Much of the Egyptian population now embraces the very military it seemed bent on ejecting from power during the 2011 revolution. What's the reason for the about-face?
If the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood refuses to evolve and learn from its mistakes, it will squander any future opportunities to be an influential component of the Egyptian political spectrum.
The dispute over the Western Sahara has been one of the most complex conflicts in recent times. After over 38 years of war and diplomacy, the parties are no closer to reaching a mutually-satisfactory settlement.
The recent Gezi Park protests in Turkey, combined with the effects of the Syria crisis, should make accelerating the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) an important priority for the Turkish government.
Egyptian political actors may gradually find ways to translate their seats at the table into real influence over outcomes, but it is difficult to see that process resulting in serious reform as long as political life is so polarized and atomized.
Both Islamists and secularists are wrong if they think they can build a new Egypt on their own. There is no way the country can be successful if only one party rules.
Many Egyptians consider the question of whether or not Morsi’s ousting was a military coup more a matter of moral judgment than terminology, but U.S. lawyers will have to figure out if recent events trigger a mandatory cutoff of aid.
The demonstrations may be larger this time, but Egyptian society is far more divided than it was during the revolution two years ago. It is essential for the transition to be inclusive.
It would be wise for those who are now victorious in Egypt to remember that the issue is not only what the Brotherhood learns from the ousting of President Morsi; the issue is also what Islamists are taught.
Mundane procedural problems were the Achilles heel of the 2011 transition, and now the body that made all those mistakes, the Egyptian military high command, has delivered a new road map.