

A Reset for the U.S.-Russia Values Gap

November 2010

Matthew Rojansky and James F. Collins

Summary

Nearly two years after the Obama administration's "reset" with Russia, significant accomplishments have validated a policy based on cooperating on shared interests and building working-level relationships as a foundation for future cooperation and conflict prevention. Moscow and Washington have worked together to reduce both sides' nuclear arsenals and combat global nuclear proliferation, to support peacekeeping and reconstruction in Afghanistan, and to prepare coordinated responses to international terrorist threats.

Yet critics have rightly pointed out that Russia is still far from a steadfast U.S. ally, and that some of the Kremlin's conduct at home—arresting dissidents, muzzling independent media, and concentrating wealth in the hands of loyal oligarchs—remains troubling. Despite the reset, a "values gap" still exists between Russia and the United States that limits progress, undermines trust and confidence in the bilateral relationship, and raises difficult issues that cannot be ignored.

Unfortunately, the responses to this challenge proposed by experts on both sides of an ongoing debate in Washington are at best inadequate, and at worst fundamentally misguided. On the one hand, a policy of "linkage"—making nascent U.S.-Russia cooperation across the board conditional on the Kremlin's domestic policies and human rights record—will not work. Rather, it is likely to undermine U.S. influence with Moscow that could be used to support change over the long term. On the other hand, compartmentalizing Russian domestic politics and U.S.-Russia cooperation on shared interests may send the wrong signal to Moscow, implying that it can deepen cooperation with Washington and increase Washington's stake in the relationship without taking any actions to reduce the values gap.

It is time for a new approach, focusing on the intersection between concrete U.S. interests and the principles that have been accepted in greater Europe since the Helsinki Final Act was adopted in 1975. First, the United States should work with European allies and multilateral institutions to remind Russia of commitments to international rules and norms it has freely undertaken, such as the Charter of Paris and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Second, the U.S. government should fulfill its duty to support the interests of U.S. citizens and U.S. companies working in Russia, insist on legal protections for U.S. entrepreneurs and innovators participating in Russia’s “modernization” campaign, and make clear that Russia must accept American rules when it participates in the U.S. market.

Third, recalling its own substantial political investment in U.S.-Russia cooperation, the Obama administration should remind Moscow that political repression and economic abuses will cause a backlash among Americans and limits its ability to pursue broader and deeper engagement with Russia in the future. By focusing on how Russian domestic policies affect U.S. interests, Washington has a better chance to influence change in Moscow than by holding cooperation hostage to unrealistic goals or by artificially de-linking Russia’s domestic policies from the U.S.-Russia relationship.

Accomplishments

The Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 marked a low point in U.S.-Russia relations. Bilateral security cooperation came to a halt and a war of words broke out between official Washington and the Kremlin. However, with President Obama’s inauguration and the launch of the U.S.-Russia reset in early 2009, a glimmer of hope emerged for renewed bilateral cooperation based on pragmatism regarding shared interests and a culture of increased communication, trust, and respect. A few months later, the creation of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC)—consisting of more than a dozen substantive working groups on topics from agriculture to nuclear security—heralded the beginning of tangible progress on a broad and deep bilateral agenda.

Progress has been especially evident in security spheres, from traditional arms control and nuclear nonproliferation to transnational threats of terrorism, trafficking, and weak states. Though falling short of some expectations in Washington and Brussels, Russia’s support for multilateral sanctions—targeted at halting Iran’s nuclear program—has grown steadily since the first post-reset summit and the launch of the BPC.

In September 2010, President Medvedev announced that Russia was permanently canceling its agreement to sell Iran the sophisticated S-300 air defense system, even though only “offensive weapons” sales to Iran were prohibited by the terms of the UN Security Council’s sanctions resolution.¹ This move has been widely and correctly interpreted as a sign that Moscow prioritized enhanced cooperation with Washington and its allies on a range of issues over the prospect of future weapons sales to Tehran.

