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Internationally, Xi confronts a trade war with the United States, a political push to uproot manufacturing supply chains and decouple from China, and a bleak overall outlook for global trade due to the coronavirus pandemic.
It is no secret that Beijing and Washington have become increasingly embittered. Here is how China became a victim of its own economic success—and why it is in the United States’ best interests to mend the relationship.
The American public is far more focused on his mismanagement of the pandemic and its effects at home than on Beijing’s responsibility for it.
Experts discuss how the United States, particularly in Asia, was standard setter through which other economies had to adjust and accommodate.
It is a mistake to assume that there is a global capital and technology frontier toward which every country must strive to acquire development. Economic development requires, above all, the right set of formal and informal institutions.
With the Tokyo Olympics postponed because of the coronavirus, Japan will delay its high-profile promotion of 5G commercial service this month. But the United States and Japan are still well-positioned for the intensifying race to harness the technology.
Before the coronavirus pandemic, Europe and China hoped to put their differences aside. But now the relationship is in free fall, with deep uncertainty about what comes next.
With echoes of their own technonationalist competition of the 1980s and 1990s, the United States and Japan are changing how they manage trade policy, export controls, investment rules, research and development strategies, supply chains, and even visa guidelines to gain a technological edge, this time over China.
For all the talk of sweeping change, U.S. dependence on Asian manufacturing is both deeply rooted and remarkably stable over time.
The United States and Japan do not have to upend globalization to compete effectively with China. The challenge for Tokyo and Washington is to leverage their common concerns about Beijing’s economic behavior and minimize the differences between their respective approaches.