



Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan

AN ACTION AGENDA *for the*
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

Frédéric Grare

© 2007 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment.

The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees.

For electronic copies of this report, visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs. Limited print copies are also available.

To request a copy, send an e-mail to pubs@CarnegieEndowment.org.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-483-7600
Fax: 202-483-1840
www.CarnegieEndowment.org

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Frédéric Grare is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. With Ashley J. Tellis and George Perkovich, he leads a project assessing U.S. and European policies toward Pakistan and, where appropriate, recommends alternatives. Grare's research focuses on the tension between stability and democratization in Pakistan, including challenges of sectarian conflict, Islamist political mobilization, and educational reform. He also facilitates interactions between U.S. experts and officials and European counterparts on the main policy challenges in South Asia.

Grare has written extensively on security issues, Islamist movements, and sectarian conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also has edited the volume *India, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle*.

The author would like to thank the Smith Richardson Foundation, whose generous grant has permitted the realization of this project. My gratitude also goes to John Judis and George Perkovich, who have made this report readable. This report has also benefitted from the advice of many colleagues and Pakistan experts who did not always agree with my conclusions and whose names do not figure in these lines. Ultimately, the responsibility for the opinions and ideas expressed in the present document is entirely mine.

Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan:

**AN ACTION AGENDA *for the*
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE**

Frédéric Grare

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	5
Chapter 1: Defining the Issue	7
Chapter 2: Pakistan’s Narrow Military and Civilian Elites	11
Chapter 3: Musharraf’s Pakistan and U.S. Interests on a Collision Course?	17
Chapter 4: Civilian vs. Military Power and U.S. Regional Interests	25
Chapter 5: Breaking the Links Between Army and Politics	33
Chapter 6: Grand Geopolitical Bargains?	43
Chapter 7: A Matter of Political Will	51
Notes	53

Executive Summary

Without Pakistan's active and full cooperation, the United States and the broader international community cannot reconstruct Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban, and turn the tide of international terrorism. Yet most observers agree that Pakistan has not provided the fullest possible cooperation. Debate is growing about whether the Pakistani state is merely unable to do better or is actively undermining international efforts in Afghanistan and against terrorism.

This report makes the case that the Pakistani state bears responsibility for the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, terrorism in Kashmir, and the growth of jihadi ideology and capabilities internationally. At the core of the problem is the Pakistani military, which has dominated Pakistan's politics since 1958 and has developed over the years a nationalism based more on its own delusions of grandeur rather than on any rational analysis of the country's national interest. Inheriting a highly divided polity, the Pakistan Army has tried to muster solidarity by stoking religiosity, sectarianism, and the promotion of jihad outside its borders, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The United States and most Western countries have traditionally dealt with Pakistan according to short-term interests, and they have left deep, structural problems to "the next administration." Pakistan exploited this natural tendency by offering (for a price) assistance in achieving urgent U.S. objectives—establishing listening posts to spy on the Soviet Union, offering entry to China, and assisting in expelling Soviet forces from Afghanistan and capturing Al Qaeda leaders.

Throughout much of this history, Pakistan has been led by military dictators. In return for helping the United States pursue its objectives, these dictators obtained sizable economic and military aid and political support. As in Afghanistan today, however, the degree of Pakistan's cooperation has been much less than claimed. Indeed, Pakistan is now arming and training forces that the United States and NATO are fighting, just as the Pakistani military establishment has for some time supported Al Qaeda and other jihadi organizations operating out of Afghanistan, northern and western Pakistan, and in Kashmir.

This report shows that these Pakistani priorities reflect the specific institutional interests of the military and therefore cannot be fundamentally changed unless the army gradually cedes its political role to representative civilian leaders and limits itself to defending borders. In other words, the United States and other international actors vital to Pakistan's future must stop taking the metaphorical bribe of partial Pakistani cooperation in fighting Al Qaeda terrorists in return for propping up an unrepresentative, military government.

This report calls for a new strategy designed to encourage Pakistanis, particularly the military, to reestablish the preeminence of civilian government according to the Pakistani constitution. The key to this strategy is to not allow Pakistan to trade off democratization for the country's cooperation on terrorism, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Kashmir. Pakistani progress on these objectives would bring increased international rewards, while its abandonment of a single one of them would expose the Pakistani leadership to the withdrawal of foreign assistance. Conditionality of cooperation assistance applied by a large number of countries, not simply by the United States, should be applied to Pakistan's leadership, in particular the military leadership, and should not affect the general population.

Defining the Issue

In the wake of Pakistan's invaluable assistance in 2001 in ousting the Taliban government and in capturing or killing Al Qaeda forces, many Americans thought of Pakistan as a key U.S. ally. But since then the actions of the military government led by General (and President) Pervez Musharraf have raised the question of whether Pakistan is an adversary as well as ally. The visit to Islamabad of Vice President Richard B. Cheney in February 2007 was widely interpreted as a message sent by President George W. Bush to General Musharraf, warning him that the U.S. Congress, now with a Democratic Party majority, could cut aid to his country if he failed to live up to its commitments in the war on terror.¹

Of course, Pakistan's fear of a larger, more powerful India has caused the country's leaders to use the low-intensity conflict of terrorism to preserve Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and to weaken India, particularly its control over the Kashmir valley. India is bigger, more powerful, and often haughty toward Pakistan. The Indo-Pak conflict is real. Yet the military actors who have largely determined the character and actions of the Pakistani state also have used the specter of India to consolidate and justify their power domestically.

Pakistan's military leaders have mobilized religious parties, militants, foreign "freedom fighters," and other players to get and keep national power and resources. They also have adeptly used their external vulnerabilities—to the Soviet Union and, more recently, to Al Qaeda and "bearded mullahs"—to elicit U.S. support and assistance. Pakistan's leaders—Yaqub Khan, Zia ul-Haq, and Musharraf—have highlighted their country's position as a frontline state facing U.S. adversaries and have offered cooperation in pursuing U.S. objectives in return for billions of dollars in economic and military assistance and political support of the dictatorship.

The Pakistan Army's adept bargaining with the United States has helped ensure its ongoing political power. This has undermined civilian government and impaired almost every aspect of Pakistan's social, economic, and political life. It has also permitted the military to impose its own mind-set on the country's strategic interests. U.S. policies have therefore not only failed to mitigate Pakistan's political weaknesses, they have reinforced them. Since September 11, 2001, U.S. policies have failed to convince Pakistan to renounce terrorism in deeds as well as words. Instead, they have reinforced the mind-set that has helped make South Asia one of the most volatile regions of the world.

The present study argues that Pakistan's lack of democratic culture is an essential problem that is too often set aside in favor of more pressing short-term objectives. The military not only sets Pakistan's foreign policy, it also shapes domestic politics by nourishing a climate of insecurity and sectarian violence, allowing it to portray itself as the only bulwark against extremism.

Demilitarizing Pakistan and setting it on the long path toward democracy are therefore prerequisites for the long-term stability of the region. The restoration of stable civilian rule in Pakistan would help lessen the obsession with an Indian threat and focus Pakistan's energies on its own economic development. It would also create better conditions for ending the use of terrorist organizations in order to secure Pakistan's objectives in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

In the light of the current Iraq disaster, one may wonder whether this objective is achievable. In Iraq, the United States used military force to get rid of a dictator and to establish a functioning democracy that it hoped would serve as a model for the entire Middle East. Although the U.S.

military succeeded in toppling the Iraqi regime, it failed miserably to establish a democracy. The present report proposes nothing of that sort of action. Instead of importing a model of democracy, this report advocates achieving democratization by returning to the principles written in the Pakistani constitution itself. It does not call for using military force; it calls instead for using political and economic leverage to achieve this objective. And it relies on the reality that Pakistani political parties and civil society are healthier than those that suffered under Saddam Hussein's brutal tyranny for decades.

Other countries have made uneasy yet peaceful transitions toward democracy. Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and, more recently, South Korea and Chile have moved away from military dictatorship. Turkey was plagued by military coups d'état, and the army has left its imprint on the political process,² but democracy has still made sufficient inroads for Turkey to enter negotiations to join the European Union. Finally, there is the example of India. If India can maintain a real, albeit imperfect, democracy, why should not Pakistan?

Civilian elites share responsibility for the liabilities of the current Pakistani system. Political leaders have repeatedly allowed themselves to be manipulated by the military and in turn have used the military in partisan battles. Pakistan's political crisis is a direct function of the compromises civilian elites have made. Civilian entrepreneurs have also used their relationship with the military to their own benefit.

Both civilians and the military share a common responsibility in setting the ideological mind-set of the country. For different reasons—militarism on the one side, preservation of class privilege on the other—both have concurred in keeping the Pakistani masses in a state of semiliteracy, making them prone to adopt a religiously based culture of resentment while depriving them of the theoretical and practical tools that would allow them to challenge the existing social order.

The current military regime is not transitional, neither is it simply the unfortunate but necessary step toward stronger institutions and true democratization. Rather, the Musharraf government perpetuates military power by undermining political institutions for the benefit of the military. Some in the Pakistani military acknowledge that military rule has been ineffective, but they insist that the military originally seized power because of an incompetent civilian leadership incapable of acting in Pakistan's national interest. Civilian leadership in Pakistan has been flawed, but its flaws pale compared with the structural dysfunction of military rule.

Effective—not to mention democratic—governance requires peaceful and rule-based turnover of officeholders on the basis of popular judgments of performance. By contrast, militaries are rigidly hierarchical permanent institutions subject to internal discipline, but (in the ideal case) subject to overall civilian control. When the military controls politics (and economic policy), it undermines the basis of effective government by blocking peaceful turnover through accountability. Thus, the military in Pakistan is largely responsible for the current mediocrity of the country's political elites.

Two questions are at the center of this report:

- How can Pakistan demilitarize itself?
- How can Pakistan democratize itself?

By demilitarization, the report obviously does not mean the elimination of the army. Rather, the concept of demilitarization suggests the end of the army's quasi monopoly on every lever of power in the country, whether it exercises these levers directly when the army is officially in power or indirectly when it withdraws behind the façade of a civilian government. This report argues for eliminating the army's interference not only in the politics and economics of Pakistan, but also in the country's judiciary and administration.

Although demilitarization is obviously part of democratization, the two processes are not

identical. Democratization is not limited to reshaping military-civilian relations. The number of people and power centers that control the entirety of the country's political-economic life is simply too limited. In such conditions, effective checks and balances, although guaranteed by the country's constitution, cannot exist. Part of the challenge, and perhaps the most important one, is therefore to identify ways and means to enlarge the elite pool. A second part of the challenge is the promotion of a democratic culture. The expression "democratic culture" should be understood here in the minimal definition of political tolerance and respect for majority rule, implying, for example, both the organization of elections for each representative position and acceptance of election results.

This report breaks new ground by describing the processes by which these issues might be addressed and focuses on the upcoming 2007–2008 elections, which promise a return to civilian power. A series of steps must be taken before the 2007–2008 elections in order to ensure a transition as smooth as possible toward civilian rule. To induce the Pakistanis to take these steps, the United States and other countries should offer conditional international assistance to all successive Pakistani governments.

The report does not in any way pretend that its proposals would solve all regional and domestic problems in Pakistan. Its objective is more modest and yet extremely ambitious. It proposes means to open up the political space and create the conditions to gradually build up and reinforce a process of democratization whose progress is the necessary condition for the emergence of a true political democracy. These conditions will be the object of a second report.

The author is also fully aware that the United States, Great Britain, and other countries are not eager to pressure Pakistan. They think they need Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the West. This puts Islamabad in a stronger bargaining position with the West than its underlying situation merits. But that could change as the international community

faces the Taliban sanctuary in southern and southeastern Afghanistan and the support of Pakistani groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad for terrorist actions in the United States, Europe, or elsewhere. Terrorism by groups based in Pakistan is not a pure abstraction, as demonstrated by the successful terrorist attack in London on July 7, 2005, and the foiled attack on July 11, 2006. Should a new attack be successful and the evidence point toward Pakistan, the political conditions will suddenly be changed and the need for alternative solutions will become more pressing.

Pakistan's Narrow Military and Civilian Elites

Power in Pakistan is monopolized by military and civilian elites who enjoy an incestuous relationship with each other and whose interests have almost always been misaligned with those of Pakistan's general population and the international community. Making up less than 1 percent of the population, these elites have dominated the state and rigged the markets to capture the benefits of economic growth.

Political Involvement of the Pakistan Army

The army owes its importance in Pakistan's political life to the extremely difficult conditions in which the new country emerged. Sheer survival was the number one priority for Pakistani decision makers. The military also benefited from those conditions that in developing states generally favor military rule. These include tenuous social cohesion, a fragmented class structure, a weak middle class, the lack of common symbols to facilitate political and social mobilization, the weakness and inefficiency of the political parties, and mediocre political personnel.

In October 1958, the army took power. It ceded power for only a short period between 1971 and 1977, after the defeat against India and the secession of East Pakistan. Even when it was in power, it did not always rule directly. Twice, in June 1962 and December 1985, the army seemed to be willing to withdraw. However, each time it took great care to plan its disengagement and to restructure the political arrangements according to its own preferences so as to ensure the permanence of its own policies. It assumed a much more subtle, yet no less real, political role in the sectors it considered vital.

The 1971 debacle of the war against India, which led to the secession of East Pakistan, allowed civilians to take power. But the army soon took advantage of the mistakes of the elected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

in particular the dissolution of Balochistan's assembly that started a five-year civil war in the province, to become again the central player on Pakistan's political scene. In 1977, the chief of army staff, Zia ul-Haq, seized power, and a year later Bhutto, the elected former prime minister, was hanged.

In 1988, the army seemed ready to give power back to the civilians. During this period, with the end of the Cold War, the United States and the nations of western Europe began to pressure authoritarian governments to move toward democracy. Moreover, the Pakistan Army was worried that its direct control of the political system could threaten its corporate interests. The chief of army staff, General Aslam Beg, decided to transfer power to civilians. However, he did it in such a way as to ensure that the military still controlled the political system. Then, in 1999, the army took over again.

Civil-Military Relationship in Pakistan

The military would not have been able to dominate Pakistan if the civil establishment, lacking a democratic culture, had not tacitly accepted the army's power. The interests of military and civilian elites partly converge. The military has developed over the years a "savior complex": It believes that it possesses professional skills necessary to run the society as well as the army and, in addition, that it is also the only institution capable of running the country. The military also feels it is entitled to economic rewards for preserving the integrity and stability of the country. The military is willing to accommodate the civilian elites, who are motivated by greed and addiction to power, as long as the civilians play by military rules.

The military is the dominant institution, but it does not always exercise power directly. When the army could not fulfill economic, social, and

political expectations or when international pressure for democracy has been too strong, the army has withdrawn behind the scenes. However, this withdrawal has always been accompanied by changes in the constitution that favored the military and by the co-optation of political elites. These political elites have distributed civilian jobs to retired generals who retain close ties to the army.

The transition led by General Musharraf is a caricature of past efforts. Six years after his coup, the Pakistani president managed to unite a substantial part of the political class under his leadership by promising to take off his uniform after his reelection, but he has failed to do so. He has also modified the constitution, transforming a parliamentary system into a presidential one, and he introduced a National Security Council dominated by the army.

The army has also used the party system to perpetuate its own rule. By playing one party against the other, it creates a situation in which the army is forced to step in as the final arbiter of political conflict.