The creation of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission heralded the beginning of tangible progress on a broad and deep bilateral agenda.

When Obama delivered his now famous Prague speech in April 2009—declaring global nuclear security, nonproliferation, and eventual disarmament to be centerpieces of his foreign policy—Russia offered concrete support instead of criticism.² At a September 2009 special session of the UN Security Council, Medvedev backed Obama’s strongly worded nonproliferation resolution, helping to deliver a unanimous vote in the Council.³

Then, at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, the United States and Russia jointly announced their fulfillment of long-standing commitments to eliminate 70 tons of weapons-usable plutonium.⁴ That same month, the two sides concluded and signed the New START agreement, which reduced the limit on their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals by one-third, and resumed a crucial regime of data sharing and inspections.⁵ Although the treaty will not take effect until the Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate both ratify it, efforts are already under way to explore the next steps on arms control, including cooperation on missile defense.

Security cooperation has extended beyond the nuclear realm, to include tangible Russian support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. U.S. personnel and equipment now transit Russian air space daily, and move by rail from Europe through Russia to Central Asia, constituting an indispensable northern supply corridor in addition to the southern route, which passes through Pakistan and the Khyber Pass. Pakistan’s recent closure of the southern route in retaliation for a U.S. strike that killed three Pakistani soldiers underlined the importance of the alternate supply route provided by Russia.⁶ Ensuring stability and effective governance in Central Asia is of interest to both the United States and Russia, as the region is already a major location for arms and drug trafficking and is vulnerable to a rising tide of extremist Islam.

Progress in other areas of the bilateral agenda has been slower and less dramatic, but promising signs of movement exist. Russia’s brush with financial collapse in 2008–2009 has persuaded the Kremlin to renew its attention on “modernization” of the country’s infrastructure and industry, and officials from Medvedev down refer to the United States and Europe as the key sources of new technologies and know-how. In June, Medvedev visited Silicon Valley, where he cut deals with U.S. high-tech firms to invest in a new “city of innovation” being built in Skolkovo outside Moscow.⁷

In addition, although long-running disputes over poultry imports, gas pipelines, and intellectual property rights persist, the political momentum on both sides now appears to favor Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the near future. Similarly, a bilateral “123” agreement on civil nuclear cooperation—concluded by the Bush administration but dormant since the Russia-Georgia war—has been resubmitted to Congress for approval, and is likely to go into effect within the next year.

Cooperation and engagement between non-governmental sectors of U.S. and Russian society have likewise grown significantly since the end of the Cold War, and have remained strong even during tense periods between Washington and Moscow. This is in part because today the role of government in educational, cultural, and other exchanges is limited.

While both governments have at times made exchanges more difficult—through visa quotas and onerous application requirements, reduced government funding for sponsoring institutions, or, in Russia’s case, increasing the burden NGOs face in carrying out their missions—today, they are promoting people-to-people exchanges at an unprecedented level. These exchanges have included performances by American musicians in Russia’s regions, an NHL-KHL exhibition hockey match in St. Petersburg, and youth basketball and swimming exchanges, to name just a few examples.⁸ Thanks to the improved overall atmospherics of the relationship post-reset and to more direct contact between Russians and Americans, approval ratings of the United States in Russia have skyrocketed, from a dismal 22 percent in 2008 to almost 60 percent in 2010.⁹

The Problem

While Moscow and Washington have agreed on many questions of shared security, economic welfare, and cultural cooperation—yielding concrete benefits for both sides—consensus remains elusive on the sensitive issues of Russia’s domestic political situation, freedom of expression for media and political opposition, or plundering of successful independent businesses by racketeers and corrupt officials. On these issues, the reset has delivered few dividends for Russian democracy or any perceptible narrowing of the persistent values gap between Washington and Moscow.

