Stronger diplomatic action on Iran depends heavily on the policies of Russia and China. The actions that either country takes next should be understood in light of their threat perceptions, economic interests, and the strength of the U.S.-French-German coalition.

On January 19 French president Jacques Chirac announced slight changes to the county’s nuclear deterrence strategy.  Chirac seemed to expand the definition ofFrance’s vital interests to include oil.  He would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons and protect these interests, he said, and to deter any terrorist attacks on those interests.  Shortly after, French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie amplified this new crease in French strategy in speeches to the public and to French parliament members.  

Some French experts say that Chirac’s speech had nothing to do with a growing Iranian threat.  “One knows that this type of speech is prepared several months in advance and by definition cannot be directly linked to current affairs,” wrote Bruno Tertrais, a senior associate at the Foundation for Strategic Research in an analysis entitled La Dissuasion Revisitée (Deterrence Revisited). (Read More)

The Washington Post’s David Ignatius this week calls France “Bush’s new ally,” noting the increased cooperation between the two nations in several key areas.    We can add one more to his list:  India.  France sees several benefits to opening up nuclear trade with India, as President George Bush wants.  Even though it could setback global nonproliferation efforts, it would increase French-Indian trade and investment.  There is a catch:  while President Bush sees the deal as a way to expand U.S. influence, France sees it as a way to check that influence.

Here is the problem for both the United States and France.  The U.S.-India “global partnership” proposed on July 18, 2005 by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will violate Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) comprehensive safeguard guidelines.  Changing NSG guidelines to give India a permanent exception to the rules requires group consensus, but the president has run into resistance from a number of key NSG members.  At an October 2005 meeting of the NSG, France, Russia and the United Kingdom showed support for dropping nuclear trade restrictions on India, but Austria, Sweden and Switzerland “registered strong reservations,” according to Wade Boese of Arms Control Today. (Read More)

If you do not know the difference between uranium metal and uranium oxide, you never heard of “Green Salt” until today, and you have been more interested in Pittsburgh vs. Seattle than Tehran vs. Vienna, here’s your chance to catch up on the latest developments in the Iranian nuclear showdown. 

We provide answers (with extensive quotes from the confidential IAEA report) to three key questions:  What did the IAEA report say that was new, what does reporting to the Security Council mean, and what happens next?

1. What new evidence was in the January 31 IAEA confidential report on Iran?

Iran has taken some measures to attempt to assure the IAEA that it is in compliance with its safeguards agreement. Yet key issues remain unresolved, including explanation of particles of enriched uranium found on centrifuges, IAEA access to critical sites and scientists, and the interesting document detailing how to turn uranium into a metal.  This later procedure has no role in fuel production; uranium in metal form is only used in nuclear weapons

The updated brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards says:

“Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early- to mid-1980’s. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal.”

Much of this language was reported in the November 2005 IAEA Report on outstanding questions on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. New to the latest report is a direct reference to a 15-page document and the critical phrase, “…related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.” (Read More)

In a candid January 18 press conference, Carnegie Vice-President George Perkovich and Visiting Scholar Pierre Goldschmidt discussed the current Iran crisis with reporters. Goldschmidt said he is urging officials to take a generic proactive approach that could solve other potential or actual cases of noncompliance:

“The UN Security Council should adopt a generic resolution saying that when the IAEA has found a country to be in noncompliance and if the IAEA requests more verification authority, the UN Security Council would immediately, under a Chapter 7 resolution, provide this additional authority.”

Unfortunately, the “international community” has a tendency “to only react to crisis,” Goldschmidt said, which puts him in an “uncomfortable” position trying to “solve one specific case, which is Iran.” He offered two solutions that, by involving the UN Security Council, would make Iran’s current voluntary commitments legally binding:

“The minimum for me is to report [Iran] to the Security Council to request Iran to immediately resume the suspension of all enrichment-related activities, and, second, [for the Security Council] to provide the IAEA with a significantly increased verification mandate and authority. Once more, this has nothing to do with sanctions.”

(Read More)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s demagoguery has triggered a strong European backlash that may produce the Western unity long lacking in negotiations with Iran.  European leaders have denounced Ahmadinejad’s screeds against Israel and his denial of the Holocaust, linked them to deep suspicions of Iran’s nuclear program and begun talk of sanctions and other actions to force Iranian compliance with its treaty obligations. Ahmadinejad’s radical statements did not start EU-US collaboration, but will strengthen their partnership in support of Security Council referral. 

EU-Iranian negotiations, set to begin December 21, will be the first time since August of this year that the EU (led by Britain, France and Germany) will hold direct talks with the Iranians.  On August 5, the Europeans gave Iran a “Framework for a Long-term Agreement,” but negotiations stalled 3 days later when Iran restarted its uranium conversion program at Isfahan.(Read More)