Pakistan for more than a decade has been accused of supporting terrorism, mainly because of its support for militants opposing Indian rule in the disputed Himalayan territory of Jammu and Kashmir and also its backing of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. After September 11, 2001, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Pakistan heeded U.S. pressure to reverse course and take a stand against terrorism. Pakistan became a key U.S. ally, facilitating U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and sharing intelligence about Al Qaeda operatives. Nevertheless, terrorists continue to operate in, and from, Pakistan. The country is now a target and a staging ground for terrorism while it is simultaneously seen by U.S. policy makers as the key to ending terrorism in South Asia.

Pakistan’s future direction is crucial to the U.S.-led war against terror, not least because of Pakistan’s declared nuclear-weapons capability. The historic alliance between Islamists and Pakistan’s military, which is the subject of this book, has the potential of frustrating antiterrorist operations, radicalizing key segments of the Islamic world, and bringing India and Pakistan yet again to the brink of war.

Pakistan’s Islamists made their strongest showing in a general election during parliamentary polls held in October 2002, when they secured 11.1 percent of the popular vote and 20 percent of the seats in the lower house of Parliament. Since then, they have pressed for Taliban-style Islamization in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) bordering
Afghanistan, where they control the provincial administration. Pakistan’s military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, has made repeated pronouncements to reassure the world of his intention to radically alter Pakistan’s policy direction away from its recent Islamist and jihadi past. In a major policy speech on January 12, 2002, Musharraf announced measures to limit the influence of Islamic militants at home, including those previously described by him as “Kashmiri freedom fighters.” “No organizations will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir,” he declared. “Whoever is involved with such acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country.”

Musharraf’s supporters described his speech as revolutionary. He received international applause and support as well. Pakistanis tired of years of religious and sectarian violence agreed with Musharraf’s statement that “Violence and terrorism have been going on for years and we are weary and sick of this Kalashnikov culture . . . The day of reckoning has come.” But soon it became apparent that Musharraf’s government continues to make a distinction between “terrorists” (a term applied to Al Qaeda members who are mainly of foreign origin as well as members of Pakistan’s sectarian militant groups) and “freedom fighters” (the officially preferred label in Pakistan for Kashmiri militants). The Musharraf government also remains tolerant of remnants of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, hoping to use them in resuscitating Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan in case the U.S.-installed regime of President Hamid Karzai falters.

This duality in Pakistani policy is a structural problem, rooted in history and a consistent policy of the state. It is not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments (beginning with that of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in 1977), as is widely believed.

Since the country’s inception, Pakistan’s leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity. Under ostensibly pro-Western rulers, Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats. Such rulers have attempted to “manage” militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves its nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries. General Zia ul-Haq went farther than others in “Islamizing” Pakistan’s legal and educational system, but his
Identity and Ideology

Policy of Islamization was the extension of a consistent state ideology, not an aberration.

Islamist groups have been sponsored and supported by the state machinery at different times to influence domestic politics and support the military’s political dominance. In the South Asian region, the Islamists have been allies in the Pakistan military’s efforts to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure on India for negotiations over the future of Kashmir. Relations between ideologically motivated clients and their state patrons are not always smooth, which partly explains the inability of Pakistan’s generals to completely control the Islamists in the post-9/11 phase. The alliance between the mosque and the military in Pakistan was forged over time, and its character has changed with the twists and turns of Pakistani history.

Pakistan’s state institutions, especially its national security institutions such as the military and the intelligence services, have played a leading role in building Pakistani national identity on the basis of religion since Pakistan’s emergence as an independent country in August 1947. This political commitment to an ideological state gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to jihadi ideology—ideology of holy war—especially during and after the Bangladesh war of 1971, when the Pakistani military used Islamist idiom and the help of Islamist groups to keep secular leaders who were supported by and elected by the majority Bengali-speaking population out of power. Rebellion by the Bengalis and their brutal suppression by Pakistan’s military followed. In the 1971 war, Pakistan was split apart with the birth of an independent Bangladesh.

After the 1971 war, in the original country’s western wing, the effort to create national cohesion between Pakistan’s disparate ethnic and linguistic groups through religion took on greater significance, and its manifestations became more militant. Religious groups, both armed and unarmed, have become gradually more powerful as a result of this alliance between the mosque and the military. Radical and violent manifestations of Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan’s stability, are in some ways a state project gone wrong.

The emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947 was the culmination of decades of debate and divisions among Muslims in
British India about their collective future. After the consolidation of British rule in the nineteenth century, Muslims found themselves deprived of the privileged status they enjoyed under Mughal rule. Some of their leaders embraced territorial nationalism and did not define their collective personality through religion. They opposed British rule and called for full participation in the Indian nationalist movement led by the Indian National Congress of Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Others felt that Muslims had a special identity that would be erased over time by ethnic and territorial nationalism centered primarily on the Hindu majority in India.

Coalescing in the All-India Muslim League and led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, these Muslim nationalists asserted that India’s Muslims constituted a nation separate from non-Muslim Indians and subsequently demanded a separate homeland in areas with a Muslim majority. British India’s Muslim-majority provinces lay in its northwest and northeast, leading to Pakistan comprising two wings separated by India until the eastern wing became the new state of Bangladesh in December 1971. Pakistan’s creation represented the acceptance of the two-nation theory, which had been periodically articulated long before the formal demand for recognition of a Muslim nation in 1940 but had never been fully explained in terms of how it would be applied. Although Pakistan was intended to save South Asia’s Muslims from being a permanent minority, it never became the homeland of all South Asia’s Muslims. One-third of the Indian subcontinent’s Muslims remained behind as a minority in Hindu-dominated India even after partition in 1947. The other two-thirds now lives in two separate countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, confirming the doubts expressed before independence about the practicality of the two-nation theory.

Pakistan’s freedom struggle had been relatively short, beginning with the demand by the All-India Muslim League for separate Muslim and non-Muslim states in 1940 and ending with the announcement of the partition plan in June 1947. Although the Muslim League claimed to speak for the majority of Indian Muslims, its strongest support and most of its national leadership came from regions where Muslims were in a minority. 

Even after the Muslim League won over local notables in the provinces that were to constitute Pakistan, it did not have a consensus
among its leaders over the future direction of the new country. Issues such as the new nation’s constitutional scheme, the status of various ethno-linguistic groups within Pakistan, and the role of religion and theologians in matters of state were still unresolved at independence.

Leaders of the Muslim League had given little thought to, and had made no preparations for, how to run a new country. One possible explanation for this lack is that the demand for Pakistan was “devised for bargaining purposes to gain political leverage for Muslims.”⁴ Several Muslim leaders, notably poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal in 1930, proposed schemes for power sharing between the religious majority and minorities in independent India. They claimed that India’s Muslims constituted a separate nation by virtue of their unique history and cultural differences with the Hindu majority. This claim to nationhood, however, was not necessarily a claim to separate statehood. A separate Muslim nation could have remained part of a federal or confederal India under special power sharing arrangements and that may have been the original intention of the Muslim League leadership.⁵ According to this argument, the refusal of the Indian National Congress to contemplate such power-sharing and to accept the notion of a multination state led inadvertently to partition and the creation of a sovereign Pakistan.

While seeking recognition of a separate Muslim nation, Jinnah had managed to pull together various elements of Muslim leadership in India, creating communal unity through ambiguity about the final goal. He was “using the demand for Pakistan to negotiate a new constitutional arrangement in which Muslims would have an equal share of power”⁶ once the British left the subcontinent. Historian Ayesha Jalal has elaborated on the impact that Indian Muslim politics of the time made on the demand for Pakistan as well as the nature and contradictions of that demand:

Once the principle of Muslim provinces being grouped to form a separate state was conceded, Jinnah was prepared to negotiate whether that state would seek a confederation with the non-Muslim provinces, namely Hindustan, on the basis of equality at the all-India level, or whether, as a sovereign state, it would make
treaty arrangements with the rest of India . . . If they were to play their role in the making of India’s constitutional future, Jinnah and the Muslim League had to prove their support in the Muslim-majority provinces. Such support could not have been won by too precise a political programme since the interests of Muslims in one part of India did not suit Muslims in others . . . Jinnah could not afford to wreck the existing structure of Muslim politics, especially since he had nothing plausible to replace it with. This is where religion came to the rescue . . . Yet Jinnah’s resort to religion was not an ideology to which he was ever committed or even a device to use against rival communities; it was simply a way of giving a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents. Jinnah needed a demand that was specifically ambiguous and imprecise to command general support, something specifically Muslim though unspecific in every other respect. The intention-ally obscure cry for a “Pakistan” was contrived to meet this re-quirement . . . Jinnah could not afford to state precisely what the demand for “Pakistan” was intended to accomplish. If the demand was to enjoy support from Muslims in the minority provinces it had to be couched in uncompromisingly communal terms. But the communal slant to the demand cut against the grain of politics in the Muslim provinces, particularly the Punjab and Bengal, where Muslim domination over undivided territories depended upon keeping fences mended with members of other communities.7

One result of Jinnah’s elaborate strategy was that India’s Muslims demanded Pakistan without really knowing the results of that demand. Once Jinnah’s demand for recognition of Muslim nationhood had been characterized as a demand for India’s division, Jinnah’s critics pointed out that any division of India along communal lines would inevitably have to include a division of the two major provinces, Punjab and Bengal, along similar lines.8 A few months before independence, Khwaja Nazimuddin, who later became Pakistan’s second governor general as well as its second prime minister, candidly told a British governor that he did not know “what Pakistan means and that nobody in the Muslim League knew.”9 What may have been an effort to seek recognition for
Muslims as a nation in minority moved millions of Indian Muslims into expecting a separate country, the running of which Muslim leaders had made no preparations for. By May 1947, Jinnah was telling a foreign visitor that “even if ‘driven into the Sind desert,’ he would insist on a sovereign state.”

Jinnah and his colleagues in the Muslim League had not contemplated a Pakistan that did not include all of Punjab and Bengal. If the entire scheme was designed to increase the Muslims’ bargaining power in post-British India, the division of India had to be between Muslim-majority provinces and Hindu-majority provinces. “Without the non-Muslim-majority districts of these two provinces [Bengal and Punjab], the [Muslim] League could not expect to bargain for parity between ‘Pakistan’ and ‘Hindustan’.”

The British agreement to concede the demand for Pakistan was based partly on the outcome of the 1945–1946 elections for a Constituent Assembly and various provincial assemblies. The elections were organized on the basis of limited franchise and separate electorates for various religious communities, a practice in vogue in India since 1909. The Muslim League won 75 percent of the Muslim vote and all the Muslim seats in the constituent assembly. Only 15 percent of the population had the right to vote on the basis of literacy, property, income, and combatant status. It can be said with some certainty that literate, salaried, and propertied Muslims as well as those who had served in the British army supported the Muslim League. The views of the Muslim peasantry and illiterate masses were less clear.