The most extreme negative images of Russia portrayed in the U.S. media are simply wrong: Russia is not the Soviet Union, Stalin has not returned, and the majority of Russians enjoy vastly greater freedom today than they did twenty years ago, even if many Russians who live outside major cities are actually poorer than they were in Soviet times. Still, over the past decade, as President Putin and his inner circle constructed a “power vertical” to control the levers of state authority and key aspects of public life, the initial profusion of political diversity, free media, and citizen activism of the post-Soviet period has been curbed significantly.

A single dominant political party—*Edinaya Rossiya* [United Russia], headed by now-Prime Minister Putin—controls both the national Duma and local legislatures across the country. Since 2005, regional governors and members of parliament’s upper chamber, the Federation Council, have been appointed directly by the Kremlin, rather than elected. The anemic official

Thanks to the improved overall atmospherics of the relationship post-reset and to more direct contact, approval ratings of the United States in Russia have skyrocketed.

opposition, including Gennady Zyuganov's Communists, the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and *Spravedlivaya Rossiya* [A Just Russia] led by Sergey Mironov, hold too few seats in the Duma—the parliament's elected lower chamber—to block Kremlin decisions. In any case, they have little incentive to fight for true political pluralism because they would lose their own privileged status and have to share the opposition platform with other parties that are currently marginalized.

Since the early 2000s, the Kremlin has made life increasingly difficult for its critics. Politicians, media, civil society activists, and businesspeople who openly challenge the regime have found themselves targets of invasive scrutiny and pressure from police and tax authorities. While there have been no mass repressions, potent examples have delivered the message about the limits of what is acceptable. These include the government's takeover of the independent and openly critical TV channel NTV, the dismantlement of Mikhail Khodorkovskiy's Yukos commercial empire (which had been used to fund political opposition), and arrests of certain academics and civil society activists on espionage and other criminal charges.

Although most effective political opposition has been marginalized, intimidation and repression continue. Limits on free assembly and media access, arrests and detention of leading figures of Solidarity (an umbrella opposition movement), and raids on non-profit environmental and other civil society groups based on dubious allegations of tax fraud and software piracy, for example, clearly serve to discourage any overt challenge to established authority.

In a general climate of lawlessness, routine cases of official corruption, incompetence, or indifference have also undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to protect citizens. Recent cases include the arrest and death in detention of lawyer Sergei Magnitskiy, the severe beating of political reporter Oleg Kashin, and traffic deaths caused by powerful figures' reckless driving, with the police consistently failing to hold the responsible individuals to account.

Two decades after the Cold War, Russia and the United States still have dramatically different and mismatched political systems. Moscow and Washington do not see eye to eye on questions related to accountable government or on how to make government more effective. They disagree about the role of civil society and the press, and U.S. policy makers have been frustrated by Russia's backsliding on human rights and democracy. After a Russian crackdown on protestors earlier this year, State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley issued a carefully worded critique of the Kremlin for "shrinking the space for civil society," adding: "We have concerns about intimidation of citizens, intimidation of journalists, intimidations of nongovernmental operators who are working on behalf of the Russian people."¹⁰

Since the early 2000s, the Kremlin has made life increasingly difficult for its critics.

What to Do About It

To address this problem, critics and defenders of Obama’s Russia policy have proposed two distinct approaches. Critics assault the administration’s expanded ties with Moscow, calling for more explicit linkage between U.S.-Russia cooperation across the board and positive changes in Russia’s domestic political situation. By this logic, each time U.S. officials engage with their Russian counterparts, they have an opportunity to hold the Kremlin accountable for abusive behavior. These critics reason that security cooperation, including arms control, and economic benefits like WTO membership and the 123 agreement, should be withheld unless there is positive change in Russia’s domestic political situation, often on some specific “litmus test” issue.

