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With echoes of their own technonationalist competition of the 1980s and 1990s, the United States and Japan are changing how they manage trade policy, export controls, investment rules, research and development strategies, supply chains, and even visa guidelines to gain a technological edge, this time over China.
For all the talk of sweeping change, U.S. dependence on Asian manufacturing is both deeply rooted and remarkably stable over time.
The United States and Japan do not have to upend globalization to compete effectively with China. The challenge for Tokyo and Washington is to leverage their common concerns about Beijing’s economic behavior and minimize the differences between their respective approaches.
As the trade war between China and the United States intensifies, supply chains are starting to see the impact. But U.S. protectionism may be backfiring.
A successful coronavirus response and liberalized trade policies have given Vietnam a production boost, but its demographics and import dependence will limit its gains from a reshuffled supply chain.
Carnegie’s Yukon Huang and Michael Pettis will debate China’s growth prospects and economic policy trajectory, including the roles of the state and private sector and potential shifts in the growth model in a time of crisis.
Mobility restrictions, especially in economies dependent on domestic demand such as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have suppressed already shy spenders.
In two separate livestreamed sessions, Carnegie will convene key thought leaders behind Japan’s “Moonshot” program, the National Science Foundation’s “10 Big Ideas” program, the EU’s Horizon programs, and other fields of science collaboration.
Countries don’t need to be “friends” to get meaningful things done. But U.S.-China strategic competition is giving way to a kind of “managed enmity” that is disrupting the world and forestalling the prospect of transnational responses to transnational threats.
Taiwan is a victim of its past success—dominating important industries, such as semiconductors, but underinvesting in the new fields.