The data also showed that industrial production was 5.6 per cent higher and the data left most analysts convinced that China’s recovery from the ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic was both solid and sustainable.
It is no secret that Beijing and Washington have become increasingly embittered. Here is how China became a victim of its own economic success—and why it is in the United States’ best interests to mend the relationship.
The remainder of 2020 is shaping up to be an unexpectedly consequential year for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, and it comes at a time of political uncertainty in both capitals.
To sustainably plug its funding shortfall and bridge its income gap, Indonesia must tap more into global value chains and capitalize on its greatest asset: its people.
Experts discuss how the United States, particularly in Asia, was standard setter through which other economies had to adjust and accommodate.
On the precipice of fragmentation, can the world escape further economic downturn by refining existing systems or is more dramatic change necessary?
It is a mistake to assume that there is a global capital and technology frontier toward which every country must strive to acquire development. Economic development requires, above all, the right set of formal and informal institutions.
With the Tokyo Olympics postponed because of the coronavirus, Japan will delay its high-profile promotion of 5G commercial service this month. But the United States and Japan are still well-positioned for the intensifying race to harness the technology.
Before the coronavirus pandemic, Europe and China hoped to put their differences aside. But now the relationship is in free fall, with deep uncertainty about what comes next.
With echoes of their own technonationalist competition of the 1980s and 1990s, the United States and Japan are changing how they manage trade policy, export controls, investment rules, research and development strategies, supply chains, and even visa guidelines to gain a technological edge, this time over China.