

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**NUCLEAR ENERGY,
NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS
CONTROL IN THE NEXT
ADMINISTRATION:
SEIZE THE SUPERSTRUCTURE**

SPEAKERS:

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GEORGE PERKOVICH: There are some seats in the front, which is also what happens in every classroom. No one wants to sit in the front. And that will remain the case, I guess. I'm going to go ahead and start. I think some people will continue to wander up. I wanted to run down and get a cookie but I forgot.

Welcome. Those of you who are just joining us and also those of you for whom this is round two of the day, my name's George Perkovich. I'm vice president for studies here at the Endowment and director of the Nonproliferation Program. And it's my pleasure to be both the host and one of the participants in this panel and more my pleasure to welcome Rose Gottemoeller back from Moscow, where she has been the outstanding director of the Carnegie Moscow Center for the past almost three years. And we wouldn't have made it without her there. It's been a challenging time and she led us – led the Center through that time with great aplomb.

And so it's our benefit and your benefit today to have Rose back. And she has just written this piece that's out there. There are a bunch of pieces out there and I like the way they were designed but they do look alike so you kind of have to search for them. But this is "Russian-American Security Relations after Georgia" and so Rose will pick up, in essence, where we're all stopped in terms of talking about a practical agenda of moving forward with Russia.

My topic of my policy brief that's out there is entitled "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead" and I'm going to pick up where we left off yesterday in many ways. We had Secretary of Defense Gates here yesterday, who gave a speech on U.S. nuclear policy and I mean, I think it's hard – hard to say anything but that Secretary Gates has been an outstanding leader of the Pentagon, as Jessica Matthews said yesterday, and has put forward many innovative ideas and given some very thoughtful speeches and we can talk about the speech yesterday.

I thought the question-and-answer was especially interesting, especially on the CTBT and the interest in going forward on a further round of reductions with Russia, with verification. But I think in the main speech, there was a kind of an implicit pushback against the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons. He talked about it more in terms of kind of realistic versus unrealistic or kind of naïve approaches to international security. And I think that's – that, that view that's kind of implicit and somewhat defensive about the idea of abolition is interesting and it reflects, in many ways, the growing salience of the idea that we can actually take seriously the abolition of nuclear weapons and it's a goal that ought to be pursued and that was put, you know, kind of – made most legitimate, in a sense, by the contributions of Secretary Shultz, Kissinger, Perry and Senator Nunn in the successive op-eds that everybody here knows about.

And so I think you start to see some kind of backfilling against that idea that kind of came out yesterday. And you see it also in the new report, the September 2008 report of the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, "National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century," which isn't exactly a bestseller in the U.S., but I can tell you, traveling internationally, people have read it and they comment on it. And you get a similar kind of feel of unstated resistance and wariness about this idea of abolishing nuclear weapons in order for you to sense here – to me, it's kind of like a Freudian slip but it says although not suited for every 21st century challenge, nuclear weapons remain an essential element in modern strategy. There's kind of an idea in there that these things have been so important and that you actually have to say they're not suited for every challenge to go forward to then argue the challenges for which they are vital.

And what I try to suggest and what I'll suggest here in the policy brief is that we actually shouldn't be so defensive about this issue and that there's a different way to frame U.S. policy, U.S. approach and it would be different. So instead of the idea that well, abolishing nuclear weapons is nice but it's not realistic because there are bad people out there and it's an uncertain world and you never know what's going to happen, so you've got to keep your nuclear weapons. You could just as well say we'd really like to abolish nuclear weapons and we also find that the conditions that would be necessary in order to make that feasible would really make the world better for everyone, including the United States.

And so we would like to try to lead in the creation of those conditions, but we can't do it alone and we can't force people to cooperate in making this feasible and if they don't cooperate and if the right conditions aren't created, there's not going to be nuclear abolition. And it's not going to be just the United States. You have to deal with the interest of all the other states that possess nuclear weapons and we understand that but as far as our intentions as the United States, we would like to move in that direction and have a world that is built on those conditions.

Now, it seems to me you could say that and you could say in the meantime, as long as other people have nuclear weapons, we're going to keep ours at the lowest number possible but we're still going to keep some. And other things would follow from that. So it's kind of a framing difference that strikes me as peculiar that why that – why you couldn't do that – why a government doesn't want to do that or what they're afraid of that kind of framing. And what I try to suggest in the paper is that you actually could serve national security interests by framing it that way and I talk about in the paper for of those interests so I'll just highlight them here. I'm not going to go into them.

But clearly, the verification and enforcement mechanisms, you would need to get close to zero, to get actually to zero nuclear weapons, and then to stay there. The verification and enforcement mechanisms you would need are clearly in the national security interest of the United States and arguably, everyone else – adopt a world that's much more transparent, where there's much more reliable kind of mechanisms and capabilities to uphold international agreements. That's kind of the vision that the West at least, has been promoting for decades. So it seems to me that kind of world, which is required for abolishing nuclear weapons, is something that we've been about and ought to be about. And so any way that you can move in that direction is a gain and therefore in our interest.

Second point would be that without a clear commitment to the elimination of all nuclear arsenals, it's going to be very hard to get non-nuclear-weapons states to support the kind of rules that we all recognize are necessary to tighten up the nonproliferation regime and to make the expansion of nuclear industry that we talked about this morning secure and therefore sustainable because by the way, if you have proliferation in this world going out – not to mention nuclear war – it's going to be much, much harder to get support for a major expansion of nuclear industry because in people's minds, nuclear things – kind of get blended together. So if you've got – God forbid, you've got kind of radiating ruins some places, people aren't going to be likely to support the next sighting of a reactor in their state and if there's proliferation, it makes it tougher, too. So that's another interest.

