

**CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION  
CONFERENCE**

**BEYOND 2010**

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NORWAY

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GEORGE PERKOVICH: Good afternoon. It's my pleasure to open our final plenary and a double pleasure to introduce the man who is going to moderate the discussion and make some opening remarks, the foreign minister of Norway, Jonas Støre, who has served in that position since 2005, before which he was the secretary general of the Norwegian Red Cross. As you look in his bio you see there's a distinguished record of involvement in world health issues and also in international organizations, the U.N. and Geneva. The part in the bio that was most intriguing to me was that he was a teaching fellow at the Harvard Negotiation Project at the Harvard Law School in 1986, which those of us who remember those years remember that there was a lot of very innovative work being done at that project that helped develop some of the pathways for negotiating the nuclear arms reduction treaties at that time, and so I was intrigued to see that in his pedigree.

In his current position as foreign minister of Norway, of course he has helped lead the Norwegian effort in leading the Seven Nation Initiative, which has been very instrumental in supporting a lot of the thinking that actors in this room are engaged in, a lot of the Track II work, and so Norway has played a most constructive role in trying to build the international nuclear order that's the theme of this conference.

Foreign Minister Støre has had an official meeting rescheduled, so that he will have to leave around 3:15 and I'll take over moderating the session. So when you see this little minuet, that's what's happening is that he now has to earn his salary here and work this afternoon rather than enjoy the rest of the time in this playful exercise of dealing with nuclear order questions that we're all engaged in.

So let me get out of the way and welcome Foreign Minister Støre.

(Applause.)

JONAS GAHR STØRE: I can assure you that I am also being paid for being here – (laughter) – by my government because it's very meaningful and it's part of what a Norwegian foreign minister should do. It's an honor to be able to speak and to moderate such a distinguished gathering of speakers and to address such an impressive gathering of expert policy-makers on a very important theme.

Scholars and diplomats, let me also express my thanks to the Carnegie Endowment, to Dr. Jessica Mathews for inviting me, and the Carnegie Endowment is a close partner of Norway in so many areas. Today it's disarmament. It could be another theme another day. And I appreciate that relationship.

Let me first, before starting, make a personal reflection. I sense – and I think we all sense – that the topic of this conference is reentering the international agenda. The agreement between Presidents Obama and Medvedev to restart negotiations on START was one telling sign, and President Obama's speech in Prague last Sunday yet another clear signal. Norway welcomes these concrete steps and the leadership that the President is now demonstrating. The speech marks U.S. leadership and a much-needed determination to advance nuclear disarmament and to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Now it is up to all of us to have these concrete steps implemented, seize the opportunity and take responsibility.

We are one year ahead of the NPT review conference. The last one failed in 2005. Since then we have had every reason to fear that the 2010 conference would be a repetition of failure and that the NPT as such would sail into sunset. Now we have reason to hope that change may be coming, that political energy will be mobilized, that ambitious and at the same time realistic agendas will be defined.

I have often reflected on the following: When I was a student in the early 1980s – and, by the way, that was a good time at Harvard and I would like to discuss that with you at some occasion – (laughter) – the nuclear issue during those years were on the global agenda between the two superpowers and as a forceful mobilizer of public opinion. We have Reykjavik in 1986, the unbelievable moment, and the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and the successive agreements and efforts to reduce the stocks.

Then the Cold War came to an end and the nuclear disarmament issue left the global agenda. As my generation got into political positions, new issues emerged: the environment, climate change, fight against extreme poverty, terrorism, human rights and so on. That's where we spent our time. But of course we cannot fool ourselves; the problem of thousands of warheads will not go away. As years go by, their challenge to all of us continues to increase. And I was intrigued by this line in President Obama's speech, quote, "The threat of global nuclear war has gone down but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up," end of quote.

So now, finally, nuclear disarmament is reemerging, challenging us, obliging us to engage. The new generation will have to take charge, finding new ways, drawing on existing expertise and experience, but paving new roads ahead. This conference I believe is an important contribution to that end. Norway, as a non-nuclear weapons state, will do its part in setting and bringing this agenda through the so-called Seven Nation Initiative. This initiative contains both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. I'm happy to see Indonesia here, a partner in that initiative. And we are happy to work together with these countries: the United Kingdom, Australia, Indonesia, South Africa, Chile and Romania.

Norway has also, over the last years, been cooperating with a number of important think tanks, particularly in the United States, with the aim of strengthening the agenda for nonproliferation and disarmament. And I saw a lot of the people here in Oslo at our conference last February 2008, more than a year ago. We will continue to build these and other relationships. By engaging these institutions and institutes, we get new ideas on how to move the disarmament and nonproliferation realistic steps forward.

So, ladies and gentlemen, in addition to the new dynamic in the U.S.-Russian relationship and President Obama's ambitious and concrete speech in Prague, we have the release last week of the report of the U.S. Strategic Posture Commission, and we await with keen interest the report of the international commission chaired by Gareth Evans, here on the panel, and Yoriko Kawaguchi. And, again, we are entering the last leg of the preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

What I see is how a common understanding may be taking shape. We cannot consolidate and sustain nonproliferation while neglecting disarmament steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons, and consequently, that we will delay or undermine nuclear disarmament unless we demand robust and credible nonproliferation. They all hang together. We now see that the abolitionists can be realists and that realists can also be abolitionists, and confronted with 21<sup>st</sup> century threats, we are

finally dispensing with the mistaken assumption that the status quo is less risky than change. But as often is the case at moments of great opportunity, we are confronted not only with the possibility of progress but simultaneously with the prospect of peril and regress. Time is, here, of essence.

Many states today face a critical choice about their nuclear future. They already have or could rapidly accumulate the technology, know-how and infrastructure to develop a weapon usable domestic nuclear fuel cycle capability. Whether those states choose to take part in multilateral fuel arrangements or whether they will feel that they must hedge their bets will depend on how we use this moment of opportunity. My government decided, as one of the first countries, to offer financial support to a future fuel bank of low-enriched uranium under the auspices of the IAEA. We are pleased that the fuel bank now will become a reality, being fully funded. This fuel bank could be the first step towards establishing an equitable multilateral framework for the fuel cycle.

So this is the fundamental question: Are we facing a future security environment in which nuclear weapons will persist, if not expand, or one in which their role is steadily and foreseeable diminishing. I believe that in seizing this moment of opportunity we should be guided by four principles, and I would like to draw them with you.

The first principle is that we begin taking concrete steps to sustain our vision and build momentum behind it, because without that vision everything else we do will have less direction. This principle has been referred to in the base camp and vantage point discussions over the last two days. While the content might be contested, the principle should not. In order to begin addressing the thorniest questions about a world free of nuclear weapons, we need to demonstrate that we can muster the thrust and cooperation to address more intermediate obstacles. Even small demonstrations of our willingness to move forward towards abolition could make many of the intermediate obstacles more surmountable, more realistic, more within reach.

The general terrain of a base camp or vantage point has been clear for some years now: significant cuts in nuclear arsenals, probably in proportion to current holdings; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines and in operational status; ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reaching agreement on a fissile material cutoff treaty; and making good on the commitments made in 1955 and 2000. I note that several of these elements are covered in President Obama's address in Prague, and I warmly welcome this.

