On the basis of what has been made known so far, there is no reason to suspect that the IAEA’s conclusions about Iran won’t be sound.
The Iran nuclear deal has yielded neither a verifiable Iranian commitment to restrict its nuclear endeavors to the parameters of a peaceful energy program, nor a mechanism that reliably prevents Iran from funneling the enormous unfrozen funds provided to it to all the wrong causes.
Beyond routine safeguards, the IAEA will continue to address with Iran allegations concerning so-called “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Russia is a superpower in decline, and the challenge it poses to the United States is very different from that posed by the Soviet Union.
If all goes according to plan, sometime in the fall of 2023, the European Union and the United States will terminate the second of three tranches of nuclear sanctions against Iran, and Iran will initiate parliamentary ratification of its Additional Protocol for IAEA safeguards.
Under the terms agreed to in Vienna, the country is going to be crawling with inspectors. No one is covertly building a nuclear weapon under this regime.
Both the Iran and Greece deals were tough to hammer out, but the real test will be making them work.
The possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program remain the biggest stumbling block to the Iran deal negotiations.
Long before a final Iran nuclear agreement was on the horizon, plans have been afoot to generalize the hoped-for results of diplomacy far beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic.
After 18 months of negotiations, one of the remaining challenges to reaching a nuclear deal with Iran is the extent to which Tehran must “come clean” about the history of its nuclear program and, in particular, about apparent efforts to design a nuclear weapon.