Civilian governments in Pakistan can develop a degree of autonomy only within the framework defined by the military leadership. Their ideology—liberal, conservative, Islamic, leftist, rightist—does not matter.

With the military ultimately in control, a small constellation of landlords, industrialists, traders, professionals, intellectuals, politicians, military and civil bureaucrats, and some members of the religious oligarchy dominate every government. This monopoly has led to a general decay of institutions, including nepotism, corruption, lawlessness, and a lack of security. Meanwhile, the military, inflamed by ambition, has generated a strategic posture that far exceeds Pakistan's capacity, generating strategic, ideological, and socioeconomic problems that have put Pakistan at odds with the rest of the world.

Misplaced Socioeconomic Priorities of the Pakistan Army

Pakistan in the 1990s was entangled in a classical model of a debt trap—forced to repay old loans as it was trying to keep the economy going. Aside from this crisis, the growth of its gross domestic product (GDP) has been tolerable during recent decades. Pakistan's per capita income tripled between 1950 and 1999 and, in purchasing power parity terms, was higher than one-third of the world's countries by 1999. Pakistan, however, has systematically underspent on social and infrastructural needs, particularly health and education, as it has sustained heavy military expenditures.

During the past six years, Pakistan has almost constantly had the highest military expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the entire South Asian region (*table 1*).

By contrast, Pakistan's performance in education is alarming. According to UNESCO, the overall percentage of literate people in the country in the age category 15–24 is 65.5 percent.³ Moreover, these figures conceal large gender and provincial disparities. UNESCO statistics estimate the percentage of literate women at 42 percent compared with men at 65 percent. The literacy rate varies from province to province; Punjab is the most educated, while Balochistan, with a 24.8 percent literacy rate according to the 1998 census, lags miserably behind all other provinces. A survey conducted in 2001 in some districts of Balochistan province estimated the literacy rate among women at 3 percent.

Pakistan compares poorly, even compared to similar South Asian countries. In 2004, the literacy rate (for citizens 15 years of age and above) was estimated by the World Bank at 90.68 percent for Sri Lanka, 63.46 percent for India, 49.85 percent for Pakistan, 48.59 percent for Nepal, 47.5 percent for Bangladesh, and 59.52 percent for South Asia as a whole.

Between 1997 and 2002, national expenditures on education as a percentage of GDP have remained at about 1.7 percent, helping to make Pakistan's primary education system one of the least effective in the world.

Even the little money allocated is not fully spent because of incompetent administration. The proportion of funds actually spent runs from about 80 percent in Balochistan to 90 percent in Punjab. The quality of education is also adversely affected by poorly trained teachers and endemic absenteeism, especially in rural areas where, very often, the government does not even provide schools.

The result has been a multiple-track educational system. The mediocrity of the public education system has generated three parallel systems, each of which follows its own curriculum, teaching methods, and examination processes. Alongside state-run schools, religious seminaries and private schools have been developing rapidly over the past two decades. The army has also developed its own school network, which benefits exclusively the children of the military. Some private schools provide quality education to the upper end of society.

Madrasahs, which offer religious education, provide food and accommodation, making them particularly attractive to poor parents. Although there are no reliable data about their actual number, they are said to contribute to the literacy of about one-third of Pakistani children. If they are often presented as problematic from a security perspective, their seemingly exponential development is the direct result of the failure of the public education system.

These trends reflect the values of an oligarchy that sees no incentive in investing in human capital. Pakistan appears stuck at the early stage of development, where land is abundant relative to physical capital, where ownership of the land is highly concentrated, and where landowners display little interest in the development of the peasantry. In South Punjab, for instance, the landlords opposed establishing government schools for the rural poor, which led to the development of madrasahs. The madrasahs are merely a symptom rather than the cause of the Pakistani oligarchy.

The lack of investment in public education deprives students of the theoretical and practical tools to envisage an alternative society. That prevents the emergence of a revolutionary situation in Pakistan, but it also prevents the emergence of a strong middle class. Madrasahs and the public education system reinforce the existing social order at the expense of the development of the Pakistani economy and society.

Sectarian and Jihadi Violence

Military power is also partly to be blamed for the sectarian and jihadi violence that has developed in Pakistan since the Zia ul-Haq era. This violence is the result of regional turbulence. It has sometimes been sustained by outside money. The importance of the

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Pakistan	4.05	4.08	4.28	4.31	3.96	3.36
India	3.05	3.02	2.93	2.76	2.94	2.90
Sri Lanka	4.53	3.85	3.11	2.67	2.78	2.66
Nepal	0.96	1.18	1.57	1.75	1.88	1.98
Bangladesh	1.4	1.34	1.25	1.2	1.19	1.14
South Asia (average)	3.07	3.02	2.95	2.87	2.99	2.89

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2005-2006*, London, Routledge, 2005. Compiled by the author.

Islamic revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war cannot be underestimated. Both events brought in Iranian, Saudi, and Iraqi money in support of the most violently anti-Sunni and anti-Shiite organizations in Pakistan. But these organizations also fulfilled other tasks for the Pakistani state and have been supported by the domestic military establishment, which has also used them as a tool to perpetuate itself in power.

Military support has varied according to the role the ideologically motivated institutions were supposed to play. Such support did not consist exclusively of training, funding, and logistically supporting jihadis. During the relief operations that followed the earthquake of October 8, 2005, radical groups not only were authorized to contribute but also were (and still are) the only organizations that have been given full visibility so as to generate the perception that they were the only expression of civil society.

Occasionally the military has used radical groups to manipulate Western perceptions. To gain some breathing space, the military played the Islamist card to mobilize support among the international community in 2002 and convince it that Pakistan was under extremist pressures. Accordingly, the current military regime will need to convince the West that it is doing what it can to prevent the rise of political Islam in Pakistan's 2008 elections. Although the 2008 election results are likely to be only marginally different from 2002 results in terms of Islamist representation, General Musharraf will most likely have to demonstrate that he (and he alone) can contain the rise of the Islamists by making sure the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of six Islamist parties, gets slightly fewer votes than during the previous elections.

Yet, maintaining an Islamist threat outside the political field will prove to the United States that a strong military government is necessary. So Musharraf has reauthorized some previously banned sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) to hold public rallies, although under a new name—Millat-e-Islamia.⁴ In such a context, any incident will play in favor of the military as it will be

presented as more evidence that the military is needed to meet an Islamic threat.

Indoctrination through education is obviously the core issue. The madrassa network, which has experienced an exponential development over the past three decades, is often blamed for spawning jihadis—a charge that is true. Madrassas have contributed to the sectarian phenomenon by using their teaching and propaganda to create an atmosphere of hatred conducive to the polarization of society and to the radicalization of some of its most marginal elements. Historically, sectarian violence finds its roots in madrassas.

Yet, not all madrassas are sectarian, and Pakistan's public education system also deserves some of the blame. As noted by A. H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim: "The textbooks tell lies, create hatred, inculcate militancy, and much more."⁵ Textbooks used in the public schools distort the events in Pakistani history, are insensitive to the religious diversity of Pakistan, and glorify war and the use of force.

Most Western foreign policy experts assume that Pakistan's educational problem is caused by the divisions within Pakistani society between secular and modernist elites on one side, and religious pressure groups on the other. They see the underinvestment in education as merely an accident of history, the unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of the army's weight on the country's budget.

They argue that the way to correct the present system is to lobby the Pakistani government to increase the share of education in the state budget and encourage Western governments to provide international assistance, both technical and financial, in the belief that rehabilitating the public education system will bring children back from the madrassas and therefore gradually diminish the culture of hatred. Other experts in international organizations believe that madrassas themselves can be modernized and the ideological content of their teaching mitigated.

However, the distortions of education in Pakistan are not merely the result of a laissez-faire policy; instead, they stem directly from the instructions given to textbook authors by the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education. The slant of the textbooks is a deliberate state policy aimed at encouraging religious chauvinism and glorifying militarism. This “culture of hatred” has been able to develop only because an oligarchy, acting in conjunction with the military, has seen it as the means to keep the masses illiterate or semiliterate, a policy that has also led to the constant underfunding of education. Thus, the demilitarization of Pakistani politics is a necessary yet insufficient condition to reduce Pakistan’s ideological problem.

Musharraf's Pakistan and U.S. Interests on a Collision Course?

Military power has its greatest impact in foreign policy. Although U.S. officials generally see Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror, Pakistan's cooperation with the United States is limited by its regional geopolitical interests. Relations with India obviously remain at the core of Pakistan's foreign policy. Alliances with major powers such as China and the United States are meant to protect Islamabad against a perceived or imagined threat from New Delhi. The rivalry between the two South Asian giants has turned both countries' relations with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle East into a zero-sum game. The asymmetry of their respective powers has generated a situation in which Pakistan, the weaker of the two, continues under its nuclear umbrella to nurture terrorist groups as a means of securing its geopolitical goals.

Neither 9/11 nor the ongoing peace process with India has radically altered Pakistan's strategic outlook. Since 9/11, Islamabad has systematically drawn a clear distinction between international organizations such as Al Qaeda, whose impact on Pakistan's foreign policy was negative and whose members could be traded for Western goodwill, and regional organizations whose usefulness in Afghanistan or Kashmir had to be and have been preserved. The Pakistani military allows officially banned organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which is active in Kashmir and in other parts of the Muslim world, to maintain its infrastructure.⁶

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan understood that terrorism had become, at least temporarily, unacceptable as a means of solving international disputes. Thus, it joined the war on terror, turning itself once again into a frontline state. The question remains, however, whether the decision to support U.S. policy in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 was a major strategic decision or a mere tactical shift. The same question can be asked about Musharraf's decision about

Kashmir. Militant groups were kept quiet for two years until India agreed to come back to the negotiating table in January 2004, but they reemerged in force during the summer of 2005, once the peace process had been consolidated. The October 2005 earthquake revealed that the supposedly dismantled training camps in Azad Kashmir were still active.

Terrorism, whether related to Afghanistan or Kashmir, is the issue where these contradictions are emerging. A close examination of Pakistan's strategy regarding the terrorism issue shows that Islamabad is gradually setting a trap for all countries involved in Afghanistan and that are potentially victims of international terrorism, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. In Kashmir, the continued support to terrorist organizations can be interpreted as Pakistan's willingness to preserve some means of pressure on India but can also be read as an indication that Islamabad has changed none of its strategic objectives.

The Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership, issued on the occasion of President George W. Bush's visit to Islamabad in March 2006, underlines a real although partial convergence of interests at the strategic level but, in a somewhat contradictory manner, barely hides the growing opposition between the two countries at the tactical level.

Pakistan's Strategic Interests

Pakistan's strategy toward the United States and the international community can only be understood if each of its theaters of action (Kashmir, Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the border with Afghanistan) is considered as part of an overall foreign policy. Islamabad has specific objectives in each of these regions, but the regional and the international aspects of each of these conflicts are linked. Islamabad constantly attempts to

exchange acceptance of one specific aspect of its regional policy for cooperation on another.

When U.S. officials use the term “Islamic threat,” they are putting very diverse geopolitical realities and interests under one designation. What happens in Kashmir, Afghanistan, or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas matters to the United States and to the international community because a continuing conflict in any of these three areas either has generated or is likely to generate a power vacuum that international terrorist groups threatening international interests could fill. The 9/11 attacks were not perpetrated by the Taliban but were the result of their complacency and their complicity with Al Qaeda. Similarly, the presence of the Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kashmir would not be seen as a major issue should its objectives be limited to Kashmir.

For Pakistan, the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Toiba are essential tools of regional policy. At the same time, Islamabad is always ready to trade international terrorists such as Al Qaeda for Western goodwill because they constitute a major liability by bringing Western wrath to Pakistan. Pakistan’s cooperation against international terrorism is therefore real and sincere. But Islamabad can at the same time threaten to loosen its cooperation and look the other way in the face of a specific threat when the pressure becomes unbearable in Afghanistan, where it feels it has vital interests. Because this strategy is backed by decades of propaganda about a so-called Islamic threat, it resonates in the United States and its European partners, allowing Islamabad to extract many more concessions from them than would otherwise be possible.

Let’s look at how Pakistan has operated in each of these theaters.

Kashmir

Because of India’s centrality to Pakistan’s foreign policy, it is necessary to examine first the situation in Kashmir. Despite the peace process and a few important yet largely symbolic measures such as the bus lines between

Muzaffarabad and Srinagar and between Sialkot and Jammu, Pakistan is still wedded to the same assumptions that produced the 2002 border crisis. This crisis arose from Pakistan’s dangerous belief that it could talk peace with New Delhi and at the same time fuel a guerrilla war in Kashmir.

Pakistan’s Use of the War on Terror

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan understood that terrorism had suddenly become an unacceptable way to pursue international disputes. The government officially joined the war on terror, once more turning itself into a frontline state. But in doing so, it faced a crisis of public legitimacy.

On the domestic front, Pervez Musharraf tried unsuccessfully to rally the secular parties—the center-left Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the center-right Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz faction (PML-N)—without their leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. He then favored creating an alliance of six Islamist parties in the form of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), led by former members of the Pak-Afghan Defence Council. The MMA had been officially opposing Musharraf’s regime, but the Pakistani president wanted to use the MMA to intimidate his opposition should he fail to get a majority in Parliament.

At the same time, Musharraf realized that he needed to play on the fear of an Islamic threat to attract strong U.S. military and financial support and cement his international support. Pakistan’s October 2002 legislative elections provided the opportunity, and the military establishment made sure that the MMA obtained majorities in the legislatures of the provinces of Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) although it received only 11.1 percent of the votes at the national level. It remained, however, officially in the opposition.

The message to the international community was simple: Don’t pressure us too much or we may be overthrown by Islamists. And it largely worked. The West adopted a lenient attitude on the restoration of democracy and came to

believe that Pakistan had only a limited ability to control militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The apparent rise of Islamists made the military regime look like a moderate stalwart against extremism.

The other key component of Musharraf's strategy was to engage in peace talks with India. Pakistan had taken the blame for the 1999 Kargil war and the 2002 escalation of tensions, and—contrary to Islamabad's expectations—international interest in the Kashmir issue had benefited India, not Pakistan. To reverse this trend, it was necessary to bring India back to the negotiating table by accepting Delhi's terms regarding the format of the negotiations without making any strategic concession.

To make its goodwill credible, Pakistan had to tangibly reduce the violence in Kashmir. It turned out that jihadi organizations were able to use this lull in the fighting to recruit young Kashmiris. Musharraf reasoned that once the dialogue appeared irreversible and the protagonists serious, violence could be resumed and be plausibly considered a local rebellion. During the spring and summer of 2005, violence resumed, initiated by supposedly new terrorist organizations such as Al Nasreen, Al Afreen, Farazan de Islam, and Al Mansoorah, which were cover names for the more traditional, Pakistan-supported Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen.

Of course, Pakistan denied all responsibility for the violence, claiming that it had done what it could and that militants were acting on their own accord. But sources close to the Pakistan government told a different story. They admitted privately that Pakistan had not fundamentally changed its attitude toward Kashmir. At the same time, sources close to the jihadis were saying that Islamabad had not reined in the jihadis. One can argue that Pakistan's posture was essentially defensive and that Islamabad felt that any sign of weakness could be exploited by India, but the fact is that Pakistan continued to maintain the terrorist infrastructure. Moreover, mujahideen themselves indicated that they were being trained, for example, on a replica of the

fence separating Pakistan from India along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, while Pakistani observers occasionally went as far as declaring that maintaining terrorist pressure was the only way to bring India along to become more amenable to Pakistani demands.