This so-called “linkage” approach is fundamentally flawed because it wrongly assumes that the United States has adequate leverage to force Russian leaders to act against their own perceived self-interest, while at the same time undercutting what limited leverage Washington has by cutting off mutually beneficial cooperation and engagement. National Security Council Senior Director Mike McFaul, the president’s top adviser on Russia, sensibly rejects this approach. He has said, for example, that the United States would not consider making approval of New START conditional on the release of Khodorkovsky, or holding up the 123 agreement unless Russia withdrew its troops from Georgia.¹¹

Instead, McFaul has argued that “dual track” U.S.-Russia engagement can help advance U.S. interests both in practical cooperation with Moscow and in Russia’s movement toward greater freedom and democracy over the long term. The “dual track” approach supports simultaneous cooperation with the Kremlin on a range of concrete policy challenges, while reaching out to Russian civil society organizations—and even opposition political figures—in hopes they will bring about gradual political change from within.

The administration is right to pursue productive bilateral cooperation on matters of vital interest to Washington. It is also right to keep both pragmatic interests and U.S. values in mind when engaging with Russia. This policy may break down, however, when it comes to turning good intentions into reality.

A similar criticism applies to those who argue that there should be no connection at all between Russia’s domestic politics and pragmatic U.S.-Russia cooperation on shared challenges and interests. This approach is simply not realistic. The United States only has real influence in Russia through its ability to offer concrete support for Russian priorities—like enhanced security, economic development, and modernization—and to negotiate to advance U.S. interests in those arenas.

Washington’s moral support and technical advice for embattled civil society activists can help at the margins. But if the United States erects an impenetrable

The “dual track” approach supports simultaneous cooperation with the Kremlin on a range of concrete policy challenges, while reaching out to Russian civil society organizations in hopes they will bring about gradual political change from within.

wall between bilateral cooperation and Russia's domestic politics, the Kremlin will simply conclude Washington is willing to give ground on transparency, democracy, and rule of law in order to gain Russian cooperation on nonproliferation, Afghanistan, or other challenges. Even if an engagement policy that maintains strict separation between bilateral cooperation and domestic politics builds greater leverage and closer ties with Russia over time, it will miss an important opportunity to make progress on both fronts simultaneously.

How, then, can the United States practice both pragmatic cooperation with Moscow, and use appropriate means to encourage Russian authorities toward domestic reform? The answer is to focus on concrete U.S. interests in both spheres. Historically, the most effective strategies for engagement between Washington and Moscow have prioritized both practical cooperation on international challenges and the need for reform within the Soviet Union or Russia to improve underlying political and economic conditions that impacted specific U.S. interests and goals. Certainly, the United States has a general interest in greater political freedom and prosperity for the Russian people in terms of accountable, honest government, a free press, and a robust Russian civil society. However the interests that Washington can effectively advance fall into a smaller subset of three core categories.

First, as Moscow and Washington explore joint approaches to international challenges and seek to advance cooperation in international fora like the UN Security Council, the G20, the IMF and World Bank, and the NATO-Russia Council, it bears remembering that membership in international institutions comes with potentially important strings attached. During the *détente* era, one of the most effective tools for pressing the Soviet government to respect international norms on human rights and democracy was to make it clear that such norms were the basis for participation in the international negotiations Moscow desperately wanted to legitimate its superpower status, participation in the world economy, and post-World War II political borders.

The most prominent example was the Helsinki process of 1972–1975, which led to the Final Act; this document committed all European states to refrain from acts of aggression against one another and to respect the basic rights and freedoms of their own citizens. The Helsinki Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process helped normalize international ties and prompt internal reform that ended the Cold War, while delivering concrete benefits for the United States, the Soviet Union, and other signatories. Most significantly, it established the principle that a government's treatment of its citizens was a matter of international security that could not be excluded from international scrutiny.

Although the Euro-Atlantic state signatories to the Final Act have come up short in applying its principles, they have frequently reaffirmed and re-committed themselves to their validity. This provides a solid base for moving toward a

shared set of values as Moscow aspires to increase its voice in the Euro-Atlantic discourse—which it has begun to do by proposing a new, inclusive European security treaty.¹² While addressing the Russian proposals on their merits, the United States and Europe should emphasize that security will be addressed in its widest dimension and that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other Euro-Atlantic institutions already play a central role in creating a region-wide security community.