Thirdly, the accounting and control over nuclear materials that would be necessary to enable you to go close to zero – that accounting and control will give you much greater confidence against

nuclear terrorism – the possibility of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, so why not do that? On the other hand, if you're not pursuing the elimination of nuclear weapons, it's very hard to get people to accept the kind of control and monitoring with the precision that you need over fissile materials, so these things go hand-in-hand.

The paper goes on, you know, on another interest and you know, to make this case, but let me briefly, and then turn to Rose, say that there are a couple of counterarguments to the idea of abolition that I just think one should clarify. The first one that one hears and there was a variation of it yesterday where the secretary said, you know, you can't put the genie back in the bottle. Although in "I Dream of Jeannie," she used to go back in the bottle – (laughter) – I just of thought of that – anyway, the one I was going to pick was on people say nuclear weapons can't be disinvented.

And that's basically a device to stop the discussion. And I would say first of all, that of course nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. No human creation can be disinvented. But the issue is that there are times when society decides that there are artifacts that we don't want to live with – there are technologies or practices that we don't want to live with and we decide that we won't have them anymore. The issue isn't disinvention, the issue is can you verify that the thing we decided we didn't want has been dismantled or gotten rid of and then can you enforce that dismantlement or riddance? And we do it with CFEs from the Ozone.

I was talking with somebody yesterday who said basically that's what we did with smallpox and there's an exception and we can talk about that because it kind of proves point and we've done it with mass-scale gas chambers. Those haven't been disinvented but we don't have them around now and don't think they should be around and we're prepared to take action to enforce that. And I think that's the issue on eliminating nuclear weapons. It's not a question of disinvention.

There's the other thing that happens when you have this discussion, especially in the United States. There's an assumption that what you're talking about is unilateral disarmament by the United States. And in this Adelphi paper which we did which is also out there, there's a great quote from General Chilton in front – he did two rounds with the House and the Senate earlier this year – he's the commander of STRATCOM and he was asked, in essence, what he thought of the Shultz-Nunn-Perry-Kissinger argument about abolition and he went on and he gave an answer about you know, he'd like to live in a world where his daughter – or he'd like there be a world where his daughters don't have to live under the fear of nuclear weapons and so on and so forth, but I'm not for unilateral disarmament.

And it's just kind of this implicit notion that when you're talking about this, it's that the U.S. is going to get rid of all its nuclear weapons but the other guys are still going to have theirs and in fact, no one's making that argument and it's not part of any process that one is talking about when one is seriously talking about abolishing nuclear weapons. There are other kind of images that come up in this discussion that I think we just need to work to kind of clear away and say that we're actually talking about a very, very hard project, a robust national security project to try to work with the others and bring them in to create these conditions.

The first condition that would have to be met, obviously, is U.S.-Russian leadership – that if the U.S. and Russia can't get reengaged on this agenda, can't lower the numbers of their weapons but as importantly or more importantly, kind of the salience and value that they bestow on them and

the sense of direction that the world feels about nuclear weapons. If that doesn't happen, you know, the process stops. I mean, this is done.

And so that has to be the first step and then one would have to bring in China as the state whose capacity's growing so you want to find out are you going to be able to create an understanding – a strategic relationship with the U.S., Russia, and China, where you don't have the sense that one is kind of going to rise up and those curves are going to pass. And both of those were talked about by Secretary Gates yesterday, which was, I think, another important element of his speech and Rose is now going to talk about the absolute premium step, which will be restoring U.S.-Russian cooperation on this agenda.

Thanks.

(Applause.)

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, George and thank you for your kind words. It's good to see so many friends and colleagues in the audience. Thank you for coming today. You know, you've mentioned "I Dream of Jeannie." What a funny thing – you know, it's on Russian cable television and I hate to admit it – (laughter) – but I was watching it, you know, to practice my Russian and Samantha and Darrin sound very funny in Russia – (laughter) – but furthermore, she does go back in the bottle. So I can confirm, to this day – (laughter) – she goes back in the bottle.

You know, I put this policy brief to bed and it went to press while the crisis in Georgia was still very much the focus of bilateral attention. And the financial crisis has brought Russia back to the table again and I use that as a symbol of the fact that when Kudrin came to Washington for the IMF meeting, he got a meeting with Secretary Paulson, you know, so out the window very quickly went the policy of no official visits above deputy assistant secretary level.

So the financial crisis has changed the calculus somewhat and has, you know, a bit, sidelined the Georgia crisis but I would argue, nevertheless, that the major motivating force of this policy brief still stands. And that is, we are going into a transition period. There is a transition going on right now in the Russia Federation. So they have a presidential transition going on at the moment. Soon, the United States will be going into a presidential transition with serious potential for miscalculation in either capital.

First of all, with regard to Russia, the tandem leadership arrangement with Medvedev as president and Putin as prime minister is unpredictable and could be unstable. So we have to be concerned about, you know, how decision-making is made in Moscow at the present time. And in a new U.S. administration, no matter who is elected, there will be unformed views on Russia. We have heard during the debates, what I would consider, you know, a kind of tough line on Russia but beyond that, I think both campaigns at this point haven't totally grappled with all the details with what a policy toward Russia should be. And there's the general notion that we must be tough on Russia but beyond that, there's very little articulated. So I do believe and as I wrote in this policy brief, I think the real potential exists for serious crisis between our two countries.

And for that reason, I have put forward a very similar approach for the transition period. And that is that I believe we must hang on to the superstructure of our relationship as it has existed

in the many treaties and agreements that we have put together over the years, arduously negotiated. We heard Secretary Gates complain yesterday about telephone-book-sized START agreements that take forever to negotiate. Yes, but that was a significant amount of joint experience that I think we should now hang on to in order to be able to get through what may be a difficult and potentially even crisis-ridden transition period.

However, I will also emphasize and I want to underscore for this audience, as for others, that this is a transitional strategy, only for the next five to six months, we should be seeking and holding onto stability that is inherent in those longstanding treaties and agreements as a basis for further discussion and development of a fresh agenda, a new agenda. However, I am not in any way advocating preserving agreements that have existed in the past and simply leaving them alone.

In the case of the CFE Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, that's simply impossible because well, we'll get into that further in a few moments. We've kind of gone beyond that phase. And in the case of the START treaty, neither Moscow nor Washington wants to preserve the START treaty as it currently exists. We realize that our relationship has developed in new directions and that much can be done to simplify and rationalize what was a very reliable, and I would say, well implemented treaty over the last 15 years.

So let's think about these treaties and agreements as building blocks for our further relationship – building blocks for a fresh agenda, but not think about them as something that must be set in concrete and must remain concrete as we move forward into new presidential administrations in both Moscow and Washington.

Let me turn now, to START, as the first point that I wanted to make. And I'm really – I invite you to read the piece, I would be very happy to hear people's reactions and comments on it, but I'd like to just emphasize a few moments and maybe start our discussion going in that way. My main point with regard to the START treaty is that we need to think now about what approach would best impel both Russia and the United States to quickly replace the existing START treaty. As you know, the two sides must consult this December as to what should happen next with START. That's a requirement in the treaty and by December 2009, well, we will have had to come up with some further approach with regard to START.

I argue that as the treaty calls for, we should simply go forward with a five-year extension. It would not need to be ratified by the Senate at this point or by the State Duma and Federation Council. We could simply extend it as called for routinely in the treaty. However, at the same time, I think that we need to agree on a political basis to negotiate and ratify a replacement treaty within one year. I believe that this is feasible because I know that a lot of homework has been done in the Bush administration and also in Moscow on the Russian side. A very significant amount of groundwork has already been laid and furthermore, I think that there is a lot of will on the two sides to move rather quickly to negotiate a replacement to START.

But my approach would accomplish two goals. First, it would prevent the START treaty from being swept away in uncertainty during this upcoming transition period. And second, and this is a very important point – it would shift the onus for quickly negotiating and ratifying the follow-up treaty onto the two governments, both the executive and the legislative branches. Thus, in effect, after a replacement treaty would be signed by the executives in both capitals, the State Duma and

the Senate would, I think, be impelled to ratify it rather quickly because otherwise, the original START treaty would remain in force.

So in other words, through the mechanism of a political agreement to act quickly, we could, in effect, both preserve the baseline of START for as long as is needed but I think we would then have an impetus to move quickly to the follow-on treaty. So I think that's a good approach on START and I would like to hear your views on it. It's very interesting and I will just mention that my colleague, Alexei Arbatov, in Moscow, differs on this. We were just discussing this point before I left Moscow.

He believes in the value of the vacuum. He says, let's let START go out of force. That will scare both sides so much that they will be impelled to move quickly to negotiate and ratify the follow-on treaty. He and I differ on that. I wish he were here to join the debate with us today but my view is that I would prefer to have the insurance policy with an impetus to fast ratification of a new treaty rather than have a vacuum to contend with because I think the uncertainties between our two capitals are too great at this point.

Now, let me turn quickly to the CFE Treaty. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty has already been severely undermined by Russia's halt to its implementation about a year ago and it has, of course, been further undermined by the Russian invasion of Georgia. Nevertheless, as we are now casting around for a wanted new security system in Europe and the Russians are very active in trying to articulate this, CFE, I do believe, can be a basis upon which we must and can build.

First and foremost, I think we need to work very hard to salvage the data exchanges, the notification, the verification, and inspection measures that were at the core of the CFE Treaty and have over the years – again, the Russians may not like to admit this, but over the years been an enormous confidence builder in Europe as NATO has enlarged and as the European security system, as it exists today, has taken shape. Again, I think we're headed for something new. Certainly, the Russians would like to see that happen. But I think we need to sustain a good baseline and CFE, with its verification, monitoring, notification, and data exchange system helps us to do it.

And second, I think we need to review and again embrace key CFE principles and the one that is most important, in my view, is the principle of host nation consent to the presence of foreign troops on their territories. It's all important. But it's those kinds of principles, inherent not only to CFE but to the Helsinki document, the OSCE arrangements that I think now, we need to take a very thorough look at. Again reaffirm and agree with the Russians about their priorities.

I just want to say, finally, on CFE, that it's so valuable because it gets everybody to the table, not only the NATO countries, new and old, and not only Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, but also countries we've been very concerned about because of instability between them like Armenia and Azerbaijan. I think the time might be right to look again at the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as we try to wrestle with what we do about South Ossetia and Abkhazia and as we try to think about unfreezing some of these frozen conflicts and finding resolution of them. So CFE, I think, can play an important role in that regard. It's our focus on the hardware of security— weapons systems in itself has a value.

My final recommendation in the policy brief is to establish a high-level commission of past presidents who would serve to maintain a priority focus on Russia – again, I want to stress –

through this transition period, five to six months and also provide wise heads to help us to get through this difficult period and to think of some new approaches, particularly in the area of European security building. I think that that must be one of our top priorities with Russia at the present time.

Now, you may, in reading this proposal, consider it somewhat whimsical. But I was inspired by recollecting the role that was played – were played by two presidents, by George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton after the tsunami crisis in Asia a couple of years ago for original partnering to raise global funding for relief for tsunami victims. It was originally considered to be a kind of odd couple partnering and people were scratching their heads. What could this possibly be all about? But the two of them worked extremely effectively together and evidently, according to press reports, got to be pretty good friends and I could see a value for that kind of relationship, not only for the substance that they might achieve, but for that kind of relationship in developing a new phase in the U.S.-Russian relationship and agenda overall.

We could see something of the same effect there and I think the idea is no more whimsical than the idea of a Putin-Palin commission so – (laughter) – that’s all I have to say about my policy brief. I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MR. PERKOVICH: The Putin-Palin commission would get a lot more hits on YouTube, I’m sure, but questions and then I’ll point to people and then if you could say your name and affiliation, please. We’ll work our way through here and – (inaudible).

Q: Hi, Richard Weitz from the Hudson Institute. One area which is implied in the title but I guess you didn’t develop is the issue of nonproliferation, cooperation in third areas. And I’d particularly like to hear both your insights on three particular areas. One, Georgia. As we know from the new reports, some of the radiation detectors were damaged, obviously, to stem potential flows of WMD-related materials through Georgia will need cooperation from United States, Europe, but also some help from Russia. Where do we go from there?

Second, the – some of the take-back operations – we just had a recent very successful one in Hungary, repatriation of former Soviet fuel, Uzbekistan was previously an area. Do you think those will continue as you’re still – if any disruption in that. And particularly, Khalistan is mentioned and then the last one would be the uranium enrichment center that Russia and Kazakhstan are developing. Is there any – I know – (inaudible) – is there any effort to get more involved in that since we don’t have our own initiative in that area?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: It won’t surprise this audience, but I do think that this whole area of what has loosely been called threat reduction cooperation is a very good area, not only to look at for fresh ideas, but also to help us to address the agenda that was raised by Russia’s invasion of Georgia. We – I think, basically need to get back to the kind of relationship where we can be working on a trilateral basis to solve some of these critical problems that are important not only for our survival, but also for countries around the world.

And the examples you’ve raised, I think, are very good ones, Richard. First of all, I’ve thought already that we should try to get the Russians and the Georgians to sit down together with

us to talk about nuclear smuggling in Georgia. I think that's a very important critical area and South Ossetia is, you probably know, a smugglers' den. So I think that's one example of where we might begin to break down what is currently a very serious Russian resistance to talking directly to the Georgians, but I think it's critical on these national security issues that we think about ways where we can be working together on a more or less equitable basis on these key national security problems.

Take-back, I think is another good example. I can't imagine that GTRI, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative is going to go away in a new administration so there will be continuing opportunities to work in that area. And Angarsk, the International Fuel Services Center at Angarsk in very interesting sense, is one of the only other gambits on the table with regard to Iran. The Russians have offered the Iranians membership in the Angarsk facility. So far, the Iranians have said no thank you, but have seemed to leave the door open for discussion of cooperation at the Angarsk facility. So I think there are many ways that both the existing agenda of bilateral cooperation in the nuclear arena, I think, can now be pushed forward and developed forward.

But also, there are certain ways, I think, we should look again at what are some Russian proposals and how they might help us to solve some critical problems like the problem with Iran and its nuclear program.

MR. PERKOVICH: Andrew and then Howard and then Laura and Henry's in the back so – and then we'll work our way here.

Q: Andrew Pierre at Georgetown University. Rose, you mentioned the importance of European security building, I think in the context of wise men or something of that sort. Both your remarks on Europe dealt with the CFE. Would you also include in that a revitalized OSCE? And would you also include a sort of fresh look at missile defense in Europe. If you were here yesterday, you may have noticed I asked Secretary Gates about that and he didn't really espouse what I would call a fresh look at the whole issue. So I'd be interested in your views on this.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Kind of.

Q: Huh?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: You said kind of.

Q: Kind of, yeah, but he really gave all the reasons why he still hoped to bring the Russians on board rather than what I would call a fresh look.

And if I may add a second question – assuming for the moment, we have an Obama administration but perhaps even if not, we've now had – we've gone through some years without ACDA and the kind of a, somewhat, to my judgment, bizarre State Department organization for dealing with some of these issues. My question is, do we need to sort of – is it important to reorganize our government for dealing with the larger arms control agenda which you seem to support and something which might be feasible now that Jessie Helms is no longer with us?

MR. PERKOVICH: Before you answer, because there were so many questions, let's two at a time – so Howard? And then I will start working.

Q: Howard Morland. Just a brief thought – I agree with everything you said. I'd like to raise a little question about the unilateralism business. I think the most useful nuclear disarmament that's happened recently is George Bush the first unilaterally disarming the U.S. Army and surface navy and also South Africa unilaterally disarmed as well as Belarus and so forth, you know, the Russian states.

I think if you don't reject the idea of unilateralism altogether, I think it's useful, regardless of what your conclusion is, to simply ask the question, what exactly do we plan to actually do with nuclear weapons and how exactly, specifically, are they useful to us because if we're acting like they're valuable and we're not going to give them up until somebody else gives them up, then you're assuming that they have a certain value and I think it'll be useful to look at exactly what that value is because actually, I don't see it.

MR. PERKOVICH: Actually, I'll answer Howard's question but on the missile defense in Europe, just a couple thoughts, Andrew. One is that I think there'll be lots of tactical issues in any case. In other words, missile defense proposals there – if Russia is truly as upset about it as they seem to me, then we actually ought to get a lot for it for not doing it. So there may be – which is paradoxical and that may be a mistake the Russians make but I think somebody in a new administration will look and say, well, if we're going to do that, let's get something, number one.

Number two, as with the question which is related, actually, to disarmament, the whole question of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is, I think, is much more complicated than often addressed because the sensitivities or the interests of the Poles for example as the most prominent and largest example, on the issue of missile defense but also on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, is different than that of, you know, say, the German Green Party. So the – and the same with the Turks regarding U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe that it's a more complicated agenda and I think that will be seen in the next administration, that these things are, you know, connected in ways.

On Howard's point about unilateralism, yeah, I was not being specific enough. I think there's lots of room and lots of values for unilateral steps and the one that you cited that President Bush the 41 did is optimal. But the way it was done is actually interesting too and it points to the South African case as well. It wasn't done through the bureaucracy or kind of staffed out with a bunch of views. It was a national security advisor, a chairman of the joint chiefs who got along well and understood this stuff and worked with the president and basically did it. And that was also largely the case with the South African disarmament decision, which was done in secret. They didn't even know they had the nuclear weapons in the first place – the country didn't – but then they got rid of them in secret without a lot of process.

What I'm talking about is the states that have nuclear weapons that have declared them, that use them in their national security politics and posture and so on and I'm talking about the last steps. I'm not talking about, you know, phasing out. We can unilaterally get rid of the land-based ICBMS and I don't think, you know, anybody but some few people in the Air Force would really miss them. And they might make the world safer without them. But if you're talking about getting rid of all the nuclear weapons, then that's going to be a different process and that I can't imagine any of the current nuclear-armed states, except maybe the U.K., doing that.

And even in the U.K., where there is a really constituency for disarmament, when they made the decision to modernize the trident, it was – that was considered and the view was, well, if we were going to ever disarm, we should get something for it and so you don't just do it without bringing other people with you. So I think on the ultimate step, that's the way folks would look at it.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I wanted to start on the unilateralism point as well because one thing I have said before from this podium is that we should be embracing all the different approaches that have been developed over the last eight years by this administration and by predecessor administrations as well. I include PNIs, unilateral measures. I'm not the great opponent of SORT, or the Moscow treaty that some of my colleagues are because I see its inherent association with START I as you know, being a comprehensive deal so to say.

So but that means it's especially important for me that there be a follow-on to start and that the important verification measures of START are transferred into a new treaty in a judicious way. So I think that we should be flexible in thinking about the future of arms negotiations now and we should be willing to think about times when we can do things with negotiations as well. I don't think that we should, by any means, return to the patterns of the past in this regard.

Andrew, I'd like to talk to you about what you think about OSCE revitalization. You know, the Russians have been very down on OSCE and I've gotten beat about the head and shoulders repeatedly about OSCE in Moscow in recent years but I will say as I've watched the Georgia crisis and its aftermath unfold, OSCE has been playing a vital role and it's a key part of the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, the observers who are being sent in from that organization. So clearly, it has a vital role already.

Now, how do we address some of the problems with it that have been raised? The Russians constantly complain about over-bureaucratization. I'm not an expert on OSCE, so I don't know, but there seems to be fruit there for some, perhaps, fresh looks at this organization and perhaps it can be part of this process of taking a new look at European security. But I would appreciate hearing your views on that.

Missile defense in Europe – here, I think what I would like to see is a kind of corrective or rebalancing going on because we've had the right idea about missile defense in Europe, I think, in that there was a very, very good NATO-Russia Council project on missile defense in Europe that has led to some significant, not only paperwork, policy work, but also some significant technical and actual changes in the way we do things in European airspace, for example. So there's been a lot accomplished in the NATO-Russia Council, which then got, I would say, skewed somewhat by this bilateral approach to negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic.

So is there a way we can rebalance now and perhaps bring those bilateral projects into more a multilateral framework, again, because I think that that's how you can begin to have a conversation, again, with the Russians. The Russians and Secretary Gates were right – they are a heck of a good set of confidence building measures on the table and everything he said yesterday I agreed with in terms of what the administration has been willing to extend to the Russians and until this whole Georgia crisis blew up, I thought that we were very close to having a very, very detailed discussion on how implement those confidence-building measures. But we're going to have to take a new look in a new administration at this whole set of questions. But to me, missile defense in

Europe is not the biggest problem we have to deal with, with the Russians. It's one where I see potential for agreement.

As far as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is concerned and reorganization, you know, every administration coming in is going to take a look at how things are organized and there may be some problems to unwind in that regard by my view at the moment is that we should not be recreating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It's just my point of view. I think we've gotten beyond that but again, I'm open to discussion and interested in other views around the room on that.

MR. PERKOVICH: Great. I've got Laura and Henry in the back. Laura's right here and Henry's in the back and then we'll do the series of comment – questions here.

Q: It's great to see you back in this room, Rose. Welcome back. I was intrigued that you did not include the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement in your superstructure and I might say it doesn't belong there because I think it's been chafing at both parties for the last couple of years. And that is one of my big concerns in this transition phase is that the lack of a replacement of that antiquated assistance model with a more partnership-based model might lead to mischief or unintended damage to that excellent history in this transition phase.

My hope had been that the 123 Agreement would provide a more balance vehicle for some of the activities and some needed new activities but I'm curious about your thoughts of the kind of the legal political processes separate from the implementation of on-the-ground understandings that have already been worked out in projects under the Nunn-Lugar scheme. How can we protect agenda in this dangerous transition period in the absence of a legal superstructure?

Q: Hi, I'm sitting next to Ed Lyman and he tells me it's "Bewitched" that you are referring to.

MR. PERKOVICH: No, it's "I Dream of Jeannie" with Barbara –

Q: I think the trivia needs to be sorted out.

(Laughter.)

MR. PERKOVICH: I know I'm right.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I stand corrected. Darrin and Samantha are actually – yes, that's "Bewitched."

Q: Ed Lyman –

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: They're both on Russian cable television so I'm getting them mixed up.

Q: Ed Lyman is my source. (Laughter.) Henry Sokolski with Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Two questions – in light of the centrality for nonproliferation analysts of Iran and the crisis and Russia's role in Iran, would you be supportive of various proposals to set up a

multinational fuel center in Iran, perhaps involving Russia because Russia has been so involved in the Iranian program. So that's question one.

And question two – what would you do with regard to what some people say is about 40 or 50,000 bombs worth of highly enriched uranium that the Russians still retain? They've made it very clear they're not very interested in blending down beyond the 500 tons, which I guess they'll be done with in a few years. That leaves an awful lot of material for people to wring their hands around and over, which I – maybe we should just leave it there so we can all be employed, but I'm curious if you take a different approach to that problem set.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Laura, I was very constrained by the word limitations on this. I had a whole list and the very next one on my list was the CTR Umbrella Agreement that I had to choose two agreements to talk about. But I agree with you entirely that there is a vacuum, potentially, in the legal arrangements and political arrangements and clearly, I think we are going to have to consider how we can move to the next stage now because as we talk to the Russians about taking more responsibility for implementing projects of the threat reduction type, particularly if they go outside the territory of Russia.

You know, what are we going to require in order to be able to trust that process? So there's a lot of work and a lot of thinking that has to be done. And of course, the Russians must be involved from the get-go in that process. And up to now, again, I think they're very much preoccupied with their own political processes and with their own problems. You know, to be honest, they're not yet ready to do a whole lot of heavy lifting outside the borders of the Russian Federation so that's an issue overall. But I agree. I think that's the direction the agenda must develop over the next eight to 10 years and it will be a tough agenda.

Henry, I'm not a supporter of multilateral fuel centers in Iran. I know there are many proposals out there, some are very interesting, well thought out proposals but I think it's premature. And that is one of the reasons why I believe that we should push the Russians to reinvigorate their proposal to Iran with regard to the Angarsk facility. The Russians, if they could get the Iranians into Angarsk and remember that the Russian approach to implementing Angarsk is that as far as enrichment technologies are concerned, for partners in Angarsk, that's a black box.

They are not giving people access to enrichment technologies who are partnering in Angarsk but it would provide the Iranians the necessary experience that they're going to need if in 10 or 15 years time and they're able to develop the confidence of the international community, they do indeed decide and get the support to establish a multinational fuel center in Iran. But I think it's way too premature to be talking about it right now. I think that the experience the Russians could provide to the Iranians in the sense of how to run a fuel center could be important but that's a 10-, 15-, even 20-year process and we should be thinking about it in those terms and not in terms of immediately establishing or encouraging the thought that a multinational fuel center could be established in Iran.

And as far as the notion of the HEU still left in Russia at the current phase, I know the Russians haven't been enthusiastic about a so-called HEU 2 deal, but you know, honestly, that's negotiation and it has a lot to do with the value of the uranium and the nuclear energy market. The Russians know, you know, that they are sitting on a valuable asset there and that uranium is

becoming scarce. So I see that as a negotiation of a commercial as well as a policy kind and I think we'll be able to address that issue over time.

MR. PERKOVICH: Great. We've got the gentleman with the purple – it's kind of purple sweater and then the lady in front of you and then Miles and then Sbergen (ph).

Q: Thank you. Andrei Piontkovsky, Hudson Institute. Two short remarks, if I may: Dr. Perkovich, it will be very difficult for you to convince Russian political and military leaders, Putin or non-Putin, in virtue of abolition of nuclear weapons. Russia finds at some direction in the East, for example, a potential opponent with huge conventional superiority, and the Russian military doctrine says a nuclear deterrent is the only option to deal with the threat.

Their CFE committee is a very paradoxical thing; as we all know, it was designed to restrict Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, and when it was signed it turned out that it's restricting military superiority, which NATO doesn't need to increase at all, so it's more about psychology than real military security matter, and that's why I suggest a psychological way out: invite Moscow to draft any version of a new SFE treaty they like, and you will see that it's no less acceptable for you, because under new conditions, Russia will have no conventional superiority and no threat of invasion for Europe to deal with, as the treaty was initially designed.

Q: My name is Ingrid Drake from the Project on Government Oversight, or POGO. And this question follows up to Gates' comments yesterday about RRW, to Rose: Is there a similar push for an RRW-like program in Russia – are they concerned about the reliability and safety of their warheads? And if not, how is the push for RRW here being interpreted there?

MR. PERKOVICH: Yeah, on your comments here about kind of Russian – Russia being hard to convince to go to zero – I think that's absolutely right, and in the Adelphi paper that we've done, we talk about that. By the way, similar considerations in China – similar considerations in Pakistan vis-à-vis India; that's reality. But my point would be, none of those reservations by others seems to me an argument for the U.S. not saying that we think it would be in our interest, but also the world's interest, to move in that direction.

Let them say they have problems, and then in addressing those problems, you actually get at important security issues. Take India and Pakistan and not talk about Russia for now; you would have to deal with Pakistan's concerns about Indian strength in conventional issues; you have to deal with unresolved borders – that there's not a formal acceptance of the territorial status quo in South Asia. Well, that's a good thing to address, and if you could make progress on that, then people there and elsewhere would be better off, so why not have that as an objective? No one's saying that because you have it as an objective, people sign up the next day and say, take the weapons; it's a process. So you're absolutely right about Russia, but that isn't an argument for the U.S. executive to be so defensive about how this is threatening to U.S. interests. That's the point I was trying to make.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: You know, I would be thrilled if we saw some very concrete proposals from the Russians on a CFE-like follow-on. So far, the great difficulty, and I felt it very acutely in Moscow with regard to the very high-level proposals by the Russians – and it began with Medvedev's inauguration speech back in the spring, but he recently spoke again about this at Evian in France – you know, there's talk about, we need a new system of European security and now,

some basic principles – six principles – are beginning to take shape. But, what’s the meat, there? And I think everyone, in my view, would welcome knowing what the Russian view is of the real substance, of the real meat – not that it would necessarily be immediately accepted, but it would be very, very useful to, I think, get more detail about what the Russian government and what the Russian president has in mind in broaching a new system and a new approach to European security.

For Ingrid Drake’s question, that is a fascinating question. I will just tell you that during – a couple of years ago – it wasn’t immediately, but it will give you a good sense of the Russian view of RRW. We were briefing a senior – very senior – Rosatom official about – from the lab side, from the technical side, so very eminent, very tied into the Russian military nuclear weapons establishment – we briefed him on the RRW and, you know, asked for his response and he kind of smiled and he said, all of our warheads are reliable replacement warheads. And if you know the Russian way of doing business, of course, all of their warheads are constantly moving through a chain of maintenance and refurbishment, because that’s the way, you know, they are designed – it’s a function of how the plutonium in them works, and so forth.

So I think the Russians, at the moment, if they’re going to design a new warhead, it will be for another purpose, in my view. They won’t design for reliability, because I think they feel like they’ve got that, and in a way, they’ve made lemonade out of lemons because of some initial problems in the way that they first designed their warheads. But, yes, it doesn’t mean that they like the RRW by any means; we’ve had several briefings at the Carnegie Moscow Center over the last couple of years on the RRW and the Russians who come to those meetings, most of them technical experts – some from the government, some from not – they all believe that this is a mask – or they articulate it as a mask – for developing a more advanced, capable warhead by the United States.

MR. PERKOVICH: Which is a perception that doesn’t exist only in Russia. (Laughter.) Miles, and then Spurgeon Keeny, and then, yeah –

Q: Miles Pomper, Arms Control Today. Rose, question on – you were talking about creating pressure to get a replacement for START, rather than just an extension. I’m just wondering if there’s a role for the legislative branches in both countries, particularly the U.S. Congress, in creating that pressure, because you just talked about an agreement between the executive branches.

MR. PERKOVICH: And Spurgeon.

Q: Spurgeon Keeny. Rose, given your very excellent agenda of things to accomplish with Russia on mutual and worldwide advantage, to what extent do you think the present U.S. position on expansion of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia will be an impediment to any near term, major accomplishments? Or, more directly and specifically, do you think, to what extent is this policy – that is being pushed very hard by this administration – is an impediment to really far-reaching and significant accomplishments on your agenda?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I’ll take that one first. You know, to be honest, although expansion of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia is a very, very serious red line in Moscow for the Russian government and for the Russian leadership, I don’t necessarily see a linkage to all aspects of the bilateral agenda. Personally, I’m not a great supporter of fast-track, myself. I think, frankly, there’s a lot of political work that still has to be done in Ukraine, particularly, to get the Ukrainian public on board with NATO membership for Ukraine, but, you know, that’s a personal view. But I

don't think necessarily for high-priority matters, particularly in the nuclear arena, which have traditionally been able to exist in a basket that's not necessarily linked to other things, I think it's possible to make progress there.

And the symbol there is just last week, the United States apparently delivered its – the Bush administration – delivered its proposal for a post-START agreement to the Russians in Moscow and there will be a meeting in November to talk about a possible post-START agreement, and this is not the meeting that must take place in December to talk about, you know, under the treaty, whether the treaty will be extended and how. So I don't necessarily see a linkage there, but it does make things much, much harder if we are pressing this issue very, very hard.

Miles, on the role for congress, I hadn't actually thought about it. I want to be clear that what I am proposing is that the two governments agree, essentially, to proceed as written in the treaty with a routine five-year extension. This is the only arrangement that does not need to go back and be ratified. Any other approach, like a one-year extension or an 18-month extension, would require re-ratification. The only thing allowed by the treaty is a five-year extension, so that's what I'm arguing for.

But then I want to flip the onus for moving quickly back onto the executive branch and the legislative branch in both countries by saying that we should politically agree, through an exchange of letters or some other mechanism, to complete negotiation of a follow-on agreement and get it ratified within 12 months, because then, you know, the treaty would be extended for five years, and if everybody here in Washington, including on Capitol Hill, wants it to stay in its very large – as Secretary Gates yesterday said once again – phone-book size form, there to be implemented, well, then it's up to the congress to decide that it doesn't want to ratify the follow-on agreement.

So that's the approach that I'm taking, and in that regard, I think there's real potential for the executive branch and the congress to work closely together on the fast-track negotiation of a follow-on deal in a 12-month period, so I think there's very good potential for a close, working relationship in that way. I can't speak for Moscow. It's a little bit different kind of relationship there. The Duma takes instruction a little better than Capitol Hill does. (Chuckles.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Norm Wolf.

Q: There's been a fair amount of discussion about European security this afternoon, but I've not heard anything about Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, and I'm wondering if Rose or George might want to say a few words about that?

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I mean, I don't know, I kind of defer to Linton Brooks, but I don't want to get him in trouble by saying that it's –

MR. PERKOVICH: Oh, sorry. I mean, that it's – it's a problem, but it – I haven't heard any discussion here or there about how to address it in this sense, because when people do talk about it, the disparities in holdings are so great that, you know, you're not going to talk about a straight trade. And then once you start trying to – well, what would be the kind of deal that would, you know, make sense politically in either place, it gets extremely complicated. And then, as I tried

to suggest, if part of a deal were to withdraw U.S. airborne nuclear weapons from NATO, that has other implications now that we haven't really begun to address.

So I guess all I'm saying on that one – which I admit, I haven't worked on in any systematic way – is that it's a problem whose solution isn't apparent, or close to apparent, whereas, on a lot of these other things that Rose has been talking about, it's both a problem and a solution where if you put some political capital and some energy into it, you could actually do something. So if you've got to do things in order, then I would focus on other things, but that's probably not the right answer.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I don't know if I've got the right answer, either. I would just mention to you all that I did a chapter in this Reykjavik II book that was the report of the conference held last October in Stanford, and the focus was on non-strategic nuclear weapons, so if you're interested in reading my views, that's on the Hoover Institution website and you can get a hold of it – it's also around in hard copy. My view is, first of all – and this process has accelerated in the last year – that NATO nuclear weapons are willy-nilly disappearing from Europe. We've had Lakenheath apparently vacated this past year; they've left at least one of the bases in Germany – and we know this because those bases have been de-certified to hold nuclear weapons.

Maybe I am old-fashioned in some regards, but I'm a bit sorry that this has happened so quietly and we haven't gotten something from the Russians for it. That said, I agree 100 percent with George that it is devilishly difficult to engage with the Russians on the matter, first of all because of their doctrinal link to non-strategic nuclear weapons; they're using them as an insurance policy against the weakness of their conventional forces, so that makes it devilishly difficult to engage an arms reduction discussion with them.

My own view on this is that we should start with a period of intensive confidence-building, and by that, I mean that we need to get to the point where we are actually exchanging the data that was promised under the PNIs – the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. The Russians haven't stepped up to that bar in the last 15 years. I'd like to see that happen. But I'd also like to see us – maybe we're the ones who have to step forward first with the transparency to begin to do some confidence-building with regard to what is happening inside NATO. Perhaps, to ask the Russians to come to Lakenheath and give them a briefing on what it takes to de-certify a base – what are all the steps that have to be gone through – and show them how the base has been de-certified to handle nuclear weapons.

I have a host of those kinds of ideas in the chapter that I wrote, and I think the way we get, eventually, into a reduction negotiation is via two paths. First of all, if the reductions in strategic nuclear forces become so great that, eventually, you know – warheads are warheads; eventually they're going to go into the same basket – non-strategic and strategic – there won't be any distinction over time, and that's how, eventually you will achieve reductions. But, in the meantime, if we can get to a point where we have a lot more confidence in what each other is doing with non-strategic nuclear weapons, I think that will be helpful to the reduction process and to the eventual goal of getting toward zero, but it is a devilishly difficult problem in trying to engage with the Russians on this.

MR. PERKOVICH: Other questions, or did we exhaust everybody? Ms. Squassoni in the back.

Q: I wanted to follow up on Andrew Pierre's question about ACDA, and I would say it's not a question of recreating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but a broader question: What kind of a bureaucratic structure might we need, George, to support abolition of nuclear weapons? I mean, I think back to – I think it was David Alan Rosenberg's "The Origins of Overkill," right, we all know bureaucratic inertia helps in building nuclear weapons, right? Well, won't there be some bureaucratic inertia in building down? So is there some value in some organization of that type that would have a dog in the fight, so to speak?

MR. PERKOVICH: Anybody else? I'm thinking, um – yes, ma'am. Thank you.

Q: For Rose Gottemoeller – that's all right, I was about to say that. I'm Susan Cornwell with Reuters. When you said extending – you suggested extended START for another five years as is provided by the treaty. Are you suggesting that the Bush administration could do that already before they leave office?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I don't think so. That's not their policy at the present time. As I've understood both the current policy of both the Bush administration and, frankly, of the Russian administration as well, both say that it's time to move toward a follow-on to START that is more streamlined and that does not sustain the very, very detailed 500 pages of verification protocol. So as I've understood the Bush administration's – I'm not sure they would articulate it quite this way, but they seem to be more on the side of the vacuum. That is that, let's, you know, if we have to, we'll allow the treaty to go out of force and we will agree, politically, to move forward with the negotiation of a follow-on. My personal view is that this is not the way to go – that there are too many uncertainties in that approach, especially if you can somehow get a push toward a fast-track replacement, as I think my approach would provide.

MR. PERKOVICH: All right. Um, Sharon, your question: I think both realistically and also to think about a way to proceed is, at some point, and hopefully sooner rather than later, you could get tasking probably from the NSC, but following a presidential statement or speech to get departments to start doing their own commissions or tasking people to do papers looking at kind of elements of this. So DOE does tasking on, okay, if there were ever an agreement on abolishing nuclear weapons, kind of, you know, what do we need to have in place to do the dismantlement, how would you task the lab – this is something that Linton Brooks has talked about, that right now, we should, as he put it, throw \$100 million at the labs and get them working on how would you verify zero.

Task the State Department to be thinking about the diplomatic strategy. There are lots of elements to this; for example, how do you deal with India, Pakistan, and Israel, three states that aren't part of the NPT – they don't have those obligations – I mean, but if you were going to abolish nuclear weapons, they'd have to be a part of it; that's kind of a State Department challenge. Same with DOD, and in the process of that, I mean I think some of thought within the NSC or elsewhere would be, okay, how would you organize this over time.

So I don't think, one, that it's feasible to have a kind of an answer to the bureaucratic question at this point, but that part of how you start it is to get the different departments tasking folks to work this through. The U.K. has done it a little bit, but not across the board. And I don't think anyone else has started, so that's how I would think about it.

Anybody else, or did we exhaust you all? It's been a long day, but thanks for coming and I hope you all found it as worthwhile as we did. But thank you very much.

(Applause.)

(END)