If any doubts persisted regarding Islamabad's support of jihadi organizations in Kashmir, they were removed by the October 2005 earthquake that devastated most of Pakistan's Kashmir and the NWFP. Militant outfits—which had suffered on both sides of the LOC as had the Indian and Pakistani armies⁷—were often the first organizations to reach the disaster spots. On the Pakistani side of the LOC, the United Jihad Council, led by Syed Salahuddin, called for a temporary cease-fire and set up medical camps in devastated areas. On both sides of the border in Kashmir, extremist religious groups stepped into the administrative vacuum, providing relief and humanitarian assistance in the earthquake-affected areas and generating respect from the local population. Local people, alienated from their central governments, became increasingly sympathetic to fundamentalist and terrorist organizations in Pakistan.

Caught in a dilemma, Musharraf went so far as to praise the Lashkar-e-Toiba⁸ for the work it conducted in Kashmir. He warned the jihadi organization that if the government saw it involved in anything other than welfare, it would ban it, which was an indirect acknowledgment that the government had not really banned it before. The group's infrastructure had never been dismantled.

The earthquake made it obvious that previous promises had not been respected. It became even more embarrassing a few days later when, on October 29 in Delhi, seventy-one people were killed and two hundred injured by a series of bomb blasts engineered by the same organization. This trend continued in 2006, with questions being raised about the link between Pakistan-based groups and terrorist attacks in India and the sincerity of Pakistan's involvement in the peace process.

Unintended Consequences?

The recent management of the Kashmir issue confirms that the Pakistan Army is, in fact, the main reason for the rise of Islamic extremism. This is likely to create at some point another clash with India, which so far has shown remarkable restraint but whose patience cannot be taken for granted. This does not mean that India is not also partly responsible for the situation that prevails on the other side of the LOC; surely, it has contributed in no small measure to the perpetuation of terrorism in the Kashmir valley. Neither does this mean that Islamabad is masterminding every operation on Indian soil, although it tolerated and, more often than not, helped terrorist groups develop their infrastructure on its territory. Delhi, more than Islamabad, is accountable to a public opinion that could pressure the Indian government for a tougher response to Pakistan's sponsored terrorism. This could lead to another conflict, potentially increasing the nuclear risk in South Asia.

In December 2006, President Musharraf stated that Pakistan would give up its claim to Kashmir if India agreed to a self-governance plan with New Delhi and Islamabad jointly supervising the region.⁹ But there was nothing new in this proposal; it reiterated previous positions and still affirms Pakistan's sovereignty in Kashmir. The offer of joint supervision over self-governance does not amount to the total control of the state that Islamabad has claimed so far, but it still confers some legitimacy on Islamabad's claim for a role in the area, which is unacceptable to India.

The presence of Kashmiri terrorist groups on Pakistani soil is assuming an increasingly international dimension. The terrorist attack of July 2005 in London and the foiled attack the following month, when terrorists planned to explode several planes over the Atlantic, had a Pakistani connection. Again, the Pakistani state had no direct responsibility in either of the events. The United Kingdom even benefited from Islamabad's cooperation. Yet in both cases, the people who were incriminated had benefited from the support of the Jamaat-ud-

Dawa, whose infrastructure remains intact in Pakistan.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan, once described as the "bear trap" by Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,¹⁰ is the most important component of Islamabad's India policy and a growing source of concern to the international community. Once considered defeated, Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies have regained strength. They have regrouped and reorganized and are now better trained and better equipped, conducting more sophisticated operations as well. The number of military casualties in Afghanistan doubled between 2005 and 2006, a clear indication of the resurgence of the Taliban.

Islamabad keeps pursuing its own objectives at the expense of its troubled neighbor. Afghanistan's domestic situation is partly, perhaps primarily, to blame for the Taliban insurgency, but evidence points to active Pakistani support for the Taliban:

- The insurgency started in a corridor 35 miles wide along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, spanning the provinces of Konar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabol, Kandahar, and Helmand, before moving west. Most attacks are carried out in southern Afghanistan by Taliban coming from the Quetta district. The guerrillas could not operate without the benefit of sanctuaries in Pakistan. Islamabad rightly argues that it cannot control the border. It has proposed fencing the border, but this proposal is totally impractical, as the former director general of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, has acknowledged.¹¹
- Witnesses say that militants are brought from the Quetta district to the Afghan border by Pakistani military trucks. Senior lieutenants to Mullah Omar are said to operate from Quetta, from where they run military operations in the south-central Afghanistan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, and Zabol.¹² Moreover Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, of the Hizbe Islami, is particularly active in

the Konar, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Laghman, and Nurestan provinces and recently declared his allegiance to the Taliban before retracting his statement. He continues to visit Peshawar regularly—according to Robert Kaplan, his headquarters are located there—in addition to the Bajaur Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.¹³

- Finally, Western troops operating in southern Afghanistan are unequivocal about the fact that part of the Taliban movement is operating from Pakistan; this has always been denied by the Pakistani government. Colonel Chris Vernon¹⁴ of Great Britain, chief of staff for southern Afghanistan, publicly declared that “the thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta,”¹⁵ which is described as the major headquarters of the movement. Vernon confirmed not only a number of previous Afghan statements but also the statements of local witnesses, who denounce army actions in their own districts, and of U.S. counterterrorism officials, who had previously declared that parts of Pakistan were a safe haven for terrorists.¹⁶ The British government later said that Vernon’s statement did not represent the official position of the British government, but that is not equivalent to saying that it was inaccurate. The British government (and many others) suffer from the subtle, double game of Pakistan—while Pakistan helps Great Britain combat international terrorism, it also aids, passively at the very least, the Taliban in endangering troops in Afghanistan.¹⁷ Vernon’s accusations, however, are confirmed in private by other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) officers present in Afghanistan.

To be sure, the Pakistani military, when under pressure from the West, will cooperate to some degree in constraining the Taliban. Two recent examples are particularly telling:

- On July 18, 2006, the press agency Reuters reported that the British government had banned the Baloch Liberation Army, an armed nationalist organization at war with the federal government in Balochistan province,

and that “scores of Taliban had been arrested in a crackdown,” including Mullah Hamdullah, a former commander of Taliban forces in the southern Afghan province of Helmand, where British troops have met fierce resistance since their deployment.¹⁸ These arrests confirmed the presence of parts of Taliban leadership in Quetta, which had been alleged for months by local observers and denied by the Pakistani government. The Reuters report indicated that the Pakistani government was willing to be more active against the Taliban if some of its demands were met.

- Similarly, in November 2006, a new series of Taliban arrests took place immediately after Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain visited Pakistan and pledged a doubling of aid to Islamabad.¹⁹ In the following days, the Pakistani police arrested more than forty Taliban in madrassas in Pashtoonabad, Satellite Town, Ghousabad, Chandi Chowk, and Kuchlak, all areas of Quetta.²⁰

Even the arrest in Quetta of the former Taliban defense minister, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, following the visit of Vice President Richard B. Cheney, although significant because of his being a top deputy of Mullah Omar,²¹ can be seen as a sacrifice necessary to protect Pakistan’s larger interests. Such arrests, meant to prove the goodwill of the Pakistani government, are politically and financially highly rewarding but they do not significantly affect Taliban operations in Afghanistan.

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

The conflict in Waziristan on the Afghanistan border has been the scene of cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. Waziristan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, reflects both the ambiguities of the Pakistani military government in the war on terror as well as the consequences of the government’s manipulation of the political process in the region and, more generally, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Pakistan’s military government is manipulating Waziristan to achieve its goals for the management and the effectiveness of the

fight against the Taliban, the perceptions of the residents of Waziristan of the government policy in the region, the perceptions of the United States, and ultimately, the perceptions of the Pakistan Army as well.

The Pakistani military government has put forward Waziristan, where some 80,000 Pakistani troops have been mobilized, as proof that Islamabad is doing whatever it can to stop the Afghan fundamentalist insurgency from spilling over into Pakistani territory. A close examination of Waziristan's recent history, however, offers a different picture of the problem and raises a number of questions.

When the coalition forces moved into Afghanistan in October 2001, the attack came from the North of Afghanistan. The military rationale was to sandwich Al Qaeda and the Taliban, who came from the East and the South, to eliminate them. It was therefore imperative to close the borders as much as possible. In Waziristan, however, the Miranshah and Mirali routes were left open. Even if it had been impossible to seal every border, at least these two routes, well known for having been intensively used by the mujahideen during the jihad against the Soviets, should have been sealed. Keeping them open was a deliberate effort by the Pakistan military establishment to aid the Taliban. The local Taliban welcomed both Taliban and foreign fighters in Waziristan. During this period only minor cadres of Al Qaeda were captured and delivered to the Americans.

This policy changed in 2002 when increasing U.S. pressure forced a reluctant Islamabad to send regular army troops into South Waziristan to check the influx of Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants fleeing the U.S.-led Operation Anaconda in southeastern Afghanistan. Local Taliban were surprised to be asked by Pakistan's intelligence agencies to surrender foreign militants. They refused on the basis of Pashtun hospitality—which, incidentally, has generated fortunes for some of the local Taliban leaders—and Islamic solidarity. Military operations in South Waziristan started in February 2004 when the U.S. military complained that the territory was not just a hideout for Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, but also a launching pad against allied troops in Afghanistan.²²

Even after December 2005, when the first signs of Taliban-like rule started to emerge, Pakistani military and civilian authorities looked the other way and did nothing to stop the militants. According to the magazine *Newsline*, "the [local] administration was under clear instructions not to impede the movements of the local Taliban who remained unchecked and continued to consolidate their position in the area."²³

As a matter of fact, the proximity of militants' hideouts and paramilitary forces' check posts to the regular Pakistani troops and intelligence officials in Waziristan has led many observers to suspect that Pakistan authorities are cooperating with the Taliban.²⁴ The Pakistani government is not only turning a blind eye to Taliban activities but also intervening to protect Taliban commanders who serve Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. According to Intikhab Amir, "the current operation is only directed against the Taliban foot soldiers of local origin, led by insignificant leaders, whereas places like Shawal from where top Afghan Taliban commanders such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Akhtar Mansoor are still organizing guerrilla raids against Afghanistan, remain calm and quiet."²⁵ As a result, Taliban based in Waziristan continues operations in Kabul and the Afghan eastern regions of Khost, Logar, Paktia, and Paktika,²⁶ and also Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan.

Some in the diplomatic community and in military circles argue that counterinsurgency is a complex military operation for which the Pakistani military is neither trained nor equipped. They are undoubtedly right, but at the same time the Pakistan Army has made no effort to obtain the sort of equipment that would help it combat the Taliban effectively. Although Pakistan asks the United States and some European countries to provide helicopters and night vision equipment free of charge, the army keeps buying F-16s, submarines, and frigates, which are of little help in the tribal areas.

Moreover, analysts tend to forget the political dimension of the issue. All madrassas training the Taliban in the tribal areas are controlled

by the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI/F), whose leader, Fazlur Rehman, is a de facto member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. Fazlur Rehman limited himself to mild protests when the government took action against the Taliban, indicating that his opposition to government action was largely formal while preserving his political credit in his constituency. But his capacity to mobilize the local population behind the government to end the conflict has apparently not been employed.

Implications for the United States

In Afghanistan, Pakistan is now in the unique position of helping both belligerents. It does train, equip, and provide shelter to the Taliban while providing logistics to NATO and ISAF at the same time. Pakistan is in a position to stop NATO and ISAF fuel supplies that transit its territory. This gives it leverage over the alliance. At the same time, its support to the Taliban allows it to vary the intensity of the harassment against ISAF troops according to the need of the moment.

Islamabad's strategy of brinkmanship is not without risks. A growing number of regional powers—Iran, Russia, and some Central Asian states—are increasingly uneasy about the U.S. and NATO long-term presence in Afghanistan, for reasons that are only partly related to Afghanistan itself. Security officials in Kabul say Iran is building up its positions in the eventuality of a U.S. military intervention if Tehran does not end its military nuclear program.²⁷ Tehran could ultimately join the Taliban in a loosely coordinated front against NATO, which would threaten NATO and potentially undermine Pakistan's national interests.

From this perspective, the current situation in Afghanistan can be characterized as one of competing ambivalences, where Iran, Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics would like NATO to leave but fear a resurgence of the Taliban that would be likely to re-create a series of domestic problems for each of them. Others, particularly Pakistan, can live with the Taliban but have no interest in NATO's departure. The current equilibrium is therefore extremely

unstable. Should the overall situation further degenerate, Afghanistan could once again become the location of a series of small proxy wars, as it had been for years before the U.S. intervention in October 2001. The risk is real that an Afghanistan totally or partly controlled by the Taliban could again become a sanctuary for international terrorists.

For the United States, the problem goes beyond Afghanistan's stability alone. Central Asia was included in the portfolio of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, with the idea of working toward the integration of Central Asia with South Asia through energy corridors and trade. A return of the Taliban would not only spoil the reconstruction effort of Afghanistan and threaten U.S. and European lives but would also put an end to any hope of integrating Central Asia with South Asia, pushing it instead into closer relations with Russia. Islamabad's position vis-à-vis Washington is further strengthened by the Bush administration's tense relationship with Tehran and Uzbekistan.

If the United States were to normalize its relations with Iran, that could create a different situation. It might allow, for example, ISAF supplies to transit through Iran. Competition between Tehran and Islamabad would undoubtedly make Islamabad more susceptible to U.S. pressure. But Washington and Tehran are unlikely to reconcile soon. An attempt at normalization would conflict with other major U.S. interests (regardless of which party holds the majority in the United States) such as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or protecting Israel. There is also no guarantee that Iran would not reject proposals for rapprochement, especially because it is in a position of relative regional strength thanks to the U.S. failure in Iraq.

In the short term, Pakistan has been able to take advantage of the conflict in Afghanistan to maintain its leverage with the West. All of the outside forces, including NATO, are under Pakistan's sway. Pakistan's alliance with the United States against Al Qaeda will bring tangible benefits in the form of weapon sales. On July 13, 2006, the Bush administration

presented the U.S. Congress with its plan to sell Pakistan F-16 fighters in a deal worth \$5 billion. Moreover, several countries with an armament industry will use the U.S. decision as a pretext to resume arms sales to Pakistan. Pakistan will ultimately obtain weapons and additional clout in the region.

The situation in the region is noteworthy for two additional reasons. Because of the tremendous international pressure faced by the Islamist networks with since 9/11, they are increasingly identifying and working with each other. It is no longer possible to distinguish international groups from regional ones. This development means that Pakistan's strategy of supporting regional groups it considers useful while cooperating in combating international groups is no longer tenable.

Also, in their funding of Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the United States and Britain have promoted the idea that Pakistan can be bought off with development support. This is a mistake. Development funding will bring United States and Britain no additional security. It will make Pakistan dependent on Western largesse as well as benefit Islamabad's clients in the region—including the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, numerically the most important Islamist party, and its network of madrassas.

The linkages established by Islamabad between its Afghan and Kashmir policies on the one side and its cooperation in the war on terror on the other indicate that ultimately none of these issues can be solved separately.

