When Benjamin Netanyahu became Israeli prime minister once again at the end of last year, some observers wondered whether Israel would move closer to Russia, despite the Russia-Ukraine conflict, thanks to the longstanding personal relationship between Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, this seems unlikely at a time when Moscow and Tehran are strengthening their ties over Ukraine and Iran seems closer than ever to building a nuclear weapon.
Recent reports claimed that international inspectors had found uranium enriched to 84 percent, close to the 90 percent required for a nuclear weapon. Iran denounced these assertions as a “conspiracy,” but they could represent a red flag for Israel. Netanyahu has indicated that his country would respond with “credible military action.” The prime minister held high-level meetings with Israeli military officials on February 22, and two days later, on the one-year anniversary of the start of Ukraine war, Foreign Minister Eli Cohen reaffirmed “Israel’s support [for] the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”
On the same day, Israel joined 140 other countries that voted in favor of a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly calling on Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. Israel is also reportedly considering supplying its David’s Sling air defense system to Ukraine. This is in sharp contrast with its previous position, in which it sought to balance ties with Russia and the United States and refused to join Western sanctions against Russia while providing only humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
Russia is caught in a triangular relationship with Iran and Israel, in which maintaining a balance of interests among different countries is becoming increasingly difficult for the Kremlin. For Israel, thwarting Iran’s nuclear program and countering its regional influence is at the top of its foreign policy priorities, as shown by the recent Juniper Oak 23 exercise involving U.S. and Israeli forces. The exercise was “the largest ever” between the two countries and simulated an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
For Russia, the top priority is to ensure the success of its “special military operation” in Ukraine and prevent the expansion of NATO’s eastern flank. A politically and economically isolated Moscow has turned to Iran in its search for allies to help it achieve that objective. Russia’s “fixation on the problem of NATO expansion” has grown into an all-or-nothing political and military battle when it comes to Ukraine. But unlike the 2014 conflict, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea, today Russia is waging a war that has reshaped the regional and international security architecture. Putin is unlikely to stop, as his goals are no longer confined to Ukraine’s demilitarization and the so-called liberation of Donetsk and Luhansk; they also include the “liberation” of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, where staged referendums were held last September.
In the past year, Iran has been one of the few countries that have openly supported Russia. Even China has been forced to walk a tightrope in supporting its longstanding strategic partner without risking being cut off from the global market. Iran, on the other hand, has been less ambiguous. Last July 19, a few days after reports that Russia had purchased Iranian drones to use in Ukraine, Putin visited Tehran and met with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and President Ebrahim Raisi, with whom he discussed expanding bilateral cooperation. This included the launching of the Iranian rial/ruble pair by the Tehran Currency Exchange, the signing of bilateral banking agreements to boost trade through the use of local currencies, and the signing of a memorandum of cooperation on a $40 billion deal between Russia’s Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company. The countries are even said to be considering launching a cryptocurrency called Stablecoin that is backed by gold to facilitate trade.
Previously, Iranian officials had criticized Russia for delaying plans to deliver S-300 air defense systems and supporting UN sanctions against Iran. But the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world breathed new life into Russian-Iranian ties when both countries supported the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Throughout this period, Russia’s foreign policy strategy in the region was based on maintaining a balanced position vis-à-vis all political actors, while pursuing its interests. This enabled Moscow to deal with multiple, sometimes opposing, actors.
With regard to Iran and Israel, Russia walked a very fine line. It cooperated with Iran in Syria, but at the same time the two countries did not have a strategic partnership based on a common, long-term understanding of goals, threats, and interests. Simultaneously, Russia had good relations with Israel, Iran’s mortal enemy, and allowed Israeli aircraft to hit Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria.
This balancing act is under threat today, especially when it comes to Israel and the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia, for instance, announced a $400 million aid package to Ukraine during the visit of Foreign Minister Faysal bin Farhan to Kyiv on February 26. In addition, all Gulf states voted in favor of a UN General Assembly resolution in February demanding that Russia leave Ukrainian territory. As Putin focuses on a victory in Ukraine, making ties with Iran that much more important for Moscow, Russian will have to preserve its relations with countries in the Middle East that view Iran as a threat. Yet Russia is actually reinforcing its military contacts with Iran, amid reports that it will soon supply it with advanced Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Nor is Iran backing down when it comes to its regional ambitions. It has continued to embolden its regional proxies and is reportedly considering supplying air defense systems to Syria after Israeli airstrikes carried out in February.
It is equally unlikely that regional tensions will be alleviated by the conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran. President Joe Biden has already described the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as being “dead,” which means Russia will face an even greater challenge of reconciling its relationships with Iran and Israel as conflict between the two sides becomes more probable. Russia will probably seek to pursue its foreign policy strategy and smoothen over its differences with Israel. However, squaring a circle may be beyond Putin’s ability if Israel attacks Iran and if many Arab states quietly welcome this. The risk then is that Russia will no longer find itself in the middle, where it likes to be, but on the sidelines.
