperation with the United States for quite a long period of time. And on proliferation, we were working almost as one in the international corridor, even in the Cold War, and increasingly are working so now, and we see eye to eye on absolute majority of issues that are being discussed in the international forum.

We will learn to reinforce each other in this field, even in the – (inaudible) – it's a small part of the overall nonproliferation effort, but then at the same time we had established a reserve stockpile of nuclear material to guarantee supplies for non-nuclear-weapon countries for energy purposes.

We have enjoyed excellent support from the United States, and we were supporting the United States' idea to establish that. And bringing it – just as an example of how we have learned not only to declare things – that are similar – but also to join forces in order to make nonproliferation efforts successful. And it certainly – it's a big problem and we will have many generations of arms control after myself and Rose who will be still cooperating in this field.

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But what I'm suggesting is that thinking about next steps – and I think there is a desire to address these issues here in Washington. There is a desire in Moscow to address these issues in a serious fashion because it's about our security, and we want to have an environment that would be stable, predictable and at the lowest level of weapons, including nuclear weapons.

But I would like to warn against seeking for a simplistic formula that will resolve it just by arithmetics. It needs to include a lot, a lot of discussions and a lot, a lot of involvement of other players, because the stability and the international security – it is so interlinked in this global-alliance world that we need to be sure that whatever we do reinforces it rather than undermine it.

Thank you.

[00:15:28]

BROOKS: Thank you, sir.

Let me ask you first a question. In – at least outside of government in Washington, it is assumed that whatever the next step is, is fundamentally bilateral, and that while we need to consider what other states are doing – you spoke of the need to pay – to take account of other nuclear states. Did you mean in a formal way or did you mean simply that we should jointly discourage others from taking advantage of our reductions for their buildup?

KISLYAK: Our preferred way of dealing with this would be to have them as a partner in negotiating what next is to be done. Certainly there are signatories and certainly – we have – fora when there will be differences in the commitments that each of us will make, but we are thinking how to – engage – these countries. I do not – have the formula to offer today – and I said that it's not a simplistic formula.

We need to work on these issues in a cooperative way with the Americans and with the Europeans and with the Arabs. We want next steps to lead to stability. And certainly, one has to decide, what are these new steps that we are talking about – (inaudible) – drastic, very – (inaudible) – the more you lower your role, the more widely you include the weapons systems you want to control to the agreements, the more important it would be to talk to the others.

[00:17:13]

BROOKS: What's your reaction to that?

GOTTEMOELLER: Well, my reaction is that we've already actually started down this road, and it was a product not so much of a bilateral or multilateral negotiating sphere in the arms-control realm but as a product of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference that took place in May of 2010 and produced for the first time a consensus action plan with a number of tasks along each of the three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, civil nuclear uses and disarmament.

And a task for the P5 that is laid out there explicitly is to pursue together verification and transparency technical talks – technical consultations. We began this effort in London in September of 2009 with what – it was at the time a kind of experiment to get the P5 together to do technical talks on verification and transparency of reductions, and it turned out to be quite successful. So we looked at it last May, decided we wanted now to launch a process and to have a regularized series of meetings on this.



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I think frankly, this is going to be beneficial, because it will establish both a process of meetings, regular, but also a process of projects or working groups where we have an opportunity to have a kind of continual interaction on these matters. And I really think that it is going to have a great benefit for the goals that Sergey is talking about – that is, drawing more countries into the discussion.

So I think – I think it will be beneficial and will also help to illuminate some of the problems and challenges but also the opportunities of working together for further transparency and confidence-building in the first instance, and down the road on more challenging technical tasks. So I really think that we are now in – shall I say it this way? – we are in train, and it's thanks to the NPT review conference and the action plan that came out of it.

By the way, first time in 10 years that we had a consensus result coming out of the NPT review conference. So it was quite an accomplishment for all the countries that participated in that effort.

[00:19:40]

BROOKS: One of the – one of the obvious issues, at least for the United States, is going to be so-called tactical weapons or nonstrategic weapons. And I know that Russian Federation has been very clear about number of things that have to happen before it's appropriate to talk about those.

But someday we'll reach the stage that we are talking about them, and I wonder if both of you could speculate a little bit on what would be – what are the kind of approaches that people in this room should be thinking through and trying to help develop?

In other words, are they – the ideas that I have heard in the last three days are locational restrictions, transparency, some kind of combined limit that effectively means that the United States would reduce non-deployed warheads while the Russian Federation reduced tactical warheads. There are a number of ideas both here and in Russia that are floating around, and I wonder if the two of you would speculate on which ones are most likely to be useful as we sort of begin this process.