To shore up Muslim support, the Muslim League appealed to religious and communal sentiment. Although Jinnah—by then known as Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader)—and most of his principal deputies in the campaign for Pakistan were secular individuals, the Muslim League’s 1945–1946 election campaign was based almost entirely on Islamic rhetoric. The Indian National Congress secured the assistance of “nationalist” Muslim clerics organized in the Jamiat Ulema Hind (Society of Indian Scholars) to attack the Islamic credentials of Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders. The Muslim League responded by rolling out its own theologians. The result was the almost total identification of Pakistan with Islam in the course of the campaign. The rural Muslim masses were
encouraged to develop “a vague feeling that they would all become better Muslims once a Muslim state was established.”

Before extending their support to the Muslim League, some religious leaders demanded assurances from Jinnah that Pakistan would follow Islamic laws. Jinnah offered these assurances, as professor Khalid bin Sayeed notes:

In a letter to the Pir of Manki Sharif, the [Muslim] League leader clearly stated in November 1945: “It is needless to emphasize that the constituent Assembly which would be predominantly Muslim in its composition would be able to enact laws for Muslims, not inconsistent with the Shariat laws and the Muslims will no longer be obliged to abide by the Un-Islamic laws. . . .” In the League meetings that the Quaid-i-Azam addressed, particularly in the Muslim majority areas, Islam with its symbols and slogans figured very prominently in all his speeches. Addressing the Pathans, he said, “Do you want Pakistan or not?” (shouts of Allah-o-Akbar) (God is great). Well, if you want Pakistan, vote for the League candidates. If we fail to realize our duty today you will be reduced to the status of Sudras (low castes) and Islam will be vanquished from India. I shall never allow Muslims to be slaves of Hindus. (Allah-o-Akbar)."

In Punjab, where the Muslim elite had been reluctant followers of Jinnah, the tide was turned with the help of conservative religious elements. A Pakistani scholar and former diplomat explains:

The spectacular victory of the Muslim League in the Punjab elections in 1946 (79 of the 86 Muslim seats as against only 2 out of 86 Muslim seats in 1937) cannot be understood only in terms of Quaid-i-Azam’s charisma. One cannot ignore the use that was made of the religious emotions by the ulema [Islamic scholars], the sajjada nashins [hereditary heads of Sufi shrines] and their supporters. The thrust of their message was simple; those who vote for the Muslim League are Muslims, they will go to Heaven for this good act. Those who vote against the Muslim League are kafirs [non-believers],
they will go to hell after their death. They were to be refused burial in a Muslim cemetery . . . The Quaid-i-Azam was not unaware of the use of religion in this manner by the Muslim League, although on principle he was opposed to mixing religion with politics . . . And yet it is a fact that the people of Pakistan talked in the only idiom they knew. Pakistan was to be the laboratory of Islam, the citadel of Islam.\textsuperscript{15}

In what was an early, but by no means the last, effort at attributing religious status to Pakistan’s political leadership, several Muslim League leaders from Punjab added religious titles, such as Maulana, Pir, or Sajjada Nashin to their names in “dubious pretensions to piety.”\textsuperscript{16} In the end, the clerics and hereditary religious leaders reduced the argument in favor of creating Pakistan to a simple question of survival of Islam on the South Asian subcontinent.

The sort of logic these religious leaders used was best summarized in one of the speeches of Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi. He said, “We have got two alternatives before us, whether to join or rather accept the slavery of Bania Brahman Raj in Hindustan or join the Muslim fraternity, the federation of Muslim provinces. Every Pathan takes it as an insult for him to prostrate before Hindu Raj and will gladly sit with his brethren in Islam in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. A Pathan is a Muslim first and a Muslim last.”\textsuperscript{17}

The 1945–1946 election enabled the Muslim League to claim that it was the sole representative of the Muslims. Jinnah interpreted the vote as a mandate for him to negotiate on behalf of Muslims, a position the British had no choice but to accept. The election campaign generated religious fervor, and its result seemed to indicate that the Muslims were unhappy at the prospect of being dominated by Hindus; but the election results did not settle the question of what India’s Muslims really wanted. Jalal points out that even the limited Muslim vote “had not ratified a specific programme because no programme had actually been specified. No one was clear about the real meaning of ‘Pakistan’ let alone its precise geographical boundaries.”\textsuperscript{18} The Muslim League still did not form the government in most of the Muslim-majority provinces, making it impossible to divide India neatly into Muslim-majority and -minority
provinces and then allowing two parties, the Muslim League and the Congress, to negotiate a future constitutional arrangement as equals.

Having decided to end colonial rule over India, the British conceded the demand for Pakistan by agreeing to divide India as well as the provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The Pakistan that was created was communally more homogenous but economically and administratively a backwater. Communal riots involving Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs resulted in massive migrations from Pakistan to India and vice versa, although no such shifts of population had been envisaged by Pakistan’s founders. The communal basis of partition, coupled with the religious frenzy generated by it, made religion more central to the new state of Pakistan than Jinnah may have originally envisaged.

The circumstances of the Muslim League’s apparent success in the 1946 elections foreshadowed the difficulties confronting Pakistan’s leaders once the new country was created. The campaign for Pakistan had, in its final stages, become a religious movement even though its leaders initiated it as a formula for resolving post-independence constitutional problems. This created confusion about Pakistan’s raison d’être, which Pakistan’s leadership has attempted to resolve through a state ideology. The Muslim League did not retain mass support in the areas that became Pakistan within a few years of independence, especially after universal adult franchise was recognized. The abstract notion of a Pakistan that would be Muslim but not necessarily Islamic in a strict religious sense was confronted with alternative visions. The elite that demanded an independent Pakistan was now challenged by groups that appealed to the wider electorate, most of whom did not have a say in the 1946 election that led to partition. Religious leaders who had been brought belatedly into campaign for the Muslim League were joined by theologians who had not supported the demand for Pakistan, and they started calling for the new country’s Islamization. Others sought to build Pakistan as a loose federation of Muslim majority provinces, with an emphasis on ethnic and regional cultures.

To complicate matters further, when Pakistan was finally born, it faced an environment of insecurity and hostility, with many Indian leaders predicting the early demise of the new country. A former Pakistani
foreign minister explained half a century later that the new country found itself beset with problems:

The partition plan of 3 June 1947 gave only seventy-two days for transition to independence. Within this brief period, three provinces had to be divided, referendums organized, civil and armed services bifurcated, and assets apportioned. The telescoped timetable created seemingly impossible problems for Pakistan, which, unlike India, inherited neither a capital nor government nor the financial resources to establish and equip the administrative, economic and military institutions of the new state. Even more daunting problems arose in the wake of the partition. Communal rioting led to the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. A tidal wave of millions of refugees entered Pakistan, confronting the new state with an awesome burden of rehabilitation.19

Getting the new state on its feet economically presented one of the major challenges. Pakistan had virtually no industry, and the major markets for its agricultural products were in India. Pakistan produced 75 percent of the world’s jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India’s cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had “only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills.”20 The non-Muslim entrepreneurial class, which had dominated commerce in the areas now constituting Pakistan, either fled or transferred its capital across the new border. The flight of capital was attributed to “uncertainties about Pakistan’s capacity to survive and the communal disturbances.”21 The U.S. consul in Karachi estimated in July 1947 that, in early June, Rs. 3 billion were sent out of the Punjab alone. Capital transferred from the province of Sindh stood at between Rs. 200 and Rs. 300 million.22 This amounted to shrinking the revenue base of the new country even before it was formally created. The monetary assets of the Pakistan government were held by the Reserve Bank of India and, given the atmosphere of hostility between partisans of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, the division and transfer of assets was by no means a smooth process. Pakistan’s earliest
government officials feared the “economic strangulation” of their new country and saw a Hindu design to force Pakistan to its knees.23

Pakistan’s evolution as a state and nation was deeply influenced by these economic and political challenges and the early responses of Pakistan’s leaders to these challenges. The ambiguity that had united the supporters of Pakistani independence could no longer be maintained now that the country had come into being. Jinnah could not now break completely from the communal rhetoric preceding independence even though he was concerned about aggravating the communal violence already stoked during partition.

Three days before Pakistan’s independence was formalized and Jinnah became the new dominion’s governor general, he addressed Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. This speech suggests that Pakistan’s founder and Quaid-i-Azam expected the new country to be a homeland of Muslims but that he did not expect a role for religion in its governance:

You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. As you know, history shows that in England conditions some time ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some states in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country, and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist, what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain, and they are all members of the
nation. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.24

Pakistan’s secularists have interpreted Jinnah’s August 11 speech as a clear statement of intent to build a secular state.25 Although the speech was widely publicized at the time in an attempt to quell the communal riots that accompanied partition, subsequent official accounts of Jinnah’s life included only an edited version of the speech. References to religion having no role in the business of state had been taken out.26 In any case, Jinnah died within a year of independence, leaving his successors divided, or confused, about whether to take their cue from his independence eve call to keep religion out of politics or to build on the religious sentiment generated during the political bargaining for Pakistan. On-the-ground political realities determined their direction.

The greatest support for Pakistan had come from Muslims living in regions that did not become part of the new state. These Muslim minority regions, now in India, also provided a disproportionate number of the Muslim League’s leadership, senior military officers, and civil servants for Pakistan’s early administration. Interprovincial rivalries, ethnic and language differences, and divergent political interests of various elite groups had remained dormant while Pakistan was only a demand. Now that it was a state, these became obstacles to constitution writing and political consensus building. India, which became independent along with Pakistan in 1947, agreed on a constitution in 1949 and held its first general election in 1951. Pakistan’s first constitution was not promulgated until 1956, and within two years it was abrogated through a military coup d’état.

Pakistan, unlike India, did not go through a general election after independence. Instead, indirect elections through provincial assemblies substituted for an appeal to the general electorate. Provincial elections, held in the Punjab and the NWFP in 1951, were tainted by allegations of administrative interference, whereas the center was often at loggerheads with the elected leadership in Sindh. The Muslim League, which had
led the country to independence, was swept out of power in the country’s eastern wing in 1954 amid a rising tide of Bengali awakening.

Jinnah’s successors chose to patch over domestic differences in the independent country the same way that Muslim unity had been forged during the pre-independence phase. They defined Pakistani national identity through religious symbolism and carried forward the hostilities between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League by building India-Pakistan rivalry. The dispute over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and continued criticism of the idea of Pakistan by Indian politicians and scholars helped fuel the view that “India did not accept the partition of India in good faith and that, by taking piecemeal, she could undo the division.” The fears of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand for carving Pakistan out of India became the new nation-state’s identity, reinforced over time through the educational system and constant propaganda.