Civilian vs. Military Power and U.S. Regional Interests

Would the return of civilian power automatically help foster U.S. interests in the region? According to many in Washington and elsewhere, the ultimate reason for the consistency of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is not Musharraf's vision or trustworthiness but the perceived lack of alternatives. The dominant view is that the army is the only effective institution in Pakistan.

Performance of Civilian Leadership in Pakistan

An examination of the performance of recent civilian governments, whether led by Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif, provides no reason for optimism. Neither prime minister performed very well. Both left the country in worse shape than they had found it. Neither initiated the structural reforms that would have been necessary to make Pakistan a viable state at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Although recent history is undoubtedly a good indicator, past performance and behavioral patterns are only one element of whether the return of civilians to power would prove more favorable to the interests of Pakistan, the United States, and other countries. The future is never the simple continuation of the past. The eventual return of civilians to power would take place in a different environment and under much tighter international scrutiny, and perhaps under the threat of international sanctions, should a civilian government cross a number of red lines.

The problem goes beyond the personality of the prime minister. Although personalities matter, democratic processes and structures at the grassroots level are even more important, and their potential impact on U.S. interests and on the regional stability of Pakistan is too often underestimated.

Management of Foreign Policy

Assessing civilian management of Pakistan's foreign policy is difficult because civilians never were solely responsible for foreign policy. When Benazir Bhutto became prime minister in 1988, the military had already begun playing an active role in the foreign policy process. Yet differences existed between her and the military. The military elite advocated that Islamabad explore the feasibility of confederation with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh.²⁸ The army had started to support vigorously the uprising in Kashmir, and it proposed that Pakistan challenge India's role of regional policeman. By contrast, Benazir Bhutto favored the development of an association of democratic nations and, in this spirit, had started reviewing relations with India, making overtures that were opposed by the military.

Clear divergences also existed over Afghanistan. Benazir Bhutto wanted to respect the April 1988 Geneva Accords, in particular the bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan that included a clause signed by her predecessor that related to noninterference and nonintervention, and she supported U.S. efforts to promote a political solution to Afghanistan-Pakistan issues. In line with the policies pursued during the jihad against the Soviet Union, the military wanted to impose Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as the new head of the Afghan state. The military ultimately prevailed, but by the time Benazir Bhutto was removed in 1991, she had begun exercising some autonomy vis-à-vis the military and was improving relations with the United States.

During her second term, between 1993 and 1996, Benazir Bhutto was more careful not to antagonize the military. Her policies were to a large extent those of the military. She was in no position to stop military support to the militancy in Kashmir, but she spent a lot of

energy (and funds) trying unsuccessfully to gain international support for Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue. Her government also supported the emergence and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In neither case was she able to significantly influence or alter a policy decided in military headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Nawaz Sharif's record is perhaps more surprising. When he became prime minister, he took pride in identifying himself with Zia ul-Haq and continued to defend Zia's policies.²⁹ Nawaz Sharif, however, supported the U.S. coalition-building effort in Iraq, against the wishes of Chief of Army Staff Aslam Beg. In regional matters, he was as powerless as Benazir Bhutto when she was prime minister. On Kashmir and Afghanistan, he was, like his predecessor, obliged to execute decisions the military had already made.

In Nawaz Sharif's second term in office, divergences between him and the military grew, leading to the military coup d'état by Pervez Musharraf. Being a businessman, Nawaz Sharif was keenly aware of the potential economic benefits of rapprochement with India. The nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by both India and Pakistan had made a rapprochement possible by establishing a sort of psychological and (largely) symbolic parity between them. The process led to the "Lahore declaration" signed by Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in February 1999. It included a clause in which the two countries reaffirmed their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.

The Kargil war, which started in May 1999, soon derailed the process. Pakistani intruders—mujahideen backed by the Pakistan Army—had infiltrated across the LOC and entrenched themselves on several hilltops in the Kargil sector, threatening India's strategic highway to Ladakh and access to Siachen. Two months later, India regained control of the situation, but the dynamic engendered by the Lahore declaration was dead.

A controversy erupted very quickly regarding who was responsible for the Kargil operation. The civilian leadership believed it was a complete fiasco, but Pervez Musharraf has presented it in his recent memoirs as a military achievement.³⁰ There is no doubt, however, that the military was primarily responsible for initiating an operation that Nawaz Sharif probably authorized under extreme pressure.

Overall, civilian leaders of Pakistan have in the past conducted foreign policies more compatible with Western ones and more conducive to regional stability even though they had to act within a framework defined by the military. Although not an absolute indicator, this means that the objectives of a civilian foreign policy would more likely be compatible or at least more sensitive to Western objectives. Hence, there is a good argument for enhancing the preeminence of civilians in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Leadership and the Sectarian Issue

The difference between civilian and military leadership is not as clear on other terrorism-related issues such as sectarianism. The Zia ul-Haq regime systematically promoted sectarianism in order to counter what it saw as a growing Iranian influence in the country. Unfortunately, subsequent regimes did not do any better. Political parties have routinely compromised with sectarian groups and have cynically used sectarian conflicts for short-term political gains. Both the SSP and the Tehriq-e-Fiqh-e-Jafferia Pakistan (TJP) were allowed to engage in electoral politics. Both entered into alliances with mainstream parties, the PPP or the PML.

Even Benazir Bhutto, whose party and family suffered the most from the policies of Zia ul-Haq, turned a blind eye to sectarian extremism. She formed a parliamentary alliance with the Fazlur Rehman faction of the JUI and provided the SSP an opportunity to pursue its sectarian activities. On January 22, 1995, Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar announced that the federal government intended to ban direct funding of all madrassas as well as track down those

institutions that were fanning sectarianism. He also promised that an antisectarian bill to facilitate the government's effort would be passed in the National Assembly.³¹ The bill, unfortunately, was not even submitted to the assembly.

In 1995, an eminent SSP leader, Sheikh Hakim Ali, even became minister of fisheries in the Punjab government because the PPP needed the SSP's support in order to gain a majority in the province.³² In 1996, Sheikh Hakim Ali was indicted in eight cases of murder.³³ He was never tried.

Azam Tariq, an SSP leader and member of the National Assembly who was assassinated in 2004, also enjoyed complete immunity from law enforcement agencies during the entire Bhutto tenure despite his active role in anti-Shiite violence. He was valued because he was an archenemy of Syeda Abida Hussain, a veteran Shiite leader from Jhang who was at political odds with Benazir Bhutto.³⁴

Nawaz Sharif was the only prime minister who tried to address the issue seriously. In 1997, an antiterrorism act was adopted by the Parliament, reinforcing the punishment for sectarian terrorism and directing the army and police to combat it. About 1,500 sectarian activists were arrested between February and May 1997. Nawaz Sharif also closed a Shiite seminary for sectarian activities and arrested even more activists after the resumption of sectarian violence in January 1998.³⁵ The comfortable majority he enjoyed in Parliament made Nawaz Sharif less susceptible than Benazir Bhutto (who was overreliant on the JUI³⁶) to sectarian pressure. However, on January 3, 1999, Nawaz Sharif narrowly escaped an assassination attempt by sectarian terrorists. The law was subsequently strengthened by the antiterrorism ordinance of July 1999.

Even though civilian governments did not necessarily approve of sectarian violence, they were not prepared to actively disband groups, or perhaps they were simply too weak. Instead, they adopted halfhearted measures, encouraging dialogue between the different groups and eventually giving police protection

to threatened religious congregations,³⁷ but they essentially turned a blind eye to sectarian activities.

Civilians were therefore not totally innocent but not directly responsible for the process that after 9/11 led to a dangerous rapprochement between sectarian movements such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and internationalist organizations such as Al Qaeda. However, it is also clear that civilians' inability or occasional unwillingness to combat sectarianism was due to their own weakness. The effectiveness of the struggle against sectarianism is therefore closely linked to the process of democratic consolidation that includes the ability of the civilian government to control the forces (army, paramilitary, police, and judicial system) that have the capacity to confront sectarian terrorist activities.

Cost of Perpetuating Military Power

The flaws of civilian power are not likely to be corrected by military rule. On the contrary, the flaws will be reinforced. Army rule in Pakistan is not simply an unfortunate, yet necessary, transition toward a true democracy. Behind a façade of democratization and the alibi of development, no previous leader has done as much damage to the social and political fabric of Pakistan as the current military leadership. Far from contributing to improving the stability of the country, the military leaders' policies have wittingly and unwittingly reinforced the country's vulnerabilities and will continue to do so as the behavior of the regime becomes increasingly erratic as it grows more alienated from the population.

Two issues in particular need to be examined: the deliberate and systematic weakening of Pakistan's political system and the concurrent weakening of the provinces at the expense of the center.

Weakening the Political System

Military leaders have attempted to weaken the political system and the political parties although they have always avoided destroying the parties because they wanted to be able

to play them against each other and present themselves as the ultimate arbiters. But Pervez Musharraf was faced with a special problem. Unlike Zia ul-Haq's coup d'état, Musharraf's coup took place after the Cold War, which meant Musharraf has had to maintain at least a façade of democracy. Moreover, a Supreme Court verdict of May 2, 2002, required that elections be held to facilitate the transition from military to civilian rule.

No more than his predecessors, however, was Musharraf willing to transfer real power to civilians. In fact, he has presided over tactical and more important structural changes that have affected the nature of the relationship between Parliament and the executive in Pakistan.

The first significant tactical move was the manipulation of the 2002 provincial and national elections in order to promote the MMA. According to the European Union Election Observation Mission, all opposition parties expressed concern that the Pakistan Election Commission was diluting strongholds of parties that opposed the regime while favoring parties that supported it.³⁸ Serious concerns were also raised regarding which voters were registered.³⁹ The Election Observation Mission noted: "The electoral process was marked by the introduction of a new set of qualification criteria for the nomination of candidates, some of which [were] not in accordance with international standards or [were] clearly targeting specific prominent politicians."⁴⁰ For example, university bachelor's degrees were required of candidates but madrasa diplomas were considered equivalent. This measure significantly benefited the MMA, particularly in Balochistan, where some prominent nationalist leaders without university degrees were prevented from running in the election even though several had previously exercised the functions of governor, or chief minister, or both, of the province. Rallies and the use of loudspeakers were forbidden during the entire campaign. The length of the campaign was reduced to a minimum.

In addition, these restrictions were applied selectively. The PML-N and the PPP, for example, were denied permission to organize rallies, but

the MMA was allowed to do so. Moreover, because the MMA campaigned essentially in madrassas and mosques as part of religious observances, it was relatively unaffected by the ban on rallies decreed by the military government.⁴¹

As a result, the MMA, a coalition of six Islamist parties, was able to form or be part of the governments in the two Pakistani provinces adjacent to Afghanistan—the NWFP and Balochistan. The MMA obtained 11.1 percent of the votes at the national level, which allowed Musharraf to raise the specter of the Islamist threat whenever he felt too pressured by the United States. Domestically, Musharraf was in a position to forge an alliance with any of the two mainstream parties whenever he felt the need to. His relationship with the MMA, in particular with one of its members, the Jamaat-i-Islami, was always smooth, and he managed to use the Islamist alliance to obtain the constitutional amendments he needed from the Parliament to change the system itself.

The second tactical move took place in 2005–2006, when the local elections were rigged to ensure the success of the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) (PML-Q), the main civilian support for Musharraf. That was also intended to ensure his success in the upcoming 2007–2008 elections. As the local bodies are in charge of the logistics of the elections on the ground, the machinery is now in place to ensure the success of whatever party or combination of parties the executive thinks will best serve his interests.

The main strategic move came in the form of constitutional amendments introduced by the Legal Framework Ordinance, thanks to the support of the MMA. The new constitutional amendments give the president the power to dissolve Parliament and sack the prime minister and provincial chief ministers, effectively transforming Pakistan's political system from a parliamentarian to a presidential one and reinforcing the power of the center at the expense of the provinces.

The deepest and probably most destructive structural change introduced by Pervez Musharraf

was the devolution program. As demonstrated by the International Crisis Group, the political devolution program, initiated in 2000, “far from enhancing democracy, has strengthened military rule and actually [raised] the risks of internal conflict.”⁴²

Although widely supported by the international community, the devolution program has served essentially two purposes:

- Bypassing the provincial governments, and therefore the political parties, to create a local clientele created by and entirely devoted to the central government; in that sense, devolution does contribute to the weakening of the political system; and
- Reinforcing centralized control over the lower levels of government; by creating a compliant local political elite, owing its position and privileges to the regime and exercising only nominal powers, the devolution helps the military to dominate local politics.

Devolution initially consisted of reestablishing elected councils at the district and subdistrict levels, each elected council being run by an elected *nazim* (mayor) and *naib nazim* (deputy mayor) with executive powers and responsibility for law and order.⁴³ To help them fulfill their responsibilities, they were supposed to get sufficient allocations to match federal and provincial grants.

As a result, because they owed their positions entirely to the federal government, not only did the new local bodies exercise only nominal authority within their own districts but they also helped manipulate elections for the benefit of the federal government at the expense of the political parties, which were formally banned from the elections. The allocation of funds guaranteed that loyalties went to the military.

Devolution provided few of the benefits it was supposed to deliver to the population: The absence of checks and balances between and across the various levels of district government led to the virtual disappearance

of all accountability on the part of the *nazims*, thus encouraging corruption. A shortage of funds and difficulties in raising additional funds locally impeded developments projects.

More important, however, the new system created tensions between local and provincial governments. Most politicians, including those in the ruling PML-Q, saw devolution as a further blow to provincial autonomy. The supposed depoliticization of governance led to the reinforcement of loyalties at the subnational and subprovincial levels, exacerbating social and political divisions within society. Combined with the exclusion of local leaders from participating in elections, it fueled provincial resentment against the center.

The Provincial Issue

The provincial issue did not start with the present regime. The most deadly internal conflict in Pakistan, the secession of East Pakistan, was the result of ill-conceived policies by the military regimes of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Civilians have also been responsible for civil wars. The Balochistan war of 1973–1977 arose from a series of nondemocratic decisions taken by an elected, civilian prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The army has never recognized ethnic identities and has always promoted a united Pakistan. Refusing to recognize ethnic identities as the elements of national identity is, however, not necessarily contrary to democracy. The French political philosopher Raymond Aron gave a very simple, yet very inclusive, definition of a nation as “a community of culture united in a common political will.”⁴⁴

A transcendent bond between the people of any given nation does not require the elimination of all ethnic identities. It does require some form of popular consensus. In other words, the absence of democracy is the core of the provincial issue today in Pakistan. Despite many crises, Pakistan has managed over the years to promote a slow, yet real, integration process because previous military regimes had partly compensated for the absence of democracy

by the co-optation of traditional leaders, thus allowing a form of representation. This process has been endangered and perhaps even reversed by Pakistan's current military regime.

The crisis that erupted in Balochistan during the summer of 2005 reflected the deep alienation of an entire province, which resulted from a sense of dispossession. Thirty years after the promises of development by former dictator Zia ul-Haq, the people of Balochistan enjoy neither the benefits of development nor the political autonomy that had been promised by the constitution.