[00:21:03]

GOTTEMOELLER: Shall I start?

I think frankly there is – I mentioned at the outset there's a lot of really good word going on both in and out of government. I don't want to zero in on any particular set of options today, but I did want to make a couple core points. When President Obama signed the New START treaty in Prague on the 8th of April, he mentioned two categories for reductions – for next-stage reductions: further reductions in strategic deployed systems; further reductions in nonstrategic – or, I should say, reductions in nonstrategic systems; and reductions in non-deployed systems.

Those three categories together basically – they set the agenda in general terms – in general terms for the next arms reductions, and two of those three categories we have never tried to tackle in a negotiated reduction activity – nonstrategic or “tac nukes”, as some people call them, and non-deployed. They represent supreme challenges for our community in terms of how are we going to go about verifying and monitoring such reductions, how are we going to structure the arrangements.

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We're doing quite a lot of thinking now, and I essentially would urge this community to think through very carefully, what are the kind of baseline that we're working from and how much can apply to these new categories, these new areas where we're going to be seeking reductions? For example, the deployed and non-deployed rules under the New Start treaty – we thought it was a clever idea; in fact, it has been important to how the central limits under the treaty are arranged.

The delivery-vehicle limit of 700 – that's deployed delivery vehicles; launcher limit of 800 – it's deployed and non-deployed launchers. That gives both of our countries a great deal of flexibility throughout the life of the New START treaty to take systems in and out of maintenance, and so it's helpful I think to the overall way the treaty is structured and gives both sides confidence that we could go down to that low number of 700 delivery vehicles.

So that's – what I think was an important conceptual advance in this treaty. Will it apply and how will it apply to a future treaty that involves deployed and non-deployed strategic and nonstrategic weapons?

So those are the kinds of things I think we need to think through in addition to the difficult technical challenges of monitoring and verifying essentially smaller objects: warheads that are non-deployed, warheads in storage facilities, potentially in transit facilities or in transit, looking at tactical nuclear weapons – also smaller objects – and held and handled in different ways than we have held and handled strategic weapons over time. Essentially, they have always been deployed if we've counted them in an arms control – arms-reduction treaty.

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So I think we have a interesting phase ahead of us. In fact, I like to think of this as a new phase of innovation for this community and one where we're all going to have to think through the next steps carefully. But it is – it's an exciting time for our field, and I really welcome it. Again, as I said at the outset, I welcome the opportunity to hear the ideas of this community as we forge ahead in planning for these next negotiations.

But – the last thing I'll say before I turn the floor over to Sergey is, we do need to work through a lot of these concepts carefully together, which is why I welcome his comment that we need to begin now to be talking together, to be thinking together about this conceptual phase and what exactly needs to be done yet.

There's probably – you know, I think in the history of arms control there have always been differences about how we define terms, for example, and through the life of first the SALT treaties, then START – well, INF as well – START, New START, we've defined terms together. Well, there may be certain new terms or different ways of thinking about existing terms. We need to work through that together, so I would welcome an early start to these kinds of discussions. I think it would be extraordinarily valuable and give us some of the conceptual underpinnings we need to tackle this new phase.

[00:25:35]

BROOKS: Mr. Ambassador.

KISLYAK: Thank you.

I agree with Rose that it will require a lot of imagination to find – fertile areas – where our respective interests coincide. Is it doable? I think it's not easy, but certainly it's worth a try. And we are willing to work together.



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In terms of the three possible approaches through tactical weapons – (that you, Ambassador Brooks, raised, – I think the easiest is locational, because we have withdrawn all our tactical weapons from other countries. All of the tactical weapons that belong to Russia are in Russia. The United States still keep the weapons in Europe. And for us, locational means withdraw and repatriate them. Then we will be talking – (on equal terms – this is the first thing.

Secondly, to simply compare the non-deployed strategic weapons and tactical weapons – it's partially – at least I've seen from our – geographic – situation, it's like comparing apples and oranges. Our tactical weapons by and large do not pose any threat to you. Your tactical weapons being here – it's almost like the equivalent to your – strategic weapons in Europe because they are forward-based and can be characterized as really fast.

[00:27:08]

So the question is how you can design a formula where we won't be haunted by that quid pro quo. I don't know. Whether the tactical weapons can be dealt with – of course they can. But what needs to be done in order to be able to do so for us may instead – to remove a number of factors that I alluded to in the very beginning – that makes us feel that we still need to keep some decent level and reliable level of deterrence.