The focus on rivalry with India as an instrument of securing legitimacy and authority for the new Pakistani state defined the locus of political power within Pakistan and influenced the relationship between the state and its citizens. Pakistanis were being conditioned to believe that their nationhood was under constant threat and that the threat came from India. Within weeks of independence, editorials in the Muslim League newspaper, Dawn, “called for ‘guns rather than butter,’ urging a bigger and better-equipped army to defend ‘the sacred soil’ of Pakistan.”

This meant that protecting Pakistan’s nationhood by military means took priority over all else, conferring a special status upon the national security apparatus. It also meant that political ideas and actions that could be interpreted as diluting Pakistani nationhood were subversive. Demanding ethnic rights or provincial autonomy, seeking friendly ties with India, and advocating a secular constitution fell under that category of subversion. Ayesha Jalal points out:

If defense against India provided added impetus for the consolidation of state authority in Pakistan, paradoxically enough, it also served to distort the balance of relations between the newly formed center and the provinces. Nothing stood in the way of the reincorporation of the Pakistan areas into the Indian union except
the notion of a central government whose structures of authority lacked both muscle and the necessary bottom. So in Pakistan’s case defense against India was in part a defense against internal threats to central authority. This is why a preoccupation with affording the defense establishment—not unusual for a newly created state—assumed obsessive dimensions in the first few years of Pakistan’s existence. An insecure central leadership of a state carved out of a continuing sovereign entity found it convenient to perceive all internal political opposition as a threat to the security of the state. In the process the very important distinction between internal and external security threats was all but blurred.29

Although before partition Jinnah had never spoken of Pakistan as an ideological state, a Pakistani ideology was delineated by his successors soon after independence. Islam, hostility to India, and the Urdu language were identified as the cornerstones of this new national ideology. Emphasis on Islamic unity was seen as a barrier against the potential tide of ethnic nationalism, which could undermine Pakistan’s integrity. It was also argued that India would use ethnic differences among Pakistanis to divide and devour the new country.30 Very soon after independence, “Islamic Pakistan” was defining itself through the prism of resistance to “Hindu India.” It was also seeking great-power allies to help pay for the economic and military development of the new country.

The emphasis on Islam as an element of national policy empowered the new country’s religious leaders. It also created a nexus between the “custodians of Islam” and the country’s military establishment, civilian bureaucracy, and intelligence apparatus, which saw itself as the guardian of the new state. Inflexibility in relations with India, and the belief that India represented an existential threat to Pakistan, led to maintaining a large military, which in turn helped the military assert its dominance in the life of the country.31 The search for foreign allies who could pay for the country’s defense and economic growth resulted in Pakistan’s alliance with the West, especially the United States.

Each element of this policy tripod—religious nationalism, confrontation with India, and alliance with the West—influenced the other, sometimes in imperceptible ways. Sometimes one factor required distortions
and convoluted explanations to manage the other. Thus, India had to be painted by Pakistan as an enemy of Islam in order to bolster Pakistan’s self-image as a bastion of Islam. The United States had to be persuaded of the value of Pakistan’s strategic location and its anticommunist credentials to be able to secure weapons, which were needed to confront the Indians. During its history, the greatest threats to Pakistan’s central authority came from groups seeking regional autonomy, ethnic rights, or political inclusion; however, successive Pakistani governments linked these threats to either an Indian-inspired plan to weaken Pakistan or “communists,” even though communist influence in Pakistan was minuscule.

The first formal step toward transforming Pakistan into an Islamic ideological state was taken in March 1949 when the country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, presented the Objectives Resolution in the constituent assembly. The resolution laid out the main principles of a future Pakistani constitution. It provided for democracy, freedom, equality, and social justice “as enunciated by Islam,” opening the door for future controversies about what Islam required of a state. The Objectives Resolution was a curious mix of theology and political science. It read:

Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a Constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;

Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;

Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;

Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality;

Wherein adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured;

Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution toward international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.32

Non-Muslim opposition members and a solitary Muslim parliamentarian expressed serious qualms about committing the new state to “ordering their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam.” But Liaquat Ali Khan described it as “the most important occasion in the life of this country, next in importance only to the achievement of independence.”33 In one way, it was. After the Objectives Resolution there was no turning back from Pakistan’s status as an Islamic ideological state.

Soon, prominent individuals within the government mooted proposals for adopting Arabic as the national language and for changing the script of the Bengali language from its Sanskrit base to an Arabic-Persian one.34 The president of the Muslim League, Chaudhry Khaliq-
uz-zaman announced that Pakistan would bring all Muslim countries together into Islamistan—a pan-Islamic entity.\textsuperscript{35} The Pakistani government also convened a world Muslim conference in Karachi in 1949, to promote pan-Islamism.\textsuperscript{36} This conference led to the formation of the Motamar al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World Congress), which has since played a crucial role in building up the feeling of Muslim victimization that subsequently fed the global Islamist movement. Toward the end of 1949, the Pakistani government reached out to the governments of other Muslim countries to try to form an Islamic conference. Only Egypt and Saudi Arabia showed any interest.\textsuperscript{37}

Delegates from eighteen Muslim countries attended an international Islamic economic conference, organized at Karachi, in November 1949. Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad, who subsequently became governor general and was an important architect of Pakistan’s alliance with the United States, called for “a system of collective bargaining and collective security” for Muslim nations.

Pakistan’s pan-Islamic aspirations, however, were neither shared nor supported by the Muslim governments of the time. Nationalism in other parts of the Muslim world was based on ethnicity, language, or territory. Most Arab governments, as well as secular states such as Turkey, were wary of a religious revival. One of the earliest Western scholars of Pakistani politics, Keith Callard, observed that Pakistanis seemed to believe in the essential unity of purpose and outlook in the Muslim world:

Pakistan was founded to advance the cause of Muslims. Other Muslims might have been expected to be sympathetic, even enthusiastic. But this assumed that other Muslim states would take the same view of the relation between religion and nationality. In fact, the political upsurge elsewhere was based largely on territorial and racial nationalism, anti-Western, anti-white. Religion played a part in this, but it was a lesser part than color, language, and a political theory of violent opposition to colonialism and exploitation. If a choice had to be made [by other Muslim states between friendship with India or Pakistan], India, as the more powerful, more stable and more influential, was likely to have the advantage.\textsuperscript{38}
Although Muslim governments were initially unsympathetic to Pakistan’s pan-Islamic aspirations, Islamists from the world over were drawn to Pakistan. Controversial figures such as the pro-Nazi former grand mufti of Palestine, Al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, and leaders of Islamist political movements like the Arab Muslim Brotherhood became frequent visitors to the country. Pakistan’s desire for an international organization of Islamic countries was fulfilled in the 1970s, with the creation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). During Pakistan’s formative years, however, pan-Islamism was more important for Pakistan’s efforts to consolidate its national identity than as the mainstay of its foreign policy.

The strongest objections to the Islamic ideological paradigm being imposed on the new state came from Pakistan’s eastern wing. Bengali-speaking Muslims from what is now Bangladesh, hoping their more numerous population would guarantee them at least an equal say in running a new country’s affairs, had supported the idea of Pakistan, but West Pakistani soldiers, politicians, and civil servants dominated Pakistan’s government. Within a year of independence, Bengalis in East Pakistan were rioting in the streets, demanding recognition of their language, Bengali, as a national language. Soon thereafter, in the western wing of the country, ethnic Sindhis, Pashtuns (also known as Pathans), and Balochis also complained about the domination of the civil services and the military’s officer corps by ethnic Punjabis and Urdu-speaking migrants from northern India.

Liaquat Ali Khan was not a religious man himself and most members of the first constituent assembly were members of the country’s secular elite. They had clearly been influenced in their decision to declare Pakistan an Islamic state by the realization that Pakistanis had multiple identities. The experience of language riots by Bengalis in East Pakistan had pointed out the difficulty of subsuming ethnic identities into a new Pakistani identity. Religion was an easier tool of mobilization. Making being Pakistani synonymous with being a good Muslim was considered the more attainable goal. Given the reality that Islam meant different things to different people, however, the development of an ideological state could not be left to the will of the people. Institutions of state had to
control the process of building the new nation. Ensuring the supremacy of these state institutions required greater centralization of authority.

The secular elite assumed that they would continue to lead the country while they rallied the people on the basis of Islamic ideology. They thought they could make use of Muslim theologians and activists, organized in religious parties such as the Majlis-e-Ahrar (Committee of Librators) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (Society of Muslim Scholars). Pakistan had inherited the “religious sections” of the British intelligence service in India, which had been created to influence different religious communities during colonial rule. The religious sections had often manipulated these groups to ward off pressures for Indian independence. With classic divide-and-rule thinking, leaders of the British Raj assumed that they would have better administrative control if groups within the various religious communities, especially Hindus and Muslims, could be persuaded to pursue sectarian issues. After independence, the Pakistani intelligence organizations hoped to use the same tactic against perceived and real threats to the state. The religious organizations were small in number and stigmatized by their pre-independence opposition to the idea of Pakistan, but they could make statements that secular officials could not. Particularly appealing was the prospect of using theologians to create an impression of pressure from below for policies that did not otherwise capture the imagination of the people.

The Pakistani government could also take advantage of the religious groups, as was the case during the anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore in 1953. The Ahmadis (also known as Qadianis or Ahmadiyyas) assert that they are Muslims, follow the teachings of a nineteenth century messiah, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (whom they consider a prophet), and do not recognize the obligation of jihad. Orthodox Muslims had always considered Ahmadis a non-Islamic cult because of their refusal to acknowledge that Muhammad was the final prophet of God. After the 1951 Punjab elections, Punjab’s chief minister, a member of the Muslim League, used the links his provincial secret service had with Islamist groups to foment popular agitation calling for legislation that would declare the Ahmadis non-Muslims for legal purposes.

The plan was that violent street protesters would call for the resignation of Pakistan’s first foreign minister, Sir Zafarulla Khan, who was an
Ahmadi, and bring down the federal government. The Punjab chief minister, Mumtaz Daulatana, hoped to benefit from the fall of the central government and expected to become prime minister. The riots could not be calibrated, however, and law and order collapsed and the army was called in to control the situation through a declaration of martial law in Lahore, the capital of Punjab.