The second principle is this: Although a prime responsibility for moving forward resides with the two states who own 95 percent of the warheads – Russia and the U.S. – achieving a world free of nuclear weapons must be a joint enterprise among all states, nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states alike, such as my own. It is only by advancing nonproliferation and disarmament together and by working together on the reliable verification tools and collective security arrangements that our vision will be achievable. Non-nuclear weapons states, for instance, should cooperate with nuclear weapons states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament. In this spirit, Norway has established a partnership with the United Kingdom and VERTIC. The aim is to develop systems by which we can verify that actual disarmament really takes place while at the same time protecting sensitive information.

We non-nuclear weapons states in particular must engage in an earnest, even soul-searching discussion about the future of security guarantees and alliances in a world with far fewer and even zero nuclear weapons. Within NATO, Norway and Germany have initiated a new discussion on

enhancing alliance role in regarding nonproliferation and disarmament. That ambition was confirmed in the NATO summit declaration last Saturday. Now we have a solid platform to move forward. Non-nuclear weapons states can also make a crucial contribution by supporting and sustaining a watertight nonproliferation regime. We must close existing loopholes and empower the IAEA.

The establishment of regional nuclear weapons-free zones is another important contribution by non-nuclear weapons states to achieving the zero option. The entry into force of the African Zone is imminent. Norway is financially supporting a project carried out by a South African institute to secure the last accessions needed for the Treaty of Pelindaba to enter into force. Establishing this nuclear weapons-free zone would be an important deliverable to the NPT Review Conference. And I would like to underline here that in my conversations with Secretary Clinton yesterday we agreed to take forward part of that cooperation also between governments.

As a third principle, we must try to uphold two key elements of effective multilateral cooperation: nondiscrimination and transparency. Nuclear weapons impose, above all, collective dangers. We must confront proliferation with unity and resolve, no matter where it occurs. We must demonstrate that our motivation to enforce the rules of the game is principled, not prejudiced. We must move forward with disarmament agreements that include all states. We should acknowledge that nuclear fuel assurances will succeed only on the basis of a nondiscriminatory approach that recognizes rights to peaceful use and energy security, qualified only by even-handed rules of responsibility and verification. Norway recognizes the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy, according to Article VI of the NPT, while that the same time underlying the safety aspect.

Transparency, meanwhile, is required from both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states as a means of building the vital elements of trust and confidence. Adoption of the IAEA additional protocol is, in this context, essential. Nuclear weapons states must demonstrate enhanced transparency on their holdings of nuclear weapons, fissile material, operational status and doctrines. To be sure, in the long term, the challenges to transparency could eventually grow as reductions in nuclear arsenals grow deeper, but in the short term, transparency is indispensable.

Finally, as a fourth principle, achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons will demand committed leadership at the highest level. Prerequisites for reaching the goal of nuclear abolition are courage, determination and competence. Only with these qualities can we drive the process of transformation and change the course of history. The discussions at this conference have revealed that getting to a base camp or a vantage point, let alone nuclear abolition, will require a fundamental rethinking of our international security architecture.

Such an enterprise demands the personal commitment of national leaders. National leaders will have to engage with all key domestic stakeholders, ranging from defense establishment to energy companies to the scientific community and so on. Above all, direct engagement with the public will be critical. Altering entrenched assumptions, creating new priorities and marshalling the combined energy of government and civil society will require extraordinary courage and conviction on the part of national leaders. This can only be sustained by broad public support for a world free of nuclear weapons. There is no time to lose. I hope, ladies and gentlemen on the panel, that these four principles can inform and inspire preparations for the 2010 review conference, a conference that we cannot let fail, and that our ascent far beyond it as well will be inspired by our common resolve. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you for your attention. (Applause.)

And now I will not speak again but I will be able to introduce the first speaker on our panel, somebody who has been a champion for a number of international causes during many, many years, disarmament as well. I am pleased to introduce Gareth Evans, International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. Gareth.

(Applause.)

GARETH EVANS: Well, thank you, Jonas, colleagues, ladies and gentleman. A number of you have asked me over the last day or so – some rather more politely than others – as to what the hell is the value that could possibly be added by a new blue ribbon International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and disarmament, given that there's been so many of these kinds of bodies giving so many reports and so many good recommendations over recent years. It's certainly a question that I ask myself when the Australian prime minister asked me, along with the Japanese prime minister, to set in train this new body, co-chaired by me and my former Japanese foreign minister colleague, Yoriko Kawaguchi, but I think there is a reasonable answer that we can give to you.

The first is the timing of this enterprise. We really are finding ourselves riding a wave, as compared with trying to hold the line or build barriers against a tide of indifference or hostility, which was rather the experience of the Canberra Commission, the Blix Commission and others before us.

Secondly, the composition of the commission is really extraordinarily broadly representative. It's not just an Australia-Japan enterprise; it's a global enterprise with members on it, albeit in their personal capacity, from all P-5 countries, for example, Bill Perry from the United States, Alexei Arbatov here with us today from Russia, but also India, Pakistan and a number of other key countries as well, including Norway and Indonesia, on today's panel. And the secretariat for the commission is really a virtual worldwide enterprise, drawing on the skills of a large number of associated research centers, including the United States Carnegie, with George Perkovich being one of our crucial research consultants.

The third thing is the actual approach that the commission will adopt. We're aiming, first of all, to be comprehensive in the sense of addressing, quite systematically, all three dimensions of disarmament and nonproliferation and civil nuclear energy, some of which have tended to drop by the wayside a little bit in some of the earlier reports, and to package the issues, even when we're saying stuff that's pretty familiar, in a way that really is systematic and brings together and shows the interrelationships between the issues.

Again, as to approach – and this is very important – we want to make the results of our work very accessible, particularly to policy-makers, given that the primary object of this exercise is to energize a high-level political debate among political leaderships around the world. I think we have to acknowledge that a lot of the stuff that's been written in the past has been the nuclear priesthood talking to other members of the nuclear priesthoods, monks talking to monks, without much in the way of effective communication to people in high places, a lot of whom in respect to which this stuff just flies over their heads, and we want to address the issues in a rather different way.

We want to be realistic in our recommendations, tempering idealism with a pretty fair measure of pragmatism, tempering our optimism with a pretty fair measure of realism, not in a way to abandon the ultimate objectives of all of this but hopefully in a way that will have resonance with policy-makers. And we want to be, finally, very action-oriented, not just producing rather undifferentiated laundry lists of recommendations but rather combining our recommendations into short, medium and longer-term action plans, which will hopefully have some utility for people in the real world who are trying to put this stuff together.

We're consulting all around the world at the moment as this enterprise proceeds, including with civil nuclear industry, and hoping that our first major and most substantial report will in fact be out at the end of the year so that it can feed very directly into the last six months of the debate proceeding the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, although the commission will have a life beyond that conference, which reflects the reality that we're not just focusing on the NPT countries, but acknowledge that there are three big elephants outside the NPT room that we all know about. We have to somehow find a way of bringing them within the nonproliferation and disarmament disciplines that the NPT represents if we're going to have a saner world in this respect.