However, we still live under each of these terms. That's a fact of life that we neither ask nor you can wish away. We need to work towards an environment where we can dispense with it, but we are not yet there. And tactical nuclear weapons, like any other nuclear weapons – it's a part of the nuclear – (inaudible) – that is to deter aggression against the country of Russian Federation and its allies. That's the – formula – that has always been part of the nuclear thinking to your country respective to your territory, and the same it is with us.

So the real – the question then is what it is that needs to be done in order to make it more plausible to work on this issue. It's not only numbers on each side of different types of nuclear weapons. It's also the security environment – in Europe – and also we are Eurasian country. It's a huge country with a lot, a lot of different borders. Some of them need to be – (inaudible).

[00:28:52]

But what I'm suggesting is that in order to be able to address tactical weapons in a reasonably reliable fashion, you need to do it working with us on a number of other factors, and conventional arms control in Europe is one of them. And to be honest –

GOTTEMOELLER: Great. Wonderful. Let's do it.

KISLYAK: Yeah? (Laughter.) That's what I wanted to address to you – (laughter) – because the problem in Europe with conventional weapons is that technically up to the moment that we decided to suspend the implementation of the – old – Vienna document –

GOTTEMOELLER: CFE.

KISLYAK: – or rather CFE document – we are living in a document that was designed for a Cold War situation in Europe. There was a dividing line, the central line; there were flanks to the dividing line and the front line that was somewhere in the middle, here. And we had one alliance that in the treaty was political – diplomatically called a “group of nations.” There was another alliance that was another “group of nations.” Each of that would

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have the entitlements— each of them would — have the holdings — (allowed in the treaty. There would be limitations in the flanks to the central dividing line between the two of us.

[00:30:28]

And what happened? We, Russia, insisted that we need to have a — modernized treaty — an adaptive treaty. We signed an adaptive treaty. By the way, Russia and many countries of the former Soviet Union have ratified it — Kazakhstan, Ukraine, some others — but the United States decided not to do so and agreed with NATO alliance not to do that as a collective entity.

So we lived for quite a while in a situation where NATO was expanding, to put it simply, pocketing the quotas that are still in the treaty that belong to the Eastern alliance, that Warsaw Pact that is no longer. It was deploying forces even — in the flank — that are beyond what it was allowed under the former — the original CFE treaty, and we were told that it was a good formula to pursue. We disagreed.

[00:31:33]

So we protested. The way to protest it was to suspend our implementation of this treaty. And what we suspended basically was, we do not cooperate in the verification; however we do present a lot, a lot of information in the terms of the Vienna document. So there's no lack of information about it. It's more political protest rather than — substantive — military, and certainly you have excellent intelligence — as we do, and you know that we do not overstep the limits that we have been sticking to all of these years.

So — but we wanted you to be serious about conventional arms control — especially the expansion of NATO made it quite difficult — for us, and very important. The alliance is expanding; the entitlements are increasing. The holdings were rather limited except for the flanks, but the entitlements are higher.

So the question is, how stable is the situation with conventional weapons in Europe for the Russian Federation? And I would say that our sense of dissatisfaction is still persistent. We have tried several times to resume discussing how to fix this situation. In the first attempt that was under the previous American Administration, we exhausted our efforts when the United States delegation was trying to resolve some regional issues that had nothing to do with the treaty or to the dialogue on this issue, and we are still struggling toward the same — — dialogue in Vienna.

Mind you, the atmosphere in Vienna is much, much better than used to be the case, and we are still hopeful that we will be able to frame together a formula that will allow us to go to a solution on this issue. But it's very important for us to define as to, what is the environment that Russia — lives in — and certainly like in your country like in mine, all we need is to have deterrence and make sure that your security —needs to be part of your strategic concept — (inaudible). So everything is very much — interlinked.

[00:33:54]

BROOKS: Secretary Gottemoeller, do you want to react to any of that?

GOTTEMOELLER: Well, this is not a panel about the CFE Treaty so I won't say too much except to just note that as far as the levels of conventional forces in Europe, everybody in Europe is below the levels that are allowed by the CFE Treaty, and those numbers continue to shrink.

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I was living in Moscow in December of 2007 when the Russian Federation suspended its implementation. I know there were many factors that were associated with that, some political and some attached to longstanding grievances, but they're not ones that we have felt on our side of the negotiating table to be particularly – well, I will only say that I think frankly we've got to modernize the CFE regime. We all recognize that and we are working hard to do so. We have now have an ongoing process – Ambassador Kislyak is right – it has been producing results. We hope more results, and we hope soon to have really a pathway forward to get to a modernized CFE regime.

[00:35:04]

But I frankly believe that the concerns the Russian Federation has registered with regard to the CFE Treaty are all ones that could have been dealt with, in my personal estimation, without suspending the implementation of the treaty. But I'm afraid we'll just have to differ on that.

KISLYAK: Oh, yeah. Unfortunately I have to differ because we were trying to draw your attention to what we were saying – not this administration; previous administration. We were trying it for several years. At the time, I was responsible for arms control in our ministry, and I did it myself. I knocked at the door. We were telling people that it cannot continue the way it is.

[00:35:43]

GOTTEMOELLER: Well, in any event –

BROOKS: Secretary Gottemoeller –

GOTTEMOELLER: Could I just come around to NATO for a minute?

BROOKS: Yes.

GOTTEMOELLER: OK. Because we started out talking a little bit about nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons in NATO, and in fact, you know, the NATO alliance has been taking a very, very serious look at this. When Secretary Clinton went to Tallinn last April, she met with our NATO allies and they set down five very, very I think serious principles about how to proceed in this regard.

It has to do – and of course NATO is a nuclear alliance; it has been throughout its lifetime, and it is an alliance that is very serious about mutual security, about joint security. But it's also very serious about its partnership with Russia, and I think that that is evident in the current phase as we inside the NATO alliance think about the future. There are several very, very serious vectors of cooperation being worked now.

One is in the realm of missile-defense cooperation. My boss, Ellen Tauscher, just got back from another round of very serious discussions on missile-defense cooperation. There was a separate set of discussions in the NATO-Russia context that will continue and will intensify as our presidents get ready to meet again in Deauville in May.

[00:37:08]

So there's lots going on in that realm, and there's also a lot going on in the realm of how we think about the future of nuclear weapons in NATO. The Secretary's five Tallinn principles were then incorporated afterwards in

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the review of the NATO strategic concept, and it has established the basis for a very, very serious review of this matter with Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which is now getting underway in NATO.

So this is an active topic and an alive topic, and I think we'll in the coming months create again a new discussion about the whole topic of nuclear weapons in NATO and their role, looking at the future of extended deterrence, looking at the future of the alliance overall.

But if you have not had a chance to contemplate this issue, I would really stress that it's a lively moment for NATO in this area. The DDPR is going on over the next – over the coming months, and we will expect to be taking some serious decisions inside the alliance in the coming months on this matter.

BROOKS: I think that I'd like to give somebody besides me the opportunity to ask questions. The way we'll do this is there are movable microphones. One will move to you, and please state your name, your affiliation. The shorter your question is, the more time you will have to hear answers from these two.

So, questions? In the back there, please.

[00:38:55]

Q: Hi. Miles Pomper from the Monterey Institute.

A question for each of you. For Ambassador Kislyak, does Russia consider the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to still be in effect? And for Rose, you've talked on a number of occasions about the P5 meeting on disarmament and verification. Is there any more clarity on the agenda for the meeting at this point?

GOTTEMOELLER: Well, that one's easy. Yes, there is more clarity on the agenda. (Laughter.)

KISLYAK: And I would like to get more explanation as to which presidential initiative you are talking about.

GOTTEMOELLER: The 1991-1992 –

BROOKS: The 1991-1992 –

KISLYAK: Ah, the – (inaudible) – I think they have – (inaudible) – that one implemented – I don't know anything new about it..

BROOKS: Down here in the front, please.

[00:40:03]

Q: Thank you. Tom Collina, Arms Control Association. Thank you both for being here.

My question is on missile defense cooperation, which was raised, and recent proposals from the Russian side on a binding agreement not to target each other's offensive forces with missile defenses, and on the American side the secretary of Defense, who was in Russia talking about a joint data fusion center. Those proposals or others – can you give us an update on what the status is of the high level talks and whether we can expect a status report as planned by June? Thank you.

[00:40:43]

KISLYAK: The status of these discussions is that discussions are ongoing. I do not believe that I can report to you that we have reached a point where we are – we feel comfortable that we have the guarantees of non-use of ballistic missile defense against each other in this dialogue.

We want to be sure that while we want to cooperate on this issue, that this cooperation isn't going to be used to undermine our strategic stability. That is important for us, especially taking a look into the future, and with this adaptive approach where huge enrichments of weapons ) – might appear at some point in time, whether that can be even – be used during the lifetime of – this generation of bureaucrats. They might be even physically – threatening to strategic offense weapons. So what we want to be sure about is that if we embark on an era of cooperation that we have a good understanding of what needs to be done, that this doesn't occur. If people say to each other that we are not – threatening – you, that's fine. Let's agree. What do you mean? And how to work on this issue in a way that will reliably guarantee what – you're saying?. And so far we haven't reached the point when I can report a success to you.

On the joint data fusion center, it's a new idea and we are looking forward to learning more about it.

[00:42:22]

GOTTEMOELLER: Let me just add – you mentioned Secretary of Defense Gates' trip to Moscow, and it's a good sign of how active this issue has been. I already mentioned that my boss, Ellen Tauscher, has been involved in her talks with her counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. Also there are military-to-military discussions going on at several levels. So it is an issue that is being worked really intensively between Moscow and Washington, and also intensively with Moscow, Brussels and Washington all in the mix.

So there are meetings going on every week at this moment, and the goal is – Sergey just said something interesting. It was a good way to put it. He said we're looking for a way to work on this issue that will reliably guarantee that these capabilities cannot be used to undermine our strategic offensive deterrent. This notion is exactly the notion that we're working on, and our focus is trying to get to the point where we are intensively involved in joint projects that will convey clearly to the Russian side the nature of the European Phased Adaptive Approach – its precise nature, technically, in terms of how it will operate, in terms of how it will exercise.

Frankly I think one of the earliest phases we're looking to return to is a successful mode of cooperation that took a break in 2008, and that is joint exercises because it's through that kind of pragmatic cooperation on detailed technical matters that I think the confidence can be raised in the exact nature of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. And so that's the goal that we've been pushing for.

[00:44:15]

And you know, we've done well historically working on intermeshing our technical capabilities. I was just thinking recently about the way our space programs have gotten intertwined in a effective way, so that nowadays as the shuttle program is phasing out, Russian space launch capabilities will essentially be intertwined with ours in providing us the lift we need to orbit. So there are a lot of ways over time that we have come to work together technologically, and it has enabled us to both work together effectively but to work together in a way that has raised mutual confidence and has allowed us to serve each our own interests but in working together cooperatively. So it's pragmatic results we're looking for, and that's where we'll be placing our focus.

[00:45:10]

KISLYAK: Could I add a couple of words to what Rose had to say? I generally agree with her generic view that working together is always better than not working together, and it always gives you more understanding for what your partner is doing. What is important also is to know what your partner isn't doing and if there's something that needs to be part of the formula for success.

But what is important to remember – in 2008, what we – not us, this was the United States – suspended were the exercises – technical exercises that were to be followed by real exercises in bringing our antiballistic missile capabilities on a practical level. It was a project that is still – it's resumed and it's continuing – that was started through NATO with Europe checking whether Russia and NATO can join forces to protect possible joint forces deployed for peacekeeping somewhere where they can be threatened by technical missiles. And I would – gladly would like to report to you that it was a rather successful – cooperation.

GOTTEMOELLER: It was.

[00:46:27]

KISLYAK: And the exercises were good. I have spoken to our military; they were satisfied that – they understood how to – work on this issue with the Americans. And to be honest, they have as good professionals on both sides as anybody else. And they certainly understand what needs to be done, and what needs to be done is just to have an excellent interface between the two systems. That – mind you.

For the technical antiballistic missile systems, we have a well-defined goal that was given to them to protect forces jointly deployed if there is a need to deploy them jointly. They had a mission; they had – they knew what capabilities needed to be used, and they had a well-designed – format on – how they can work on this issue. That level of exercise was very important – in proving – that our militaries can work together when they have clear, well-defined goals together, and this goal needs to be defined by the coalition. But they were working on a level that wouldn't be threatening strategic offensive capability – that means deterrence.

[00:47:45]

What we are talking about now is a possible – cooperation – that can lead to a situation where strategic offensive capabilities – can be mutual – and here, apart from the well-defined mission and well-defined design of systems that needs to be – built and full – cooperation on both sides, we also need to remember what we do and what we do not do to each other. If we work in order to collectively protect our territory, your territory, the territory of the – Europeans at large – from all kind of missiles – threats, it's one thing. If we see a development of a – (– capability on the side of NATO, on the side of the United States that can threaten our offensive deterrence capability, that certainly would create a lot, a lot of concerns from Russia and that would make our – ability to work with you – a little bit less available.

[00:48:43]

GOTTEMOELLER: Yeah. That's – you know, I think that is a very important example to point to because it was one where we had – we had a deep joint planning, deep intermeshing, and I know it's an area that you worked on very successfully when you were Russian ambassador to NATO.



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There is also, and there was even at that time, a layer of exercise activity based in Colorado Springs that was focused more on the national missile defense levels. So I think we need to do both, essentially, and continue working in the NATO-Russia context and also reenergize our activities in the Colorado Springs context as well.

BROOKS: Ralph Cossa?

Q: Thank you. Ralph Cossa from the Pacific Forum, CSIS in Honolulu.

Following up on Linton's earlier question, Rose, I thought you said that as regards the P5, preliminary arms control discussions had been some progress, and I'm curious as to your definition of progress. In our own discussions with the Chinese there's been a decided lack of enthusiasm toward entering into discussions at this period or even of providing the necessary transparency both in force posturing and future force planning, so I'm just curious as to where you see the progress and where you see the – where the problems. And assuming that at some point it has to go beyond just the five recognized nuclear weapon states to, at a minimum, also include India and Pakistan, at what point does that become necessary and through what vehicle would that be accomplished?

[00:50:27]

GOTTEMOELLER: Very good question. I think a lot of us have been laboring in these fields for a very long time. What I have noticed – and I said it started with this London P5 meeting in September of 2009 – but what I have noticed is a willingness among the P5 to talk about and, as I said, even engage in some projects that develop new mutual understanding, confidence-building and transparency.

But in the – if you're used to the world of Soviet-U.S., U.S.-Russian arms control where we've had a 40-year history now of working together on these matters, and we've come an enormous distance in terms of – you know, I keep saying how under the New START treaty we're actually going to be counting reentry vehicles on delivery vehicles or reentry vehicles on warheads, and we're going to be doing onsite inspections for that to confirm those numbers. You know, that's a pretty big step, and it's one that would not have been imaginable back in 1971 when the SALT talks were underway.

[00:51:35]

So I do think that we have to bear in mind that we will have some work to do, that it's going to take some time, but I've already seen signs of interest in working these issues. I'll give you an example that's a little perhaps off the exact agenda item, but we haven't had a chance to talk yet today about the comprehensive test ban and what's happening with the comprehensive test ban. You know, the CTBTO has really taken off in the last decade and has done an enormous amount of impressive work, again, drawing in a large community of countries.

And there, for example, the Chinese have been active in terms of supplying technology and being involved in developing sensor capability and that type of thing. So I just think, you know, we sometimes have to look in different areas for some examples of where there might be possibility for building out the discussion and advancing the discussion.

So – but for the reason that I named – that is, that I see evidence of practical interest and practical involvement in other areas, I think that we can actually have a good discussion in this coming year among the P5 about various aspects of transparency, confidence building and verification technologies.

[00:53:00]

BROOKS: Any additional thoughts, Mr. Ambassador, on that point?

KISLYAK: I don't believe I have anything to add. I think Rose – presented those views well. –

BROOKS: Question.

Q: Yes, Howard Moreland (sp). Yesterday Alexei Arbatov said that Russians were worried about a nuclear attack from the United States in part because of the imbalance of submarine forces – that the Russian strategic nuclear forces do not have an invulnerable component, whereas the U.S. does. When U.S. Trident submarines leave Bremerton and Kings Bay, Georgia, they disappear into the ocean and become invulnerable to attack. Russian ballistic missile submarines are mostly in port, and when they leave they are tracked by U.S. attack submarines so they are always vulnerable to attack. Is this imbalance of submarine forces and imbalance of vulnerability – more vulnerable on the Russian side than the American side – is that a factor in the arms control negotiations?

[00:54:04]

GOTTEMOELLER: Nothing new about that. You know, the structure of our strategic forces has been very different for the entire life of strategic nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union and now Russia is a great land power. Naturally enough, it deploys the majority of its forces on land and has become incredibly skilled at deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles, both silo-based and mobile; the United States, traditionally is a naval power and so that is nothing new.

I mean, that imbalance has existed throughout the lives of our deterrence forces. It's always been a kind of factor at the table, indeed, because we have to think about how to come up with arms control deals that make sense to both countries.

So, yes, indeed, it's a factor at the table, but again, an important aspect of the New START treaty is that it incorporated for both parties a concept that was first laid down in the Moscow treaty – that is, that both countries should have the right to determine for themselves the structure of their strategic forces below the central limits, and in my view, it is this flexibility that allows us to continue to go lower because in the Russian Federation they have the right – and they have smart people running their strategic forces – they have the right to figure out what makes most sense for them, and we have the right to figure out what makes the most sense for us.

And so I think we can therefore deal with whatever issue arises from this imbalance by having the flexibility to plan and manage it for ourselves, and the same again for the Russian side.

[00:55:52]

BROOKS: But it seems to me that, as the ambassador was saying in his opening remarks, we have the force structure we have, and so it's not going lower with an optimized force structure for some next step. So I guess I'd be interested in hearing the ambassador's comments about whether this is of particular concern, recognizing we both are where we are because we chose to be there. Nonetheless, we chose to be there when we were at much higher levels. And so is this, as one of your countrymen suggested yesterday – this imbalance in vulnerability – is this a particular concern for the Russian Federation? If there is, what would you ideally like to see us do about it?

[00:56:49]

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KISLYAK: Well, first of all, it's a historical fact that we have asymmetries ) – of strategic forces that we deploy. It's correct and – that's absolutely right – you're a more maritime nation; we are a more land – (inaudible) – nation.

I can hardly believe that Alexia said that we are fearful of the strike from your submarines. I think currently we are not in that mode. We need to prepare for the eventualities, so the current agreement that we just – started implementing – allows a little bit more flexibility in how we build our force structures – as to what it was – in previous times. That certainly would allow the – military – planners to optimize the systems that you want to deploy in the future, but certainly taking into account the strategic differences to adjust in our – (inaudible) – strategic situations. But also, yes, you will also see us building new submarines, and I cannot tell you what would be ultimate propulsion and final propulsion in the decades to come. We will see. Maybe we will have additional agreements – that will also be factored in – those type of things. But these asymmetries have existed and do exist, and that's also a factor of strategic stability that we need to – remember.

BROOKS: James Acton).

[00:58:17]

Q: Thank you very much. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, you mentioned that you endorsed both the Moscow treaty and New START, that each side has the freedom to select for itself the composition of its strategic forces. Can you comment on whether the United States is concerned that the Russian government is providing research and development funding for a new silo-based, liquid-fueled, heavily MIRV'ed ICBM? And if you are concerned about it, do you view arms control as a potential means to do something about that concern?

GOTTEMOELLER: There have been lots of reports about this in the media. As I understand, there is still somewhat a debate on this matter and I'm not sure that it's actually been decided. So I'd rather not comment on the matter. But I will stand by what we put into the New START treaty – that is, this – I call it “flexibility principle,” that each side has the right to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces.

[00:59:18]

BROOKS: In the back, right next to the camera.

Q: (Inaudible) – Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research in Frankfurt. The impression is I got after having listened to you, a beautiful, handsome couple that talks about all these difficult questions. (Laughter.) And congratulations. (Laughter.) Wonderful, wonderful! I compliment you.

GOTTEMOELLER: I'm blushing.

Q: My question is, you're representing the two countries. Are you soft adversaries? Are you reluctant partners? Are you on your way to being – become committed partners? How would you describe in general terms – (laughter) –

GOTTEMOELLER: This gets more and more embarrassing. (Chuckles.)

Q: As a country – as a country. As a country. How would you describe the relationship of the United States and Russia of the 20 years that the Cold War is over? Thank you.

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[01:00:20]

BROOKS: (Laughter.) One of you has to start.

GOTTEMOELLER: (Chuckles.)

KISLYAK: I will say that –

GOTTEMOELLER: Mr. Ambassador, you go first. (Chuckles.)

KISLYAK: – had it been for Rose and myself to resolve all the troubles between Russia and the United States, I think we would have been better off already now. (Laughter.)

But we have a history on our – of our relations. We have history of military development. We have different views on the use of force sometimes in the world. We have seen the United States together with NATO in recent years to – use force in Europe, against Serbia, without reliance on international law.

We have seen United States enter Iraq where the pretext proved to be wrong. And many lives were lost in this country, and a lot of instability – was brought – to the region as a result of it. And we have seen that even with the better relations that we enjoy now that the Cold War is over, we still have to be bracing for contradictability in the development of the security situation around it.

We cannot rely on the wisdom of others to decide how, we say, the European security environment needs to be built, and we are concerned that NATO is trying to take the European space as almost their own for – defining – security. We want to do it in a different fashion. We want to build it – and Europe is where we live. It's very important. It's where Germany lives – Germans live. And it's very important that we have a comprehensive security system in Europe that favors not only our NATO partners but also Russia and – other – countries as well. But we are yet to achieve this.

[01:02:33]

Then we also see that with the Cold War is over, the – security pacts – of the past are still haunting us. We're judging each other and taking decisions. I came here to the United States in 2008 in September.

You remember, in August there was an attack by Georgians against Ossetians. I remember the reaction in the United States at that time. I was probably – relieved that – at that time in the lowest point in our bilateral relations in the whole post-Cold War history. Was it warranted? I don't know, because it was misperception, miscalculation, what was happening, based on false information. And our relations were very, very tense at that time. So we're asking ourselves, having lived almost 20 years after the Cold War, have we already achieved the level of our trust and understanding when Americans, Europeans and us – we are – closer – to Europeans, by the way, can we feel relaxed about whatever each of us is doing?

Having served as Russian ambassador to NATO after the Cold War, I remember how NATO is watching us still today. And even today NATO is preplanning for a war with the big neighbor in the east, and they're working under that, trying to understand what is the big neighbor in the east. That's still part of the reality that we need to work on, and most probably will require a level of additional effort in our additional – cooperation to overcome that kind of stereotypes and to come to a situation where we – will be relaxed that whatever each one does is not against each other, something we want to achieve. ).

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We would like to see, at the end of the day, the kind of military postures and military strategies developed through Russia and the United States and NATO that will be kind of preemptive focusing on building the military postures in a way that there will be no trouble in the future. We have yet to achieve.

BROOKS: Secretary Gottemoeller?

[01:05:18]

GOTTEMOELLER: The way I look at it is we have a promising partnership, but it's incomplete at this point. And Sergey is quite right: There's still a dearth of mutual confidence. But I also get the impression, quite frankly, that oftentimes we are talking past each other. You know, NATO is not preoccupied with the east at this point, by any means, in any way, shape or form. It simply does not see an enemy in that direction. Instead it sees a partner. In fact, where NATO is preoccupied is with conflicts in other areas, and we've seen the example of that this very week in the – in the operations that are going on with Libya – in Libya and their handover of command to NATO that will – if I'm not mistaken, will soon be happening.

So there is this element that we do talk to each other that Moscow is still very concerned that NATO is focused on it, whereas NATO is focused elsewhere and is hoping to have a chance to work with Russia on some of these challenges.

Now, do we agree? I know quite often Moscow has a different view as to what threats are important, what challenges are important, what cudgels should be picked up. (Chuckles.) So there are serious differences in that – in that regard. But I hope that we can get to the point – the way I see it, as I mentioned a few moments ago, is that we have pockets of promising partnership, and I hope we can continue to develop them.

Another area that we haven't even discussed again today is the way that Russia and the United States, together with NATO, have been able to agree on transit of military materiel through Russia to Afghanistan. This has saved a lot of money; it's saved a lot of difficulty and time for the United States and NATO as they operate in Afghanistan, where we have a mutual interest. We have a lot of mutual interests in Eurasia, such as counter-narcotics – that type of thing.

[01:07:28]

So I hope that we can over time develop these pockets of cooperation so that our promising partnership gets to be more extensive and profound than it is today. It's promising, but it's partial at this moment.

BROOKS: I thank –

KISLYAK: If I could say a couple of words to add to what Rose had to say, because she was right that we have a lot of opportunities to work with NATO – a lot of opportunities that have already been missed, but there are still opportunities to work on. And there are all the necessary documents to do so. What we need to do is to work and to work together as equal partners. That is the corner I think that would benefit the security of Russia and NATO. It's a win-win situation we are interested in.

If Rose believes – you believe that we are overly focused on NATO as a threat – with due respect to NATO, we have other things to think about. And we are minding now more economic issues and many others, but we need to remember that we are self-sufficient in security and assuring our security, and we need to remember all the

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challenges that can pop up tomorrow, day after tomorrow, everywhere, including in the rest – in the rest of – (inaudible).

[01:08:48]

BROOKS: And with that, I apologize to all the people who I've been nodding at as though I were going to call on you – (laughter) – but I'm not. But what I'm going to do instead is ask you to join me in thanking our two panelists. (Applause.)

KISLYAK: Thank you.

BROOKS: And as I said, we will not be taking a break. And as soon as we get off, someone else will get on.

(END)