Balochistan's natural gas and the royalties it generates crystallized the resentment, but there had already been widespread discontent that basic needs for clean water, health care, and education were not being satisfied. The province generally suffered from the lowest social indicators in the entire country. The present crisis is essentially the result of the predatory behavior of a central government that has favored military intervention over dialogue. Even the recommendations of the national representation were ignored.⁴⁵ Instead, Balochistan has experienced repression on a large scale. Hundreds of students and activists have disappeared, even as the intelligence agencies used blackmail to intimidate the Baloch leaders.

As a result, the conflict, although still a low-intensity one, has entered a phase of radicalization. Moderate people, whose initial claims were for the autonomy promised by the 1973 constitution and a greater share for Balochistan of its own resources, have been pushed to the extreme and are now demanding independence. What could have been considered not so long ago as an "integration nationalism," in which the claim for independence is no more than a means to get greater political representation and access to the provincial economic resources, is now becoming a real independence movement. Such a movement already existed in some parts of Balochistan but earlier had not attracted a majority of the population.

Ultimately, the Balochistan issue could prove much more dangerous to Pakistan than any of the other (sometimes mythical) threats to the country's political order. A failure of Pakistan to contain the rebellion could fuel nationalist revolts among other ethnic groups outside Balochistan in the future. Before 1970, the problem came from the NWFP; at that time, Baloch and Pashtun nationalists were united in a single movement, the National Awami Party (NAP). It could also come from Sindh, a province situated east of Balochistan. In Sindh, the military government has systematically reinforced the position of the Muttahida Qwami Movement (MQM)—the Pakistani party closest to a fascist organization—in the cities and has given a blank check to the most reactionary landlords in the rural areas where development levels are as low as in Balochistan. Although unlikely at the moment, an alliance between nationalists in Sindh and Balochistan would further complicate the task of the army. The military regime could well be ultimately transforming a slow, difficult process of national integration into a whirlwind of centrifugal forces.

None of the three issues described above threatens the regime if considered individually. To some extent, these issues even strengthen the regime by making the army the ultimate arbiter of all political, administrative, and law and order matters. Together, however, they could lead to a real destabilization of the country. The probable rigging of the coming elections, for example, could lead to a general revolt throughout the country and the rise of competing leadership groups. Election rigging could also inspire repressed ethnic nationalism. In a scenario in which, for example, the army would have to counter insurgencies in Balochistan and Sindh while it tried to control riots in the major cities would make it almost impossible for the military leadership to be of any help in the fight against Al Qaeda and its allies. Moreover, it is difficult to predict what the army's reaction would be. Such a situation is not the most likely scenario, but it is possible.

U.S. Interests and Democracy in the Tribal Areas

Talking about democracy in the context of the present Talibanization of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas can seem at first extremely naïve, if not irresponsible. But democratization is the only means of accomplishing what both the insurgency and counterinsurgency aim to do: conquer the hearts and minds of the population. The absence of democracy in the region reinforces the Taliban and deprives the army of precious intelligence sources.

The Talibanization of Waziristan is not just the result of a sudden and unexpected rise of extremism in a remote border area. In 1996 the universal adult franchise was introduced in the tribal areas with the objective of bringing the tribal population into the mainstream. Political parties were banned, however, except for religious ones that were operating from mosques and madrassas. This led to the erosion of the power of the tribal elders—the maliks—as simultaneously a new leadership that was more charismatic, religiously oriented, and endowed with considerable resources emerged from the war in Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Army cannot be blamed for the 1996 decision. In 2000, however, it decided to not allow political parties to contest in the tribal areas during the national elections. The Talibanization of Waziristan was on its way, and with it came the predominance of the mullahs. Encouraged by the complacency (at best) of the Pakistani authorities, the local Taliban started to shelter their tribal brothers fleeing Afghanistan. Foreign militants renting compounds and training camps and buying food at inflated prices became sources of extra money.

By 2003, when the Pakistan Army under U.S. pressure intervened in Waziristan, the local Taliban had already consolidated its position and refused to hand over the foreigners.⁴⁶ The Pakistan Army offered them freedom of action if they did so, but in Waziristan they felt they

already had freedom of action. The confrontation led to an initial agreement in 2004, soon violated by the army, that led to a second and similar agreement in 2006. The Taliban was allowed to retain its administrative and political position as well as its weapons. Foreigners were also allowed to stay without registering, on a promise of good behavior. According to the new deal, the army was supposed to withdraw from most areas, including border posts, on the condition that the Taliban would not use these areas for operations against the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan. The Taliban would also refrain from imposing their lifestyle on others by force in the tribal areas.

Whether this specific agreement sanctioned the inability or the unwillingness of the Pakistani government to impose its will on the Taliban is irrelevant here. What matters is that the agreement resulted in a complete loss of credibility for the Pakistani government and a rise of anti-Americanism in the entire region—the United States is now being systematically associated with whatever action the Pakistani government is taking, whether or not the United States is responsible.

Democratizing the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the present situation would mean nothing else than opening them to all political parties and completing the process started with the introduction of the universal adult franchise in 1996. This would provide mainstream political forces within the tribal areas with the backing of their national organization. Being stronger, they would offer representation to a large segment of the population not necessarily seduced by the Taliban ideology. As a result, the Taliban would be limited to its real yet more limited constituency. It would not be eliminated but reduced to its real weight.

This would have an impact on military operations as well. First, it would be easier for the army to gather intelligence and support among a population that felt less threatened by it. Democratization would also isolate the Taliban and allow for better-targeted operations, thus preventing the victimization of an entire population. As a result, democratization would

also allow for a better understanding and greater acceptance of the military operations by the local population. It would clearly not solve all the problems of the United States and the Pakistan Army, but it would be much more effective in combating the Taliban.

Policy Implications

Overall, military rule has exacerbated the dislocation of Pakistani society. Supposedly strategic initiatives such as the military's intervention in Balochistan are conducted at the expense of the population and of national integration, thus undermining their very purpose. Military policies have not reinforced stability in Pakistan; they have undermined it, and they continue to do so.

There is a sharp contrast between civilian and military rule. When civilian rule goes wrong, it suffers from corruption and is identified with poor economic performance. By contrast, the military appears as the institution that has been able to reestablish some economic discipline and decrease corruption. But if the military is credited with better economic performance, its record regarding corruption appears positive only because the military has institutionalized corruption to its own advantage.

Civilians have not always performed better on security issues because the instruments of security have been controlled by the army, but the civilians did occasionally conduct policies more favorable to Pakistani and international interests. These policies were sabotaged or hijacked by the military. Ultimately, this has meant that civilians have tended to conduct policies more congenial to international interests but that civilians cannot be totally trusted because of their own weakness and their dependence on the army for security matters.

Any policy aiming at inducing Pakistan to adopt more acceptable international behavior will therefore have to take all these elements into account. Helping reestablish civilian power will mean subordinating military to civilian power as well as gaining the military's cooperation.

The need to transfer power to civilians in foreign policy (and other matters) does not mean, however, that civilians should be given a free hand in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Civilians, like the military, should face strict international conditionality in international cooperation and assistance and be assessed according to a series of criteria and as part of a process described in chapter 5.

Breaking the Links Between Army and Politics

The preceding chapters demonstrated the cost of continuing army rule and the desirability of a return to democracy. Two scenarios can be envisaged:

First, military officers themselves could be willing to give up power should they feel, for example, that the current military-civilian relationship is harming them. Retired officers have criticized army rule as an aberration that “does more harm than good to the polity.” They charge that it fundamentally corrupts the normal functioning of society because it counterposes two very different, if not contradictory, cultures: one civilian, which must “allow pluralism and is, therefore, accommodative”; the other, military, which essentially reflects its training “to use organized violence.”⁴⁷ The army itself “is distracted from the main mission and its ability to perform suffers. The military culture gets corrupted and the quality of leadership starkly affected.”⁴⁸

Historically, the Pakistan Army has occasionally withdrawn behind the scenes whenever it could not fulfill the economic, social, and political expectations of society, or when international pressures were strong. Such was the case in 1988 when Benazir Bhutto became prime minister after more than ten years of military dictatorship. The army, however, did not really give up power. It kept the main levers of power under its control.

But a similar move in the months or years to come would take place in quite a different institutional context. General Musharraf and his cronies have introduced constitutional changes that have radically altered the nature of the political system, and the army has never been so deeply entrenched, not only in the economy but, more importantly, in every sector of the country’s public life. Its total control of administration is particularly significant in this regard. The former implicit alliance between the bureaucracy and the military has been replaced by explicit

subordination of the bureaucracy to the military in which the army controls recruitment, training, and promotion. Moreover, all public institutions, including the judiciary, have been weakened. Political parties are in shambles.

In the second scenario, the Pakistani military would be unwilling to give up power voluntarily. Then the challenge would be to identify the vulnerabilities of the army that would make it more compliant. This scenario is more likely than the previous one. Having secured control of the electoral machinery in the 2005 local elections and being in a position to pressure all actual and potential candidates, the military has little to fear from elections alone.

Problems could arise, however, from popular mobilization against the regime on the occasion of the elections or because the elections are too blatantly rigged. The sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry on March 9, 2007, generated weeks of protest across the entire country. The mobilization was insufficient to bring the regime down but was sufficient to demonstrate the level of alienation of the population from the regime. It also indicated that the political parties were able to send their supporters to the street.

If the army voluntarily withdraws from power, it is essential to prevent the reemergence of a situation in which the military exercises the real power while the civilians have to bear the burden of day-to-day government. It is equally important, however, that the army not be emasculated but instead play its proper role in society. It will be impossible to deal with the mujahideen and the Taliban without the cooperation of the army, although it would probably be easier for a truly democratic government to mobilize the population against extremism. A representative government would have legitimacy that the military regime lacks.

The objective is therefore to reestablish the right balance of power between military and civilian actors according to the Pakistani constitution (including its revised version) in order to put the Pakistani state back on its feet, with an army serving the state rather than vice versa. This strategy is not without risks. The terrorist threat will remain. However, if the proposed policy is designed to address the root cause of the present regional situation, it need not sacrifice the short-term requirements of the war on terror and the problems in Afghanistan and Kashmir because it will expose any lack of cooperation by Pakistan's government on these two issues to the same sanctions as the absence of democracy.

The risk of the proposed strategy should not be assessed in the abstract nor even purely on its own merits; instead it must be weighed against the potential costs of maintaining the status quo. The proposed new strategy toward Pakistan will inevitably prove less costly—politically, financially, and in terms of human lives—than continuing the present trajectory.

Defining a New Strategy for U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan

Current U.S. relations with Pakistan are based almost entirely on security. Of approximately \$10 billion in assistance given to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, only \$900 million has gone to development while the bulk of the money has been channeled through the military for the military. Approximately \$1.81 billion went to security assistance, while \$5.64 billion went to coalition support funding; the remaining \$1.62 billion went to direct budget support.⁴⁹

The question is the extent to which this money has effectively increased U.S. and international security. Pakistan's cooperation has produced mixed results as U.S. and ISAF soldiers are still being killed in Afghanistan. If the number of Al Qaeda operatives arrested thanks to Islamabad is impressive, numbers are much less impressive for the Taliban. Very few Taliban leaders have been caught so far, and Pakistan has proved unwilling to move decisively against the Quetta Shura, the assembly of Taliban decision makers

living in Quetta. Neither has the government in Islamabad acted decisively against major warlords such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Pakistan's cooperation with the British government helped foil a terrorist attack in July 2006, but the Pakistani government has still balked at dismantling the terrorist infrastructure.

Security assistance money provided to Pakistan has been spent essentially on weapon systems aimed at combating India. Very little has been spent on meeting the actual requirements of the war on terror. In response, the United States, while providing substantial incentives, has sporadically pressured Pakistan to change, but this has not worked. What should be done?

Two things, immediately: First, if Islamabad is simply not doing enough in the war on terror, U.S. assistance should, at the very least, be conditioned on results. Second, if Pakistan's failure is due primarily to a lack of adequate equipment and training for the war on terror, U.S. financial support should be directed explicitly at these shortcomings.

Over the long term, aid and pressure should be directed at establishing a course toward real and functional democracy. This will mean the departure of all military personnel from positions of power and the establishment of the preeminence of civilians. This should immediately bring about a change of attitude toward the existing democratic forces within Pakistan.

But democratization cannot be the only objective. An end to Pakistan's support for terrorism and to the hostile India-Pakistan relationship cannot be assumed to be the direct and immediate consequence of Pakistan's democratization. A democratic, yet weak, government could engage in strong nationalistic rhetoric, leading to a further aggravation of the relationship with India and consequently with other neighbors such as Afghanistan and the Central Asian states.

The short-term objective of eliminating terrorism seems to be better served by an

army that possesses the means to take on the “bad guys.” This study demonstrates, however, that this position is untenable in the long run. Without democratization, the Pakistan Army will keep pursuing its disastrous regional policy while officially claiming to cooperate with the West on international terrorism. That could lead to the transformation of parts (not necessarily all) of Afghanistan into a sanctuary for international terrorists while movements such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (including under its new name, Jamaat-ud-Dawa) would continue to shelter and train international terrorists. What is immediately important is putting a halt to the constant double dealing of the army and inducing the beginning of the process of democratic consolidation while providing Pakistan with powerful assurances on some of its legitimate concerns.

All policies toward Pakistan have so far sacrificed long-term objectives—democratization, for example—to the immediate requirements of the war on terror. Understanding the connection between short- and long-term objectives offers a way out of this dilemma. If military chauvinism is understood to be the main cause, or at least a facilitating element, of all the other issues, then democratizing Pakistan will begin to address these other issues. Moreover, if one assumes, as does this report, that the flaws in Pakistan’s cooperation result from a deliberate policy, then it would make sense to condition cooperation and assistance on real change.

No strategy will be successful unless it aims at the right targets. If one concurs with the current study that the army is the main source of problems in Pakistan, the target should be the army as an institution. Although institutions have occasionally been affected by sanctions, none of the economic assets of the military has ever been targeted. If need be, sanctions should also be applied to the members of the civilian elite who work with the military to frustrate democratization. The general population should, as much as possible, be shielded from the effects of the withholding of assistance; thus, sanctions should clearly penalize only the leadership.

The U.S. government should also seek to develop a consensus among allies and friends and get them to agree on a Pakistan policy. Potential sanctions against Pakistan, especially against individuals in Pakistan, will make sense only if such sanctions are not undermined by other states. Allies’ participation would also be important in increasing the psychological impact of withholding cooperation.

Finally, the United States should make its objectives known to the Pakistani people. Pakistanis are deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions in the region and tend to be cynical about U.S. rhetoric on democratization. They are aware that the United States has always supported military regimes in Pakistan, and they fear that U.S. plans might conceal a brutal imperialism. It is therefore essential to let the people of Pakistan know that the United States is serious about democracy. That can be done by announcing in advance a series of verifiable criteria that the United States will employ and a series of consequences that will be imposed if the military does not comply.

Cease Attacks on Political Islam

The United States should cease its campaign against political Islam in Pakistan. The U.S. approach of opposing political Islam has proved counterproductive and has contributed to the U.S. reliance on the Pakistan Army.

The question remains: What should be done about the MMA, the coalition of six Islamic parties that in 2002 obtained 11.1 percent of the votes in the national elections and was able to form governments in two provinces, Balochistan and NWFP? It is counterproductive to continue making the MMA a target of U.S. policy.

