The year 2025 marked a period of profound political transformation in both Syria and Lebanon. In Syria, it ushered in the first year without the Assad family in office since 1970, while in Lebanon the political balance of power shifted significantly away from Hezbollah. Yet despite these changes, neither country was able to achieve long-awaited stability.
For Syria, the central challenge remains safeguarding the state’s unity, consolidating internal stability, and combating existential threats to the new order. The most serious danger in this regard lies in potential coordination between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, Israel, Syrian opposition groups, such as those within the Druze community, and remnants of the former regime and their affiliates. Damascus is looking to manage such threats cautiously, avoiding cycles of violence whose outcomes would be difficult to control.
Syria’s perception of Lebanon must be understood in this broader security framework. While outstanding issues such as Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons remain important to Damascus, they do not pose a systemic threat comparable to that of former regime figures, particularly the possibility that Lebanon could serve as a logistical base for these individuals’ networks.
Against this backdrop, and despite Lebanese reporting suggesting an improvement in Syrian-Lebanese relations, a series of leaks released by Al-Jazeera at the end of December left a different picture. The Qatari media outlet made public several hours of leaked audio recordings of prominent figures in the Assad regime, some of them reportedly residing in Lebanon, in which they discussed plans to destabilize Syria and engage in possible coordination with Israel.
The disclosures raised several questions. Was the exposure of the former regime’s networks solely the result of Syrian state action, or did it rely on external technical or intelligence support? Why did the information surface at this particular moment, a matter that is never incidental in politics? And to what extent are former regime officials receiving outside backing that could enable them to plan operations aimed at subverting the emerging order in Syria?
More broadly, the behavior of former regime networks follows a familiar pattern. Political actors who governed for decades, then were pushed out of office, naturally seek to reverse such an outcome. This involves either regaining what was lost or, at a minimum, undermining the authority of those who replaced them. In this sense, then, what the leaks revealed was neither anomalous nor unexpected.
At the same time, the substance of the Al-Jazeera disclosures did not point to a cohesive, disciplined, and operationally developed organization capable of exerting decisive influence in a new Syria. Nor did the leaked conversations suggest the presence of regional or international backers guiding the former regime’s networks. This is what appears to have pushed the Assad-era figures to discuss cultivating new links of their own, most notably with Israel, a central element in the Al-Jazeera report. Yet these efforts seemed to be limited to establishing rudimentary contacts and, in hindsight, reveal a degree of political and strategic naivety.
The impact of the Al-Jazeera leaks was partly directed at Israel, in the context of the broader rivalries taking place in the Levant. It underlined that the former Syrian regime networks were under close surveillance and that the attempt by any side to initiate contacts with them could be exposed. The aim appeared to be to prevent Israel from exploiting groups that oppose the current leadership in Damascus.
The gist of the message conveyed by the leaks was that hosting and shielding remnants of the former Syrian regime—even without directly supporting their activities—has become increasingly unacceptable. This was a point specifically directed at the Lebanese state and certain political groups in Lebanon. This issue is now becoming a priority in the country, amid reports of meetings involving regime figures and other opposition actors on Lebanese territory. Accordingly, while official Syrian rhetoric toward Iran has recently softened, this does not translate into tolerance for Iranian, or by extension Hezbollah’s, destabilization of Syria.
In the aftermath of the leaks, Lebanon and Syria sought to contain the escalating tension. The Lebanese tried to reassure the Syrians in two ways. First, they signaled that the information in the leaks was being taken seriously in Beirut, and this was made clear in statements by officials as well as in security measures undertaken by the Lebanese army. Second, the Lebanese authorities refrained from directly challenging the Al-Jazeera report, while at the same time emphasizing that the information had been exaggerated. They indicated that even if a small number of former regime figures were in Lebanon, these figures lacked political influence. The Lebanese also denied the existence of meetings and planning sessions as revealed in the leaks.
From the Syrian perspective, however, this response was likely seen as insufficient, and even counterproductive. The Syrians were probably suspicious that the Lebanese reaction was aimed at burying the story, rather than showing any intention of taking action against former regime elements. Such a perception may have been reinforced by a Syrian conviction that the leaks were credible, because disclosures of this nature rarely emerge without at least implicit official consent. Consequently, Lebanon’s response was unlikely to have convinced Damascus. This may have been reinforced by Lebanese who are aligned with the official Syrian position. Notably, Dar al-Fatwa in the town of Rachayya issued a statement in which it stated that it had informed Lebanese officials of the locations of former Assad regime figures, noting that they were “present in areas designated for them, and among the population in rented apartments and villas with which they had been provided, with full services, supported by Lebanese, Arab, and international associations.” Such statements surely strengthened Syrian skepticism.
Certain municipalities in northern Lebanon also called for state intervention, while a member of parliament urged heightened security measures and the arrest of members of the former Syrian regime. Complicating the picture, a former Assad regime officer, Ghassan Naassan al-Sakhni, was recently killed in a Lebanese mountain village. This raised the possibility that, in the absence of action by Lebanon, groups close to the Syrian leadership, or acting on its behalf, could take matters into their own hands and exact revenge on members of the former regime.
Such developments point to a deepening erosion of trust between Lebanon and Syria. As a result, attention will increasingly focus on the Lebanese state and how it chooses to manage its relationship with Syria, particularly with regard to Syrian national security and the impact on Lebanon’s domestic stability. This will also feed into assessments outside Lebanon of the extent to which Hezbollah continues to exert decisive influence over Lebanese state institutions.
While Hezbollah denied any involvement in supporting or facilitating the activities of Assad-era officials inside Syria, there continue to be accusations that the party is hosting these individuals and creating a propitious environment in which they can function. Whatever the reality, another, more uncomfortable question remains: Why is Lebanon, or at least some Lebanese groups, sheltering former Syrian regime figures if not to use them at a later time?