But what might these action plans actually look like against that background? I can't speak now completely for the commission because all of this is work in progress, but the general direction in which I think we're heading and which I'll flag at least as my personal view at this stage is as follows:

First of all, as to the short term, how are we defining the short term? I think it has to be a little bit beyond just the May 2010 NPT conference, because although a number of things are going to be, I believe, doable by that point, including hopefully the START follow-on treaty and the U.S.-Russian negotiations, there's clearly quite a few things that are not going to be doable or at least completable within that timeframe, but in respect of which we still want to create a sense of urgency, a sense of this is the short term, not just steps to be addressed sort of in an incremental way on into the indefinite future.

So we are likely to define the short term in terms of 2012, which has the further advantage of reflecting the first term—or the present term, I should say more politely—of the Obama administration, but also reflecting what I think is achievable within – with the appropriate will and energy within a four-year term, if not two-year.

There is an issue which the commission is pondering as to whether we should argue for the holding of the new Special Session on Disarmament of the U.N. General Assembly in 2012 in order to mark a short-term benchmark point – review point, forward-looking point. For some people that's a dream institutional outcome; for others it's a nightmare, and we're in the process of really weighing and balancing the utility of that.

But in terms of going into 2010 and taking a package into the May review conference, I think the way the commission is thinking at the moment is that there are two tranches of things that ought to be sought to be accomplished at that conference. The first is to try and update and get a re-articulation of the famous 13 steps of 2000 in the form of some kind of “new international nuclear consensus” of a kind into which not only the NPT member states could buy, but which could have buy-in ultimately from the countries outside the NPT as well. Every time you mention the 13 steps this seems to generate frissons of anxiety around certain U.S. quarters, and I think we

might hear some of that from Bob Einhorn a little later on today, but equally I know Ambassador Sudjadnan has got some other views on that so I'll let him articulate them.

The second tranche of things that I think we all ought to be focusing on – I won't go into any detail about this because it's all familiar to you – is agreement on specific measures to strengthen the NPT, which we all know needs strengthening in a number of specific ways: in the area of safeguards and verification, on the compliance and enforcement side, and also on the basic institutional side, although it is worth making the point – as Pierre Goldschmidt has been making very effectively over the last day or so – there's a lot the IAEA can do within its present powers at the moment which it's not doing as effectively as it might, and that needs to be borne in mind.

To create a positive momentum for these sorts of outcomes from the 2010 conference, a lot of things, however, do need to be done in this very short-term period leading up to it which are outside the formal NPT framework. And as I've said, some of these things I think are doable by May next year, but most can at best just get started. Although I said that this commission won't be in the business of producing sort of laundry lists, let me, just to be quick, indicate what I think the main seven things are that need to be done between now and 2010, or least by way of getting started.

The START follow-on treaty speaks for itself, and that's something we would all hope could be completed in that timeframe. Secondly, associated with that, the commencement of wider strategic dialogues with both Russia and China on the whole range of issues – which we rather hope will be quarantined from the START negotiations in the case of Russia – in the case of China, issues which are clearly out there on the table – we've been discussing a lot of them in these last two days – but which will be important if we are going to create the conditions ultimately for an effective multilateral process of disarmament. The third thing is of course CTBT, achieving, if humanly possible, U.S. ratification of that by May next year, if not at least shortly thereafter in generating all the momentum, however, that will come from the effort. And the visible utility of this for the NPT conference I think is very great.

Fourthly, fissile material, clearly getting the conference on disarmament negotiations restarted, including on the issue of verification, wrestling, I guess, with the issue of stocks in a way that will enable it to move on. And also, in the contest of fissile materials, getting something moving in this vast, sprawling, difficult area of fuel banks and guaranteed assurances of supply, but certainly significant movement on the fissile material front.

Fifthly, obviously the securing loose materials enterprise, which has been given brand new energy and input by President Obama's speech in Prague this week and which has a 2012 timeframe about it, which fits conveniently with the sort of four years that we're thinking about as the short term, and all of which is of course hugely important in its own right.

Sixthly, getting the Iran and DPRK problems as close as possible to solution as can be achieved within that timeframe. I, for one, think that's doable. In the case of Iran I think it will take rather longer than that to get the DPRK, in its present mood, to actual denuclearization, but that shortly – certainly should be a shorter-term objective to get things moving on both those fronts as far as possible.

And finally, in this period an early statement by the U.S., which may, I guess, have to now await the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review, an early statement on the de-alerting issue and launch readiness, which we didn't hear anything about and would have rather liked to in the Obama speech, and also more generally on nuclear doctrine – some language to the effect that the only purpose of having nuclear weapons is to deter others from using them. Again, some of us were hoping, perhaps naively optimistically, that that would be there in the Prague speech. We're also now, many of us, hoping – I hope not with as much naiveté – that it will be there in a year or so's time after the Nuclear Posture Review is completed.

Well, that's about feeding into 2010. By 2012 one would hope that all those things could be pretty much accomplished, and in addition some other things would have happened as well, including some sort of agreement about how to move forward on residual space issues, which are causing so much difficulty and anxiety, and some agreement on how to bring the non-NPT nuclear arms states within the NPT-type disciplines, presumably through some kind of a parallel process, which will hopefully be rather better in the future than the India-U.S. nuclear deal was; that did have the advantage of demonstrating that parallel process could give you some advantages in terms of exposing things to safeguards that weren't previously, but has left a lot of people disappointed.

We would also hope that by 2012, on a completely different issue, some agreement could be reached on how the international community could share the costs of managing a really much more substantial and effective disarmament and nonproliferation enterprise. But above all, one would hope that by 2012, within the next four years, with all the discussions that are going on, strategic dialogues and so on, we could have reached a very significant agreement on a general strategy, a general way forward for disarmament. And that takes me quickly into the medium-term and longer-term agendas that I think my commission will be trying to articulate with a little bit more precision perhaps than has been the case in some other discussions of this.

In terms of the medium term, which for present purposes we're thinking about as the period running through to about 2025, the basic object, as we're thinking about it again at the moment, is to both set and get to a target, minimalist vantage point – we're still wrestling with the appropriate metaphor but I'll leave that discussion to one side – a minimalist vantage point which would be characterized by dramatically reduced numbers of warheads, and we're still debating what those numbers should be, whether it's possible to have any actual numbers or would it only be a formula, but certainly dramatically reduced; secondly, dramatically reduced deployment of any of the weapons left in existence; thirdly, nothing anywhere on high readiness – on high launch readiness; and fourthly, common acceptance in military doctrine that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others.

Again, whether or not no-first-use should be part of that kind of military doctrine or whether that's an add-on or more emotional and real-world utility is something the commission is wrestling with. But we believe, I think in our preliminary discussions, that getting to a result like this with very low numbers, very little actual deployment, nothing on high readiness, and a common doctrine accepting that there's no other purpose for these things in their potential use of tools other than to deter others from using nuclear weapons, we think that that would be a very much better world than the one we have at the moment, and one that is achievable within a time certain by a date certain, and for present purposes, 2025 seems to be workable.

Finally, we do, however, think, as a commission in terms of our preliminary discussions, that it's very, very difficult indeed to be as confident about setting dates certain for the step – the final step from the minimalist vantage point, so defined, to actual zero. The truth of the matter is that there are a number of very big and very difficult conditions that will have to be satisfied. Many of them have been a subject of discussion during this conference. Political conditions, giving all states, all relevant states confidence that the final step won't put their security at risk, confidence about the effectiveness of verification mechanisms on which Norway and the U.K. have been doing so much good work recently, and confidence about compliance and enforcement for those who might be minded to break out of this new discipline.