The events of that year highlighted three interlinked problems that have dogged Pakistan’s internal politics over the past fifty years: part of the state apparatus used religion and religious groups for a political purpose. The extent of the religious groups’ influence and the sentiment unleashed by them could not be controlled. And the military stepped in to deal with the symptoms of the chaos generated by religious-political agitation, without any effort to deal with its causes.41

The anti-Ahmadi riots brought into the limelight Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi and his Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Society or Islamic Party). Founded in 1941, the Jamaat-e-Islami was different from other religious groups. It was neither sectarian nor an association of theologians of a particular Islamic school. The Jamaat-e-Islami was an Islamist party similar to the Arab Muslim Brotherhood. Maulana Maududi, its founder, aimed his calls for Islamic revival at middle-class professionals and state employees rather than traditional mullahs. He had not been part of the campaign for Pakistan and had been critical before partition of the Muslim League’s “un-Islamic” leadership, but his writings had supported the theory that Muslims were a nation distinct from non-Muslims. Vali Nasr points out that “communal rights for Muslims” was the common theme of both organizations: “The Jamaat and Muslim League each legitimated the political function of the other in furthering their common communalist cause . . . The Jamaat legitimated communalism in Islamic terms and helped the League find a base of support by appealing to religious symbols. The Muslim League, in turn, increasingly Islamized the political discourse on Pakistan to the Jamaat’s advantage, creating a suitable gateway for the party’s entry into the political fray.”42

Maulana Maududi’s emphasis before Pakistan’s creation was on religious and spiritual revival, and he had commented on politics without taking part. He had hoped to create a large cadre of pious Muslims who would not aspire to power and would lead by example. The process of
independence seems to have changed his mind. If Jinnah—a Western-educated and, by all accounts, nonpracticing Muslim—could inspire India’s Muslims to create a state by appealing to their religious sentiment, Maulana Maududi reasoned there was scope for a body of practicing Islamists to take over that state.

Maulana Maududi (1903–1979) was a prolific writer. He argued that Islam was as much an ideology as a religion. The Islamic ideology, according to Maulana Maududi, carried forward the mission of the prophets, which he described as follows:

1. To revolutionize the intellectual and mental outlook of humanity and to instill the Islamic attitude toward life and morality to such an extent that their way of thinking, ideal in life, and standards of values and behaviour become Islamic.
2. To regiment all such people who have accepted Islamic ideals and moulded their lives after the Islamic pattern with a view to struggling for power and seizing it by the use of all available means and equipment.
3. To establish Islamic rule and organize the various aspects of social life on Islamic bases, to adopt such means as will widen the sphere of Islamic influence in the world, and to arrange for the moral and intellectual training, by contact and example, of all those people who enter the fold of Islam from time to time.

The Jamaat-e-Islami adopted a cadre-based structure similar to that of communist parties. It built alliances with Islamist parties in other countries, recruited members through a network of schools, and hoped to be the vanguard of a gradual Islamic revolution. The party’s call for Islamic revolution did not have mass appeal, however, even though its social service helped create a well-knit, nationwide organization within a few years of partition. The Jamaat saw its opportunity in working with the new state’s elite, gradually expanding the Islamic agenda while providing the theological rationale for the elite’s plans for nation building on the basis of religion. Jamaat-e-Islami’s cadres among students, trade unions, and professional organizations, as well as its focus on building its own media, made it a natural ally for those within the government
who thought that Pakistan’s survival as a state required a religious anchor.\footnote{36}

The Pakistani establishment immediately after partition was wary of Maulana Maududi. Some saw rudiments of totalitarianism in his concept of pious leadership while others considered Jamaat-e-Islami’s revolutionary rhetoric dangerous. Muslim League leaders saw Maulana Maududi as a rival claimant for popular support. Some were concerned about the claim to leadership by someone who had not participated in the campaign for Pakistan’s creation. Liaquat Ali Khan advised civil servants and military officers against joining the Jamaat-e-Islami and even clamped down on the organization in 1948, banning its newspapers and arresting its leaders.\footnote{37}

Liaquat Ali Khan’s admonition did not prevent the state apparatus from adapting or adopting some of Maulana Maududi’s ideas in their own nation-building enterprise. The Jamaat-e-Islami benefited from close ties with Muslim League leaders, such as Punjab chief minister Nawab Iftikhar Mamdot, who were “eager to enlist the support of Islamic groups such as the Jamaat”\footnote{38} in battles against political rivals. Maulana Maududi continued to be disliked by the pro-Western interior minister, Major General Iskander Mirza, and the army chief, General Ayub Khan, both of whom later rose to the office of Pakistan’s president. These members of the permanent state establishment encouraged the creation of other religious groups more amenable to official control, which in turn influenced the politics of Jamaat-e-Islami.

Maulana Maududi’s idea of regimenting Muslims and instilling a belief system in their thinking was not very different from the objectives of Pakistan’s top-down nation builders, who considered regimentation necessary to iron out the creases in the design of a nation-state united primarily by the religion of its citizens. Pakistan’s early elite embraced Maulana Maududi’s message even as it opposed the messenger. To them the concept of a religious state was desirable as long as it did not entail ceding power to a group of theologians. Maulana Maududi, on the other hand, sought power for the saleheen (the pious ones). The Jamaat-e-Islami summed up its philosophy in the slogan, “The country is God’s; rule must be by God’s law; the government should be that of God’s pious men.”
In December 1947, a group of students inspired by Maulana Maududi’s writings formed the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (Islamic Students Society, also known as Jamiat or by its initials, IJT). Although essentially the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the IJT was greatly influenced by the methods of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which were more radical than the constitutional gradualism advocated by Jamaat-e-Islami. The IJT became involved in student politics, which enabled it to act as a big tent for center-right students opposed to Marxist student groups on Pakistan’s college campuses. IJT members clashed violently with rival, mostly left-wing, student groups and engaged in agitation on issues affecting students. In addition to providing a large cadre for recruitment for the Jamaat-e-Islami, the IJT also created a wide circle of “fellow travelers” in Pakistan’s educational system, civil services, and the military’s officer corps. As IJT members graduated to membership in the parent organization, Jamaat-e-Islami became more overtly political; it no longer stuck to a single modus operandi and was now willing to explore all possible avenues toward expanding its influence and ideology.

Maulana Maududi outlined a nine-point agenda for Islamic revival. Some of the points, such as the need to “break the power of un-Islam and enable Islam to take hold of life as a whole” were not particularly appealing to the ruling elite. Others points, such as his ideas for intellectual revolution and defense of Islam, could be useful in building an Islamic national identity for Pakistan. Maulana Maududi defined intellectual revolution as an effort to “shape the ideas, beliefs and moral viewpoints of the people into the Islamic mould, reform the system of education and revive the Islamic sciences and attitudes in general.” This plan for shaping and molding ideas provided the basis later in Pakistan’s life for creating a national culture and history that traced Pakistan’s origins to the arrival of Islam in South Asia.

The Pakistani state, in its various campaigns against ethnic nationalists and leftists who did not agree with a centralized state, similarly adopted Maulana Maududi’s notion of defense of Islam against “political forces seeking to suppress and finish Islam and [to] break their power in order to make Islam a living force.” Pakistan was now the bastion of Islam and an Islamic state, even if the pious elite did not yet rule it. Critics and enemies of the state could now be called enemies of
Islam and their ideas described as threats to Islam’s emergence as a living force.

One of Maulana Maududi’s earliest contacts with the Pakistani establishment was Maulana Zafar Ahmed Ansari, who had served as office secretary of the All-India Muslim League and who shared Maulana Maududi’s vision of a greater role for religion in Pakistan. Both Maulana Ansari and Maulana Maududi were consulted by the first head of the country’s civil service, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, who subsequently became Pakistan’s prime minister. Maulana Maududi was also invited to speak on Pakistan’s state radio to elaborate his vision of an Islamic state. The Jamaat-e-Islami played a key role in mobilizing theologians to favor an Islamic constitution. It maintained a hard-line posture against India and helped the state by describing leftists, secularists, and ethnic nationalists as “anti-Islam unbelievers.” When Muhammad Ali, as prime minister, finally thrashed out a Pakistani constitution in 1956, it included the Objectives Resolution in its preamble, transformed the Constituent Assembly into the National Assembly, and declared Pakistan’s official name to be “the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” Pakistan became the first Muslim country to use the religious appellation in its constitutional name. Maulana Maududi’s followers credited their leader’s influence for this achievement. Since then, the Jamaat-e-Islami has emerged as Pakistan’s most well-organized and internationally visible religious party although the number of its followers as a proportion of the total population has remained small.

Maulana Maududi was initially also critical of Pakistan’s alliance with the United States, but he gradually tempered his criticism and focused more on combating communism. However, Jamaat-e-Islami’s critique of Western civilization and values helped shape the Pakistani state’s later worldview of suspicion toward the United States. Pakistani Islamists did not seriously challenge the plans of Pakistan’s leaders to build their economy and military with U.S. assistance, but they periodically questioned U.S. intentions, which enabled Pakistan’s rulers to cite opposition from both right and left in fulfilling their end of the bargain when Pakistan became a U.S. ally.

A parallel development during Pakistan’s formative years was the rise to power of the military and civil bureaucracy. The politicians of the
Muslim League had little or no administrative experience and relied heavily on civil servants inherited from the Raj. The Kashmir dispute as well as the ideological project fueled rivalry with India, which in turn increased the new country’s need for a strong military. The military and the bureaucracy, therefore, became even more crucial players in Pakistan’s life than they would have been had the circumstances of the country’s birth been different. There were fewer Muslim than Hindu officers in the highest echelons of the British Indian army and civil service. For the first few years, British generals commanded Pakistan’s military, and British officers also filled many important civil service positions. Midrank Muslim officers, eager for promotions, accused the British of favoring India and played the religious card to move British officers out.51

At partition Pakistan had received 30 percent of British India’s army, 40 percent of its navy, and 20 percent of its air force.52 Its share of revenue, however, was a meager 17 percent, leading to concerns about the new state’s ability to pay for all its forces. Within days of independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India’s assets, both financial and military. India’s decision to delay transferring Pakistan’s share of assets increased the bitterness of partition. Mohandas Gandhi, the father of modern India, recognized the importance of containing that bitterness in India-Pakistan relations; in fact, he went on a fast in January 1948 and demanded that Pakistan’s share of the monetary assets be paid.53 But Pakistanis were not fully satisfied by the terms of the partition. They felt strongly that the Indians as well as the British had created additional problems for the new country while dividing the assets and, especially, in demarcating the border.

If Indian leaders were openly hostile to the idea of Pakistan, global public opinion had also been lukewarm to partition. Time magazine, while reporting on the independence of India and Pakistan, wrote that “Pakistan was the creation of one clever man, Jinnah”54 and compared it unfavorably to the “mass movement” leading to India’s independence. The dominant Indian narrative of independence demonized Jinnah and spoke of Pakistan’s creation as a tragedy. Indian intellectuals and officials routinely predicted that India and Pakistan would become one nation again. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, the sister of India’s Prime Minister Nehru who
served as Indian ambassador to the United States told an American newspaper in 1951, “We agreed to partition because failure to do so would have perpetuated foreign rule.”

Persistent questioning of the wisdom of their nationhood bred insecurity among Pakistanis about the viability of their new state. Pakistanis responded with a parallel narrative justifying the creation of Pakistan that blamed the Hindu leadership of Congress for threatening Muslim identity and culture and thereby making separation inevitable. Pakistanis also defended their founder, Jinnah, whom they considered the Quaid-e-Azam (great leader). Although much thought might not have gone into creating the separate state of Pakistan, considerable effort was now expended on defining, justifying, and protecting it. Pakistani insecurity was reinforced whenever Indians or other foreigners alluded to the futility of Pakistan’s creation. Pakistanis were concerned about the prospect of India “undoing” the partition and the attitude of India’s post-independence elite, which continued to speak in terms of the inevitability of “reunification,” did not help in allaying Pakistani fears.

Among the contentious issues born out of the partition was that of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. During the Raj, 562 princely states had retained varying degrees of administrative independence through treaties with Britain concluded during the process of colonial penetration. Jammu and Kashmir was one of them. The treaty relationships conferred “paramountcy” on the British and, in most cases, control over defense, external affairs, and communications. The end of the Raj also marked the end of paramountcy. At the time of partition, the British asked the rulers of these states to choose between India and Pakistan, taking into consideration geographical contiguity and the wishes of their subjects.

Kashmir’s contiguity with Pakistan and its Muslim majority created the expectation of its inclusion in the new Muslim country. The state’s ruler at the time of partition, Maharajah Hari Singh, sought to retain independence even though a segment of his Muslim subjects wanted Kashmir to become part of Pakistan. It has been argued that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had thought through a grand strategy for the princely states, including a design to ensure the inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir in the independent Indian state.
Most Pakistani leaders and scholars, as well as some Western authors, have also implicated the last British viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and members of his staff in the “conspiracy” to draw the boundary in a manner that Kashmir would abut both India and Pakistan. Under the partition plan, the province of Punjab was to be divided between India and Pakistan on grounds of contiguity and majority of religious affiliation. Two Muslim-majority tehsils (subdivisions) in Gurdaspur district were awarded to India by the Boundary Commission led by British judge Sir Cyril Radcliffe. This provided overland access to Kashmir from India.59

Had the map of the Punjab been drawn differently, Kashmir could have ended up with road access only to Pakistan and a natural mountainous frontier with India. This would have precluded any effective Indian claim on the princely state.

The chaotic condition of government in the newly born state of Pakistan left little room for planning grand strategy. Pakistanis felt cheated over the Boundary Commission award. Concern about the future of Kashmir was addressed by support for the pro-Pakistan All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference that led an agitation against the Maharajah.60 Pashtun tribesmen were hastily trained to enter Kashmir; they were supported by Pakistani military officers. The fact that a British general headed the new Pakistani army limited the scope for a declaration of war against the ill-equipped forces of a British-allied maharajah.

Pakistan’s first move in Kashmir was an unconventional war, begun with the assumption that the Kashmiri people would support the invading tribal lashkar (unstructured army) and that the maharajah’s forces would be easily subdued. Little, if any, thought had been given to the prospect of failure or to what might happen if the Indian army got involved in forestalling a Pakistani fait accompli against the Kashmiri maharajah.

Maharajah Hari Singh sought Indian military help and signed the instrument of accession with India to secure military assistance.64 India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, sent in Indian troops to fend off the Azad (Free) Kashmir forces. Pakistan continues to dispute Hari Singh’s accession, arguing that it was not the result of a voluntary decision and that he was not competent to accede to India because he had signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan earlier.65
The Indian army secured the capital, Srinagar, and established control over the Kashmir valley and most parts of Jammu and Ladakh before a cease-fire was declared and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops arrived. The critical consequence of the 1947–1948 war and the subsequent cease-fire was that it conferred upon India the position of a status quo power, holding most of the population and significant territory of Jammu and Kashmir, including its capital, Srinagar. Kashmir continues to bedevil India-Pakistan relations. The role of the conflict, beginning soon after partition, in the ideological evolution of Pakistan is most relevant to the subject of this study.

Muslim officers of Pakistan’s army involved in the Kashmir military operation of 1947–1948 used the Islamic notion of jihad to mobilize the tribesmen they had recruited as raiders for the seizure of Kashmir. Akbar Khan, who rose to the rank of major general before being implicated in a 1951 conspiracy to overthrow the government, commanded the Kashmir liberation forces.63 He adopted the nom de guerre of Tariq, after the Muslim conqueror of Spain, Tariq bin Ziyad.64 Religious scholars were invited by the government to issue fatwas (Islamic religious opinions issued by a mufti or jurisconsult) declaring the tribesmen’s foray into Kashmir as a jihad, and both the tribesmen and the military officers assisting them were described as mujahideen. Notwithstanding the fact that the Pakistani army had been created out of the British Indian army and had inherited all the professional qualifications of its colonial predecessor, within the first few months of independence it was also moving in the direction of adopting an Islamic ideological coloring.

With an ongoing war in Kashmir and the need to maintain the military that had come as Pakistan’s share, Pakistan’s central government was forced to allocate 70 percent of its projected expenditure in its first year’s budget for defense.65 The prospect of conflict with a much larger neighbor bent upon denying Pakistan’s right to exist also led to the strengthening of the country’s intelligence services. Pakistan’s intelligence services were particularly attentive to the prospect of domestic political forces cooperating with the country’s external enemies. As in many insecure states, in Pakistan the line between preventing the nation’s enemies from causing it harm and declaring everyone who disagrees with the government an enemy of the nation was blurred. In addition to
the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB), each of Pakistan’s provinces had a
special branch in its police force that dealt primarily with local intelligence. Each arm of the military (the army, navy, and air force) had its
own intelligence service. In 1948, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) di-
rectorate was created, primarily to coordinate strategic intelligence gath-
ering. The IB and the provincial special branches had been involved in
politics since the British Raj, spying on dissidents and playing one group
of natives against another. The military intelligence services became
politicized in their effort to find a great-power patron for an economi-
cally and militarily weak Pakistan.

If concerns about national identity led to an emphasis on religious
ideology, the need for keeping the military well supplied resulted in
Pakistan’s alliance with the United States. Even before partition, Jinnah
had indicated that Pakistan’s foreign policy would be oriented toward
the Muslim world but that there would be an expectation of U.S. sup-
port. “Muslim countries would stand together against possible Russian
aggression and would look to the U.S. for assistance,” he told a visiting
U.S. diplomat.66 After independence, Jinnah’s emphasis on alliance with
the United States increased, and he believed that Pakistan could extract
a good price from the United States for such an alliance in view of
Pakistan’s strategic location. Margaret Bourke-White, a Life magazine
reporter-photographer, reported that Jinnah told her that “America needs
Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America . . . Pakistan is the pivot of
the world, as we are placed . . . [on] the frontier on which the future
position of the world revolves.”67

Bourke-White had interviewed Jinnah soon after partition and referred
to that interview in her book, which was published within two years of
the founding of Pakistan. That 1947 interview and Bourke-White’s ob-
servations, based on conversations with Pakistani officials in 1947–1948,
reveal the underlying assumptions of Pakistan’s relations with the United
States for the next five decades:

“Russia,” confided Mr. Jinnah, “is not very far away.” This had a
familiar ring. In Jinnah’s mind, this brave new nation had no other
claim on American friendship than this—that across a wild tumble
of roadless mountain ranges lay the land of the Bolsheviks. I
wondered whether the Quaid-i-Azam considered his new state only as an armored buffer between opposing major powers. He was stressing America’s military interest in other parts of the world. “America is now awakened,” he said with a satisfied smile. Since the United States was now bolstering up Greece and Turkey, she should be much more interested in pouring money and arms into Pakistan. “If Russia walks in here,” he concluded, “the whole world is menaced . . .” In the weeks to come I was to hear the Quaid-i-Azam’s thesis echoed by government officials throughout Pakistan. “Surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in.” But when I asked whether there were any signs of Russian infiltration, they would reply almost sadly, as though sorry not to be able to make more of the argument. “No, Russia has shown no signs of being interested in Pakistan . . .” This hope of tapping the U.S. Treasury was voiced so persistently that one wondered whether the purpose was to bolster the world against Bolshevism or to bolster Pakistan’s own uncertain position as a new political entity.”

Bourke-White attributed the interest of Pakistan’s founders in foreign affairs to the “bankruptcy of ideas in the new Muslim State.” Pakistan, she observed, had a policy of “profiting from the disputes of others,” and she cited Pakistan’s desire to benefit from tension between the great powers and Pakistan’s early focus on the Palestine dispute as examples of this tendency. “Pakistan was occupied with her own grave internal problem, but she still found time to talk fervently of sending ‘a liberation army to Palestine to help the Arabs free the Holy Land from the Jews,’” she wrote. “Muslim divines began advocating that trained ex-servicemen be dispatched in this holy cause. Dawn, the official government newspaper, condemned the ‘Jewish State’ and urged a united front of Muslim countries in the military as well as the spiritual sense. ‘That way lies the salvation of Islam,’ said one editorial.”

Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s anointed successor and Pakistan’s first prime minister, explained the three fundamental interests that would define Pakistan’s external relations: “integrity of Pakistan, Islamic culture and the need for economic development.” Maintaining Pakistan’s integrity was a euphemism for ensuring adequate defense and military
preparedness; it implied Pakistan’s need of a great-power patron to help pay for its defense. When Liaquat Ali Khan addressed a Western audience, as when he stated the three fundamental interests, his Islamic rhetoric was diluted by couching it in cultural terms. In the domestic arena, however, he continued to use the term, “Islamic ideology,” making it possible for Islamist ideologues to assert their role as interpreters of that ideology.

The United States was Pakistan’s great-power patron of choice, crucial as a source of weapons and economic aid. Alliance with the United States became as important a part of the plans for consolidating the Pakistani nation and state as Islam and opposition to Hindu India. At one stage, Liaquat Ali Khan even suggested that Pakistan would have “no further need to maintain an army,” let alone a large one, if the United States was ready to “guarantee Pakistan’s frontiers.”

In one of its first overtly political initiatives, Pakistan’s intelligence community fabricated evidence of a communist threat to Pakistan to get U.S. attention:

Since the cease-fire in Kashmir, the joint services intelligence had been fabricating increasingly bizarre reports about the fledgling local Communist party and its purported plans to destabilize the state. An early attempt to get attention from London and Washington was “a most hair-raising leaflet . . . which talked . . . of subterranean armies of shock troops, planned attacks on ‘nerve centers,’ shadow governments” and so on. By the summer of 1949, the director of military intelligence, Brigadier Shahid Hamid, had started dreaming up phantoms and spent the better part of his waking hours “seeking funds and authority to establish a large secret civilian intelligence agency.” The brigadier had touched [a] sensitive nerve among senior bureaucrats. The finance minister himself showed a keen interest in the matter and began exploring the possibility of receiving help from American intelligence to build an “Islamic barrier against the Soviets.”

In May 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan visited Washington at the invitation of President Harry Truman and was warmly received. During the visit he declared Pakistan’s alignment with the United States. Although India
remained Pakistan’s main military concern, the first Pakistani prime minister went along with the theme of fighting the communist menace. He supported U.S. actions in Korea, which he described as being aimed at “saving Asia from the dangers of world communism.” U.S. economic aid started flowing to Pakistan soon after Liaquat’s trip to Washington. Liaquat balanced his generally pro-West policy with a refusal to align Pakistan completely with the United States “unless Washington guaranteed Pakistan’s security against India.”

The push for formalizing a treaty relationship with the United States even without specific guarantees regarding India came from the army, which was concerned about keeping itself well supplied. In 1951, General Ayub Khan became the first Pakistani commander in chief of Pakistan’s army, marking the indigenization of the military and ending the transition role of British officers. In the same year, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. Before the assassination, Liaquat, his foreign minister, Sir Zafarulla Khan, and General Ayub Khan initiated talks about military cooperation with the United States. In September–October 1953, General Ayub Khan visited Washington “at his own volition,” ahead of a visit by Pakistan’s civilian head of state and foreign minister. He sought a “deal whereby Pakistan could—for the right price—serve as the West’s eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure.”

The new U.S. administration, led by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, sought to reduce U.S. involvement in military operations of the type undertaken in Korea by building the military capability of frontline states such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. This plan of building a “northern tier of defense” against Soviet expansion required Pakistan’s participation. Pakistan’s leaders of the time saw in it an opportunity to secure the resources and material for the country’s military. During his independent visit to Washington, General Ayub Khan “made a favorable impression on both [Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles and [his chief military adviser, Admiral Arthur W.] Radford. Indeed, by this time the mystique of the martial Pashtuns with their splendid warrior traditions was beginning to take firm hold in Washington. Ayub, himself a Pathan and in person an impressive man, was readily seen as epitomizing the best of these traditions. Better still, he was in a position to deliver the goods and seemed willing to do so.”
Pakistan concluded a joint defense treaty with the United States in 1954 and became part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). From Pakistan’s point of view, the relationship was one of quid pro quo. Pakistan would get U.S. arms as well as substantial aid to cover the costs of economic development. The United States would secure Pakistan’s membership in alliances it considered necessary. Pakistan subsequently also became part of the Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The deal ensured the resources needed to protect the integrity of Pakistan and the need for economic development—two of the three fundamental national interests identified by Liaquat Ali Khan.

The third element—Islamic ideology—remained in the picture, but its priority was lowered for the moment. Appeals to Islamic sentiment against godless communism fit in well with Pakistan’s alliance with the United States; however, as Liaquat had himself realized, while dealing with Americans it was not expedient to go beyond mild references to Islamic culture and the importance of religious roots. The United States, in a policy statement, had made it clear that “[a]part from Communism, the other main threat to American interests in Pakistan was from ‘reactionary groups of landholders and uneducated religious leaders’ who were opposed to the ‘present Western-minded government’ and ‘favor[ed] a return to primitive Islamic principles.’”

At home, however, the domestic audience continued to be given the full dose of Islamic ideology. This created a dichotomy for the Pakistani state. On the one hand, it had to take into account U.S. expectations on a range of issues, from attitudes toward India to attitudes toward developments in the rest of the Islamic world. On the other hand, it had to contend with opposition from more eager Islamists, who saw a close relationship with the United States as impeding Pakistan’s ideological growth. At home, Pakistan’s leaders dealt with the problem partly by portraying the alliance with the United States in terms of ensuring Pakistani security vis-à-vis India and acquiring Kashmir although, in fact, Washington had given no clear guarantee about Kashmir. In their eagerness to seek alliance with the United States, Pakistani officials had exaggerated their commitment to fighting communism and had even pledged that U.S. military aid would not be used against India.
The United States, after getting Pakistan’s participation in SEATO and CENTO, fulfilled Pakistan’s demand for military equipment and economic aid. In the quest for U.S. support, Ayub Khan had gone so far as telling a U.S. official, “Our army can be your army if you want.”  However, Washington’s expectation of a centrally positioned landing site for possible operations against the Soviet Union and China was not met. Shirin Tahir-Kheli points this out in her study of U.S.-Pakistan relations:

Despite the overwhelming disparity in the power equation, Washington was not able to convince Ayub—who as commander in chief of the army was the key relevant figure—to grant full access rights. Ayub tantalized Washington with possible offers of such facilities and manpower only if the price was “right.” There were three main reasons for his demanding the maximum price.

First, Ayub fully recognized the enormous costs of Pakistan’s military expansion program, which could not be borne indigenously. Second, he was aware of the resentment the cost of military expansion would engender in the civilian sector if the funds were abstracted from the civilian budget and allocated for defense. Washington represented a possible way out of the dilemma because it could become the source not only for military assistance but for other economic aid. Ayub could thus become a national hero for bringing home both guns and butter, so to speak. Third, Ayub was keenly aware that Pakistan needed its military for defense against India and could not deplete its ranks in pursuit of U.S. options. The only way Pakistan could play that proxy role, in his view, was if Washington guaranteed Pakistan’s security against India.

While Pakistan did not provide the military facilities the United States sought as part of the strategy for the containment of communism, it permitted U-2 reconnaissance flights and listening posts that were aimed at the Soviet Union. The United States had to be content with looking upon its investment in Pakistan as one that would bear fruit only over time. Ayub Khan’s bargaining for greater military and economic assistance became the norm for his successors. General Zia ul-Haq drove a
similarly hard bargain when the United States sought to expand an anticomunist insurgency in Afghanistan after the 1979 Soviet invasion of that country. General Musharraf, too, followed Ayub Khan in seeking the right price for cooperation in the war against terrorism after September 11, 2001. While the Pakistanis bargained well for military and economic assistance, the United States has generally had to be modest in its ambitions about what it could hope to achieve. Pakistan’s real or projected limitations and compulsions have repeatedly been cited during the execution stage of deals based on a quid pro quo, limiting the fulfillment of U.S. expectations.

The most significant result of the U.S. treaty relationship was to enhance General Ayub Khan’s standing within the Pakistani ruling elite and, more important, provide an increased role for the military in Pakistan’s subsequent development. The military was already a significant institution, one that existed well before the country came into being. It had fought India in 1947–1948, helped resettle the refugees, and provided crucial assistance during national disasters such as floods. Now it had emerged as the major reason for U.S. interest in Pakistan. The political leadership, on the other hand, was mired in infighting that—at least in the eyes of the military and the civil bureaucracy—could jeopardize Pakistan’s survival. The same year he secured Pakistan’s relationship with the United States, Ayub Khan wrote a memo entitled “A short appreciation of present and future problems of Pakistan.” He was preparing for a military takeover of Pakistan; this was his blueprint for governance.

Between 1954 and 1958, members of Pakistan’s permanent state structure—the civil services and the military—enhanced their share of power although they did not completely dispense with trappings of a parliamentary democracy. Soon after Liaquat’s assassination in 1951, the civil servant finance minister, Ghulam Muhammad, became governor general. Major General Iskander Mirza, graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and one-time member of the British Indian political service, succeeded him.

General Ayub Khan remained a constant power broker throughout this period, playing a behind-the-scenes political role. In 1953 he was named defense minister. This marked a break from the tradition of
parliamentary government, which requires cabinet ministers to be members of Parliament. Ayub Khan remained a constant factor in Pakistan’s circle of power between 1951 and 1958, even though the country went through seven prime ministers and several cabinets during this prolonged period of political uncertainty.

The rise to power of the civil-military complex ended the process of political bargaining in defining the direction of Pakistan. These primarily British-trained men “deferred to the experts, minimized the role of the politicians and tried to isolate the clerics.” But that did not mean they had abandoned the notion of building a nation through administrative fiat and with the help of an ideology. The bureaucrats, backed by the military, attempted to reduce the domestic role of religion by ignoring, for example, calls for Sharia rule. But religious sentiment continued to be exploited in responding to what came to be described as the Indian threat. The civil-military complex adapted the ideology of Pakistan to mean demonization of India’s Brahmin Hinduism and a zealous hostility toward India. Domestic political groups demanding provincial autonomy or ethnic rights were invariably accused of advancing an Indian agenda to dismember or weaken Pakistan.

Iskander Mirza had impressed Western statesmen and diplomats as a secular man, but, when it came to India, his reaction was visceral and not very different from the more religiously inclined politicians or bureaucrats. Before Iskander Mirza abrogated the 1956 constitution and imposed martial law in 1958, he confided his intention to Sir Alexander Symon, the British high commissioner. Immediately after what amounted to a coup d’état, when Sir Alexander advised him to make an early statement about peaceful intentions toward India, Mirza ignored that advice.

General Mirza imposed martial law on October 7, 1958, ostensibly to save the country from its political drift. Although General Mirza’s coup d’état had been planned for some time, the immediate provocation for such a drastic move came when a confrontation between various political factions in the East Pakistan legislative assembly turned into a brawl and resulted in the death of that assembly’s deputy speaker. In August 1958, almost two months before what was to be Pakistan’s first direct military coup d’état, the British high commissioner at Karachi reported
the possibility of the military’s direct assumption of power, General Iskander Mirza had shared with the high commissioner the view that democracy was unsuited to a country like Pakistan, even as plans were publicly laid out for general elections. The high commissioner reported that the president had told him of his intention to intervene “if the election returns showed that a post-electoral government was likely to be dominated by undesirable elements.” Sir Alexander noted parenthetically that the term “undesirable” was not defined and “no doubt the term may include any persons who are unlikely to vote for Iskander Mirza as president.”

By September 23, 1958, the British high commissioner was reporting the suspicion that “the President himself may take a hand in the provocation of violence in order to clear the way for the intervention of the army and the postponement of elections.” Later, on September 27, General Mirza confided to Sir Alexander his conviction that democracy would not work in Pakistan and that “the time had come for him to act.”

“What he had in mind,” wrote Sir Alexander in a letter to the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, “was (after the army’s intervention had cleared the ground) to appoint 20 to 30 good men, if he could find them, to reshape the constitution and govern the country.” But martial law shifted the power balance completely in favor of the military, making it untenable for Mirza to remain in charge. Twenty days later, on October 27, 1958, General Ayub Khan, the army chief, assumed the presidency.

Ayub Khan announced a comprehensive program of reforms and styled himself as a revolutionary leader. Most of these reforms were in the temporal domain, but the question of ideology did not escape attention. In a 1960 Foreign Affairs article, Ayub Khan reinforced Liaquat Ali Khan’s definition of Pakistan’s crucial interests and spoke of “the peculiar strains which confronted Pakistan immediately on its emergence as a free state.” The first of these strains was described as ideological and Ayub Khan declared his intention of “liberating the basic concept of our ideology from the dust of vagueness.” Ayub Khan explained the importance of his plan to build a Pakistani nation from the top. “Till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani,” he wrote, “for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name.” Before 1947,
our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller provincial loyalties.” Ayub Khan expected his military coup, which he described as a revolution, to resolve these contradictions.

In the same article, Ayub Khan also argued that Pakistan could be “submerged under the tidal wave of Communism” and that Pakistan was entitled to “claim still more” aid from western nations, especially the United States for “reasons of history.” As Pakistan had “openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West,” the western nations had “a special responsibility to assist Pakistan in attaining a reasonable posture of advancement.”

Ayub Khan’s prescription for national consolidation was to combine ideology and economic development aided by the west. An alternative strategy had been argued by Pakistan’s most popular post-independence politician, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, who served as prime minister in 1956–1957 only to be ousted by the civil-military combine. Suhrawardy, who was barred from politics by Ayub Khan, challenged the concept of Pakistan as an ideological state. Emphasis on ideology, he argued, “would keep alive within Pakistan the divisive communal emotions by which the subcontinent was riven before the achievement of independence.”

Suhrawardy argued in favor of seeing “Pakistan in terms of a nation state” wherein a “durable identity between government and people derived from the operation of consent.” Suhrawardy supported a pro-western foreign policy and saw little gain for Pakistan in impractical visions of pan-Islamism. He felt, however, that the government should explain the rationale of Pakistan’s external relations to the people and secure their support for its alliances abroad instead of operating secretly.

It was Ayub Khan’s vision, however, that prevailed and Pakistan’s military put its weight behind the notion of an ideological state. The success of Ayub Khan’s policy of close ties with the United States and Pakistan’s economic development under his rule impressed many observers at the time. Ayub Khan, who promoted himself to field marshal, was praised as a reformer and a visionary, a genuinely enlightened dictator. Among Ayub Khan’s reforms were the consolidation of state control over education and the media.
At this time, the study of Islam or “Islamiyat” began receiving considerable emphasis. The study of history, geography, and civics at primary and secondary school levels was collapsed into a single subject called social studies. Curricula and textbooks were standardized, presenting a version of history that linked Pakistan’s emergence to Islam’s arrival in the subcontinent instead of it being the outcome of a dispute over the constitution of postcolonial India. The history of Islam was presented, not as the history of a religion or a civilization, but as a prelude to Pakistan’s creation. Muslim conquerors were glorified, Hindu-Muslim relations were painted as intrinsically hostile, and the ability of Pakistanis to manage democratic rule was questioned. Ayub Khan’s revolution was characterized as an important step toward the consolidation of Pakistan. The field marshal’s successors required the study of the same themes at undergraduate level as Pakistan studies and diluted the exaggerated praise of Ayub Khan, but they retained the contrived historical narrative and expanded the emphasis on Islam. The Ministry of Information and the Bureau of National Reconstruction ensured that a message similar to that taught in schools was available to adults through radio, television, films, magazines, books, and newspapers.

Ayub Khan’s close companion and his secretary for information, Altaf Gauhar, revealed several years after Ayub Khan’s death that “In 1959 Ayub had written a paper on the ‘Islamic Ideology in Pakistan,’ which was circulated to army officers among others.” Ayub Khan also explained his views on the subject of ideology in his autobiography:

Man as an animal is moved by basic instincts for preservation of life and continuance of race but as a being conscious of his power of thinking he has the power to control and modify his instincts. His greatest yearning is for an ideology for which he should be able to lay down his life. What it amounts to is that the more noble and eternal an ideology, the better the individual and the people professing it. Their lives will be much richer, more creative and they will have a tremendous power of cohesion and resistance. Such a society can conceivably be bent but never broken . . . Such an ideology with us is obviously that of Islam. It was on that basis that we fought for and got Pakistan, but having got it, we failed to
define that ideology in a simple and understandable form. Also in our ignorance we began to regard Islamic ideology as synonymous with bigotry and theocracy and subconsciously began to feel shy of it. The time has now come when we must get over this shyness, face the problem squarely and define this ideology in simple but modern terms and put it to the people, so that they can use it as a code of guidance.\textsuperscript{102}

Ayub Khan then proceeded to define and outline the issues of a simplified Islamic ideology: “True that in [Islamic] society national territorialism has no place, yet those living in an area are responsible for its defense and security and development. Attachment to the country we live in and get our sustenance from is therefore paramount.”\textsuperscript{103} “Moreover, considering that the people of Pakistan are a collection of so many races with different backgrounds, how can they be welded into a unified whole whilst keeping intact their local pride, culture, and traditions.”\textsuperscript{104}

Contrary to widespread perception, Ayub Khan was not a secularist; neither was he averse to the notion of Pakistan having a state ideology. Being a straightforward soldier, he did not have time for an elaborate theory of the Islamic state such as the one proposed by Maududi. He simply wanted to do what he perceived was good for the state and declare it as Islamic.

Ayub Khan did not think highly of the ulema and spoke of their conflict with “the educated classes.” He also did not like the complicated and mutually contradictory versions of religion offered by theologians and clearly opposed their role in governance. Ayub Khan wanted the state to exercise the function of religious interpretation and wanted an Islamic ideology that would help him in the “defense and security and development” and the “welding” of Pakistan’s different races into a unified whole. He envisioned Islam as a nation-building tool, controlled by an enlightened military leader rather than by clerics. His vision was shared by most of his fellow military officers even though some had started reading Maududi and other theoreticians of the Islamic state. Some had even started developing close relations with religious scholars.

One element of Ayub Khan’s thinking that overlapped with the ideas of religious-political leaders related to the characterization of India as a
Hindu state and of Hindus as irreconcilable enemies of Islam and Muslims. "It was Brahmin chauvinism and arrogance that had forced us to seek a homeland of our own where we could order our life according to our own thinking and faith," he wrote in his autobiography. In Ayub Khan’s view:

The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from the Oxus to Mekong . . . India was not content with her present sphere of influence and she knew that Pakistan had the will and the capacity to frustrate her expansionist designs. She wanted to browbeat us into subservience. All we wanted was to live as equal and honorable neighbors, but to that India would never agree . . . There was the fundamental opposition between the ideologies of India and Pakistan. The whole Indian society was based on class distinction in which even the shadow of a low-caste man was enough to pollute a member of the high caste.

Without wanting to emphasize piety or get involved in the fine points of theology, Ayub Khan wanted Pakistani nationalism to reflect pan-Islamic aspirations and a fear of Hindu and Indian domination:

The countries in [the Muslim] region from Casablanca to Djakarta are also suspect in the eyes of the major powers because most of them profess the faith of Islam. Whatever may be the internal differences among these countries about Islam, and regardless of the approach to Islam, which each one of these countries has adopted, it is a fact of life that the Communist world, the Christian World, and Hindu India treat them as Muslim countries.

India particularly has a deep pathological hatred for Muslims and her hostility to Pakistan stems from her refusal to see a Muslim power developing next door. By the same token, India will never tolerate a Muslim grouping near or far from her borders.

In a sense, Ayub Khan was the first Pakistani leader with international stature who convinced the world of his modernizing bona fides without giving up religious prejudices. His lack of outward religious
observance, his distance from the ulema, and his careful choice of words abroad helped create his image as a latter day Atatürk or a Muslim de Gaulle; however, Ayub Khan moved Pakistan further along the road of a state-sponsored ideology. The military leadership, assuming that the military would remain in control, saw no threat to the state from the Islamists. Acceptance of an Islamic ideological state, however, led to the inevitable claim by Islamists of their right to define the contours of that state.

Ayub Khan was a firm believer in the policy tripod developed within the first few years of Pakistan’s creation: he identified India as Pakistan’s eternal enemy, Islam as the national unifier, and the United States as the country’s provider of arms and finances. In his particular mixture of the three key elements of state policy, however, hostility toward India and friendship with the United States took precedence over Islam as unifier.

During Ayub Khan’s first few years in power, the religious parties were generally kept out of the orbit of power, partly because Ayub Khan sought to cultivate the image of an enlightened Muslim leader in the West. This led to the Jamaat-e-Islami joining up with secular parties opposed to military rule. At one point, Ayub Khan banned the Jamaat-e-Islami under a law regulating political parties, but the Supreme Court forced him to withdraw the ban.108 The Jamaat and some officials in Ayub Khan’s regime cooperated with each other, however, so that the Jamaat would use its Islamist contacts in Arab countries over the Kashmir issue.109

When Ayub Khan introduced the 1962 constitution that provided for a presidential system with indirect elections for president, its initial version deleted “Islamic” from Pakistan’s official name and used the term “Republic of Pakistan.” Under the protest of religious parties, the indirectly elected National Assembly restored the original designation, “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” With the new constitution in force, martial law ended although the constitution was widely unpopular and seen as an instrument of one-man rule in the country. Ayub Khan saw the country “behaving like a wild horse that had been captured but not yet tamed.”110

To tame the wild horse, Ayub Khan mobilized the machinery of state to suppress dissent. The brunt of the repression had to be borne by
ethnic nationalist groups and mainstream political parties, although the Jamaat-e-Islami was also not spared for aligning with them against the new constitution. When Ayub Khan held the first indirect presidential election under this constitution in January 1965, the opposition parties nominated Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Pakistan’s founder, as their joint candidate. The main issue in the elections was parliamentary democracy versus Ayub Khan’s system of controlled governance. Ayub Khan pointed to his achievements in international relations and in the economic sphere but felt overwhelmed by the vociferous opposition to his domestic policies by politicians he thought he had already discredited. As a general who saw his role as keeping the nation together, Ayub Khan could not adjust to competitive politics. He asked his administrative and intelligence machinery to deal with the opposition’s attacks.

Among the various political strategies used by Ayub Khan’s Interior Ministry (which controlled the domestic intelligence service) in that campaign was a fatwa declaring that Islam did not allow a woman to be head of state. Maududi, committed to Fatima Jinnah’s candidacy, said a woman could be head of an Islamic state but it was not desirable. In the ensuing controversy, the government persuaded or bribed many clerics. One pro-Ayub holy man, Pir Sahib Dewal Sharif, “claimed that in the course of meditation, the Almighty had favored him with a communication which indicated divine displeasure with the Combined Opposition Parties.” The episode undermined Ayub Khan’s original plan of keeping clerics at a distance.

Ayub Khan’s foreign policy also started running into some difficulty after the election of John F. Kennedy, in 1960, which sought to strengthen U.S. relations with India. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles had been impressed by Ayub Khan and the potential for Pakistan’s participation in their “northern tier of defense” strategy. Dulles had told the U.S. Congress of his belief that the Pakistanis “are going to fight any communist invasion with their bare fists if they have to.” India’s unwillingness to join U.S.-sponsored treaties had given Pakistan an advantage in the eyes of Dulles, who looked upon Indian nonalignment as immoral, but Pakistan had not provided the kind of support for the U.S.-led alliances that the United States had hoped for. Pakistan, on the other hand, felt that it needed greater U.S. support,
especially in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. By the time President Kennedy took office, both sides felt they were no longer getting what they wanted from the relationship.

Ayub Khan started warming up to China just as the Kennedy-Johnson administration sought to build closer ties with India. In his July 1960 *Foreign Affairs* article, Ayub Khan had pointed to the need for cooperation between India and Pakistan: “As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other.” But four years later, Ayub Khan was willing to forgo containment of China to secure advantage against India. In a new *Foreign Affairs* piece, “Pakistan-American Alliance—Stresses and Strains,” published in January 1964, the Pakistani leader explained that the priority for Pakistan was to ensure its security against India, and he voiced the Pakistani grievance that the United States was not helping on that front.114

The problem of Pakistanis and Americans having different priorities in their alliance came to a head at the time of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. During that war, the United States provided military assistance to India. Pakistan’s view was that supply of U.S. arms to India should be linked to a Kashmir settlement; otherwise India would use U.S. weapons against Pakistan, a U.S. ally. Pakistan also turned down U.S. suggestions that Pakistan mend fences with India and back away from an entente with the People’s Republic of China. Pakistan reached an agreement on demarcating its border with the Chinese, including territory that was formally part of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. It also became the first noncommunist country to begin commercial flights to the People’s Republic.

Pakistan’s leaders had been clear from the beginning that they were allying with the United States only to offset the disadvantages in resources Pakistan had inherited at the time of partition and that they did not completely share the U.S. worldview. Well before he became president, in July 1958, General Ayub Khan wrote a paper for *Asian Review* on Pakistan’s defense requirements: “We have proven and trusted manpower that can do the fighting; but that manpower by itself, unless married up with the necessary modern equipment, is really not much use;
and the only country that equipment can come from is America. Now that he had secured some equipment, Ayub Khan wanted to raise the ante and sought U.S. pressure on India for resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He also asked his brain trust to work out a plan for breaking the stalemate in Kashmir.

The Bureau of National Reconstruction, Ayub Khan’s intelligence and research outfit, had published a study of Pakistan’s security requirements and recommended that the country look beyond the alliance with the United States in ensuring its defense. The study claimed that in addition to the threat from India, Pakistan had also inherited all the problems of defense of British India owing to Afghanistan’s claim on Pashtun tribal areas in the country’s northwest and the possibility of a Russian push for warm waters through Afghanistan and Pakistan. The study argued:

Pakistan must be prepared for the day when [the relationship with the United States] is dissolved or loosened . . . Then our “proven and trusted manpower” should be able to hold its own ground. To meet this situation, Pakistan should turn to its own ideology and inherent strength. The duty of self-defense (Jehad) which Islam has ordained makes it incumbent upon everyone to contribute toward the national defense. It also underlines the importance of individual effort and initiative which have become extremely important under conditions of modern warfare.

The Bureau of National Reconstruction’s proposed solution to Pakistan’s security problems was irregular warfare:

In its manpower, Pakistan is very fortunate. In some of the regions, people have long traditions of irregular fighting. Now that they have got a homeland and a state based on their own ideology they are bound to show great courage and determination to defend them. Then why not train irregular fighters whom even the existing industries of Pakistan can well equip? Of course, they will have to be politically conscious. They will have to be aware of the stakes involved in such a struggle, which is bound to be protracted. Their training in warfare will have to be strenuous and wide in scope. The irregular fighter will have to be shrewd,
familiar with local environment factors, aware of the psychology of his own people and of the enemy and of the political consequences of the struggle.

Irregular warfare can help in reducing the crucial nature of the initial battles of Pakistan. It can help in spreading out prolonging action. The essence of this irregular warfare is to deny the enemy any target and keep attacking him again at unexpected places . . .

Lack of military formalities in the eyes of military experts seems to detract from the respectability of irregular warfare. But actually, it is this lack of formal logic and system which is making it increasingly important in this age of missiles and nuclear weapons.”117

The 1964 death of India’s long-serving prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, at a time of Muslim unrest in the Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir, encouraged anti-India hard-liners in Pakistan to test this doctrine of irregular warfare, albeit in an offensive posture. Infiltrators were sent into Kashmir in August 1965, hoping to ignite a wider uprising. On September 6, India retaliated by widening the war along Pakistan’s international border. The United States suspended supplies of arms to both India and Pakistan, causing disappointment in Pakistan because of the country’s greater dependence on U.S. weapons. The war ended in a stalemate, denying Pakistan the military advantage it had hoped to seek.

The 1965 war with India had several consequences, each important for Pakistan’s future. First, it bred anti-Americanism among Pakistanis on the basis of the notion that the United States had not come to Pakistan’s aid despite being its ally. Second, it linked the Pakistani military closer to an Islamist ideology. Religious symbolism and calls to jihad were used to build the morale of soldiers and the people. Third, it widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan as Bengalis felt that the military strategy of Ayub Khan had left them completely unprotected. Fourth, it weakened Ayub Khan, who lost the confidence of the United States by going to war with India and of his own people by his being unable to score a definitive victory against India.

On the first day of India’s offensive against the Pakistan border, Ayub Khan addressed the nation and set the tone for the India-Pakistani relationship for years to come:
Indian aggression in Kashmir was only a preparation for an attack on Pakistan. Today [the Indians] have given final proof of this and of the evil intentions, which India has always harbored against Pakistan since its inception. The Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where the Muslims could build a homeland of their own. All their military preparations during the last 18 years have been directed against us.

They exploited the Chinese bogey to secure massive arms assistance from some of our friends in the West who never understood the mind of the Indian rulers and permitted themselves to be taken in by India’s profession that once they were fully armed they will fight the Chinese. We always knew that these arms will be raised against us. Time has proved this is so.

Now that the Indian rulers, with their customary cowardice and hypocrisy, have ordered their armies to march into the sacred territory of Pakistan, without a formal declaration of war, the time has come for us to give them a crushing reply which will put an end to India’s adventure in imperialism . . . The 100 million people of Pakistan whose hearts beat with the sound of ‘La ilaha illallah, Muhammad Ur Rasool Ullah’ [There is no God but God and Muhammad is His messenger] will not rest till India’s guns are silenced.118

Pakistan’s state-controlled media generated a frenzy of jihad, extolling the virtues of Pakistan’s “soldiers of Islam.” An officer of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations wrote years later:

There was a spurt of gallantry stories, of divine help, of superhuman resistance and of unrivalled professional excellence in the face of overwhelming odds . . . The story of the suicide squad—a band of dedicated soldiers who acted as live mines to blow up the advancing Indian tanks in the Sialkot sector—became one of the most popular war legends. There was no end of stories about divine help. People, both soldiers and civilians, had actually “seen with their eyes” green-robed angels deflecting bombs from their targets—
bridges, culverts, mosques—with a wave of the hand. Soldiers were reported shooting enemy aircraft with their .303s [rifles].

Several junior officers who saw action in that war, including some who rose to become generals, came back to describe it as a struggle of Islam and un-Islam—terminology previously used only by religious ideologues such as Maududi.

The Pakistani people were told by the state that they had been victims of aggression and that the aggression had been repelled with the help of God. The propagation of this view needed the help of religious leaders and groups. The traditional ulema and Islamists used the environment of jihad to advance their own agenda, and one agenda item was that they should be accepted as custodians of Pakistan’s ideology and identity. After the war, several state-sponsored publications were devoted to building the case that one Muslim soldier had the fighting prowess to subdue five Hindus.

In discussions with U.S. diplomats, however, Ayub Khan acknowledged that the war had begun as a result of Pakistan’s forays in Kashmir. That did not stop Ayub Khan from seeking U.S. intervention on behalf of Pakistan and the Pakistanis from feeling aggrieved when the United States did not help. The official Pakistani attitude was summarized in a conversation between the Canadian high commissioner and Ayub Khan. During the war the Canadian diplomat asked the Pakistani president what he wanted. Ayub Khan replied, “We want Kashmir but we know we can’t win it by military action. If only you people would show some guts, we would have it.”

The war ended within seventeen days with a UN-sponsored cease-fire, but was far from decisive. Official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war. Pakistan had occupied 1,600 square miles of Indian territory, 1,300 of it in the desert, while India secured 350 square miles of Pakistani real estate. The Pakistani land occupied by the Indians was of greater strategic value, as it was located near the West Pakistani capital, Lahore, and the industrial city of Sialkot as well as in Kashmir. Moreover, although Pakistan had held its own against a larger army, it came out of the war a weakened nation. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship had lost its initial strength, Kashmir was still
unsettled, and inattention from the central government was upsetting the Bengalis in East Pakistan more than ever. Domestic factors were also causing unrest in Sindh and Balochistan.

The situation immediately after the 1965 war presented an opportunity for the civil-military combine to see the limitations of its nation- and state-building enterprise. Basing Pakistani nationalism on hostility toward India had led the country into a war that had attained none of Pakistan’s war aims. It diverted precious resources away from economic development and weakened the links between the country’s two wings. Neither Ayub Khan nor his deputies realized that it was time to move away from the ideological tripod. The belief persisted that Pakistan’s success depended on an Islamic nationalism, confrontation with India, and external alliances to help the country acquire weapons and pay for development. Evidence to the contrary was either brushed aside or hidden from the Pakistani people.

When Field Marshal Ayub Khan met Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India in Tashkent in January 1966, he agreed to swap the territory seized by both sides during the recent war. Brought to believe that the war had ended in a Pakistani victory, the public found it difficult to understand why “objective reality on the ground” had forced an “unfavorable” settlement on Pakistan. The Tashkent agreement also made no mention of Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which made the people wonder why Pakistan’s “military victory” did not bring it any gain in territory or at least the promise of a future favorable settlement. Ayub Khan’s foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, resigned from the cabinet and led critics in suggesting that “political surrender” at Tashkent had converted a military victory into defeat.

Ayub Khan resigned as president in March 1969 after several months of violent demonstrations against his government. Instead of transferring power to the speaker of the National Assembly, a Bengali, as required by his own constitution of 1962, Ayub Khan returned the country to martial law. The army chief, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, became Pakistan’s president and chief martial law administrator and ruled by decree, without a constitution.