It’s not enough to ask China to pressure Pyongyang to set up a U.S.-North Korea negotiation. China has to be a central part of the negotiation, too.
A second draft of the Nuclear Ban Treaty retains many problems associated with the first and raises new, serious questions.
Thomas Wood, Robert Otto, and Tristan Volpe will discuss their recent articles in The Nonproliferation Review on positive inducements for nuclear proliferation, safety, and security.
Opponents and skeptics fear that the dynamics surrounding a nuclear ban treaty will distract attention and effort from the nonproliferation regime that has helped prevent nuclear war since 1945, and that has prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states and to terrorist organizations.
An initial read of the first Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons raises new questions on implementation, testing, and more.
The United States, South Korea, China, and Japan must work together to offer a combination of security and economic incentives to make denuclearization a reasonable alternative for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.
The dangers of nuclear proliferation and the policy responses to it should be assessed differently if nuclear weapons do not significantly augment a possessor’s coercive power.
Where North Korea is concerned, neither China nor the United States will achieve security acting separately.
Increased risk-taking concerning North Korea’s nuclear ambitions could potentially pay off, but there’s a catch.
What are the realistic implications of North Korea's nuclear capability?