It's important, in the middle of all this realism, however, about getting to the beyond 2025 final zero, to keep our basic idealism intact. The ultimate goal must remain one – the ultimate goal that we must never lose sight of is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the effective outlawing of nuclear weapons from the planet.

The rationale for that goal I think must again also never be lost sight of. It was very well articulated I think by the original Canberra Commission and rearticulated as the central motif of the Blix Commission, namely that so long as any country has nuclear weapons, others will want them; so long as any country has nuclear weapons, they're bound one day to be used by accident if not design, and any such use would be catastrophic.

What's given us all a huge amount of renewed confidence that this message is actually now being heard is of course the emergence of – with all the commitment and all the leadership that's gone with it – of President Obama and his new administration. You in the United States are clearly getting your act together. It's time for the rest of the world to get its act together, and hopefully our new commission can play at least a small part in achieving that outcome.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

H.E. STØRE: Thank you, Gareth. We look forward to seeing the results now we know the outline. I have the pleasure of giving the floor to Ambassador Sudjadhan, who is Indonesia's ambassador to the United States. Please, Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR SUDJADHAN PARNOHADININGRAT: Thank you. Let me first of all extend my thanks and gratitude to the Carnegie Endowment for inviting me to share with you some of my thoughts about the NPT and its implementations from the perspective of people like myself, representing a developing country, Indonesia, a state party to the NPT, a non-nuclear weapons state and which only has its interest in fully implementing the treaty as a faithful state party.

This will bring me to the next phase of my presentation. Now, being the ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, my presentation should be without prejudice to my position as the representative of Indonesia bilaterally with the US. So it is a matter of how I should disclaim myself from saying something on behalf of the state – on behalf of my government vis a vis the US, and that I would like, to approach the issue personally from the perspective of somebody who has been for sometime dealing with this issue.

My involvement in the NPT dated back to 1990 – that is the first time when I joined the, 1990 NPT Review Conference. I also attended the NPT Review Conference in 1995. I attended and participated in the 2000 Review Conference and I was there in 2005 as Chairman of the Main Committee I, dealing with the questions of nuclear disarmament. So with these involvement, I would like to perceive what is going to happen and what we expect to happen in 2010 and beyond, judging from what I have gone through the NPT process within these last two decades.

Nineteen-ninety, for instance, was the time when state parties expected the conduct of the NPT Review Conference, back then, to cultivate what happened surrounding the NPT review process; that is, the end of the Cold War. The sticking issue at that point was that there have been two approaches on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. That is that, some of the nuclear weapons states, the major players of nuclear weapons states, on the one hand, assumed that it is a matter of how states parties implement Article VI in a kind of a step by step approach – a kind of a step-by-step process. On the other hand, the non-nuclear weapons states which pressed it as a matter of implementing this Article within a set of timeframe, a time-table, which can be applied in implementing Article VI of the NPT, dealing with nuclear disarmament.

So, the stalemate which occurred at the very end of the process of the 1990 Review Conference has thrown the Review Conference into collapse and no substantive outcome document was produced by the state parties in 1990. Nineteen-ninety-five Review Conference is a different things. We, the state parties, were asked by Article X to discuss and decide whether the Treaty – was to be extended indefinitely or extended for some period of time. As you may know at the end of the review process a decision was taken by the state parties, and coupled with it a resolution was also adopted – these two sets of outcome were very fundamental kind of international instruments that were referred to by the state parties within the context of reviewing the implementation of the NPT from 1995 until 2000.

In 2000, circumstances have allowed the state parties to, as you all know, adopt documents, and outcome agreed by consensus by states parties of the NPT. It contains very important aspect of the implementation of the NPT, namely acceleration measures in order to implement the NPT especially Article VI known to be the 13 steps.

Now, when I was asked to discuss the 13 steps, this was when I received the invitation by Carnegie to speak, of course I only please to dwell upon this issue and at the same time present my calculus about what's going to happen in 2010. I should judge this from what happened, say for instance, in between 2000 and 2005. We all know 2005 Review Conference was a failure. The fact that only to adopt the agenda, the PrepCom III in 2004 failed, and it is also supposed to produce recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference and yet it also failed, I sensed that the states parties were not ready yet to implement the 13 steps as soon as they were adopted in 2000. The PrepCom III in 2004, which I had the privilege to chair, was able only to recommend to the 2005 Review Conference the rules of procedure and was able only to recommend who is going to be the president for 2005 Review Conference. So, the very meager non-substantive steps which were taken by the state parties in 2004 indicated that those who committed to the 2000 Review Conference 13 steps, had departed from their previous commitment. This, coupled with different kinds of factors that involved in the 2005 Review Conference, has finally drawn the 2005 Review Conference to collapse.

In my view, judging from my long involvement in this process, it takes a conventional wisdom, commitment and willingness to take steps collectively to work on the preparation for 2010 learning from the failure and what has happened in 1990 and 2005 and capitalized the outcome of 1995 and 2000 as the starting point. What is also important then is, how a country like Indonesia, a non-state-party like Indonesia, would like to contribute to the achievement of the objectives and principles of the NPT, contained in the NPT preamble, and how we will reenergize all states parties to implement NPT Articles, particularly Article I and II, Article IV, Article III and Article VI.

So these are what a country like Indonesia, being a non-nuclear weapon state party, wanted to see the process to take place in 2010. That is how we give sharper focus on the implementation of these articles with a view achieving the objectives set out in the preamble paragraphs of the treaty.

What I thought going to be an important factor for a successful conference in 2010 was what I took from the experiences in the past. I conclude that political and strategic circumstances surround and shape an NPT review conference. So we may learn what happened in 2005, what happened in 2000 and also what happened in 1995. All of the political and strategic circumstances surrounded each of the review conference including the relations amongst the major players very much involved in the decision-making process of the conference.

And, secondly, another very important factor, from a very conventional wisdom— I mean, a kind of conventional wisdom- is the political will of the leadership of the state parties – major state parties, especially nuclear weapons states. If you recall, back in 1995 Review Conference, when finally it adopted a consensus outcome, it was because of the decision made at the very high level of the nuclear weapon states leaderships, allowing the 1995 to produce outcome documents. It was also due to the involvement of those who was willing to accommodate each other's positions, then can only the 1995 Review Conference produced results.

The third factor is the negotiators. Negotiators of the review conference are those that involves in practically the whole process of a three or four weeks review conference, preceded by, process of preparations, including three consecutive preparatory committee meetings. The fact that in every review conference a number of very active participants participate in the negotiations, then these operators have a very crucial role played in the context of making a review conference a success or failure.

Concerning the political and strategic circumstances, of course a review conference and the NPT process are absolutely relevant factors in the maintenance of the vital or strategic interests of nuclear weapons states. It pertains to their possessions of nuclear weapons. The fourth factor, is the decision making process at a review conference and another factor is two separated but a kind of an integral process namely the prevailing bilateral and multilateral relations among the major players and a number of factors influencing each other in the negotiations at the NPT process.

Now let me touch upon what happened in 1999 and 2000 as the starting point and how we will see-- at least Indonesia – will see what is going to happen or what we expect to happen in 2010. Back to 1995, the Decisions of the NPT Review Conference on the Strengthening Review Process was a very important outcome for Indonesia. We agreed to extend indefinitely the NPT in 1995 based on the agreement by all states parties to adopt the Decision on the Strengthening Review Process and The Resolution on the Middle East. They were seen by a country like Indonesia as a

very fundamental basis for us to see what we expect to happen in 2010. And then what happened in the 2000 review conference, especially these 13 practical steps?

I now come to the point where I would like underline the important of 2010 NPT Review Conference for the future of NPT. In this connection I would also like to argue that what had been agreed in 1995 and 2000 should become the starting point. We could not agree on the final document in 2005 because among other things a number of states parties denied the consensus reached in 2000. It is a matter of how we see the NPT review conference as a continuous and sustained process of achieving the objective and principle content in the preamble paragraph of the NPT. So taking into account the outcome of 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and the imperative to agree on these review conference outcomes as a basis for reaching agreement in 2010 – in the context of achieving the objective and principles of the NPT as contains in its preamble paragraph is a crucial process that we would like to involve actively involve ourselves.

On NPT 2010 Review Conference -- which I have argued that 1995 Decision on the Strengthening the Review Process and Resolution on the Middle East should become a starting point, now let me explain why I thought the 2000 Review Conference outcome is also crucially important for a country like Indonesia. In this regard let me touch upon the 13 steps agreed in the 2000 Review Conference Document.

Some of the 13 steps have been said by state parties involved in the 2005 review conference as obsolete, as something that has to be revisited or – or even being left out because it is irrelevant to the circumstances in 2005. But for a country like Indonesia, a state partly like Indonesia, as I said earlier, NPT is a continued process as a sustained process. For us, from one to the next review conference is a kind of process toward the achievement of the NPT goal, as set in its preamble paragraph. So what has been agreed in 1995 or has been achieved in the year 2000 is being valued as an important achievement in a continuous process.

So first let me touch upon the 13 steps, namely on the signing of the CTBT. I was asked by the organizer of this conference, on a piece of paper, to answer a question. what is the likelihood for Indonesia – to ratify CTBT. Well, as you all know that question pertain to the process of implementing democratic principles in a newly establish democracy. We, in the government have to listen very carefully of what the constituents has been saying and what they would like to say on our position to ratify or not to ratify CTBT.

Secondly, amongst the constituents of the government nowadays a group of representatives treated this ratification issue as kind of domestic politics. They argue on the questions – on many occasions asking why us, why should Indonesia – which is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty – the one who has taken the initiative to establish nuclear weapon-free zone in South East Asia and while now we are striving for its full implementations should ratify CTBT. Why not countries beyond the region do it first? We are an active participant, which have chiefly taken part in many disarmament activities should do first? Why a non-nuclear weapons state should ratify first? So we would like to share with you, that some of our constituency wanted us to wait first, on the step taken by nuclear weapons state parties to NPT – nuclear weapons states signatories of the CTBT, taking their step first, and whether we ratify or not, and we will rethink it over. This is the position taken by some of our constituents. So this is a matter of how a positive mood in the domestic politics will prevail influencing the government position to ratify CTBT.

Now, on what we expect to happen in 2010, first we want an outcome which is not only paper to be adopted by consensus, but papers that contain commitments of state parties to fully implement their obligations – to live up to their obligations in accordance with the provisions of the NPT, especially Article I, II, VI, III and IV. We also want to see the 2010 as a makeup of the failure of 2005 Review conference.

Second, another important point which I think worth considering– at least from the perspective of state party like us is, that we would like to see the documents to contain commitments on the critical importance of implementing NPT obligations of nonproliferation and disarmament which have been long overdue. Secondly we want all states parties to commit and take collective steps to strengthen the nonproliferation regime by assuring the participation of all states in the existing non-proliferation mechanism, further enhance and strengthen the safeguards system of the IAEA and the capacity of the IAEA safeguards to deal with the new challenges.

Third, we want the reaffirmations of commitments to the – well, this is the letter of Article IV of the Treaty, that is, the inalienable rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Of course, this should be in conformity with Article I, II and III.

Then fifth, we would like to see the 2010 outcome to contain state parties commitments – or agreement on an achievable and implementable policies or steps in the context of implementation of Article VI. We also want to see an agreed practical means to provide assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. We also would like to see the outcome of 2010 to contain agreed steps on countering and preventing nuclear terrorism.

And next, we want agreed steps leading to the full implementations of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and decisions on the Strengthening the Review Process. And we also would like to see the 2010, a conference – a review conference which can produce a statement of willingness or intentions or even a commitment by state parties to promote education and strengthen the engagement of civil society in strengthening the NPT norms.

So these are some of my thoughts about what happened within these last few years in terms of implementation of the NPT and what we expect to happen in 2010 Review Conference. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

(Applause.)

H.E. STØRE: Thank you so much, Ambassador. We will now turn to an Egyptian perspective from the minister at the Egyptian embassy in London?

SAMEH ABOUL-ENEIN: Yes.

H.E. STØRE: Mr. Sameh, you have the floor.

ABOUL-ENEIN: Thank you. Well, thank you so much. I'm delighted to be back here in my private capacity and would like first to thank the Carnegie Endowment for their invitation again. Well, I will try to make my remarks very brief and short because of time limits. And in this respect I will limit myself to what I consider to be some of the practical steps in five areas to move forward to

2010 and beyond. Now, for those who will be interested in looking at other ideas, putting forward, they can go back to the book, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons," by the Carnegie. My article is there.

Now, the first area is the NPT itself and the review conference. The NPT review conference presents a real window of opportunity to build on previous commitments such as those made in 2000, and to take concrete steps to achieve progress towards a nuclear weapon-free world. Now, the responsibility to achieve that lies with all of us, nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, members and non-members of the NPT. We must constructively utilize the remaining time before 2010 with a more intensive, ongoing discussion.

The NPT, before and beyond 2010 itself, needs to be strengthened. We should look at setting up a permanent secretariat and move towards creating an organization. We could also consider ways to ensure continuity in the annual process and raise the tempo, perhaps by having a fourth PrepCom. Member states should consider ways of raising the political profile of the NPT as well. How about making the upcoming NPT review conference in 2010 a ministerial-level meeting?

We have recognized the need to think along the lines of summits on the topics of energy, population, food – I've just come from London – G-20 and climate change, et cetera. Why can't there be a summit for a nuclear-free world? Such a summit would provide a potential mechanism also to achieve the universality of the NPT.

More than 10 years ago the foreign ministers of seven countries – Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico and New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden – joined together to form the New Agenda Coalition. The need for a new impetus of such energy is as strong as ever today. We can pull together the 13 steps from the 2000 review conference with the many other proposals made by member states and expert groups and panels and commissions as the vehicle for achieving this aim. An attempt to merge these initiatives will have a much better chance of achieving global consensus.

What we need is a cross-regional, multilateral and multicultural dialogue for this purpose, one with a clear objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. We need a revitalized New Agenda Coalition to work closely with the new U.S. administration, especially in light of the last speech of President Obama.

Point two, the Conference on Disarmament. Now, on nuclear disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament has a special role to play. It is a unique forum that we tend to forget. It includes the P-5 plus the three non-NPT members. It should immediately establish an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. Much more could be done in Geneva. There is a vast potential and expertise that can make a difference, but if we have the political will.

In this context, the following steps in the conference would be appropriate: a discussion by an ad hoc group of the steps that would lead towards systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, a dialogue among states that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not on practical steps that would lead to the elimination and a clear commitment in this respect, technical seminars to address the issues of scope, definitions and verification, development of ad hoc exchanges to establish a precedent that non-nuclear weapons states have a legitimate interest and right to question nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament matters and to hold them accountable.

The Conference on Disarmament must begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material, based on the Shannon mandates. The time is right, and with a view to completing a final draft within five years before the 2015 review conference. The deadlock over establishing an ad hoc committee on the FMCT must be global must be broken. A group of experts should be convened with a new session opening in mid-May to discuss all the relevant details.

Moving to the Middle East, 14 years have elapsed since the adoption of the 1995 resolution – Middle East resolution. It is clear that new impetus must be given to this agenda. We should not miss the opportunity we have. It should be suggested that the review conference should appoint a special coordinator for the resolution whose role will be to oversee its implementation. The coordinator would facilitate a route to constructive dialogue in the framework of the resolution and to begin immediate practical steps to convene an international Middle East conference with the objective of establishing a legally binding and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty for a Middle East free zone. The establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East is a first step towards creating an effectively verifiable zone of weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their delivery systems.

It's a long process. All states in their region, including Israel, must acknowledge and accept a challenging and deep responsibility towards achieving regional security. Looking forward from here, the universality of the NPT is critical to regional and global security because states outside the treaty fundamentally weaken it by continuing the nuclear danger and weakening the benefits of membership for their neighbors. For 2010 and beyond, I would suggest that an NPT universality adherence support unit should be considered in the review conference to address directly the mechanisms that will bring states outside the treaty into the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.

Fourth, behind the review conference, and approaching the issue of the nuclear zero, we must not let the momentum that has grown now fade. We must keep our eyes on the goal of the total elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced again. This will require an active negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention, as called for by the U.N. secretary general last October. It is a logical conclusion to the current zero project and all states need to engage seriously with this project.

For the vision of the zero to be credible, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council should take the lead at an early stage. We have seen recently the link between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation explicitly acknowledged by several key statesmen, and this is warmly welcomed. This agenda must now include the verification, the progressive de-production of operationally deployed strategic warheads and a freeze in upgrading, modernizing and replacing existing weapons. The role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines must be dramatically reduced with the total objective of elimination. The P-5 needs to take action in a coordinated manner and to show leadership.

Finally, the issue of trusts and its relevance to the way forward. The concept of trust remains poorly understood, yet it is central to our work on the future of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Mutual trust is a key to any process of cooperation among nations. It's about a constructive dialogue across regional exchange, reaching out and crossing bridges. It is about mutual interests and respect for differences and security for all, not for one side. We need a genuine and candid conversation about nuclear disarmament between officials and experts from nuclear

weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. There hasn't been such a conversation for a long time. We need to exploit all the opportunities that can exist to make this happen and to invite into this conversation representatives of the civil society and NGOs who can contribute constructively in this regard, giving also the proper role to gender and the culture of making peace and pushing peace in different regions of the world.

Thank you so much.

(Applause.)

H.E. STØRE: Well, these are good and rich introductions. If I stand up and leave, Bob, it's not because I protest – (laughter) – but simply because time is running, but I have the pleasure of introducing Bob Einhorn. Please.

BOB EINHORN: Thank you, Minister, and I know you're going to have to leave in the next minute or so.

Our goal at the 2010 NPT Review Conference shouldn't merely be to avoid another debacle like in 2005 or to achieve a consensus final document by papering over basic differences. We should set our sights much higher. We should be much more ambitious about the 2010 review conference. We should seek a renewed and reinvigorated NPT bargain. The original NPT bargain remains sound, but clearly it's fraying. We need to shore it up, to update it and strengthen it for the decades ahead.

The next 12 months should be a period of very active diplomacy to explore and hopefully agree upon a renewed nuclear bargain. In the interest of time I won't try to outline what the substantive elements of an NPT bargain, of a renewed bargain might be. Instead I'd like to focus on five principles that I believe should guide the effort.

First, we should give roughly equal weight to the three original pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and we should pursue these three elements in a balanced way. These three pillars are integrally related. Without nonproliferation it would be much too risky to expand nuclear energy worldwide. Without disarmament, international support for tough nonproliferation measures would be inadequate. And we should add a fourth pillar: preventing nuclear terrorism. The detonation of a single terrorist nuclear bomb anywhere in the world would gravely undermine prospects for the three other pillars.

Second is the principle of reciprocal responsibility, which Jim Steinberg mentioned yesterday. Today's nuclear threats put the security and well-being of all states in jeopardy and all states must therefore do what they can to reduce those threats.

Of course, the nuclear weapons states bear special responsibility to pursue nuclear disarmament and to move with conviction toward a world without nuclear weapons, as President Obama pledged to do on Sunday. And the non-nuclear weapons states bear a critical responsibility to work energetically to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. That responsibility doesn't end with their decision to forgo their own nuclear capabilities and to accept IAEA's safeguards to verify that decision. It must continue through the participation of those non-nuclear weapons states in rigorous collective efforts to impede other countries from joining the

nuclear club because their own security and well-being are affected by whether they're living in a world of more and more nuclear-armed states.

Third, NPT parties should stop acting like members of special interest groups. Nuclear weapons states or non-nuclear weapons states, developing countries or developed countries, members of security alliances or members of the non-aligned movement. When it comes to nuclear dangers we're all in the same boat. Disarmament is not a favor to non-nuclear weapons states, nonproliferation is not a favor to the nuclear weapons states, and the civil uses of nuclear energy is not a favor to developing countries. We each have a stake in each of the three pillars. Diplomatic engagement in the coming year should be inclusive and wide-ranging, not confined to consensus building within separate caucuses. Sure, the P-5 countries will meet, as will the NAM countries, but the groups should be speaking to one another and not just among themselves.

Fourth, NPT parties should set aside slogans and dogmatic positions and seek pragmatic solutions that work. We should look forward and not fight old battles. I personally supported the 13 steps in 2000 and I thought it was unwise for the United States to walk away from those 13 steps so dismissively. But things have changed. Not all of those steps are relevant today. And let's not waste time debating whether to resurrect those steps. Let's instead create a new and a more promising agenda for the years ahead. And on promoting the responsible growth of civil nuclear energy, let's stop talking about legal abstractions. Instead, let's explore practical means of meeting the genuine economic and other needs of countries embarking on or expanding their civil nuclear programs, and let's do so in a way that also serves our collective security interest in preventing the destabilizing spread of nuclear weapons production facilities.

Fifth, we should seek a more equitable sharing of the burdens of disarmament and nonproliferation. For example, take the issue of verification. In verifying nonproliferation, it makes sense for the states prohibited from having nuclear weapons to bear the lion's share of the safeguards burden. The nonproliferation rationale for applying IAEA safeguards in nuclear weapons states is less compelling and the costs can be prohibitive. But when it comes to verifying disarmament and the need for nuclear weapons states to reassure one another and the world community at large that they're abiding by their obligations, that's a different story.

And so, in multilateral measures like the fissile material cutoff treaty or bilateral measures like the START follow-on agreement, the burden of accepting more extensive verification should shift to the nuclear-weapon states.

We should also seek a more equitable sharing of the burden of nuclear disarmament among the nuclear-weapon states. With Russia and the U.S. now possessing well over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, they clearly deserve to continue taking the lead in reducing nuclear arsenals. But there's no reason that responsibility for reducing the numbers and the role of nuclear weapons and demonstrating transparency should fall exclusively on them. All nuclear weapon states, including those that chose not to join the nonproliferation treaty, bear a responsibility to exercise nuclear restraint.

Some current nuclear powers – notably the United Kingdom and France – have already taken steps to cut back their limited nuclear capabilities. Yet some other nuclear powers are now both increasing and upgrading their nuclear forces and demonstrating very little transparency. It will

be hard to move toward a nuclear-free world if some continue building up while others are building down.

I'm sure there are other principles that could be articulated. Many of you will have some in mind. These are the five I wanted to mention today in the limited time available. I think if we follow them over the next year, not only can we ensure a successful NPT Review conference, but we can also renew and reinvigorate the NPT bargain for years to come. Thank you.

(Applause.)

PERKOVICH: I want to thank Bob and all the speakers for some very constructive, concrete suggestions. We're running later than we had thought, but in bumping two principles into each other – timeliness and discussion – but I want to err on the side of discussion because we're kind of leading into the reception and you can drink more at home. (Laughter.) And so the plan would be to go to 3:40 instead of 3:30 and then move to the reception. And so let me take two questions at a time, though. So we'll start with Abner and then this gentleman over here. Thank you.

Q: Hi, Avner Cohen, University of Maryland. In the spirit of the effort to try to be honest, transparent and trust – as one of the participants said, I have a question to all four or five members of the panel. As you know, there are three weapons states outside the NPT – alphabetically, India, Israel and Pakistan. Two are declared, one is not – not acknowledged. My question is how do you think you should address the question of Israel?

I'll say two words about that. For some time, George and I – George Perkovich and I – had a very friendly discussion about that. George believed that Israel should be addressed by reference to unsafeguarded fissile material. I, myself, on the other hand, believe that Israel should be addressed first as a nuclear-armed state. I think for reasons of ethics, reasons of politics, reality cannot be denied, reality cannot be fudged, reality cannot be put aside.

I think it's healthy, it's transparent to treat a nation as she is, whether she wants it or not. So my question is – and I think it's useful, because one should understand why that particular nation with a specific case had gone nuclear so early on – in fact just a little bit before the nuclear nonproliferation was signed. Israel could have tested – according to my research – by 1966 – just before the deadline. So my question to all of you is how do you think the issue of Israel – if you want Israel to be engaged – how this issue has to be addressed?

PERKOVICH: Thank you Avner. You're younger, so you have to be briefer, okay?

Q: I will be concrete – that even better.

PERKOVICH: Great.

Q: My name is Christian Ricky (ph) from U.S. Consulting Company. I would like to ask a concrete question to the panel – actually basically the issue of fuel banks. Two of the – three of the panelists – well, two of the panelists mentioned fuel banks. Mr. Einhorn hinted to it, somehow. And the ambassadors from Indonesia and Egypt – I didn't hear the word fuel bank in their remarks.

Maybe 15 or 20 years ago, this question had been hypothetical, but now it's pretty much possible. I would like to know the position – in principle – of the ambassador of Indonesia and Egypt regarding the establishment of an IEA fuel bank, taking into consideration that such a fuel bank would not limit the rights – Article IV rights of the countries that could establish the fuel banks. So pretty much the time has come, it seems. I just would like to know the position – the personal position of the Egyptian and Indonesian ambassador. Thank you.

PERKOVICH: Thank you. What I want to do, actually, is ask Daryl – so we'll have three questions, because I think we can remember them – Israel and fuel banks – CTBT.

(Laughter.)

Q: You know me quite well, George. I guarantee this question is easier than Avner's though. I have a question for our excellencies from Indonesia and Egypt regarding the test ban. As you know, Article VI of the NPT obligates all states to pursue nuclear disarmament. Your two countries have signed the CTBT. In Indonesia's case, I understand why you might want to see what other countries do, but if the United States and China were to ratify the treaty, how might that change Indonesia's calculus?

And regarding Egypt, given the value that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty might contribute to achieving a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, what are your thoughts about Egypt's leadership role in ratifying the test ban treaty to provide an example for countries like Israel and Iran as to how they might behave in the future on this regard?

PERKOVICH: Can we work from the freshest question up? Ambassador, can you address the CTBT question, we'll go to Sameh and then you can work your way back through the questions.

AMB. PARNOHADININGRAT: Thank you. At least the Indonesia government can have a better position to convince in the parliament that we need to ratify. So your question is that if U.S.A. and China ratify, then a matter of domestic political process, we will have a better position to convince them that look, you are asked about a nuclear-weapons state to ratify first. And knowing they ratify, then we can convince them this is a political process at domestic level. So I think this answers the question.

PERKOVICH: Okay, Sameh, do you want to –

ABOUL-ENEIN: Yeah. On the CTBT, well, we look to the U.S. for leadership on this – China, India. Now, in the Middle East, we can't take things à la carte. If we want to handle these things in the Middle East, we have the resolution – the '95 resolution. Let's appoint a special coordinator and work on the steps that would bring the universality of the NPT and other WMD conventions in the region. That's my answer.

PERKOVICH: Anybody else then on fuel bank? Or CTBT, but the questions on CTBT were concrete to Egypt and Indonesia. I'm not sure you got the answer you were looking for, but you got an answer.

(Laughter.)

KIMBALL: Dialogue is helpful – thank you, George.

H.E. EVANS: Just on the question of how to deal with Israel, for all practical discussion purposes in policy reviews and commission reports of the kind that my group will be writing, we have no difficulty about referring to Israel as a nuclear-armed state and referring generically to all the nuclear-armed states in that terminology. There is a bit of a difficulty, obviously, if you were to have an Israeli signatory to form a report because of the metaphysical problems of talking other than in terms of safeguarded or unsafeguarded countries.

And for more formal purposes than the kind of discussion we do on these occasions or in these reports, there is something to be said – not just from the Israeli perspective of maintaining strategic ambiguity, et cetera, but from the perspective of the number of countries in the region other than Israel who really are quite uncomfortable with the notion of formally bringing Israel out of the closet in this respect because of the worries about the political implications of that in terms of their own domestic politics and the additional pressure that they feel that would place upon them to go down the sort of matching route.

So I have to say I started life with a rather more robust approach to this issue; why the hell just don't we talk about openly and frankly for all practical purposes and for more formal purposes as well. But it is a little bit more complicated than that. And I think George's familiar distinction between safeguarded and unsafeguarded countries is a good enough vehicle for managing that. On the fuel banks issue, my Indonesian and Egyptian colleagues can speak for themselves. But from the commission's point of view – and this is an issue that we are obviously wrestling with – the utility of having fuel banks or guaranteed fuel supply in terms of creating a more proliferation-free environment in the future, it's very difficult to see this as being the answer to all our problems in this respect. This is partly because there's no great willingness on the part of most of the fuel producers at the moment to either multilateralize or internationalize their own facilities. So the old double-standards arguments keep on cropping up.

In terms of the actual utility of having an available resource like this to stop those countries that are determined to acquire fissile manufacturing capability, it's obviously not going to have much use in that context. But as an addition to the general framework that we all want to create where there's much less of a disposition to go down and to give excuses for going down the fissile material-producing path, I'd love us to be able to get more agreement. And that's not been apparent so far on that front.

EINHORN: Just very quickly on –

PERKOVICH: Yeah, go ahead on any of those.

EINHORN: Yeah, I see, Avner – this is a long-standing debate with him, but I see very little to be gained and much to be lost in Israel abandoning its policy, its strategic ambiguity. On the fuel bank question, I'm aware of no current proposal regarding fuel banks or international fuel cycle centers that require countries to give up rights.

Yet lots of people talk about the denial of rights. President Obama on Sunday said we're not talking about the denial of rights. We shouldn't be doing that. This is an issue that really needs to

be handled pragmatically and not ideologically. And if we look at it from the practical needs of countries expanding on or embarking on nuclear energy programs, I think we can find a solution.

PERKOVICH: Yeah, please.

ABOUL-ENEIN: On the Israeli one, well, I commend what President Obama – the new spirit that he’s bringing. And I think we should look to the White House in this respect. So this language coming on Israel, I don’t think it’s the right time now. And plus, we have excellent examples in history – South Africa dismantled a whole program, Brazil and Argentina as well. We had the new CIS – converted the nuclear weapons to Russia. So we have success stories. We need to work on a process, engage in discussions and bring things to reality.

PERKOVICH: Thank you, Sameh.

Is this – are you – you are so reticent. Come forward to the microphone. You get to ask the last question and then I’m going to ask everybody to be seated because Deepti wants to come out and I’ve asked her to come and make just two minutes of closing remarks. But, please.

Q: Okay, thanks for your time. I’m Ferris Stockman with the *Boston Globe*. This is for Bob Einhorn or whoever else might have insight. I’m just wondering if you have insight on the administration’s position on the India deal – the Bush administration’s India deal and whether this might be a model that is going to be followed in the future to bring other nations that might have nuclear weapons under some sort of umbrella?

EINHORN: I have no particular insights. I’m speaking personally. My understanding is the Obama administration wants very good relations with India and intends to implement the deal that was adopted over the last 18 months.

H.E. EVANS: I think from the most of the rest of the international community’s point of view the good news about the India deal is that it does demonstrate that there is a kind of bilateral process and maybe there are plurilateral or multilateral ones as well in the NSG role, and this demonstrates that, by which you can find ways of bringing the elephants outside the NPT room at least partly into the room when it comes to safeguarding certain facilities and so on.

And that’s a first step forward and it just does demonstrate that such a process is available. The bad news is it wasn’t a very good deal from the point of view of most of the rest of the world, apart from India and the U.S., because, of course, it was quite inexplicit on limiting India’s capacity to go on manufacturing fissile material. It was even inexplicit on the question of India testing, although in practice I think that would be a bit of a showstopper for the continuation of the deal.

But I don’t think it ought to be dismissed out of hand at all in the way some of the more robust critics would like to do. I think we ought to see it as an imperfect model for a step forward focusing not so much on the virtues or otherwise of particular countries, but rather the applicability of general criteria to deals of this kind: identify the criteria and then if a country fits them, that’s great.

PERKOVICH: Ambassador Sudjudnan wants to address the fuel bank. I would just add on the India deal, I’m not sure of what it’s a model. But go ahead.

(Laughter.)

AMB. PARNOHADININGRAT: Thank you. On this ideas too, I – (inaudible) – nuclear – the fuel banks. First is that we are open to these ideas and would like to see what is going to be the format of such kind of new establishment if it is going to be the case. But the most important leaf for us is that we would like to see an establishment of a new institution which does not then prolong the status of privileged and nonprivileged countries, which is the right to implement programs and look at nuclear – basically just nuclear energy is in the hand of ever state, guaranteed by Article IV of the NPD. So we are open, but in any case, we would like to see it in the context of limitations of article four of the NPD.

PERKOVICH: Great, thanks. Okay?

ABOUL-ENEIN: Yeah, maybe I'll just add that plus Article IV, of course of the NPT, the issue is considered in the IAEA. So this is – as far as Egypt is concerned, it's being dealt with there. So there are 12 projects I think now.

AMB. PARNOHADININGRAT: Yes.

PERKOVICH: That's correct. All right. I want to do two things. Before I – well, yes, in this order. I'm going to thank the panel, but I also – I'm seeing one of trustees at the Carnegie Endowment, and these people help make this happen—Aso Tavitian—who has been here both days, and I just want to thank him because it gives all of us a lot of support and confidence when our trustees pay as much attention and work and to take two days out of your valuable time. I want to acknowledge that and thank that.

And I then want to thank our panel and then I'm going to ask Deepti to thank all of you and instruct us on our way to the reception.

(Applause.)

DEEPTI CHOUBEY: Thank you. And also our thanks to Minister Støre. Unfortunately, he had another meeting he needed to run off to. And it's always great to have George, because clearly he can just jump in and manage a session like that. Thanks, George.

So, ladies and gentlemen, I think the results of this conference speak for themselves. We've seen how the concepts of build or break run parallel to those of hope and peril. And it's this choice that this year brought some of the leading minds from around the world to Washington D.C., making this conference the largest and most international we have had yet. We've heard great debate and deliberation and I hope all of us will leave today feeling educated and determined to do our bit to build.

So to help us build on the results of this gathering, in a few days you'll receive a brief survey. Please provide us with your feedback on this conference and, more importantly, your ideas for the next. In this way, we really aim to make this conference your conference. It may not always be apparent, but the panels we had reflected the ideas that you communicated to us. So to that end, I know that it is sometimes hard to choose amongst the concurrent sessions that we have.

And some of you have expressed your angst to me in going through that process, and I apologize for it. But I am told a little angst is good for the soul and it's a mark of a strong agenda. (Laughter). So I hope that you know that there will be videos, photos, transcripts, audios of the other sessions on our website, and I encourage you to continue to keep checking out our website. I understand some materials are already up there.

And then finally, on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment, I want to thank all of our speakers for their contributions and all of the attendees for the lively, thoughtful and provocative participation you have all demonstrated. You have made this conference a success. And also a huge word of thanks to all of the Carnegie Staff who helped George and I plan and execute this conference, making it seem so effortless.

And my deep thanks also go out to Nonproliferation Junior Fellow Kim Misher, whose tremendous efforts and rare talents I have relied upon heavily for the last eight months.

So I look forward to seeing you at the next conference, which is likely to take place near the end of 2010. I don't really want to think about it right now, so don't ask me any questions. (Laughter.) But I hope to see you even sooner at the closing reception, which we will have in the Polaris room. So please join me in thanking again, this terrific panel and all of you.

(Applause.)

(END)