Many described the MMA’s performance in the 2002 general and provincial elections as proof of an upsurge of fundamentalist Islam. However, a closer analysis of the results shows that the MMA, with just over 11 percent of the votes, came in far behind the PPP of exiled former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, which received 25 percent; behind the pro-Musharraf Pakistan

Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), which received almost 25 percent; and also slightly behind the PML-N of another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, which received a bit more than 11 percent of the votes. Therefore, although on the rise, the MMA was only a distant fourth.

Historically, the 2002 elections were an anomaly. Religious parties have usually gotten between 5 and 8 percent of the votes, with the notable exception of 1988, when they reached 12 percent. They lost ground again in the 2005 local elections, however, to the PML-Q in the NWFP and the Muttahida Qwami Movement (MQM) in Karachi. The only exception was in Balochistan, where the JUI/F enjoys a large voting base.

The point here is not to ignore popular support for the religious parties but to take notice of the fact that despite strong state manipulation and treachery in their favor,⁵⁰ this support remains limited.

The religious parties also have to contend with mainstream political parties that the military has been careful to preserve, albeit in weakened form. The left-leaning PPP is constrained in its ability to actually oppose the government, yet it still functions as the single most important political party in the country. Similarly, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam faction) may have become a puppet organization whose unique *raison d'être* is to generate support for Musharraf's policies. Yet, the PML-Q occupies a political space the Islamic parties cannot fill. Whatever their flaws, Pakistan's mainstream parties still carry the vast majority of the vote in Pakistan, and there is therefore no reason to believe that the democratization of Pakistan would lead to a situation comparable to the Hamas victory in Palestine.

Some may argue that, because Pakistani voters have backed mainstream political parties but have been disillusioned by them, Pakistanis may be tempted by an Islamist experiment. This is unlikely. Loss of faith in electoral politics is by no means new to Pakistan; it has been apparent since the beginning of the 1990s. In the past,

it always took the form of low turnout, with a historic 35.4 percent of voters participating in 1997. The MMA success in the NWFP was due not only to sensitivity to the fate of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, the absence of campaign issues and the exile of the mainstream political parties' leaders, but also to the military's manipulation of the electoral process.

It is therefore a mistake to make the MMA the target of U.S. policy. Targeting the MMA places U.S. policy under the thumb of the Pakistani military, which can always claim to be the strongest rampart against political Islam and can manipulate the political game accordingly. This was the intention behind the 2002 manipulations. The military government wanted a significant Islamist vote so that it could warn the U.S. government that too much pressure on Pakistan would cause the mullahs to come to power and make matters worse for U.S. interests.

Targeting the MMA is also a mistake because it allows both the religious parties and the military government to manipulate religious symbols in order to make the population believe that U.S. pressures are directed against Islam.

In a democratic system, the religious parties will still exist but will be no more than one component of the political scene, and probably not the most important one. Their electoral support may vary over time, as is the case with every political organization, but there is no reason to believe that religious parties will become the dominant force.

Reintegrate Sectarian and Jihadi Elements

Similarly, the links between religious parties and jihadi organizations should neither be ignored nor become the dominant concern when one considers whether the MMA is an acceptable political player. The military has used religious parties as a front between itself and the jihadi organizations in exchange for support and funding. But support from the military will automatically disappear once the military is no longer in power. Moreover, religious parties may prove useful as interlocutors with the jihadis

and also as the means by which to reintegrate them into society.

In the past, Islamic political parties have created the conditions for the reintegration of the militants. During the 1980s, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), which has always opposed sectarianism, sent a number of recruits to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet fighting. Between 1994 and 1996, when, following the emergence of the Taliban, the training camps in Afghanistan were initially closed, many of these recruits returned to Pakistan. The JI then mobilized its youth wing to form the Pasban and saved the majority of its “soldiers” from falling into the sectarian trap.

But would they accept this role? One should not forget that some of the parties composing the MMA, in particular the JI, have been constantly calling for greater democracy as they recognized it was the condition for their own political survival. Others, such as the JUI, are numerically more important but have been relatively comfortable with an authoritarian regime that guarantees them a role in the state machinery. Yet, deprived of their military support, Islamic parties would be less at ease in operating on their own. Some might ultimately be tempted to return to being revivalist movements that were, historically, strongly opposed to the politicization of their religious message.

What, then, could be done with the unemployed sectarian and jihadi elements who, left to themselves, could become easy prey for internationalist groups that could attack the Pakistani state itself? That’s where the Pakistani military could come in.

The Pakistani intelligence agencies could probably help eliminate the militants by generating rivalries between groups and within each group to make them fight and physically eliminate each other. The army and the police could also be asked to integrate a number of former militants as they have already done in Jammu and Kashmir.

Phase 1: Elections in 2007–2008

At the end of 2007, the current legislature will come to the end of its term. The national and provincial assemblies will have to be reelected. The president will have to be elected at approximately the same time. The legislature will have allowed General Musharraf to claim that he has restored true democracy in Pakistan although this democratic façade will have been made possible at the cost of Parliament’s growing irrelevance and the erosion of political parties. Pakistani people have few or no illusions about the system, but for the outside world, the upcoming elections could contribute to legitimizing, and therefore reinforcing, the army’s hold on power. However, the 2007–2008 elections will offer an opportunity to redress the course of Pakistani politics.

Musharraf argues that his mandate will end in November 2007 and that he will eventually have to be reelected by the National Assembly, the Senate, and the four provincial assemblies. His only real constituency, however, is the army. His reelection—and his ability to rig the elections—will depend on whether he remains chief of army staff.

Several scenarios are still theoretically possible, but the 2005 local elections laid the groundwork for Musharraf supporters to dominate the upcoming parliamentary elections at the end of 2007. At the same time, the larger the coalition, the less the need for rigging the election because the outcome will then matter only marginally. Musharraf’s electoral defeat is in any case almost unthinkable.

The signals the United States will send to Pakistan’s military rulers as well as to mainstream political parties will be decisive for both the preelection situation and the election outcome. All actors are looking to Washington to identify the limits of acceptable behavior and will likely respect the wishes of a country whose influence in Pakistan remains great. The EU can help in this regard too.

The U.S. administration should present its new policy to the Pakistani leadership as a

nonnegotiable package. The United States would demand that

- General Musharraf cease violating the Pakistani constitution by holding both the positions of president and chief of army staff;
- Free and fair elections, monitored by international observers, be held;
- All Pakistani infiltration into Afghanistan and Kashmir be ended; this could be verified by NATO along the eastern and southern Pakistan-Afghan border and by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in Kashmir; and
- Terrorist infrastructure be disbanded immediately.

To avoid any change of U.S. priorities and to prevent the Pakistani military from using the war on terror to consolidate its power, it is essential that these priorities be presented as a nonnegotiable package. No item would be any more important than any other. The violation of any element of the package, no matter which, would have to be perceived as inimical to the United States. That would immediately bring on targeted withdrawal of assistance and a decrease in international cooperation such as provision of visas.

Phase 2: Sanctions and Incentives

Two scenarios could emerge if withdrawal of cooperation were threatened: Musharraf could resign his position as chief of army staff and contest the elections. His reelection (although unlikely) would now conform to a truly democratic process and would be acceptable. In addition, he could accept the other part of the nonnegotiable package. Alternatively, the army, under Musharraf's leadership, could refuse to hand over power to civilians and then it would face the prospect of withdrawn assistance and cooperation on which it depends.

Sanctions

If sanctions are applied, they would initially target the military, both individual officers and the military as an institution:

- Denying visas to all military officers from the rank of colonel up, along with their families. Ironically, such a measure has occasionally already been applied to religious leaders considered too close to terrorist movements but never to their military sponsors. The larger the number of countries involved, the more efficient the sanction is likely to be. The participation of some countries, such as Turkey, would be of crucial symbolic importance. One may argue that visa restrictions have so far failed to produce any meaningful result in Burma. Pakistan's military is different from Burma's: The Pakistani military is much more outwardly oriented and desirous of international approval and of an international role than its Burmese counterpart.
- Imposing an embargo on all arms sales. Historically, the Pakistani military was always more affected by embargoes on arms sales than by the suppression of development aid. A new embargo would operate at two levels:
 - Psychological signals. Arms sales have always been understood to signify tacit political approval of the military's policies. A new embargo, coming after a period of intense efforts to reestablish military cooperation and to show the regime in a more positive light, would create a psychological shock;
 - Force modernization. The military is still suffering from previous embargoes in some sectors such as combat aircraft. It would immediately feel the heat if deliveries of new aircraft and parts were terminated.⁵¹ In fact, all Pakistani equipment is aging and needs to be replaced and modernized; this at a time when India is modernizing its armed forces. Such sanctions would not

affect Pakistani capabilities to combat terrorism should Pakistan decide at a later stage to cooperate.

- Banning all transactions, commercial and otherwise, with military-controlled economic interests and institutions. This proposal stands at the crossroads between individual and institutional sanctions. It is not without precedent. On March 24, 2003, Washington imposed a two-year sanction against A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) as a penalty for Pakistan's clandestine relationship with North Korea for missile supply.⁵² The measure was purely symbolic as KRL did not have any exchanges with entities in the United States, but the Pakistani government still strongly protested it.

A ban on all transactions with the famous military-controlled "foundations" would have a much more direct impact. Four foundations—the Army Welfare Trust, the Bahria Foundation, the Fauji Foundation, and the Shaheen Foundation—currently control businesses as diverse as banking, insurance, real estate, cement, pharmaceuticals, shoes, commercial complexes, shipping, bread manufacturing, boat building, engineering work, fertilizers, power generation, breakfast cereals, sugar mills, natural gas, air cargo, TV broadcasting, and knitwear. Some of these companies are exclusively domestic, but some are also active internationally and would be affected by the proposed ban.

Of particular significance would be a ban on all arms production companies. Pakistan has a weapons industry and intends to become an arms exporter. Taking measures to prevent this from happening would amount to significant pressure.

Similarly, students from military-controlled universities (including universities controlled by foundations belonging to the military) would be banned from any exchange program with any university abroad. Nine Pakistani universities are currently under military leadership. Banning their students from exchange programs could significantly affect the current effort of the

Pakistani government to revitalize the country's higher education system.

Sanctions could then be extended to the civilian politicians cooperating with the military. They could later be extended selectively to the private sector, starting with the industries either controlled by retired military officers or those close to them, so as to gradually increase the pressure on the army to relinquish power.

Sanctions should remain limited to Pakistan's small elite. In no case should development aid be diminished or the population affected. The public will accept sanctions only if, by targeting the real "culprits," they show that the United States is serious about democratization.

Sanctions should be applied collectively by the largest possible coalition. The withholding of cooperation and assistance will be efficient only if it makes the military leadership recognize its own isolation. Sanctions will therefore have to be applied by a very large number of countries including, of course, the United States and Europe but also Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, the Gulf Emirates, and, if possible, Saudi Arabia. Convincing China to participate in a sanctions regime aimed at restoring democracy seems rather doubtful even though, given Pakistan's constitution, it would not amount to regime change. Sanctions on Pakistan would require the development of a large diplomatic consensus that, although difficult, would be possible as an increasing number of countries suffer from Islamic terrorism that is supported or tolerated by Pakistan.

One may argue that such noncooperation would destroy the existing cooperation with the Pakistani military. This would pose difficulties in gaining the agreement of Europeans and other allies insofar as many of them believe that no matter how unsatisfactory the cooperation with the Pakistani military, it is still better than no cooperation at all.

The United States, for its part, should insist it is changing its relationship with Pakistan but explain that it is acting on what have been U.S. objectives for decades—objectives that have

been formally accepted by the Pakistani state. Thus, sanctions do not represent a sudden change of terms by the United States. In fact, the terms of this cooperation have always been the same but were never enforced because of the competing priorities of the United States and Pakistan. What is required now is real conditionality of cooperation.

Both the military and civilians should be held collectively accountable. The threat of sanctions should not stop if the military regime is no longer in power. In the 1990s, after all, the army officially withdrew from power but retained its control of the government.

Two scenarios in particular should be avoided at all costs:

- Arbitration by the military of civilian political conflicts, which has happened on many occasions in the past; and
- Insubordination by the military to civilian orders regarding military or paramilitary matters (such as terrorism), which would leave the civilian government without a military force with which to contend with rebellious Taliban or sectarian groups.

In both scenarios the preeminence of civilian democratic power over the military would be undermined or violated; thus the scenarios would endanger Pakistan's nascent democracy. To avoid such outcomes, the threat of sanctions could possibly be extended to the entirety of the political establishment and the military. Both would be made collectively accountable for any violation of the package of objectives. Such a threat would inevitably generate mutual pressures and force civilians and the military to work together to regain needed international cooperation yet still maintain a separation between civilians and the military.

Incentives

Leadership by civilians will be more acceptable to the military if soldiers and officers do not feel threatened by the democratization process. More precisely, the military is likely to accept its

eviction from power more gracefully if individual and personal advantages are preserved, the military's role redefined but institutionalized, and the military's legitimate security concerns addressed.

The military is more likely to resist any democratic change if officers' and soldiers' salaries and other material advantages are reduced. If military personnel refuse to cooperate, they should be penalized; but if they do cooperate, they should be guaranteed their pensions, salaries, and other perquisites and benefits.

This may be difficult to sell politically as the military is already seen as being both corrupt and unfairly privileged. Indeed, the military's benefits have increased greatly under Musharraf's leadership. Officers were traditionally allotted a once-in-a-lifetime plot of land when they retired, which they usually bought at a nominal price and sold at the market price. Since Musharraf has been in power, land parcels have been given at each promotion. Military personnel may similarly get loans at preferential rates that are sometimes written off. Yet the military is so entrenched in the country's public life that it would be imprudent to antagonize it beyond what is necessary for the reestablishment of democracy.

This will not in itself ensure that the military voluntarily withdraws from power but it should be sufficient to ease the process and prevent the emergence of an Iraq-like situation, where a disbanded army, having nothing more to lose, has joined the rebellion against the U.S. occupation.

The military would also require that its importance in the life of the country be preserved. The National Security Council (NSC), created in 2004 by an ordinary law, already institutionalizes the role of the military. Currently, however, the NSC does not meet on a regular basis. When it does meet, the military predominates. The role and constitution of the NSC could easily be amended by a simple majority vote to make it a truly consultative and representative body in which the military maintains its representation but is not necessarily the dominant force.

This change would undoubtedly be a concession to the military, which would see its role institutionalized, but during the period following the military's withdrawal from power, it would be foolish to antagonize the army when the balance of power vis-à-vis the civilian political forces would still be in its favor. Preserving the NSC would give the military a role (although no longer a dominant one) while it would allow civilians to use parliamentary means to change the role and composition of the institution in their favor as they assume more effective control of the state. The evolution of post-Pinochet Chile provides good examples of what can be done and of the risks involved.

Some of the strategic challenges the new government will have to assume will be of a military nature. Thus, there will be a need to associate the military with the decision-making process while making sure civilians remain predominant. The National Security Council in the United States includes in the same institution both civilian and military personnel without affecting the democratic character of the whole system. The presence of both the military and civilians within the Pakistani NSC would endorse the idea of collective responsibility. It is essential, given the reality of Pakistani political culture and practices, that neither the military nor the civilians be able to blame the other side for any wrongdoing.

Grand Geopolitical Bargains?

Grand geopolitical bargains are often cited as potentially important tools to convince Pakistan to adopt more acceptable behavior on the international scene. The rationale is that these grand bargains can address Pakistan's deep sense of insecurity by providing the strong protector the country has historically always sought.

Pakistan has intervened in Afghanistan to force the Karzai government to sign an agreement on the border question. It also tries to convey to the international community that no settlement of the Afghan problem can be obtained without accounting for Islamabad's interests. It also desperately tries to secure U.S. and international support.

Too weak to confront India directly, Pakistan needs to avoid isolation and maintain international engagement at all cost. In particular, Pakistan constantly seeks U.S. protection, which it has never been able to formalize through a bilateral treaty. This protection can be granted only on a case-by-case basis, depending on the particular circumstances. The military feels Pakistan must preserve its status as a frontline state for as long as possible to qualify for this kind of protection.

Pakistan's activism therefore sends two different messages: It tells the international community, and the United States in particular, that Pakistan is still a player in Afghanistan and regionally despite the obvious preference for India expressed by the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal.⁵³ It also tells the United States that Pakistan needs the United States to guarantee that no regional power, in particular India, will acquire a dominant influence in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan's perceived national interests.

At the same time Pakistan is preparing for a post-U.S. Afghanistan. Despite assertions to the contrary during the recent NATO summit in Riga, Pakistani officials, who speak of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan as "occupation forces," remain convinced that history will repeat itself and that the United States will sooner or later leave the region. Once the Americans leave, NATO's determination will fade and Afghanistan will be left to itself. In this case, the Afghan government may unravel. Pakistan would be faced with a political vacuum that it believes it will have to fill in order to prevent any other regional power from acquiring a predominant influence.

By cooperating fitfully with the United States and other Western powers in the war on terror, Islamabad is not simply trying to protect itself from Washington's wrath but is also trying to avoid being totally marginalized on the international scene. Leaving Pakistan to itself, as the United States did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, could therefore be a mistake for the United States but would be even more damaging for Pakistan as no other power, including China, is willing to replace the United States as Pakistan's main protector. This means that Washington's margin for maneuver is greater than is usually thought. The United States has something to exchange with Pakistan for its good behavior.

Addressing Pakistan's insecurities can and should be part of any effort aimed at bringing Pakistan back to a more acceptable mode of action through democratization. As discussed below, minimizing the risk of another India-Pakistan war, stabilizing relations with Afghanistan, and more generally helping Pakistan manage its problems of external security would be essential incentives for the return and consolidation of democracy in Pakistan and the end of Pakistan's interference in Afghanistan and Kashmir. That's the grand bargain that the United States can offer.

Geostrategic Incentives

Any geopolitical bargain with Pakistan will face structural problems. According to Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Kashmir “the fundamental problem arises over goals and motivations . . . Pakistan seeks negotiations with India principally to alter the status quo in Kashmir, whereas India accepts negotiations with Pakistan primarily to ratify it.”⁵⁴ To get Pakistan to temper its ambitions in Kashmir, the United States with its allies could not only act as a guarantor to the agreement but also obtain from India a real improvement in the human rights situation in Kashmir.

For Pakistan, Afghanistan is part of the same security complex. If Pakistan takes the step called for above, the United States must exert pressure on Afghanistan to recognize the current border in exchange for the end of all Pakistani interference in the country. A permanent U.S. presence in Afghanistan could guarantee for Pakistan that India will not exert a dominant influence in Afghanistan as well as reassure Afghanistan about Pakistan’s potential interference.

Washington could also “normalize” its military relations with Pakistan to appease Pakistan’s concerns by:

- Providing Islamabad with missile defense;⁵⁵ and
- Enlarging, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the scope of arms deliveries to the Pakistan Army, although on a commercial basis.

Should such a change occur, the recent India-U.S. rapprochement would no longer be perceived by Islamabad as an additional threat but as an additional guarantee. If Pakistan is firmly on a course of democratization, relations between Washington and Islamabad could be formalized by a treaty addressing Pakistan’s security concerns.

Policy of Conditionality

Withholding cooperation or simply threatening to do so requires an understanding of the legal background for sanctions, how past sanctions have fared, the cost of the proposed strategy, and its potential consequences, including the reaction of the Pakistani leadership.

Legal Background

Sanctions would require legal justifications that already exist but that are not yet applied to Pakistan. Pakistan is most vulnerable in all matters related to terrorism. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), and 1566 (2004) provide the legal tools to withhold cooperation from Pakistan, which violates almost all of these resolutions.

Article 1 of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, for example, states that all states shall:

- (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
- (b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly and indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorists acts;
- (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit . . . terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
- (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from

making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons.⁵⁶

obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;

(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery, or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.⁵⁷

Article 2 decrees that all states shall:

(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;

(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other states by exchange of information;

(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;

(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens;

(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;

(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in

A clause-by-clause examination of Pakistan's compliance with the resolution shows that Pakistan is in violation of each and every one of these provisions. The legal basis for sanctions exists and can be used whenever necessary. Other UN resolutions on terrorism apply to Pakistan as well. Not only does Pakistan continue to shelter, train, and fund terrorist groups, but it has cooperated only partially and reluctantly against terrorism. The same legal arsenal applies too for the sort of actions conducted in Kashmir and in Afghanistan and also for what can be labeled international terrorism.

Similarly, the United States could apply any of a series of federal laws related to countries supporting terrorism:

- United States Code, Title 22, Section 2371, prohibits foreign assistance;
- United States Code, Title 22, Section 2780, prohibits sale, transfer, lease, loan, grant, credit, and foreign assistance associated with munitions items to terrorist states;
- United States Code, Title 22, Section 2781, prohibits sale or license for export of defense services to a country determined by the president, in a fiscal year, not to be cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts;
- United States Code, Title 12, Section 635(b)(1)(B), denies Export-Import Bank support where the president determines it to be contrary to U.S. national interests related to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protections, and human rights.

Legal tools need not be limited to antiterrorist legislation. The Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) on December 10, 1948, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966, constitute solid foundations for international action against Pakistan should the need arise. U.S. legislation itself contains a solid array of texts aimed at implementing democracy and human rights.

The objective here is not to establish an exhaustive list of all instruments, but to demonstrate the existence of international legal levers covering all aspects of Pakistan's misbehavior that could be used against Islamabad should the United States and the international community decide to change their policy toward Pakistan. Such a change is therefore a matter of political will and is not impeded by any lack of legal justification.

Past Sanctions Against Pakistan

Although Pakistan is one of the developing countries most dependent on foreign aid, the history of past sanctions is not very conclusive. A total of \$73.14 billion (bilateral and multilateral aid, at constant 2001 prices) was disbursed to Pakistan from 1960 to 2002.⁵⁸ Despite the fact that between 1990 and 1998 U.S. aid was almost negligible, aid from the United States accounted for almost half of the total bilateral aid received by Pakistan during these 42 years. Neither the assistance offered by the United States and the rest of the international community nor the sanctions have dramatically altered Pakistan's international behavior.

U.S. aid and arms sales to Pakistan were prohibited in October 1990 because, after years of contortions by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, the U.S. president could no longer certify to Congress, as required by the Pressler Amendment, Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device.⁵⁹ The aid under economic and military aid programs approved for 1991 was frozen, amounting to \$564 million out of which nearly \$300 million was for arms and military supplies.⁶⁰ After that, U.S. aid disbursement to Pakistan, which had

been as high as \$452 million in 1989, fell during the 1990s to reach a historic low in 1998 of only \$5.4 million.

In 1995, however, the Brown Amendment repealed the clauses of the Pressler Amendment referring to development assistance. It narrowed the scope of the aid cutoff to military assistance and transfers but allowed cooperation for counterterrorism and antinarcotics activities, activities promoting airport safety and security, and international peacekeeping operations. It also specifically allowed military-to-military contacts, including international military education and training.⁶¹ Moreover, if the Brown Amendment specifically barred the delivery of 28 F-16 aircraft (partially paid for by Pakistan), it did allow the one-time release of \$368 million worth of other military equipment ordered by Pakistan before October 1990.⁶²

As a result, new aid commitments were made. For bureaucratic reasons, the first noticeable disbursements were made right after Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998. Moreover, almost immediately after the 1998 reimposition of sanctions on Pakistan, Congress intervened on behalf of U.S. wheat growers by passing the Agriculture Export Relief Act, which exempted various forms of U.S. Department of Agriculture-backed financial support from sanctions.⁶³ In effect the Agriculture Relief Act had two consequences: It allowed U.S. wheat farmers to sell wheat to Pakistan and, more important, it immediately weakened the sanctions against Pakistan.

The same year, the U.S. Congress passed the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, which authorized the president to waive, for a period of one year, the application of sanctions relating to U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. government nonmilitary transactions, U.S. opposition to loans or assistance by international financial institutions, and U.S. commercial bank transactions.⁶⁴

The sanctions were further weakened in 1999 when Congress gave the president authority to waive "all the economic sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan in response to

the nuclear test, including for the first time those sanctions related to military assistance, USML licenses, and exports to high technology entities.”⁶⁵ For Pakistan, President Bill Clinton waived only the restrictions on U.S. Department of Agriculture credits and U.S. commercial bank loans and transactions.

From 1999 to 2001, however, because of President Musharraf’s coup d’état, Pakistan continued to be ineligible for most forms of U.S. foreign assistance under a provision of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act that bans foreign assistance “to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.”⁶⁶ But Congress enacted an exception to the prohibition on aid in Pakistan for 2001.

As a result of the U-turn in Pakistan’s foreign policy following September 11, 2001, almost all sanctions were lifted. Under terms of the Foreign Assistance Act of September 2000 and under terms of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in March 2001, Pakistan had been found in arrears of servicing its debt to the United States and was therefore supposed to be denied foreign assistance.⁶⁷ Following the events of September 2001, however, all restrictions were dropped. On September 24, 2001, \$379 million of Pakistan’s debt to the United States was rescheduled; on September 28, President Bush provided \$50 million in an economic support fund.

As a matter of fact, disbursements kept increasing during the entire period. According to Mumtaz Anwar and Katharina Michaelova, they “went up to \$77.8 million in 1999, and, further, to \$101.4 million in 2000. One year later, the aid volume increased to 7 times as much and reached \$776.5 million . . . While disbursements fell to U.S.\$208 million once again in 2002, the U.S. President announced another \$3 billion five-year economic assistance package for Pakistan in June 2003.”⁶⁸

Although directed exclusively at Pakistan’s nuclear policy, the sanctions of the 1990s failed to have any impact. Islamabad always expressed its desire to continue what was still

seen at the end of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union as a positive relationship, but it refused to do anything that would have allowed a presidential certification. Any concession by Pakistan was to be based on a similar treatment of India. Pakistan went as far as voting for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty but reserved judgment about signing it, maintaining that it would not sign unless India did.

Sanctions can be effective in two ways: Directly they put sufficient pressure on a regime to convince it to behave differently, or indirectly they provoke domestic political pressure on political leaders. U.S. sanctions against Pakistan, however, did not work in either way. Several factors can explain this failure.

Suppression of U.S. aid affected Pakistan only between 1990 and 1996. During the same period, the United States was replaced by Japan as the main source of aid to Pakistan, thus diffusing the impact of the U.S. aid cutoff. Retrospectively, one can seriously wonder whether sanctions had any impact at all. Richard Cronin could write in 1996 that “the rapid growth of Japanese aid has been more noticeable than any effort to diffuse aid as a lever to promote nonproliferation.”⁶⁹ After 1995, U.S. aid resumed progressively. Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear test did not affect the aid policy.

Sanctions did not affect the army significantly enough. The sanctions did cut off new procurement programs, but existing capabilities were left untouched. Also, sanctions came only after a period of intense and generous deliveries owing to Pakistan’s participation in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s. Even though the sanctions probably made the Pakistan Army uneasy because India benefited at the same time from even more important arms deliveries from the Soviet Union, they were a problem that the Pakistan military could live with.

The military saw the strategic benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons as exceeding the loss generated by sanctions. Although much less advanced technologically, Chinese arms partly compensated for the decrease in Western supplies. Beijing had been forthcoming in

providing hardware to Pakistan since the 1960s and became even more so in the 1990s as it provided missile and nuclear technology.⁷⁰

Overall, the impact of the sanctions was more psychological than real. Coming after years of bilateral cooperation in the Afghan conflict, U.S. sanctions were perceived as a betrayal and a sign of contempt. The United States had used Pakistan when it needed to but could now dispense with it. Sanctions convinced Pakistanis that they could count only on themselves. They increased the country's feeling of insecurity and its determination to pursue its nuclear program at any cost. The 1990s were the years of the unprecedented expansion of A. Q. Khan's proliferation network.

Sanctions on Pakistan have also been inhibited by a lack of consistency in policy. U.S. governments have always been concerned about nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and democracy (and more recently narcotics), but their relative importance has varied over time. The Pakistani leadership has always been aware of shifting U.S. priorities and has played them to its advantage.

Pakistan became a pariah state after the overthrow and execution of the elected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the hierarchy of U.S. priorities and brought Pakistan back into favor. Supporting the mujahideen and, consequently, Zia ul-Haq's military regime, became the number one concern to which all other objectives were subordinated, including the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Democracy has never, in practice, figured very highly in U.S. priorities. In Pakistan it has been merely important. The United States has always supported military regimes.

The United States has always lacked a coherent strategy toward Pakistan. Beyond a series of stated general objectives, it has pursued a series of ad hoc policies dictated by circumstances. For a long time, the Cold War obscured this. But when this geostrategic framework disappeared, what remained was an absence of real U.S. concern for Pakistan. U.S. policies appeared to

be incoherent, contradictory, and unfair, which allowed the Pakistani leadership to manipulate public opinion against the United States while it manipulated the United States through agitation of the masses. U.S. policy proved ultimately counterproductive.

Potential Pakistani Reactions to Sanctions

How Pakistani authorities react to any given policy is of course a central consideration. Two scenarios—the traditional scenario in which cooperation and assistance are withdrawn to punish separately the absence of desired results for a series of independent objectives, and a changed scenario in which the objectives are identical but are all linked—have to be considered here (irrespective of the incentives that may also be offered for good behavior).

In the first scenario, which has been the pattern of past sanctions on Pakistan, any priority given to any particular objective will open up a possibility of retaliation in another sector. Pushing the military out of power through punitive measures could lead them, for example, to refuse to cooperate in the war on terror and the fight against the Taliban. Applying sanctions as a response to a deliberate anti-U.S. policy on the Afghan border could, for example, loosen Pakistan's cooperation against international terrorism. The lack of linkage among objectives can therefore lead to ignoring the root causes of the various problems analyzed in this report and open the way to explicit or implicit blackmail by the Pakistani leadership.

Linking the issues does not totally eliminate the problem. Linking, in particular, does not diminish the risk of Pakistan's reducing its cooperation on international terrorism. But this possibility would become much more risky for the Pakistani leadership if it were to face additional and automatic sanctions.

Alternative Allies for Pakistan

The possibility remains that Pakistan might decide to end all relations with the United States. Islamabad would then lose a substantial amount of assistance and would risk being left

to its own devices in a conflict with India. The question then is whether Pakistan has any real alternative to U.S. assistance.

China appears to be the most serious contender for the position of ally with Pakistan. It is not clear, however, whether China would be a real substitute for the U.S. partnership and would be able or even willing to meet Pakistan's security needs.

Moreover, it is not clear that China would like to eliminate U.S. influence over Pakistan. China seems to share Washington's view that the Pakistani regime is the best available option. China would probably oppose any forced democratization of Pakistan, but it shares with the United States a number of concerns about Islamic terrorism and instability in Afghanistan. Beijing's support cannot be taken for granted by Islamabad.

No other state is likely to come forward to replace the United States. Some Persian Gulf countries may be in a position to help, but none is capable of providing Pakistan with the sort of security assistance that the United States can.

Pakistan might be tempted by isolation. Even in such a case, sanctions would continue to apply. The Pakistani leadership would have to choose between compliance and marginalization—for themselves and for their families.

Status Quo a Costly Alternative

The potential cost of any alternative policy must be weighed against the risk of perpetuating the status quo. This risk is already very high but is only likely to increase. It requires no particular imagination to envisage the kind of scenario the international community could face if the present situation should continue. In August 2006, a plot to blow up aircraft flying from Great Britain to the United States was foiled by the British police. Liquid explosives were to be hidden in carry-on luggage, and six to ten planes were targeted. The police soon announced that twenty-four people, most of them Pakistanis, had been arrested and that the mastermind of the operation was still at large in Pakistan.

Fortunately this plot was uncovered a few days before it was to have been carried out.

The August 2006 incident demonstrated that the existence of a terrorist threat linked to Pakistan was no fiction. The problem was not the nationality of the plotters but the fact that Pakistan still offered the operational facilities necessary to prepare such acts of terrorism, although Pervez Musharraf had officially promised in 2002 to dismantle all terrorist infrastructure, a commitment he has constantly reiterated since then but has never respected.

Let us examine for a moment the consequences of a successful attack—the consequences of the attack itself and of the response to the attack. The first consequence would obviously be the death of hundreds, possibly thousands, of people, most from the United States and the United Kingdom but also from other countries whose citizens would be aboard the planes. This would threaten the social cohesion of those countries. The United Kingdom, for example, not only has an important Muslim population but counts a great number of Pakistanis among them. The point here is not to single out these Muslim populations as potential vectors of terrorism but to point out the risk of their becoming victims of a society polarized along religious lines. That would play into the terrorist plan and could create a dynamic that would be even more difficult to stop in the future.

More relevant for the present chapter is the question of what could or should be done the day after the attack and the potential cost of any policy. Two extreme but opposite scenarios can be envisaged, both extremely costly:

More of the same.

Even in the circumstances described above, it is possible to imagine the continuation of the status quo. Governments would tell their populations that these tragic events demonstrate the need to work more closely with the Pakistani authorities, whose cooperation is vital for eventual success in the war on terror. Additional incentives would even be offered to convince the Pakistanis of U.S. and British

goodwill. The Pakistani authorities would initially respond by strongly condemning the attacks: They would make some arrests, potentially including an Al Qaeda leader of some importance, to demonstrate their solidarity, and they would demand additional equipment.

The risk of repeating the same catastrophic event would not be reduced. Instead, the message sent by this response would be that there are no longer any red lines, no consequences to Pakistan's double game. This would generate a loss of credibility about the international resolve to fight terrorism. Pakistani authorities would be encouraged to blackmail their U.S. counterparts. In other words, the continuation of the status quo would not result in increased security but, on the contrary, would increase the risk of terrorist attacks while the costs generated by the attacks would also continue to increase as time passed.

Changed response.

The people of the victims' countries would not be satisfied, however, with the continuation of the status quo. After years of hearing about Pakistan's cooperation in the war on terror, these populations would probably grow restive, and their governments would most likely be faced with mounting political pressure to act decisively against Pakistan.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that a response to a successful terrorist attack on U.S. or European soil would have to be radically different from the status quo policy described above. A new policy would entail forcing the Pakistani leadership to cooperate through a threat of or by the imposition of sanctions. It could even consist of conducting military operations within Pakistan aimed at regime change.

This last option is of course unlikely at present, and the possibility of coercing the Pakistanis is one reason that U.S. policy makers might blanch at the approach recommended here. The Pakistani military could react to coercive methods by refusing to cooperate or by actively resisting, and the U.S. political leadership

would be trapped between the same constraints that always have prevented it from acting: fear that no Pakistani cooperation will prove worse than flawed cooperation.

In all scenarios, the potential for the Pakistani military's redefining its constitutional role diminishes and the possibility for cooperation decreases. Such a situation would force the United States or the United Kingdom to assume an ever-increasing share of the burden of actions directly around Pakistan or against targets within it.

Whether countries respond with more of the same or change their responses, the risk of terrorist attack remains unchanged or even increases dramatically the political, financial, and human cost. Therefore, it makes sense to propose a strategy that, in its initial phase, does not entirely eliminate the terrorist risk but does put the international community rather than Pakistan in command of the situation and suppresses the root cause of many insecurities on the Indian subcontinent.

Refusing to make cooperation with Pakistan conditional leads to immobility and impotence. If the only measures capable of obtaining cooperation are positive incentives, then countries are condemned to provide them indefinitely insofar as withdrawing them can then be perceived as inimical and could generate a refusal to cooperate. Being limited to positive incentives is therefore the end of all policy and could create infinite possibilities for blackmail.

A Matter of Political Will

Many analysts concur that Pakistan's situation is not sustainable. Islamabad will not be able to play double games eternally without creating at some point a major problem for itself, the region, and the world.

Even if it is accepted that Pakistan plays an indispensable role in the war on terror, it can be seen that policies toward Islamabad have consisted of a mix of bribery in the form of financial, military, and technical assistance and pressure at the margin. Islamabad's preference that its local activities be kept separate from its effect on global security has been accepted by most countries.

The distinction Islamabad makes between its regional interests and its participation in the war against terror is valid only at a theoretical level. Five years of pressure on regional movements have pushed them closer together and strengthened Islamist solidarities.

Western powers involved in the region, particularly in Afghanistan, will not eternally shut their eyes to Pakistan's sabotage of their security interests. By helping to prevent the reconstruction of Afghanistan, current Pakistani policies are fundamentally at odds with U.S. and international policies in the region. Moreover, public opinion is increasingly wary about soldiers being killed in Afghanistan.

At the same time, Pakistani cooperation on matters related to international terrorism purchased by Western silence on Pakistan's regional policy may not be sufficient to prevent attacks on European and eventually U.S. soil, as demonstrated by the July 2005 bombings in London. The current relationship introduces an element of blackmail in Pakistan's relations with its Western interlocutors.

The West's bargain with Pakistan will cease to be cost-effective if any major incident occurs.

Unless Western governments decide to exit from the region, with all the negative consequences that such a decision would entail for them and for the region, these governments will be forced, under pressure from public opinion, to reconsider their policies toward Pakistan. The search for solutions will oscillate between maintaining the status quo and seeking a military solution, with all the risks that could involve.

This report proposes a middle way. It addresses some of the challenges that the Pakistani military regime's regional policies create for the international community, arguing that none can be resolved in isolation from the others. Arguing that the nature of the regime is the main source of trouble for the region, it urges a return to a civilian government according to Pakistan's own constitution.

The proposed policy is not without risk. Pakistan has since 2001 set up a trap that will be difficult to get out of without boosting, either in Afghanistan or in Pakistan, the fortunes of international terrorism. Moreover, there are strong institutional links between the U.S. government and Pakistan—U.S. intelligence agencies cooperate with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and are not ready to cease this cooperation, and the U.S. Department of Defense works with Pakistan's Ministry of Defense. These links constitute an additional reason to not pursue more proactive policies. The cost of preserving the status quo, however, could prove much more costly in terms of both money and human lives—Western and Pakistani—than trying to impel the Pakistani leadership into implementing effectively the objectives it has formally accepted. It is ultimately a matter of political will.

Finally, the proposed policy will favor the long-term emergence of a formal democracy. Neither sanctions nor the eventual compliance of the

Pakistani establishment with Western demands will by themselves create a stable and sustainable social democracy. Creating the political and societal conditions for such an ambitious goal is a long-term endeavor.

The proposed measures should be seen only as a first step, but a necessary one. What they will achieve is the creation of political space. This political space will have to be enlarged by civilian leadership. Long-term measures to transform the system in a sustainable manner will then have to be adopted. In the meantime even antiterrorism policies would benefit from the legitimacy of a freely elected government.

Notes

- 1 *New York Times*, February 26, 2007.
- 2 Teresita C. Schaffer, *Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, March 2004), 28.
- 3 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Education in Pakistan, http://www.uis.unesco.org/profiles/EN/EDU/countryProfile_en.aspx?code=5860
- 4 Azmat Abbas, "Warming Up," *Herald*, May 2006, 30–31.
- 5 A. H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, *The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan* (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2004).
- 6 Lashkar-e-Toiba was responsible for the bombings in Delhi that took place a few days after the October 8, 2005, earthquake that devastated Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and part of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.
- 7 Lashkar-e-Toiba admitted important damages as well as the loss of at least 70 cadres. B. Raman, "Quake Impact on Jihadi Terrorism," paper no. 1573, South Asia Analysis Group, October 12, 2005, www.saag.org/papers16/paper1573.html.
- 8 Banned in January 2002, Lashkar-e-Toiba renamed itself Jamaat-ud-Dawa but continued to operate under its previous name in Kashmir.
- 9 "Pakistan Makes Kashmir Offer," Aljazeera.net, December 5, 2006, <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/94D4429B-2D59-4CE9-80A5-47D7C0355E09.htm>.
- 10 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story* (London: L. Cooper, 1992).
- 11 Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani (Ret.), "Whither Strategic Depth?" *Nation/Post*, May 27, 2006.
- 12 Robert Kaplan, "The Taliban's Silent Partner," *New York Times*, July 20, 2006. The International Crisis Group provided the same information, quoting NATO sources, in its recent report, "Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes," Asia report no. 123, November 2006, www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/123_countering_afghanistans_insurgency.pdf.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 *Frontier Post*, May 20, 2006.
- 15 *Post*, May 20, 2006.
- 16 *Daily Mail*, May 7, 2006.
- 17 This dilemma was reflected in recent NATO discussions regarding the opportunity to issue a diplomatic ultimatum to Pakistan demanding that it end its support to the Taliban and arrest leaders living in Pakistan. According to Ahmed Rashid, senior diplomats from four NATO countries whose troops are fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan urged their governments collectively to issue a *démarche* to Pakistan's military government. However, the *démarche* was cancelled owing to divergences among NATO countries, with Britain citing cooperation in intelligence in uncovering plots to attack planes departing from British airports. Ahmed Rashid, "NATO Backs Down Over Pakistan Ultimatum," *Telegraph.co.uk*, September 16, 2006, <http://telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/09/16/wafg116.xml>.
- 18 "Pakistan Arrests Scores of Taliban in Crackdown," Reuters, July 18, 2006.
- 19 "Our Global Struggle," Sky News, November 19, 2006, <http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30200-13552807,00.html?f=rss>.
- 20 "Over 40 Taliban Suspects Held in Pakistan," DNAIndia.com, November 22, 2006, www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1065498.
- 21 Griff Witte and Kamran Khan, "Arrest in Pakistan Spurs Hope of Stronger Effort," *Washington Post*, March 3, 2007, Sec. A.

- 22 Rahimullah Yousoufzai, "No End in Sight," *Newsline*, April 2006, 27.
- 23 Zahid Hussain, "Terror in Miranshah," *Newsline*, April 2006, 23.
- 24 Intikhab Amir, "Waziristan: No Man's Land?" *Herald*, April 2006, 77.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Kaplan, "The Taliban's Silent Partner."
- 27 Afghan security officials, interview with author, Kabul, May 2006.
- 28 Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), 234.
- 29 Ibid., 236.
- 30 Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York, Free Press, 2006), 87–98.
- 31 Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan* (Lahore: System Books, 1999), 74.
- 32 Maryam Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan," in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), 119.
- 33 *Herald*, September 1996, 78.
- 34 Mumtaz Ahmad, "Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism, and Violence in Pakistan," in *Pakistan 1997*, ed. Craig Baxter and Charles Kennedy (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 1998), 117.
- 35 Vali Reza Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 2 (January 2000): 185.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Yunas Samad, "Pakistan, 'Pro-Taliban Elements' and Sectarian Strife," Middle East Report Online, November 16, 2001, www.merip.org/mero/mero111601.html.
- 38 *EU Election Observation Mission: Final Report of the European Union's Observation Mission to Pakistan* (European Union, October 10, 2002), 31, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/pak/finalreport02.pdf.
- 39 Ibid., 32.
- 40 Ibid., 33.
- 41 International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military." Asia Report No. 49, March 2003, 16.
- 42 "Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression," International Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 77, Islamabad/Brussels, March 2004, www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/077_pakistan_devolution.pdf.
- 43 Local bodies had in the past been created by previous military dictators such as Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haq in order to bypass the provincial level. For a brief history of the system, see *ibid.*, 3–5.
- 44 Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1968).
- 45 A parliamentary committee on Balochistan was formed in September 2005.
- 46 Only the foreigners located in Waziristan were targeted. Those living in other agencies in the tribal areas were ignored.
- 47 Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani (Ret.), "It Is Not a Tiger," *Nation*, August 16, 2006.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 13.
- 50 See *EU Election Observation Mission*.
- 51 It goes without saying that the decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan and any subsequent decision to provide additional weaponry to Pakistan's army, navy, or air force would be a mistake.
- 52 B. Raman, "Pakistan: America's Blind Spot," [rediff.com](http://in.rediff.com/news/2003/apr/07spec.htm), April 8, 2003, <http://in.rediff.com/news/2003/apr/07spec.htm>.
- 53 For additional information, see the White House fact sheet on the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-2.html.
- 54 Ashley J. Tellis, "U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation," *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2004–2005): 113.
- 55 Such a proposal has been put forward by Ashley Tellis, *ibid.*
- 56 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, September 28, 2001, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/>

GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.
pdf?OpenElement.

57

Ibid.

58

Mumtaz Anwar and Katharina Michaelova, "The Political Economy of U.S. Aid to Pakistan," *Review of Development Economics* 10, no. 2 (2006): 197.

59

Richard P. Cronin, "Pakistan Aid Cutoff: U.S. Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations," Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, Washington, D.C., December 6, 1996, www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/90-149.htm.

60

Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 308–309.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid.

63

Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions," Congressional Research Service, report no. RS20995, Washington, D.C., October 12, 2001, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6202.pdf>.

64

Ibid.

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid.

67

At the end of 1999, Pakistan's international debt was \$30.7 billion, of which \$2.38 billion was owed to the United States.

68

Anwar and Michaelova, "The Political Economy of U.S. Aid to Pakistan," 196.

69

Cronin, "Pakistan Aid Cutoff."

70

Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, *Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-Up, 1979–99: In Search of a Policy* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, Carnegie is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Through research, publishing, convening and, on occasion, creating new institutions and international networks, Endowment associates shape fresh policy approaches. Their interests span geographic regions and the relations between governments, business, international organizations, and civil society, focusing on the economic, political, and technological forces driving global change.

Building on the successful establishment of the Carnegie Moscow Center, the Endowment has added operations in Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels to its existing offices in Washington and Moscow, pioneering the idea that a think tank whose mission is to contribute to global security, stability, and prosperity requires a permanent international presence and a multinational outlook at the core of its operations.

The Endowment publishes *Foreign Policy*, one of the world's leading journals of international politics and economics, which reaches readers in more than 120 countries and in several languages.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE