The lack of any apparent strategy and political determination in both India and Pakistan to establish a peacemaking process is dangerous. Continued violence across the Line of Control, the lack of progress in redressing the suffering and the interests of Kashmiri Muslims, and the absence of sustained serious diplomacy between India and Pakistan leave the two countries one high-casualty terrorist attack away from war.
President Trump’s only realistic option for stopping North Korea’s nuclear march is reinvigorated diplomacy, followed by significantly ratcheting up the pressure if it fails.
The likelihood of North Korean nuclear and missile tests over the next six months is fairly high if the Trump administration continues the Obama administration’s unsuccessful approach of “strategic patience.”
The question of the resilience of arms control and disarmament institutions to different political or other pressures rests mainly on their continued ability to function effectively.
Critical differences between Chinese and U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence result not merely from differing security environments and levels of military strength; they also exist because China and the United States have developed their own nuclear philosophies in implementing their security policies over many years.
What is the current relationship between disarmament and strategic stability? How might arms control and disarmament change in the twenty-first century? What relevance does the security environment have in current and future arms control initiatives?
An advanced missile defense system, commonly called THAAD, is heading to South Korea, to counter threats from the DPRK. Neighboring China opposes the system.
Given the substantial tensions concerning the unresolved Sino-Indian border issue, China’s perception of India as a nuclear weapons power is important not only for the future evolution of the international nuclear regime but also for the ongoing Sino-Indian security situation.
India’s nuclear deterrence policy should work in parallel along twin tracks: continuing to enhance the quality of India’s nuclear deterrence while simultaneously working to achieve total nuclear disarmament in the shortest possible time frame.
In the current environment, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan in response to India’s limited war strategy is only a means of reinforcing deterrence and enhancing stability at the higher level of conflict by inducing instability at the lower levels.