At the same time, Russia should be reminded that each member state in these institutions is committed to the values represented in the Helsinki Final Act, Charter of Paris, and other statements, including provisions on the “human dimension” that commit each signatory to abide by the rule of law, promote democratic principles and institutions, and encourage tolerance.¹³ When working with Russia to revise or expand the security architecture in the broader Euro-Atlantic region, the United States should focus on its own interests in maintaining a shared security space defined by Helsinki and other principles of political, economic, and human security, to which Russia has already freely committed.

Focusing on U.S. interests in Russia’s observance of freely undertaken international obligations is so powerful because these commitments are owed not only to Washington, but to the entire international community. Consider Russia’s mixed record of compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which it is a signatory. Although more cases have been brought against it than against any other state—many of them related to alleged abuses in Chechnya—Russia has paid financial damages ordered by the court and Russian high courts frequently cite judgments of the ECHR.¹⁴

Compliance with the court is part of Russia’s effort to remain connected with institutional Europe. At the ECHR, like the OSCE, Russia’s willingness to respect the basic rights of its own citizens becomes a metric for participation in the international system, which is itself one of the Kremlin’s top foreign policy priorities.¹⁵ As a result, it is not only the United States holding Russia accountable to international standards, but the broader international community as well.

Russia’s bid for WTO accession represents one avenue for advancing this approach in the near future. The Kremlin is keenly interested in joining the free-trading international community of the WTO because it stands to reap significant economic benefits. However, WTO membership is a two-way street, and Russia will have to play by a set of clear rules, requiring it to eliminate its own trade barriers toward other WTO members (such as Georgia and Moldova), guarantee the property rights of its trading partners, and commit to resolve disputes solely through the WTO’s arbitration body. Each of these steps benefits the Russian people as well as Russian industry, and enhances the overall rule of law in Russia. The United States also has a concrete interest in calling for Russian compliance with the WTO’s standards, and in so doing, Washington will

WTO membership is a two-way street, and Russia will have to play by a set of clear rules.

enjoy the support of other WTO member states who represent an overwhelming majority of Russia's trading partners.

While encouraging Moscow to expand the reach of Russia's freely undertaken international commitments, the United States should also push to clarify their meaning. For instance, Russia has used the rhetoric of international standards for free and fair elections cynically, attacking neighboring Belarus for "non-compliance with democratic norms," even as it hailed allegedly democratic processes in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan that ousted leaders it viewed unfavorably.¹⁶ Moscow's own adoption of democracy rhetoric in these contexts provides an opening for the United States and other countries to raise the profile of the OSCE, an inclusive and neutral arbiter of elections and other democratic processes, which has been unable to observe Russian elections since 2004.¹⁷

The Kremlin's willingness to open its own elections to international scrutiny should not be a prerequisite for U.S.-Russia cooperation on unrelated matters; however, it does constitute a legitimate interest and concern for the United States and all other OSCE member states. It is entirely fair and appropriate that the United States call for Russia to comply with its own freely undertaken commitments to the Euro-Atlantic community if Moscow expects that same community to give enhanced consideration to its security interests.

Second, the United States has a long-standing, legitimate, and important right to intervene to protect U.S. citizens and property jeopardized by abusive practices within Russia, and to insist that Russia act in accordance with U.S. laws and practices when it engages the American market or seeks to use its instruments.

Although U.S. direct investment in Russia and the presence of large numbers of American expatriates in the country are relatively new phenomena, it is an established principle of public international law that states are entitled to act in support of the interests of their nationals working, residing, or traveling abroad.¹⁸ Russia itself has cited this principle to justify its actions in responding to alleged abuse of Russian citizens' rights in former Soviet states such as Moldova, Latvia, and Ukraine, and even—quite controversially—to justify its use of force against Georgia in 2008.¹⁹ Opportunistic U.S.-Russia cooperation to advance trade, conduct joint scientific research, and support Russia's modernization efforts should not preclude tough measures from Washington to ensure that U.S.-Russia economic engagement is a fair and open two-way street.

Although the story of U.S. investment in Russia over the past decade is largely positive, there are prominent examples of American companies and investors suffering losses or outright expropriation at the hands of the Russian state. When the Kremlin dismantled the Yukos energy company this fall, U.S. minority shareholders lost their investments and had no effective recourse in the Russian legal system.²⁰

Similarly, U.S. energy companies have lost large sums of money in agreements to develop oil and gas fields in Russia's Far East on which the government later renegeed or changed the terms to impose expensive tax burdens. Other private U.S. investors have been crowded out of lucrative Russian markets after taking the risks and investing the initial capital to open those markets.

Whether the Kremlin has been right or wrong to assert increasingly extensive control over the energy sector and other "strategic sectors" in the Russian economy, the United States can and should push back to make sure that transactions involving American companies and investors are handled transparently, and that Americans have reasonable recourse against abusive actors within the Russian legal system. As a condition of full U.S. participation in Russia's modernization drive, Washington should insist on clear rules to protect U.S. citizens and their property, including intellectual property. In practice, transparency and rule of law are the same whether applied to American or Russian companies and citizens, but approaching these issues by focusing on concrete U.S. interests in investments and transactions in Russia strengthens and clarifies Washington's position, even as it expands cooperation with Russia post-reset.

Finally, Washington should underscore the place respect for democracy and human rights in Russia plays in shaping bilateral relations by reminding the Kremlin that the interests of both sides in cooperation and engagement can be obstructed if Congress and the American people turn against the policy. Although Russian leaders are often loath to recognize this reality, no U.S. administration can sustain its foreign policy without support from the legislative branch and the public.

The Obama administration and its post-reset policy of engagement with Russia is no exception. When the Kremlin attracts negative publicity by arresting political dissidents, shuttering free media outlets, and permitting rampant corruption to continue despite its own public rhetoric, average Americans and their representatives in Congress may be convinced that engagement with Russia should be cut off, rather than expanded. Critics of the administration have made this very argument, citing the Kremlin's authoritarianism as a reason to distrust Russia and refrain from ratifying the New START treaty.²¹

Reminding Russia of the political consequences of its anti-democratic behavior is different from adopting an official policy of linkage. Even though the administration may wish to pursue some avenues of cooperation with Moscow—especially on security challenges like Iran, Afghanistan, and nuclear security—regardless of Russia's conduct at home, egregious abuses by the Kremlin can change the political atmosphere in the United States so dramatically that Russia becomes a domestic political liability for the U.S. administration.

When that occurs—as it did following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008—U.S.-Russia cooperation in any sphere becomes effectively impossible.

As a condition of full U.S. participation in Russia's modernization drive, Washington should insist on clear rules to protect U.S. citizens and their property.

With bilateral engagement and cooperation on the rise, now is the time for Washington to remind Moscow of the need to maintain positive public perceptions on both sides, and of the importance that respect for human rights and democratic values can play in that perception on the U.S. side.

Conclusion

U.S.-Russia relations have recovered significantly from the low point reached after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Thanks to revived political will on both sides and new institutions for managing the relationship, cooperation has blossomed, including on shared interests in arms control and nuclear security, counterterrorism, anti-trafficking and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, plus trade promotion, scientific cooperation, and connections among ordinary citizens. Yet two years after a successful reset, the United States and Russia are still at odds over issues related to Russia's domestic policies, especially on political freedoms, transparency, and the rule of law.

This persistent values gap between Washington and Moscow can be neither erased nor effectively managed by either of the methods espoused by experts on opposite sides of an ongoing policy debate in Washington. Linkage—the policy of making bilateral cooperation on shared interests conditional on changes in Russia's domestic policies—is both ineffective and counterproductive because it breaks down the very relationships to which it seeks to apply leverage. On the other hand, a policy of strict compartmentalization—cooperating with the Kremlin on urgent shared interests, while supporting Russian civil society in hopes of fostering change from within—is inadequate and fails to take advantage of influence gained through enhanced bilateral engagement.

The most effective strategy for addressing the values gap is firmly rooted in a tradition of U.S. engagement with the Kremlin centered on concrete U.S. interests, whatever the subject of the discourse. By holding Moscow accountable to freely undertaken and reciprocal commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, the ECHR, and other instruments, the United States can advance its own interest in a rules-based international system, while gaining support from the broader international community and tapping into Russia's desire to participate in that community.

By advocating for protection of property rights and due process for U.S. companies and individuals investing in the Russian market, the United States can also strike an appropriate balance between continuing to promote enhanced economic cooperation and supporting the legal protections that are both necessary to justify U.S. investments and beneficial to Russian citizens themselves. Finally, Washington should remind Moscow that even if the administration rejects linkage, abusive and autocratic behavior by Russia can persuade the American

The most effective strategy for addressing the values gap is firmly rooted in a tradition of U.S. engagement with the Kremlin centered on concrete U.S. interests.

people and Congress to impose severe constraints on the development of the bilateral relationship.

A successful U.S.-Russia policy depends on cooperation and engagement to build working relationships among U.S. and Russian officials, and between the two societies. Both sides should pursue cooperation when interests are shared, and work to develop enhanced mutual understanding, so that interests converge and cooperation increases over the long term. Although failure to see eye to eye on important values weakens the framework for cooperation even on shared priorities, the United States cannot coerce the Kremlin to act against what it sees as its own interest. On the contrary, Washington can make the most persuasive case for democratic values in Russia by consistently emphasizing their centrality to concrete American interests.

Notes

- 1 Executive Order on Measures to Implement UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on Iran, adopted on June 9, 2010. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/acts/8986> (Medvedev's announcement in Russian); an abridged English version is available at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/980>. Resolution 1929 Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting on June 9, 2010. Available at <http://www.iranwatch.org/international/UNSC/unsc-1929-060910.pdf>.
- 2 Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation, July 6, 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-President-Dmitry-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-on-Nuclear-Cooperation.
- 3 Security Council Resolution 1887, September 24, 2009. Available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm>.
- 4 Clinton, Russia's Lavrov Sign Plutonium Disposition Protocol: Protocol Reaffirms Both Countries' Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament, April 13, 2010, U.S. Department of State, Media Note, <http://www.america.gov/st/nonprolif-english/2010/April/20100413172713xjsnommis0.9075238.html>.
- 5 Macon Phillips, "The New START Treaty and Protocol," The White House Blog, April 8, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol>.
- 6 Fact Sheet: United States-Russia Military Transit Agreement, June 6, 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-United-States-Russia-Military-Transit-Agreement. On the Pakistani closure, see Zahid Hussain, "Pakistan Closes NATO's Khyber Pass Supply Route Into Afghanistan," *Times*, December 31, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5420575.ece>.
- 7 "Medvedev Hopes his Visit to Silicon Valley will Boost Russian Business," RIA Novosti, June 24, 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/news/20100624/159551159.html>; Wallace Witkowski, "Cisco Investing \$1 Billion in Russia Over Decade," Market Watch, June 23, 2010, <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cisco-investing-1-billion-in-russia-over-decade-2010-06-23>.
- 8 U.S.-Russia Bilateral Commission, Education, Culture, and Sports: Past Events, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/usrussiabilat/c38709.htm>.
- 9 Ilya Arkhipov, "Obama's 'Reset' Pays Off as Russian Approval Hits 12-Year High," Bloomberg Businessweek, June 28, 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-28/obama-s-reset-pays-off-as-russian-approval-hits-12-year-high.html>.
- 10 "U.S. criticizes Russia for arrests during rallies on Aug. 31," RIA Novosti, September 2, 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100902/160432281.html>.
- 11 Michael McFaul keynote address at "Russia after the Global Economic Crisis," Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 10, 2010. See http://www.iie.com/events/event_detail.cfm?EventID=154.
- 12 "The Draft of the European Security Treaty," November 29, 2009. Available at: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275>
- 13 http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf.
- 14 Elena Variyuchuk, "The Implementation of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Russia," IPRA Research Paper (undated). See also "Strasbourg Court Orders Russia to Compensate Chechen Families," RIA Novosti, May 14, 2009. Available at <http://en.rian.ru/world/20090514/155020385.html>.

- 15 Nikolaus von Twickel, “Leaked Paper Calls for Friendlier Foreign Policy,” *Moscow Times*, May 13, 2010. Available at <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/leaked-paper-calls-for-friendlier-foreign-policy/405884.html>.
- 16 Natalia Shapovalova and Kateryna Zarembo, “Russia’s Machiavellian Support For Democracy,” FRIDE Policy Brief, October 2010, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/201010078895/russias-machiavellian-support-for-democracy.html>.
- 17 See Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights—Elections, <http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/eom.html>.
- 18 See, e.g., *Durand v. Hollins*, 8 Cas.112 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860). The court held that, “the citizen abroad is as much entitled to protection as the citizen at home. The great object and duty of Government is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the people composing it, whether abroad or at home; and any Government failing in the accomplishment of the object, or the performance of the duty, is not worth preserving.”
- 19 Natalie Wild, “Does A State Have The Right To Protect Its Citizens Abroad?” August 22, 2008, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Commentary, http://www.rferl.org/content/Does_A_State_Have_The_Right_To_Protect_Its_Citizens_Abroad/1193050.html.
- 20 “U.S.-Russia Economic Relationship: Implications of the Yukos Affair,” Testimony by Anders Aslund, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Before the Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, October 17, 2007. Available at <http://www.iie.com/publications/testimony/testimony.cfm?ResearchID=844>.
- 21 “Top 10 Reasons Not to Trust Russia,” Heritage Foundation, Fact Sheet no. 71, July 29, 2010, <http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/top-10-reasons-not-to-trust-russia>.

MATTHEW ROJANSKY is the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment. Rojansky is responsible for advancing the Program's strategic priorities, ensuring operational support for resident and visiting experts, and managing relationships with other Carnegie programs, partner institutions, and policy makers. An expert on U.S. and Russian national security and nuclear weapons policies, his work focuses on relations among the United States, NATO, and the states of the former Soviet Union.

From 2007–2010, Rojansky served as executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America (PSA). Founded by former Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) and former Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), with a group of two dozen former senior leaders from both political parties, PSA seeks to rebuild bipartisan dialogue and productive debate on U.S. national security and foreign policy challenges.

Rojansky is frequently interviewed on TV and radio, and his writing has appeared in the *International Herald Tribune*, *Jerusalem Post*, and *Moscow Times*.

AMBASSADOR JAMES F. COLLINS was appointed the director of the Russia and Eurasia Program in January of 2007. He is an expert on the former Soviet Union, its successor states, and on the Middle East.

Ambassador Collins was the U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1997 to 2001. Prior to joining the Carnegie Endowment, he served as senior adviser at the public law and policy practice group Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP.

Before his appointment as ambassador to Russia, he served as ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the secretary of state for the New Independent States in the mid 1990s and as deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1990 to 1993. In addition to three diplomatic postings in Moscow, he also held positions in the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, and the Consulate General in Izmir, Turkey.

He is the recipient of the Secretary of State's Award for Distinguished Service; the Department of State's Distinguished Honor Award; the Secretary of State's Award for Career Achievement; the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service; and the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. The Endowment—currently pioneering the first global think tank—has operations in China, the Middle East, Russia, Europe, and the United States. These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies will most determine the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance.

© 2010 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE